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PETITIONER: I.   C. GOLAKNATH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB & ANRS.(With Connected Petitions)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/02/1967

BENCH: RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) BENCH: RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S. RAMASWAMI, V. SHELAT, J.M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1643            1967 SCR  (2) 762  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1967 SC1776  (7)  F          1968 SC1395  (7)  RF         1970 SC 898  (61)  RF         1972 SC 425  (7,16,21)  D          1972 SC 963  (27)  O          1973 SC1461  (10,15,16,17,25,30,32,37,50,51  RF         1975 SC2299  (251,325,522,576,577,649)  F          1976 SC 490  (196)  RF         1976 SC1207  (283,285,397,548)  R          1977 SC1027  (42)  R          1978 SC  68  (89,101,233,261)  D          1978 SC 489  (9)  E&R        1978 SC 597  (19)  RF         1979 SC1550  (9)  RF         1980 SC1762  (5)  RF         1980 SC1789  (86)  RF         1981 SC 271  (33,42)  RF         1981 SC 431  (10)  R          1984 SC 326  (8)  O          1984 SC 684  (65)  RF         1987 SC1140  (3)  R          1987 SC1986  (29)  F          1991 SC 101  (131)  RF         1991 SC1676  (66,71)

ACT:  Constitution of India, Arts. 13(2), 368, 245, 248, Schedule 7,  List  1.  Entry 97-Power  to  amend  Constitution  where resides-Whether resides in Art. 368 or in residuary power of Parliament  under  Art.  248  read with  Entry  97  List  1- Fundamental  Rights in Part III whether can be  amended  and abridged by the procedure in Art. 368-Law’ under Art.  13(2) Whether   Includes   constitutional   amendments-Scheme   of Consitution  Fundamental  rights  whether  intended  to   be permanent  and  unamendable-Amendment  whether  exercise  of

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sovereign power-Amendment whether a political matter outside the purview of courts. Constitution   Seventeenth  Amendment   Act,,   1964-Whether invalid for contravention of Art. 13(2). Prospective  overruling, doctrine of-Vast  agrarian  changes under constitutional amendments-Necessity of preserving past while protecting future decisis. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Act 10 of  1953)- Mysore  Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by  Act 14  of  1965-Acts  contravening  fundamental  rights-Whether valid.

HEADNOTE: The  validity  of the Punjab Security of Land  Tenures  Act, 1953  (Act  10 of 1953) and of the Mysore Land  Reforms  Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of 1965 was challenged by the petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  Since these  Acts  were  included  in  the  9th  Schedule  to  the Constitution  by  the Constitution  (Seventeenth)  Amendment Act,  1964, the validity of the said Amendment Act was  also challenged.   In this connection it was urged  that  Sankari Prasad’s  case  in which the validity  of  the  constitution (First)  Amendment  Act,  1951 had been  upheld  and  Sajjan Singh’s  case  in  which the validity  of  the  Constitution (Seventeenth)  Amendment Act, 1964, had been upheld by  this Court,  had  been wrongly decided.  It  was  contended  that Parliament had no   power  to  amend fundamental  rights  in Part III of the Constitution. HELD:   Per  Subba  Rao,  C.J.,  Shah,  Sikri,  Shelat   and Vaidialingam, JJ.   (Hidayatullah,    J.    Concurring)    : Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged   or taken away by the amending  procedure  in Ail. 368 of  the  Constitution.   An amendment to the Constitution is ’law’ within the meaning of Art.  13(2)  and  is therefore subject to Part  III  of  the Constitution. Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India JUDGMENT: Rajasthan,  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933, reversed.  Per Subba,  Rao, C.J., Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ. (i)  Fundamental rights are the primordial rights  necessary for  the  development of human personality.   They  are  the rights which enable a 763 man  to chalk out his own life in the manner he likes  best. Our Constitution, in addition to the well-known  fundamental rights,  also  included the rights of minorities  and  other backward communities in such rights. [789 E] The  fundamental rights are given a transcendental  position under  our  Constitution and are kept beyond  the  reach  of Parliament.   At  the  same time Parts III  and  IV  of  the Constitution constituted an integrated scheme forming a self contained code.  The scheme is made so elastic that all  the Directive  Principles  of  State Policy  can  reasonably  be enforced  without  taking away or-abridging the  fundamental rights.  While recognisingthe   immutability   of    the fundamental   rights,   subject  to   social   control   the Constitution  itself  provides  for the  suspension  or  the modification   of   fundamental   rights   under    specific circumstances, as in Arts. 33, 34 and 35.  The  non-obstante clause with which the last article opens makes it clear that all the other provisions of the Constitution are subject  to this  provision.   Article 32 makes the right  to  move  the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of  the  rights conferred by the said  Parts  a  fundamental

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right.  Even during grave emergencies Art. 358 only suspends Art.  19  and all other rights are  untouched  except  those specifically suspended by the President under Art. 359. [789 H; 790 D]      The Constitution has given a place of permanence to the fundamental   freedoms.    In  giving  to   themselves   the Constitution  the  people  have  reserved   the  fundamental freedoms  to themselves.  Art. 13 merely in-corporates  that reservation.   The Article is however not the source of  the protection  of fundamental rights but the expression of  the reservation.   The  importance attached to  the  fundamental freedoms  is  so  transcendatal that a  bill  enacted  by  a unanimous  vote  of  all  the  members  of  both  Houses  is ineffective to derogate from its guaranteed exercise.  It is not  what Parliament regards at a given moment as  conducive to the public benefit but what Part III declarer. protected, which determines the ambit of the freedom. The incapacity of Parliament  therefore in exercise of its amending  power  to modify, restrict, or imposefundamental  freedoms in  Part III arises from the scheme of theConstitution   and    the nature of the freedoms. [792 D-F] A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R.88,  State of Madras v.   Smt.   Champakam  Dorairajan,  (1951)  S.C.R. 525,  Pandit  M.  S. M. Sharma v. Shri  Sri  Krishna  Sinha, [1959]  Supp.  1 S.C.R. 806 and Ujjam Bai v. State of  Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778, referred to. If  it  is  the  duty of  Parliament  to  enforce  directive principles  it is equally its duty to enforce  them  without infringing   the   fundamental  rights.   The   verdict   of Parliament  on  the scope of the law of  social  control  of fundamental rights is not final but justiciable.  If it were not  so, the whole scheme of the Constitution  would  break. [815 H; 816 A-B] , (ii)Article  368 in terms only prescribes various steps  in the  matter of amendment.  The article assumes the power  to amend  found else where.  The completion of  the  procedural steps cannot be said to culminate in the power to amend  for if  that  was so the Constitution makers could  have  stated that  in  the Constitution.  Nor can the  power  be  implied either  from  Art. 368 or from the nature  of  the  articles sought to be amended; the doctrine of necessary  implication cannot  be invoked if there is an express provision.   There is  no necessity to imply any such power as  Parliament  has the plenary power to make any law including the law to amend the  Constitution  subject  to  the  limitations  laid  down therein [793 E-G] (iii)The power of Parliament to amend the  Constitution is derived from Arts. 245, 246 and 248 read with item 97  in List I. The residuary 764 power of Parliament can certainly take in the power to amend the Constitution. [794 A-D] Though  a  law      made under Art. 245 is  subject  to  the provisions of the Constitution it would be wrong to say that every  law of amendment made under it would  necessarily  be inconsistent  with  the articles sought to be  amended.   It cannot reasonably be said that a law amending an article  is inconsistent  with  it.  The limitation in Art.  245  is  in respect of the power to make a law and not of the content of the law made within the scope of its power. [794 E-F] An order by the President under Art. 392 cannot attract  Art 368  as the amendment contemplated by the latter  provisions can  be  initiated  only by the introduction of  a  bill  in Parliament.   It cannot therefore be said that if the  power of amendment is held to be a legislative power the President

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acting under Art. 392 can amend the Constitution in terms of Art. 368. [794 G-H] (iv) The Constituent Assembly, it so minded, could certainly have conferred an express legislative power on Parliament to amend  the  Constitution by  ordinary  legislative  process. There  is,  therefore,  no  inherent  inconsistency  between legislative  process and the amending one.  Whether  in  the field of a constitutional law or statutory law amendment can be brought about only by ’law’. [794 C-D] Article  13(2),  for the purpose of that Article,  gives  an inclusive  definition  of ’law’.  It does  not  Prima  facie exclude  constitutional  law.  The process  under  Art.  368 itself closely resemble the legislative process. Article  368  is  not  a complete code  in  respect  of  the procedure of amendment.  The details of procedure in respect of  other  bills have to be followed so far as  possible  in respect of a Bill under Art. 368 also, The rules made by the House  of the People providing procedure for amendments  lay down  a  procedure similar to that of other bills  with  the addition  of  certain special provisions.  If  amendment  is intended  to be Something other than law the  constitutional insistence  on the said legislative process is  unnecessary. The  imposition  of further conditions is only  a  safeguard against the hasty action or a protection to the states   but does  not change the legislative character of the  amendment [795 G 796 C] Article 3 of the Constitution permits changes in States  and their boundaries by a legislative process under Arts. 4  and 169  amendments in the Solution are made by ’law’ but  by  a fiction  are deemed not to be amendments for the purpose  of Art. 368.  This shows that amendment is law and that but for the  fiction it would be an amendment within the meaning  of Art, 368. [796 C-F] Therefore  amendments either under Art. 368 or  under  other Articles   are  only  made  by  Parliament   following   the legislative  process and are ’law’ for the purpose  of  Art. 13(2). [798 C] Mccawley  v.  The  king, [1920]A.C.,  691  and  The  Bribery Commissioner  v.  Pedrick Ransinghe, [1964] 2  W.L.R.  1301, referred to. (v)  One need not cavil at the description of amending power as  a sovereign power for it is sovereign only  viithin  the scope  of the power conferred by a  particular  Constitution which  may  expressly  limit the  power  of  amendment  both substantive  and  procedural.  If cannot therefore  be  said that amending power can have no limitations being a sovere4p power. [804] The  argument that the amending process  involves  political questions and is therefore outside.the scope of judicial re- view cannot also be aeCePted- It may be.Parliament seeks  to amend  the Constitution for political reasons but the  court in denying that power will not be deciding 765 a   political  question;  it  will  only  be  holding   that Parliament has no power to armed Particular articles of  the Constitution for any purpose whatsoever, be it political  or otherwise. [804 E-G] (vi) If power to abridge the fundamental rights is denied to Parliament  revolution  is  not  a  necessary  result.   The existence  of  an  all comprehensive  power  cannot  prevent revolution if there is chaos in the country brought about by misrule  or abuse of power.  Such considerations are out  of place in construing the provisions of the Constitution by  a Court of law. [816 B-C] (vii)     While-ordinarily  @  Court will  be  reluctant  to

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reverse  its  previous  decisions  it is  its  duty  in  the constitutional field to correct itself as early as possible, for  otherwise  the  future  progress  of  the  country  and happiness  of the people will be at stake.  As it was  clear that the decision in Sankari Prasad’s case was wrong, it was pre-eminently  a  typical  case  where  this  Court   should overrule  it.  The longer it held the field the greater  the scope  for erosion of fundamental rights.  As  it  contained the  seeds  of destruction of the cherished  rights  of  the people,  the  sooner  it was overruled the  better  for  the country. [816 G-H] The  Superintendent  and Legal Remembrancer  Stale  of  West Bengal  v.The Corporation at Calcutta, [1967] 2 S.C.R.,  170 relied on. (viii)    The  Constitution  (Seventeenth  Amendment)   Act, 1964,  inasmuch  as it takes away  or  abridges  fundamental rights was beyond ’the amending power of Parliament and void because  of contravention of Art. 13(2).  But having  regard to  the  history  of  this  and  earlier  amendment  to  the Constitution,  their  effect  on  the  social  and  economic affairs of the country and the chaotic situation that may be brought  about by the sudden withdrawl at this stage of  the amendments from the Constitution it was undesirable to  give retroactivity of this decision.  The present was therefore a fit   case   for  the  application  of   the   doctrine   of "prospective.  overruling,  evolved  by the  courts  in  the United States of America. [805 E; 807 E, G; 808 C-D] Great  Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.   Co.  (1932) 287  U.S.  358:  77 L. Ed. 360, Chicot  County  Drainage  v. Baxter State Bank, (1940) 308 U.S. 371, Griffin v. Illionis, (1956)  351 U.S. 12, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 : 193  L. Ed.  872, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 : 6 L. Ed.  (2nd  Edn.) 1081  and  Link  letter  v. Walker,  (1965)  381  U.S.  618, referred to. (ix),  The doctrine of "prospective overruling" is a  modern doctrine suitable for a fast moving society.  It does not do away with the doctrine of state decision but confines it  to past  transactions.  While in Strict theory it may  be  said that  the  doctrine ’involves the making of  law,  *hat  the court  really does is to declare the law but refuse to  give retroactivity  to  it.  It is really  a  pragmatic  solution reconciling  the two conflicting doctrines, namely,  that  a court  finds the law and that it does make law It finds  law but  restricts its operation to the future.  It enables  the court to bring about a smooth transition by correcting,  its errors without disturbing the impact of those errors on past transactions.  By the application of this doctrine the  past may be preserved and the future protected. [913 A-C; 814  E- F] Our   Constitution  does  not  expressly  of  by   necessary implication  speak  against  the  doctrine  of   prospective overruling.   Articles 32, 141 and 142 are  designedly  made comprehensive to enable the Supreme Court to declare law and to give such directions or pass such orders as are necessary to  do complete justice.  The expression ’declared’ in  Art. 141  is  wider  than the words ’found  or  made’.   The  law declared  by the Supreme Court is the law of the  land..  If so, there is no acceptable reason why 7 66 the  Court, in declaring the law in supersession of the  law declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation  of the law as declared to the future and save the  transactions whether  statutory  or otherwise that were affected  on  the basis of the earlier law. [813 F-H] As  this  Court for the first time has been called  upon  to

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apply  the  doctrine evolved in a  different  country  under different circumstances, it would like to move warily in the beginning  and would lay down the following  propositions  : (1)  The doctrine of prospective overruling can  be  invoked only  in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it  can be  applied  only by highest court of the country,  ie.  the Supreme  Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction  to declare  law binding on all the Courts as it has India;  (3) the scope of the retrospective operation of the law declared by  the supreme Court superseding its earlier  decisions  is left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with- the justice of the cause or matter before it. [814 C-D] Applying  the  doctrine  of prospective  overruling  in  the circumstances  of the present case the Court  declared  that this   decision  would  not  affect  the  validity  of   the Constitution  (Seventeenth  Amendment) Act  1964,  or  other amendments  to the Constitution taking away or  abridge  the fundamental  rights.   It further declared  that  in  future Parliament  will  have  no power to amend Part  III  of  Abe Constitution  so as to take away or abridge the  fundamental rights. [814 F-G] (x)  As  according  to the above decision  the  Constitution (Seventeenth  Amendment) Act held the field the validity  of the  two impugned Acts, namely the Punjab Security  of  Land Tennures Act, 10 of 1953 and the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 10 of  1962,  as  amended  by Act 14 of  1965,  could,  not  be questioned on the ground that they offended Art 13, 14 or 31 of the Constitution. [815 E] (xi) On  the findings the following, questions did not  fall to be considered :               (a)   Whether in the exercise of the power  of               amendment  the  fundamental structure  of  the               Constitution may be changed or even  destroyed               or  whether the power is restricted to  making               modification  within  the  framework  of   the               original    instrument    for    its    better               effectuation ?               (b)   Whether  the  amendment  of  fundamental               rights is covered by the proviso to Art. 368 ?               (c)   To what extent can the provisions of die               Constitution other than fundamental rights  be               amended ?               (d)   To  what extent can Part III be  amended               otherwise thin by taking away or abridging the               fundamental rights ?               (e)   Whether   the  impugned  Act  could   be               sustained   under   the  provisions   of   the               Constitution without the aid of Arts. 31A  and               31B of the Schedule. Obiter    If  necessity  to abridge the  fundamental  rights does arise the residuary power  of Parliament may be  relied upon to call for a constituent bly for    making    a    new Constitution  or  radically  changing it.   The  recent  Act providing  for a poll in Goa, Daman and Diu was an  instance of  analogus  exercise  of  such  residuary  power  by   the Parliament, [816 E-F] Per Hidayatullah.  J. : (i) The scope of the amending  power under the COnstitution is not to be determined by taking  an apriori view of the 767 omnicompetence of Art. 368.  When there is conflict  between that Article and Art. 13(2) juridical hermeneutics  requires the  Court to interpret them by combining ’them and  not  by destroying  one  with the aid of the other.  No  part  in  a Constitution   is  superior  to  another  part  unless   the

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Constitution-itself  says  so and there is no  accession  of strength to any provision. by calling it a code.  It is, the context of the legal provisions that illustrates the meaning of  the different parts so that among them and between  them there should be correspondence and harmony. [857 H-858C] (ii) It  is  wrong  to think of the  Fundamental  Rights  as within  Parliament’s giving or taking.  They are secured  to the people by Arts. 12, 13, 32, 136, 141,,144 and 226.   The High Courts and finally this Court have been made the Judges of whether any lagislative or executive action on  the  part of   the   State,  considered  as  comprehensively   as   is possible,offends     the   Fundamental   Rights   and   Art. 13(2)declares  that  legislation which so offends is  to  be deemed to be void.  The general words of art. 368 cannot  be taken  to  mean that by calling an Act an Amendment  of  the Constitution Act a majority of total strengths and a  2/3rds majority of the members presnt and voting in each House  may remove not only any of the Fundamental Rights but the  whole Chapter giving them. [860 A-D; 867 FF] (iii)     In   Britain  there  is  no  distinction   between constitutional law and’ ordinary law as to the procedure  of their  enactment.  In our Constitution too in spite  of  the claim that Art. 368 is a Code Arts. 4, 11 and 169 show  that the amendment of the Constitution can be by the ordinary law making  procedure.   By this method one of  the  legislative limbs  in a State can be removed or created.  This  destroys at  one stroke the claim that Art. 368 is a code  and.  also that any special method of amendment of the Constitution  is fundamentally necessary. [861 E-G] The only difference between constitutional law and  ordinary law can, be said to arise from the fact that  constitutional laws  are  generally  amend-able under a  process  which  in varying  degrees, is more difficult or elaborate.  This  may give a distinct character to the law of the  Constitutionbut it  does not serve to distinguish it from the other laws  of the land for the purpose of Art. 13(2).  The Article  itself does  not exclude constitutional law which could  have  been easily  done had the constitution makers. so intended.  [862 B; 866 B] An  amendment  to the Constitution is not made  under  power derived’ from Arts. 245 or 248 of the Constitution read with entry  97 of List 1. The power of amendment is sui  generis. [900 E] (iv) A   narrow  view  need  not  be  taken  of   the   word amendment’..  By an amendment new matter may be  added,  old matter  removed  or  altered.  The  power  of  amending  the Constitution  is  however  not  intended  to  be  used   for experiments or as an escape, from restrictions against undue State action enacted in the Constitution itself.  Nor is the power  of  amendment available for the  purpose  of  remoing express  or implied restrictions against the State. [862  F; 863 B-C] Coleman v. Milter, 307 U.S. 443 (83 L. Ed. 1385), Luther  V. Borden,, 7 How. 1(12 L. Ed. 58) and Baker v. Carr, 369  U.S. 186 (7 L. Ed. 2d., 633), referred to. The  State is no doubt supreme but in the supremacy  of  its powers  it  may create impediments on its  own  sovereignty. There  is nothing to prevent the State from placing  certain matters  outside the amending procedure.  When this  happens the  ordinary  procedure  of  amendment  ceases  to   apply. Amendment can then only be by a freshly constituted body.. 768 To  attempt  to do this otherwise is to  attempt  revolution which  is  to  alter the will of the people  in  an  illegal manner.   Courts can interfere to nullify the  revolutionary

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change  because there is an infraction of exiting  legality. Democracy  may be lost if there is no liberty based  on  law and   law  based  on  equality.   The  protection   of   the fundamental  rights is necessary so that we may not walk  in fear of democracy itself. [863 G; 864 A-C; 865 A-D] (v)  In  Art.  13(2) the restriction is against  the  State. There  is  a difference between the State and  its  agencies such  as  Government,  Parliament, the  Legislature  of  the States,  and  the local and other  authorities.   The  State means  more than any of these or all of them  put  together. By  making  the State subject to Fundamental  Rights  it  is clearly stated in Art. 13(2) that any of the agencies acting alone or all the agencies acting together are not above  the Fundamental Rights.  Therefore when the- House of the People or  the  Council  of  States  introduces  a  Bill  for   the abridgement  of  the  Fundamental  Rights,  it  ignores  the injunction  against it and even if the two Houses  pass  the Bill the injunction is next operative against the  President since  the  expression Government of India  in  the  General Clauses  Act  means  the  President  of  India.   Thus   the injunction  in Art. 13(2) is against the whole force of  the State   acting  either  in  its  executive  or   legislative capacity. [866 E-H] (vi) It  is wrong to invoke the Directive Principles  as  if there  is  some antinomy between them  and  the  Fundamental Rights.   The  Directive Principles lay down the  routes  of State  action  but such action must avoid  the  restrictions stated  in the Fundamental Rights.  It cannot  be  conceived that  in following the Directive Principles the  Fundamental Rights can be ignored. [867 G, 868 B] (vii)     Our  Constitution has given a guaranteed right  to the  persons whose fundamental rights are affected  to  move the  Court.   The guarantee is worthless if the  rights  are capable  of being taken away.  This makes  our  Constitution unique  and the American or other foreign precedents  cannot be of much assistance. [875 H] Hollingsworth  v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, Leser  v.  Garnett, 258  U.S.  130, Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 and  Texas  v. White, 7 Wall, 700, referred to. It  is  not that Fundamental Rights are not subject  to  any change   or  modification.   The  Constitution   permits   a curtailment  of  the  exercise of most  of  the  Fundamental Rights  by  stating  the limits  of  that  curtailment.   It permits   the  Fundamental  Rights  to  be  controlled   but prohibits their erasure. [878 B] (viii)    Parliament  today is not the constituent  body  as the  constituent ’assembly was but a constituted body  which must  bear  true allegiance to the Constitution  as  by  law established.    To  change  the  Fundamental  Part  of   the individuals  liberty  is  a usurpation  of  the  constituent functions because they have been placed outside the scope of the power of the constituted Parliament. [870 B-D] Our  Constitution like some others has kept certain  matters outside   the   amendatory  process  so   that   the   their representatives.  In Art. 35 obstante clause.  They  exclude Article under the proviso.  It is therefore a great error to think  of Art. 368 as a code or as omnicompetent. [901  C-E; 902 A-B] 769 Garnishee case, 46 C.L.R. 155, referred to. Article  368  cannot directly be amended  by  Parliament  to confer power on itself over the fundamental rights, It would be against Art. 13(2).  Parliament cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. [878 H] (ix) If it is desired to abridge the Fundamental Rights  the

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legal  method  is that the State must  reproduce  the  power which it has chosen to put under restraint.  Parliament must amend Art. 368 to convoke another constituent assembly, pass a  law under item 97 of the List 1 of Schedule 7 to  call  a constituent assembly, and then that assembly may be able  to abridge  or  take away the fundamental  rights.   Any  other method must be regarded as revolutionary. [878 D-E; 879 B] (x)  The   various  amendments  that  have  been   made   by Parliament   in  Arts.  15,  16  and  19  did  not   abridge fundamental rights and were therefore valid. [879 C, 883 B] (xi) Our  Constitution  accepted the theory  that  Right  of Property  is  a fundamental right though perhaps it  was  an error  to  do so if socialisation was desired.   It  treated property rights as inviolable except through law for  public good  and on payment of compensation.  However  the  various amendments  have significantly changed the position.   As  a result  of  them,  except for  land  within  the  prescribed ceiling,  all other land can be acquired or  rights  therein extinguished   or  modified  without  compensation  and   no challenge to the law can be made under Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. [887 B; 888 B-C; 896 F-G] As  there is apprehension that the erosion of the  right  to property  may be practised against other fundamental  rights it  is necessary to call a halt.  An attempt to  abridge  or take  away  Fundamental Rights by a  constituted  Parliament even through an amendment of the Constitution can I declared void.   This Court has the power and the jurisdiction to  do so.  The opposite view expressed in Sajjan Singh’s case  was wrong.. [898 B-C] (xii)     The  First, Fourth and Seventh amendments  of  the Constitution,  cannot  now  be challenged  because  of  long acquiescence.   It  is good sense and sound policy  for  the courts to decline to take up an amendment for  consideration after  a  considerable  lapse  of  time  when  it  was   not challenged  before or was sustained on an  earlier  occasion after challenge. [893 O, H 1902 D-E] Lesser  v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922), referred to. (xiii)    In the Seventeenth Amendment, the extension of the definition of ’estate’ to include ryotwari and  agricultural lands is an inroad into the Fundamental Rights but it cannot be questioned in view, of the existence of Art. 3 1A(1)  (a) whose validity cannot now be challenged.  The new definition of estate introduced by the amendment is beyond the reach of the Courts not because it is not law but because it is "law" and fills within that word in Art. 31(1) (2) (2A) and Art. 3 1-A(1). [899 C-G] The third section of the Act is however invalid.  It adds 44 State  Acts  to the ninth schedule.  The Schedule  is  being used  to  give advance protection  to-legislation  which  is known  or  apprehended  to  derogate,from  the   Fundamental Rights.   The  power under Art. 368 was not  meant  to  give protection to State statute-, which offend the Constitution. The  intent here is to silence the courts and not  to  amend the Constitution. [900 A-D] 770 (xiv)     The  two impugned Acts namely the Punjab  Security of  Land Tenures Act, 1953 and the Mysore Land Reforms  Act, 1962 as amended are valid under the Constitution not because they  are  included in Schedule 9 of  the  Constitution  but because they are protected by Art. 3 1-A and the President’s assent. [902 G-H] Per  Wanchoo, Bachawat, Ramaswami, Bhargava and Mitter,  JJ. (dissenting):  Article  368 carries the power to  amend  all parts  of the Constitution including the fundamental  rights in  Part III of the Constitution. An amendment is not  ’law’

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for  the  purpose of Art. 13(2) and cannot be  tested  under that Article. Sri  Sankari  Prasad  Singh Deo v. Union  of  India,  [1952] S.C.R.  89 and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965]  1 S.C.R. 933, reaffirmed. Per  Wanchoo, Bhargava and Mitter, JJ.-(i) The  Constitution provides   a   separate  part  headed  ’Amendment   of   the Constitution’ and Art. 368 is the only article in that Part. There can therefore, be no doubt that the power to amend the Constitution  must be contained in Art. 368.  If  there  was any doubt in the matter it is resolved by the words, namely, "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms  of  the bill".  These words can only  mean  that  the power  is  there  to  amend  ,the  Constitution  after   the procedure has been followed. [826 A-D] (ii) While there is a whole part devoted to the amendment of the  Constitution  there  is  no  specific  mention  of  the amendment of the Constitution in Art. 248 or in any entry of List  1. It would in the circumstances ’be more  appropriate to  read  the power in Art. 368 than in Art. 248  read  with item 97 of List I. [826 H-827 A] The  original  intention of the Constitution makers  was  to give  residuary  power to the States.  The  mere  fact  that during  the passage of the Constitution by  the  Constituent Assembly  residuary  power was finally vested in  the  Union would not therefore mean that it includes the power to amend the  Constitution.  Moreover residuary power cannot be  used to  change the fundamental law of the  Constitution  because all legislation is under Art. 245 "subject to the provisions of this Constitution". [827 B, H] Mere  accident of similarity of procedure provided  in  Art. 368  to  that  provided  for  ordinary  legislation   cannot obliterate the basic difference ’between constitutional  law and  ordinary law.  It is the quality and nature of what  is done  under  Art.  368  and  not  its  similarity  to  other procedure  that should be stressed.  What emerges after  the procedure in Art. 368 has been followed is not ordinary  law but fundamental law. [829 D; 830 C-D] (iii)     The  procedure  under  the proviso  to  Art.   III cannot  apply to a ’bill to amend the Constitution.  If  the President  refused to, give his assent to such a bill-,  the proposed  amendment falls.  In this respect at any rate  the procedure   under  Art.  368  differs  from,  the   ordinary legislative process. [831 B-E] (iv) The  word ’law’ has been avoided apparently with  great care  in Art.368. What emerges after the procedure has  been followed is not an Act but the Constitution stands  amended. After that the courts can only see whether the procedure  in Art. 368 was followed.  If it has been followed there is  no question of testing the amendment of the Constitution On the avail  of fundamental rights or in any other way as  in  the case of ordinary legislation. [832 A-G] 771 (v)  To  say  that ’amendment’ in law only  means  a  change which results in improvement would make amendment impossible for what is improvement is a matter of opinion. [834 B] It  may  be  open to doubt whether the  power  of  amendment contained  in  Art.  368 goes to the  extent  of  completely abrogating the present Constitution and substituting I it by an  entirely new one.  But short of that the power to  amend includes the power to add any provision to the  Constitution to alter any provision and substitute any other provision in its place or to delete any provision. [834 F-G] The seventeenth amendment is merely in exercise of the power of amendment as indicated above and cannot be struck down on

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the  ground  that  it goes beyond  the  power  conferred  by Parliament to amend the Constitution by Art. 368. [834 H] (vi) There is no express limitation on power of amendment in Art. 368 and no limitation can or should be implied therein. If the Constitution makers intended certain basic provisions in  the Constitution, and Part III in particular, to be  not amendable  there  is no reason why it was not so  stated  in Art. 3 68.  The acceptance of the principle that them is  an implied   bar  to  amendment  of  basic  features   of   the Constitution  would lead to the position that any  amendment to  any  article  would be liable to  challenge  before  the courts  on  the ground that it amounted to  amendment  of  a basic  feature.  Constituent power like that in Art 368  can only  be  subject  to  express limitations  so  far  as  the substance of the amendments is concerned. [835 A; 836 D, G] (vii)     For interpreting Art. 369 it is not permissible to read   the  speeches  made  in  the  Constituent   Assembly. Historical  facts namely what was accepted or what  was  not accepted or what was avoided in the Constituent Assembly can be looked into; but in connection with Art. 368 no help  can be got from the historical material available. [838 C] Administrator General, of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick, (1895) XXII I.A- 107, Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxation, (1907)  4 C.I.R. 1087, A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950]  S.C.R. 88 and The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491, referred to. (viii)    The  preamble to the Constitution cannot  prohibit or control in any way or impose any implied restrictions  or limitations on the power to amend the Constitution contained in Aft. 368. [838 H] In re the Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, [1960]  3 S.C.R. 250, referred to. (ix) The word ’law’ in Art. 13(1) does not include. any  law in the nature of a constitutional.provision for no such  law remained in view of Art. 395 which provided that "the Indian Independence  Act,  1947 and the Government  of  India  Act, 1935, together with all enactments amending or supplementing the  latter  Act, but not including the Abolition  of  Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, are hereby repealed.   There is no reason why if the word ’law’ in Art. 13(1) relating to past laws does not include any constitutional provision the- word  ’law’  in  cl.  (2) would take in  an  amount  of  the Constitution for it would be reasonable to read the word  in the same sense in both the clauses. [839 D-F] Article  13 (2) when it talks of the State making  any  law, refers to the law made under the provisions contained in Ch. 1  of Part XI of the Constitution beginning with  Art.  245. It can have no reference to the 772 Constituent  power of amendment under Art. 368.  For  it  is somewhat  contradictory that in Art. 368 power  should  have been  given  to  amend any  provision  of  the  Constitution without any limitations but indirectly that power should  be limited by using words of doubtful import in Art. 13(25.[841 C] The  power  conferred  by  the  words  of  Art.  368   being unfettered,  inconsistency  between.  that  power  and   the provision  in  Art.  13(2) must be  avoided.   Therefore  in keeping with the unfettered power in Art. 368 the word ’law’ in  Art. 13(2) must be read as meaning law passed under  the ordinary   legislative  power  and  not   a   constitutional amendment.   The  words in Art. 13(2) are not  specific  and clear enough to be regarded as an express limitation on Art. 368. [842 G-H] (x)  Merely  because there was some indirect effect on  Art.

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226  it  was not necessary that  the  Seventeenth  Amendment should  have  been ratified under the proviso to  Art.  368. Art. 245 had not also been directly affected by the said Act and  no  ratification %-as required on this  ground  either. [843 G-H; 846 C] (xi) The laws added to the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment   Act  had  already  been  passed  by  the   State Legislatures  and it was their constitutional infirmity,  if any, which was being cured by the device adopted in Art. 31B read  with the Ninth Schedule, the amendment being  only  of the relevant provisions of Part III which were compendiously put in one place in Art. 31B.  Parliament could alone do  it under   Art.  368  and  there  was  no  necessity  for   any ratification under the proviso, for amendment of Part HI  is not entrenched in the proviso. [847 E] In curing the infirmity of the said laws Parliament was  not encroaching  on  the  exclusive legislative  powers  of  the States  because  only Partiament could card  the  infirmity. For the same reason the fact that the laws in question  were State laws did. not make  ratification  obligatory.. [847 G] A limited meaning cannot be given to Art, 368 because of the possibility of abuse of the power.  The check is not in  the courts  but in the people who plect members  of  Parliament. [848 F] The  power  of  amendment contained  in  a  written  federal constitution  is  a  safety valve which to  a  large  extent provides for stable growth and makes violent revolution more or  less  unnecessary.  The fact that in  the  last  sixteen years a large number of amendments , could be made and  have been  made  is due to the accident that one party  has  been returned  by electors in sufficient strength to be  able  to command  Special majorities which are required in Art.  368, not  only at the Centre but in all the States.  But that  is no ground for limiting the clear words of Art. 368. [850  C- D, E] (xii)Though  the period for which Sankari Prasad’s case  has stood  unchallenged  is  not long, the  effects  which  have followed  on the passing of State laws on the faith of  that decision,  are so overwhelming that the decision should  not be disturbed otherwise chaos will follow.  This is the fittest  possible  case  in which  the  principle  of  stare decisis should be applied [851 G] Keshav Mills: Company,    Ltd  V  Commissioner    of Income- tax,[1965] 2 S.C.R. 908, referred to. (xii)The  doctrine  of  prospective  overruling  cannot   be accepted in this    country.  The doctrine accepted here  is that courts declare law and  that   a declaration made by  a court is the law of the land and takes effect 773 from  the  date  the  law came  into  force.   It  would  be undesirable  to give up that doctrine and supersede it  with the doctrine of prospective overruling.  [852,D-F] Moreover a law contravening Art. 13(2) is void ab initio  as held  by  this Court in Deep Chand’s case and  Mahendra  Lal Jaini’s  case.   In  the  face  of  these  decisions  it  is impowible to apply the doctrine of prospective overruling to ordinary  laws.  If constitutional law is to be  treated  as ordinary  law the same principle applies.  If however it  is not  treated  as  ’law’ under Art. 13(2) then  there  is  no necessity   of   applying  the  principle   of   prospective overruling  for  in that case the amendment under  Art.  368 does  not have to be tested under Art. 13(2). [852 G-H;  853 B] Deep Chand v. St ate of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8 and Mahendra, Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh,  [1963]

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Supp.  1 S.C.R. 912, referred to. Per  Bachawat  J.-(i) Article 368 not  only  prescribes  the procedure  but  also gives the power of  amendment.   It  is because  the power to amend is given by the article that  by following  its  procedure the Constitution  stands  amended. The  proviso is enacted on the assumption that  the  several articles mentioned in it are amendable; but for the  proviso they  would have been amendable under the main part.   There is no other provision in the Constitution under which  these articles’ can be amended. [904 D] Articles  4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part D and  Sixth  Schedule Para 21 empower the Parliament to make amendments to certain parts of the Constitution by law, and by, express  provision such  law is deemed not to be amendment for the  purpose  of Art.  368.  All other provisions of the Constitution can  be amended  by  recourse to Art. 368 only.   No  other  article confers the power of amending the Constitution. [904E-F] (ii) The  power to amend the Constitution cannot be said  to reside in Art. 248 and List 1, item 97 because if  amendment could be made by ordinary legislative process Art. 368 would be meaningless.  Under the residual power the Parliament has no  competence  to make any law with respect to  any  matter enumerated  in  Lists II and III of the  7th  Schedule,  but under  Art.  368  even  Lists 11 and  III  can  be  amended. Moreover a law passed by residual power is passed by  virtue of  Art.  245 and must be subject to the provisions  of  the Constitution   so   that  it  cannot   derogate   from   the Constitution or amend it.  Such a law would be void. [905 C- P] (iii)     Article  368  gives the power  of  amending  ’this Constitution’.   This Constitution means every part  of  the Constitution  including Part ITT and Art. 13(2).  Thus  Art. 13(2)  is  also  within the reach  of  the  amending  power. Instead  of  controlling Art. 368 it is controlled  by  that Article. [906 C-D; H] (iv) The  contention that a constitutional  amendment  under Art.  368  is a law within the meaning of Art.  13  must  be rejected.  The distinction between the Constitution and  law is so fundamental that the Constitution is not regarded as a law  or  a  legislative act.  The  Constitution  mean-,  the Constitution  as amended.  An amendment made  in  conformity with Art. 368 is a part of the Constitution and is  likewise not  law.  Save as expressly provided in Arts. 4, 169  Fifth Schedule Part D and Sixth Schedule para 21 no law can  amend the  Constitution and a law which purports to make  such  an amendment  is  void.  It is for this reason  that  Art.  368 avoids all reference to law making by the Parliament.  There 3 Sup.  CI./67-4 774 are.  also  material differences between  the  ordinary  law making  procedure and the procedure under the Article.  [907 B-F; 908 D-H] If  a  constitutional amendment creating a  new  fundamental rights and incorporating it in Part III were a law, it would not  be open to the Parliament by a subsequent amendment  to abrogate  the  new fundamental right for such  an  amendment would  be  repugnant  to Part 111.  But  the  conclusion  is absurd for the body which enacted the right can surely  take it away by the same process. [909 E] Marbury  v.  Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137 :2  L.Ed.  60  and Riley v. Carter, 88 A.L.R. 1008, referred to. (v)  There is no conflict between Arts. 13(2) and 368.   The two articles operate in different fields, the former in  the field   of  law,  the  latter  in  that  of   constitutional amendment. [910 B]

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(vi) The  non-obstante clause in Art. 35 does not show  that the article is not amendable.  The non-obstante clause is to be found also in, Arts. 258(1). 364, 369, 370 and 371A.   No one  has  suggested that these articles are  not  amendable. [910 D] (vii)     The  words ’fundamental’ used in regard to  rights in  Part III and the word guaranteed in Art. 32 do not  mean that the said rights cannot be amended.  The constitution is never  at rest; it changes with the progress of  time.   The scale  of  values in Parts III and IV is  not  immortal  and these  Parts being parts of the Constitution are not  immune from amendment under Art. 368. [910 F-G] The impugned amendments to be Constitution were made to meet the  situations  created by decisions of this Court  and  to carry  out urgent agrarian reforms.  If it is held that  the rights,  conferred by Part III cannot be abridged  or  taken away  by  constitutional amendments,  all  these  amendments would  be invalid.  The Constitution makers could  not  have intended  that the ’ rights conferred by Part III could  not be  altered for’ giving effect to the policy of  Part.   IV. Nor  was it intended that defects in Part III could  not  be cured or that possible errors in judicial interpretations of Part   III   could  not  be  rectified   by   constitutional amendments. [913 D-E] (viii)    It  cannot be said that the people in exercise  of their  sovereign  power have placed the  fundamental  rights beyond  the reach of the amending power.  The people  acting through  the  Constituent Assembly reserved  for  themselves certain  rights and liberties and ordained that  they  shalt not be curtailed by ordinary legislation.  But the people by the same Constitution also authorised the Parliament to make amendments to the Constitution.  In exercise of the amending power the Parliament has ample authority to, abridge or take away the fundamental rights under Part III [915 B-C] Merely because of possibility of abuse, the power cannot  be denied. [916 H] Webb  v. Outrim, [1907] A.C. 81 and amalgamated  Society  of Engineers’.   The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited &  Ors. 28 C.L.R. 129, referred to. (ix) The  main part of Art. 368 gives the power to amend  or make   changes  in  the  Constitution.   A  change  is   not necessarily  an  improvement.  Normally the change  is  made with the object of making an improvement but the  experiment may fail to achieve the purpose. [916 A] Livermore  v.  E. G. Waite, 102 Cal. 113-25 L.R.A.  312  and National Prohibition case. 253 U.S. 350, referred to.                                      77 5 (x)  The  best exposition of the Constitution is that  which it has received from contemporaneous judicial decisions  and enactments.   No one in Parliament doubted  the  proposition that  fundamental  rights could be amended, when  the  First Amendment   Act  of  1951  was  passed.   The   concept   of amendability  was upheld in S. Krishnan & Ors. v.  State  of Madras [1951] S.C.R. 621 decided in 1951,’in Sankari  Prasad decided in 1952 and Sajjan Singh decided in 1964. [918 C-D] (xi) There is no provision in the Constitution for calling a convention  for  its  revision  or  far  submission  of  any proposal for amendment to the referendum. [918 G] (xii)     The impugned amendments affected Arts. 226 and 245 only  indirectly and did not require ratification under  the proviso to Art. 168. [919 D-H] In   validating  the  impugned  laws  Parliament   was   not encroaching on-.the State List.  It was only validating  the said laws and such constitutional validating was within  its competence. [920 C-E]

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(xiii)    The abolition of Zamindari was a necessary reform. It  is the First Constitution Amendment Act that  made  this reform  possible.,  No  legal  argument’  can  restore   the outmoded  feudal Zamindari system.What has been done  cannot be undone.  The battle for the put is lost. [921 B-C] If the First Fourth, Sixteenth & Seventeenth Amendments Acts are  void  they do not legally exist from  their  inception. They  cannot  be,  valid  from  1951  to  1967  and  invalid thereafter.   To  say that they were valid in the  past  and Will be invalid in the future is to amend  the.Constitution. Such  a naked power of amendment is not given to the  Judges and therefore the doctrine of prospective overruling  cannot be, adopted. [921 D-E] It  is  not  possible  to say  that  the  First  and  Fourth Amendments  though originally valid have now been  validated by acquiescence.  If they infringe Art. 13(2) they were void from their inception.  If these ammendments are validated by acquiescence the Seventeenth Amendment is equally validated. [921 F; 922 B] (xv) The  contention  that Dr. Ambedkar did not  regard  the fundamental  rights  as amendable is not  supported  by  the speeches in the’ Constituent Assembly. [922 C-D] Per Ramaswami J.(i) In a written Constitution the  amendment of the Constitution is a substantive constituent act  which, is  made  in the exercise of the sovereign power  through  a predesigned procedure unconnected with ordinary legislation. The  amending  power in Art. 368 is hence  sui  generis  and cannot  be  compared to the law making power  of  Parliament pursuant to Art. 246 read with Lists II and Ill.  It follows that the expression ’law’ in Art. 13(2) cannot be  construed as  including  an  amendment of the  Constitution  which  is achieved   by  Parliament  in  exercise  of  its   sovereign constituent  power but must mean law made by  Parliament  in its legislative capacity under Art. 246 read ’with I List  I and  III of the 7th Schedule.  It is also clear on the  same line of reasoning that law in Art. 13(2) cannot be construed so  as  to include "law’ made by Parliament under  Arts.  4, 169, 392, 5th Schedule Part 1 and 6th Schedule para 21.  The amending power of Parliament exercised under these  Articles stands on the same pedestal as the constitutional amend ment made under Art. 368 so far as Art. 13(2) is concerned.  [930 H 931 E] (ii) The  language  of  Art. 368 is  perfectly  general  and empowers  Parliament to amend the Constitution  without  any exception whatsoever. 776 The use of the word ’fundamental’ to describe the rights  in Part  III and the word ’guaranteed’ in Art. 32  cannot  lift the fundamental rights above the Constitution itself [931 F, H] (iii)     It  is unreasonable to suggest that what Art.  368 provides  is  only  the  mechanics  of  the  procedure   for amendment and not the power to amend.  The significant  fact that  a separate part has been devoted in  the  Constitution for  "amendment of the constitution" and there is  only  one Article  in  that  Part shows that both the  power  and  the procedure to amend are enacted in Art. 368.  Again the words "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms  of  the  Bill" in Art. 368  clearly  contemplate  and provide for the power to amend after the requisite procedure has been followed. [932 C-E] (iv) The  power  of  constitutional  amendment  cannot  fall within Arts. 246 and 248 read with item 97 of List I because it is illogical and a contradiction in terms to say that the amending  power can be exercised "subject to the  provisions

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of the Constitution" as the power under these articles  must be. [933 B] (v) There is no room for an implication in the  construction ofArt. 368.    If  the  Constitution makers  wanted  certain basic  features to be unamendable they would have  said  so. [933 G-H] State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1 S.C.R.  371 and In re The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250, referred to. The  concepts  of  liberty and  equality  are  changing  and dynamic  and hence the notion of permanency or  immutability cannot  be attached to any of the fundamental  rights.   The adjustment  between  freedom  and  compulsion,  between  the rights  of individuals and the social interest  and  welfare must  necessarily  be  a  matter  for  changing  needs   and conditions.  The proper approach is therefore to  look  upon the  fundamental rights of the individual as conditioned  by social responsibility, by the necessities of the society, by the  balancing  of  interests and not  as  pre-ordained  and untouchable private rights. [934 E-935 C] (vi) It  must  not be forgotten that neither the  rights  in Art. 31 nor those in Art. 19 are absolute.  The purposes for which   fundamental  rights  can  be  regulated  which   are specified in cls. (2) to (6) could not have been assumed  by the  Constitution  makers  to be  static  and  incapable  of expansion.   It  cannot  be assumed  that  the  Constitution makers  intended  to  forge a  political  strait-jacket  for generations  to  come.  Today at a time when  absolutes  are discredited,  it must not be too readily assumed that  there are  basic  features of the Constitution which  shackle  the amending  power and which take precedence over  the  general welfare  of  nation  and the need for  agrarian  and  social reform. [936 B-937 C] (vii)     In construing Art. 368 it is essential to remember the  nature  and  subject  matter of  that  Article  and  to interpret it subjectae materies.  The power of amendment  is in  point  of quality an adjunct of sovereignty.  It  is  in truth  the  exercise of the highest sovereign power  in  the State. if the amending power is an adjunct of sovereignty it does not admit of any limitations. [937 D] (viii)    If  the fundamental rights are unamendable and  if Art. 368 does not include any such power it follows that the amendment  of, say, Art. 31 by insertions of Arts.  31A  and 31B  can  only  be  made by a  violent  revolution.   It  is doubtful  if the proceedings of a new  Constituent  Assembly that may be called will have any legal validity for if the 777 Constitution provides its own method of amendment, any other method will be unconstitutional and void. [490 A-B] George  S.  Hawke  v.  Harvey C. Smith,  64  L.Ed.  871  and Feigenspan v.  Bodine, 264 Fed. 186, referred to. (ix) It is not permissible in the first place to assume that in a matter of constitutional amendment there will be  abuse of  power and then utilise it as a test for finding out  the scope of the amending power.  In the last analysis political machinery  and artificial limitations will not  protect  the people from themselves. [941 F-G] State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1 S.C.R.  371 and  American Federation of Labour v. American Sash  &  Door Co. 335 U.S. 538, referred to. (x)  What the impugned Act purports to do is not to make any and legislation but to protect and validate the  legislative measure  passed by different State legislatures.   This  was within the legislative competence of Parliament. [942 F] Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, National Prohibition  Cases.

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253  U.S.  350 and United States v. Sprague, 282  U.S.  716, referred to. Articles  226  and 245. were not directly  affected  by  the impugned  Act  and therefore no ratification  by  the  State Legislatures was necessary. [942 D-H; 945 D] A.   K.  Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R.  88,  Ram Singh  & Ors. v.  State of Delhi & Anr., [1951] S.C.R.  451, Express  Newspapers  (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of  India,  [1959] S.C.R. 12, Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, [1961] 1 S.C.R.  809  and  Naresh  Shridhar  Mirajkar  v.  State   of Maharashtra [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744, referred to. (xi) Even  on  the  assumption  that  the  impugned  Act  is unconstitutional  the  principle of stare  decisis  must  be applied  to  the  present  case and the  plea  made  by  the petitioners for reconsideration of Sankari Prasad’s case and Sajjan Singh’s case must be rejected. [948 D-E] On  the landings it was not necessary to express an  opinion on  the doctrine of prospective overruling  of  legislation. [948 G-H]

& ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966. (Under Article  32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement  of the Fundamental Rights) And Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for  enforce- ment of the Fundamental Rights)                             And Writ Petition No. 205 of 1966. (Under   Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of  India   for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights) 778 In Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966. R. V.     S.  Mani,  S. K, Mehta and K. L.  Mehta,  for  the petitioners. Niren,De, Additional Solicitor-General      of India,and R. N. Sachthey, for the Respondents. Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General of India,G.Rajagopal, and R. H. Dhebar,for Intervener Ng. 1. S.   D.  Banerjee,  Advocate-General for the State  of  West Bengal, B.   Sen and P. K. Bose,for Intervener No.2. Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, Bajrang  Saha, M. M. Gajadhar, K. M. K. Nair, D. P.   Singh, M.  K.  Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, S. C.. Agarwala  and  G.  D. Gupta, for Intervener No. 3. Mohan  Kumaramangalam.,  Advocate-General for the  State  of Madras, B.  Ramamurthi and A. V. Rangam, for Intervener No. V. D. Mahajan and R. H. Dhebar, for Intervener No., 5. K.   L.  Mishra,  Advocate-General for the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh, and O. P. Rana, for Intervener No., 6. V.   A.  Seyid  Muhamad, Advocate-General for the  State  of Kerala,  B.  R. L. Iyengar, A. G. Pudissery, for  Intervener No. 7. Naunit Lal, for Intervener No. 8. K.   B. Mehta, for Intervener No. 9. P.   Ram  Reddy and T. V. R. Tatachari, for  Intervener  No. 10. M.   C.  Stealvad,  B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H.  Dhebar,  for Inter-vener No. 11. R.   Thiagarajan, for Intervener No. 12. D.   N. Mukherjee, for Interveners Nos. 13 and 19 to 21.

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E.   Udayairatnam, S. S. Dalal and D.  D. Sharma, for Inter- veners Nos. 14 and 15. R.   K Garg, D.. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, S. C. Agarwala, G. D. Gupta and K. M. K. Nair’      for Intervener No. 16. ’K.  Parasaran and K. R. Chaudhuri, for Intervener No. 17. Basudev  Prasad,  K.  Parasaran and  K.  R.  Chaudhuri,  for Intervener No. 18. Basudev-Prasad,  K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, K. R. Chaudhuri  and S. N. Prasad, for Interveners Nos. 22 to 24. 779 in Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966. M.K.  Nambyar,  K. B. Jinaraja Hegde,  N.  A.,  Subramaniam, Bhuvanesh Kumari, O. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and  Ravin- der Narain, for the Petitioner. H.   R.  Gokhale,  B. P.. G. K. Achar, K. H. Dhebar,  R.  N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayyar, for Respondent No. 1. Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R.   N. Sachthey, for Respondent No. 2. A.  K. Sen, F. S. Nariman, M. L. Bhakte, S. I.  Thakere,  J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No. 1. N.   A.  Palkhiwala,  F.  S. Nariman, M. L.  Bhakte,  D.  M. Popat,0.  P.  Malhotra, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C.  Mathur  and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No. 2. D.   M., Parulekar B. Dutta, J. B.  Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No. 3. In Writ Petition No. 205 of 1966. M.   K.  Nambyar, K. B. Jinaraja Hegde, N.  A.  Subramaniam, Bhuvanesh Kumari, O. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and  Ravin- der Narain, for the Petitioner. H. R. Gokhale, B. R. G. K. Achar, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayyar, for Respondent No. 1. S.   G.  Patwardhan,  D.  M.  Parulekar,  B.  Dutta,  S.  K. Dhelika, 1.   B.  Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder  Narain,  for the Intervener. The  Judgment  Of SUBBA RAO, C.J., SHAH, SIKRI,  SHELAT  and VAIDIALINGAM, JJ. was delivered by SUBBA RAO, C.I. According to this Judgment-(i) the power to amend the Constitution  is not  to be found in Art. 368 but in Arts. 245, 246  and  248 read  with Entry 97 of List 1; (ii) the amending power  can. not  be used to abridge or take away the fundamental  rights guaranteed  in  Part III of the Constitution;  (iii)  a  law amending  the  Constitution is "Law" within the  meaning  of Art.  13(2)  and  (iv). the First,  Fourth  and  Seventeenth Amendments  though  they abridged  fundamental  rights  were valid in the past on the basis of earlier decisions of  this Court  and  continue  to be valid for the  future.   On  the application of the doctrine of "prospective over-ruling", as enunciated  in  the judgment, the decision  will  have  only prospective  operation and Parliament will have no power  to abridge or take away Fundamental Rights from the date of the judgment. The  Judgment  of  WANCHOO, BHARGAVA  and  MITTER,  JJ.  was delivered by WANCHOO, J. According to this Judgment (i) the 780 power  of amending the Constitution resides in Art. 368  and not in Arts. 245, 246 and 248, read with EntrY 97 of List 1; (ii)  there,  are  no  restrictions  on  the  power  if  the procedure  in Art. 368 is followed and all the Parts of  the Constitution  including Part III, can be amended,  (iii)  an amendment  of  the  Constitution is not  "’law"  under  Art. 13(2);  and  (iv) the doctrine of  "prospective  overruling" cannot be applied in India.

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HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate judgment agreeing with SUBBA  RAo,  CJ. on the following two points: (i)  that  the power to amend the Constitution cannot be used to abridge or take  away fundamental rights; and (ii) that a law  amending the Constitution is "law" under Art. 13 (2).  He agrees With WANCHOO, J. that the power to amend does not reside in Arts. 245 and 248 read wish Entry 97 of List 1. Art.  368, according to him, is sui generis  and  procedural and  the  procedure when correctly followed, results  in  an amendment.  He does not rely on the doctrine of "prospective overruling".   As  regards  the First,  Fourth  and  Seventh Amendments, these having long enured and been acquiesced in, he  does not treat the question of their validity  as  being before  him.  As regards the Seventeenth Amendment he  finds sufficient support for it in the Constitution as amended  by the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments and holds that  the new  definition  of "estate", introduced by  the  Amendment, though  it is "law" under Art. 13 (2) and is an inroad  into fundamental  rights,  is  beyond the  reach  of  the  courts because it falls within the word "law" in Arts. 31 (1), (2), 2A  and  31A(1).   He, however, declares section  3  of  the Seventeenth  Amendment Act ultra vires the amending  process as an illegitimate exercise of the amending power. [BACHAWAT  and RAMASWAMI, JJ. delivered  separate  judgments concurring with WANCHOO, J.] Subbarao,   C.J.  These  three  writ  petitions  raise   the important  question  of  the validity  of  the  Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. Writ  Petition No. 153 of 1966, is filed by the  petitioners therein  against  the  State of  Punjab  and  the  Financial Commissioner, Punjab.  The petitioners are the son, daughter and granddaughters of one Henry Golak Nath, who died on July 30,  1953.  The Financial Commissioner, in revision  against the  order  made by the Additional  Commissioner,  Jullundur Division,  held by an order dated January 22, 1962  that  an area  of 418 standard acres and 9-1/4 units was  surplus  in the  hands  of the petitioners under the provisions  of  the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act X of 1953, read with  s. 10-B  thereof.  The petitioners, alleging that the  relevant provisions of the said Act where under the said area was 781 declared surplus were void on the ground that they infringed their  rights under cls. (f) and (g) of Art. 19 and Art.  14 of  the Constitution, filed a writ in this Court under  Art. 32 of the Constitution for a direction that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, Constitution (Fourth  Amendment) Act,  1955, Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act,  1964, insofar  as  they  affected their  fundamental  rights  were unconstitutional and inoperative and for a direction that s. 10-B  of  the said Act X of 1953 was void  as  violative  of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. Writ  Petitions  Nos.  202 and 203 of  1966  were  filed  by different petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution  for a  declaration that the Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act  10  of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of 1965, which fixed ceilings  on land  holdings and conferred ownership of surplus  lands  on tenants  infringed Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of  the  Constitution and, therefore, was unconstitutional and void. The States of Punjab and Mysore, inter alia, contended  that the said Acts were saved from attack on the ground that they infringed  the  fundamental  rights of  the  petitioners  by reason  of  the Constitution  (Seventeenth  Amendment)  Act, 1964,  which, by amending Art. 31-A of the Constitution  and including the said two Arts in the 9th Schedule thereto, had placed them beyond attack.

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In Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966, 7 parties intervened.   In Writ  Petition  No. 202 of 1966 one  party  intervened.   In addition,  in  the first petition, notice was given  to  the Advocates  General  of  various  States.   A11  the  learned counsel  appearing  for the parties, the  Advocates  General appearing  for  the States and the learned counsel  for  the interveners   have,  placed  their   respective   viewpoints exhaustively before us.  We are indebted to all of them  for their  thorough  preparation  and clear  exposition  of  the difficult  questions  of law that were raised  in  the  said petitions. At  the outset it would be convenient to place  briefly  the respective  contentions  under  different heads  :  (1)  The Constitution is intended to be permanent and, therefore,  it cannot  be  amended  in a way which would  injure,  maim  or destroy   its   indestructible  character.  (2)   The   word "amendment"  implies such an addition or change  within  the lines   of  the  original  instrument  as  will  effect   an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed  and  it  cannot be so construed  as  to  enable  the Parliament  to  destroy  the  permanent  character  of   the Constitution.  (3) The fundamental rights are a part of  the basic structure of the Constitution and, therefore, the said power can be exercised only to preserve rather than  destroy the essence of those rights. (4) The limits on the power  to amend are implied in Art. 368, for the 782 expression   "amend"  has  a  limited  meaning.   The   wide phraseo-logy  used  in the Constitution in  other  Articles, such as "repeal" and "re-enact" indicates that art. 368 only enables a modification of the Articles within the  framework of  the  Constitution  and a destruction of  them.  (5)  The debates in the Constituent Assembly, particularly the speech of  Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the first PA= Minister of  India, and the reply of Dr. Ambedkar, who piloted the Bill disclose clearly that it was never the intention of the makers of the Constitution by putting in Art. 368 to enable the Parliament to  repeal the fundamental rights, the  circumstances  under which  the amendment moved by Mr. H. V. Kamath, one  of  the members of Constituent Assembly, was withdrawn and Art.  368 was  finally adopted, support the contention that  amendment of  Part II, is outside the scope of Art. 368. (6) Part  III of  the  Constitution  is a  self-contained  Code.  and  its provisions  are  elastic  enough  to  meet  all   reasonable requirements of changing situations. (7) The power to  amend is  sought to be derived from three sources, namely, (i)  by implication  under Art. 368 itself; The procedure  to  amend culminating in the amendment of the Constitution necessarily implies  that power, (ii) the power and ,the limits  of  the power  to  amend are implied in the Articles  sought  to  be amended, and (iii) Art. 368 only lays down the procedure  to amend, but the power to amend is only the legislative  power conferred on the Parliament under Arts. 245, 246 and 248  of the Constitution. (8) The definition of "law" in Art.  13(2) of the Constitution includes every branch of law, statutory, constitutional, etc.,’ and therefore, the power to amend  in whichever  branch it may be classified, if it takes away  or abridges  fundamental rights would be void  thereunder.  (9) The impugned amendment detracts from the jurisdiction of the High  Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and also  the legislative  powers  of the States and  therefore  it  falls within the scope of the proviso to Art. 368. The  said summary, though not exhaustive, broadly gives  the various  nuances  of the contentions raised by  the  learned counsel,  who question the validity of the  17th  Amendment.

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We  have  not noticed the other arguments  of  Mr.  Nambiar, which  are peculiar to the Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966  as those  questions do not arise for decision, in the  view  we are taking on the common questions. On  behalf of the Union and the States the following  points were  pressed  : (1) A Constitutional amendment is  made  in exercise of the sovereign power and not legislative power of Parliament  and,.  therefore, it partakes  the  quality  and character   of  the  Constitution  itself.  (2)   The   real distinction is between a rigid and a flexible  Constitution. The  distinction  is based upon the express  limits  of  the amending power. (3) The provisions of Art.                             783 368-axe  clear  and unequivocal and there  is  no-scope  for invoking  implied  limitations on that  power:  further  the doctrine  of impliedpower has been rejected by the  American courts and jurists. (4) The object of the amending clause in a  flexible  Consetitution is to enable  the  Parliament  to amend  the Constitution in order to express the will of  the people  according  to the changing course of events  and  if amending  power  is restricted by implied  limitations,  the Constitution  itself  might  be  destroyed  by   revolution. Indeed,  it  is  a safety valve and  an  alternative  for  a violent  change by revolution. (5) There- are no  basic  and non-basic  features of the Constitution; everything  in  the Constitution is basic and it can be amended in order to help the future growth and progress of the country. (6)  Debates. in  the  Constituent  Assembly cannot  be  relied  upon  for construing Art. 368 of the Constitution and even if-they can be,  there  is nothing in the debates to  prove,  positively that  fundamental rights were excluded from  amendment.  (7) Most of the amendments are made out of political  necessity: they  involve, questions, such. as, how to exercise  power,, how to make the lot of the citizens better and the like and, therefore,  not being judicial questions, they  are  outside the  court’s jurisdiction. (8) The language of Art.  368  is clear,  categorical, imperative and universal, on the  other hand,  the  language  of  Art. 13(2) is  such  as  to  admit qualifications or limitations and, therefore, the Court must construe  them  in such a manner as that Article  could  not control  Art.  368. (9) In order to  enforce  the  Directive Principles  the Constitution was amended from time  to  time and  the  great fabric of the Indian Union  has  been  built since  1950  on  the basis that the  Constitution  could  be amended  and,  therefore, any reversal of,  the  previous  I decisions would introduce economic chaos in our country  and that,   therefore,   the  burden  is  very   heavy   uponthe petitioners to establish that the fundamental rights  cannot be amended under Art. 368 of the Constitution. (10) Art. 31- A  and the 9th Schedule do not affect the power of the  High Court under Art. 226 or the legislative power of the  States though   the  area  of  their  operation  is  limited   and, therefore, they do not fall within the scope of the  proviso to Art. 3 68. The aforesaid contentions only represent a brief summary  of elaborate arguments, advanced by learned counsel.  We  shall deal  in  appropriate context with the other  points  mooted before US.               It  will  be convenient to read  the  material               provisions of theConstitution at. this  stage.               Article 13(1)               (2)   The  State shall not make any law  which               takes away or   abridges the rights  conferred               by this part and any law  made              in               contravention  of this clause shall,  toy  the

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             extent of the contravention, be void.               784               (3)   In  this  article,  unless  the  context               otherwise requires,-               (a)   "law"  includes  any  Ordinance,  order,               bye-law, rule regulation, notification, custom               or usage having in the territory of India  the               force of law.               Article   31-A(1),  Notwithstanding   anything               contained in article 13, no law providing for,               (a)   the  acquisition  by the  State  of  any               estate  or  of  any  rights  therein  or   the               extinguishment  or  modification of  any  such               rights,               shall be deemed to be void on the ground  that               it  is  inconsistent with, or  takes  away  or               abridges  any  of  the  rights  conferred   by               article 14, article 19 or article 31.               (2)   (a)  the expression "estate"  shall,  in               relation  to  any local area,  have  the  same               meaning  as  that  expression  or  its-  local               equivalent has in the existing law relating to               land  tenure in force in that area  and  shall               also include,               (ii)  any land held under ryotwari settlement,               (iii) any  land  held or let for  purposes  of               agriculture   or   for   purposes    ancillary                             thereto......               Article   31-D.   Without  prejudice  to   the               generality  of  the  provisions  contained  in               article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations               specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the               provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void,               or  ever  to have become void, on  the  ground               that  such  Act, Regulation  or  provision  is               inconsistent  with, or takes away or  abridges               any of the rights conferred by, any provisions               of   this  Part,  and  not  withstanding   any               judgment  decree  or  order of  any  court  or               tribunal  to  the contrary, each of  the  said               Acts  and  Regulations shall, subject  to  the               power  of any competent Legislature to  repeal               or amend it, continue in force. In  the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution the  Mysore  Land Reforms  Act, 1961, (Mysore Act 10 of 1962) is  included  as item  51 and the Punjab Security of Land Tenures  Act,  1953 (Punjab  Act  10  of  1953) is included  as  item  54.   The definition  of "estate" was amended and the  Ninth  Schedule was  amended by including therein the said two Acts  by  the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. 785 The result of the said amendments is that both the said Acts dealing-   with  estates,  within  their   wide   definition introduced by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)  Act, 1964, having been included in the Ninth Schedule, are placed beyond  any attack on the ground that their  provisions  are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the  rights conferred  by  Part III of the Constitution.  It  is  common case  that if the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)  Act, 1964, was constitutionally valid, the said Acts could not be impugned on any of the said grounds. The  question of the amendability of the fundamental  rights was  considered  by  this Court earlier  in  two  decisions, namely,  Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India  and State of Bihar(1) and in Sajjan Singh v. State of  Rajasthan

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(2) In the former the validity of the Constitution (First Amend- ment) Act, 1951, which inserted, inter alia, Arts. 31-A  and 31-B  in the Constitution, was questioned.   That  amendment was  made  under  Art.  368  of  the  Constitution  by   the Provisional Parliament.  This Court held that Parliament had power to amend Part III of the Constitution.  The Court came to  that  conclusion on two grounds, namely,  (1)  the  word "law" in Art. 13(2) was one made in exercise of  legislative power  and  not  constitutional  law  made  in  exercise  of constituent  power; and (ii) there were two articles  (Arts. 13(2)  and  368)  each  of which  was  widely  phrased  and, therefore, harmonious construction required that one  should be  so read as to be controlled and qualified by the  other, and  having  regard to the circumstances  mentioned  in  the judgment  Art.  13  must be read subject  to  Art.  368.   A careful  perusal of’ the judgment indicates that  the  whole decision turned upon an assumption that the expression "law" in Art 13(2) does not include constitutional law and on that assumption  an attempt was made to harmonise Article 13  (2) and 368 of the Constitution. The decision in Sajjan Singh’s case(2) was given in the con- text  of  the question of the validity of  the  Constitution (Seventeenth  Amendment) Act, 1964.  Two questions arose  in that  case:  (1)  Whether  the  amendment  Act  insofar   it purported  to take away or abridge the rights  conferred  by Part III of the Constitution fell within the prohibition  of Art. 13(2) and (2) Whether Articles 31-A and 31-B sought  to make changes in Arts. 132, 136 or 226 or in any of the lists in  the Seventh Schedule and therefore the  requirements  of the  proviso to Article 368 had to be satisfied.   Both  the Chief Justice and Mudholkar, J. made it clear that the first contention  was  not raised before the Court.   The  learned counsel   appearing  for  both  the  parties  accepted   the correctness  of the decision in Sankari Prasad’s case(1)  in that (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89,105. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933, 946, 950, 959, 961, 963. 786 regard.  Yet Gajendragadkar, C.J. speaking for the  majority ,agreed  with the reasons given in Sankari Prasad’s  case(1) on  the first question and Hidayatullah and  Mudholkar,  JJ. expressed their dissent from the-said view.  But all of them agreed, though for different reasons on the second question. Gajendragadkar,  C.J.  speaking  for  himself,  Wanchoo  and Raghubar  Dayal, JJ. rejected the contention that  Art.  368 did  not  confer  power  on Parliament  to  take.  away  the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. When a suggestion was  made that the decision in the aforesaid case should  be reconsidered and reviewed, the learned Chief Justice  though he  conceded  that  in  a  case-  where  a  decision  had  a significant  impact on the fundamental rights  of  citizens, the  Court would be inclined to review its earlier  decision in  the  interests  of  the public good,  he  did  not  find considerations of substantial and compelling character to do so  in  that case.  But after: referring  to  the  reasoning given in Sankari Prasad’s case(1) the; learned Chief Justice observed               "In our opinion , the expression "amendment of               the,  Constitution" plainly and  unambiguously               means  amendment of all the provisions of  the               Constitution." Referring,  to Art. 13 (2), he restated the  same  reasoning found in, the earlier decision and added that if it was  the intention  of the Constitution-makers to  save,  fundamental

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rights from the amending,process they should have taken  the precaution of making A-. clear provision in that regard.  In short,  the majority, speaking through  Gajendragadkar,  C.L agreed  that  no case had been made, out for  reviewing  the earlier decision and practically accepted the reasons  given in the-earlier decision.  Hidyatullah J.     speaking    for himself, observed               "But  I  make  it clear that  I  must  not  be               understood to have subscribed to the view that               the word "law" in Art. 13(2) does not  control               constitutional   amendments.,  I  reserve   my               opinion  on that case for I apprehend that  it               depends  on  how  wide  is  the  "law"in  that               Article."               After  giving  his reasons  for  doubting  the               correctness of the reasoning given in  Sankari               Prasad’s case(1), the learned Judge  concluded               thus :               "I  would require stronger reasons than  those               given  in Sankari Prasad’s case(1) to make  me               accept  the view that Fundamental Rights  were               not really fundamental but were intended to be               within the powers of amendment in common  with               the  other  parts  of  the  Constitution   and               without the concurrence of the States."               (1)   [1952] S.C.R. 89.               787               The. learned Judge continued               "The Constitution gives so many assurances  in               Part  III that it would be difficult to  think               that  they  were the playthings of  a  special               majority." Mudholkar, J. was positive that the result of a  legislative action  of a legislature could not be other than "law"  and, therefore,  it  seemed  to  him  that  the  fact  that   the legislation  dealt with the amendment of a provision of  the Constitution would not make, its results anytheless a ’law". He  further  pointed  out that Art. 368  did  not  say  that whenever Parliament made an amendment to the Constitution it assumed  a  different capacity from that  of  a  constituent body.   He  also brought out other defects in  the  line  of reasoning  adopted  in Sankari Prasad’s case(1).   It  will, therefore,be  seen-that the correctness of the  decision  in Sankari  Prasad’s  case(1)  was not  questioned  in   Sajjan Singh’s  case(2) Though it was not questioned, three of  the learned  Judges agreed with the view expressed therein,  but two  learned Judges were inclined to take a different  view. But,  as that question was not raised, the  minority  agreed with  the  conclusion,  arrived at by the  majority  on  the question whether the Seventeenth Amendment Act was,  covered by  the  proviso.  to Art. 368  of  the  Constitution.   The conflict between the majority and the minority in   Sajjan’s Singh’s case(1) falls to be resolved in this case.  The said conflict and, the great importance of the question raised is the  justification  for-..the  Constitution  of  the  larger Bench., The decision in Sankri Prasad’s case(1) was  assumed to be correct in subsequent decisions of this Court.  See S. Krishnan  v. State of Madras(1), The State-’ of West  Bengal v.   Anwar   All  Sarkar(1)  and  Basheshar  Nath   v.   The Commissioner  of  Income-tax, Delhi and  Rajasthan(5).   But nothing  turns  upon that fact, as the  correctness  of  the derision was not questioned-. in those cases. A correct appreciation of the scope and the place of  funda- mental  rights in our Constitution will give its  the  right perspective for solving the problem presented before us, Its

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scope  cannot be appreciated unless we have a conspectus  of the Constitution, its objects. and its machinery to  achieve those  object.  The objective sought- to be achieved by  the Constitution is declared in sonorous terms. in its  preamble which reads               "We  the  people  of  India  having   solemnly               resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign,               Democratic, Republic and to secure to all  its               citizens   justice.  liberty.  equality.   and               fraternity-. (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89 (3)  [1951] S.C.R. 621 at page 652. (2)  [1965] 1 S.C.R.933. (4) [1952] S.C.R. 284, 366. (5) [1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 528,563. 788 It  contains in a nutshell, its ideals and its  aspirations. The  preamble  is  not  a platitude but  the,  mode  of  its realisation  is  worked out in detail in  the  Constitution. The    Constitution   brings   into   existence    different constitutional  entities, namely, the Union, the States  and the  Union Territories.  It creates three major  instruments of  power,  namely, the Legislature, the Executive  and  the Judiciary.   It demarcates their jurisdiction  minutely  and expects  them  to exercise their respective  powers  without overstepping their limits.  They should function within  the spheres allotted to them.  Some powers overlap and some  are superseded  during emergencies.  The mode of  resolution  of conflicts   and   conditions  for  supersession   are   also prescribed.  In short, the scope of the power and the-manner of its exercise are regulated by law.  No authority  created under  the  Constitution  is supreme;  the  Constitution  is supreme; and all the authorities function under the  supreme law of the land.  The rule of law under the Constitution has a  glorious content.  It embodies the. modem concept of  law evolved over the centuries.  It empowers the Legislatures to make  laws in respect of matters enumerated in the  3  Lists annexed  to Schedule VII.  In Part IV of  the  Constitution, the Directive Principles of State Policy are laid down.   It enjoins  it to bring about a social order in which  justice, social.   economic  and  political-shall  inform   all   the institutions of national life.  It directs it to work for an egalitarian  society  where  there is  no  concentration  of wealth,  where  there  is  plenty,  where  there  is   equal opportunity for all, to education, to work, to  livelihood’. and  where there is social justice.  But, having  regard  to the  past  history of our country, it could  not  implicitly believe the representatives of the people, for  uncontrolled and unrestricted power might lead to an authoritarian State. It,  therefore,  preserves the natural  rights  against  the State  encroachment and constitutes the higher judiciary  of the  State  as  the  sentinel of the  said  rights  and  the balancing  wheel  between  the  rights,  subject  to  social control.   In  short,  the fundamental  rights,  subject  to social  control, have been incorporated in the rule of  law. That  is  brought about by an interesting process.   In  the implementation  of the Directive Principles,  Parliament  or the  Legislature of a State makes laws in respect of  matter or  matters allotted to it.  But the higher Judiciary  tests their  validity on certain objective criteria,  namely,  (i) whether  the  appropriate Legislature  has  the  legislative competency  to  make  the law; (ii)  whether  the  said  law infringes  any of the fundamental rights; (iii) even  if  it Infringement  the  freedoms  under  Art.  19,  whether   the infringement  only  amounts to "reasonable  restriction"  on

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such  rights  in  "public  interest."  By  this  process  of scrutiny, the court maintains the validity of only such laws as keep a just balance between freedoms and social  control. The  duty of reconciling fundamental rights in Art.  19  and the laws of social control is cast upon the courts 789 and the touchstone or the standard is contained in the  said two expressions.  The standard is an elastic one; it  varies with  time, space and condition.  What is  reasonable  under certain   circumstances  may  not  be  so  under   different circumstances.   The  constitutional philosophy  of  law  is reflected  in  Parts-1111 and IV of the  Constitution.   The rule  of law under the Constitution serves the needs of  the people   without   unduly  infringing  their   rights.    It recognizes the social reality and tries to adjust itself  to it  from-time,  to  time avoiding  the  authoritarian  pat@. EKery  institution or political party that  functions  under the  Constitution must accept it; otherwise it has no  place under the Constitution. Now, what are the fundamental rights ? They are embodied  in Part III of the Constitution and they may be classified thus :  (i) right to equality, (ii) right to freedom,  (iii)right against exploitation, (iv) right to freedom of religion, (v) cultural and educational rights, (vi) right to property, and (vii) right to constitutional remedies.  They are the rights of  the people preserved by our Constitution.   "Fundamental rights" are the modern name for what have been traditionally known  as "natural rights".  As one author puts:  "they  are moral rights which every human being everywhere at all times ought   to  have  sim  y  because  of  the  fact   that   in contradistinction  with ot moral." They are  the  primordial ment of human personality. man to chalk out his own life  in is  rational and ry for the developrights which enable a  he likes best.  Our Constitution, in addition to the well-known fundamental   rights,  also  included  the  rights  of   the minorities, untouchables and other backward communities,  in such rights. After   having   declared  the   fundamental   rights,   our Constitution says that all laws in force in the territory of India   immediately   before   the   commencement   of   the Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent with the said rights, are, to the extent of such inconsistency, void.  The Constitution  also  enjoins the State not to  make  any  law which  takes away or abridges the said rights  and  declares such laws, to the extent of such inconsistency, to be  void. As  we  have  stated earlier, the only  limitation  c)n  the freedom  enshrined  in Art. 19 of the Constitution  is  that imposed by a valid law rating as a reasonable restriction in the interests of the public. It  will,  therefore, be seen that  fundamental  rights  are given   transcendental position under our  Constitution  and are  kept beyond the reach of Parliament.  At the same  time Parts 1111 and V constituted an integrated scheme forming  a self-contained code.      The scheme is made so elastic that all   the  Directive  ’  Principles  of  State  Policy   can reasonably be enforced ’without taking -up.  Cl/67-5 790 away or abridging the fundamental rights.  While recognizing the  immutability of fundamental rights, subject  to  social control,   the  Constitutional  itself  provides   for   the suspension  or the modification of fundamental rights  under specific  circumstances,  for  instance,  Art.  33  empowers Parliament  to  modify the rights conferred by Part  III  in their  application to the members of the armed forces,  Art.

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34 enables it to impose restrictions on the rights conferred by the said parts while martial law is in force in an  area, Art. 35 confers the power on it to make laws with respect to any of the matters which under clause (3) of Art. 16, Clause (3) of Art. 32,     Art. 33 and Art. 34                  may be provided for by law.  The non-obstante clause with  which the        last article opens makes  it clear that  all  the other  provisions  of the Constitution are subject  to  this provision.   Article 32 makes the right to move the  Supreme Court, by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by the said Parts a guaranteed right.  Even during   grave  emergencies  Art.  358  only  suspends   the provisions of Art. 19; and Art. 359 enables the President by order  to  declare  the  right to move  any  court  for  the enforcement  of such of the rights conferred by Part III  as may  be mentioned in that order to be suspended; that is  to say,  even  during  emergency, only  Art.  19  is  suspended temporarily and all other rights are untouched except  those specifically suspended by the President. In the Book "Indian Constitution-Corerstone of a Nation"  by Granville Austin, the scope origin and the object of  funda- mental  rights  have been graphically stated.   Therein  the learned author says :               "........  the core of the commitment  to  the               social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in               the  Fundamental Rights and fit the  Directive               Principles  of  State Policy.  These  are  the               conscience of the Constitution."               Adverting  to the necessity for  incorporating               fundamental  rights  in  a  Constitution,  the               learned author says               That a declaration of rights had assumed  such               importance  was  not surprising; India  was  a               land  of communities, of  minorities,  racial,               religious, linguistic, social and caste.   For               India  to become a state these minorities  had               to agree to be governed both at the centre and               in  the  provinces by  fellow  Indian-members,               perhaps,  of  another minority-and  not  by  a               mediatory  third power, the British.  On  both               psychological    and    political,    rounds.,               therefore-,  the  demand  for  written   right               rights  would  provide  tangible   safeguards,               against oppression-proved overwhelming. 791 Motilal Nehru, who presided over the Committee called for by the Madras Congress resolution, in May, 1928 observed in his report :               "It  is obvious that our first care should  be               to have our Fundamental Rights guaranteed in a               manner which will not permit their  withdrawal               under  any circumstances ....  Another  reason               why great importance attached to a Declaration               of  Rights-  is the unfortunate  existence  of               communal differences in the country.   Certain               safeguards   are  necessary  to   create   and               establish a sense of security among those  who               look   upon  each  other  with  distrust   and               suspicion.   We could dot, better  secure  the               full  enjoyment  of  religious  and   communal               rights  to all communities than  by  including               them   among  the  basic  principles  of   the               Constitution."               Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, on April 30, 1947  in               proposing  for  the adoption  of  the  Interim

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             Report on Fundamental Rights, said thus :               "A  fundamental right should be  looked  upon,               not  from the point of view of any  particular               difficulty  of  the moment, but  as  something               that  you  want  to  make  permanent  in   the               Constitution.   The  other  matter  should  be               looked upon-however important it might  be-not               from  this permanent and fundamental point  of               view,  but  from the more temporary  point  of               view." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who was Prime Minister at that time and. who must have had an effective voice in the framing  of the Constitution, made this distinction between  fundamental rights and other provisions of the Constitution, namely, the former  were  permanent and the latter were  amendable.   On September 18, 1949 Dr. Ambedkar in speaking on the amendment proposed by Mr. Kamath to Art. 304 of the Draft Constitution corresponding   to  the  present  Art.  368,  namely,   "Any provision  of this Constitution may be amended,  whether  by way of variation, addition or repeal, in the manner provided in this article", said thus               "Now,  what  is  it  we do  ?  We  divide  the               articles  of  the  Constitution  under   three               categories.   The  first category is  the  one               which   consists  of-articles  which  can   be               amended by Parliament by a bare majority.  The               second  set  of articles  are  articles  which               require  two-thirds majority.  If  the  future               Parliament  wishes  to  amend  any  particular               article which is not mentioned in Part III  or               article 304, all that is necessary for them is               to  have two-thirds majority.  Then  they  can               amend it." 792 Therefore,  in  Dr. Ambedkar’s view the  fundamental  rights were  so  important that they could not be  amended  in  the manner provided by Art. 304 of the Draft Constitution, which corresponds to the present Art. 368. We have referred to the speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal  Nehru and Dr. Ambedkar not with a view to interpret the provisions of  Art. 368, which we propose to do on its own  terms,  but only  to  notice the transcendental character given  to  the fundamental rights by two of the important architects of the Constitution. This  Court also noticed the paramountcy of the  fundamental rights in many decisions.  In A. K. Gopalan v. State of Mad- ras(1) they are described as "paramount’, in State of Madras v. Smt.  Champakam Dorairajan(2) as "sacrosanct", in  Pandit M.  S.  M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna  Sinha(s)  as  "rights reserved  by  the people’, in Smt.  Vijam Bai  v.  State  of Uttar  Pradesh(1)  as "inalienable  and  inviolable",and  in other  cases as "transcendental".  The  minorities  regarded them  as  the bedrock of their political existence  and  the majority  considered  them as a guarantee for their  way  of life.  This, however, does not mean that the problem is  one of  mere  dialectics.   The Constitution has  given  by  its scheme  a place of permanence to the  fundamental  freedoms. In  giving to themselves the Constitution, the  people  have reserved the fundamental freedoms to themselves.  Article 13 merely  incorporates  that  reservation.   That  Article  is however  not  the source of the  protection  of  fundamental rights   but  the  expression  of  the   reservation.    The importance  attached  to  the  fundamental  freedoms  is  so transcendental  that a bill enacted by a unanimous  vote  of all  the members of both the Houses is ineffective to  dero-

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gate  from  its  guaranteed exercise.  It is  not  what  the Parliament  regards  at a given moment as conducive  to  the public benefit, but what Part III declares protected,  which determines the ambit of the freedom.  The incapacity of  the Parliament  therefore in exercise of its amending  power  to modify, restrict or impair fundamental freedoms in Part  III arises from the scheme of the Constitution and the nature of the freedoms. Briefly stated, the, Constitution declares certain rights as fundamental  laws  infringing  the  said  rights  of  social control infringing the said power on Parliament and the them in specified circumstances; if the decisions in San Prasad’s case(1)  and  Sajjan Singh’s case(1) laid down  the  correct law,  it enables the same Parliament to abrogate  them  with one  stroke,  provided  the  party in  power  singly  or  in combination with other parties commands the neces- (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88 198. (3)  [1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 806. (5)  [1952] S.C.P. 89,105. (2)  [1951] S.C.R, 525. (4)  [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778. (6)  [1965] S. C. R. 933. 793 sary  majority.  While articles of less  significance  would require  consent of the majority of the States,  fundamental rights can. be dropped without such consent.  While a single fundamental  right cannot be abridged or taken away  by  the entire Parliament unanimously voting to that effect, a  two- thirds’  majority  can  do away  with  all  the  fundamental rights.  The entire super structure built with precision and high  ideals  may  crumble  at  one  false  step.   Such   a conclusion would attribute unreasonableness to the makers of the Constitution, for, in that event they would be  speaking in  two voices.  Such an intention cannot be  attributed  to the makers of the Constitution unless the provisions of  the Constitution compel us to do so. With  this  background  let  us  proceed  to  consider   the provisions  of  Art.  368,  vis-a-vis  Art.  13(2)  of   the Constitution. The first question is whether amendment of the  Constitution under  Art. 368 is "law" within the meaning of  Art.  13(2). The marginal note to Art. 368 describes that article as  one prescribing  the  procedure for amendment.  The  article  in terms only prescribes various procedural steps in the matter of amendment: it shall be initiated by the introduction of a bill  in either House of Parliament; it shall be  passed  by the prescribed majority in both the Houses; it shall then be presented  to  the President for his assent; and  upon  such assent  the  Constitution shall stand amended.  The  article assumes the power to amend found else and says that it shall be  exercised in the manner laid down therein. The  argument that  the completion of the procedural AM culminates in  the exercise  of the power to amend may be subtle but  does  not carry  conviction.   If  that  was  the  intention  of   the provisions, nothing prevented the makers of the Constitution from  stating  that the Constitution may be amended  in  the manner suggested.  Indeed, whenever the Constitution  sought to  confer  a  special power to amend on  any  authority  it expressly said so : (See Arts. 4 and 392).  The  alternative contention that the said power shall be implied either  from Art.  368  or from the nature of the articles sought  to  be amended  cannot be accepted, for the simple reason that  the doctrine of necessary implication cannot be invoked if there is  an express sion or unless but for such  implication  the article will no necessity to imply any plenary power to make

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any Constitution subject to the Uninfluenced  by  any foreign doctrines let us look  at  the provisions of our Constitution.  Under Art. 245, "subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of  India........ Article  246  demarcates  the matters in  respect  of  which Parliament and State 794 Legislatures  may  make  laws.  In the  field  reserved  for Parliament there is Entry 97 which empowers it to make  laws in respect of " any other matter not enumerated in Lists  II and  III including any tax not mentioned in either of  those lists."  Article  248 expressly states that  Parliament  has exclusive  power to make any law with respect to any  matter not  enumerated in the Concurrent List ,or State  List.   It is, therefore, clear that the residuary power of legislation is vested in Parliament.  Subject to the argument based upon the  alleged nature of the amending power as  understood  by jurists  in  other countries, which we shal  consider  at  a later stage, it cannot be contended, and indeed, it was  not contended,  that  the Constituent Assembly, if  it  were  so minded,  could  not have conferred  an  express  legislative power  on Parliament to amend the Constitution  by  ordinary legislative process.  Articles 4 and 169, and para 7 of  the 5th Schedule and para 21 of the 6th Schedule have  expressly conferred  such  power.  There is,  therefore,  no  inherent Inconsistency  between legislative process and the  amending one.  Whether  in  the  field of  a  constitutional  law  or statutory  law amendment can be brought about only  by  law. The  residuary power of Parliament, unles there is  anything contrary in the ,Constitution, certainly takes in the  power to  amend  the Constitution. It is said  that  two  Articles ’indicate the contrary intention.  As Art. 245, the argument proceeds, is subject to the provisions of the  Constitution, every law of amendment will necessarily be inconsistent with the articles sought to be amended.  ’Ibis is an argument  in a circle.  Can it be said reasonably that a law amending  an article  is  inconsistent with the article amended ?  If  an article of the Constitution expressly says that it cannot be amended,  a law cannot be made amending it, as the power  of Parliament to make a law is subject to the said Article.  It may-well be that in a given case such a limitation may  also necessarily  be implied.  The limitation in Art. 245  is  in respect of the power to make a law and not of the content of the  law  made Within the scope of its  power.   The  second criticism  is based upon Art. 39 of the Constitution.   That provision   confers  power  on  the  President   to   remove difficulties;   in  the  circumstances  mentioned  in   that provision,  he  can by order direct  that  the  Constitution shall  during such period as may be specified in that  order have  effect subject to such adaptations, whether by way  of modification,  addition ,or omission, as he may deem  to  be necessary   or   expedient.   The  argument  is   that   the President’s power, though confined to a  temporqry period,is co-extensive  with  legislative power and if  the  power  to amend  is a legislative power it would have to be held  that the  President can amend the Constitution in terms  of  Art. 368.   Apart  from the limited scope of Art. 392,  which  is intended  only for the purpose of removing difficulties  and for bringing about a smooth transition, an order made by the Presi- 795 dent cannot attract Art. 368, as the amendment  contemplated by that provision can be initiated only by the  introduction of a bill in the Parliament.  There is no force in either of

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the two criticisms.  Further,  there is, internal evidence in  the  Constitution itself which indicates that amendment to the Constitution is a "law" within the meaning of Art. 245.  Now, what is  "law" under  the  Constitution  ? It is not  denied  that  in  its comprehensive  sense it includes constitutional law and  the law  amending the Constitution is constitutional  law.   But Art.  13(2)  for  the  purpose  of  that  Article  gives  an inclusive  definition.  It does not  exclude  Constitutional law.-  It prima facie,takes in constitutional law.   Article 368  itself  gives the necessary clue to the  problem.   The amendment  can be initiated by. the introduction of a  bill; it shall be passed by the two Houses; it shall’ receive  the assent  of the President.  These are  well-known  procedural steps  in the process of law-making : Indeed this  Court  in Sankari  Prasads  case(1)  brought out this  idea  in  clear terms.. It said "in the first place, it is provided that the amendment  must be initiated by the introduction of a  "bill in  either  House  of  Parliament’  a  familiar  feature  of Parliament  procedure (of Article 107(1) which says "A  bill may  originate in either House of Parliament").  ’Then,  the bill  must be "Passed in each House,"-just  what  Parliament does  when  it  is  called  upon  to  exercise  its   normal legisrative function Article 107(2)1; and finally, the  bull thus  passed  must be "president to the President"  for  his "assent", again a parliamentary process through which  every bill  must  pass  before  it  can  reach  the  statute-book, (Article  1 1 1 ). We thus- find that each of the  component units of Parliament is to play its allotted part in bringing about  an  amendment to the Constitution.  We  have  already seen  that Parliament effects amendments of the first  class mentioned  above  by  going  through  the  same   three-fold procedure  but  with  a simple majority.  The  fact  that  a different  majority  in  the  same  body  is  required   for effecting  the second and third- categories of 1  amendments make the amending agency a different body." In the same decision it is pointed out that Art. 368 is  not a  complete  code in respect of the procedure.   This  Court said  "There are gaps in the procedure as to how  and  after what  notice  a bill is to be introduced, how it  is  to  be passed by each House and how the President’s assent is to be obtained.   Having  provided  for  the  Constitution  of   a Parliament  and  prescribed  a  certain  procedure  for  the conduct   of  its  ordinary  legislative  business   to   be supplemented by rules made by each House (Article 118),  the makers  of the Constitution must be taken to  have  intended Parliament  to follow that procedure, so far as they may  be applicable  consistently with the express provision of  Art. 368, when they have entrusted to it the power of =ending the Con- (1)  ( 1 952) S.C. R. 89. 796 stitution."  The  House of the People made  rules  providing procedure  for amendments, the same as for other Bills  with the addition of certain special provisions viz., Rules  155, 156, 157 and 158.  If amendment is intended to be  something other  than law, the constitutional insistence on  the  said legislative  process  is unnecessary.  In  short,  amendment cannot  be made otherwise than by following the  legislative process.  The fact that there are other conditions, such as, a  larger majority and in the case of articles mentioned  in the proviso a ratification by Legislatures is provided, does not make the amendment anytheless a law.  The imposition  of further conditions is only a safeguard against hasty  action or  a  protection  to the States, but does  not  change  the

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Legislative character of the amendment. This  conclusion is reinforced by the other articles of  the Constitution.   Article 3 enables Parliament by law to  form now  States  and  alter areas, boundaries or  the  names  of existing  States.  imposed two, further conditions,  of  the President,  and (ii) in therein, the views expressed by  the Legislatures.  Notwithstanding the said conditions it cannot be  suggested  that  the expression  "law"  under  the  said Article  is not one made by the Legislative process.   Under Art.  4, such a law can contain provisions for amendment  of Schedules  I and IV indicating thereby that  amendments  are only  made  by Legislative process.  What is more,  cl.  (2) thereof  introduces a fiction to the affect that such a  law shall not be deemed to be an amendment to the  Constitution. This  shows that the amendment is law and that but  for  the fiction it would be an amendment within the meaning of  Art. 368.   Article  169  which empowers  Parliament  by  law  to abolish or create Legislative Councils in States, para 7  of the  5th  Schedule  and para 21 of the  6th  Schedule  which enable  Parliament by law to amend the said Schedules,  also bring  out the two ideas that the amendment is law  made  by legislative process and that but for the fiction  introduced it would attract Article 368.      That   apart   amendments under the said provisions can be made   by     the     Union Parliament  by simple majority.  That an amendment  is  made only by legislative process with or without conditions  will be  clear  if  two  decisions  of  the  Privy  Council   are considered  in  juxta-position.  They are  McCawley  v.  The King(1)  and  The  Bribery  Commissioner  v.  Pedrick   Rana singhe(2). The  facts  in McCawley v. The King(1) were these:  In  1859 Queensland  had been granted a Constitution in the terms  of an Order in Council made on June 6 of that year under powers derived  by Her Majesty from the Imperial Statute, 18  &  19 Vict. (1) [1920] A.C. 691. (2) [1964] W.L.R. 1301. 797 c.   54.  The Order in Council had set up a legislature  for the  territory,  consisting  of  the  Queen,  a  Legislative Council  and  a. Legislative Assembly,  and  the  law-making power  was vested in Her Majesty acting with the advice  and consent of the Council and Assembly.  Any laws could be made for the "peace, welfare and good government of the  Colony". The  said legislature of Queensland in the year 1867  passed the Constitution Act of that year.  Under that Act power was given  to  the  said legislature to make  laws  for  "peace, welfare  and  good  Government of the Colony  in  all  cases whatsoever".  But, under s. 9 thereof a two-thirds  majority of  the  Council  and of the Assembly  %,as  required  as  a condition precedent to the validity of legislation  altering the  constitution,of the Council.  The  Legislature,  there- fore, had, except in the case covered by s. 9 of the Act, an unrestricted  power to make laws.  The Legislature passed  a law  which conflicted with one of the existing terms of  the Constitution Act.  Lord Birkenhead, L.C., upheld-the law, as the  Constitution Act conferred an absolute power  upon  the legislature  to pass any law by majority even though it,  in substance, amended the terms of the Constitution Act. In  The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick  Ranasinghe(1),  the facts are these : By section 29 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, Parliament shall have power to  make laws  for  the, "peace. order and good  government"  of  the Island  and  in  the exercise of its power  under  the  said section it may amend or repeal any of the provisions of  the

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Order in its application to the Island.  The proviso to that section says that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of any of  the provisions of the Order shall be presented  for  the Royal  assent  unless it has endorsed on  it  a  certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes  cast in  favour thereof in the House of Representatives  amounted to  not less than two-thirds of the whole number of  members of the House.  Under s. 55 of the said Order the appointment of Judicial Officers was vested in the Judicial Service Com- mission.   But  the Parliament under s. 41  of  the  Bribery Amendment  Act,  1958, provided for the appointment  of  the personnel  of the Bribery Tribunals by the  Governor-General on  the  advice  of  the  Minister  of  Justice.   The  said Amendment  Act  was in conflict with the said s. 55  of  the Order and it was passed without complying with the terms  of the  proviso to s. 29 of the Order.  The Privy Council  held that  the  Amendment  Act  was  void.   Lord  Pearce,  after considering   McCawley’s   case(2)   made   the    following observations, at p. 1310 :               "........  a  legislature  has  no  power   to               ignore, the conditions of law-making that  are               imposed by the               (1) [1964] 2 W.L.R. 1301.               (2) [1920] A.C. 69 1.               798               instrument which itself regulates its power to               make    law.     This    restriction    exists               independently  of the , question  whether  the               legislature   is   sovereign,   as   is    the               legislature   of   Ceylon,  or   whether   the               Constitution  is "uncontrolled", as the  Board               held  the  Constitution of Queensland  to  be.               Such a Constitution can, indeed, be altered or               amended by the legislature, if the  regulating               instrument  so  provides and if the  terms  of               those provisions are complied with........ It will be seen from the said judgments that an amendment of the  Constitution is made only by legislative  process  with ordinary majority or with special majority, as the case  may be.   There.fore, amendments either under Art. 368 or  under other Articles ,axe made only by Parliament by following the legislative process adopted by it ’ n making other law,.  In the  premises,  an  amendment "Of the  Constitution  can  be nothing but "law". A comparative study of other Constitutions indicates that no particular pattern is followed.  AR the Constitutions confer an  ,express  power  to  amend, most  of  them  provide  for legislative  procedure  with special  majority,  referendum, convention,  etc., and a few with simple majority.   Indeed, Parliament  of England, which is a supreme body,  can  amend the  constitution like any other :statute.  As none  of  the Constitutions  contains provisions similar to Art.  368  and Art. 13(2), neither the said Constitutions nor the decisions given  by  courts  thereon would be  of  any  assistance  in construing the scope of Art. 368 of our Constitution. A brief survey of the nature of the amending process adopted by various constitutions will bring out the futility of  any attempt  to  draw  inspiration from  the  said  opinions  or decisions  on  the said constitutions.  The  nature  of  the amending power in different constitutions generally  depends on  the  nature of the polity created by  the  constitution, namely, whether it is federal or unitary constitution or  on the   fact  whether  it  is  a  written  or   an   unwritten constitution  or on the circumstances whether it is a  rigid or a flexible constitution.  Particularly the difference can

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be traced to the "spirit and genius of the nation in which a particular  constitution  has  its  birth".   The  following articles of the ’Constitution of the different countries are brought  to our notice by one or other of the  counsel  that appeared  before  us.   Art. 5 of the  Constitution  of  the United  States  of  America,  Arts.  125  and  128  of   the Commonwealth  of Australia Constitution Act, Art. 92 (1)  of the British North American Act, s. 152 of the South  African Act,  Art. 217 of the Constitution of, the United States  of Brazil,  Section  46 of the Constitution of  Ireland,  1937, Arts.  207, 208 and 209 of the Constitution of the Union  of Burma,  Art.  88  ,of the Constitution  of  the  Kingdom  of Denmark Act, Art. 90 of 799 the  Constitution of the French Republic, 1954, Art. 135  of the United States of Mexico, Art. 96 of the Constitution  of Japan,  Art. 112 of the Constitution of Norway, Art.  85  of the  Constitution of the Kingdom of Sweden, Arts. 118,  119, 120,  121,  122  and 123 of the Constitution  of  the  Swiss Federation,  Arts. 140, 141 and 142 of the  Constitution  of Venezuela, and Art. 146 of the Constitution of the Union  of Soviet  Socialist  Republics, 1936 and s.  29(4)  of  Ceylon Constitution Order in Council, 1946. Broadly speaking amendments can be made by four methods (i)  by ordinary  legislative process with or without  restrictions, (ii) by the people through, referendum, (iii) by majority of all  the   units of a federal State; and (iv) by  a  special convention.  The first method can be in four different ways, namely,  (i)  by  the  ordinary  course  of  legislation  by absolute majority or by special majority, (See Section 92 (1 )-  of the British North America Act, sub-section 152  South African  Apt, where under except sections 35, 137  and  152, other  provisions could be amended by  ordinary  legislative process  by absolute majority.  Many  constitutions  provide for special majorities.); (ii) by a fixed quorum of  members for  the  consideration  of the  proposed  amendment  and  a special   majority  for  its  passage;  (see   the   defunct Constitution  of Rumania), (iii) by dissolution and  general election  on a particular issue; (see the  Constitutions  of Belgium,  Holland,  Denmark  and  Norway),  and  (iv)  by  a majority of two Houses of Parliament in joint session as  in the  Constitution  of the South Africa.  The  second  method demands  a  popular vote, referendum , or plebiscite  as  in Switzerland, Australia, Ireland, Italy, France and  Denmark. The third method is by an agreement in some form or other of either of the majority or of all the federating units as  in Switzerland,  Australia  and the United States  of  America. The fourth method is generally by creation of a special body ad hoc for the purpose of constitution revision as in  Latin America.    Lastly,   some  constitutions   impose   express limitation on the power to amend. (See Art. 5 of the  United States  Constitution  and  the Constitution  of  the  Fourth French Republic).  A more elaborate discussion of this topic may  be  found  in the American  political  Constitution  by Strong.  It will, therefore, be seen that the power to amend and  the procedure to amend radically-differ from  State  to State;  it is left to the constitution-makers  to  prescribe the  scope of the power and the method of  amendment  having regard  to the requirements of the particular State.   There is  no  article in any of the constitutions referred  to  us similar to article 13(2) of our Constitution.  India adopted a  different system altogether: it empowered the  Parliament to amend the Constitution by the legislative process subject to  fundamental rights.  The Indian 1 Constitution has  made the amending process comparatively flexible, but it is  made

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subject to fundamental rights. 800 Now let us consider the argument that the power to amend  is a  sovereign  power, that the said power is supreme  to  the legislative  power,  that  it does not  permit  any  implied limitations  and  that amendments made in exercise  of  that power involve political questions and that, therefore,  they are outside judicial review, This wide proposition is sought to  be  supported on the basis of opinions  of  jurists  and judicial decisions.  Long extracts have been read to us from the  book "The Amending of the Federal Constitution  (1942)" by  Lester Bernhardt Orfield, and particular  reference  was made to the following passages :               "At the point it may be well to note that when               the  Congress  is  engaged  in  the   amending               process   it  is  not  legislating.    It   is               exercising  a peculiar power bestowed upon  it               by  Article Five.  This Article for  the  most               part   ,controls   the  process;   and   other               provisions of the Constitution, such as  those               relating to the passage of legislation, having               but little bearing." Adverting to the Bill of Rights, the learned author  remarks that  they may be repealed just as any other  amendment  and that  they are no more sacred from a legal  standpoint  than any  other  part  of the  Constitution.   Dealing  with  the doctrine of implied limitations, he says that it is  clearly untenable.   Posing the question ’Is other a law  about  the amending power of the Constitution ?", he answers, "there is none".   He would even go to the extent of saying  that  the sovereignty,  if it can be said to exist at all, is  located in  the  amending body.  The author is  certainly  a  strong advocate  of  the  supremacy of the amending  power  and  an opponent  of  the  doctrine  of  implied  limitations.   His opinion   is  based  upon  the  terms  of  Art.  5  of   the Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  his interpretation  of  the decisions of the  Supreme  Court  of America.  Even such an extreme exponent of the doctrine does not  say  that a particular  constitution  cannot  expressly impore  restrictions on the power to amend or that  a  court cannot   reconcile   the  articles  couched   in   unlimited phraseology.   Indeed  Art. 5 of the  American  Constitution imposes  express  limitations on the amending  power.   Some passages from the book "Political Science and Government" by James Wilford Garner are cited.  Garner points out :               "An unamendable constitution, said Mulford, is               the  &&worst  tyranny of time, or  rather  the               very tyranny of time"               But he also notices               "The provision for amendment should be neither               so rigid as to make needed changes practically               impossible  nor  so flexible as  to  encourage               frequent and                             801 unnecessary changes  and thereby lower the authority of  the Constitution." Munro in his book "The Government of the United States", 5th Edition, uses strong words when he says               ".......  it is impossible to conceive  of  an               unamendable  constitution  as anything  but  a               contradiction in terms." The  learned  author  says that such  a  constitution  would constitute  "government  by the  graveyards."  Hugh  Evander Wills in his book "Constitutional Law of the United  States" avers that the doctrine of amendability of the  Constitution

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is grounded in the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and  that  it  has no such implied limitations  as  that  an amendment  shall not contain a new grant of power or  change the dual form of government or change the protection of  the Bill   of   Rights,  or  make  any  other  change   in   the Constitution.   Herman  Finer in his book  "The  Theory  and Practice of Modem Government" defines "constitution" as  its process  of  amendment,  for, in his view, to  amend  is  to deconstitute and reconstitute.  The learned author concludes that the amending clause is so fundamental to a constitution that he is tempted to call it the constitution itself.   But the  learned author recognizes that difficulty in  amendment certainly  products circumstances and makes  impossible  the surreptitious   abrogation  of  rights  guaranteed  in   the constitution.   William  S. Livingston  in  "Federalism  and Constitutional Change" says :               "The  formal  procedure  of  amendment  is  of               greater    importance   than   the    informal               processes,  because  it constitutes  a  higher               authority to which appeal lies on any question               that may arise." But  there  are  equally  eminent  authors  who  express   a different  view.  In "American Jurisprudence", 2nd  Edition, Vol.  16,  it is stated that a statute  and  a  constitution though of unequal dignity are both laws.  Another calls  the constitution  of  a State as one of the laws of  the  State. Cooley  in  his  book on "Constitutional  Law"  opines  that changes  in  the  fundamental  laws of  the  State  must  be indicated  by  the people themselves.   He  further  implies limitations  to  the amending power from the belief  in  the constitution  itself,  such  as,  the  republican  form   of Government cannot be abolished as it would be  revolutionary in ifs characters.  In the same book it is further said that the  power to amend the constitution by  legislative  action does  not  confer  the power to break it any  more  than  it confers the power to legislate on any other subject contrary to  the  prohibitions.   C. F. Strong  in  his  book  "Modem Poliical  Constitutions", 1963 edition, does not accept  the theory  of absolute sovereignty of the amending power  which does not brook any limitations, for he says. 802               "In  short,  it attempts to  arrange  for  the               recreation of a constituent assembly  whenever               such  matters are in future to be  considered,               even though that assembly be nothing more than               the ordinary legislature acting under  certain               restrictions.  At the same time, there may  be               some  elements of the constitution  which  the               constituent    assembly   wants   to    remain               unalterable  by  the action of  any  authority               whatsoever.    These   elements  are   to   be               distinguished  from  the rest,  and  generally               come  under  the heading of  fundamental  law.               Thus, for example, the American  Constitution,               the  oldest  of  the  existing  Constitutions,               asserts that by no process of amendment  shall               any   State,  without  its  own  consent,   be               deprived of its equal suffrage in the  Senate,               , while among the Constitutions more  recently               promulgated, those of the Republics of; France               and  Italy, each containing a  clause  stating               that the republican form of government  cannot               be the subject of an amending proposals" it is not necessary to multiply citations from text-books. A catena of American decisions have been cited before us  in

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support  of  the  contention that the unending  power  is  a supreme power or that it involves political issues which are not  justiciable.  It would be futile to consider  them.  at length, for after going through them carefully we find  that there  are no considered judgments of the  American  Courts, which would have a persuasive effect in that regard.  In the Constitution  of the United States of America,  prepared  by Edwards S. Corwin, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress,  (1953  edn.),  the following  summary  under  the heading "Judicial Review under Article V" is given :               "Prior  to 1939, the Supreme Court  had  taken               cognizance  of a number of diverse  objections               to the validity of specific amendments.  Apart               from   holding   that   official   notice   of               ratification  by the several States  was  con-               clusive upon the Courts, it had treated  these               questions  as  justiciable,  although  it  had               uniformly  rejected  them on the  merits.   In               that  year,  however, the  whole  subject  was               thrown  into  confusion  by  the  inconclusive               decision in Coleman v. Miller.  This case came               up  on  a writ of certiorari  to  the  Supreme               Court of Kansas to review the denial of a writ               of  mandamus  to compel the Secretary  of  the               Kansas  Senate  to erase an endorsement  on  a               resolution ratifying the          child               labour  amendment to the Constitution  to  re-               effect that it had been adopted by the  Kansas               Senate.  The attempted ratification was               803               assailed  on  three  grounds :  (1)  that  the               amendment had been previously rejected by  the               State  Legislature; (2) that it was no  longer               open  to ratification because an  unreasonable               period  of  time thirteen years,  had  elapsed               since  its submission to the States,  and  (3)               that  the lieutenant governor had no right  to               cast the deciding vote in the Senate in favour               of  ratification.  Four opinions were  written               in   the  Supreme  Court,  no  one  of   which               commanded  the support of more than four  mem-               bers  of the Court.  The majority  ruled  that               the  plain-tiffs, members of the Kansas  State               Senate,  had  a  sufficient  interest  in  the               controversy   to  give  the   federal   courts               jurisdiction  to  review  the  case.   Without               agreement   as  to  the  grounds   for   their               decision,  a different majority  affirmed  the               judgment  of  the  Kansas  court  denying  the               relief sought.  Four members who concur-red in               the  result had voted to dismiss the  writ  on               the  ground  that  the  amending  process  "is               political"  in its. entirety, from  submission               until   an  amendment  becomes  part  of   the               Constitution,  and is not subject to  judicial               guidance,  control  or  interference  at   any               point."   whether  the  contention  that   the               lieutenant governor should have been permitted               to  cast  the  deciding  vote  in  favour   of               ratification    presented    a     justiciable               controversy  was  left  undecided,  the  court               being  equally  divided on the point.   In  an               opinion  reported  as  "the  opinion  of   the               Court"’  but  in which it  appears  that  only               three Justices concurred, Chief Justice Hughes

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             declared  that  the  writ  of’  mandamus   was               properly denied because the question as to the               effect  of  the  previous  rejection  of   the               amendment  and the lapse of time since it  was               submitted   to  the  States   were   political               questions  which should be left  to  Congress.               On  the same day, the Court dismissed a.  writ               of  certiorari  to review a decision  ’of  the               Kentucky Court of Appeals declaring the action               of the Kentucky General Assembly purporting to               ratifying  the child labour amendment  illegal               and  void.   Inasmuch  as  the  governor   had               forwarded the certified copy of the resolution               to the Secretary of State before being  served               with a copy of the restraining order issued by               the State Court, the Supreme Court found  that               there ’was no longer a controversy susceptible               of judicial determination." This passage, in our view, correctly summarises the American law  on the subject.  It will be clear therefrom that  prior to  1939  the  Supreme  Court of  America  had  treated  the objections  to  the  validity  of  specific  amendments   as justiciable  and  that only in 1939 it rejected them  in  an inconclusive judgment without 804 discussion.   In  this state of affairs we  cannot  usefully draw  much  from the judicial wisdom of the  Judges  of  the Supreme Court of America. One  need not cavil at the description of an amending  power as  sovereign  power, for it is sovereign  only  within  the scope  of the power conferred by a particular  constitution. All  the authors also agree, that a particular  constitution can expressly limit the power of amendment, both substantive and  procedural.   The only conflict lies in the  fact  that some  authors  do not pen-nit implied limitations  when  the power  of  amendment  is expressed in  general  words.   But others  countenance  such  limitations  by  construction  or otherwise.   But none of the authors goes to the  extent  of saying, which is the problem before us, that when there  are conflicting articles couched in widest terms, the court  has no jurisdiction to construe and harmonize them.  If some  of the  authors meant to say that-in our view, they did  not-we cannot agree with them, for, in that event this Court  would not be discharging its duty. Nor  can we appreciate the arguments repeated before  us  by learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  that  the  amending process involves political questions which are, outside  the scope  of judicial review.  When a matter comes  before  the Court,  its jurisdiction does not depend upon the nature  of the  question raised but on die, question whether  the  said matter  is expressly or by necesssary  implication  excluded from  its  jurisdiction.  Secondly, it is  not  possible  to define  what is a political question and what is  not.   The character  of a question depends upon the circumstances  and the  nature of a political society.  To put if  differently, the  court does not decide any political question at all  in the ordinary sense of the. term, but only ascertains whether Parliament is acting within the scope of the amending power. It  may be that Parliament seeks to amend  the  Constitution for  political reasons, but the Court in denying that  power will  not be deciding on political questions, but will  only be holding that Parliament has no power to amend  particular articles of the Constitution for any purpose whatsoever,  be it  political or otherwise.  We, therefore, hold that  there is nothing in the nature of the amending power which enables

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Parliament  to  override all the express  or  implied  limi- tations  imposed  on  that power.  As we  have  pointed  out earlier,   our  Constitution adopted a novel method  in  the sense  that  Parliament makes the amendment  by  legislative process   subject  to  certain  restrictions  and,that   the amendment so made being law" is.subject to Art. 13(2). The  next argument is based upon the expression  "amendment" in Art. 368 of the Constitution and if is contended that the said 805 expression  has-.a Positive and a negative content and  that in exercise of the power amendment parliament cannot destroy the  structure of the Constitution, but it can  only  modify the provisions thereof within the framework of the  original instrument for its better effectuation.  If the fundamentals would be amenable to the ordinary process of amendment  with a special majority, the argument proceeds, the  institutions of  the  President  can  be  abolished,  the   parliamentary executive  can  be removed, the fundamental  rights  can  be abrogated, the concept of federalism’ can be obliterated and in short the sovereign democratic republic can be  converted into   a  totalitarian  system  of  government.   There   is considerable  force in this argument.  Learned  and  lengthy arguments  are advanced to sustain it or to reject it.   But we  are relieved of the necessity to express our opinion  on this  all important question as, so far as  the  fundamental rights  are concerned, the question  raised can be  answered on   a   narrower  basis.  This  question  may   arise   for consideration  only  if  Parliament  seeks  to  destroy  the structure  of  the Constitution embodied in  the  provisions other  than  in Part III of the Constitution.   We  do  not, therefore, propose to express our opinion in that regard. In  the view we have taken on the scope of Art.  368  vis--a vis  the  fundamental  rights, it  is  also  unnecessary  to express our opinion on the question whether the amendment of the  fundamental  rights is covered by the proviso  to  Art. 368. The result is that the Constitution (Seventeenth  Amendment) Act, 1964, inasmuch as it takes away or abridges the  funda- mental rights is void under Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. The  next question is whether our decision should  be  given retrospective operation.     During the period between  1950 and 1967 i.e 17 years as many as 20 amendments were made in our  Constitution.   But  in  the  context  of  the  present petitions  it  would be enough if we notice  the  amendments affecting  fundamental right to property.  The  Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, amended Arts. 15 and 19, and Arts. 31- A  and  31-B were inserted with retrospective  effect.   The object  of  the  amendment was said to be  to  validate  the acquisition  of  zamindaries or the abolition  of  permanent settlement  without interference from courts.  The  occasion for  the  amendment  was that the High  Court  of  Patna  in Kameshwar  Singh  v, State of Bihar(1) held that  the  Bihar Land  Reforms Act (30 of 1950) passed by the State of  Bihar was unconstitutional, while the High Courts of Allahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of corresponding legislations  in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively. (1) A. I. R. 1951 Patna 91. p.C.T.167-6 806 The amendment was made when the appeals from those decisions were  pending  in the Supreme Court.   In  Sankari  Prasad’s case(1)  the  constitutionality of the  said  amendment  was questioned but the amendment was upheld.  It may be  noticed

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that  the  said amendment was not made on the basis  of  the power  to amend fundamental rights recognized by this  Court but only in view of the conflicting decisions of High Courts and without waiting for the final decision from this  Court. article  31-A was again amended by the Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.  Under that amendment cl. (2) of  Art. 31 was amended and cl. (2-A) was inserted therein.  While in the  original  article  31-A  the  general  expression  "any provisions  of his Part" was found, in the  amended  article the scope was restricted only.to the violation of Arts.  14, 19 and 31 and 4 other clauses were included, namely, clauses providing for (a) taking over the management of any property by  the State for a limited-period; (b) amalgamation of  two or more corporations; (c) extinguishment or modification  of rights  of  person;  interested  in  corporations;  and  (d) extinguishment or modification of rights accruing under  any agreement,  lease or licence relating to minerals,  and  the definition of "estate" was enlarged in order to include  the interests  of  raiyats  and  under-raiyats.   The  expressed object  of the amendment was to carry out  important  social welfare  legislations on the desired lines, to  improve  the national   economy  of  the  State  and  to  avoid   serious difficulties  raised by courts in that regard.  Article  31A has  further  been  amended  by  the  Constitution   (Fourth Amendment)  Act, 1955.  By the said amendment in  the  Ninth Schedule  to the Constitution entries 14 to 20  were  added. The main objects of this amending Act was to distinguish the power of compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of private property  and the deprivation of property and to extend  the scope  of Art. 31-A to cover different categories of  social welfare legislations and to enable monopolies in  particular trade  or  business to be created in favour  of  the  State. Amended  Art.  31(2)makes the adequacy of  compensation  not justiciable.   It may be said-that the Constitution  (Fourth Amendment)  Act, 1955 was made by Parliament as  this  Court recognized the power of Parliament to amend Part III of  the Constitution;  but  it can’ also be said with  some  plausi- bility  that,  as Parliament had exercised  the  power  even before  the.  decision  of this Court  in  Sankari  Prasad’s case(1), it would have amended the Constitution even if  the said decision was not given by this Court.  The  Seventeenth Amendment  Act was made on June 20, 1964.  The occasion  for this  amendment was the decision of this Court  in  Karimbil Kunhikoman  v.  State of Kerala(2), which  struck  down  the Kerala  Agrarian  Relations  Act  IV  of  1961  relating  to ryotwari lands.  Under that amendment the definition of  the expression "estate" was enlarged so as to take (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89, 105 (2) [1962] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 829 807 in  any land held under ryotwari settlement and any held  or let  for purposes of agriculture or for  purposes  ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or  sites  of  buildings and other  structures  occupied  by cultivators  of  land, agricultural  labourers  and  village artisans.   In  the Ninth Schedule  the  amendment  included items  21 to 65.  In the objects and reasons it  was  stated that  the definition"’estate" was not wide enough, that  the courts  had  struck  down many land reform  Acts  and  that, therefore,  in order to give them protection  the  amendment was made.  The validity of the Seventeenth Amendment Act was questioned in this Court and was held to be valid in  Sajian Singh’s case(1).  From the history of these amendments,  two things  appear, namely, unconstitutional laws were made  and they were protected by the amendment of the Constitution  or

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the amendments were made in order to protect the future laws which  would be void but for the amendments.  But  the  fact remains  that  this  Court held as early  as  in  1951  that Parliament  had power to amend the fundamental  rights.   It may,   therefore,   said  that  the   Constitution   (Fourth Amendment)  Act,  1955, and  the  Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, were based upon the scope of the power to  end recognized by this Court.  Further  the  Seventeenth Amendment Act was also approved by this Court. Between  1950  and 1967 the Legislatures of  various  States made  laws  bringing  about an agrarian  revolution  in  our country  zamindaries, inams and other  intermediary  estates were  abolished,  vested  rights were  created  in  tenants, consolidation  of  holdings of villages was  made,  ceilings were  fixed  and the surplus lands transferred  to  tenants. All these were done on the, basis of the correctness of  the decisions  in  Sankari Prasads case(2)  and  Sajjan  Singh’s case(1), namely, that Parliament had the power to amend  the fundamental  rights and that Acts in regard to estates  were outside  judicial scrutiny on the ground they infringed  the said rights.  The agrarian structure of our country has been revolutionised on the basis of the said laws.  Should we now give  retrospectivity  to our decision, it  would  introduce chaos and unsettle the conditions in our country.  Should we hold  that because of the said consequences  Parliament  had power  to  take away fundamental rights, a time  might  come when  we  would  gradually and imperceptibly  pass  under  a totalitarian  rate.  Learned counsel for the petitioners  as well as those for the respondents placed us on the horns  of this  dilemma, for they have taken extreme  positions-leamed counsel  for  the petitioners want us to reach  the  logical position by holding that all the said laws are void and  the learned counsel for the respondents persuade us to hold that Parliament has unlimited power and, if it chooses, it can do away with fundamental rights.  We do not think that (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 89, 808 this Court is so helpless.  As the highest Court in the land we  must  evolve  some reasonable  principle  to  meet  this extraordinary situation.  There is an essential  distinction between Constitution and statutes.  Comparatively  speaking, Constitution  is  permanent; it is an  organic  statute;  it grows  by  its  own  inherent  force.   The   constitutional concepts are couched in elastic terms.  Courts are  expected to  and  indeed should interpret, its  terms  without  doing violence to the language, to suit the expanding needs of the society.   In  this process and in a real  sense  they  make laws.   Though  it is not admitted, the said  role  of  this Court is effective and cannot be ignored.  Even in the realm of  ordinary statutes, the subtle working of the process  is apparent  though  the  approach  is  more  conservative  and inhibitive.--In the constitutional field, therefore, to meet the  present extraordinary situation that may be  caused  by our  decision, we must evolve some doctrine which has  roots in  reason and precedents so that the past may be  preserved and the future protected. There are two doctrines familiar to American  Jurisprudence, one  is  described as Blackstonian theory and the  other  as "prospective over-ruling", which may have some relevance  to the  present  enquiry.  Blackstone in his  Commentaries,  69 (15th  edn., 1809) stated the common law rule that the  duty of  the  Court  was  "not to pronounce a  new  rule  but  to maintain and expound .the old one".  It means the Judge does not make law but only discovers or finds the true law.   The

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law  has  always been the same.  If  a  subsequent  decision changes  the earlier one, the latter decision does not  make law  but only discovers the correct principle of  law.   The result of this view is that it is necessarily  retrospective ,operation.   But Jurists, George F. Canfield,  Robert  Hill Freeman, John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo, have expounded  the doctrine of "prospective over-ruling" and suggested it as "a useful  judicial .tool".  In the words of Canfield the  said expression means               "......a court should recognize a duty to  an-               nounce  a  new  and  better  rule  for  future               transactions  whenever the court  has  reached               the   conviction   that  an   old   rule   (as               established by the precedents) is unsound even               though  feeling compelled by stare decisis  to               apply  the  old  and  condemned  rule  to  the               instant  case  and to transactions  which  had               already taken place." Cardozo,  before he became a Judge of the Supreme  Court  of the United States of America, when he was the Chief  Justice of New York State addressing the Bar Association said thus               The  rule (the Blackstonian rule) that we  are               asked  to apply is out of tune with  the  life               about us.  It has been made discordant by  the               forces that generate a                                    809               living law.  We apply it to this case  because               the  repeal might work hardship to  those  who               have trusted to its existence.  We give notice               however that any one trusting to it  hereafter               will do at his peril." The  Supreme Court of the United States of America,  in  the year 1932, after Cardozo became an Associate Justice of that Court  in  Great  Northern Railway v. Sunburst  Oil  &  Ref. Co.,(1) applied the said doctrine to the facts of that case. In  that case the Montana Court had adhered to its  previous construction  of the statute in question but  had  announced that  that  interpretation  would not  be  followed  in  the future.   It was contended before the Supreme Court  of  the United  States of America that a decision of a  court  over- ruling   earlier   decision  and  not  giving   its   ruling retroactive operation violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.  Rejecting that plea, Cardozo said :               "This   is  not  a  case  where  a  Court   in               overruling an earlier decision has come to the               new ruling of retroactive dealing and  thereby               has  made  invalid what was  followed  in  the               doing.   Even  that may often be  done  though               litigants not infrequently have argued to  the               contrary .... This is a case where a Court has               refused  to make its ruling  retroactive,  and               the novel stand is taken that the Constitution               of  the  United  States is  infringed  by  the               refusal.    We   think   that   the    Federal               Constitution has no voice upon the subject.  A               state in defining the elements of adherence to               precedent may make a choice for itself between               the principle of forward operation and that of               relation  backward.   It may be  so  that  the               decision  of the highest courts, though  later               over-ruled,    was   law    nonetheless    for               intermediate  transactions .... On  the  other               hand,  it may hold to the ancient  dogma  that               the law declared by its Courts had a  platonic               or ideal existence before the act of  declara-

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             tion,   in   which  event,   the   discredited               declaration will be viewed as if it had  never               been and to reconsider declaration as law from               the  beginning... . The choice for  any  state               maybe determined by the juristic philosophy of               the Judges of her Courts, their considerations               of law, its origin and nature." The  opinion of Cardozo tried to harmonize the  doctrine  of prospective over-ruling with that of stare decisis. In 1940, Hughes, C.J., in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank(2) stated thus (1)  (1932) 287 U.S. 358, 366. 17 L. Ed. 360. (2) (1940) 308 U.S. 371. 810               "The   law  prior  to  the  determination   of               unconstitutionality  is an operative fact  and               may  have consequences which cannot justly  be               ignored.  The past cannot always be erased  by               a new judicial declaration." In  Griffin  v.  Illionis(1) the Supreme  Court  of  America reaffirmed  the doctrine laid down in Sunburst’s  case  (2). There,  a  statute required defendants to  Submit  bills  of exceptions   as  a  pre-requisite  to  an  appeal   from   a conviction;  the  Act was held unconstitutional in  that  it provided no means whereby indigent defendants could secure a copy  of the record for this purpose.  Frankfurter,  J.,  in that context observed               "......  in arriving at a new  principle,  the               judicial  process is not important to,  define               its  scope and limits.  Adjudication is not  a               mechanical   exercise  nor  does   it   compel               ’either/or’ determination." In Wolf v. Colorado(3) a majority of the Supreme Court  held that  in a prosecution in a State Court for a  state  crime, the 14th Amendment did not forbid the admission of  evidence obtained  by  an unreasonable search and  seizure.   But  in Mapp.  v. Ohio(4) the Supreme Court reversed  that  decision and held that all evidence obtained by searches and  seizure in   violation   of  the  4th  Amendment  of   the   Federal Constitution was, by virtue of the due process clause of the 14th  Amendment guaranteeing the right to privacy free  from unreasonable  State  instrusion,  inadmissible  in  a  State court.   In  Linkletter  v.  Walker(5)  the  question  arose whether  the  exclusion of the rule enunciated  in  Mapp  v. Ohio(4)  did not apply to State Court convictions which  had become final before the date of that judgment.  Mr.  Justice Clarke, speaking for the majority observed               "We  believe  that the existence of  the  Wolf               doctrine prior to Mapp is ’an operative’  fact               and may have consequences which cannot  justly               be ignored.  The past cannot always be  erased               by a new judicial declaration."               "Mapp had as its prima purpose the enforcement               of the Fourth Amendment through the  inclusion               of   the   exclusionary   rule   within    its               rights..............               We  cannot  say  that this  purpose  would  be               advanced  by  making the  rule  retrospective.               The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has               already occurred and win               (1)  [1956]351U.S.12,2..(2) (1932) 287  U.  S.               358,366: 77 L Ed. 360.               (3) [1948-49] 338 U. S. 25: 193L.Ed. 872.  (4)               [1966] 367 U.S. 643: 6 L. Ed.               (5) [1965] 381 U.S. 618.(2nd Edn.) 1081.

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             811               not  be corrected by releasing  the  prisoners               involved....  On  the other hand,  the  States               relied  on  Wolf  and  followed  its  command.               Final  judgments  of conviction  were  entered               prior  to  Mapp.  Again and  again  the  Court               refused  to  reconsider  Wolf  and  gave   its               implicit  approval  to hundreds  of  cases  in               their  application of its rule.  In  rejecting               the Wolf doctrine as to, the exclusionary rule               the purpose was to deter the lawless action of               the  police  add to  effectively  enforce  the               Fourth  Amendment.  That purpose will  not  at               this  late  date be served  by  the  wholesale               release of the guilty victims."               "Finally,   there   are  interests   in   the,               administration of justice and the integrity of               the judicial process to consider.  To make the               rule  of  Mapp  retrospective  would  tax  the               administration  of  justice  to  the   utmost.               Hearings   would  have  to  be  held  on   the               excludability    of   evidence   long    since               destroyed,  misplaced or deteriorated.  If  it               is excluded, the witness available at the time               of the original trial will not be available or               if  located their memory will be  dimmed.   To               thus   legitimate   such   an    extraordinary               procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt               would seriously disrupt the administration  of               justice." This  case  has  reaffirmed  the  doctrine  of   prospective overruling and has taken a pragmatic approach in refusing to give it retroactivity.  In short, in America the doctrine of prospective  overruling is now accepted in all  branches  of law,  including constitutional law.  But the carving of  the limits of retrospectivity of the new rule is left to  courts to  be done, having regard to the requirements  of  justice. Even  in England the Blackstonian theory was  criticized  by Bentham and Austin.  In Austin’s Jurisprudence, 4th Ed.,  at page 65, the learned author says :               "What  hindered Blackstone was  ’the  childish               fiction’  employed  by our  judges,  that  the               judiciary or common law is not ’Made by  them,               but-  is  a  miraculous  something  made,   by               nobody,  existing, I suppose,  from  eternity,               and  merely declared from time to time by  the               Judges." Though English Courts in the past accepted the  Blackstonian theory and though the House of Lords strictly adhered to the doctrine  of  ’precedent’  in the earlier  years,  both  the doctrines  were  practically  given  up  by  the   "Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)" issued by the House of Lords recorded  in  (1966)  1 W.L.R. 1234.   Lord  Gardiner  L.C., speaking   for  the  House  of  Lords  made  the   following observations 812               "Their  Lordships nevertheless recognise  that               too  rigid adherence to precedent may lead  to               injustice in a particular case and also unduly               restrict  the proper development of  the  law.               They  propose,  therefore,  to  modify   their               present  practice and, while  treating  former               decisions  of this House as normally  binding,               to  depart  from a previous decision  when  it               appears right to do so.

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             In this connection they will bear in mind  the               danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis               on  which contracts, settlements  of  property               and fiscal arrangements have been entered into               and also the especial need for certainty as to               the criminal law."               This  announcement is not intended  to  affect               the  use of precedent elsewhere than  in  this               House." It  will be seen from this passage that the House  of  Lords hereafter in appropriate cases may depart from its  previous decision when it appears right to do so and in so  departing will  bear in mind the danger of giving effect to  the  said decision retroactivity.  We consider that what the House  of Lords means by this statement is that in differing from  the precedents it will do so only without interefering with  the transactions  that had taken place on the basis  of  earlier decisions.   This decision, to a large extent, modifies  the Blackstonian theory and accepts, though not expressly but by necessary   implication   the   doctrine   of   "prospective overruling." Let us now consider some of the objections to this doctrine. The objections are: (1) the doctrine involved legislation by courts; (2) it would not encourage parties to prefer appeals as  they  would  not  get any  benefit  therefrom;  (3)  the declaration  for the future would only be obiter, (4) it  is not   a   desirable  change;  and  (5)   the   doctrine   of retroactivity  serves  as a brake on court  which  otherwise might be tempted to be so fascile in overruling.  But in our view,  these objections are not insurmountable.  If a  court can over-rule its earlier decision-there cannot be any  dis- pute now that the court can do so there cannot be any  valid reason  why it should not restrict its ruling to the  future and not to the past.  Even if the party filing an appeal may not be benefited by it, in similar appeals which he may file after  the change in the law he will have the benefit.   The decision cannot be obiter for what the court in effect  does is  to declare the law but on the basis of another  doctrine restricts  its scope.  Stability in law does not  mean  that injustice shall be perpetuated.  An illuminating article  on the subject is found in Pennsylvania Law Review, [Vol.  I 10 p. 650]. 813 It  is a modem doctrine suitable for a fast moving  society. It does not do away with the doctrine of stare decisis,  but confines  it to past transactions.  It is true that  in  one sense  the court only declares the law, either customary  or statutory or personal law.  While in strict theory it may be said  that  the doctrine involves making of  law,  what  the court really does is to declare the law but refuses to  give retroactivity  to  it.  It is really  a  pragmatic  solution reconciling  the two conflicting doctrines, namely,  that  a court finds law and that it does make law.  It finds law but restricts its operation to the future.  It enables the court to bring about a smooth transition by correcting its  errors without  disturbing the impact of those errors on  the  past transactions.  It is left to the discretion of the court  to prescribe  the  limits of the retroactivity and  thereby  it enables it to would the relief to meet the ends of justice. In India there is no statutory prohibition against the court refusing  to give retroactivity to the law declared  by  it. Indeed,.  the doctrine of res judicata precludes  any  scope for  retroactivity in respect of a subject-matter  that  has been  finally decided between the parties.  Further,  Indian court  by interpretation reject retroactivity. to  statutory

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provisions  though  couched in general terms on  the  ground that  they  affect  vested rights.  The  present  case  only attempts  a  further  extension of  the  said  rule  against retroactivity. Our Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implica- tion speak against the doctrine of prospective  over-ruling. Indeed,  Arts. 32, 141 and 142 are couched in such wide  and elastic  terms  as to enable this Court to  formulate  legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice.  The only  limitation thereon is reason, restraint and injustice.  Under Art.  32, for  the enforcement of the fundamental rights  the  Supreme Court  has the power to issue suitable directions or  orders or  writs.   Article 141 says that the law declared  by  the Supreme  Court shall be binding on all courts; and Art.  142 enables it in the exercise of its jurisdiction to pass  such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice  in  any cause or matter pending before  it.   These articles  are  designedly made comprehensive to  enable  the Supreme Court to declare law and to give such directions  or pass  such orders as are necessary to do  complete  justice. The expression "declared" is wider than the words "found  or made".   To  declare is to announce  opinion.   Indeed,  the latter  involves  the process, while  the  former  expresses result.   Interpretation,  ascertainment and  evolution  are parts of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law.  The law declared by the Supreme Court  is  the  law of the and.  If so, we do  not  see  any acceptable reason why it, in declaring the law in superses- 814 sion  of the law declared by it earlier, could not  restrict the operation of the law as declared to future and save  the transactions,  whether  statutory  or  otherwise  that  were effected  on  the basis of the earlier law.   To  deny  this power  to  the Supreme Court on the basis of  some  outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it is to  make  ineffective the powerful  instrument  of.  justice placed  in  the  hands  of the  highest  judiciary  of  this country. As  this  Court for the first time has been called  upon  to apply  the  doctrine evolved in a  different  country  under different  ,circumstances, we would like to move  warily  in the beginning.  We would lay down the following propositions :  (I)  The  doctrine of  prospective  over-ruling,  can  be invoked  only in matters arising under our Constitution;  (2 it  an be applied only by the highest court of the  country, i.e.,  the  Supreme  Court  as  it  has  the  constitutional jurisdiction  to  declare an binding on all  the  courts  in India; (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  superseding  its  earlier decisions  .is  left  to its discretion  to  be  moulded  in accordance  with the justice of the cause or  matter  before it. We  have arrived at two conclusions, namely, (1)  Parliament has no power to amend Part III of the Constitution so as  to take away or abridge the fundamental rights; and (2) this is a  fit case to invoke and apply the doctrine or  prospective overruling.   What then is the effect of our  conclusion  on the  instant  case ?. Having regard to the  history  of  the amendments  their impact on the social and economic  affairs of our country and the chaotic situation that may be brought about  by  the  sudden  withdrawal  at  this  stage  of  the amendments from the Constitution, we think that considerable judicial  restraint is called for.  We,  therefore,  declare that  our  decision  will not affect  the  validity  of  the Constitution  (Seventeenth  Amendment) Act, 1964,  or  other

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amendments made to the Constitution taking away or abridging the  fundamental rights.  We further declare that in  future Parliament  will  have  no power to amend Part  III  of  the Constitution  so as to take away or abridge the  fundamental rights.   In  this  case we do not propose  to  express  our opinion on the question of the scope of the amendability  of the   provisions   of  the  Constitution  other   than   the fundamental  rights, as it does not arise for  consideration before us.  Nor are we called upon to express out opinion on the  question regarding the scope of the amends  ability  of Part  Ill of the constitution otherwise than by taking  away or  abridging the fundamental rights.  We will not also  in- dicate  our  view one way or other whether any of  the  Acts questioned  can  be sustained under the  provisions  of  the Constitution  without the aid of Arts. 31A, 31B and the  9th Schedule. 815 The aforesaid discussion leads to the following results               (1)  The power of the Parliament to amend  the               Constitution  is derived from Arts.  245,  246               and 248 of the Constitution and not from  Art.               368  thereof which only deals with  procedure.               Amendment is a legislative process.               (2)   Amendment is ’law’ within the meaning of               Art. 13 of the Constitution and, therefore, if               it takes away or abridges the rights conferred               by Part III thereof, it is void.               (3)   The Constitution (First Amendment)  Act,               1951,  Constitution  (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,               1955,   and,the   Constitution    (Seventeenth               Amendment)  Act, 1964, abridge the  scope.  of               the fundamental rights.  But, on the basis  of               earlier  decisions  of this Court,  they  were               valid.               (4)   On  the application of the  doctrine  of               ’prospective over-ruling’, as explained by  us               earlier,   our   decision   will   have   only               prospective operation and, therefore, the said               amendments will continue to be valid.               (5)   We declare that the Parliament will have               no  power  from the date of this  decision  to               amend any of the provisions of Part III of the               Constitution so as to take away or abridge the               fundamental rights enshrined therein.               (6)   As    the   Constitution    (Seventeenth               Amendment)  Act holds the field, the  validity               of  the two impugned Acts, namely, the  Punjab               Security  of Land Tenures Act X of  1953,  and               the  Mysore  Land Reforms Act X  of  1962,  as               amended   by  Act  XIV  of  1965,  cannot   be               questioned  on  the ground  that  they  offend               Arts. 13, 14 or 31 of the Constitution. Before we close, it would be necessary to advert to an argu- ment  advanced on emotional plane.  It was said that if  the provisions  of  the   Constitution could not be  amended  it would  lead  to  revolution.   We have  not  said  that  the provisions of the Constitution cannot be amended but what we have said is that they cannot be amended so as to take  away or  abridge the fundamental rights.  Nor can  we  appreciate the  argument  that  all  the  agrarian  reforms  which  the Parliament  in power wants to effectuate cannot  be  brought about  without  amending  the fundamental  rights.   It  was exactly to prevent this attitude- and to project the  rights of  the  that the fundamental rights were  inserted  in  the Constitution.   If  it  is the duty  of  the  Parliament  to

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enforce the directive principles, it is equally its duty  to enforce them without infringing the fundamental rights.  The Constitution-makers  thought  that it could be done  and  we also think that the directive prin- 816 ciples can reasonably be enforced within the self-regulatory machinery  provided by Part III.  Indeed both Parts III  and IV  of  the Constitution form an integrated  scheme  and  is elastic  enough  to  respond to the changing  needs  of  the society.  The verdict of the Parliament on the scope of  the law  of social control of fundamental rights is  not  final, but  justiciable.   If  not  so, the  whole  scheme  of  the Constitution  will break.  What we can- I not understand  is how  the enforcement of the provisions of  the  Constitution can   bring   about  a  revolution.   History   shows   that revolutions  are brought about not by the majorities but  by the  minorities  and  some  time  by  military  coups.   The existence  of  an all comprehensive  amending  power  cannot prevent  revolutions,  if  there is  chaos  in  the  country brought  about by mis-rule or abuse of power.  On the  other hand,  such  a  restrictive power  gives  stability  to  the country and prevents it from passing under a totalitarian or dictatorial  regime.  We cannot obviously base our  decision on  such hypothetical or extraordinary situations which  may be  brought  about with or without  amendments.   Indeed,  a Constitution  is only permanent and not eternal.   There  is nothing  to  choose between destruction by amendment  or  by revolution,  the  former is brought  about  by  totalitarian rule, which cannot brook constitutional checks and the other by the discontentment brought about by mis-rule.  If  either happens,  the constitution will be a scrap of  paper.   Such considerations are out of place in construing the provisions of the Constitution by a court of law. Nor  are we impressed by the argument that if the, power  of amendment is ’not all comprehensive there will be no way  to change  the  structure of our Constitution  or  abridge  the fundamental  rights  even if the whole country  demands  for such  a  change.   Firstly,  this  visualizes  an  extremely unforeseeable and extravagant  demand; but even if such a  contingency  arises the residuary power of the Parliament may be relied upon  to call   for   a  Constituent  Assembly  for  making   a   new Constitution  or  radically  changing it.   The  recent  Act providing for a poll in Goa, Daman and Diu is an instance of analogous   exercise   of  such  residuary  power   by   the Parliament.   We  do not express our final opinion  on  this important question. A  final  appeal  is made to us that we  shall  not  take  a different  view as the decision in Sankari Prasad’s  case(1) held the field for many years.  While ordinarily this  Court will  be reluctant to reverse its previous decision,  it  is its  duty in the constitutional field to correct  itself  as early as possible, for otherwise the future progress of  the country  and the happiness of the people will be  at  stake. As  we are convinced that the decision in  Sankari  Prasad’s case(1)  is wrong, it is pre-eminently a typical case  where this  Court  should over-rule it.  The longer it  holds  the field the greater will (1)  [1952] S.C.R 89, 105 817 be  the  scope  for erosion of fundamental  rights.   As  it contains the seeds of destruction of the cherished rights of the  people the sooner it is over-ruled the better  for  the country. This argument is answered by the remarks made by this  Court

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in  the  recent  judgment in The  Superintendent  and  Legal Remembrancer  State  of West Bengal v., The  Corporation  of Calcutta(1).               "The third contention need not detain us  ]’or               it  has  been rejected by this  Court  in  The               Bengal  Immunity Company Limited v. The  State               of  Bihar(2)  .  There a  Bench  of  7  Judges               unanimously held that there was nothing in the               Constitution that prevented the Supreme  Court               from departing from a previous decision of its               own  if it was satisfied of its error  and  of               its baneful effect on the general interest  of               the   public.   If  the  aforesaid   rule   of               construction  accepted  by this Court  is  in-               consistent  with the legal philosophy  of  our               Constitution,  it  is  our  duty  to   correct               ourselves  and  lay down the right  rule.   In               constitutional   matters  which   affect   the               evolution of our polity, we must more  readily               do  so  than  in other  branches  of  law,  as               perpetuation  of a mistake will be harmful  to               public   interests.   While   continuity   and               consistency   are  conducive  to  the   smooth               evolution of the rule of law, hesitancy to set               right  deviation will retard its  growth.   In               this  case, as we are satisfied that the  said               rule of construction is inconsistent with  our               republican  polity and, if accepted,  bristles               with  anomalies,  we  have  no  hesitation  to               reconsider our earlier decision." In  the  result  the petitions are  dismissed,  but  in  the circumstances without costs. Wanchoo,  J.  This Special Bench of eleven  Judges  of  this Court  has been constituted to consider the  correctness  of the  decision of this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh  Deo v.  Union of India(,,) which was accepted as correct by  the majority in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (4) . The  reference has been made in three petitions  challenging the  constitutionality of the Seventeenth Amendment  to  the Constitution.   In one of the petitions, the  inclusion,  of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, (No.  X of 1953) in the Ninth Schedule, which makes it immune from. attack under any  provisions contained in Part III of  the  Constitution’ has  been  attacked  on  the  ground  that  the  Seventeenth Amendment  is in itself unconstitutional.  In the other  two petitions,  the  inclusion of the Mysore Land  Reforms  Act, (No. 10 of 1962) has been attacked on the same grounds.   It is not necessary to set out the facts in (1)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 170,176 (2)  [1955] 2S.C.R.603. (3)  [1952] S.C.R. 89. (4)  [1965] 1.C.S.R. 933. 818 the three petitions for present purposes.  The main argument in  all  the three petitions has been as to  the  scope  and effect  of  Art.  368  of the  Constitution  and  the  power conferred thereby to amend the Constitution. Before  we  come  to the specific I  points  raised  in  the present  petitions,  we may indicate  the  circumstances  in which  Sankari  Prasad’s case(1) as well as  Sajjan  Singh’s case (2) came to be decided and what they actually  decided. The  Constitution  came into force on January  26,.1950.  It provides  in  Part  III  for  certain  fundamental   rights. Article  31  which is in Part 111, as it  originally  stood, provided for compulsory acquisition of property.  By  clause

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(1)  it  provided that "no person shall be deprived  of  his property  save  by authority of law".   Clause  (2)  ;hereof provided  that any law authorising taking of  Possession  or acquisition  of  property  must  provide  for   compensation therefor  and  either  fix the  amount  of  compensation  or specify the principles on which, and the manner in which the compensation  was to be determined and paid.  Clause(4) made a  special provision to the effect that if any Bill  pending at  the commencement of the Constitution in the  Legislature of  a  State had, after it had been passed  by  such  Legis- lature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and  had  received his assent, then such law  would  not  be called  in question though it contravened the provisions  of cl. (2) relating to compensation.  Clause (6) provided  that any  law of the State enacted not more than eighteen  months before the Constitution might be submitted to the  President for his certification, and if so certified, it could not  be called  in  question on the ground that it  contravened  the provision of cl. (2) of Art. 31 relating to compensation. These  two  clauses  of  Art. 31  were  meant  to  safeguard legislation  which either had been passed by  Provincial  or State  legislatures  or  which was on  the  anvil  of  State legislatures for the purpose of agrarian reforms.  One  such piece  of legislation was the Bihar Land Reforms Act,  which was  passed  in 1950.  That Act received the assent  of  the President  as  required under cl. (6) of Art.  31.   It  was however  challenged  before  the Patna High  Court  and  was struck  down  by that court on the ground that  it  violated Art’ 14  of  the  Constitution.  Then there  was  an  appeal before this    Court, but while that appeal was pending, the First Amendment     to the Constitution was made. We may briefly refer to what the First Amendment provided for.   It was the First Amendment which was  challenged  and was upheld in Sankari Prasad’s case(1).  The First Amendment contained  a number of provisions; but it is  necessary  for present  purposes  only to refer to those  provisions  which made changes in Part III of the Constitution.  These changes related to Arts. 15 (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933 819 and  19  and  in addition, provided  for  insertion  of  two Articles,  numbered  31-A and 31-Bin Part III  Article  31-A provided  that no law providing for the acquisition  by  the State  of  any  estate  or of  any  rights  therein  or  the extinguishment  or modification of any such rights shall  be deemed  to be void on the ground that it  was.  inconsistent with,  or took away or abridged any of the rights  conferred by  any provision in part Ill.  ’The word "estate" was  also defined  for the purpose of Art. 31-A Further Article  31-B. provided for validation of certain Acts and  Regulations and specified  such Acts and Regulations in the Ninth  Schedule, which was for the first time added to the Constitution.  The Ninth  Schedule  then  contained 13 Acts,  all  relating  to estates , passed by various legislatures of the Provinces or States.  It laid down that those Acts and Regulations  would not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void, on the ground  that  they were inconsistent with. or took  away  or abridged  any  of the rights conferred by any  provision  of Part  III.   It further provided  that  notwithstanding  any judgment,  decree or order of any court or tribunal  to  the contrary, all such Acts and Regulations subject to the power of  any  competent  legislature to  repeal  or  amend  them, continue in force. This amendment, and in particular Arts. 31-A and 31-B  were.

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immediately  challenged  by various writ petitions  in  this Court  and  these came to be decided on October 5,  1951  in Sankari Prasad’s case(1).  The attack on the validity of the First Amendment was made on various grounds; but three  main grounds which were. taken were, first 1 , that amendments to the  Constitution  made  under Art. 368 were  liable  to  be tested under Art. 13(2); secondly that in any case as  Arts. 31  A  and  31-B  insert  the  Constitution  by  the  First. Amendment  affected the power of the High Court  under  Art. 226  1  and of this Court under Articles 132  and  136;  the amendment  required ratification under the proviso  to  Art. 368;  and, thirdly that Acts. 31-A and 31 B were invalid  on the ground that they related to matters-covered by the State List, namely, item 18 of List 11, and could not therefore be passed  by  Parliament.This  Court rejected  all  the  three contentions.  It held that although ."law" would  ordinarily include  constitutional law, there was a  clear  demarcation between  ordinary  law made in the exercise  of  legislative power  and  constitutional  law  made  in  the  exercise  of constituent power, and in the context of Art. 13, "law" must be  taken to mean rules or regulations made. in exercise  of ordinary  legislative  power  and  not  amendments  to,  the Constitution  made in the exercise of constituent power;  in consequence Art. 13(2) did not affect amendments made  under Art.  3 68.  It further held that Arts. 3 1 A and  31-B  did not curtail the power of the High Court under Art. 226 or of this  court  under Arts. 132 and 136- and  did  not  require ratification under the (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89 820 proviso  contained in Art. 368.  Finally, it was held  that- Arts.  31.-A  and 31-B were essentially  amendments  to  the Constitution  and Parliament as such had the power to  enact such amendments.  In consequence, the First Amendment to the Constitution was upheld as valid. After   this   decision,   there   followed   sixteen   more amendment   .to  the  Constitution  till  we  come  to   the Seventeenth  Amendment, which was passed on June  20,  1964. There does not seem to have been challenge to any  amendment up  to  the Sixteenth Amendment, even though  two  of  them, namely,  the Fourth Amendment and the Sixteenth  Amendment,, contained  changes  in  the provisions of Part  III  of  the Constitution.  Further the nature of these amendments was to add  to, or alter or delete various other provisions of  the Constitution  contained in Part III thereof On  December  5, 1961  came  the decision of this Court by which  the  Kerala Agrarain  Reforms Act (No. 4 of 1961), passed by the  Kerala legislature,  was struck down, among other grounds, for  the reason  that ryotwari lands in South India were not  estates within the meaning of Art. 31-A and therefore acquisition of reyotwari  land  was not protected under Art.  31-A  of  the Constitution   :  [see  Karimbil  Kunhikoman  v.  State   of Kerala(1)].   This decision was followed by the  Seventeenth Amendment on June 20, 1964.  By this amendment, changes were made  in  Art.  31-A of the Constitution and  44  Acts  were included  in  the  Ninth  Schedule  to  give  them  complete protection  from attack under any provision of Part  III  of the  Constitution.   Practically all these Acts  related  to land tenures and were concerned with agrarian reforms.  This amendment  was  challenged  before  this  ’Court  in  Sajjan Singh’s  case(2).  The points then urged were that  as  Art. 226 was likely to be affected by the Seventeenth  Amendment, it  required ratification under the proviso to Art. 368  and that  the  decision  in Sankari Prasads  case(3)  which  had negatived this contention required re-consideration.  It was

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also  urged that the Seventeenth Amendment  was  legislation with  respect  to  land  and  Parliament  bad  no  right  to legislate   in  that  behalf,  and  further  that   as   the Seventeenth  Amendment  provided that the Acts  put  in  the Ninth  Schedule would be valid in spite of the  decision  of the  Courts,  it  was unconstitutional..  This  Court  by  a majority  of 3 to 2 upheld the correctness of  the  decision in  Sankari Prasad’s case(,,).  It further held  unanimously that the Seventeenth Amendment did not require  ratification under the proviso to Art. 368 because of its indirect effect on  Art. 226, and that Parliament in enacting the  Amendment was  not  legislating with respect to land and that  it  was open  to Parliament to validate legislation which  had  been invalid by courts.  Finally this Court held by majority (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 829.  (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. (3)  [1952] S.C.R. 89. 821 that  the power conferred by Art. 368 included the power  to take away fundamental rights guaranteed by Part HI and  that the  power to amend was a very wide power and could  not  be controlled  by  the literal dictionary meaning of  the  word "amend"  and  that  the word "law" in Art. 13  (2)  did  not include  an amendment of the Constitution made in  pursuance of  Art. 368.  The minority however doubted the  correctness of  the view taken in Sankari Prasads case(1) to the  effect that the word ’law" in Art. 13 (2) did not include amendment to  the  Constitution  made under  Art.  368  and  therefore doubted  the competence of Parliament to make any  amendment to Part III of the Constitution.  One of the learned  Judges further  doubted  whether  making  a  change  in  the  basic features of the Constitution could be regarded merely as  an amendment  or would, in effect, be re-writing a part of  the Constitution,  and  if so, whether it could’ be  done  under Art.  368.   It  was because of this  doubt  thrown  on  the correctness  of the view taken in Sankari  Prasad’s  case(1) that  the  present reference has been made to  this  Special Bench. As  the  question  referred  to  this  Bench  is  of   great constitutional importance and affected legislation passed by various  States, notice was issued to the Advocates  General of all States and they have appeared and, intervened  before us.   Further a number of persons who were also affected  by the Seventeenth Amendment have been permitted to  intervene. The   arguments  on  behalf  of  the  petitioners  and   the interveners who support them may now. be briefly summarised. It is urged that Art. 368-when it provides for the amendment of the Constitution merely’ contains the procedure for doing so and that the power to make amendment has to be found.  in Art.  248 read with item 97 of List 1. It is  further  urged that  the  word  "amendment"  in Art.  368  means  that  the provisions  in  the  Constitution can be changed  so  as  to important  upon  them And that this power is  of  a  limited character  and  does not authorise Parliament  to  make  any addition to, alteration of or deletion of any ,provision  of the Constitution, including the provision contained in  Part III.   So  Art. 368 authorises only those  amendments  which have  the effect of improving the Constitution.  Then it  is urged  that amendment permissible under Art. 368 is  subject to certain implied limitations and the these limitations are that basic features of the Constitution cannot be amended at all.   An attempt was made to indicate some of  these  basic features,  as, f( example, the provisions in Part  III,  the federal  structure, the republican character of  the  State, elected  Parliament and State Legislatures on-the  basis  of adult  suffrage, control by the judiciary and so on, and  it

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is.  said that- an amendment under Art. 3 69 is  subject  to the implied limi- (1) (1952] S.C.R. 89. L3Sup.CI/67-7 822 tations  that  these basic features and others of  the  kind cannot  be,  changed.  Thus in effect the argument  is  that there  is  a  very  limited power  of  amendment  under  the Constitution. It   is  further  urged  that  apart  from   these   implied limitations, there is an express limitation under Art. 13(2) and  the word "law in that Article includes an amendment  of the  Constitution. The argument thus in the  alternative  is that   as   the  word  "law"  in  Art.  13(2)   includes   a constitutional  amendment, no amendment can be made in  Part HI under Art. 368 which would actually take away or  abridge the  rights  guaranteed under that Part.  In effect,  it  is said that even if there are no implied limitations to  amend the  Constitution under Art. 368, Art. 13(2) is  an  express limitation  insofar  as  the  power to  amend  Part  III  is concerned and by virtue of Art. 13(2) the rights  guaranteed under  Part III cannot be taken away or abridged under  Art. 368,  though it is conceded that Part III may be amended  by way of enlarging the rights contained therein. Another  line  of  argument  is that  in  any  case  it  was necessary  to take action under the proviso to Art. 368  and as that was not done the Seventeenth Amendment is not valid. It  is  urged that Art. 2,26 is seriously  affected  by  the provisions  contained in the Seventeenth Amendment and  that amounts  to  an  amendment of Aft. 226  and  in  consequence action  under the- proviso was necessary.  It is also  urged that Art. 245 was addition of a number of Acts in the  Ninth 13  (2) and therefore also it was necessary to  take  action under  the  proviso.  It is further urged that  it  was  not competent  for  Parliament  to  amend  the  Constitution  by putting a large number of Acts in the Ninth Schedule as  the power  to  legislate with respect to land is  solely  within the.  competence of State Legislatures and that  is  another reason why the addition to the Ninth Schedule read with Art. 31 B should be struck down. Lastly  an argument had been advanced which we may call  the argument  of  fear.  It is said that if Art.368 is  held  to confer full to amend each and every part of the Constitution as has been    held in Sankari Prasad’s case(1).  Parliament May do all kinds of things, which were never intended, under this unfettered power and may, for example, abolish  elected legislatures,  abolish the President or change  the  present form of Government into a Presedential type like the  United States.  Constitution or do away with the federal  structure altogether.   So it is urged that, we should,interpret  Art. 368 in such a way that Parliament may not be able to do- all these things.  In effect this argument of fear has been  put forward to reinforce the contention that this Court should (1)[1952] S.C.R. 89. 823 hold that there are some implied limitations on the amending power and these implied limitations should be that there  is no  power any where in the Constitution to change the  basic features of the Constitution to which reference has  already been made.  This is in brief the submission on behalf of the petitioners and the interveners who support them. The   submission  on behalf of the Union of  India  and  the States may now be summarised.  It is urged that Art. 368 not only provides procedure or amendment but also contains in it the  power to amend the Constitution.  It is  further  urged

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that the word "amendment" in law does not merely mean making such  changes  in the Constitution as would improve  it  but includes the power to make any addition to the Constitution, any  alteration  of any of the existing provisions  and  its substitution by another provisions, and any deletion of  any particular provision of the Constitution.  In .effect, it is urged  that  even if the word "amendment" used in  Art.  368 does not take in the power to abrogate the entire ’Constitu- tion  and  replace  it  by  another  new  Constitution,   it certainly means that any provisions of the Constitution  may be  changed and this change can be in the form  of  addition to,  alteration  of  or deletion of  any  provision  of  the Constitution.  So long therefore as the Constitution is  not entirely  abrogated and replaced by a- new  Constitution  at one  stroke, the power of amendment would enable  Parliament to-  make  all  changes  in  the  existing  Constitution  by addition, alteration or deletion.  Subject only to co repeal being not possible, the power of amendment contained in Art. 368 is unfettered.  It is further urged that there can be no implied   limitations  on  the  power  to  amend   and   the limitations  if any on this. power must be found hi  express terms  in  the  Article  providing  for-amendment.   It   is conceded that there may be an express limitation not  merely in  the Article providing for amendment, but in  some  other part  of the Constitution.  But it is said that if  that  is so, there must be a clear provision to that effect.  In  the absence  of express limitations, therefore, there can be  no implied limitations ,on the power to amend the  Constitution contained  in  Art.  368 and that power  will  take  in  all changes whether by way of addition, alteration or  deletion, subject  only to this that the power of amendment  may  riot contain  the,  power  to  abrogate  and  repeal  the  entire Constitution and substitute it with a new one. It  is  then  urged that there is no  express  provision  in Art.368  itself  so  far as any amendment  relating  to  the substance  of  the amending power is  concerned-,  die  only limitations  in Art, 368 are as to procedure and courts  can only  see  that the procedure as indicated in  Art.  368  is followed before an amendment can be said to be valid.  It is further  urged  that  the word "law", in Art.  13  does  not include an amendment of the Constitution and only 824 moans   law  as  made.  under  the  legislative   provisions contained  in Chapter, I of Part XI read with,  Chapters  II and III of Part V of the.  Constitution and Chapters III and V  of Part VI thereof.  In effect it is a law which is  made under  the Constitution which included in the word "law"  in Art.  13(2) and not an amendment to the  Constitution  under Art. 368. As  to  Articles  226 and 245 and the  necessity  of  taking action under the proviso to Art. 368, it is urged that there is no change in Arts. 226 and 245on account of any provision in  the Seventeenth Amendment and therefore no action  under the proviso was necessary.    it  is only direct  change  in Arts.  226  and  245  which  would  require  following   the procedure  as to ratification or at any rate such change  in other  Articles  which  would have the  effect  of  directly compelling  change  in  Arts 226 and 245  and  that  in  the present case no such     direct compulsion arises.  Lastly as to the argument of fear it is urged that there is always  a  provision with respect to  amendment  in  written federal  Constitutions.   Such a provision may be  rigid  or flexible.   In  our  Constitution Art. 368  provides  for  a comparatively flexible provision for amendment and there is’ no  reason to make it rigid by implying any  limitations  on

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that power.  Further there Is no reason to suppose that  all those  things  will be done by Parliament  which  are  being urged to deny the power under Art. 368 which flows naturally from its terms. Besides the above, reliance is also placed on behalf of  the Union  of  India and the States on the  doctrine.  of  stare decisis.  It is urged that since the decision of this  Court in Sankari Prasad’s case(1), sixteen further amendments have been  made  by  Parliament on the  faith  of  that  decision involving  over  200  Articles  of  the  Constitution.   The amendments  relating  to  Part III  have  been  mainly  with respect to agrarian reforms resulting in transfers of  title of  millions  of  acres of land in  favour  of  millions  of people.   Therefore’, even though Sankari  Prasad’s  case(1) has  stood  only  for fifteen years there has  been  a  vast agrarian  revolution effected on the faith of that  decision and this Court should not now go back on what was decided in that  case.   Further, besides the argument based  on  state decisis,  it is urged on the basis of certain  decisions  of this  Court that the unanimous decision in Sankari  Prasad’s case(1)   which  had  stood  practically  unchallenged   for about’15’years till the decision in Sajjan Singh’s  case(2), should not be over-ruled unless it is found to be  incorrect by a large majority of the Judges constituting this  Special Bench.   It  is urged that if the present Bench is  more  or less  evenly divided it should not over-rule  the  unanimous decision in’ Sankari Prasad’s case(1) by a Majority of one. (1) (1952] S.C.R. 89. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933 825 We shall first take Art, 368.  It is found in Part XX of the Constitution   which   is   headed.    Amendment   of    the Constitution"  and is the only Article in that  Part.   That Part  thus  provides specifically for the amendment  of  the Constitution, and the first question that arises is  whether it  provides power for the amendment of the Constitution  as well as the procedure for doing so.  It is not disputed that the  procedure  for amendment of the Constitution is  to  be found  in Art. 368, but what is in dispute is  whether  Art. 368 confers power also in that behalf. Now the procedure for the amendment of the Constitution is this: The amendment  is initiated  by the introduction of a Bill in either House  of Parliament.   The Bill has to be passed in each House  by  a majority  of  the total membership of that House  and  by  a Majority of not less two-thirds of the members of that House present  and  voting.  After it is so passed, it has  to  be presented  to  the  President  for  his  assent.   On   such presentation if the President assents to the Bill, Art. 3-68 provides  that  the  Constitution  shall  stand  amended  in accordance  with the terms of the Bill.  Further there is  a proviso  for ratification with respect to  certain  Articles and other provisions of the Constitution including Art. 368, and those matters can only be amended if the Bill passed  by the  two  Houses by necessary majority is  ratified  by  the legislatures  of  not less than one-half of  the  States  by resolutions to that effect.  In such a case the Bill  cannot be presented for his assent to the President until necessary ratification   is  available.   But  when   the.   necessary ratification  has been made, the Bill with respect to  these matters is then presented to the President and on his assent being given, the Constitution stands amended. in  accordance with the terms of the Bill. The argument is that there is no express provision in  terms in  Art.  368 conferring power on Parliament  to  amend  the Constitution, and in this connection our attention has  been

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invited  to  an analogous provision in the  Constitution  of Ireland in Art. 46, where cl. 1 provides that any  provision of  the Constitution, may be amended in the manner  provided in  that  Article,  and  then  follows  the  procedure   for amendment  in  clauses  2 to 5. Reference is  also  made  to similar  provisions  in.  other  constitutions,  but  it  is unnecessary to refer to them. . It is urged that as Art. 368 has  nothing  comparable to cl.  I of Art. 46 of  the  Irish Constitution, the power to amend the Constitution is not in. Art.  3  68  and  must .be. found  elsewhere.   We  are  not prepared to accept this argument.  The fact that Art. 368 is not  in  two  parts,  the first  part  indicating  that  the Constitution  shall  be  amended  in  the  manner   provided thereafter, and the second part indicating the procedure for amendment,  does not mean that the power to amend the  Cons- titution is not contained in Art. 368 itself.  The very fact that a 826 separate  Part  has  been devoted in  the  Constitution  for amendment thereof and there is only one Article in that Part shows  that  both the power to amend and the  procedure  for amendment  are to be found in Art. 368.  Besides, the  words "the  Constitution shall stands amended in accordance  ’with the  terms of the Bill" in Art. 368 clearly in  our  opinion provide for the power to amend after the procedure has  been followed.   It  appears that  our  Constitution-makers  were apparently  thinking  of economy of words  and  elegance  of language  in  enacting  Art. 368 in the terms  in  which  it appears and that is why it is not in two parts on the  model of  Art.46 of the Irish Constitution.  But there can in  our opinion.  be  not doubt, when a separate Part  was  provided headed  "Amendment  of the Constitution" that the  power  to amend  the Constitution must also be contained in  Art.  368 which  is the only Article in that Part.  If there  was  any doubt  about  the-  matter, that doubt  in  our  opinion  is resolved  by  the words to which we  have  already  referred namely "the Constitution shall stand amended in the terms of the  Bill".   These words can only mean that the.  power  is there to amend the Constitution after the procedure has been followed.  It   is  however  urged  that  the  power  to   amend   the Constitution is not to be found in Art. 368 but is contained in  the residuary power of Parliament in Art. 48  read  with item  97 of List 1. It is true that Art. 248 read with  item 97 of List I, insofar as it provides for residuary power  of legislation, is very wide in its scope and the argument that the,  power to amend the Constitution is contained  in  this provision  appears  prima facie attractive ’in view  of  the width  of the residuary power.  But we fail to see why  when there is a whole Part devoted to the amendment of the  Cons- titution  the  power to amend should not be  found  in  that Part,  if it can be reasonably found there and why Art.  368 should  only  be  confined to providing  for  procedure  for amendment.  It is true that the marginal note to Art. 368 is "procedure  for  amendment of the  Constitution",  but.  the marginal note cannot control the meaning of the words in the Article  itself,  and we have no doubt that the  words  "the Constitution  shall  stand amended in accord  the  power  of amendment.  If we were to compare the language of cls. 2  to 5of Art. 46- of the Irish Constitution which prescribes  the procedure for amendment, we find no words therein comparable to  these words in Art. 368.  These words clearly  are  com- parable  to cl.  I of Art. 46-of the Irish Constitution  and must  be rod as conferring power on Parliament to amend  the Constitution.   Besides  it is remarkable in  contrast  that

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Art.  248  read with List I does not in  terms  mention  the amendment  of the Constitution. while therefore there  is  a whole Part devoted to the amendment of the Constitution,  we do not find any specific mention of the 827 amendment of the Constitution in Art. 248 or in any entry of List 1. It  would in the circumstances be more appropriate to   read in  power in Art. 3 68 in view of the, words which  we  have already  referred to than in Art. 248 read with item  97  of List  I.  Besides it is a historical fact to  which  we  can refer  that originally the intention was to  vest  residuary power  in States, and if that intention had been  eventually carried  out, it would have been impossible for any  one  to argue  that  the power to amend the Constitution was  to  be found  in the residuary power if it had been vested  in  the States and not in the Union.  The mere fact that during  the passage  of  the Constitution by the  Constituent  Assembly, residuary  power was finally vested in the Union  would  not therefore mean that it includes the power to amend the Cons- titution.   On a comparison of the scheme, of the  words  in Art  368 and the scheme of the words in Art. 248  read  with item 97 of List 1, therefore, there is no doubt in our  mind that both the procedure and power to amend the  Constitution are to be found in Art. 368 and they are not to be found  in Art.  248  read with item 97 of List I  which  provides  for residuary legislative power of Parliament. There  is  in our opinion another reason why  the  power  to amend  the Constitution cannot found in Art. 248  read  with item  97 of List 1. The Constitution is the fundamental  law and no law passed under mere legislative power conferred  by the Constitution can affect any change, in the  Constitution unless there is an express power to that effect given in the Constitution  itself.   But subject to  such  express  power given  by  the  Constitution itself,  the  fundamental  law, namely  the Constitution, cannot be changed by a law  passed under   the   legislative  provisions   contained   in   the Constitution as all legislative acts passed under the  power conferred   by   the  Constitution  must  conform   to   the Constitution can make no change therein.  There are a number of Articles in the Constitution, which expressly provide for amendment by law, as,. for example, 3, 4, 10, 59(3),  65(3), 73(2),  97,  98(3), 106, 120(2), 135, 137,  142(1),  146(2), 148(3), 149, 169, 171(2), 196, 187(3), 189(3), 194(3),  195, 210(2), 221(2). 225, 229(2), 239(1), 241(3), 283(1) and (2), 285(2), 287, 306(1), 313, 345, 373, Sch.  V. cl. 7 and  Sch. VI, cl. 21,, and so far as these Articles are concerned they can  be  amended  by  Parliament  by.  ordinary   law-making process.   But  so far as the other Articles  are  concerned they  can only be amended by amendment of ’the  Constitution under Art. 368.  Now Art. 245 which gives power to make  law for  the  whole  or any part of the territory  of  India  by Parliament  is  "subject to the provisions of  this  Consti- tution"  and any law made by Parliament whether  under  Art. 246 read with List I or under Art. 248 read with item 97  of List I be subject to the provisions of the Constitution.  If therefore  the power to amend the Constitution is  contained in Art. 248 828 read with item 97 of List 1, that power has to  be exercised subject to the provisions of the Constitution and cannot  be used   to   change   the  fundamental   law   (namely,   the Constitution) itself.  But it is argued that Art. 368  which provides   a   special  procedure  for  amendment   of   the Constitution should be read along with Arts. 245 248, and so

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read  it  would  be  open to  amend  any  provision  of  the Constitution by law passed under Art. 248 on the ground that Art.  248  is  subject to Art. 368  and  therefore  the  two together  give power to Parliament to pass a law under  Art. 248   which  will  amend  even  those  provisions   of   the Constitution  which are not expressly made amendable by  law passed under the legislative power of Parliament.  This  in- our opinion is arguing in a circle.- If the fundamental  law (ie. the Constitution) cannot be I changed by any law passed under   the  legislative  powers  contained   therein,   for legislation  so passed must conform to the fundamental  law, we  fail to see how a law, passed under the residuary  power which  is nothing, more than legislative power conferred  on parliament   under   the  Constitution,   can   change   the Constitution (namely, the fundamental law) Itself. We,may in this connection refer to the following passage  in The Law.and the Constitution by W. Ivor Jennings (1933  Ed.) at p. 51 onwards :-                "A   written   constitution   is   thus   the               fundamental  law  of a  country,  the  express               embodiment  of the doctrine of the  region  of               law.    All   public   uthorities-legislative,               administrative  and judical-take their  powers               directly  or indirectly  from  it.....Whatever               the  nature of the written constitution it  is               clear that there "is a fundamental distinction               between constitutional law and the rest of the               law........  There  is  a  clear   separation,               therefore, between the constitutional law  and               the rest of the law." It  is because of this difference between  the.  fundamental law (namely, the Constitution) and the law passed under  the legislative  provisions of the Constitution that it  is  not possible  in  the absence of an express  provision  to  that effect in the fundamental law to ,change the fundamental law by ordinary legislation passed thereunder, for such ordinary legislation must always conform to the fundamental law (i.e. the  Constitution).  If the power to amend the  Constitution is  to be found in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List 1.  It will mean that ordinary legislation passed under fundamental law  would  amend that law and this cannot  be  done  unless there is express provision as in Art. 3 etc. to that effect In  the  absence of such express provisions any  law  passed under the legislative powers granted under the fundamental’- law  cannot amend it.  So if we were to hold that the  power to amend the 829 Constitution is comprised in-Art. 248, that would mean that- no  amendment-,of the Constitution would be possible at  all except to the extent expressly provided in various  Articles to  which  we  have  referred  already,  for  the  power  to legislate  under  Art.  245 read with  Art.  248  is  itself subject to the Constitution.  Therefore reading Art. 368 and considering  the scheme of the legislative powers  conferred by Articles 245 and 248 read with item 97 of List I" this to our  mind  is clear, firstly that the power  to  amend  the, Constitution  is  to  be  found  in  Art.  368  itself,  and secondly, that the power to amend the Constitution can never reside in Art. 245 and Art. 248 read with item 97 of List 1, for  that  would  make any  amendment  of  the  Constitution impossible  except  with respect to  the  express-provisions contained in certain Articles thereof for amendment by law-. We  may in this connection add that all this  argument  that power  to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art.  245 and  Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I has been based  on

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one    accidental   circumstance,   and   that    accidental circumstance  is  that the procedure for  amendment  of  the Constitution   contained  in  Art.  368  is  more  or   less assimilated to the procedure for making ordinary laws  under the  Constitution.   The  argument  is  that  constitutional amendment  is also passed by the two Houses  of  Parliament, and   is  assented  to  by  the  President   like   ordinary legislation, with this difference that a special majority is required  for certain purposes and a special  majority  plus ratification is required for certain other purposes.  It may be admitted that the procedure for amendment under Art.  368 is  somewhat similar to the procedure for  passing  ordinary legislation under the Constitution.  Even so, as pointed out by Sir Ivor Jennings in the passage already quoted, there is a  clear separation between constitutional law and the  rest of  the law and that must never be forgotten.  An  amendment to the Constitution is a constitutional law and as  observed in  Sankari Prasad’s case(1) is in exercise  of  constituent power;  passing of ordinary law is in exercise  of  ordinary legislative power and is clearly different from the power to amend  the Constitution.  We may in this  connection  refer, for  example, to Art.  V of other U.S.  Constitution,  which provides  for  the, amendment thereof.  It will  be  clearly seen  that  the  power  contained in Art.   V  of  the  U.S. Constitution  is not ordinary legislative power and  no  one can possibly call it ordinary legislative power, because the procedure provided for the amendment of the Constitution  in Art.   V differs radically from the procedure  provided  for ordinary legislation, for example, the President’s assent is not  required constitutional amendment under Art.  V of  the U.S. Constitution,; Now if Art. 368 also had made a  similar departure   from   the  procedure  provided   for   ordinary legislation, it could never have (1)  [1952 ] 1 S. C. R. 89 830 said  that  Art.  368 merely  contained  the  procedure  for amendment  and  that what emerges after  that  procedure  is followed  is ordinary law of the same quality and nature  as emerges  after following the procedure for passing  ordinary law.  If, for example, the assent of the President which  is to  be  found  in  Art.  368 had  not  been  there  and  the Constitution  would  have stood amended after the  Bill  had been  passed  by the two Houses by  necessary  majority  and after  ratification by not less than one-half of the  States where so required , it could never have been argued that the power  to amend the Constitution was contained in  Art.  245 and 248 read with item 97 of List I and Art. 368 merely con- tained the procedure. We are however of opinion that we should look at the quality and  nature  of what is done under Art. 368 and not  lay  so much stress on the similarity of the procedure contained  in Art.  368 with the procedure for ordinary lawmaking.  If  we thus  look at the quality and nature of what is  done  under Art.  368,  we find that it is the exercise  of  constituent power  for the purpose of amending the  Constitution  itself land  is  very  different  from  the  exercise  of  ordinary legislative  power  for  passing  laws  which  must  be   in conformity  with the Constitution and cannot go against  any provision thereof, unless there is express provision to that effect to which we have already referred.  If we thus  refer to the nature and quality of what is done under Art. 368, we immediately  See  that what emerges after the  procedure  in Art.  368 is gone through is not ordinary law which  emerges after   the   legislative   procedure   contained   in   the Constitution  is gone through.  Thus Art. 368  provides  for

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the  coming  into  existence  of  what  may  be  called  the fundamental  law  in  the  form  of  an  amendment  of   the Constitution and therefore what emerges after the  procedure under  Art. 368 is gone through is not ordinary  legislation but  an amendment of the Constitution which becoming a  part of  the  fundamental  law itself, by  virtue  of  the  words contained  in Art. 368 to the effect that  the  Constitution shall  stand  amended in accordance with the  terms  of  the ’Bill. It  is  urged in this connection on behalf of the  Union  of India  that  even  though the assent  of  the  President  is required under Aft. 368, the ;President must assent  thereto and cannot withhold his assent as is possible in the case of ordinary  law in view of Art.  III of the Constitution,  for the words "that he withholds assent therefrom" found in Art. III  are  not  to  be found in  Art.  368.   It  is  however difficult to accept the argument on behalf of the Union that the  President  cannot withhold his assent when a  Bill  for amendment of the Constitution is presented to him.   Article ’368  provides  that  a  Bill  for  the  amendment  of  the, Constitution  shall  be presented to the President  for  his assent.  It further provides 831 that  upon  such assent by the President,  the  Constitution shall,  stand amended.  That in our opinion postulates  that if assent is not given, the Constitution cannot be  amended. Whether  a  President will ever withhold his assent  in  our form of Government is a different matter altogether, but  as we road Art. 368 we cannot. hold that the President is bound to  assent  and cannot withhold his assent when a  Bill  for amendment  of the Constitution is presented to him.  We  are of opinion that ’the President can refuse to give his assent when  a Bill for amendment of the Constitution is  presented to him, the result being that the Bill altogether falls, for there  is no specific provision for anything further  to  be done,: about the Bill in Art. 368 as there is in Art.   III. We  may in this. connection refer to the different  language used  in  cl. 5 of Art. 46 of the Irish  Constitution  which says that "a Bill containing a proposal for the amendment of this Constitution shall be signed by the President Forthwith upon his being satisfied that the provisions of this Article have  been complied with, in respect thereof’.  It  will  be seen  therefore  that if the intention kinder Art.  368  had been that the President cannot withhold his assent, we would have  found  language similar in terms to that in cl.  5  of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution. We thus see that in one respect at any rate Art. 368 even on its present terms differs from the power of the President in connection with ordinary legislation under the  Constitution and  that is if the President withholds his assent the  Bill for  amendment of’ the Constitution immediately  falls.   We cannot accept that the procedure provided under the  proviso to  Art. 111 can apply in such a case, for this much  cannot be  disputed that so far as the procedure for  amendment  of the Constitution is concerned we must look to Art. 368  only and  nothing  else.   In any case the  mere  fact  that  the procedure  in  Art.  368 is very much  assimilated.  to  the procedure for passing ordinary legislation is no reason for, holding that what emerges after the procedure under Art. 368 is followed is ordinary law and no more.  We repeat that  we must  look at the quality and nature of what is  done  under Art.  368, and that is, the amendment of  the  Constitution. If  we  look at that we must bold that what emerges  is  not ordinary  law  passed under the Constitution  but  something which has the effect of amending the fundamental law  itself

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which  could  not be done by  ordinary  legislative  process under the Constitution unless there is express provision  to that  effect.   We  have already referred  to  such  express provisions  in  various  Articles, but Art.  368  cannot  be treated  as such an Article, for it deals specifically  with the amendment of the Constitution as a whole. It  is also remarkable to note in this connection that  the, word  "law" which has been used in so many Articles of  ’the Consti- 832 tution  has been avoided apparently with great care in  Art. 368.  We again refer to the concluding words 368 which  says that  the  "Constitution shall stand amended  in  accordance with  the terms of the Bill.  Now it is well-known  that  in the case of ordinary legislation as soon both Houses and has received  the assent of the main part of Art. stand  amended in ac it is well-known that as the Bill is passed by of  the President it becomes an Act.  But Art. 368 provides that  as soon as the Bill for amendment of the Constitution has  been passed  in accordance with the procedure provided  there  in the  Constitution shall stand amendmend in  accordance  with the  terms  of the Bill.  These words in  our  opinion  have significance of their own.  It is also remarkable that these words  clearly show the difference between the,  quality  of what emerges after the procedure under Art., 368 is followed and  what  happens  when ordinary  law-making  procedure  is followed.   Under  Art.  III, in the case of  ordinary  law- making when a Bill is passed by the two Houses of parliament it  is presented to the President and the  President   shall declare  either  that  he assents to the  Bill  or  that  he withholds assent therefrom.  But it is remarkable that  Art. 111 does not provide that when the Bill has been assented to by  the President it becomes an Act’ The reason for this  is that  the  Bill assented to by the President though  it  may become law is still not declared by Art.  I I I to be a law, for  such  law  is open to challenge in  courts  on  various ,grounds,  namely,  on  the  ground  that  it  violates  any fundamental rights, or on the ground that Parliament was not competent  to pass it or on the ground that it is in  breach of any provision of the Constitution.  On the other hand  we find that when a Bill for the amendment of the  Constitution is  passed  by  requisite majority and assented  to  by  the President,  the  Constitution  itself  ,declares  that   the Constitution  shall  stand amended in  accordance  with  the terms  of  the  Bill.  Thereafter what  courts  can  see  is whether  the  procedure  provided  in  Art.  368  has   been followed,  for if that is not done, the Constitution  cannot stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill.  But if the procedure has been followed, the Constitution  stands amended,  and there is no question of testing the  amendment of  the Constitution thereafter on the anvil of  fundamental rights  or  in  any other way as in  the  case  of  ordinary legislation.  In view of an this we have no doubt that- even though. by accident the procedure  provided in  the Constitution for amendment thereof is very  akin  to the  procedure for passing ordinary legislation,  the  power contained  in  Art. 368 is still  not  ordinary  legislative power  but  constituent power for the  specific  purpose  of amendment of the Constitution; and it is the quality of that power which determines the nature of what emerges after  the procedure  in  Art.  368 has been  followed  and  what  thus emerges  is  not ordinary legislation  but  fundamental  law which  cannot be tested,. for example, under Art.  13(2)  of the  Constitution  or  under  any  other  provision  of  the Constitution.

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833 We  may briefly refer to an argument on behalf of the  Union of  India that the amending power contained in Art.  368  is same sovereign power which was possessed by the  Constituent Assembly  when it made the Constitution and therefore it  is not subject to any fetters of any kind.  We do not think  it necessary  to enter into the academic question as  to  where sovereignty re-sides and whether legal sovereignty is in the people and political. sovereignty in the body which has  the power to amend the Constitution and vice versa.  In our view the words of Art. 368 clearly confer the power to amend  the Constitution  and also provide the procedure for  doing  so, and  that  in  our  opinion is enough  for  the  purpose  of deciding whether the Seventeenth Amendment is valid or  not. Further as we have already stated, the power conferred under Art. 368 is constituent power to change the fundamental  law i.e.  the Constitution, and is distinct and  different  from the  ordinary legislative power conferred on  Parliament  by various  other provisions in the Constitution.  So  long  as this  distinction is kept in mind Parliament would have  the power  under  Art. 368 to amend the  Constitution  and  what Parliament  does under Art. 368 is not  ordinary  law-making which is subject to Art. 13 (2) or any other Article of  the Constitution.  What is the extent of the power conferred  on Parliament   and  whether  there  are  any  limitations   on it--express  or implied-will be considered by us  presently. But we have no doubt, without entering into the question  of sovereignty  and  of  whether  Art.  368  confers  the  same sovereign  power on Parliament as the  Constituent  Assembly had when framing the Constitution, that Art. 368 does confer power  on  Parliament  subject  to  the  procedure  provided therein for amendment of any provision of-the Constitution.. This  brings  us  to  the scope  and  extent  of  the  power conferred,  for amendment under Art. 368.  It is urged  that Art.  368  only  gives  power  to  amend  the  Constitution. Recourse  is  had  on  behalf  of  the  petitioners  to  the dictionary  meaning  of the word, "amendment".  It  is  said that  amendment implies and means improvement in detail  and cannot  take  in  any change in the basic  features  of  the Constitution.  Reference in this connection may be made  to- the  following  meaning of the word "’amend" in  the  Oxford English Dictionary, namely, "to make professed  improvements in  a,  measure  before Parliament; formally,  to  after  in detail, though practically it may be to alter its principle, so  as  to  thwart ". This meaning lit  any  rate  does  not support  the case of the petitioners that  amendment  merely means  such change as results in improvement in detail.   It shows  that  in-law  though amendment  MAY  professedly,  be intended to make- improvements and to alter only in  detail, in  reality, it may make a radical change in  the  provision which is amended.  In any case, as was pointed out in Sajjan Singh’s  case(1)  the word "amend" or "amendment"’  is  well under- (1)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. 834 stood  in law and will certainly include any change  whether by  way  of  addition  or  alteration  or  deletion  of  any provision in the Constitution.  This is no reason to suppose that  when  the word.  "amendment" of the  Constitution  was being  used  in  Art. 368, the intention  was  to  give  any meaning  less than what we have stated above.  To  say  that "amendment"  in  law only means a change ’which  results  in improvement  would make amendments impossible, for what-  is improvement  of an existing law is a matter of  opinion  and what,   for  example,  the  legislature  may   consider   an

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improvement  may  not  be so considered by  others.   It  is therefore  in  our opinion impossible to  introduce  in  the concept  of  amendment  as  used in Art.  368  any  idea  of improvement  as  to details of the Constitution.   The  word "amendment"  used  in Art. 368 must therefore be  given  its full  meaning  as  used  in law  and  that  .means  that  by amendment  an existing Constitution or law can  be   changed and this change can take the form either of addition to  the existing  provisions, or alteration of  existing  provisions and  their  substitution by others or  deletion  of  certain provisions.  altogether.  In this connection  reference  has been  made-to  contrast  certain  other  provisions  of  the Constitution,  where, for example the word "amend" has  been followed  by such words as "by way of addition, variance  or repeal" (see Sixth Schedule, paragraph 2-1) and more or less similar  expressions in other Articles,of the  Constitution. it is very difficult to say fact, that no such words  appear in Art. make any difference, for the meaning of the word why this  was  done.   But  the  368  does  not  in  our,   mind "amendmend"  in law is clearly as indicated above by us  and the  presence or sense, of explanatory words of  the  nature indicated above do not in our opinion make any difference. The  question whether the power of amendment given  by  Art. 368  also ’includes the power to abrogate  the  Constitution completely and to replace it by an entire new  Constitution, does  not  really  arise  in  the  present  case,  for   the Seventeenth  Amendment has not done any such thing and  need not be considered.  It is enough to say that it may be  open to doubt whether the power of amendment   contained in  Art. 568 goes to the extent of completely abrogating the  present Constitution and substituting it by an entirely new    one. But short of that, we are of opinion that the power to amend includes      the  power  to  add  any  provision   to   the Constitution.  to  alter any  provision and  substitute  any other  provision in its place and to delete  any  provision. The Seventeenth Amendment is merely in exercise of the power of amendment a indicated above and cannot be struck down  on the  ground  that  it goes beyond  the  power  conferred  on Parliament to amend the Constitution by Art. 368. The next question that arises is whether there is any  limi- tation on the power of amendment as explained by us above. 835 Limitations may be of two kinds, namely, express or implied. So far as express limitations are concerned, there are  none such in’ Art. 368.  When it speaks of the "amendment of this Constitution it obviously and clearly refers to amendment of any provision thereof, including the provisions contained in Part III relating to fundamental rights.  Whether Art. 13(2) is  an express limitation on the power of amendment will  be considered  by us law, but so far as, Art. 368 is  concerned there  are  no  limitation  whatsoever  in  the  matter   of substance  on  the amending power and any provision  of  the Constitution,  be it in Part III and any other Part, can  be amended under Art. 368. The  next question is whether there are any implied  limita- tions  on the power of amendment contained in Art. 368,  and this  Wags us to the argument that there are  certain  basic features of the Constitution which cannot be amended at  all and there is an implied limitation on the power of amendment contained  in Art. 5-68 so far as these basic  features  are concerned.   We  may in this connection refer  to  the  view prevailing  amongst jurists in the United States of  America as  to whether there are any plied limitations on the  power of amendment contained in Art.  V of the U.S.  Constitution. There are two lines of thought in this matter in the  United

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States.  Some jurists take the, view that there are  certain implied limitations on the power to amend contained in  Art. V  of  the  U.S. Constitution.  These are said  to  be  with respect   to  certain basic features, like,  the  republican character of Government, the federal structure etc.  On  the other  hand,  it is  that the more  prevalent  view  amongst jurists  in the United States is that there are  no  implied limitations on the scope of the amending power in Art.  V of the U.S. Constitution.  Willis on the Constitutional Law  of the  United  States  of  America  (1936-Edition  says   that probably  the  correct position is that the  amending  power embraces  everything;  in  other words there  are  no  legal limitations whatever on the power of amendment, except  what is expressly provided, in Art.  V : (see- discussion on  pp. 1.22   to  127).   Even  with  respect  to   these   express limitations,  Munro in The Government of the  United  States (Fifth  Edition)  at  p. 77 says  that  even  these  express limitations  can be removed and one of the ways of doing  so is "to remove, the exception by a preliminary amendment  and thus  clear  the  way for further action".   Besides,  as  a matter of fact there is no decision of the Supreme Court  of the United States holding that there are implied limitations on  the power of amendment contained in Art.  V of the  U.S. Constitution  and all amendments so far made in  the  United States  have been upheld by the Supreme Court there  in  the few  cases  that  have  been taken  to-it  for  testing  the validity of the amendments. 836 We  have  given careful consideration to the  argument  that certain basic features of our Constitution cannot be amended under  Art.  368 and have come to, the  conclusion  that  no limitations  can be and should be implied upon the power  of amendment  under Art. 368.  One. reason for coming  to  this conclusion  is that if we were to accept that certain  basic features  of the Constitution cannot be amended  under  Art. 368, it will lead to the position that any amendment made to any Article of the Constitution would be liable to challenge before courts on the ground that it amounts to amendment  of a  basic  feature.  Parliament would thus never be  able  to know  what  amendments it can make in the  Constitution  and what  it  cannot; for, till a complete  catalogue  of  basic features  of  the  Constitution is available,  it  would  be impossible  to  make any amendment under Art. 368  with  any certainty  that  it would be upheld by courts.  If  such  an implied limitation were to be put on the power of  amendment contained  in  Art. 368, it would only be the  courts  which would  have the power to decide what are basic  features  of the  Constitution and then to declare whether  a  particular amendment  is  valid or not on the ground that it  amends  a particular basic feature or not.  The .result would be  that every  amendment  made in the Constitution would  provide  a harvest  of  legal wrangles so much so that  Parliament  may never  know what provisions can be amended and what  cannot. The  power to amend being a constituent power cannot in  our opinion  for  these reasons be held subject to  any  implied limitations  thereon  on  the  ground  that  certain   basic features of the Constitution cannot be amended.  We fail  to see  why if there was any intention to make any part of  the Constitution unamendable, the Constituent Assembly failed to indicate  it  expressly in Art. 368.  If, for  example,  the Constitution-makers  intended  certain  provisions  in   the Constitution,  and  Part  III  in  particular,  to  be   not amendable, we can see no reason why it was not so stated  in Art. 368.  On the clear words of Art. 368 which provides for amendment  of  the Constitution which  means  any  provision

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thereof,. we cannot infer an implied limitation on the power of  amendment of any provision of the Constitution’,  be  it basic  or  otherwise.  Our conclusion  is  that  constituent power, like that contained,in Art. 368, can only be  subject to  express limitations and not to any  implied  limitations so,far  as substance of the amendments are concerned and  in the absence of anything in Art. 368 making any provision  of the Constitution unamendable, it Must be held that the power to.  amend  in  Art. .3 68 reaches every  provision  of  the Constitution and can be used to amend any provision  thereof provided the procedure indicated, in Art. 368 is followed. Copious references were made during the course of  arguments to debates in Parliament and it is urged that it is open  to this 837 Court  to look into the debates in order to  interpret  Art. 368  to find out the intention of the  Constitution  makers. We  are of opinion that we cannot and should not  look  into the  debates that took place in the Constituent Assembly  to determine  the interpretation of Art. 368 and the scope  and extent  of  the  provision contained  therein.   It  may  be conceded  that  historical background and perhaps  what  was accepted  or what was rejected by the  Constituent  Assembly while  the Constitution was being framed, may be taken  into account  in  finding out the scope and extent of  Art.  368. But we have no doubt that what was spoken in the debates  in the  Constituent  Assembly cannot and should not  be  looked into- in order to interpret Art. 368.  Craies on Statute Law (Sixth  Edition) at p. 128 says that "it is not  permissible in discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment, to  refer to ’parliamentary history’ of a statute, in the sense of the debates which took place in Parliament when the statute  was under  consideration", and supports his view with  reference to a large number of English cases.  The same is the view in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, (11th Edition) p. 26. Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edition) at p.  340 says  that  resort may not be had to  debates  to  ascertain legislative Intent though historical background in which the legislation   came   to  be  passed,  can  be   taken   into consideration-. In  Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Lai  Mullick(1), the Privy Council held that "proceedings of the  legislature cannot be referred to as legitimate aids to the construction of the Act in which they result." In  Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxation(2), it was said  that reference  to  historical  facts can be  made  in  order  to interpret a statute.  There was however no reference to  the debates  in order to arrive at the meaning of  a  particular provision of the Constitution there in dispute. In  A. K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras(3), Kania C.J.  re- ferring to the debates and reports of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly in respect of the words of  Art. 21  observed  at  p. I 10 that they might  not  be  read  to control  the meaning of the Article.  In that case all  that was accepted was that "due process of law" which was a  term used  in the.  U.S. Constitution, was not accepted  for  the purpose  of Art. 21 which used the words  44  the  procedure established  by law".  Patanjali Sastri J. (at p. 202)  also refused  to  look  at  the  debates  ’and  particularly  the speeches made in order to determine the meaning of Art.  21. Fazl Ali, J. (at p. 158) was of opinion that the pro- (1) [1895] 22 LA. 107.  (2) [1907] 4 C.L.R. 1087. (3) [1950] S.C.R. 88. Sup.CI/67-8 838

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ceedings  and discuss ions In Constituent Assembly were  not relevant for the purpose of construing the expressions  used in Art. 2 1. Again in The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Limited v. the State   of  Rajasthan(.’),  this  Court  looked   into   the historical  background but refused to look into the  debates in  order to determine the meaning of the provisions of  the Constitution in dispute in that case. We are therefore of opinion that it is not possible to  read the  speeches made in the Constituent Assembly in  order  to interpret  An. 368 or to define its extent and scope and  to determine what it,takes in and what it does not.  As to this historical  facts..  namely, what was accepted or  what  was avoided in the Constituent Assembly in connection with  Art. 368, it is enough to say that we have not been able to  find any  help  from the material relating to this.   There  were proposals for restricting the power of amendment under  Art. 368 and making fundamental rights immune from and there were counter proposals before the Constituent assembly for making the  power, of amendment all embracing They were all  either dropped or negatived and in the circumstanses are of no help in determining the interpretation of Art. 368 which must  be interpreted on the words thereof as they finally found place in  the  Constitution, and on those words we have  no  doubt that  there  are no implied limitations of any kind  on  the power to amend given therein. An argument is also raised that limitations on the power  to amend  the Constitution can be found in the preamble to  the Constitution.   As to that we may refer only to in  re:  the Berubari  Union and Exchange of Enclaves(2) with respect  to the  value  of  the preamble to  the  Constitution  and  its importance   therein.    It  was  observed  in   that   case unanimously by a Bench of nine judges that "although it  may be correct to describe the preamble as a key to the mind  of the Constitution-makers, it form no part of the Constitution and  cannot  be regarded as the source  of  any  substantive power which the body of the Constitution alone can confer on the  Government  ,  expressly or by  implication.   This  is equally  true to prohibitions and limitations".   The  Court there was considering whether the preamble could in any  way limit  the  power  of Parliament to cede  any  part  of  the national  teritory and held that it was not correct  to  say that "the preamble  in any way limit the power of Parliament to  cede parts of the national territory".  On a parity,  of reasoning  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  preamble  cannot prohibit  or  control  in  any way  or  impose  any  implied prohibitions  or  limitations  oft Me  power  to  amend  the Constitution contained in Art. 368. (1) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491.       (2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250.        839 This  brings  us to the question whether the word  "law"  in Art.  13 (2) includes an amendment of the Constitution,  and therefore  there  is an express provision in Art.  1  3  (2) which at least limits the power of amendment under Art. 3 68 to  this  extent that by such amendment  fundamental  rights guaranteed by Part 111 cannot be taken away or abridged.  We have already pointed out that in Sankari Prasad’s case(1) as well as Sajjan Singh’s case(1) it has already been held,  in one case unanimously and in the other by majority, that  the word  "law" in Art. 13(2) does not include an  amendment  of the  Constitution,  and it is the correctness of  this  view which  is being imputed before this Bench, Article 13 is  in three  parts.   The first part lays down that "all  laws  in force  in  the territory of India  immediately   before  the commencement  of  this  Constitution, insofar  as  they  are

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inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent  of  such  inconsistency,  be  void".   Further   all previous constitutional,provisions were repealed by Art. 395 which provided that "’the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935,  together  with  all enactments amending or supplementing the latter Act, but not including  the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction  Act, 1949, are hereby repealed."’ Thus it is clear that the  word "law"  in Art. 13(1) does not include any law in the  nature of  a  constitutional provision, for no  such  law  remained after the repeal’in Art. 395. Then comes the second part of Art. 13, which says that State shall  not  make any law which takes away  or  abridges  the rights   conferred  by  this  Part  and  any  law  made   in contravention  of  this clause shall, to the extent  of  the contravention,  be void".  The third part defines  the  word "law"  for  the  purpose  of  Art.  13;  the  definition  is inclusive  and  not  exhaustive.   It  is  because  of   the definition in cl. (3-) of Art. 13 being inclusive that it is urged  that  the  word  "law" in Art.  13  (2)  includes  an amendment  of the Constitution also.  Now we see  no  reason why  if the word "law" in Art. 13(1) relating to  past  laws does not include any constitutional provision the word "law" in  cl. (2) would take in an amendment of the  Constitution, for  it would be reasonable to the word "law"’in Art.  13(2) includes  an  amendment  of  the 13.  But  apart  from  this consideration, we are of opinion that the word "law" in  Art 13(2) could never have been intended to take in an amendment of  the Constitution.  What Art. 13(2) means is that  a  law made under the constitutional provisions would, be tested on the  anvil  of  Part III and if it takes  away  or  abridges rights conferred by Part III it would be void to the  extent of the contraventions.  There are many Articles in the  Con- stitution,  which  directly for making law  in  addition  to Articles  245, 246, 248, etc. and the three  Lists  and-Aft. 13(2) (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R 933. 840 prohibits  the  State  from  making  any  law  under   these provisions.   We see no difficulty in the  circumstances  in holding  that Art. 13 (2) when it talks of the State  making any  law,  refers  to  the law  made  under  the  provisions contained in Ch.  I of Part XI of the Constitution beginning with Art. 245 and also other provisions already referred  to earlier.  Article 246 provides that Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and  the legislature  of a State may make laws for the whole  or  any part of the State.  Article 246(1) gives exclusive power  to Parliament to make laws with respect to subjects  enumerated in  List  1. Article 246(3) gives exclusive power  to  State legislatures to make laws with respect to List II.   Article 248(1) gives exclusive power to Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent  List or  the  State List.  We are referring to  these  provisions merely  to show that the various provisions in Chapter I  of Part XI provide for making laws,and these laws are all  laws which  are  made under the legislative  power  conferred  on Parliament or on State legislatures under the  Constitution. Therefore when in Art. 13( ) it is said that the State shall not  make  any  law (State there  including  Parliament  and legislature  of each State), its meaning could only take  in laws  made  by Parliament and State legislatures  under  the powers conferred under Chapter I of Part XI. and also  other provisions  already  referred to earlier.  We  have  already

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held that the power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 368 along with the procedure and that such power  is not  to  be  found  in Art. 248 read  item  97  of  List  I. Therefore  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  is  not  an ordinary law made under the powers conferred under Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution and cannot be subject to Art. 13(2) where the word "law" must be read as meaning law  made under  the  ordinary  legislative power.   We  have  already referred  to a large number of Articles where Parliament  is given the power to make law with respect to those  Articles. So far as this power of Parliament is concerned it is  ordi- nary  legislative power and it will certainly be subject  to Art. 13 (2).  But there can in our opinion be no doubt  that when  Art.  13(2) prohibits the State from  making  any  law which  takes away or abridges rights conferred by Part  III, it is only referring to ordinary legislative power conferred on  Parliament and legislatures of States and  cannot  halve any reference to the constituent power for amendment of  the Constitution contained in Art. 368.  We  have  already  pointed out that there  are  no  implied limitative  on the power to amend under Art. 368 and  it  is open  to Parliament under that Article to amend any part  of the Constitution, including Part M. It is worth  remembering that  a whole Part XX is devoted by the  Constitution-makers to the subject of 841 amendment  of the Constitution.  If it was  their  intention that  Part  III of the Constitution will not  be  liable  to amendment  by  way of abridgement or  abrogation  under  the amending power contained in Art. 368 we see no reason why an express  provision to that effect was not made in Art.  368. We  cannot see what prevented the Constituent Assembly  from making  that clear by an express provision in Art. 368.   It is however said that it was not necessary to say so in  Art. 368,  because the provision was already made in Art.  13(2). We  are  unable to accept this contention, for  we  have  no doubt  that Art. 13(2), when it refers to making of laws  is only referring to the ordinary legislative power and not  to the constituent power which results in amendment of the Con- stitution.    In   any  case  it  seems   to   us   somewhat contradictory that in Art. 368 power should have been  given to  amend  any  provision of the  Constitution  without  any limitations  but indirectly that power is limited  by  using words  of doubtful import in Art. 13(2).  It  is  remarkable that  in  Art.  13(2) there is  no  express  provision  that amendment  of  the Constitution, under Art.  368,  would  be subject  thereto.  It seems strange indeed that  no  express provision  was  made in Part XX in this matter and  even  in Art. 13(2) no express provision is made to this effect,  and in both places the matter is left in a state of uncertainty. It is also remarkable that in Art. 368 the word "law", which we   find  so  often  used  in  so  many  Articles  of   the Constitution   is   conspicuously   avoided,   and   it   is specifically provided that after the procedure has been gone through  the Constitution shall stand amended in  accordance with  the terms of the Bill.  This language of Art.  368  is very  significant and clearly makes a distinction between  a constitutional  Amendment and an ordinary law passed  as  an Amending Act.  The validity of a law has to be determined at the time when the Bill actually matures into an Act and  not at  the  stage while it is still a Bill.  The  provision  in Art.  368  has  the effect that when  a  Bill  amending  the Constitution  receives  the  assent of  the  President,  the Constitution stands amended in accordance with the terms  of the Bill.  The Constitution thus stands amended in terms  of

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the  Bill  if  the  Bill has  been  introduced,  passed  and assented  to  by  the  President  in  accordance  with   the procedure  laid down in Art. 368 and not as a result of  the Bill becoming an Amendment Act introducing amendment in  the Constitution.   The  provision that the  Constitution  shall stand amended in terms of the Bill was thus clearly intended to  indicate that the amendment of the Constitution  is  not dependent on the Bill being treated as a law or an Act  duly passed  by Parliament.  Thus it is clear that by  indicating that the Constitution is to stand amended in accordance with the  terms of the Bill, Art. 368 clearly envisages that  the power of amendment of the Constitution stands on an entirely different footing from an ordinary law made by Parliament in exercise of its legislative power. 842 If  We keep in mind this difference, between  constitutional amendment or constitutional law and an ordinary amending Act or law, it should not be difficult to hold that when Art  13 (2),  speaks of the St-ate making a law, it is referring  to ordinary law made under the powers conferred by Art. 245 etc read  with  various  Lists and  various  provisions  of  the Constitution where express provision to that effect has been made   and  is  not  referring  to  the  amendment  of   the Constitution  which  is made under the  ’constituent  power. Once it is held that the power to amend is found in Art. 368 and is not to be found in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I,  it must follow that the power to amend the  Constitution under  Art.  368 is a different power  (namely,  constituent power)  and when Art. 13 (2) speaks of making ’law,  it  can only  refer  to making ordinary law,  particularly  when  we compare  the words of Art. 13 (2) (namely, the  State  shall not  make any law) and the words of Arts. 245, 248, and  250 (which   all   speak  of  Parliament  making   law,   State- legislatures making law, and so on). Lastly,  as  the power to amend is in Art. 368  and  on  the words,  as  they  stand  in  that  Article,  that  power  is unfettered  and includes the power to amend Part III, it  is strange  that  that power should be limited  by  putting  an interpretation on the word "law" in Art. 13(2), which  would include  constitutional  law  also.   There  is  nothing  to suggest  this even in the inclusive definition of the  words "law"  and  "laws in force" in Art. 13(3).  Besides,  it  is conceded  on behalf of the petitioners that Art.  368  gives power to amend Part 111, but that power is only to amend one way,  namely,  towards enlargement of the  rights  contained therein,  and not the other way, namely, for,  abridging  or taking  away  the rights contained therein.  W.-,  must  say that  it  would  require  a  very  clear  provision  in  the Constitution  to  read the power to amend  the  Constitution relating  to Part III in this manner.  We cannot  find  that clear  provision in Art. 1 3 (2).  We repeat that  when  the Constituent  Assembly was taking the trouble of providing  a whole  Part for amendment of the Constitution and  when  the words  in  Art.  368 clearly give the  power  to  amend  the Constitution  and are subject to no implied limitations  and contain no express limitations, it is strange indeed that it should  have  omitted to provide in that very  Article  that Part III is not liable to amendment thereunder.  In any case if the power of amendment conferred by the words of Art. 368 is unfettered, we must avoid any inconsistency between  that power and the provision contained in Art. 13 (2).  We  avoid that  in  keeping with the unfettered power in Art.  368  by reading the word "law" in Art. 13 (2) as meaning law  passed under: ordinary legislative power and thus not including  an amendment of the Constitution therein.  The words in  Art.II

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(2)  are  in our opinion not specific and clear’  enough  to take in 843 the  power of amendment under Art. 368 and must be  confined only to the power of ordinary law-making contained in  Arts. 245 etc., and other provisions of the Constitution read with various Lists.  We have therefore no hesitation in  agreeing with  the view taken in Sankari Prasad’s case(1)  which  was upheld by the majority in Sajjan Singh’s case(2). The  next argument is that action under the proviso to  Art. 368  is necessary as the Seventeenth Amendment  affects  the power  of the High Court contained in Art. 226.  It is  said that  by  including various Acts in the Ninth  Schedule  and making  them  immune  from challenge  under  the  provisions contained  in  Part III, the power of the High  Court  under Art.  226  is  affected inasmuch as the  High  Court  cannot strike  down any of the Acts included in the Ninth  Schedule on  the  ground that they take away or  abridge  the  rights conferred by Part III.  So it is said that there has been  a change in Art. 226 and it was necessary that the Seventeenth Amendment  should have been ratified by more than  half  the States under the proviso.  A similar argument was raised  in Sankari  Prasad’s case(1) and was turned  down  unanimously. The same argument was again raised in Sajjan Singh’s case(2) and  was  also turned down.  Now  ratification  is  required under the proviso if the amendment seeks to make any  change in  various  provisions  mentioned  therein  and  one   such provision  is Art. 226.  The question therefore  is  whether the   Seventeenth Amendment makes any change in Art. 226 and whether  this change has to be a direct change in the  words of  Art.  226 or whether merely because there  may  be  some effect  by the Seventeenth Amendment on the, content of  the power in Art. 226 it will amount to change in Art. 226.   We are  of opinion that when the proviso lays down  that  there must  be  ratification  when  there is  any  change  in  the entrenched  provisions,   including Art. 226, it means  that there  must be actual change in the terms of  the  provision concerned.   If  there is no actual change directly  in  the entrenched  provision, no ratification is required, even  if any amendment of any other provision of the Constitution may have  some  effect indirectly on the  entrenched  provisions mentioned in the proviso.  But it is urged that there may be such  a  change in some other provision as  would  seriously affect   an  entrenched  provision,  and  in  such  a   case ratification  should be necessary.  This argument  was  also dealt  with  ’in  the majority judgment  in  Sajjan  Singh’s case(2) where the doctrine of pith and substance was applied and  it  was  held that where the  amendment  in  any  other Article so affects the entrenched Article as to amount to an amendment therein, then ratification may be necessary,  even though  the entrenched Article may not be directly  touched. Perhaps the use of the doctrine of pith and substance (1) [1952] S. C. R. 89. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.P. 933. 844 in  such  a case is not quite apt.  But what  was  meant  in Sajjan  Singh’s  case(1)  was  that  if  there  is  such  an amendment  of an unentrenched Article that it will  directly affect  an  entrenched  Article  and  necessitate  a  change therein, then recourse must be had to ratification under the proviso.   We may illustrate this by two examples.   Article 226  lays  down inter alia that the High  Court  shall  have power  to  issue  writs for the enforcement of  any  of  the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.  Now assume  that Part III is completely deleted by amendment  of

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the Constitution.  If that takes place, it will  necessitate an amendment of Art. 226 also and deletion therefrom of  the words "for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III".  We have no doubt that if such a contingency ever happens and Part III is completely deleted, Parliament  will amend  Art. 226 also and that will necessitate  ratification under  the proviso.  But suppose Parliament  merely  deletes Part  III  and  does not make  the  necessary  consequential amendment in Art. 226, it can then be said that deletion  of Part III necessitates change in Art. 226 also, and therefore in  such  a  case ratification  is  necessary,  even  though Parliament  may not have in fact provided for  amendment  of Art 226. Take  another example.  Article 54 is an entrenched  Article and provides for the election of the President.  So is  Art. 55  which provides for the manner of election.   Article  52 which  lays down that there shall be a President is  on  the other hand not an entrenched Article.  It is said that  Art. 52  may be altered and something else may be substituted  in its  place and that would not require ratification in  terms as Art. 52 is not among the entrenched Articles.  But we are of opinion that if Parliament amends Art. 52, it is bound to make consequential amendments in Arts. 54 and 55 which  deal with  the election of the President and the  manner  thereof and  if it is so the entire amendment must be submitted  for ratification.  But suppose Parliament merely amends Art.  52 and makes no change in Arts. 54 and 55 (a supposition  which is  impossible to visualise).  In that case it would in  our opinion  be right to hold that Art. 52 could not be  altered by abolition of the office of the President without necessi- tating  a  change in Arts. 54 and 55 and in such a  case  if Art.  52  alone  is altered by Parliament,  to  abolish  the office of President, it will require ratification. These two examples will show where alteration or deletion of an  unentrenched Article would necessitate amendment  of  an entrenched  Article, and in such a case if Parliament  takes the  incredible  course of amending  only  the  unentrenched Article and not amending the entrenched Article, courts  can say that ratifi- (1)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. 845 cation  is  necessary  even for  amending  the  unentrenched Article,  for  it  directly necessitates,  a  change  in  an entrenched  Article.   But short of that we are  of  opinion that  merely because there is some effect indirectly  on  an entrenched  Article by amendment of an unentrenched  Article it  is  not necessary that there should be  ratification  in such circumstances also. Besides,  let us consider what would happen if the  argument on  behalf of the petitioners is accepted that  ratification is  necessary whenever there is even indirect effect  on  an entrenched  Article  by amending  an  unentrenched  Article. Take  the  case of Art. 226 itself.. It gives power  to  the High  Court not only to issue writs for the  enforcement  of fundamental rights but to issue them for any other  purpose. Writs  have  thus been issued by High Courts  for  enforcing other  rights  conferred by ordinary laws as well  as  under other  provisions  of the Constitution, like Arts.  301  and 311.   On this argument if any change is made in  Arts.  301 and  311  there  is bound to be an effect on  Art.  216  and therefore ratification would be necessary, even though  both Arts.  301  and  311  are not  entrenched  in  the  proviso. Further,  take an ordinary law which confers certain  rights and it is amended and those rights are taken away.   Article 226  would be clearly affected.  Before the amendment  those

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rights  may  be enforced through Art. 226  while  after  the amendment  the  rights having disappeared there  can  be  no enforcement  thereof.  Therefore, on this argument  even  if there is amendment of ordinary law there would be an  effect on Art. 226 and it must therefore be amended every time even when ordinary law is changed and the entire procedure  under Art.  368 must be gone through including ratification  under the  proviso.  It is however said that when ordinary law  is amended, rights disappear and therefore there is no question of  enforcement thereof; if that is correct with respect  to ordinary  law,  it is in our opinion  equally  correct  with respect to the amendment of an unentrenched provision of the Constitution.  The answer given in Sankari Prasad’s  case(1) to this argument was that Art. 226 remained just the same as it  was before, and only a certain class of cases  had  been excluded  from the purview of Part III and the courts  could no longer interfere, not because their powers were curtailed in  any manner or to any extent, but because there would  be no  occasion thereafter for the exercise of their  power  in such  cases.  We respectfully agree with these  observations and  are  of  opinion  that merely  because  there  is  some indirect  effect on Art. 226 it was not necessary  that  the Seventeenth Amendment should have been ratified by more than one half of the States.  It is only in the extreme case, the examples of which we have given above, that an amendment  of an  unentrenched  Article without  amendment  of  entrenched Article (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89. 846 might be had for want of ratification, and this is what  was intended-  by  the  majority  judgment  in  Sajjan   Singh’s case(1), when it applied the doctrine of pith and  substance in  these circumstances.  The argument that ratification  is necessary  as Art. 226 is indirectly affected has  therefore no  force and must be rejected.  This is equally  true  with respect to the power of this Court under Arts. 132 and 136. Then  it  is  urged  that  Art.  245  is  enlarged  by   the Seventeenth  Amendment  inasmuch as State  legislatures  and Parliament  were freed from the control of Part III  in  the matter  of  certain laws affecting,  for  example.  ryotwari lands,  and therefore as Art. 245 is an  entrenched  Article there should have been ratification under the proviso.  This argument in our opinion is of the same type as the  argument with respect to the effect on Art. 226 and our answer is the same, namely, that there is no direct effect on Art. 245  by the  amendment  and the indirect effect, if.-any,  does  not require  that  there should have been  ratification  in  the present case. It is then urged that ratification is necessary as Art. 31-B deals  with  State legislation and in  any  case  Parliament cannot make, any law with respect to Acts which were put  in the Ninth Schedule and therefore Parliament could not  amend the  Constitution  in  the manner in which it  was  done  by making  additions in the  Ninth Schedule, both for  want  of ratification  and for want of legislative  competence.   The answer  to  this  argument was  given  in  Sahkari  Prasad’s case(2) and it was observed there that-               "Article  31-A and 31-B really seek to save  a               certain  class of laws and  certain  specified               laws   already   passed  from   the   combined               operation of Art. 13 read with other  relevant               Articles of Part III.  The new Articles  being               thus   essentially  amendments  of  the   Con-               stitution,   Parliament  had  the   power   of               enacting them.  That laws thus saved relate to

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             matters covered by List II does not in any way               affect   the  position.   It  was  said   that               Parliament  could not validate a law which  it               had no power to enact.  The proposition  holds               good  where.  the  validity  of  the  impugned               provision turns on whether the subject matter,               falls  within or without the  jurisdiction  of               the legislature which passed it.. But to  make               a  law  which  contravenes  the  Constitution,               constitutionally   valid   is  a   matter   of               constitutional amendment and as such it  falls               within the exclusive power of Parliament." (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 89. 847 We   respectfully  agree  with  these  observations.    They succinctly  put the legal and constitutional  position  with respect to the ’validity of Arts, 3 1 A and 3 1 B.  It seems to  us  that  Art.  3 1 B in  particular  is  a  legislative drafting  device  which  compendiously  puts  in  one  place amendments  which  would otherwise have been  added  to  the Constitution  under various Articles in Part III.  The  laws in the Ninth Schedule have by the device of Art. 3 1 B  been excepted  from  the various provisions in Part  ]III,  which affected  them  and  this exception could only  be  made  by Parliament.   The  infirmity in the Arts put  in  the  Ninth Schedule was apprehended to be a constitutional infirmity on the ground that those laws might take away or abridge rights conferred by Part HI. Such a constitutional infirmity  could not be cured by State legislatures in any way and could only be  cured by Parliament by constitutional  amendment.   What Parliament  in  fact did by including various  Acts  in  the Ninth Schedule read with Art. 3 1 B was to amend the various provisions in Part III, which affected these Acts by  making them  an  exception to those provisions in Part  III.   This could only be done by Parliament under the constituent power it  had  under  Art. 368 and there was no  question  of  the application  of the proviso in such a case,  for  Parliament was amending Part III only with respect to these laws.   The laws  had already been passed by State legislatures  and  it was their constitutional infirmity, if any, which was  being cured  by  the device adopted in Art. 3 1 B  read  with  the Ninth  Schedule, the amendment ’being only of  the  relevant provisions  of Part III which was compendiously put  in  one place  in  Art. 3 1 B.  Parliament could alone do  it  under Art.  368  and there was no necessity for  any  ratification under  the  proviso,  for  amendment  of  Part  III  is  not entrenched in the proviso. Nor  is  there  any force in the  argument  that  Parliament could’ not validate those laws by curing the  constitutional infirmity  because they dealt with land which is in List  11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution over which State Legislatures have exclusive legislative power.  The laws had already  been  passed  by  State  legislatures  under  their exclusive  powers;  what has been done  by  the  Seventeenth Amendment is to cure the constitutional’ infirmity, if  any, in  these laws in relation to Part III.  That could only  be done  by  Parliament  and in so  doing  Parliament  was  not encroaching on the exclusive legislative power of the State. The States had already passed the laws and all that was done by the Seventeenth Amendment was to cure any  constitutional infirmity  in  the  laws  by including  them  in  the  Ninth Schedule read with Art. 31-B.  We must therefore reject  the argument    that   the   Seventeenth   Amendment    required ratification  because  laws put in the Ninth  Schedule  were

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State  law-,.  We must equally reject the argument  that  as these laws dealt with land, which is in the- 848 exclusive legislative power of State legislature, Parliament could  not  cure the constitutional infirmity,  if  any,  in these laws by putting them in the Ninth Schedule. We now come to what may be called the argument of fear.   It is  urged that if Art. 368 confers complete power  to  amend each and every provision of the Constitution as we have held that  it does-frightful consequences will follow on such  an interpretation.  If Parliament is clothed with such a  power to  amend  the Constitution it may proceed to do  away  with fundamental  rights  altogether,  it  may  abolish   elected legislatures, it may change the present form of  Government, it  may  do  away with the federal structure  and  create  a unitary  state  instead, and so on. It is  therefore  argued that we should give a limited interpretation to the power of amendment  contained in Art. 368, as otherwise we  shall  be giving  power  to  Parliament to  destroy  the  Constitution itself. This  argument is really a political argument and cannot  be taken into account in interpreting Art. 368 when its meaning to our mind is clear.  But as the argument was urged with  a good deal of force on behalf of the petitioners and was  met with  equal force on behalf of the Union and the States,  we propose  to  deal with it briefly.  Now,  if  this  argument means  that  Parliament  may abuse its  power  of  amendment conferred  by  Art. 368, all that need be said in  reply  is that  mere  possibility  of abuse cannot  result  in  courts withholding the power if the Constitution grants it.  It  is well-settled so far as ordinary laws are concerned that mere possibility of abuse will not induce courts to hold that the power  is  not  there, if the law is  valid  and  its  terms clearly confer the power.  The same principle in our opinion applies  to the Constitution.  If the Constitution  gives  a certain  power and its terms are clear, there is  no  reason why  that  power  should  be  withheld  simply  because   of possibility  of  abuse.  If we may say  so,  possibility  of abuse of any power granted to any authority is always there; and if possibility of abuse is a reason for withholding  the power,  no  power  whatever can ever  be  conferred  on  any authority,  be it "executive, legislative or even  judicial. Therefore,  the  so-called fear of  frightful  consequences, which  has  been urged on behalf of the Petitioners  (if  we hold, as we do, that the power to amend the Constitution  is unfettered  by  any implied limitations), is no  ground  for withholding the power, for we have no reason to suppose that Parliament  on whom such power is ,conferred will abuse  it. Further  even  if  it abuses  the  power  of  constitutional amendment under Art. 368 the check in such circumstances  is not  in  courts but is in the people who  elect  members  of Parliament.  The argument for giving a limited 849 meaning  to  Art. 368 because of possibility of  abuse  must therefore be rejected. The other aspect of this argument of fear is that we  should not  make  the Constitution too flexible so that it  may  be open   to   the  requisite  majority  with   the   requisite ratification   to  make  changes  too  frequently   in   the Constitution.   It  is  said that  the  Constitution  is  an organic document for the governance of the country and it is expected  to  endure and give stability to  the  institution which it provides.  That is undoubtedly so and this is. very true  of a written federal Constitution.  But a perusal  of. various  Constitutions  of the world shows  that  there  are

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usually provisions for amendment of the Constitution in  the Constitution itself.  This power to amend a Constitution may be rigid or flexible in varying degrees.  Jurists have  felt that  where the power to amend the Constitution is made  too rigid  and the people outgrow a particular Constitution  and feel  that it should be amended but cannot do so because  of the   rigidity   of  the  Constitution,   they   break   the Constitution,  and this breaking is more often than  not  by violent revolution.  It is admitted by even those writers on the  United  States Constitution who are of  the  view  that there are certain basic features which cannot be amended and who would thus make the U. S. Constitution even more  rigid’ than it is; that howsoever rigid the Constitution may be its rigidity  will not stop the people from breaking it if  they have  outgrown it and this breaking is, generally  speaking, by violent revolution.  So, making our Constitution rigid by putting the interpretation which the petitioners want us  to put on it will not stop the frightfulness which is  conjured up before us on behalf of the petitioners.  If anything,  an interpretation which will make our Constitution rigid in the manner  in which the petitioner want the amending  power  in Art.  368 to be interpreted will make a violent  revolution, followed  by  frightfulness  of which  the  petitioners  are afraid,  a nearer possibility than an  interpretation  which will make it flexible. It  is clear that our Constitution-makers wanted  to  avoid’ making the Constitution too rigid.  It is equally clear that they  did not want to make an amendment of the  Constitution too easy.  They preferred an intermediate course which would make,the Constitution flexible and would still not allow  it to be amended too easily.  That is why Art. 368 provides for special  majorities  of the two Houses for  the  purpose  of amendment of the Constitution.  Besides it also provides for ratification  by  more  than  half the  States  in  case  of entrenched  Provisions  in the proviso.   Subject  to  these limitations,  the  Constitution has  been,  made  moderately flexible  to  allow  any change when the  people  feel  that change is necessary.  The necessity for special majorities 850 in   each   House  separately  and,   the   necessity   for, ratification  by more than half the States in certain  cases appear to us to be sufficient safeguards to prevent too easy change in the Constitution without making it too rigid.  But it  is said that, in the last sixteen Years, a large  number of  amendments have been made to the constitution  and  that shows that the power to amend is much too easy and should be restricted   by  judicial  interpretation.   Now,   judicial interpretation  cannot restrict the power on the basis of  a political  argument.  It has to interpret  the  Constitution and   finds  it  on  the  basis  of   well-known,canons   of construction,and on the terms of Art. 368 in particular.  If on those terms it is clear    we  think it is-that power  to amend is subject to no limitations except   those   to    be expressly found in the Constitution, courts must give effect to  that.  The fact that ’m the last sixteen years  a  large number of amendments could be made and have been made is  in our  opinion  due to the accident that one  party  has  been returned  by electors in sufficient strength to be  able  to command the special majorities which are required under Art. 368, not only at the Centre but also in all the Stites.  It’ is  because  of this circumstance that we have had  so  many amendments  in  the course of the last sixteen  years.   But that  in  our opinion is no ground for  limiting  the  clear words of Art. 368. The  power of amendment contained in a written federal  Con-

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stitution is a safety valve which to a large extent provides for stable growth and makes violent revolution more or  less unnecessary.  It has been said by text-book writers that the power of amendment, though it allows for change, also  makes a Constitution long lived and stable and serves the needs of the  people  from time to time.  If this power to  amend  is made  too rigid it loses its value as a safety  valve.   The more rigid a Constitution the more likely it is that  people will  outgrow it and throw it over-board violently.  On  the other  hand, if the Constitution is flexible (though it  may not  be made too easy to modify it) the power  of  amendment provides  for stability of the Constitution itself  and  for ordered progress of  the nation.  If therefore there had  to be  a  choice between giving an interpretation-to  Art.  368 which  would  make  our Constitution  rigid  and  giving  an interpretation which would make it flexible, we would prefer to make it flexible, so that it may endure for a long period of time and may, if necessary, be amended from time to  time in  accordance with the progress in the ideas of the  people for whom it is meant.  But we feel that it is not  necessary to  go to this extent, for that would be entering  into  the field of politics.  As we see the terms of Art. 368, we  are clearly  Df  opinion that the Constitutionmakers  wanted  to make  our  Constitution reasonably flexible and  ,.that  the interpretation that we have given to Art. 368 is in 851 consonance with the terms thereof and the intention of those who  made  it.   We therefore reject the  argument  of  fear altogether. This  brings us to the argument of stare decisis  raised  on behalf  of the Union of India and the States.  The  argument is  put  thus.  After the decision of the Patna  High  Court invalidating  the Bihar Land Reforms Act,  1950,  Parliament passed  the  First  Amendment  to  the  Constitution.   That Amendment  was challenged in this Court by a number of  writ petitions  and  was upheld in Sankari  Prasad’s  case(-)  in 1951.  That case practically stood unchallenged till  Sajjan Singh’s case(2) in 1964 after the Seventeenth Amendment  was passed.   Thus in the course of these fifteen years or so  a large  number of State Acts were passed on the basis of  the First  Amendment by which in particular Arts. 31-A and  31-B were introduced in the Constitution.  It is said that though Sankari  Prasad’s case (1) has stood for less than 15  years there  have been so many laws dealing with agrarian  reforms passed on the basis of the First Amendment which was  upheld by this Court that the short period for which that case  has stood  should not stand- in the way of this Court acting  an the  principle  of, stare decisis.  The reason for  this  is that  an agrarian revolution, has taken place all  over  the country  after the First Amendment by State laws  passed  on the faith of the decision of this Court in Sankari  Prasad’s case(1).   This agrarian revolution has led to  millions  of acres  of  land  having changed hands and  millions  of  now titles  having  been created.  So it is urged that  the  un- animous  decision  in Sankari Prasad’s  case(2),  which  was challenged when the Seventeenth Amendment was passed and was upheld by majority in Sajjan Singh’s case(2) should not  now be  disturbed as its disturbance would create chaos  in  the country,   particularly  in  the  agrarian-   sector   which constitutes  the  vast majority of the  population  in  this country. We  are  of opinion that there is force in this  argument  . Though  the  period for which Sankari Prasad’s  case(1)  has stood  unchallenged  is  not long, the  effects  which  have followed in, the passing of State laws on the faith of  that

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decision’,  are so overwhelming that we should  not  disturb the decision in that case.  It is not disputed that millions of  acres  of land have changed hands and  millions  of  new titles in agricultural lands have been created and the State laws  dealing with Agricultural land which have been  passed in  the course of the last fifteen years after the  decision in  Samkari Prasad’s case(1) have brought about an  agrarian revolution.   Agricultural  population  constitutes  a  vast majority  of  the  population in  this  country.   In  these circumstances  it would in our opinion be wrong to hold  now that (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. 852 Sankari Prasad’s case (1) was not correctly decided and thus disturb all that has been done during the last fifteen years and  create  chaos  into  the  lives  of  millions.  of  our countrymen  who  have benefited by these laws  relating,  to agrarian reforms.  We would in the circumstances accept  the argument on behalf of the Union of India and the States that this is the fittest possible case in which the principle  of stare decisis should be applied.  On this basis also,  apart from  our  view that Sankari Prasad’s case (1) was  in  fact rightly  decided, we would not interfere with that  decision now. But  it is urged that instead of following the principle  of stare  decisis  which  would make die  decision  in  Sankari Prasad’s  case(1) good for all times., we should follow  the doctrine of prospective over-ruling, which has been  evolved by  some  United States courts so that everything  that  has been  done  up to now, including the  Seventeenth  Amendment would  be  held good but in future it would not be  open  to Parliament to amend Part III by taking away or abridging any of  the rights conferred thereby and, if the argument as  to implied  limitations  on  the power to  amend  is  accepted, further  limit the power of Parliament to amend what may  be called basic features of the Constitution.  We must say that we  are not prepared to accept the doctrine  of  prospective over-ruling.  We do not know whether this doctrine which  it is urged should be applied to constitutional amendment would also be applied to amendments of ordinary laws.  We find  it difficult  to  visualise what would be the  effect  of  this doctrine if it is applied to amendment of ordinary laws.  We have  so far been following in this country  the  well-known doctrine that courts declare law and that a declaration made by a court is the law of the land and takes effect from  the date  the  law came into force.  We would  on  principle  be loath to change that well-known doctrine and supersede it by the  doctrine of prospective over-ruling.  Further it  seems to us that in view of the provisions of Art. 13(2) it  would be  impossible  to apply the doctrine of  prospective  over- ruling  in our country, particularly where a  law  infringes fundamental rights.  Article 13(2) lays down that all.  laws taking away or abridging fundamental rights would be void to the extent of contravention.  It has been held by this Court in  Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2) that a  law made after the Constitution came into force which  infringes fundamental   rights  is  a  stillborn  law  and  that   the prohibition contained in Art. 13(2) went to the root of  the State power of legislation and any-law made in contravention of  that provision was void ab initio.  This case  has  been followed  in  Mahendra  Lal  Jaini v.  The  State  of  Uttar Pradesh(3).  In the face of these (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89. (2) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8. (3)  [1963] Supp. 1. S.C.R. 912.

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853 decisions  it  is  impossible  to  apply  the  principle  of prospective  over-ruling in this country so far as  ordinary laws  are  concerned.  Further, if the word  "law"  in  Art. 13(2)  includes an amendment of the Constitution,  the  same principle will apply, for that amendment would be  stillborn if  it  infringes any fundamental rights contained  in  Part III.   In  these circumstances, it would  be  impossible  to apply   the   principle  of   prospective   over-ruling   to constitutional  amendments also.  On the other hand, if  the word  "law" in Art. 13(2) does not include an  amendment  of the Constitution, then there is no necessity of applying the principle  of  prospective  over-ruling, for  in  that  case unless  some  limitations on the power of amendment  of  the Constitution are implied the amendment under Art. 368  would not  be  liable  to  be tested under  Art.  13(2).   We  are therefore unable to apply the doctrine of prospective  over- ruling  in the circumstances.  Further as we are of  opinion that  this is the fittest possible case in which  the  prin- ciple  of  stare  decisis  applies,we  must  uphold  Sankari Prasad’s case (1) for this reason also. Lastly  we  would  refer to the  following  observations  in Sajjan Singh’s case(2) (at pp. 947-48) with respect to over- ruling earlier judgments  of this Court and specially  those which are unanimious like Sankari Prasad’s case(1):-               "It  is  true that the Constitution  does  not               place any restriction on our powers to  review               our  earlier decisions or even to depart  from               them and there can be no doubt that in matters               relating  to  the decision  of  constitutional               points which have a significant impact on  the               fundamental  rights of citizens, we  would  be               prepared to.’ review our earlier decisions  in               the interest of public good.............  Even               so,  the  normal  principle  that   "judgments               pronounced  by  this  Court  would  be  final,               cannot be ignored and unless considerations of               a substantial and compelling character make it               necessary  to. . do so, we should be  slow  to               doubt the correctness of previous decisions.or               to depart from them.               "It  is universally recognised that in  regard               to  a large number of constitutional  problems               which  are brought before this Court  for  its               decision,  complex  and  difficult   questions               arise and on many of such questions two  views               are   possible.   Therefore, if one  view  has               been   taken.  by  this  Court  after   mature               deliberation,  the fact that another Bench  is               inclined  to  take a  different-view  may  not               justify the Court in reconsidering the earlier               decision     or     in     departing     from,               it................  Even so, the Court  should               be re-               (1) (1952] S.C.R.  89.     (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R.               933.               p. CI/67-9               854               luctant  to accede to the suggestion that  its               earlier  decisions should  be  light-heartedly               reviewed  and departed from.  In such  a  case               the test should be: is it absolutely necessary               and   essential  that  the  question   already               decided should be reopened The answer to  this               question   would depend on the nature  of  the

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             infirmity alleged in the earlier decision, its               impact  on public good, and the  validity  and               compelling  character  of  the  considerations               urged in support of the contrary view.  If the               said  decision  has been followed in  a  large               number of cases, that again is a factor  which               must be taken into account." A similar view was taken in the Keshav Mills Company Limited v.  Commissioner  of Income-tax,(1) where  it  was  observed that-               "...before  a previous decision is  pronounced               to  be  plainly erroneous, the Court  must  be               satisfied  with  a fair  amount  of  unanimity               amongst  its  members that a revision  of  the               said view is fully justified." These principles were applied in Sajjan Singh’s case(2)  and it was observed that if Sankari  Prasad’s case(3) were to be overruled, "it would lead to the inevitable consequence that the  amendments  made in the Constitution both in  1951  and 1955  would  be  rendered  invalid and  a  large  number  of decisions dealing with the validity of the Acts included  in the Ninth Schedule which have been pronounced by,  different High Courts ever since the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad’s  case(3)  was declared, would also be  exposed.  to serious jeopardy." The  majority  in that case therefore was not in  favour  of reviewing  Sankari Prasad’s case(".) even so in View of  the argument  raised  and  the importance  of  the  question  it considered  the arguments against that decision and came  to the conclusion its that that case was rightly decided We may add that besides so many cases in the High Courts there have been  a large number of cases in this Court to which  it  is unnecessary   to  refer  where  on  the  faith  of   various amendments made in the Constitution, particularly the First, the  Fourth and the Sixteenth, amending fundamental  rights, this  Court has upheld the, validity of various Acts on  the basis  of  these  amendments.   Further  we  would  be  very reluctant  to  over-rule the unanimous decision  in  Sankari Prasad’s  case.(3)  or any other unanimous decision  by  the slender  majority of one in a larger Bench  constituted  for the purpose.  We say this with great respect and would  hold that  apart ’from the principle of stare decisis  we  should not say that the (1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 908. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933 (3) [1952] S.C.R. 89 855 unanimous  judgment in Sankari Prasad’s case(,) was  wrongly decided by such a slender majority in this Special Bench. We  therefore  hold  that  Sankari  Prasad’s  cases(1)   was correctly  decided and that the majority,in  Sajjan  Singh’s case(2)  WAS Correct in following that decision.   We  would follow the decision in Sankari Prasad’s case(1) even now  as in  our  opinion it was correctly decided.’  Following  that decision we hold that the Seventeenth Amendment is good. In view of this decision it is unnecessary to refer to other arguments   raised  with  respect  to  the   two   petitions challenging the Mysore Land Reforms Act. In  our view therefore all the three petitions  should  fail and  we would dismiss them.  In the circumstances  we  would pass no order as to costs. Hidayatulla.  J In these three writ petitions, the facts  of which  appear  in  the  two  judgment  just  delivered,  the validity  of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures  Act,  1953 and  the  Mysore  Land Reforms  Act,  1953,  is  principally

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involved.    ’  Since  these  Acts  are  protected  by   the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, the validity of   the  constitutional  amendment  is   also   questioned. Therefore, a much larger field must be traversed because  of the claim of the State that no part of the Constitution from the Preamble to the Ninth Schedule, is beyond the  provision for amendment contained in Art. 368.  The article, forms the Twentieth Part of the Constitution and is said to be a  code by  itself in which reposes a sovereign power,  transcending anything  elsewhere in the Constitution.  The State  submits that  (except  as  stated  in  the  article)  there  are  no limitations on the amending power and denies that there  are any  implied  restrictions.  It claims, therefore,  that  an amendment  of  the Constitution Or of any of  its  part  can never be a justiciable issue if the procedure for  amendment has been duly followed.  In this claim no exception is made- the Preamble, the Fundamental Rights, the guaranteed  remedy to  uphold them all of them severally and together are  said to  be capable of being Partially or wholly abrogated by  an amendment.   Looked at from, this Point of view  the  Seven- teenth Amendment Act not only ’must be valid but also beyond the  Power of the courts to question.  The  petitioners,  on the  other  hand,  contend that this is  to  deny  the  real importance and inviolability of the Fundamental Rights which the  Constitution  itself,  paramount  even  to  Art.,   368 consideration.’ before we can Acts are valid or not. (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89.     (2)  [1965] 1 S.C.  R.933. 856  The  same questions were before this Court on  two  earlier occasions.  They arose for the first time immediately  after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was adopted and became  the subject of a decision of this Court reported  in Sri  Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of  India(1).   There Patanjali  Sastri  J.  speaking  for  Harilal  Kania   C.J., Mukherjea,  Das  and Chandrasekhara  Aiyar,  JJ.and  himself upholds  the First Amendment on the grounds that  the  power conferred by Part XX is constituent, paramount and sovereign and is, therefore, not subject to Art. 13(2) which prohibits the making of ordinary laws   tending  to  abridge  or  take away Fundamental Rights.The   questions  were  again  before the Court in sajjan Singh c. State of Rajasthan(2) when  the Seventeenth Amendment was impugned. The authority of Sankari Prasad’s case(1) was the ministry ofof  the argument  in support of the validity of the new amendment. This  time the Court was not unanimous although the Court as aas a whole did not strike down the Act. Three opinions weredelivered by  Gajendragadkar, C.J. on behalf of Wanchoo  and  Raghubar Dayal, JJ. and himself, by Mudholkar, J. and by me.  I found the  reasoning in Sankari Prasad’s case(1) to  be  unaccept- able,  although for reasons which I shall give, I  refrained from  expressing  a  final opinion.  Mudholkar,  J.  in  his opinion  supported me with additional and  forceful  reasons but  he also did not express himself finally on the  broader question.    I   closed  my  opinion  with   the   following observations :--               "I  would require stronger reasons than  those               given  in Sankari Prasad’s case(1) to make  me               accept  the view that Fundamental Rights  were               not really fundamental but were intended to be               within the powers of amendment in common  with               the  other  parts  of  the  Constitution   and               without  the  concurrence of the  States.   No               doubt  Art.  19  by clauses numbered  2  to  6               allows  a curtailment of rights in the  public               interest.   Ibis  shows that Part III  is  not

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             static.   It Visualises changes  and  progress               but   at  the  same  time  it  preserves   the               individual   rights.   There  is  hardly   any               measure  of reform which cannot be  introduced               reasonably,   the  guarantee   of   individual               liberty  notwithstanding.  Even  the  agrarian               reforms  could  have been partly  carried  out               without  Article 31-A and 31-B but they  would               have cost more to the public exchequer.   ’the               rights of society are made paramount and  they               ire placed above those of the individual.               This is as it should be.  But  restricting the               Fundamental Rights by resort to cls. 2 to 6 of               Mt. 19 is               (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89.               (2)   [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933.               857               one  thing  and removing the rights  from  the               Constitution   or  debilitating  them  by   an               amendment  is  quite  another.   This  is  the               implication of Sankari Prasad’s case(1). It is               true that such things would never be, but  one               is concerned to know if such a doing would  be               possible."               "The Constitution gives so many assurances  in               Part  III that it would be difficult to  think               that  they  were the playthings of  a  special               majority.  To hold this would prima facie that               the  most  solemn parts  of  our  Constitution               stand  on  the  same  footing  as  any   other               provision and even on a less firm ground  than               one  on  which the articles mentioned  in  the               proviso  stand.   The anomaly  that  Art.  226               should  be somewhat protected but not Art.  32               must give us pause.  Article 32 does not erect               a  shield against private conduct but  against               state conduct including the legislatures  (See               Art. 12).  Can the legislature take away  this               shield  ?   Perhaps  by  adopting  a   liberal               construction  of  Art. 368 one can  say  that.               But  I am not inclined to play a  grammarian’s               role.   As at present advised I can  only  say               that  the power to make amendments  ought  not               ordinarily  to  be  a  means  of  escape  from               absolute constitutional restrictions." My opposition (lest one misunderstands its veridical charac- ter)  appears  to be cautious and even timid  but  this  was because  it was attended by an uneasy feeling that  I  might have  missed  some immanent truth beyond what  was  said  in Sankari Prasad’s case(1).  The arguments then were extremely brief.   After hearing full arguments in this-  case,  which have  not added to the reasoning of the earlier cases, I  am not  satisfied that the reasons are cogent enough for me  to accept  them.  I say it with respect that I felt then, as  I do so even more strongly now, that in the two earlier cases, the  result  was reached by a mechanical juris  prudence  in which harmonious construction was taken to mean that  unless Art. 368 itself made an exception the existence of any other provision  indicative  of  an  implied  limitation  on   the amending power, could not be considered.  This was really to refuse  to consider any argument which did not  square  with the  a priori view of the omnicompetence of Art. 368.   Such reasoning  appears  to  me  to  be  a  kind  of  doctrinaire conceptualism based on an and textual approach  supplemented by one concept that an amendment of the Constitution is  not

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an exercise of legislative (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89. 858 power but of constituent Dower and, therefore, an  amendment of  the  Constitution is not law at all as  contemplated  by Art.  13(2).   I.  am reminded of the.  words  of.   Justice Holmes  that  "we ,must think- things and not  words".   The true  principle is that if there are two provisions  in  the Constitution   which   seem   to   be   hostile,   juridical hermeneutics  requires  the  Court  to  interpret  them   by combining them and not by destroying one with the aid of the other.   No  part in a Constitution is superior  to  another part unless the Constitution itself says so and there is  no accession  ’of  strength to any provision by  calling  it  a code.   Portalis, the great.  French Jurist .(who helped  in the  making  of  the Code Napole on)  supplied  the  correct principle  when he said that it is the context of the  legal provisions  which serves to illustrate the meaning.  of  the different  parts, so that among them and between them  there should be correspondence and harmony. We have two provisions to reconcile.  Article 368 which says that the Constitution may be amended by, following this  and this. procedure, and Art. 13(2) which says, the State  shall not  make  any law which takes away or abridges  the  rights conferred by Part III and that any law made in contravention of the clause shall, to the extent of the contravention,  be void.  The question, therefore, is : does- this create   any limitation  upon  the amending process ?  On the  answer  to this  question depends the solution of all the  problems  in this case. It is an error to view our Constitution as if it were a mere organisational document by which the people established  the atructure  and  the  mechanism  of  their  Government.   Our Constitution is intended to be much more because it aims  at being a social document In which the relationship of society to  the indiVidual and of Government to both and the  rights of the minorities and the backward classes are clearly  laid down.   This social document is headed by a Preamble*  which epitomizes  the  principles  on  which  the  Government   is intended to function and these principles are later expanded into  Fundamental  Rights  in Part  III  and  the  Directive Principles of Policy in Part TV.  The former ’are  protected but the latter are not.  The former represent the "PREAMBLE  WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA having  solemnly  Resolved to  .constitute India into a SOVEREIGN  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC and to secure all Its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote  among them.all FRATERNITY  assuring the, dignity of the individual  and.the unity of Nation: IN  OUR  CONSTITUENT  ASSEMBLY  this  twenty-sixth  day   of November,1949,do  HEREBY ADOPT,ENACT AND GIVE  TO  OURSELVES THIS CONSTffUTION." 859 limits  of State action and the latter are  the  obligations and  the  duties  of the Government as  a  good  and  social Government. Why  was it necessary to have the Fundamental Rights at  all and make them justiciable ? As we seem to be forgetting  our own  history so soon let me say that the answer  lies  there the  Nationalist  Movement  and  the  birth  of  the  Indian National  Congm  in  1885  were the  direct  result  of  the discriminatory  treatment  of  the  Indians  in  their   own

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country.  The demand for the guarantee of Fundamental Rights had unfortunately to be made. then to a foreign ruler and it appeared  in  the Constitution of India Bill framed  by  the Indian  National  Congress  ten years later.   All  that  is valuable  to an Individual in civilized  society,  including free  speech,  imprisonment only by a  competent  authority, free law education, etc. were claimed therein.   Resolutions of  the Congress since then reiterated this demand  and  the securing  of Fundamental Rights in any  future  Constitution became  one of the articles of faith.  To cut the  narration short, the main steps may only be mentioned.  Mrs.  Besant’s Commonwealth  of India Bill 1925 with its seven  fundamental rights  (the  precursor  of Art. 19),  the  Madras  Congress Resolution   of  1927--"a  constitution  on  the  basis   of declaration  of rights"-- the Nehru Report--it  is  obviour, that our first care should be to have the Fundamental Rights guaranteed   in  a  manner  which  will  not  permit   their withdrawal in any circumstancees--, the draft article in the Nehru  Constitution  "No  person shall be  deprived  of  his liberty,  nor  shall his dwelling or  property  be  entered, requisitioned or confiscated save in accordance with  law"-, the  Independence  Resolution  of  26th  January,   1930--We believe  that  it  is the inalienable right  of  the  Indian people, as of any other people, to have freedom and to enjoy the  fruits of their toil and have the necessities of  life, so  that  they may have full opportunities  of  growth"  the Karachi  Resolution  on  Fundamental  Rights,  Economic  and Social Change (1931), the Sapru Report (1945) which for  the first  time  distinguished  between  justiciable  and   non- ,justiciable  rights, the Suggestion of the Cabinet  Mission for the constitution of an Advisory Committee on Fundamental and   Minority   Rights,  and,  lastly  the   Committee   on Fundamental  Rights of the Constituent Assembly, are just  a few  of the steps to be remembered.  The Fundamental  Rights and the Directive Principles were the result. Fundamental laws are needed to make a Government of laws and not  of men and the Directive Principles are needed  to  lay down the objectives of a good Government.  Our  Constitution was  not the cause but the result of political and  personal freedom".  Since Dicey had said that "the proclamation .  in a Constitution or Charter of the right to personal  freedom, or  indeed  of any other right, gives of itself  but  slight security that the right has more than a 860 nominal   existence",(1)  provision  had  to  be  made   for guaranteeing   them   andto  make   them   justiciable   and enforceable.   This result is reachedby means of  Arts.  12, 13, 32, 136, 141, 144 and 226. The The  High   Courts    and finally this Court have been made the Judges of whether  any legislative  or executive action on the part oft  the  State considered  as comprehensively as is possible,  offends  the Fundamental Rights and Art. 13(2) declares that  legislation which  so  offends is to be deemed to be void.  It  is  thus that  Parliament cannot today abridge or take away a  single Fundamental  Right  even by a ’unanimous vote  in  both  the Chambers.  But on the argument of the State it has only  ’to change  the  title of the same Act to an  Amendment  of  the Constitution  Act and then a majority of the total  strength and  a 2/3rds majority of the members present and voting  in each  House  may  remove not only  any  of  the  Fundamental Rights, but the whole Chapter giving them.  And this is said to be possible because of Art. 368 and its general  language which,  it is claimed, makes no exception in its  text  and, therefore, no exception can be implied.  It is obvious  that if an Act amending the Constitution is- treated as a law  it

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must also be subject to the provisions of Art. 13(2).  Since the  definition  of  the word ’law’, makes  no  exception  a strenuous  eeffort  is  made on the basis  of  argument  and authority  to  establish that a constituent power  does  not result in a law in the ordinary sense.  Distinction is  thus made  between laws made ordinarily that is to say, from  day to  day by ordinary majority and laws made occasionally  for the  amendment  of the Constitution by a  slightly  enhanced majority.  In our Constitution this distinction is not valid in the eye of Art. 13(2). It  is  not essential,, of course, that  a  difference  must always   exist  in  the  procedure  for  the   exercise   of constituent and ordinary, legislative power.  One has not to go   far  to  find  the  example  of  a  country  in   which constitutional  law as such may be made by the  same  agency which makes ordinary laws.  The most outstanding, example is that of England about which de Tocqueville observed.               "the  Parliament has an acknowledged right  to               modify  the Constitution; as,  therefore,  the               Constitution may undergo perpetual changes, it               does  not in reality exist; the Parliament  is               at  once  a  legislative  and  a   constituent               assembly:"(2) of  course,  the dictum of de Tocqueville that  the  English Constitution  "elle n’existe point" (it does not  exist)  is far from accu- (1)Dicey: "Law of the Constitution" 10th Edn. p. 207. (2)Introduction to the Study of the Law of the  Constitution A.V.  Dicey Tenth Edn p. 88 quoting from  OEuvres  completes (14th ed.,1864) (Democratie en Amerique), pp. 166, 167. 861 rate.   There  is  a vast body  of  constitutional  laws  in England  which  is written and statutory but it is  not  all found  in one place and arranged as a  written  Constitution usually is.  The Act of Settlement (1701), the Act of  Union with  Scotland (1707), the Act of Union with Ireland  (1800) the Parliament Act (1911) the Representation of the  Peoples Acts  of 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928 and 1948,  the  Ballot Act  (1872),  the Judicature Acts 1873, 1875 and  1925,  the Incitement   to  Disaffection  Act  (1934),  His   Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act (1936), the Regency Act (1937) and  the  various Acts setting up different  ministries  are examples of what will pass for constitutional law under  our system(1).   The  Bill  of  Rights  (1689)  lays  down   the fundamental rule in England that taxation may not be  levied without the consent of Parliament which in our  Constitution has  its counterpart in Art. 265.  In our Constitution  also the  laws  relating  to delimitation  of  constituencies  or allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purporting to  be  made under Art. 327 or Art. 328, by  reason  of  the exclusion of the powers of the courts to question them,  are rendered  constitutional  instruments.   Other  examples  of constitutions  which,  in addition to  constitution  proper, contain certain ordinary legislation, having  constitutional qualities, also exist. (2) What  then is the real distinction between ordinary law  and the law made in the exercise of constituent power?  I  would say under the scheme of our Constitution none at all.   This distinction  has been attempted to be worked out by  several authors.   It  is not necessary to quote them.   Taking  the results  obtained by Willoughby(3) it may be said  that  the fact that a Constitution is written as a Constitution is  no distinction because in Britain constitutional law is of both kinds   and   both  parts  coexist.   The  test   that   the Constitution  requires  a different kind  of  procedure  for

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amendment,  also  fails because in Britain Parliament  by  a simple  majority makes laws and also  amends  constitutional statutes.   In our Constitution too, in spite of  the  claim that  Art.  368  is a code (whatever is meant  by  the  word ,code, here), Arts. 4, 11 and 169 show that the amendment of the   Constitution  can  be  by  the  ordinary  law   making procedure.  By this method one of the legislative limbs in a State  can  be removed or created.  ’This  destroys  at  one stroke the claim that Art. 368 is a code arid also that  any special   method  of  amendment  of  the   Constitution   is fundamentally necessary. (1)  The list is raken from K. C. Wheare’s: "The Statute  of Westminster  and Dominion Status" (4th Edn) p. 8. Dicey  and others give different list. (2)  See Constitutions of Austria, Honduras, Nicaragua Peru, Spain  and Sweden among others.  The Constitution of  Spain, in  particular is in several Instruments.  The  Constitution of  Austria  (A-t.  149)  makes  special  mention  of  these constitutional instruments. (3)  Tagore Law Lectures (1924) p. 83. 862 The next test that the courts must apply the Constitution in preference  to the ordinary law may also be rejected on  the ansalogy of the British practice.  There, every statute  has equal standing.  Therefore, the only difference can be  said to   arise  from  the  fact  that.constitutional  laws   are generally  amendable  under  a  process  which  in   varying degrees,  is more difficult or elaborate.  This may  give  a distinct  character  to the law of the Constitution  but  it does not serve to distinguish it from the other laws of  the land for purposes of Art. 13(2).  Another difference is that in   the  written  constitutions  the  form  and  power   of Government  alone are to be found and not rules  of  private law as is the case with ordinary laws.  But this is also not an   invariable   rule.   The  Ame  Constitution   and   our Constitution  itself  are  outstanding  examples  There  are certain  other  differences  of degree, such  as  that  nary _legislation may be tentative or temporary, more detailed or secondary,   while  the  Constitution  is  intended  to   be permanent,   general  and  primary.   Because   it   creates limitations    on    the   ordinary    legislative    power, constitutional law in a sense is fundamental law, but if the legislative  and  constituent processes can become  one,  Ls there any reason why the result should be regarded as law in the one case and not in the other ? On the whole, therefore, as observed in the American Jurisprudence               "It  should be noticed however that a  statute               and a constitution, though of unequal  dignity               are  both laws and each rests on the  will  of               the people........" A Constitution is law which is intended to be, for all  time and is difficult to change so that it may not be subject  to "impulses  ofmajority"  "temporary  excitement  and  popular caprice or passion"(2). I  agree with the authors cited before us that the power  of amendment  must be possessed by the State.  I do not take  a narrow view of the word "amendment" as including only  minor changes  within the general framework.  By an amendment  new matter  may be added, old matter removed or altered.  I  alm concede   that   the  reason  for  the  amendment   of   the Constitution  is a political matter although I do not go  as far  as  some  Justice of the Supreme court  of  the  United States did in Coleman v. Miller(3) that the whole process is "political   in  its  entirely  from  submission  until   an Amendment  becomes  part  of the  Constitution  and  is  not

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subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." There are fundamental differences between our Con- (1) American Jurispruence Vol.  II Section 3. (2)  Amendment is expressly called a legislative process  in the Constitutions of Colombia:, Costa Rica, Hungary,  Panama and  Peru..  In  Portugal the  ordinary  legislatures  enjoy constituent powers every 10 years. (3)  3)7 U.S. 443 (83 L. Ed. 1385). 863 stitution  and  the  Constitution of the  United  States  of America..  Indeed  this: dictum of the four  Justices  based upon,  the case of Luther v. Borden(1) has lost some of  its force after Baker v. Carr(2) A  Republic must, as says Story, (8) possess the  means  for altering  and improving the fabric of the Government so  as, to  promote  the happiness and safety of  the  people.   The power  is  also  needed to  disarm  opposition  and  prevent factions over the Constitution.  The power, however, is  not intended  to  be used for experiments or as an  escape  from restrictions  against  undue  state action  enacted  in  the Constitution  itself.   Nor  %’LS  the  power  of  amendment available  for  the purpose of removing express  or  fmplied restrictions against the State. Here I make a difference between Government and State  which I  shall  explain presently.  As  Willoughby(4)  points  out constitutional law ordinarily limits Government but not  the State  because a constitutional law is the creation  of  the State for its own purpose.  But there is nothing to  prevent the  State from limiting itself.  The rights and  duties  of the individual and the manner in which such rights are to be exercised  and enforced ;ire ordinarily to be found  in  the laws though some of the Constitutions also fix them.  It  is now  customary  to  have  such  rights  guaranteed  in   the Constitution.   Peaslee,(5) writing in 1956 says that  about 88% of the national Constitutions contain clauses respecting individual  liberty and fair legal process;  83%  respecting freedom  of  speech and the press; 82%  respecting  property right;  80% respecting rights of assembly  and  association; 80%  respecting rights of conscience and religion; 79%  res- pecting secrecy of correspondence and inviolability of domi- cile; 78% respecting education; 73% respecting equality  64% respecting  right  to petition; 56% respecting  labour;  51% respecting   social  security;  47%  respecting  rights   of movement within, and to and from the nation; 47%  respecting health   and  motherhood;  and  35%  respecting   the   non- retroactivity  of laws.  In some of the Constitutions  there is an attempt to put a restriction against the State seeking to whittle down the rights conferred on the individual.  Our Constitution  is  the  most  outstanding  example  of   this restriction which is to be found in Art. 13(2).  ’The  State is  no  doubt legally supreme but in the  supremacy  of  its powers  it may create, impediments on its  own  sovereignty. Government  is always bound by the restrictions  created  in favour  of fundamental Rights but the State may or  may  not be.   Amendment  may be open to the State according  to  the procedure laid (1) 7 How.  1 (12 L. Ed. 58).       (2) 369 U. S. 186 (7  L. Ed. 2d 633). (3)  Commentaries on the Constittition of the United  States (1833) Vol.  III pp 686-687. (4)  Tagore Law Lectures, p. 84. (5)  Constitutions of Nations, Vol.  I (2nd Edn.) p. 7. 863 stitution  and  the  Constitution of the  United  States  of America.this:  dicttan of the four Justices based upon,  the

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case of Luther v. Borden(1) has lost some of its force after Baker v. Carr(2). A Republic must, as says Story,-(,,) ssess the means for  ai and:improving the ’fabric of tc Government so as, to promote the  happiness and safety, of the people.  The power, is  dw needed to disarm opposition and prevent factions over theThe power,  however, is not intended to be used for  experiments or as an escape from restrictions against undue state action enacted  in  the Constitution itself.  Nor is the  power  of amendment  available for the purpose of removing express  or implied restrictions against the State. Here I make a difference between Government and Statewhich I shall  explain  presently.   As  Willoughby(4)  points   out wmtitutional  law ordinarily limits Government but  not  the State  because a constitutional la,* is the creation of  the State  for its own pu, se. But there is nothing  to  prevent the  State from rpo limiting itself.  The rights and  duties of  the individual and the. manner in which such rights  are to  be exercised and enforced are ordinarily to be found  in the laws though some of the Constitutions also fix them.  It    now  customary  to have such  rights  guaranteed  in  the Constitution.   Peaslee,(5) writing in 1956 says that  about 88,Yo   of  the,  national  Constitutions  contain   clauses respecting  individual liberty and fair legal  process;  83% respecting  freedom of speech and the press; 82%  respecting property  right;  80%  respecting  rights  of  assembly  and association;   80%  respecting  rights  of  conscience   and religion;  79%  respecting secrecy  of  correspondence  and’ inviolability  of  domicile; 78% respecting  education;  73% respecting equality; .64% respecting right to petition;  56% respecting  labour;  51%  respecting  social  security;  47% respecting  rights of movement within, and to and  from  the nation;  47%  respecting  health  and  motherhood;  and  35% respecting  the non-retroactivity of laws.  In some  of  the Constitutions  there  is  an attempt to  put  a  restriction Against  the  State  seeking  to  whittle  down  the  rights conferred’ on the ’individual.  Our Constitution is the most outstanding  i6xample  of this restriction Which  is  to  be found in Art. 1.3(2). ,Tbe State is no doubt legally supreme but  in  the  supremacy  of  its  powers  it  may   creat-e- impediments on its OI%M sovereignty.  Govent is always bound by the restrictions created in favour of Fundamental  Rights but  the State may or may not be.  Amendment may be open  to the State according to the procedure lai(r (1)7  How.  1 (12 L. Ed. 58). (2) 369 U. S. 186 (7 L.  Ed. 2d 633). (3) Commentaries on the Constitution of the United,  Sta:tes (1 833)’Vol.  III PP, 686-687. (4)Tagore Law Lectures, p. 84. (5)Constitutions of Nations, Vol.  I (2nd Edn.) p. 7. 864 down  by  the Constitution.  There is nothing,  however,  to prevent  the State from placing certain matters outside  the amending  procedure(’).  Examples of this exist  in  several Constitutions  of  the world : see Art. 5  of  the  American Constitution; Art. 95 of -the Constitution of France,;  Art. 95   of  the  Constitution  of  Finland;  Art.  97  of   the Constitution  of Cambodia; Art. 183 of the  Constitution  of Greece;  Art. 97 of the Japanese Constitution; Art.  139  of the Italian Constitution, to mention only a few. When  this  happens  the  ordinary  procedure  of  amendment ,ceases to apply.  The unlimited competence (the  kompetenz- kompetenz of the Germans) does not flow from the  amendatory process.  Amendment can then be by a fresh constituent body. To attempt to do this otherwise is to attempt a  revolution.

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I do not known why the word "revolution", which I have  used before,  should evoke in some persons an image  of  violence and  subversion.   The whole American Constitution  was  the result of a bloodless revolution and in a sense so was ours. The  adoption of the whole Constitution and the adoption  of an  amendment to the Constitution have much in  common.   An amendment  of  the  Constitution has  been  aptly  called  a Constitution in little and the same question arises  whether it  is  by a legal process or by revolution.   There  is  no third alternative.  An amendment, which repeals the  earlier Constitution,  unless legal, is achieved by revolution.   As stated in the American Jurisprudence : "An attempt by the majority to change the fundamental law in violation  of self-imposed restrictions is  unconstitutional and revolutionary".(’) There  are illegal and violent revolutions and  illegal  and peaceful revolutions.  Modification of Constitution can only be  by the operation of a certain number of wills acting  on other  wills.  The pressure runs through a  broad  spectrum, harsh at one end and gentle at the other.  But whatever  the pressure  may  be, kind or cruel, the revolution  is  always there if the change is not legal.  The difference is one  of method, not of kind.  Political thinking starts from the few at the top and works downward more often than in the reverse direction.   It is wrong to think that masses alone,  called "the people" after Mazini, or "the proletariate" after Marx, ’begin a revolutionary change.  Political changes are always preceded  by  changes  in thought in a  few.   They  may  be outside the (1)  In the Constitution of Honduras, partial amendment only is  possible.   For  a  complete  amendment  a   Constituent Assembly has to be convoked.  In the Constitution of Brazil, the Constitution cannot be amended when there is a state  of seige (our emergency).  In Turkey an amendment of Article  1 cannot even be proposed. (2)  Vol. 12, Section 25 pp. 629-630. 865 Government or in it.  It is a revolution nevertheless, if an attempt  is  made  to alter the will of  the  people  in  an illegal manner.  A revolution is successful only if there is consent  and  acquiescence and a failure if  there  is  not. Courts  can  interfere to nullify the  revolutionary  change because  in all cases of revolution there is  infraction  of existing  legality.  It is wrong to classify  as  revolution some  thing  coming  from  outside  the  Government  and  an illegality   committed   by  the  Government   against   the Constitution as evolution.  I am mindful of the observations of Justice Holmes, that-               "We need education in the obvious to learn  to               transcend  our  own convictions and  to  leave               room  for  much that we hold dear to  be  done               away with short of revolution, by the  orderly               change of law."(1) But  the problem we are faced with is not an orderly  change of law but of a claim to a revolutionary change against  the vitals of the Constitution.  In such a case the apprehension is  that democracy may be lost if there is no liberty  based on  law  and law based on equality.  The protection  of  the fundamental  Rights is necessary so that we may not walk  in fear of democracy itself. Having assumed the distinction between Government and’ State let me now explain what I mean by that distinction and  what the  force of Art. 13(2) in that context is.  I shall  begin first  by  reading the pertinent article.  Article  13  (2), which I quoted earlier, may again be read here:

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             "13...............................               (2)The  State  shall not make  any  law  which               takes away or abridges the rights conferred by               this Part and any law made in contravention of               this   clause   shall,  to   the   extent   of               contravention, be void."               The definition of the State in Art. 12 reads               "12.    In  this  Part,  unless  the   context               otherwise  requires, "the State"  includes.the               Government  and  Parliament of India  and  the               Government and the Legislature of each of  the               States  and  all local  or  other  authorities               within  the  territory of India or  under  the               control of the Government of India." The  State  is the sum total of all the agencies  which  are also individually mentioned in Art. 12 and by the definition all   the   parts  severally  are  also  included   in   the prohibition.  Now see how ’law’ is defined: "13....................... (1)  The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes p. 390. 866 (3)In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a)  "law"  includes  any ordinance, order,  bye-law,  rule, regulation,  notification,  custom or usage  having  in  the territory of India the force of law;" In  Sajjan Singh’s case(1) I said that if amendments of  the constitution  were meant to be excluded from the word  "law" it  was  the  easiest thing to add  to  the  definition  the further  words  "but shall not include an amendment  of  the Constitution". it ’LS argued now before us that this wag not necessary  because  Art. 368 does not  make  any  exception. This  argument came at all stages like a refrain and is  the real  cause of the obfuscation in the opposite view.   Those who  entertain this thought do not pause to consider  :  why make a prohibition against the State? As Cooley said:               "there  never  was a  republican  Constitution               which  delegated  to  functionaries  all   the               latent  powers  which  lie  dormant  in  every               nation  and  are  boundless  in  extent.   and               incapable of definition.", If the State wields more power than the functionaries  there must  be a difference between  the.  State and its  agencies such  as  Government, Parliament, the  Legislatures  of  the States and the local and other authorities.  Obviously,  the State  means  more  than any of there or  all  of  them  put together.   By  making  the State  subject  ’to  Fundamental Rights it is clearly stated in Art. 13 (2) that any’ ,of the agencies  acting alone or all the agencies, acting  together are  not above the Fundamental Rights.  Therefore, when  the House  .of the People or the Council of States introduces  a Bill-  for  the abridgement of the  Fundamental  Rights,  it ignores the injunction against it and even if the two Houses pass  the Bill the injunction is next operative against  the President since the expression "Government of India" in  the General  Clauses Act means the President of India.  This  is equally true of ordinary laws and laws seeking to amend  the Constitution.   The meaning of the word "State" will  become clear  if I draw attention at this stage to Art. 325 of  the Constitution of Nicargua, which reads as follows:-               "325.  The agencies of the Government, jointly               or separately, are, for-bidden to suspend  the               Constitution or to restrict she rights granted               by it, except in the cases provided therein." In our Constitution the agencies of the State are controlled jointly  and separately and the prohibition is  against  the

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whole force of (1)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. 867 the  State  acting either in its  executive  or  legislative capacity.  Ile of the Executive is more important than  even the  Legislature.   In modem politics run  on  parliamentary democracy  the Cabinet attains a position of dominance  over the  Legislature.   The Executive, therefore,  can  use  the Legislature as a means of securing changes in the laws which it desires.  It happened in Germany under Hitler.  The  fact has been noticed by numerous writers. for example, Wade  and Philips(1),  Sir Ivor Jennings(2) , Dawson(3), Keith(4)  and Ramsay Muir(5).  Dawson in particular said that a Cabinet is no  longer  responsible to the Commons but the  Commons  has become instead responsible to the Government.  Ivor Jennings added  that  if a Government had majority  it  could  always secure  the  legislation.  The others pointed out  that  the position  of the Cabinet towards Parliament tends to  assume more  or  less dictatorial powers and that  was  why  people blamed  Government, this is to say, the Cabinet rather  than Parliament for ineffective and harsh laws. This  is true of our country also  regarding  administration and  Station.  Fortunately, this is avoided at least  in  so far  as  the Fundamental Rights  are  concerned.   Absolute, arbitrary  power  in defiance of  Fundamental  Rights  exist nowhere  under  our Constitution, not even  in  the  largest majority.   The  people’s representatives have,  of  course, inalienable  and  undisputable  right to  alter,  reform  or abolish the Government in any manner they think fit, but the declarations  of the Fundamental Rights of the citizens  are the  inalienable  rights of the people.  Ile extent  of  the power  of  the  rulers  at any  time  is,  measured  by  the Fundamental Rights.  It is wrong to think of them as  rights within the Parliament’s giving or taking.  Our  Constitution enables  an  individual  to oppose  successfully  the  whole community  and  the  State and claim his  rights.   This  is because  the Fundamental Rights are I so  safe-guarded  that within   the  limits  set  by  the  Constitution  they   are inviolate.  The Constitution has itself said what protection has been created round the person and property of the  citi- zens and to what extent this protection may give way to  the general good. it is wrong to invoke the Directive Principles as   if  there  is  some  antinomy  between  them  and   the Fundamental  Rights.  The Directive Principles lay down  the routes of State but such action must avoid the  restrictions stated  in  the  Fundamental Rights.   Prof.   Anderson  (6) taking  the constitutional amendments, as they have been  in our country, considered the Directive principles to be  more potent than the Fundamental (1)  Constitutional Law, 6th Edn. p. 27. (2)  Parliament (1957) pp. 11-12. (3)  Government of Canada (1952) Chapter XIX. (4)  An Introduction to British Constitutional Law (1931) P. 48, (5)  How Britain is Governed P. 5,6. (6)  Changing Law in Developing Countries, pp. 88, 89. 868 Rights.  That  they  are not, is clear when  one  takes  the Fundamental-  Rights.  with- the guaranteed  remedies.   The Directive Principles are not justiciable but the Fundamental Rights are’ made justiciable.  This gives a judicial control and check over State action even within the four corners  of the  Directive Principles.  It cannot be conceived  that  in following  the Directive Principles the  Fundamental  Rights (say  for example, the equality clause) can be ignored.   If

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it  is  attempted,  then . the action is  capable  of  being struck  down.   In  the same way, if  an  amendment  of  the Constitution is law for the reasons explained by me, such an amendment  is  also open to challenge under Art. 32,  if  it offends  against  the  Fundamental Rights  by  abridging  or taking  them away.  Of course, it is always open  to  better Fundamental Rights.  A law or amendment of the  Constitution would offend the Fundamental Rights only when it attempts to abridge or take them away. The  importance of Fundamental Rights in the world of  today cannot be-lost sight of.  On December 10, 1948, the General. Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  adopted  the   Universal Declaration  of Human Rights without a dissent.  This  draft was made after the Third Committee of the United Nations had devoted  85 meetings to it.  The Declaration represents  the civil, political and religious liberties for which men  have struggled  through  the centuries and those new  social  and economic  rights  of the Individual which  the  Nations  are increasingly  recognising in their Constitutions.   Some  of these  were  proclaimed  during the  French  Revolution  and areincluded  in the declarations of Nations taking pride  in the  dignity  and  liberty  of  the  Individual.   They  are epitomized  in  the Preamble, and more  fully  expressed  in Parts  III and IV of our Constitution.   These  Declarations wherever found are intended to give a key to social progress by  envisaging  rights to work, to education  and  to’social insurance. The Nations of the world are now in the second stage,  where Covenants  are  being signed on the-part of  the  States  to respect such rights.  United Nations Human Rights Commission has worked to produce two drafts-one dealing, with civil and political  rights  and the other with economic,  social  and cultural rights., The third stage is still in its infancy in which  it is hoped to provide for the enforcement  of  these rights  on an international basis.  The Regional Charter  of the Human Rights under which there is established already  a European  Commission  of  Human Rights  to  investigate  and report on violations of Human Rights, is a significant  step in  that direction.  After 1955 the European Commission  has become  competent  to receive  complaints  from  individuals although   the   enforceability  of  Human  Rights   on   an international  basis is still far from being  achieved.   If one compares the Uni 869 versal Declaration with Parts III and IV of our Constitution one   finds  remarkable  similarity  in  the  two.   It   is significant  that  our Committee on Fundamental  Rights  was deliberating  when the This Committee of the United  Nations was  deliberating  on the.  Universal Declaration  of  Human Rights.   Both  are  manifestos  of  man’s  inviolable   and fundamental freedoms. While the world is anxious to secure Fundamental Rights  in- ternationally,   it  is  a  little  surprising   that   some intellectuals  in our country, whom we may call "classe  non classe"  after Hegel, think of the Directive  Principles  in our  Constitution  as if they were superior  to  Fundamental Rights.  As a modern philosopher(1) said such people ’do lip service’ to freedom thinking all the time in terms of social justice  "with ’freedom’ as a by-product".   Therefore,  in. their  scheme  of things Fundamental Rights become  only  an epitheton  ornans.  One does not know what they  believe  in the  communistic millennium of Marx or  the  individualistic Utopia of Bastiat.  To them an amendment of the  Fundamental Rights  is  permissible  if it can be said to  be  within  a scheme of a supposed socioeconomic reform, however, much the

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danger  to liberty, dignity and freedom of  the  Individual. There  are  others who hold to liberty and freedom  of  the. Individual  under all conditions.  Compare the  attitude  of Middleton  Murray who would have Communism  provided  "there was   universal  freedom  of  speech,  of  association,   of elections  and  of  Parliament"  To  such  the  liberty  and dignity  of the Individual are inviolable.  Of  course,  the liberty  of  the individual under our  Constitution,  though meant to be fundamental, is subject to such restrictions  as the  .  needs  of  society  dictate.   These  are  expressly mentioned  in  the Constitution itself in the hope  that  no further limitations would require to be imposed at any time. I  do  not  for a moment suggest  that  the  question  about reasonableness, expediency or desirability of the amendments of  the  Constitution  from  a  political  angle  is  to  be considered  by  the courts.  But what I do say is  that  the possession of the necessary majority does not put ’any party above   the  constitutional  limitations  implicit  in   the Constitution.   It is obvious that the Constituent  Assembly in  making  the  Fundamental  Rights  justiciable  was   not justisfied  with reliance on the sense of self-restraint  or public opinion(2) on which the majority in Sajjan Singh’s(3) case  does.  This is not argument of fear: The  question  to ask  is : can a party, which enjoys 2/3rds  majority  today, before it (1)Benedetto Croce. (2)Sir Robert Peel calls it "that great compound of foiiy, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy and newspaper paragraphs" (3)[1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. CI/67-10 870 loses it, amend Art. 368 in such wise that a simple majority would  be  sufficient  for  the  future  amendments  of  the constitution  ?   Suppose  it did so,  would  there  be  any difference between the constitutional and the Ordinary  laws made thereafter ? The  liberty of the Individual has to be fundamental and  it has been so declared by the people.  Parliament today is not the constituent body as the Constituent Assembly was, but is a  constituted body which must bear true, allegiance to  the Constitution   ’as  by  law  established.   To  change   the Fundamental part of the Individual’s liberty is a usurpation of  constituent  functions be-cause they  have  been  placed outside the scope of the- power of constituted.  Parliament. It is obvious that Parliament need not now legislate at all. It  has  spread the umbrella of Art. 31-B and .has  only  to add,  a  clause that all legislation  involving  Fundamental Rights  would  be  deemed  to  be  within  that   protection hereafter.   Thus  the only  palladium  against  legislative dictatorship may be removed by a 2/3rds majority not only in praesanti  but,  defuturo.  This can hardly  be  open  to  a constituted Parliament. Having established, that there is no difference between  the ordinary legislative and the amending processes in so far as cl.(2)  of Aft. 13 is concerned, because both being laws  in their  true character, come within the prohibition  created, by  that,  clause against the State and that  the  Directive Principles cannot be invoked to destroy Fundamental  Rights. I  proceed  now to examine whether the English  and  Amercan precedents  lay down any principle applicable to  amendments of  our  Constitution.  In, Britain the question  whether  a constitutional  amendment is valid or not at  arise  because the  courts are powerless’ Parliamentary  Sovereignty  under the  English Constitution means that Parliament  enjoys  the

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right  to make or unmake any law whatever  and no  person or body has any right to question the legislation.  The  utmost and  absolute  despotic  power belongs  to  Parliament.   It "make, confirm, enlarge, restrain, abrogate, repeal,  revise and   expand   law  concerning  matters  of   all   possible denominations".  What Parliament does, no authority on earth can  undo.   The  The Queen, each House  of  Parliament  the constituencies and the law  courts have in the past  claimed independent   legislative  powers  but  these   claims   are unfounded.    It  is  impossible  to  compare   the   Indian Parliament  with the Brittsh Parliament as the  former  con- codedly  in the ordinary legislation is subject to  judicial review,  both  on the ground of competence  arising  from  a federal  structure And the existence of Fundamental  Rights. The question of competence in the matter of amendment of the Constitution  depends  upon, firstly,  compliance  with  the procedure  laid  down in Art. 368 and,  secondly,  upon  the question whether,the.process is in 871 any  manner  restricted by the  Fundamental  -Rights.   Such questions   cannot   obviously   arise   in   the    British Parliament(’). The example  of the Constitution of the United States cannot also  serve  any  purpose although the  greatest  amount  of support  was sought to be derived from the decisions of  the Supreme  Court and the institutional writings in the  United States.    The   power  of  amend  in  the   United   States Constitution  flows from Art.  V. (1).  It must  be  noticed that  the  power  is  clearly not  made  equal  to  ordinary legislative  process.   One salient point of  difference  is that  the President is nowhere in’ this scheme  because  his negative  does not run.(’) The amendment is thus not of  the same quality as ordinary legislation. The Supreme Court of the United States has no doubt  brushed aside  objections to amendments of the Constitution  on  the score  of  incompetence, but has refrained from  giving  any reasons.   In the most important of them,  which  questioned the  18th Amendment, the Court only stated its  conclusions. After  recalling  the  texts  of  the  Article  under  which Amendments may be made and of the 18th Amendment proposed by the  Congress  in  1917 and proclaimed as  ratified  by  the States in 1919, the Court announced : "4.  The  prohibition  of  the  manufacture,  sale,   trans- portation,  importation,  and  exportation  of  intoxicating liquors  for  beverage  purposes, as embodied  in  the  18th amendment,  Is within the power to amend reserved by Art.  5 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) (4) One would have very much liked to know why this  proposition was laid down in the terms emphasised above if the effective exercise of the. power depended upon a particular  procedure which  was immaculately followed.  The silence of the  Court about  its reasons has been noticed in the same judgment  by Mr. Justice (1)  Dicey gives three supposed limitations on the power  of Parliament.   Of  these one that language has been  used  in Acts  of  Parliament which implies that one  Parliament  can make  laws  which  cannot  be  touched  by  any   subsequent Parliament,  is  not  true.  The best examples  are  Act  of treaties with Scotland and Ireland but these same Acts  have been  amended later.  Francis Bacon found this claim  to  be -untenable.  See Dicey ’The Law of the Constitution pp.  64, 65. (2)  Article  V. The Congress, whenever two-thirds  of  both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose -amendments to this   Constitution,   or,  on  the   application   of   the

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legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a  convention  for proposing amendments,  which,  in  either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this  Constitution,  when ratified by  the  legislatures  of three-fourths  of the several States, or by  conventions  in three-fourths  thereof,  as  the one or the  other  mode  of ratification may be proposed by the Congress, provided  that no  amendment  which  may be made prior  to  the  year’  one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner  affect the  first  and fourth clauses in the ninth section  of  the first article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." (3)  Hollingsworth v. Virginia 3 Dall. 378. (4)  National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350. 872 Mckenna.   In feser v. Garnett(1) the Court was hardly  more expressive.  The only question considered by the Court was "The  first  contention  is  that  the  power  of  amendment conferred  by  the’ Federal Constitution, and sought  to  be exercised, does not dxtend to this Amendment, because of its character." (emphasis supplied). This was repelled by Brandeis, J on behalf of the  unanimous court  on the grx)und that the- Amendment was  in  character and  phraseology  similar  to the  15th  Amendment  and  was adopted by following the same method.  As the,lsth Amendment had been accepted for half a century the suggestion that  it was  not  in  accordance  with law, but  as  a  war  measure validated by acquiescence was not accepted. It  is  significant, however, that at the time of  the  18th Amendment,  the  arguments were (a)  that  ’amendment’  was’ limited  to  the correction of error in the framing  of  the Constitution, (b) Article V did not comprehend the  adoption of  additional  or supplementary  provisions,  (c)  ordinary legislation  could  not be embodied. in  the  constitutional amendment,  and  (d) Congress could not  ’propose  amendment which  pared  the  sovereign power of the States.   None  of these at I guin ents was accepted.  At the time of the  19th Amendment, which increased the franchise in the States,  the narrow  ground was that a State which had not  ratified  the Amendment  would be, deprived of its equal suffrage  in  the Senate  because  its representatives in that body  would  be persons  not of its choosing, i.e. persons,chosen by  voters whom  the  State  itself  had not  authorised  to  vote  for Senators.  This argument was rejected.  However, in  Dillion v.  Gloss(2) the Supreme Court held that Congress  had  the, power  to  a  time limit for ratification  because  Art.   V implied that application must be within some reasonable time after.  the proposal".  The fixation of 7 years was held  by the Court to be reasonable. In  1939 came the case of Coleman v. Miller(3)  which  dealt with the Child Labour Amendment.  Such a law was earlier re- jected by the Kansas Leizislature.  Later the State ratified the amendment after a lapse of 13 years by the casting  vote of  the  Lt.  Governor.   Mandamus  was  asked  against  the Secretary  of  Kansas  Senate to erase  the  endorsement  of ratification from its record and it was denied.  The Supreme Court of Kansas refused to review this denial on certiorari. The  Supreme  Court of the United States in an  opinion,  in which not more than 4 Justices (1) 258-U.S. 130.           (2)256 U.S. 368. (3)  307 U.S. 443. 873 took any particular view,. declined to interfere.   Majority affirmed  the  decision of Supreme Court  of  Kansas.   Four Justices  considered  that the question was  political  from

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start  to  finish  and  three  Justices  that  the  previous rejection  of  the law and the extraordinary time  taken  to ratify were political questions. Although  the Supreme Court has scrupulously refrained  from passing on the ambit of Art.  V it has nowhere said that  it will  not  take  jurisdiction  in  any  case  involving  the amending  process. (1) In Hollingsworth v.  Virginia(2)  the supreme  Court  assumed that the question  was  legal.   The Attorney General did not even raise an objection.  In Luther v.  Borden($)  the matter was finally held to  be  political which  opinion prevailed unimpaired ’till some  doubts  have arisen  after  Baker  v. Carr(4).  In  the  case  the  Court remarked-               "We conclude...... that the non-justiciability               of  claims  resting on  the  guarantee  clause               which arises from the embodiment of  questions               that  were  thought ’Political’  can  have  no               bearing upon the justiciability of the,  equal               protection claim presented in this  case......               We  ernphasise that it is the  involvement  in               guarantee   clause  claims  of  the   elements               thought to define "political questions" and no               other  feature, which could render  them  non-               justiciable.  specifically, We have said  that               such  claims  are  not  held   non-justiciable               because   they   touch   matters   of    State               governmental Organisation. It would appear that the Equal Protection Clause was held to supply  a  guide for examination  of  apportionment  methods better than the Guarantee Clause. Although  there is no clear pronouncement, a  great  contro- versy  exists whether questions of substance can  ever  come before   the  Court  and  whether  there  are  any   implied limitations  upon the amendatory Power.  In the cases  above noted, the other articles (particularly the Bill of  Rights) were  not read as limitations and no limitation outside  the amending  clause was implied.  In the two cases inwhich  the express limitation of Equal suffrage Clause was involved the Court did not enter the question.  Thus the 15th and, on its strength,  the 19th Amendments were upheld.  In  Coleman  v. Miller(5)  the  political  question  doctrine  brought   the support  of only four Justices and in Baker v.  Carr(4)  the Federal, Courts were held to have jurisdiction to scrutinise the  fairness of legislative apportionment, under  the  14th Amendment   and  to  take  steps  to  assure  that   serious inequities were wiped out.. The (1)  See Rottschaeffer: Handbook of American  Constitutional Law (1939) pp. 397, 398, though the author’s opinion is that it will deny jurisdiction. (2)  3 Dall. 378. (3)  12 L. Ed. 58. (4)  369 U.S. 186. (5)  307 U. S. 443 874 courts have thus entered the political thicket’.The question of delimitation of constituencies cannot, of, course,  arise before courts under our Constitution because of Art. 329. Baker  v. Carr(1) makes the Court sit in judgement over  the possession  and distribution of politcal power which  is  an essential  part of a Constitution.  The magical  formula  of "political questions" is losing ground and it is to be hoped that  a change may be Soon. coming.  Many of the attacks  on the  amendments were the result of a  misunderstanding  that the  Constitution Was a compact between States and that  the allocation of powers was not to be changed at all.  This was

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finally decided by Texas v. White (2) as far back as 1869. The main question of implied limitations has evoked a  spate of  writings.  Bryce(s), Weaver(4), Mathews(5),  Burdick(6), Willoughby(7),  Willis(8), Rottshaefer(9),  Orfield(10)  (to name  only  a  few) are of the opinion that  there  are  no, implied limitations, although, as Cooley points out, "it  is sometimes expressly declared-what indeed is implied  without the declaration that everything in the declaration of rights contained   is  excepted  out  of  the  general  powers   of Government,   and  all  laws  contrary  thereto   shall   be void(11)."  Ex-press  checks  there  are  only  three.   Two temporary  checks  were operative till 1808 and  dealt  with interference with importation of slaves and the levying of a direct tax without apportionment among then States according to population.  Permanent check that now remains is equality of  representation  of States in the Senate.   Some  writers suggest  that this, check may also be-removed in two  moves. By the- first the Article can be, amended and by the  second the  equality  removed. When this happens it  will  be  seen whether  the  Supreme  Court invokes any  doctrine  such  as achieving. indirectly what cannot be done directly. It will, of course, be completely out of place in a judgment to discuss the. views of the several writers and so I  shall confine  myself to the observation of Orfield to whom  again and again counsel for the State turned either for support or inspiration.   Accord.  ing to him, there  are’  no  implied limitations unless the Courts adopt (1)  369 U.S. 186. (2) Wall.700. (3)  The American Commonwealth Vol.  I. (4)  Constitutional law and its Administration (1946). (5)  American Constitutional System (2nd Edn.) p. 43-45. (6)The  Law of the American Constitution (7th Imp.)  p.  45. (7) Tagore Law Lectures (1924). (8)constitutionaI Law of United States (1936). (9)  Handbook of American Constitutional Law. (10)The Amending of the Federal Constitution (11)Constitutional  Limitations Vol.  I, 8th Edn.  pp.  95, 96. 875 that  view and therefore no limitations on the substance  of the amendments except the Equality Clause.  His view is that when  Congress  is  in  the  amending  process,  it  is  not legislating but exercising a peculiar power bestowed by Art. V.  I  have already shown that under  our  Constitution  the amending   process  is  a  legislative  process,  the   only difference  being  a special majority and the  existence  of Art.  13(2).  Orfield brushes aside the argument  that  this would destroy the very concept of the Union which, as  Chief Justice.   Marshall had said, was  indestructible.   Orfield faces boldly the question whether the whole Constitution can be overthrown by an amendment and answers yes.  But he  says that the amendment must not be in violation of the  Equality Clause.  This seems to be a great concession.  He makes this exception but Munro(-’), who finds it difficult to  conceive of  an unamendable constitution suggests that it  should  be possible  to  begin with that clause and then  the  door  to amendments  would  be wide open.  Of  course,  the  Supreme, Court has not yet faced an amendment of this. character  and it  has  not  yet denied jurisdiction to  itself.   In  the. United States the Constitution works because, as observed by Willis,  the  Supreme Court is allowed to do "’the  work  of remolding  the  Constitution  to keep it  abreast  with  new conditions  and  new  times,  and  to  allow  the   agencies expressly endowed with the; amending process to act only  in

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extraordinary  emergencies  or  when,  the  general  opinion disagrees  with the  opinion of the Supreme Court."  In  our country  amendments,  so far have bean made  only  with  the object  of negativing the Supreme Court,decisions, but  more of it later. I have referred to Orfield although there are greater  names than  his expounding the same views.  I have refrained  from referring  to  the  opposite  view which  in  the  words  of Willoughby   has  been  "strenuously  argued  by   reputable writers" although Willis discourteously referred to them  in his book.  My reason for not doing so is plainly this.   The process  of amendment in the United States is clearly not  a legislative  process and there is no provision like Art.  13 (2) under which "laws" abridging or taking away  Fundamental Rights  can be declared void.  Our liberal Constitution  has given  to the Individual all that he should have-freedom  of speech, of association, of assembly, of religion, of  motion and  locomotion, of property and trade and  profession.   In addition  it  has made the State incapable of  abridging  or taking  away these rights to the extent guaranteed, and  has itself  shown how far the enjoyment of those rights  can  be curtailed.  It; has given a guaranteed right ’to the  person affected to move the Court.-, I-le guarantee is worthless if the rights are capable of being taken away.  This makes  our Constitution unique and the American precedents cannot be of much assistance. (1)  The Govenment of the United States (5th Edn.) p. 77. 876 The  Advocate  General  of  Madras  relied  upon   Vedel.(1) According  to  Vedel,  a  prohibition  in  the  Constitution against its own amendment has a political but not  juridical value,  and from the juridical point of view, a  declaration of absolute constitutional immutability cannot be  imagined. The  constituent  power being supreme, the State  cannot  be fettered  even  by itself.  He notices,  however,  that  the Constitution   of  1791  limited  the  power  of   amendment (revision)  for a certain time and that of  1875  prohibited the  alteration  of the Republican form of  Govermment.   He thinks  that  this hindrance can be removed by  a  two  step amendment.   He  concludes  that the  constituent  of  today cannot  bind the nation of tomorrow and no Constitution  can prohibit its amend- Of  course, the French have experimented with over  a  dozen Constitutions,  all very much alike, while the British  have slowly  changed  their entire structure from  a  monarchical executive  to an executive from Parliament and have  reduced the  power of the House of Lords.  Cambell-Bannerman  former Prime  Minister  of  England summed  up  the  difference  to Ambassador M. de Fleurian thus :               "....  Quand nous faisons une Revolution, nous               ne ditruisons               pas notre maison, nous en conservons avec soin               la  facade,  et, derriere cette  facade,  nous               reconstruisons  une  nouvelle  maison.   Vous,               Francais, agissez autrement; vous jetez bas le               vieil  edifice et vous reconstruisez  la  mime               maison  avec une autre facade et sous  un  nom               different."  (When we make a Revolution we  do               not  destroy an house, we save with  care  the               facade and behind construct a new house.  You,               Frenchmen,  act differently.  You  throw  down               the  old edifice and you reconstruct the  same               house  with  a different facade  and  under  a               different name). M.de Fleurian agreed that there was a lot of truth in  it

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(ll ya du vrai dans cette boutade) (2). But of course to a Frenchman brought up in a legal system in which the Courts do not declare even an ordinary statute  to be  invalid,  the  idea  of  the  unconstitutionality  of  a constitutional  amendment does not even occur.   France  and Belgium   have   created  no   machinery   for   questioning legislation and rely on moral and political sanctions.  Even an  English  lawyer and less so an American lawyer  find  it difficult to understand how the legality of an amendment  of the Constitution can ever be questioned.  It (1)  Mannual Elementaire da Droil Constitutional (Sirey) p.. 117. (2)  Recounted by M. de Fleuriau in the Preface to J. Magnan de Bornier, L’Empire Britannique, son evolution    politique et constitutionnelle p.  6, quoted in Wheare: The Statute of Westminster and Dominion status, P. 9-10. 877 appears  to them that the procedure for the amendment  being gone through there is no one to question and what emerges is the  Constitution as valid as the old Constitution and  just as  binding.   The matter, however, has to be looked  at  in this  way.   Where the Constitution is  overthrown  and  the Courts lose their position under the old Constitution,  they may  not  be  able  to  pass on  the  validity  of  the  new Constitution.  This is the, result of a revolution pure  and simple.  Where the new Constitution is not accepted and  the people  have  not acquiesced in the change  and  the  courts under the old Constitution function, the courts can  declare the  new  Constitution to be void.  Perhaps  even  when  the people acquiesce and a new Government comes into being,  the courts may still declare the new Constitution to be  invalid but  only  if moved to do so.  It is only  when  the  courts begin  to  function  under the new  Constitution  that  they cannot consider the vires of that Constitution because  then they  owe their existence to it.  I agree with Or  field  in these  observations taken from his book.  He, however,  does not include amendments of the Constitution in these  remarks and  expressly  omits them.  His opinion seems  to  indicate that in the case of amendments courts are completely free to see  that the prescribed constitutional mode, of  alteration is complied with and the alteration is within the permissive limits  to which the Constitution wishes the  amendments  to go.   This is true of all amendments but particularly of  an amendment  seeking to repeal the courts’ decision and  being small  in dimension, leaves the courts free to consider  its validity.   The  courts derive the power from  the  existing terms  of  the Constitution and the amendment  fails  if  it seeks to overbear some existing restriction on legislation. What  I have said does not mean that Fundamental Rights  are not  subject  to  change  or  modification.   In  the   most inalienable  of  such  rights a  distinction  must  be  made between  possession of a right and its exercise.  The  first is fixed and the latter controlled by justice and necessity. Take for example Art. 21 :               "No  person shall be deprived of his  life  or               personal liberty except according to procedure               established by law". Of  all  the rights, the right to one’s life,  is  the  most valuable.   This  article of  the  Constitution,  therefore, makes. the right fundamental.  But the inalienable right  is curtailed by a murderer’s conduct as viewed under law.   The deprivation, when it takes place, is not of the right  which was  immutable but of the continued exercise of  the  right. Take  a Directive Principle which is not enforceable at  law but where the same result is reached.  The right to  employ-

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ment is a directive principle.  Some countries even view  it as  a  Fundamental Right.  The exercise,  however,  of  that right  must  depend upon the capacity of Society  to  afford employment to all 878 and sundry.  The possession of this right cannot be confused with  its exercise.  One right here is positive and  can  be enforced  although its, exercise can be curtailed  or  taken away, the other is a right which, the State must try to give but  which cannot be enforced.  The Constitution  permits  a curtailment  of  the  exercise of most  of  the  Fundamental Rights by stating the limits of that curtailment.  But  this power  does  not permit the, State itself, to take  away  or abridge the right beyond the limits set by the Constitution. It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  rights  of   one% individual  are  often  opposed by  the  rights  of  another individual   and   thus   also   become   limitative.    The Constitution in this way" permits the Fundamental Rights  to be controlled in their exercise but prohibits their erasure. It  is  argued that such approach makes Society  static  and robs the State of its sovereignty.  It is submitted that  it leaves  revolution  as  the holy alternative  if  change  is necessary.   This is not  right.  The whole Constitution  is open  to amendment only two dozen articles are  outside  the reach  of Art. 368.  That too because the  Constitution  has made  them  fundamental.   What is being  suggested  by  the counsel  or  the State is itself a  revolution,  because  as things are that method of,amendment is illegal.  There is  a legal method.  Parliament must act in a different way  reach the Fundamental Rights.  The State must reproduce the  power which  it has chosen to put under a restraint.  Just as  the French  or the Japanese,etc. cannot change the  articles  of their  Constitution which are, made free, from the power  of amendment and’ must call a convention or a constituent body, so   also  we’  India  cannot  abridge  or  take  away   the Fundamental   Rights  by  the  ordinary  amending   process. Parliament   must   amend  Art.  369  to   convoke   another Constituent  Assembly pass a law under item 97 of the  First List of Schedule VII to call a Constituent Assembly and then that  assembly  may  be able to abridge  or  take  away  the Fundamental Rights if desired.  It cannot be done otherwise. The  majority in Sajjan Singh’s case(1)  suggested  bringing Art.  32  under  the Proviso to improve  protection  to  the Fundamental  Rights.  Article 32 does not stand in  need  of this Protection.  To abridge or take away that article  (and the  same  is  true  of  all  other  Fundamental  Rights)  a constituent  body  and not a constituted body  is  required. Parliament  today  is  a constituted  body  with  powers  of legislation which include amendments of the Constitution  by a  special majority but only so far as Art. 13  (2)  allows. To bring into existence a constituent body is not impossible as, I had ventured to suggest during the hearing and which I have now more fully explained here.It may be said that. this is  not  necessary  because  Art.  368  can  be  amended  by Parliament  to confer on itself constituent powers over  the Fundamental  Rights.  This would he wrong and against-  Art. 13 (2).  Parliament cannot. increase its (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. 879 powers  in this way and do indirectly which it  is  intended not   to  de.  directly.   The  State  does  not  lose   its sovereignty.  but as it has chosen. to create,  self-imposed restrictions through one constituent body those restrictions cannot  be ignored by a constituted body which  makes  laws. Laws  so  made can affect those parts  of  the  Constitution

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which are outside the restriction in Art. 13 (2) but any’law (legislative  or  mendatory)  passed by  such  a  body  must conform  to  that article.  To be able to abridge,  or  take away  the Fundamental Rights which give so  many  assurances and  guarantees  a  fresh  Constituent  Assembly  must   be, convoked.   Without  such  action  the  protection  of   the Fundamental Rights must remain immutable and any attempt  to abridge or take them away in any other way must be  regarded as revolutionary. I  shall  now  consider the amendments  of  the  Fundamental Rights  made since the adoption of the Constitution, with  a view to illustrating my meaning.  Part III is divided  under different  headings.   They are (a), General  (b)  Right  to Eqility (c) Right to Freedom (d) Right against  exploitation (e)   Right  to  Freedom  of  Religion  (f)   Cultural   and Educational  Rights  (g)  Right to  Property  (h)  Right  to Constitutional Remedies.  I shall first deal with amendments of topics other than the topic (g)- Right to Property.  ’The articles  which are amended in the past are Art 15 & and  19 by the 1st Amendment (18th June 1951) and Art, 16 by the 7th Amendment (19th October 1956).  The 16th Amendment added the words  "the  sovereignty  and integrity  of  India  to  some clauses.   As  that  does  not  abridge  or  take  away  any Fundamental  Right, I shall not refer to the 16th  Amendment hereafter.   That Amendment was valid.  The changes so  made may   be  summarized.   In  Art.  15,  which   deals   with. prohibition  or  discrimination on the ground  of  religion, race,  caste, sex or place of birth, clause (3) allowed  the State  to make special provision for women and children.   A new clause was added which reads:               "(4) Nothing in this article or in clause  (2)               of  article  29 shall prevent the  State  from               making   any   special   provision   for   the               advancement of any socially and  educationally               backward  classes  of  citizens  or  for   the               Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes". It  is argued by counsel for the State that by  lifting  the ban  to  make  special- provision for  backward  classes  of citizens,   there  is  discrimination  against  the   higher classes.   This  is the view which classes in  a  privileged position who had discriminated against the backward ,classes for centuries, might indeed take.  But I cannot accept  this contention.   The Constitution is intended to secure to  all citizens  "Justice,  social,  economic  and  political   and Equality of status and opportunity" (vide the Preamble)  and the Directive Principles include Art. 38 which provides: 880 .lm15 "38  The  State shall strive to promote the welfare  of  the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social   order  in  which  justice,  social,  economic   and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life." To   remove  the  effect  of  centuries  of   discriminatory treatment  and to raise the down-trodden to an equal  status cannot  be regarded ,as discriminatory against any one.   It is  no doubt true that in State of Madras  v..  Champakam(1) the  reservation  of seats for Backward  Classes,  Scheduled Castes  and  Tribes in public educational  institutions  was considered  invalid.   Articles 16(4) and  340  had  already provided  for special treatment for these backward  ,classes and Art. 46 had provided that the State shall promote,  with special care their educational and economic interests.  With all  ,due  respects the question  of  discrimination  hardly arose  because  in view of these provisions  any  reasonable

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attempt  to raise the status of the backward  classes  could have been upheld on the principle of classification.  In any event,  the  inclusion of this clause to Art.  16  does  not abridge or take away any one’s Fundamental Rights unless the view be taken that the backward classes for ever must remain backward. By  the First Amendment the second and the sixth clauses  of Art.  19  were  also  amended.  The  original  cl.  (2)  was substituted by a new clause and certain words were added  in clause  (6).   The  changes may be  seen  by  comparing  the unamended and the amended clauses side by side :          "19( 1) All citizens shall have the right- (a)  to freedom of speech and expression; (2) (Before  Amendment)        (After Amendment) Nothing  in  sub-clause (a) of clause (1), Nothing  in  sub- clause  (a) of clause (1)shall affect the operation  of  any existing  law  in so far as it relates to,  or  prevent  the State  from  making  any law  relating  to  libel,  slander, defamation,  contempt of Court or any matter  which  offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security or tends to overthrow, the State. shall affect the operation of  any existing law, or prevent the State from  making  any law.  in so far as such law imposes reasonable  restrictions on  the  exercise of the right conferred by  the  said  sub- clause  in  the  interest of the...        security  of  the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency  or morality, or in relation to contempt  of  court, defamation or incitement to an offence, The amendment was necessary because in Romesh Thapar v State of  Madras(2)  it  was  held  that  disturbances  of  public tranquallity did not come within the expression  "undermines the secu- (1)[1951]S.C.R.525. (2) [1950] S.C.R. 594. 881 rity of the State".  Later the Supreme Court itself observed in the State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi(1) that this  Court did  not intend to lay down that an offence  against  public order  could  not in any case come within  that  expression. The changes related to (a) "friendly relations with  foreign States",  (b)  "public  order" and  (c)  "incitement  to  an offence"  and  the words ."undermines the  security  of  the State  or tends to, overthrow the State". were  replaced  by the  words "in the interests of the security of the  State". This change could be made in view of the existing provisions of  the  clause as the later decision of  this  Court  above cited  ’clearly show that "public order" and "incitement  to offence"  were  already  comprehended.   The  amendment  was within the permissible limits as it did not abridge or  take away any Fundamental Right. The  Amending Act passed by Parliament also included a  sub- section which read               "(2)  No  law  in force in  the  territory  of               India, immediately before the commencement  of               the Constitution which is consistent with  the               provisions  of article 19 of the  Constitution               as amended by sub-section (1) of this  section               shall  be deemed to be void, or ever  to  have               become  void, on the ground only that being  a               law  which  takes away or abridges  the  right               conferred by sub-clause (a) of clause ( I ) of               the said article, its operation was not  saved               by  clause (2) of that article  as  originally               enacted.               Explanation.-In    this    sub-section,    the

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             expression "law in force" has the same meaning               as  in  clause  (1) of article  1  3  of  this               Constitution". This sub-section was not included in the Constitution.  That device  was  followed in respect of certain  State  statutes dealing  with  property rights by including them  in  a  now Schedule.  It did not then occur to Parliament that the laws could be placed. under a special umbrella of  constitutional protection.   Perhaps  it  was  not  considered’   necessary because  Art.  19(2) was retrospectively changed,  and  the, enactment  of this sub-section was an  ordinary  legislative action.  If the amendment had failed, the second  subsection of section 3 would not have availed at all. Tuming  now to clause (6), we may read the original and  the amended clause side by side "19(1) All citizens shall have the right= (g)  to  practise  any  profession,  or  to  carry  on   any occupation, trade or business. (1) [1952] S.C.R. 654. 882 (6)  (Before, Amendment) Nothing,  in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall  affect the  operation of any existing law in so far as it  imposes, or  prevent the State from making any law imposing,  in  the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions  on the exercise of the right conferred by the said  sub-clause, and,  in  particular nothing in the said  sub-clause,  shall affect  the  operation of any existing law in so far  as  it prescribes  or  empowers  any  authority  to  prescribe,  or prevent  the  State  from  making  any  law  prescribing  or empowering  any authority to prescribe, the professional  or technical   qualifications  necessary  for  practising   any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business. (After Amendment) Nothing  in sub-clause (g) of the said clause  shall  affect the  operation of any existing law in so far as it  imposes, or  prevent the State from making any law imposing,  in  the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions  on the exercise of the right conferred by the said  sub-clause, and,  in particular, nothing in the said  sub-clause,  shall affect  the  operation of any existing law in so far  as  it relates  to,  or  prevent  the State  from  making  any  law relating to,- (i)the  professional or technical  qualifications  necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii)the carrying on by the State, or a corporation owned  or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service,  whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,  of citizens or otherwise, The  first  change  is in the verbiage and  is  not  one  of substance.   It -only removes some unnecessary  words.   The new sub-clause is innocuous except where it provides for the exclusion  of  citizens.   It  enables  nationalisation   of industries and trade.  Sub-clause (g) (to the generality  of which  the  original  clause (6)  created  some  exceptions) allowed the State to make laws imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the  exercise of  the right conferred by the sub-clause.  A  law  creating restrictions   can,   of  course,  be   made   outside   the Constitution  or inside it.  If it was considered that  this right  in  the state was required in the  interests  of  the general  public, then the exercise of the right to  practise profession  or to carry on an occupation, trade or  business could  be  suitably  curtailed.   It  cannot  be  said  that

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nationalisation  is  never in the interest  of  the  general public.   This amendment was thus within the  provision  for restricting the exercise of the Fundamental Right in sub-cl. (g) and was perfectly in order. The  Seventh Amendment introduced certain words in  Art.  16 (3).  ’no clauses may be, compared: " 16. (3)  (Before Amendment) Nothing  in  this  article shall  prevent   Parliament  from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or  classes of  employment or appointment to an office under  any  State specified  in  the  First Schedule or  any  local  or  other authority  within  its  territory,  any  requirement  as  to residence  within  the ’State prior to  such  employment  or appointment.  (After  Amendment) Nothing  in  this   article shall  prevent  Parliament  from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or  classes of  employment  or  appointment  to  an  office  under   the Government  of,  or any local authority within, a  State  or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State  or  Union  territory  prior  to  such  employment  or appointment." 883 The  change,  is necessary to include a reference  to  Union territory.   It  has no breaking upon  Fundamental  Rights., and,  neither abridges nor, takes away any of them.  In  the result  none  of the, amendments, of the article.  in  parts other  than that dealing with Right to property is,  outside the  amending  process because Art.  13(2) is  in  no manner breached. This  brings me, to the main question in this case,,  It  is whether  the  amendments of the part Right  to  Property  in Part, III of the Constitution were legally made or not.   To understand  this  part  of the case I must  first  begin  by discussing  what  property  rights mean and  how  they  were safeguarded by the Constitution as it was originally framed. "Right to Property"in Part III was originally the subject of one  article,  namely,  Art.  31.   Today  there  are  three articles 3 1, 3 1 A and 31-B and the Ninth Schedule.   The original thirty-first article read: "31 Compulsory acquisition of property. (1)  Nov  person shall be deprived of his property  save  by authority of law. (2)  ’No  property,  movable  or  immovable,  including  any interest  in  or in any company owning,  any  commercial  or industrial  undertaking,  shall be taken  possession  of  or acquired  for public purposes under any law authorising  the taking  of such possession or such acquisition,  unless  the law  provides  for  compensation  for  the  property   taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation,  or specifies the principle on which, and  the manner. in which, the compensation is, to be determined  and given. No  such  law as is referred to in clause. (2) made  by  the Legislature of the State shall have effect unless such  law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. (4)  If  any  Bill  pending  at  the  commencement  of  this Constitution  in the Legislature of a State has,  ’after  it has  been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for  the consideration of the President and has received his  assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this constitution, the law so assented to shall not be Called in question in any, court on  the ground that it contravenes the provisions of  clause

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(2).               (5) Nothing in clause(2) shall affect-               (a)  the provisions of any existing law  other               than a  law to which the provisions of  clause               (6) apply,.or               884               (b)   the  provisions  of any  law  which  the               State may hereafter make-               (i)   for the ,purpose of imposing or  levying               any tax or penalty, or               (ii)  for  the promotion of public  health  or               the prevention of danger to life or  property,               or               (iii) in  pursuance of any  agreement  entered               into between the Government of the Dominion of               India  or  the  Government of  India  and  the               Government   of  .  any  other   country,   or               otherwise,  with respect to property  declared               by law to be evacuee property.               (6)   Any  law of the State enacted  not  more               than  eighteen months before the  commencement               of  this Constitution may within three  months               from  such  commencement be submitted  to  the               President    for   his   certification;    and               thereupon,   if   the  President   by   public               notification  so  certifies, it shall  not  be               called in question in any court on the  ground               that  it contravenes the provisions of  clause               (2)  of  this article or has  contravened  the               provisions  of sub-section (2) of section  299               of the Government of India, Act, 1935".               The provisions of this article are intended to               be read with Art. 19(1) (f) which reads               "19(1) All citizens shall have the right-               (f)   to  acquire,  hold    and   dispose   of               property". Article  19 1 ) (f ) ’is subject to clause (6) which I  have already  set  out elsewhere and considered.   Ownership  and exchange  of  property are thus recognised by  the  article. The word "property" is is not defined and I shall  presently consider  what may be included in ’property’.  Whatever  the nature of property, it is clear that by the first clause  of Art.  3  1  the right to property may be  taken  away  under authority  of law.  This was subject to one condition  under the original Art. 3 1, namely, that the law must either  fix the   compensation  for  the  deprivation  or  specify   the principles on which and the manner in which compensation was to,  be  determined and given.  This was the  heart  of  the institution  ’of property as understood by  the  Constituent Assembly.  The rest of the article only gave  constitutional support against the second clause, to legislation already on foot  in  the States.  This created a Fundamental  Right  in property.  The question may now be 885, asked,:why-  was  it necessary to make  such  a  Fundamental Right at all ? There  is no natural right in property and as Burke said  in his Reflections, Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of  it. Natural  rights  embrace  activity  outside  the  status  of citizen.  Legal rights are required for free existence as  a social  being  and  the State undertakes  to  protect  them. Fundamental Rights are those rights which the State enforces against   itself.   Looking  at  the  matter   briefly   but historically, it may be said that the Greeks were not  aware

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of  these distinctions for as Gierke(1) points out they  did not  distinguish  between  personality  as  a  citizen   and personality  as a human being.  For them the Individual  was merged  in the citizen and the citizen in the State.   There was personal liberty and private law but there was no  sharp division  between the different kinds of laws.   The  Romans evolved this gradually not when the Roman Republic  existed, but when the notion of a Fiscus developed in the Empire  And the  legal personality of the Individual was separated  from his  membership  of the State.  It was then that  the  State began  to  recognize  the rights of the  Individual  in  his dealings with the State.  It was Cicero(2) who was the first to declare that the’ primary duty of the Governor of a State was  to secure to each individual in the possession  of  his property.  Here we may see a recognition of the ownership of property as a Fundamental Right.  This idea wasso  engrained in early social philosophy that we find Locke opining in his Civil Government’ (Ch. 7) that "Government has no other  end but the preservation of property".  The concepts of liberty, equality and religious freedom were well-known.  To them was added  the  concept  of property  rights.   Later  the  list included   "equalitas,   libertas   ius   securitatis,   ius defensionis and ius puniendi.  The concept of property right gained further support from Bentham and Spencer and Kant and Hegel(3).   The  term  property  in  its  pristine   meaning embraced  only  land  but it soon came to  mean  much  more. According to Noyes(4)_               "Property is any protected right or bundle  of               rights  (interest  or thing) with  direct,  or               indirect  regard to any external object  (i.e.               other  than  the  person  himself)  which   is               material  or quasi material (i.e. a  protected               ,process)   and  which  the  then  and   there               Organisation  of Society permits to be  either               private  or public, which is connoted  by  the               legal  concepts of occupying,  possessing  or,               using". (1)  Das Doutscheg Genossenschaftrecht (III, 10). (2)  De Off. (The Offices) It Ch.  XXI (Everyman) p. 105. (3)  W. Friedman:Legal Theory (4th Edn.) see pp. 373-376. (4)  The Institution of Property (1936) p. 436. L3Sup CI/67-11 886 The right is enforced by excluding entry or interference  by a per. son not legally entitled.  The position of the  State vis a vis the individual is the subject of Arts. 19 and  31, 31-A and 31-B. Now in the enjoyment, the ultimate right may be an  interest which  is  connected  to  the object  through  a  series  of intermediaries  in which each ’holder’ from the last to  the first  ’holds  of’ ’the holder’ before him.  Time  was  when there  was  a  lot of ’free property’  which  was  open  for appropriation.    As   Noyes(’)  puts  it,   "all   physical manifestations  capable  of being  detected,  localised  and identified"  can be the objects of property.  One  exception now made by all civilized nations is that humanbeings are no longer  appropriable.   If any free property  was  available then  it could be brought into possession and  ownership  by mere  taking.  It has been very aptly said that all  private property  is  a  system  of  monopolies  and  the  right  to monopolise  lies  at the foundation of  the  institution  of property.  Pound(-) in classifying right in rem puts private property along with personal integrity [right against injury to  life,  body  and health  (bodily  or  mental),  personal liberty  (free motion and locomotion)], Society and  control

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of  one’s  family  and dependents.   An  extremely  valuable definition of ownership is to be found in the Restatement of the Law of Property where it is said : "It  is  the totality of rights as to any  specific  objects which  are  accorded by law, at any time  and  place,  after deducting social reservations". This is the core from which some rights may be detached  but to which they must return when liberated. The right to property in its primordial meaning involved the acquisition, of ’a free object by -possession and conversion of this possession into ownership by the protection of State or the ability to exclude interference.  As the notion of  a State grew, the right of property was strong or we according to  the  force  of  political  opinion  backing  it  or  the legislative  support of the State.  The  English  considered the  right  as the, foundation  of  society.   Blackstone(&) explained it on religious; and social ground% claiming universality  for it and called it the right of the  English people.   William’   Paley(4),although   he   thought    the institution paradoxical and unnatural  found   it  full   of advantage and Mackintosh in his famous diatribe against  the French  Revolution  described  it  as  the   "sheet-anchorof society".   This in"stitution’ appeared in the Magna  Carta, in  the American Declaration of Independence and the  French Declaration of Rights of Man.  Later we find it in many (1)  The Institution of Property (1936)p. 438. (2)  Readings; p. 420. 3) Commentaries. (4) Moral Philosophy.                             887 Constitutions described as Fundamental, general and  guaran- teed(1). Our Constitution accepted the theory that Right of  Property is  a fundamental right.  In my opinion it was an  error  to place it in that category.  Like the original Art. 16 of the Draft  Bill  of the Constitution which  assured  freedom  of trade,  commerce  and intercourse within  the  territory  of India  as  a fundamental right but was  later  removed,  the right  of  property should have been placed in  a  different chapter.   Of all the fundamental rights it is the  weakest. Even  in the most democratic of Constitutions, (namely,  the West German Constitution of 1949) there was a provision that lands, minerals and means of production might be  socialised or  subjected  to  control.  Art.  31,  if  it  contemplated socialization  in  the  same way in India  should  not  have insisted  so plainly upon payment of compensation.   Several speakers warned Pandit Nehru and others of the danger of the second clause of Art. 31, but it seems that the  Constituent Assembly was quite content that under it the Judiciary would have no say in the matter of compensation.  Perhaps the dead hand of s. 299 of the Constitution Act of 1935 was upon  the Constituent  Assembly.  Ignored were the resolutions  passed by  the National Planning Committee of the  Congress  (1941) which   had   advocated  the  co-operative   principle   for exploitation of land, the Resolution of 1947 that land  with its  mineral resources and all other means of production  as well  as  distribution and exchange must belong  to  and  be regulated  by  the  Community, and the  warning  of  Mahatma Gandhi that if compensation had to be paid we would have  to rob  Peter to pay Paul(2) In the Constituent  Assembly,  the Congress (Which wielded the majority then, as it does today) was  satisfied  with  the Reprt  of  the  Congress  Agrarian Reforms  Committee 1949 which declared itself in  favour  of the elimination of all intermediaries between the State  and the tiller and imposition of prohibition against subletting.

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The  Abolition Bills were the result.  Obviously the  Sardar Patel Committee on Fundamental Rights was not prepared to go far.   In  the debates that followed,  many  amendments  and suggestions to alter the draft article protecting  property, failed.   The  attitude was summed up by Sardar  Patel.   He conceded that land would be required for public purposes but hopefully  added : "not only land but so many  other  things may  have to be acquired.  And the State will  acquire  them after paying compensation and not expropriate thenm". (3) (1)  Under the Constitution of Norway the rights (Odels  and Asaete rights) cannot be abolished but if the State requires the owner must surrender the property and he is compensated. (2)  Gandhi  :  Constituent Assembly Debates  Vol.   IX  pp. 1204-06. (3)  Patel : Constituent Assembly Debates Vol.  I p. 517. 888 What  was then the theory about Right- to Property  accepted by  the Constituent Assembly ? Again I can only describe  it historically.  Grotius(1) had treated the right as  acquired right  (ius  quaesitum) and ownership (dominium)  as  either serving  individual  interests (vulgare) or for  the  public good (eminens).  According to him, the acquired right had to give  way to eminent domain (ex vi auper-eminentis  dominii) but  there must be public interest (publicautilitas) and  if possible  compensation.   In-- the  social  contract  theory also  .  the contract included protection of  property  with recognition  of the power of the ruler to act in the  public interest  and emergency.  Our constitutional theory  treated property rights as inviolable except through law for  public good  and on payment of compensation.  Our Constitution  saw the  matter  in  the  way  of  Grotius  but  overlooked  the possibility that just compensation may. not be possible.  It follows  almost  literally the German jurist  Ulrich  Zasius (except  in one respect) : Princeps non potest auferee  mihi rem mean sive iure gentium, sive civile sit facta mea. All  would,  have  been well if  the  Courts  had  construed Article 31 differently.  However, the decisions of the  High Courts  and the Supreme Court, interpreting  and  expounding this  philosophy took a different view of  compensation.   I shall  refer  only to some of them., First  the  Patna  High Court  in.  Kameshwar v. Bihar(2) applied Art. 14 to  strike down   the   Reforms  Act  in  Bihar  holding   it   to   be discriminatory.  This need not have occasioned an  amendment because  the  matter could have been righted, as  indeed  it wag,  by,an appeal to the Supreme Court [see State of  Bihar v.  Kameshwar(3)].The Constitution  (First  Amendment)  Act, 1951  followed.  It left Art. 31 intact but added two  fresh articles, Arts.  31-A and 31-B which are respectively headed "saving  of laws providing for acquisition of estates  etc." and "Validation of certain Acts and Regulations" and added a schedule  (Ninth) to be read with Art 31-B  naming  thirteen Acts  of  the State Legislatures.  Article 31-A  was  deemed always  to  have  been  inserted and  Art.  31-B  wiped  out retrospectively  all  decisions  of the  courts  which  had. declared any of the scheduled Acts to be invalid.  The texts of these new articles may now be seen:               "31A.    Saving   of   laws   providing    for               acquisition of estates, etc.-               (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  in   foregoing               provisions of this Part, no law providing  for               the acquisition by the State of any estate  or               of any rights therein or for               (1) Grotius : De jure Belli ac Pacis. 11 c.  2               2 (5)6. 1 c. I  6 and II c.               14    7 and 8.

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             (2)   A.L.R. 1951 Patna 91.               (3)   [1952] S.C.R. 889.               889               the extinguishment or modification of any such               rights  shall  be deemed to be  void  on  the:               ground  that it is consistent with,  or  takes               away  or abridges any of the rights  conferred               by, any provisions of this Part               Provided that where such law is a law made  by               the Legislature of a State, the provisions  of               this  article shall not apply  thereto  unless               such   law,  having  been  reserved  for   the               consideration  of the President, has  received               his assent.               (2)   In this article,               (a)   the   expression  "estate"   shall,   in               relation  to  any local area,  have  the  same               meaning  as  that  expression  or  its   local               equivalent has in the existing law relating to               land tenures in force in that area, and  shall               also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other               similar grant;               (b)   the expression "right" in relation to an               estate shall include ’any rights vesting in  a               proprietor,  sub-proprietor, tenure-holder  or               other   intermediary   and   any   rights   or               privileges in respect of land revenue."               "31-B.    Validation  of  certain   Acts   and               Regulations.               Without  prejudice  to the generality  of  the               provisions  contained in article 31A, none  of               the  Acts  and Regulations  specified  in  the               Ninth  Schedule  nor  any  of  the  provisions               thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to               have become void, on the ground that such Act,               Regulation or provision is inconsistent  with,               or  takes away or abridges any of  the  rights               conferred by, any provision of this Part,  and               notwithstanding any judgment, decree or  order               of  any  court or tribunal to  the,  contrary,               each  of the said Acts and Regulations  shall,               subject   to-the   power  of   any   competent               Legislature to repeat or amend it, continue in               force’." Article 31-A has been a Protean article.  It has changed its face  many times.  Article 31-B has remained the  same  till today  but the Ninth Schedule has grown..  The  Constitution (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,  1955,  took  the  number  of  the Scheduled  statutes to 20 and the Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 to 64 and a so-called explanation which saved the application of the Proviso in Art. 31-A, was  also added.  The  device [approved by Sankari  Prasad’s  case(1)] was,found so (1)  [1952] 1 S.C.R. 89. 890 attractive  that many more Acts were sought to  be  included but  were dropped on second thoughts.  Even so, one  wonders how the Railway Companies (Emergency Provisions) Act,  1951, The  West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act and  some others  could have been thought of in this  connection.   By this device, which can be extended easily to other  spheres, the  Fundamental Rights can be completely emasculated  by  a 2/3  majority,  even though they cannot be  touched  in  the ordinary  way  by a unanimousvote of the same body  of  men! The  State Legislatures may drive a coach and  pair  through

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the  Fundamental Rights and the Parliament by  2/3  majority will  then put them outside the jurisdiction of the  courts. Was  it  really intended that the  restriction  against  the State  in Arts. 13(2) might be overcome by the two  agencies acting hand in hand ?  Article  3 1 A dealt with the acquisition by the  State  of an  .estate’ or of any rights therein or the  extinguishment or  modification  of any such rights.  A law  of  the  State could do these with the President’s assent, although,it took away  or  abridged  any  of  the  rights  conferred  by  any provisions  of Part Ill.  The words ’estate’ and ’rights  in relation  to  an estate’ were defined.   The  constitutional amendment  was  challenged in Sankari  Prasad’s  case(1)  on various  grounds  but was upheld mainly on  two  grounds  to which I objected in Sajjan Singh’s case(2).  I have shown in this judgment, for reasons which I need not repeat and which must  be  read  in addition to what I said  on  the  earlier occasion, that I disagree respectfully but strongly with the view  of  the Court in those two cases.   This  touches  the first part of the amendment which created Art.31-A. I do not and  cannot  question  Art.31-A  because  (a)  it  was   not considered at the hearing of this case, and (b) it has stood for  a  long  time as part of  the  Constitution  under  the decision  of  this Court and has been acquiesced in  by  the people.   If I was free I should say that the amendment  was not  legal and certainly not justified by the reasons  given in the earlier cases of this Court.  Under the original Art. 31,  compensation  had  to be paid for  acquisition  by  the State.  This was the minimum requirement of Art. 31 (1)  and (2)  and  no  amendment  could  be  made  by  a  constituted parliament   to  avoid  compensation.   A  law  made  by   a constituted Parliament had to conform to Art. 13(2) and Art. 31 could not be ignored. In 1954 the Supreme Court in a series of cases drew the dis- tinction between Art. 19(1)(f) and Art. 31, particularly  in West  Bengal  v.  Subodh  Gopal(3),  Dwarkadas  Srinivas  v. Sholapur  Spinning  Co. (4).  In State of I West  Bengal  v. Mrs.  Bela  Banerjee  and  Others(5),  this  Court  held   a compensation in Art. 31(2) meant (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89.    (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. (3)[1954] S.CR. 587.    (4) [1954] S.CR. 558. (5)  [1954] S.C.R. 678. 891 just  equivalent, i.e. full and fair money equivalent’  thus making the adequacy of compensation justiciable. The  Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 then  amended both  Art.  31 and Art. 31-A.  Clause (2) of  Art..  31  was substituted by-               "(2)   No  property  shall   be   compulsorily               acquired  or requisitioned save for  a  public               purpose  and save by authority of a law  which               provides for compensation for the property  so               acquired or requisitioned and other fixes  the               amount  of the compensation or  specifies  the               principles on which, and the manner in  which,               the  compensation  is  to  be  determined  and               given;  and  no such law shall  be  called  in               question  in any court on the ground that  the               compensation  provided  by  that  law  is  not               adequate". The opening words of the former second clause were  modified to  make them more effective but the muzzling of  courts  in the matter of adequacy of the compensation was the important move.  As Basu says :               "It  is  evident that the  1955  amendment  of

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             clause (2) eats   into  the  vitals   of   the               constitutional mandate to pay Compensation and               demonstrate  a drift from the meetings of  the               American  concept  of  private  Property   and               judicial review to which our Constitution  was               hitherto tied, to that of socialism."(1) It  is  appropriate  to recall here  that  as  expounded  by Professor  Beard  (2) (whose views offended Holmes  and  the Times  of New York but which are now being recognised  after his  further explanation(3) the Constitution of  the  United States  is  an economic document prepared by  men  who  were wealthy or allied with property rights, that it is based  on the  concept  that the fundamental rights  of  property  are anterior  to  Government and morally beyond  the,  reach  of popular majorities and that the Supreme Court of the  United States preserved the property rights till the New Deal  era. The,  threat at that time was to enlarge the  Supreme  Court but  not  to amend the Constitution.  It  appears  that  the Indian Socialists charged with the idea of Marx, the  Webbs, Green,  Laski  and  others  viewed  property  rights  in   a different  way.   Pandit  Nehru once said  that  he  had  no property  sense,meaning  that he did not value  property  at all.   The Constitution seems to have changed  its  property significantly.  In addition to avoiding (1)  Basu  : commentaries on the Constitution of India  (5th Edn.) Vol. 2 p. 230. (2)  An   Economic  Interpretation  of  the  United   States Constitution- (3)  See   Laski   :  The  American  democracy;   Weaver   : Constitutional   Law,   Brown:   Charles   Beard   and   the constitution; will is constitutional Law. 892 the concept of just compensation, the amendment added a  new clause (2A) as follows :-               "(2A)  Where  a law does not provide  for  the               transfer   of  the  ownership  or   right   to               possession of, any property to the State or to               a  corporation  owned or control  led  by  the               State,  it shall not be deemed to provide  for               the  compulsory acquisition or  requisitioning               of property, notwithstanding that’ it deprives               any person of his property." This  narrowed the field in which compensation was  payable. In addition to this, clause (1) of Art. 31-A was substituted and  was  deemed to be always substituted by  a  new  clause which provided:               "(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               article 13, no law providing for-               (a)  the  acquisition  by the  State  -of  any               estate  or  of  any  rights  therein  or   the               extinguishment  or  modification of  any  such               rights, or               (b)  the taking over of the management of  any               property  by  the State for a  limited  period               either in the public interest ’or in order  to               secure the proper management of the  property,               or               (c)  amalgamation of two or more  corporations               either  in the public interest or in order  to               secure  the  proper management of any  of  the               corporation, or               (d)  the extinguishment or modification of any               rights  of  ’managing agents  secretaries  and               treasurers,  managing directors, directors  or               managers  of  corporations, or of  any  voting

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             rights of shareholders thereof, or               (e)  the extinguishment or modification of any               rights  accruing by virtue of  any  agreement,               lease or licence for the purpose of  searching               for,  or winning, any mineral or mineral  oil,               or  the premature termination or  cancellation               of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall  be  deemed  to  be void on  the  ground  that  it  is inconsistent  with,  or takes away or abridges  any  of  the rights conferred by Art. 14, article 19 or article 31 Provided  that  where  such  law  is  a  law  made  by   the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved                             893 for  the  consideration  of  the  President,  has   received assent." In  clause (2)(a) after the word ’grant’, the words "and  in any State of Madras and Travancore Cochin any, Janmam right" were  inserted ’and deemed always to have been inserted  and in clause (2) (b) after the words ’tenure-holder’ the  words "raiyat,  under raiyat" were inserted and deemed always  to- have  been  inserted.   Once again the reach  of  the  State towards  private  property  was made  longer  and  curiously enough  it  was done retrospectively from the  time  of  the Constituent  Assembly and so to speak, in its name.   As  to the   retrospective  operation  of   these,   Constitutional amendment.  I entertain considerable doubt... A  Constituent Assembly makes a new Constitution for itself.  Parliament is not even a Constituent Assembly and to. abridge  fundamental rights  in  the  name of the  Constituent  Assembly  appears anomalous.   I am reminded of the conversation between  apo- leon  and Abe . Sieyes, the, great jurist whose  ability  to draw  up one Constitution after another has been  recognised and  none of whose efforts lasted for long.   When  Napoleon asked him "what has survived ?" Abe Sieyes answered "I  have survived".   I  wonder if the Constituent Assembly  will  be able  to  say the same thing  What it had  written  or  the, subject of property rights, appears to have been written  on water.   The  Fourth Amendment served to do  away  with  the distinction  made by this Court between Arts. 19 and 31  and the  theory of just compensation.  The Fourth Amendment  has not been challenged before us.  Nor was it challenged at any time  before.  For the reasons for which I have declined  to consider the First Amendment I  refrain from considering the validity  of  the  Fourth Amendment.  It  may,  however,  be stated here that if I was free to consider it,, I would have found great difficulty in accepting that the  constitutional guarantee could be abridged in this way. I may say here that the method I have followed in not recon- , sidering an amendment which has stood for a long time, was also invoked by the Supreme Court of United: States in Leser v.   Garnett(1).  A  constitution  works  only  because   of universal  recognition.  This recognition may. be  voluntary or forced where people have lost liberty of speech.  But the acquiescence  of the people is necessary for the working  of the  Constitution.   The  examples  of  our  neighbours,  of Germany, of Rhodesia and others illustrates the  recognition of Constitutions by acquiescence.. It is obvious that it  is good  sense and sound policy for the ’Courts to  decline  to take ’up an amendment for consideration after a considerable lapse  of  time when it was not challenged  before,  or  was sustained on an earlier occasion after challenge. (1)  (1922) 258 U.S. 130. 894 It  is  necessary to pause here and see  what  the  property

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rights  have  become under the  repeated  and  retrospective amendments  of the Constitution.  I have already  said  that the Constitution started with the concept of which,  Grotius may’  be  said to be the author, although his  name  is  not particularly  famous  for  theories  of  constitutional   or municipal  laws.   The  socialistic  tendencies  which   the amendments  now manifest take into consideration some  later theories  about  the  institution of  property.   When  the- original  Art. 31 was moved by Pandit Jawaharlal  Nehru,  he had described it as a compromise between various  approaches to  the question and said that it did justice  and  equality not  only  to the individual but also to the  community’  He accepted  the principle of compensation but compensation  as determined  by the Legislature and not the  Judiciary.   His words were               "The  law should do it.  Parliament should  do               it.   There  is no reference in  this  to  any               judiciary  coming  into  the  picture.    Much               thought  has  been given to it and  there  has               been  much  debate as to where  the  judiciary               comes  in.  Eminent lawyers have told us  that               on  a  proper  construction  of  this  clause,               normally  speaking  the judiciary  should  not               come   in.    Parliament  fixes   either   the               compensation itself or the principle governing               that  compensation  and  they  should  not  be               challenged except for one reason, where it  is               thought  that there has been a gross abuse  of               the  law,  where, in fact, there  has  been  a               fraud  on  the  Constitution.   Naturally  the               judiciary comes in to see if there has been  a               fraud on the Constitution or not."(1) He  traced  the  evolution of  property  and  observed  that property  was becoming a question of credit, of  monopolies, that  there  were  two  approaches,  the  approach  of   the Individual and the approach of the community.  He  expressed for  the for protection of the indi vidual’s rights.(2)  The attitude changed at the time of the First Amendment.  Pandit Nehru  propheised that the basic problem would  come  before the  House  from time to, time.  That it has,  there  is  no doubt,  just  as  there  is no  doubt  that  each  time  the individual’s rights have suffered. Of  course,  the growth of collectivist theories  have  made elsewhere  considerable inroads into the right of  property. In Russia there is no private ownership of. land and even in the Federal Capital Territory of Australia, the ownership of land  is  with  the  Crown and  the  individual  can  get  a leasehold  right only.  Justification for this is  found  in the fact that the State must benefit from (1)  Constituent Assemembly Debates Vol.  IX pp. 1193-1195. (2)  Constituent Assembly Debates Vol.  IX p. 1135. 895 the  rise in the value of land.  The paucity of land and  of dwelling houses have led to the control of urban  properties and  creation  of  statutory tenancies.  In  our  country  a ceiling  is put on agricultural land held by an  individual. The Supreme Court, in spite of this, has not frustrated  any genuine legislation for agrarian reform.  It has upheld  the laws   by  which  the  lands  from  latifundia   have   been distributed  among  the  landless.  It  seems  that  as  the Constitutions of Peru, Brazil, Poland, Latvia, Lethuania and Mexico  contain provisions for such reforms, mainly  without payment  of compensation, our Parliament has taken the  same road.   Of course, the modem theory regards the  institution of proper on a functional basis(1) which means that property

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to  be  productive must be property  distributed.   As  many writers  have said property is now a duty more than a  right and  ownership  of  property entails  a  social  obligation. Although Duguit(2), who is ahead of others, thinks that  the institution  of  property has undergone  a  revolution,  the rights  of the Individual are not quite gone,  except  where Communism  is firmly entrenched.  The rights  are  qualified but  property belongs still to the owner.   The  Seventeenth Amendment,  however,  seems to take us far away,  from  even this  qualified concept, at least in so far as "estates"  as defined by Art. 31-A.  This is the culmination of a process. Previous to the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act the Constitution  (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 had given  power indirectly  by  altering  entry No. 42  in  List  III.   The entries may be read side by side : "42.       (Before Amendment) (After Amendment) Principles   on  which  compensation  for  Acquisition   and requisitioning,   of   pro          property   acquired   or requisitioned  for perty. the purposes of the Union or of  a State  or for any other public purpose is to be  determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given." This  removed the last reference to compensation in  respect of acquisition and requisition.  What this amendment  began, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964  achieved in   full.    The  Fourth  Amendment  had   added   to   the comprehensive definition of ’right in relation to an estate, the  rights  of raiyats and under-raiyats.   This  time  the expression ’estate’ in Art. 31 A was amended retrospectively by a new definition which reads:               "the expression "estate" shall, in relation to               any local area, have the same meaning as  that               expression or its local equivalent has in  the               existing law relating to               (1)   See   G.W.   Paton  :   Text   Book   of               Jurisprudence (1964) pp. 484-485.               (2) Transformations du droit prive.               896               land tenures in force in that area, and  shall               also include-               (i)   any  jagir,  inam  or  muafi  or   other               similar grant and in the States of Madras  and               Kerala, any janmam right;               (ii)  any land held under ryotwari settlement;               (iii) any  land  held or let for  purposes  of               agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto,               including  waste land, forest land,  land  for               pasture  or  sites  of  buildings  and   other               structures  occupied by cultivators  of  land,               agricultural labourers and village artisans,"               The  only saving of compensation is now to  be               found  in the second proviso added  to  clause               (1) of the article which reads               "Provided  further that, where any  law  makes               any provision for the acquisition by the State               of  any estate. and where any  land  comprised               therein  is  held  by a per-,  son  under  his               personal  cultivation, it shall not be  lawful               for  the State to acquire any portion of  such               land as is within the ceiling limit applicable               to  him under any law for. the time  being  in               force  or any building or  structure  standing               thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law               relating  to  the acquisition  of  such  land,               building or structure, provides for payment of

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             compensation at a rate which shall not be less               than the market value thereof." There  is  also the provision  for  compensation  introduced indirectly  in  an  Explanation  at the  end  of  the  Ninth Schedule, in respect of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.  By this  explanation  the  provisions of this  Tenancy  Act  in conflict         with        the        proviso         last last quoted are declared to be void. The  sum  total of this amendment is that  except  for  land within  the  ceiling,all other land can be  acquired  ed  or rights therein extinguished or modified without compensation and no. challenge to the law can be made under Arts. 14,  19 or  31  of the Constitution.  The same is also true  of  the taking over: of ’the management of any property by the State for  a  limited period either in the public interest  or  in order  to secure the proper management of the  property,  or the   amalgamation  of  two  or  more  companies,   or   the extinguishment  or  modification of any rights  of  managing agents,,   secretaries,  treasurers,   managing   directors, directors  or  managers, of corporations or  of  any  voting right, of shareholders thereof any rights by virtue of  an), agreement,  lease, or licence for the purpose  of  searching for,  or  winning,  any mineral or mineral oil,  or  of  the premature 897 termination.  or cancellation of any such agreement,-  lease or licence. It  will be noticed further that deprivation of property  of any  person  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  acquisition   or requisition  unless  the  benefit of  the  transfer  of  the ownership or right to possession goes to the State--or to  a corporation  owned or controlled by the State.   Acquisition or requisition in this limited sense alone requires that  it should  be  for public purpose and under  authority  of  law which fixes the compensation or lays down the principles  on which and. the manner in which compensation is to be  deter- mined.  and  given,  and the adequacy  of  the  compensation cannot  be any ground of attack.  Further still  acquisition of  estates  and of rights therein and the  taking  over  of property,  amalgamation of corporations,  extinguishment  or modification  of rights in companies and mines may  be  made regardless  of  Arts. 14, 19 and 31.  In addition  64  State Acts are given special protection from the courts regardless of  therein  contents which ’may be  in  derogation  of  the Fundamental Rights. This  is  the  kind of amendment which has  been  upheld  in Sajjan  Singh(1)  case on the theory of the  omnipotence  of Art. 368.  The State had bound itself not to’ enact any  law in  derogation  of Fundamental Rights.  Is  the  Seventeenth Amendment a law ? To this question my answer is a  categoric yes.  It is no answer to gay that this is an amendment  and; therefore;  not  a law, or that it is passed  by  a  special power  of  voting.  It is the action of the  State  all  the same.  The State had put restraints on itself in law  making whether   the  laws  were  made  without  Dr.   within   the Constitution.. it is also’ no answer to say that this  Court in a Bench of five Judges on one, occasion and by a majority of 3 to 2 on another, has said the,same thing.  In a. matter of   the  interpretation  of  the-Constitution  this   Court must,look at the functioning of the Constitution as a whole. The rules of res indicate and stare decisis are not,  always appropriate  in  interpreting a  Constitution,  particularly when  Art.  13(2)  itself declares a law to  be  void.   The sanctity  of  a  former  judgment is  for  the  matter  then decided-.   In  Plessy v. Fergusson(2),  Harlan,  J.  alone,

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dissented against the "separate but equal doctrine  uttering the  memorable  words that there was no caste and  that  the Constitution  of the United States was ’colour blind.   This dissent  made some Southern Senators to oppose his  grandson (Mr.  Justice John Marshall Harlan) in 1954.  It took fifty- eight years for the words of Harlan, J.’s lone dissent (8 to 1)  to  become,  the law of the united states  at  least  in respect  of segregation in the public schools [See Brown  v. Board of Education(3)].  As Mark Twain (1) (1965] 1 S. C. R. 933. (2)163 U. S. 537. (3) (1954) 347 U. S. 483. 898 said  very truly-"Loyality to a petrified opinion never  yet broke a chain or freed a human soul" I am apprehensive that the erosion of the right to  property may  be  practised against other Fundamental Rights.   If  a halt  is  to  be  called,  we  must  declare  the  right  of Parliament  to  abridge  or take  away  Fundamental  Rights. Small inroads lead to larger inroads and become as  habitual as before our freedom won The history of freedom is not only how  freedom is achieved but how it is preserved.  I  am  of opinion that an attempt to abridge or take away  Fundamental Rights by a constituted Parliament even through an amendment of  the Constitution can be declared void.  This  Court  has the  power  and  jurisdiction to make  the  declaration.   I dissent   from  the  opposite  view  expressed   in   Sajjan Singh’s(1) case and I overrule that decision. It remains to consider what is the extent of  contravention. Here  I must make it clear that since the First, Fourth  and Seventh  Amendments  are  not  before me  and  I  have  not, therefore, questioned them, I must start with the provisions of Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, List III and the Ninth Schedule  as they  were immediately preceding the Seventeenth  Amendment. I  have elsewhere given a summary of the inroads  made  into property  rights  of individuals and Corporations  by  these earlier  amendments.   By this amendment the  definition  of ’estate’ was repeated for the most part but was extended  to include:               "(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement;               (iii) any  land  held  or  let  for   purposes               ancillary   thereto,  including  waste   land,               forest  land,  land for pasture  or  sites  of               buildings  and  other structures  occupied  by               cultivators  of land,  agricultural  labourers               and village artisans." Further reach of acquisition or requisition without adequate compensation and without a challenge under Arts. 14, 19  and 31  has  now  been  made possible.   There  is  no  kind  of agricultural estate or land which cannot be acquired by  the State  even  though it pays an illusory  compensation.   The only  exception is the second proviso added to Art.  31-A(1) by which, lands within the ceiling limit applicable for  the time being to a person personally cultivating his land,  may be  acquired  only on paying compensation at  a  rate  which shall not be less than the-market value.  This may prove: to be  an illusory protection.  The ceiling may be  lowered  by legislation.   The  State may leave the person an  owner  in name and acquire all his. other rights.  The latter question did come before this Court in two cases-Ajit Singh v.  State of Punjab (2) (1) (1965] 1 & C. R. 933 (2) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 143. 899 and  Bhagat  Ram and Ors. v. State of Punjab, and  Ors.  (1)

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decided  on  December  2, 1966.  My brother  Shelat  and,  I described the device as a fraud upon this proviso but it  is obvious  that a law lowering the ceiling to  almost  nothing cannot  be declared a fraud on the Constitution.   In  other words, the agricultural landholders hold land as tenants-at- will.   To achieve this a large number of Acts of the  State Legislatures have been added to the Ninth Schedule to  bring them under the umbrella of Art. 31-B.  This list may grow. In my opinion the extension of the definition of ’estate’ to include  ryotwari and agricultural lands is an  inroad  into the  Fundamental Rights but it cannot be questioned in  view of  the  existence of Art. 31-A(1) (a) as  already  amended. The  constitutional  amendment  is a law  and  Art.  31  (I) permits  the  deprivation of property by authority  of  law. The  law may be made outside the Constitution or within  it. The word ’law’ in this clause includes both ordinary law  or an  amendment of the Constitution.  Since "no law  providing for  the  acquisition by the State of any estate or  of  any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of  any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is  inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of  the rights  conferred  by  Art. 14, Art. 19  or  Art.  31",  the Seventeenth Amendment when it gives a new definition of  the word   ’estate  cannot  be  questioned  by  reason  of   the Constitution  as  it exists.  The new definition  of  estate introduced  by  the  amendment is beyond the  reach  of  the courts not because it is not law but because it is "law" and falls within that word in Art. 31 (1) (2) (2-A) and Art. 31- A(1).  1, therefore, sustain the new definition, not on  the erroneous  reasoning in Sajjan Singh’s case (2 ) but on  the true construction of the word ’law’ as used in Arts.  13(2), 31(1)(2-A) and 31-A(1).  The above reason applies a fortiori to  the  inclusion of the proviso which preserves  (for  the time being) the notion of compensation for deprivation of  a cultural  property.  The proviso at least  saves  something. It  prevents the, agricultural lands below the ceiling  from being appropriated without payment of pro-per  compensation. It  is  clear,that the proviso at least cannot  be  held  to abridge  or take away fundamental rights.  In the  result  I uphold  the second section of the Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This  brings me to the third section of the Act.  That  does no  more than add 44 State Acts to the Ninth Schedule.   The object  of  Art.  31-B, when it was  enacted,  was  to  save certain State Acts notwithstanding judicial decision to  the contrary.   These  Acts were already protected by  Art.  31. One  can with difficulty understand such a  provision.   Now the Schedule is being used to (1) 11967] 2 S. C. R. 165. (2) (1965) 1 S. C. R. 933. 900 give advance protection to legislation which is known appre- hended to derogate from the Fundamental Rights.  The power under  Art. 368, whatever it may be, was given to amend  the Constitution.   Giving.  protection  to  statutes  of  State Legislatures  which  offend  the Constitution  in  its  most fundamental part, can hardly merit the description amendment of the Constitution in fact in so cases it is not even known whether  the statues in question stand in need of such  aid. The  intent  is to silence the courts and not to  amend  the Constitution.   If  these Acts were’, not  included  in  the Schedule they would have to face the Fundamental Rights  and rely  on  Arts. 31 and 31-A to save them.   By  this  device protection  far in excess of ’these articles is afforded  to them.  This in my judgment is not a matter of amendment at

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all.   The power which is given is for the specific  purpose of  amending the Constitution and not to confer validity  on State  Acts  against the rest of the Constitution.   If  the President’s  assent  did  not do this, no  more  would  this section.  I consider s.. 3 of the Act., to be invalid as  an illegitimate  exercise of the powers . of amendment  however generous.  Ours is the only Constitution in the world  which carries  a  long  list of ordinary laws  which  it  protects against  itself,.  In the result I declare s. 3 to be  ultra vires the amending process. As stated by me in Sajjan Singh’s case(1) Art. 368  outlines process, which if followed strictly results in the amendment of  the  Constitution.   The  article  gives  power  to   no particular  person  or persons.  All the  named  authorities have to act according to the letter       of the article  to achieve the result.  The procedure of, amendment, if it  can be  called a ’power at all is a legislative power but it  is sui generi and outside the three lists in Schedule 7 of  the Constitution.   ’It  does  ’not’ have to  depend.  upon  any entry,in the lusts. Ordinarily  there would-be no limit to the extent of  the  , amendatory  legislation but. the Constitution  itself  makes distinctions.   It states three methods and  places  certain bars.    For  some  amendments  an  ordinary,  majority   fs sufficient;  for  some  others ’a  2/3rd  majority  of  the, members  present  and voting with a majority  of  the  total members, in each House is necessary: and for some others  in addition to the second requirement, ratification by at least one,half of the legislatures of the States must be forthcom- ing.   Besides these methods, Art. 13(2) puts an embargo  on the legislative power of the State and consequently upon the agencies  of  the  State.  By its means  the  boundaries  of legislative action of any of including legislation to  amend the Constitution have been marked out. (1)  [1965]1 S.C.R 933. 901 I have    attempted to show hem that under our Constitution revolution     is  not  the only alternative  to  change  of Constitution under Art.     368.  A  Constitution  can.   be changed by consent or, revolution  Rodee,    Anderson    and Christol  (1)  have shown the sovereignty of the  People  is either  electoral or constituent.  When the People elect the Parliament   and  the  Legislatures  they   exercise   their electoral   sovereignty.   I  includes    some   constituent sovereignty  also  but  only in so  far  as  conceded.   The remaining constituent sovereignty which is contained in  the Preamble  and  Part III is in abeyance because of  the  curb placed  by the People on the state under Art. 13(2).  It  is this  power which can be reproduced.  I have  indicated  the method.  Watson(2) quoting Ames- On Amendments p. 1 note  2) points  out that the idea that provision should be  made  in the  instrument of Government itself for the method  of  its amendment   is  peculiarly  American.   But  even   in   the Constitution  of the United States of America  some  matters were kept away from the amendatory process Other temporarily or  permanently.  Our Constitution has done the same  .  Our Constitution  provides for minorities,  religions,  socially and  educationally  backward peoples, for  ameliorating  the condition   of   depressed  classes,  for   removing   class distinctions,  titles,  etc.  This reservation was  made  so that in the words of Madison(3), men of factious tempers, of local  prejudices, or sinister designs may not by  intrigue, by  corruption, or other means , first obtain the  suffrages and then betray the interests of the people.  It was to plug the  loophole  such  as  existed in  s.  48  of  the  Weimar

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Constitution(  4) that Art. 13 (2) was. adopted. of  course, as.  Story(’’) says, an amendment process is a safety  valve to,  let off all temporary effervescence and excitement,  as an effective instrument to control and adjust the  Movements of  the machinery when out of order or in danger  of  self-d tion  but is not an open valve to let, out’ even that  which was intended to be retained.  In the words of Wheare(6)  the people or a Constituent Assembly acting on their behalf, has authority  to enact a Constitution and by the same  token  a portion  of-the Constitution placed  outside  the-amenditory process  by  one  Constituent body can only  be  amended  by another Constituent body.  In the Commonwealth of, Australia Act  the provisions of the last Paragraph of   s.  128  have been  regarded  as,  mandatory,  and-  held  to   be   clear limitations  of  the power of amendment.  Dr.  Jethro  Brown considered that the amendment of the paragraph was logically impossible even by a two step amendment.  Similarly, s. 105- A has been judicially (1)  Introduction to Political Science, p. 32 et seq. (2)  Constitution" Its History, Application and Construction Vol.II (1910) p. 1301. (3)  Federalist No. 10. (4)  See Louis L. Snyder: The Weimar Constitution, p. 42  et seq. (5)  Commentaries  on the Constitution of the United  States (I 833) Vol.  II. (6)  K. C. Wheare: Modern Constitutions, p. 78. sup Cl/67-12 902 considered  in the Garnishee case(-’) to be an exception  to the power of amendment in s. 128 although Wynes(2) does  not agree.   I prefer the judicial view to that of  Wynes.   The same  position  obtains under our Constitution  in  Art.  35 where  the  opening  words, are  more  than  a  non-obstante clause.   They exclude Art. 368 and even amendment  of  that article under the proviso.  It is, therefore, a grave  error to think of Art. 368 as a code ;Dr as omnicompetent.  It  is the  duty  of  this  Court to  find  the  limits  which  the Constitution has set on the amendatory power and to  enforce those  limits.  This is what I have attempted to do in  this judgment.               My conclusions are               (i)   that the Fundamental Rights are  outside               the amendatory process if the amendment  seeks               to abridge or take away any of the rights;               (ii)  that  Sankari Prasad’s case (and  Sajjan               Singh’s  case which followed it) conceded  the               power  of  amendment  over  Part  III  of  the               Constitution  on  an erroneous view  of  Arts.               13(2) and 368;               (iii) that  the  First,  Fourth  and   Seventh               Amendments  being part of the Constitution  by               acquiescence  for a long time, cannot  now  be               challenged and they contain authority for  the               Seventeenth Amendment;               (iv)  that  this  Court having now  laid  down               that Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged  or               taken  away  by  the  exercise  of  amendatory               process  in Art. 368, any further inroad  into               these  rights  as  they exist  today  will  be               illegal   and   unconstitutional   unless   it               complies  with  Part III in general  and  Art.               13(2) in particular,               (v)   that   for  abridging  or  taking   away               Fundamental  Rights, a Constituent  body  will

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             have to be, convoked; and               (vi)  that the two impugned Acts, namely,  the               Punjab  Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953  (X               of 1953) and the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961               (X of 1962) as amended by act XIV of 1965  are               valid under the Constitution not because  they               are included in schedule 9 of the Constitution               but  because the, are protected by Art.  31-A,               and the President’s assent. (1)  46 C. L. R. 155. (2)  Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia pp. 695-698. 903 In  view  of  my decision the several  petit  ions  will  be dismissed, but without costs.  The State Acts Nos. 21-64  in the Ninth Schedule will have to be tested under Part HI with such protection as Arts. 31 and 31 A give to them. Before  parting  with  this  case  I  only  hope  that   the Fundamental Rights will be able to withstand the pressure of textual  readings  by  "the depth  and  toughness  of  their roots". Bachawat, J The constitutionality of the Constitution First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendment Acts is challenged on the . ground that the fundamental rights conferred by Part HI  are inviolable and immune from amendment.  It is said that  art. 368 does not give any power of amendment and, in any  event, the  amending power is limited expressly by art.  13(2)  and impliedly by the language of art. 368 and other articles  as also  the  preamble.   It is then said  that  the  power  of amendment  is abused and should be subject to  restrictions. The  Acts  are attacked also on the ground  that  they  made changes  in arts. 226 and 245 and such changes could not  be made  without  complying  with  the  proviso  to  art.  368. Article  31-B  is  subjected  to  attack  on  several  other grounds. The  constitutionality of the First Amendment was upheld  in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union, of India and State of Bihar(1),  and that of the Seventeenth amendment, in  Sajjan Singh is that these cases were Part  XX of the Constitution specifically provides  for  its amendment.   It consists of a single article-.  Part XX-  is as follows "PART XX. Amendment of the Constitution Procedure for amendment of the Constitution 368.      An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House  of  Parliament, and when the Bill is passed  in  each House  by a majority of the total membership of  that  House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of  that House present and voting, it shall be presented  to the  President  for his assent and upon  such  assent  being given  to the Bill the Constitution shall stand  amended  in accordance with the terms of the Bill : Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in  (a) article 54. article 55, article 73, article 162 or (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. 1196712 S.C.IL  904               (b)  Chapter  IV of Part V, Chapter V of  Part               VI, or Chapter 1 of Part XI, or               (c)  any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule,               or               (d)  the    representation   of   States    in

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             Parliament, or               (e)  the provisions of this article,               the   amendment  shall  also  require  to   be               ratified by the Legislatures of not less  than               one-half of the States by resolutions to  that               effect passed by those Legislatures before the               Bill  making provision for such  amendment  is               presented to the President for assent." The   contention  that  article  368  prescribes  only   the procedure of amendment cannot be accepted.  The article  not only  prescribes the procedure but also gives the  power  of amendment.   If  the procedure of art.368 is  followed,  the Constitution  "shall stand amended" in accordance  with  the terms  of  the bill.  It is because the power  to  amend  is given  by the article that the Constitution stands  amended. The  proviso is enacted on the assumption that  the  several articles  mentioned in it are amendable.  The object of  the proviso is to lay down a stricter procedure for amendment of the articles which would otherwise have been amendable under the  easier procedure of the main part.  There is  no  other provision in the Constitution under which these articles can be amended. Articles  4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part D, and Sixth  Schedule Para  21 empower the Parliament to. pass laws  amending  the provisions  of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth  Schedules and  making amendments of the Constitution consequential  on the  abolition  or creation of the legislative  councils  in States, and by express provision no such law is deemed to be an  amendment of the Constitution for the purposes  of  art. 368.   All  other  provisions of  the  Constitution  can  be amended  by  recourse to art. 368 only.   No  other  article confers the power of amending the Constitution. Some  articles are expressed to continue until provision  is made  by law [see articles 59(3), 65(3), 73(2),  97,  98(3), 106, 135, 142(1), 148(3), 149, 171(2), 186, 187(3),  189(3), 194(3), 195, 221(2), 283(1) and (2), 285, 313, 345,  372(1), 373].   Some  articles  continue unless  provision  is  made otherwise  by law [see articles 120(2), 133(3),  210(2)  and some  continue  save  as  otherwise  provided  by  law  [see articles  239(1),  287].  Some articles are subject  to  the provisions of any law to be made [see articles 137,  146(2), 225,  229(2), 241(3), 300(1), 309], and some  are  expressed not to derogate from the power of making laws [see  articles 5  to  11, 289(2)].  All these articles  are  transitory  in nature and cease to operate when provision is made by law on the subject.  None of them can be regarded as conferring 905 the  power  of  ’amendment of  the  Constitution.   Most  of articles continue until provision is made by law made by the Parliament.   But  some  of them continue  until  or  unless provision is made by the State Legislature (see articles 189 (3),  194 (3), 195, 210(2), 229(2), 300(1), 345) or  by  the appropriate  legislature (see articles 225,  241(3));  these articles  do not confer a power of amendment, for the  State legislature  cannot  amend the Constitution.   Many  of  the above-mentioned  articles  and  also  other  articles   (see articles 22(7), 32(3), 33 to 35, 139,140, 239A, 241, 245  to 250,  252, 253, 258(2), 286(2), 302, 307, 315(2),  327,  369 delegate powers of making laws to the legislature.  None  of these articles gives the power of amending the Constitution. It  is  said  that art. 248 and List 1 item 97  of  the  7th Schedule read with art. 246 give the Parliament the power of amending  the  Constitution.  This argument  does  not  bear scrutiny.   Art.  248 and List I item 97 vest  the  residual power  of legislation in the Parliament.  Like other  powers

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of legislation, the residual power of the Parliament to make laws  is by virtue of art. 245 subject to the provisions  of the Constitution.  No law made under the residual power  can derogate  from the Constitution or amend it.  If such a  law purports to amend the Constitution, it will ’be void.  Under the  residual  power of legislation, the Parliament  has  no power to make any law with respect to any matter  enumerated in  Lists II and III of the 7th Schedule but under art.  368 even  Lists  II and III can be amended.  The  procedure  for constitutional  amendments under art. 368 is different  from the  legislative  procedure  for  passing  laws  under   the residual   power  of  legislation.   If   a   constitutional amendment could be made by recourse to the residual power of legislation and the ordinary legislative procedure, art. 368 would  be  meaningless.   The power  of  amending  the  Con- stitution is to be found in art. 368 and not in art. 248 and List I item 97.  Like other Constitutions, our  Constitution makes express provisions for amending the Constitution. The  heading  of art. 368 shows that it is a  provision  for amendment  of the Constitution, the marginal note refers  to the  procedure for amendment and the body shows that if  the procedure is followed, the Constitution shall stand  amended by the power of the article. Chapter  VIII of the Australian Constitution consists  of  a single section (S. 128).  The heading is "Alteration of  the Constitution".   The marginal note is "Mode of altering  the Constitution".   The  body  lays  down  the  procedure   for alteration.   The  opening words are  :  "This  Constitution shall  not  be  altered except  in  the  following  manner". Nobody  has  doubted  that the section gives  the  power  of amending the Constitution.  Wynes in his book on Legislative Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, third edition, 906 p.   695,  stated  "The  power,  of  amendment  extends   to alteration  of  this  Constitution’ which  includes  S.  128 itself.  It is true that S.   128  is negative in form,  but the power is impled by the terms of     the section." Article 5 of the United States Constitution provides that  a proposal  for amendment of the constitution by the  Congress on  being ratified by the three-fourth of the states  "shall be  valid  to  all  intents and purposes  as  part  of  this Constitution".   The accepted view is that "power  to  amend the  Constitution  was  reserved  by  article  5",  Per  Van Devanter,  J,  in Rhode Island v. Palmer(1): Art  .368  uses stronger  words.  On the passing of the bill  for  amendment under  art.  368, "the Constitution shall stand  amended  in accordance with the terms of the bill". Article 368 gives the power of amending "this-Constitution". This  Constitution  means  any  of  the  provisions  of  the Constitution.   No limitation on the amending power  can  be gathered  from  the language of this article.   Unless  this power  is  restricted  by  some  ,other  provision  of   the Constitution, each and every part of the Constitution may be amended  under art. 368.  AR the articles mentioned  in  the proviso  are necessarily within this amending  power.   From time to time major amendments have been made in the articles mentioned  in  the  proviso  (see articles  80  to  82,  124 (2A),131,214,217(3),222,(k2)  224A,226(IA)  230,231,241  and Seventh Schedule) and other articles (see articles 1, 3, 66, 71, 85, 153. 158, 170, 174, 239, 239A, 240, 258A, 2,69, 280, 286,  290A, 291, 298, 305, 311, 316, 350A, 350B, 371,  371A, 372A,   376,  379  to  391,  the  first  third  and   fourth schedules),   and  minor  amendments  have  been   made   in innumerable articles.  No one has doubted so far that  these articles  are  amendable.   Part  III  is  a  part  of   the

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Constitution and is equally amendable. It is argued that a Constitution Amendment Act.is a law  and therefore  the  power  of amendment given  by  art.  368  is limited by art. 13(2)., Art. 13(2) is in these terms:--               "13(1).......................................               (2)   The  State shall not make any law  which               takes away or abridges the tights conferred by               this Part and any law     made              in               contravention  of  this clause shall,  to  the               extent of the contravention, be void." Now  art. 3 68 gives, the power of amending each  and  every provision  of the Constitution Art. 13 (2) is a part of  the Constitution and is within the reach of the amending  power. In other words art 13 (2) is subject to the overriding power of  an.  368  and  is controlled by it.   Art.  368  is  not controlled by art. 13 (2) and the (1) 253 U.S. 350 : 64 LE.d. 946. 907 prohibitory injunction in art. 13(2) is not directed against the amending power Looked at from this broad angle, art.  13 (2) does not forbid the making of a constitutional amendment abridaing or taking away any right confesed by Part III. Let us now view the matter from a narrower angle.  The  con- tention is that a constitutional amendment under art. 368 is a law within the meaning of art. 13. 1 am inclined to  think that this narrow contention must also be rejected. In  art.  13  unless the context  otherwise  provides  ’law’ includes  any ordinance, order, bye-law,  rule,  regulation, notification,  custom  or usage having in the  territory  of India  the force of law [article 13(3).(a)].  The  inclusive definition  of  law  in art. 13 (3)  (c)  neither  expressly excludes  nor  expressly  includes  the  Constitution  or  a constitutional amendment. Now  the term law’ in its widest and generic sense  includes the Constitution and a constitutional amendment.  But in the constitution this term is employed to designate an  ordinary statute  or  legislative  act in  contradistinction  to  the Constitution    or   a   constitutional   amendment.     The Constitution  is  the basic law providing the  framework  of government  and  creating the organs for the making  of  the laws.  The distinction between the Constitution and the laws is so fundamental that the Constitution is not regarded as a law  or  a  legislative act.   The  Constitution  means  the Constitution  as amended.  An amendment made  in  conformity with  art.  368  is  a part of  the.   Constitution  and  is likewise not a law. The  basic theory of our Constitution is that it  cannot  be changed by a law or legislative Act.  It is be-cause special provision is made by articles 4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part  D and   Sixth  Schedule  para  21  that  some  parts  of   the Constitution are amendable by ordinary laws.  But by express provision  no  such  law is deemed to  be  a  constitutional amendment.  Save as express.1y provided in articles 4,  169, Fifth Schedule Part D and Sixth Schedule para 21, no law can amend  the  Constitution, and a law which purports  to  make such an amendment is void. In Marbury v. Madison(1), Marshall, C.J., said:               "It   is  a  proposition  too  plain   to   be               contested, that the Constitution controls  any               legislative Act repugnant to it; or, that  the               legislature  may alter the Constitution by  an               ordinary Act.               Between these alternatives there is no  middle               ground.  The Constitution is either a superior               paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,

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             or it is on a level with               (1)   [1803]  1 Cranch 137,177:. 2 L. Ed.  60,               73. 908  Ordinary legislative Acts, and, like other Acts, is  alter- able when the legislature shall please to alter it.  If  the former  part of the alternative be true, then a  legislative Act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the,  latter part   be  true,  then  written  constitutions  are   absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly  all those who have framed  written  constitutions contemplate  them as forming the fundamental  and  paramount law  of the nation, and, consequently, the theory  of  every such  government  must be, that an Act of  the  Legislature, repugnant  to  the Constitution, is void.   This  theory  is essentially  attached  to  a written  constitution,  and  is consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of  the fundamental principles of our society." It  is  because a Constitution Amendment Act can  amend  the Constitution  and  is  not a law that art.  368  avoids  all reference  to  law making by the Parliament.  As soon  as  a bill is passed in conformity with art. 368 the  Constitution stands amended in accordance with the terms of the bill. The  power of amending the Constitution is not  an  ordinary law making power.  It is to be found in art. 368 and not  in articles 245, 246 and 248 and the Seventh Schedule. Nor  is  the procedure for amending the  Constitution  under art.  368  an  ordinary law making  procedure.   The  common feature  of  the  amending process under art,  368  and  the legislative procedure is that a bill must be passed by  each House  of Parliament and assented to by the  President.   In other  respects the amending process under art. 368 is  very different   from   the  ordinary   legislative   proms.    A constitution  amendment  Act  must be initiated  by  a  bill introduced  for that purpose in either House of  Parliament. The  bill must be passed in each House by not less than  two thirds  of  the members present and  voting,  the  requisite quorum  in  each  House  being  a  majority  of  its   total membership;  and  in  cases coming under  the  proviso,  the amendment  must be ratified by the legislature of  not  less than one half of the States.  Upon the bill so passed  being assented  to  by  the President,  the  Constitution  stands. amended  in  accordance  with the terms of  the  bill.   The ordinary  legislative  process  is  much  easier.   A   bill initiating a law may be passed by a majority of the  members present and voting at a sitting of each House or at a  joint sitting of the Houses, the quorum for the meeting of  either House being one tenth of the total number of members of  the House.   The  bill  so passed on being assented  to  by  the President  becomes a law.  A bill though passed by  all  the members of both Houses cannot take effect as a               909               Constitution   amendment  Act  unless  it   is               initiated for the express purpose of  amending               the Constitution.               The essence of ,a written Constitution is that               it cannot be changed by an ordinary law.   But               most  written Constitutions Provide for  their               organic  growth by constitutional  amendments.               The   main method of constitutional amendments               are (1) by the ordinary legislature but  under               certain   restrictions,  (2)  by  the   people               through  a- referendum, (3) by a  majority  of               all  the  units of a Federal State; (4)  by  a

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             special  convocation,  see C.F.  strong  Modem               Political institutions, 5th Edition, pp.  133-               4,146.   Our Constitution hag by  article  368               chosen  the  first and a  combination  of  the               first and the third methods.               The   special  attributes  of   constitutional               amendment  under art. 368 indicate that it  is               not  a law or a legislative act.  Moreover  it               will  be seen presently that the  Constitution               makers  could not have intended that the  term               "law"  in art. 13 (2) would include a  consti-               tutional amendment under art. 368.               If  a constitutional amendment creating a  new               fundamental right and incorporating it in Part               III  were a law, it would not be open to  the.               parliament  by  a subsequent  constitution  to               abrogate the new fundamental right for such an               amendment  would  be repugnant to  Part  ]III.               Bit  the  conclusion is absurd for.  the  body               which  created  the right can surely  take  it               away by the same process.               Shri  A. K. Sen relied upon a decision of  the               Oklahoma  Supreme Court in Riley v.  Carter(1)               where  it was held that for some purposes  the               Constitution of a State was one of the laws of               the  State.   But even in  America,  the  term               "law’   does   not   ordinary   include   the-               Constitution or a constitutional amendment  in               this  connection,  I will read  the  following               passage  in  Corpus Juris Secundum,  Vol,  XVI               Title Constitutional Law Art. 1, P. 20:               .lm15               "The   term   ’constitution’   is   ordinarily               employed  to  designate  the  organic  law  in               contradistinction  to the term law,  which  is               generally   used  to  designate  statutes   Or               legislative enactments.  Accordingly the  term               ’law.’ under this distinction does not include               a constitutional amendment.  However, the term               "law’  may, in accordance with the context  in               which  it is used, comprehend or included               the constitution or a constitutional provision               or  amendment.  A statute and a  constitution,               although of unequal dignity,, are both ’laws’,               and rest on the will of the people." (1)  88 A:A.L.R. 1008. 910 In  our Constitution, the expression "law" does not  include either the constitution or a constitutional amendment.   For all  these  reasons  we  must  hold  that  a  constitutional amendment under art. 368 is not a law within the meaning  of art. 13 (2). I find no conflict between articles 13(2) and 368.  The  two articles  operate in different fields.  Art. 13(2)  operates on   laws;  it  makes  no  express  exception  regarding   a constitutional amendment, because a constitutional amendment is not a law and is outside its purview.  Art. 368  occupies the  field  of  constitutional  amendments.   It  does   not particularly  refer  to the, articles in Part III  and  many other  articles, but on its true construction it  gives  the power of amending each and every provision of the  Constitu- tion and necessarily takes in Part III.  Moreover, art.  368 gives the power of amending itself, and if express power for amending  the  provisions of Part III were  needed,  such  a power could be taken by an amendment of the article.

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It  is  said that the non-obstante clause in art.  35  shows that the article is not amendable.  No one has amended  art. 35 and the point does not arise.  Moreover, the non-obstante clause is to be found in articles 258(1), 364, 369, 370  and 371A.   No  one has suggested that these  articles  are  not amendable. The next contention is that there are implied limitations on the amending power.  It is said that apart from art. 13  (2) there  are expressions in Part III which indicate  that  the amending power ,cannot touch Part III.  Part III is headed " fundamental  rights".  The right to move the  Supreme  Court for  enforcement  of the rights conferred by  this  Part  is guaranteed  by  art. 32 and cannot be  suspended  except  as otherwise provided for by the Constitution (art. 32(4)).  It is  said  that  the  terms  "fundamental"  and   "guarantee" indicate  that  the  rights conferred by  Part  HI  are  not amendable.  The argument overlooks the dynamic character  of the  Constitution.  While the Constitution is static, it  is the fundamental law of the country, the rights conferred  by Part  III  are,  fundamental, the right  under  art.  32  is guaranteed, and the principles of State policy enshrined  in Part  IV are fundamental ’m the governance of  the  country. But  the Constitution is never at rest; it changes with  the progress  of  time.   Art. 368 provides the  means  for  the dynamic  changes in the Constitution.  The scale  cf  values embodied in Parts III and IV is not immortal.  Parts III and IV  being  parts  of the Constitution are  not  immune  from amendment under art. 368. Demands  for safeguards of the rights embodied in  Part  III and IV may be traced to the Constitution of India Bill 1895, the  Congress  Resolutions  between  1917  and  1919,   Mrs. Beasan’s  Commonwealth of India Bill of 1925, the Report  of the Nehru Committee set up under the Congress Resolution  in 1927, the Congress                             911 Resolution of March. 1931 and the Sapru Report of 1945.  The American bill of rights,the constitutions of other countries the  declaration of human rights by the United  Nations  and other declarations and charters gave impetus to the  demand. In  this  background the Constituent  Assembly  embodied  in preamble to the Constitution the resolution to secure to all citizens social, economic and political justice, liberty  of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, equality  of status  and opportunity and fraternity assuring the  dignity of   the  individual  and  the  unity  of  the  nation   and incorporated safeguards as to some human rights in Parts III and  IV of the Constitution after separating them  into  two parts  on  the Irish model.  Part III contains  the  passive obligations  of the State.  It enshrines the right of  life, personal liberty, expression, assembly, movement, residence, avocation,  property, culture and education,  constitutional remedies, and protection against exploitation and  obnoxious penal  laws.  The State shall not deny these rights save  as provided  in the Constitution.  Part IV contains the  active obligations  of the State.  The State shall secure a  social order in which social, economic and political justice  shall inform  all the institutions of national life.   Wealth  and its  source of production shall not be concentrated  in  the hands of the few but shall be distributed so as to  subserve the  common  good,  and there shall  be  adequate  means  of livelihood for all and equal pay for equal work.  The  State shall  endeavour  to  secure  the  health  and  strength  of workers,  the right to work, to education and to  assistance in  cases  of want, just and humane conditions  of  work,  a living  wage  for workers, a uniform civil  code,  free  and

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compulsory  education  for children.  The State  shall  take steps   to   organize  village   panchayats,   promote   the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the  people,  raise the level of nutrition and  standard  of living,  improve  public health. organize  agricultural  and animal  husbandry separate the judiciary from executive  and promote international peace and security. The  active obligations of the State under Part IV  are  not justiciable.  If a law made by the State in accordance  with the fundamental directives of Part IV comes in conflict with the  fundamental rights embodied in Part II the law  to  the extent  of repugnancy is void.  Soon after the  Constitution came  into force, it became apparent that laws for  agrarian and other reforms for implementing the directives of Part IV were  liable  to  be  struck  down  as  they  infringed  the provisions  of Part III.  From time to  time  constitutional amendments  were  proposed  with  the  professed  object  of validating  these laws, superseding certain judicial  inter- pretations  of  the Constitution and curing defects  in  the original  Constitution.   The First, Fourth,  Sixteenth  and Seventeenth   Amendments  made  important  changes  in   the fundamental rights.  The First amendment introduced cl.  (4) in art. 15 enabling the State to make special provisions for the benefit of the socially and 912 educationally  backward  class  of  citizens,  the,scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes in derogation of articles 15 and 29,(2) with a view to implement art. 46 and to supersede the decision in State of Madras v. Champakam(1), substituted a  new cl. (2) in art. 19 with retrospective effect  chiefly with  a  view to be in public order within  the  permissible restrictions  and  to  supersede  the  decisions  in  Romesh Thappar  v.  State of Madras(’), Brij Bhushan  v.  State  of Delhi(-’),,  amended cl. (6) of art. 19 with a view to  free state trading monopoly from the test of reasonable ness  and to supersede the decision in Moti Lal v. Government of State of Uttar Pradesh().  Under the stress of the First amendment it  is  now  suggested  that  Champakam’s  case(’),   Romesh Thappar’s   case(’)  and  Motilal’s(4)  case  were   wrongly decided,  and the amendments of articles 15 and 19  were  in harmony  with  the original Constitution and  made  no  real change in it.  It is to be, noticed however that before  the First amendment no attempt was made to overrule these cases, and  but for the amendments, these judicial  interpretations of  the Constitution would have continued to be the  law  of the land.  The Zamindari Abolition Acts were the subject  of bitter  attack  by  the zamindars.   The  Bihar  Act  though protected by cl. 6 of art. 31 from attack under art. 31  was struck down as violative of art. 14 by the Patna High  Court (see  the  State of Bihar v.  Maharajadhiraj  Sri  Kameshwar Singh(5),  while the Uttar Pradesh Act (see Raja  Surya  Pal Singh v. The State. of U.P.) (6) and the Madhya Pradesh  Act (see  Visweshwar Rao v. State.of Madhya Pradesh (7),  though upheld  by  the  High Courts were under  challenge  in  this Court.   The First amendment therefore introduced art.  31A, 31B and the Ninth Schedule with a view to give effect to the policy of agrarian reforms, to secure distribution of  large blocks  of land in the hands of the zamindars in  conformity with  art. 39, and to immunize specially 13 State Acts  form attack under Part Ill.  The validity of the First  Amendment was  upheld in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo’s case(8).   The Fourth amendment changed art. 31(2) with a view to supersede the decision in State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee(9) and to  provide that the adequacy of compensation  for  property compulsorily acquired would not be justiciable, inserted Cl.

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(2A)  in art. 31 with a view to supersede the  decisions  in the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose("), Dwarka Das Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd.,("), (1) [1951] S.C.R. 525. (2) [1950] S.C.R, 605. (3) [1952] S.C.R. 654. (4) I.L.R. [1951] 1 All. 269. (5) [1952] S.C.R. 389 (A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 91). (6) (1952] S.C.R. 1056 (A.I.R. 1961). (7) [1952] S.C.R. 1020.  All. 674.) (8) [1952] S.C.R. 89.    (9) [1954] S.C.R. 558. (10) 11954] S.C.R. 587.(11) [1954] S.C.R. 674. 913 Saghir  Ahmad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,(1) and to  make it  clear  that  clauses (1) and (2) of art.  31  relate  to different  subject’  matters and a deprivation  of  property short of transference of ownership or right to possession to the State should not be treated as compulsory acquisition of property.  The Fourth amendment also amended art. 31A with a view to protect certain laws other than agrarian laws and to give  effect to the policy of fixing ceiling limits on  land holdings and included seven more Acts in the Ninth Schedule. One  of the Acts (item 17) though upheld in Jupiter  General Insurance Co. v. Rajgopalan(2) was the subject of  criticism in Dwarka Das’s case (3 ) . The Sixteenth amendment  amended clauses (2), (3) and (4) of art. 19 to enable the imposition of   reasonable   restrictions  in  the  interest   of   the sovereignty   and  integrity  of  India.   The   Seventeenth amendment amended the definition of estate in art. 31A  with a view to supersede the decisions in Karimbil Kunhikoman  v. State  of Kerala (4 ) and A. P. Krishnaswami Naidu v.  State of Madras(’) and added a proviso to art. 31A and included 44 more  Acts  in the Ninth Schedule, as some of the  Acts  had been  struck down as unconstitutional.  The validity of  the Seventeenth amendment was upheld in Sajjan Singh’s  case(’). Since 1951, numerous decisions of this Court have recognised the   validity   of  the  First,  Fourth   and   Seventeenth amendments.   If the rights conferred by Part III cannot  be abridged  or  taken away by constitutional  amendments,  all these amendments would be invalid.  The Constitution  makers could  not have intended that the rights conferred  by  Part TIT could not be altered for giving effect to the policy  of Part TV.  Nor was it intended that defects in Part III could not   be   cured  or  that  possible  errors   in   judicial interpretations  of  Part  III could  not  be  rectified  by constitutional amendments. There  are, other indications in the Constitution  that  the fundamental rights are not intended to be inviolable.   Some of  the articles make express provision for  abridgement  of some  of the fundamental rights by law (see articles  16(3), 19(1) to (6), 22(3), 23(2), 25(2), 28(2), 31(4) to (6),  33, 34).   Articles  358  and  359  enable  the  suspension   of fundamental  rights  during emergency.  Likewise,  art.  368 enables  amendment  of the Constitution  including  all  the provisions of Part Ill. It is argued that the preamble secures the liberties grouped together in Part III and as the preamble cannot be  amended, Part III is not amendable.  The argument overlooks that  the preamble  is  mirrored in the entire Constitution.,  If  the rest of the Constitution is amendable, Part III cannot stand on a higher (1)  [1954) S.C.R. 1218. (3)  [1954] S.C.R. 674,706. (5)  [1964] 7 S.C.R. 82. (2)  A.I.R. 1952 Pun. 9.

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(4)  [1962] Supp.  I S.C.R. 829. (6)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933. 914 control  the  unambiguous language of the  articles  of  the Constitution, see’ Wynes, Legislative Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia third edition, pp. 694-5; in Re Berubari Union & Exchange of Enclaves(").  The last case decided that the  Parliament  can  under art. 368 amend  art.  1  of  the Constitution  so as to enable the cession of a part  of  the national  territory  to a foreign power, The  Court  brushed aside  the  argument that "in the transfer of the  areas  of Berubari to Pakistan the fundamental rights of thousands  of persons  are  involved." The case is an  authority  for  the proposition  that  the Parliament can lawfully make  a  con- stitutional amendment under art. 368 authorising cession  of a part of the national territory and thereby destroying  the fundamental   rights  of  the  citizens  of   the   Effected territory,  and this power under art. 368 is not limited  by the preamble. It  is next argued that the people of India in  exercise  of their  sovereign  power have placed the  fundamental  rights beyond  the reach of the amending power.  Reliance is  place on  the  following  passage in  the  judgment  of  Patanjali Sastri, J., in A. K. Gopalan V.    The State of Madras(2):               "There  can  be no doubt  that,the  people  of               India  have,  in exercise of  their  sovereign               will as expressed in the Preamble, adopted the               democratic ideal which assures to the  citizen               the  dignity  of  the,  individual  and  other               cherished human values as a means to the  full               evolution  and expression of his  personality,               and  in  delegating  to  the  Legislature  the               executive  and the Judiciary their  respective               powers   in  the  Constitution,  reserved   to               themselves  certain  fundamental  rights,  so-               called,  I apprehend, because they  have  been               retained by the people and made, paramount  to               the  delegated  powers,  as  in  the               American Model." I  find  nothing  in  the  passage  contrary  to  the   view unequivocally  expressed  by the same learned Judge  in  Sri Sankari  Prasad  Singh Deo’s(3) case  that  the  fundamental rights  are amendable.  The power to frame the  Constitution was  vested in the Constituent Assembly by s. 8 (1 ) of  the Indian  Independence  Act, 1947.  ’The  Constitution  though legal  in  its  origin was revolutionary  in  character  and accordingly the Constituent Assembly exercised its powers of framing  the  Constitution in the name of the  people.   The objective  resolution of the Assembly passed on January  22, 1947 (1)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250,261-2,281 (2)[1950] S.C.R. 88, 98. (3) (1952] S.C.R. 89. 915 solemnly declared that all power and authority of  sovereign independent India, its constituent parts, and organs and the Government  were derived from the people.  The  preamble  to the  Constitution declares that the people of India  adopts, enacts  and gives to themselves the Constitution.   In  form and in substance the Constitution emanates from the  people. By the Constitution. the people constituted themselves  into a republic.  Under the republic all public power is  derived from  the  people and is exercised by  functionaries  chosen either   directly  or  ’indirectly  by  the   people.    The Parliament can exercise only such powers as are delegated to

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it  under the Constitution.  The people acting  through  the Constituent Assembly reserved for themselves certain  rights and liberties and ordained that they shall not be  curtailed by  ordinary legislation.  But the people by the  same  Con- stitution also authorised the Parliament to make  amendments to, the Constitution.  In the exercise of the amending power the  Parliament has ample authority to abridge or take  away the fundamental rights under Part III. It  is  urged that the word ’amend’ imposes  the  limitation that   an   amendment  must  be  an   improvement   of   the Constitution.  Reliance is placed on the dictum in Livermore v. E. C. Waite(1): "On, the other hand, the significance  of the  term  ’amendment’ implies such an  addition  or  change within  the lines of the original instrument as will  effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was  framed." Now an attack on the eighteenth  amendment  of the  U.S.  Constitution based on this  passage  was  brushed aside  by  the  U.S. Supreme Court in the  decision  in  the National   Prohibition(2)   case.   The   decision   totally negatived the contention that "an amendment must be confined in its scope to, an alteration or improvement of that  which is  already contained in the Constitution and cannot  change its  basic  structure, include new grants of  power  to  the Federal Government nor relinquish, in the State those  which already   have   been  granted  to  it",   see   Cooley   on Constitutional  Law, Chapter III Art. 5, pp. 46 & 47. 1  may also  read a passage from Corpus Juris Secundum  Vol.   XVI, title ’Constitutional Law, p. 26 thus : "The term ’amendment a-,  used  in the constitutional article giving  Congress  a power  of  proposal  includes  additions  to,  as  well   as corrections  of,  matters.  already treated,  and  there  is nothing there which suggests that it is used in a restricted sense." Article 368 indicates that the term "amend" means  "change". The  proviso is expressed to apply to amendments which  seek to make any "change" in certain articles.  The main part  of art. 368 (1)  102 Cal. 11 3-25 L.R.A. 312. (2)  Rhode  Island v. Palmer-253 U.S. 350 : 64 L.  ed.  947, 960, 978. 916 thus  gives  the power to amend or to make  changes  in  the Constitution.   A change is not necessarily an  unprovement. Normally  the  change is made with the object of  making  an improvement,  but  the experiment may fail  to  achieve  the purpose.   Even  the plain dictionary meaning  of  the  word "amend"  does not support the contention that  an  amendment must  take  an improvement, see  Oxford  English  Dictionary where  the  word  "amend"  is defined thus  :  "4.  to  make professed  improvements  (in a measure  before  Parliament); formally  to alter ’in detail, though practically it may  be to  alter its principle so as to thwart it." The  1st,  4th, 16th  and. 17th Amendment Acts made changes in Part  III  of the  Constitution.  All the changes are authorized  by  art. 368. It  is  argued  that under the  amending  power,  the  basic features  .,of the Constitution cannot be amended.   Counsel said that they could not give an exhaustive catalogue of the basic  features,  but sovereignty, the  republican  form  of government the federal structure and the fundamental  rights were  some of the features.  The Seventeenth  Amendment  has not derogated from the sovereignty, ,the republican form  of government  and  the federal structure,  and  ’the  question whether they can be touched by amendment does not arise  for decision.  For the purposes of these cases, it is sufficient

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to say- that the fundamental rights are within the reach  of the amending power. It  is  said that in the course of the last 16  years  there have  been numerous amendments in our  Constitution  whereas there  have  been  very  few  amendments  of  the   American Constitution  during ’the last 175 years.  Our condition  is not  comparable  with  the American.  The  dynamics  of  the social  revolution  in our country may  require  more  rapid changes.   Moreover every part of our Constitution  is  more easily  amendable than the American.  Alan Gledhill  in  his book  "The Republic of India", 1951 Edition, pp. 74 &  75  , said:               "The   Indian  Founding,  Fathers  were   less               determined    than   were    their    American               predecessors  to  impose  rigidity  on   their               Constitution.....................  The  Indian               Constitution  assigns  different  degrees   of               rigidity to its different parts, but any  part               of  it  can be more easily  amended  than  the               American Constitution." It  is  said  that the Parliament is abusing  its  power  of amendment  by  making  too many frequent  changes.   If  the Parliament  ’has  the  power- to make  the  amendments,  the choice  of making- any particular amendment must be left  to it.  Questions of policy cannot be debated in ’ this  Court. The possibility of, abuse of a power  is not the test of its existence.  In Webb v. Outrim(1) lord (1)  [1907] A.C. 81. 917 Hobhouse said, "If they find that on the due construction of the Act a legislative power falls within s. 92, it would  be quite  wrong of them to deny its existence because  by  some possibility  it  may  be abused, or limit  the  range  which otherwise  would be open to the Dominion Parliament".   With reference to the doctrine of implied prohibition against the exercise  of power ascertained in accordance  with  ordinary rules of construction, Knox C.J., in the Amalgamated Society of  Engineers  v. The Adelaide Steams  Company  Limited  and others(1)  said,  "It  means  the  necessity  of  protection against the aggression of some outside and possibly  hostile body.  :It  is  based  on distrust,  lest  powers,  if  once conceded  to the least degree, might be abused to the  point of  destruction.  But possible abuse of powers is no  reason in British law for Emiting the natural force of the language creating them The  historical  background in which  the  Constitution  was framed  shows that the ideas embodied in Part III  were  not intended to be immutable.  The Constituent Assembly was corn of  representatives of the provinces elected by,the  members of  the  lower  houses of the  provincial  legislatures  and representatives  of the Indian States elected  by  electoral colleges  constituted by the rules.  The draft  Constitution was released on February 26, 1948While the Constitution  was on the anvil it was envisaged the, future Parliaments  would be elected on the basis of adult suffrage.  Such a provision was later incorporated in art. 326 of the Constitution.   In a special article written on August 15, 1948, Sir B., N. Rau remarked:               "It seems rather illogical that a constitution               should  be settled by a simple majority by  an               assembly elected indirectly on a very  limited               franchise and that it should not be capable of               being amended in the same way by a  Parliament               elected-and perhaps for the most Part  elected               directly  by adult suffrage", (see B. N.  Rau’

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             India’s   Constitution  in  the  making,   2nd               Edition p. 394). The  conditions  in  India were  rapidly  changing  and  the country was in a state of flux politically and economically. Sir  B.  N.  Rau therefore recommended that  the  Parliament should  be  empowered  to  amend  the  Constitution  by  its ordinary  law  making process for at least  the  first  five years.   Earlier,  para 8 of the Suggestions of  the  Indian National  Congress  of  May  12, 1946 and  para  15  of  the Proposal  of the Cabinet Mission of May 16, 1946 had  recom- mended  similar powers of revision by the Parliament  during the  initial years or at stated intervals.  The  Constituent Assembly   did  not-  accept  these   recommendations.    On September  17,  1949  an amendment (No. 304)  moved  by  Dr. Deshmukh providing (1) 28 C.L.R. 129,151. Cf/67-13 918 for  amendment  of the Constitution at any time by  a  clear majority  in  each house of Parliament was  negatived.   The Assembly  was conscious that future Parliaments, elected  on the  basis of adult suffrage would be  more  representative, but they took the view that art. 368 provided a sufficiently flexible   machinery   for  amending  all  part-,   of   the Constitution.   The  Assembly never entertain  the  proposal that any part of the Constitution including Part III  should be beyond the reach of the, amending power.  As a matter  of fact, Dr. Deshmukh proposed an amendment (No. 212)  habiting any  amendment  of the rights with respect  to  property  or otherwise  but  on  September  17,  1949  he  withdrew  this proposal  (we Constituent Assembly Debates  Vol.  IV  pp.  1 642-43). The best exposition of the Constitution is that which it has received   from  contemporaneous  judicial   decisions   and enactments.   We find a rare unanimity of view among  Judges and   legislators   from  the  very  commencement   of   the Constitution  that  the fundamental rights  are  within  the reach  of  the  amending power.  No one  in  the  Parliament doubted   this  proposition  when  the  Constitution   First Amendment  Act  of 1951 was passed.  It is  remarkable  that most of the members of this Parliament were also. members of the Constituent Assembly.  In, S. Krishnan and Others v. The state  of Madras(1), a case decided on May 7, 1951 Bose,  J. said:               "My   concept  of  a  fundamental   right   is               something  which Parliament cannot touch  save               by an amendment of the Constitution". , In  Sri  Sankari  Prasad Singh  Deo’s  case(2),  decided  on October   5,  1951,  this  Court  expressly  decided   that- fundamental  rights  could be abridged by  a  constitutional amendment.   This view was acted upon in all the  subsequent decisions and was reaffirmed in Sajjan Singh’s case(3).  Two learned  Judges  then  expressed some doubt  but  even  they agreed with the rest of the Court in upholding the  validity of the amendments. A  static  system of. laws is the worst   tyranny  that  any constitution  can  impose upon a  country..  An  unamendable constitution  means that all. reform and progress are  at  a standstill.   If  Parliament cannot amend Part  III  of  the Constitution  even by recourse to art. 368, no  other  power can  do so.  There is no, provision in the Constitution  for calling  a convention for its revision or for submission  of any proposal for amendment to the referendum.  Even if power to call a convention or to submit a proposal. to the  refere be  taken  by  amendment of art. 368, Part  III.  would  sip

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remain  unamendable on the assumption that a  constitutional amendment is a law.  Not even the unanimous vote of the 500 (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 621, 652. (2) [1952] S. C. R, 89. (3) [1965] 1 S. C. R. 933. 919 million  citizens  or their representatives,  at  a  special convocation  could  amend Part III.  The deadlock  could  be resolved  by  revolution only.  Such a consequence  was  not intended   by   the  framers  of  the   Constitution.    The Constitution is meant to endure. It  has been suggested that the Parliament may  provide  for another  Constituent Assembly by amending  the  Constitution and  that  Assembly  can amend Part III  and  take  away  or abridge "the fundamental rights.  Now if this proposition is correct,  a  suitable  amendment  of  the  Constitution  may provide that the Parliament will be the Constituent Assembly and there upon the Parliament may amend Part III.  If so,  I do not see why under the Constitution as it stands now,  the Parliament  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  recreation  of  the Constituent  Assembly. for the special purpose of  making  a constitutional  amendments  under  art.  368,  and  why  the amending  power cannot be regarded a a constituent power  as was held in Sri Sankari Prasad-Singh Deo’s (1) case. The  contention that the constitutional amendments  of  Part III  had  the effect (I changing articles 226  and  245  and could  not be passed without complying with the  proviso  to art.  368 is not tenable; A constitutional  amendment  which does not profess to amend- art. 226 directly or by inserting or  striking words therein cannot be regarded as seeking  to make,  any  change  in  it  and  thus  falling  within   the constitutional  inhibition of the proviso.  Art.  226  gives power  to  the  High Court  throughout  the  territories  in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to  any person  or  authority within those  territories  directions, orders  and Writs for the enforcement of any of  the  rights conferred  by Part III and for any purpose- The  Seventeenth Amendment  made  no  direct change in  art.  226.   It  made changes  in  Part In and abridged or took away some  of  the rights conferred by that Part.  As a result of the  changes, some  of those rights no longer exist and as the High  Court cannot  issue writs for the enforcement of those rights  its power  under  art.  226 is affected  incidentally.   But  an alteration  in the area of its territories or in the  number of persons or authorities within those territories or in the number of enforceable rights under Part III or other  rights incidentally  affecting  the Power of the High  Court  under art.  226  cannot  be  regarded as  an’  amendment  of  that article. Art.  245 empowers the Parliament and  the  Legislatures-of, the  States  to make laws subject to the provisions  of  the Constitution.   This  power to make laws is subject  to  the limitations imposed by Part M. The abridgement of the rights conferred   by  Part  III  by  the   Seventeenth   Amendment necessarily  enlarged the scope of the legislate power,  and thus  affected  art. 245 indirectly.   But  the  Seventeenth amendment  made  no direct change in art. 145  and  did  not amend it. (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89. 920  Art  3 1B retrospectively validated the Acts  mentioned  in the  Ninth Schedule notwithstanding any judgment  decree  or order  of  any court though they take away  or  abridge  the rights conferred by Part Ill.  It is said that the Acts  are still-bom and cannot be validated.  But by force of Art. 31B

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the  Acts are deemed never to have become void and  must  be regarded as valid from their inception.  The power to  amend the  Constitution  carries  with  it the  power  to  make  a retrospective  amendment.  It is Said that art. 3 1B  amends art. 141 as it alters the law declared by this Court on  the validity  of the Acts.  This argument is baseless.   As  the Constitution  is  amended retrospectively,  the  basis  upon which the judgments of this Court were pronounced no  longer exists,  and  the  law declared by this Court  can  have  no application.   It  is  said that art. 3 1B  is  a  law  with respect  to land and other matters within the competence  of the  State Legislature, and the Parliament has no  power  to enact such a law.  The argument is based on a misconception. The  Parliament has not passed any of the Acts mentioned  in the  Ninth Schedule.  Art. 3 IB removed  the  constitutional bar  on the making of the Acts.  Only the  Parliament  could remove  the bar by the Constitution amendment.  It has  done so by art. 3 1 B. The Parliament could amend each article in Part  III  separately  and provide that the  Acts  would  be protected from attack under each article.  Instead of amend- ing each article separately, the Parliament has by art. 3  1 B  made  a comprehensive amendment of all  the  articles  by providing  that the Acts shall not be deemed to be  void  on the ground that they are inconsistent with any of them.  The Acts  as  they  stood  on  the  date  of  the   Constitution Amendments are validated.  By the last part of Art. 31B  the competent legislatures will continue to  the power to repeal or  amend the Acts.  The subsequent repeals  and  amendments are  not validated.  If in future the competent  legislature passes  a  repealing or amending Act which  is  inconsistent with Part III it will be void. I  have, therefore, coma to the conclusion that  the  First, Fourth,    Sixteenth   and   Seventeenth   Amendments    are constitutional and am not void.  If so, it is common  ground that these petitions must be For  the  last  16  years  the  validity  of  constitutional amendments of fundamental rights have been recognized by the people  and all the organs of the government ’including  the legislature,    the    judiciary    and    the    executive. Revolutionary, social and economic changes have taken  place on  the  strength  of  the  First,  Fourth  and  Seventeenth Amendments.  Even if two views were possible on the question of,  the  validity  of the amendments,  we  should  not  now reverse  our  previous decisions and pronounce  them  to  be invalid.   Having heard lengthy arguments on the question  I have 921 come   to   the  conclusion  that  the   validity   of   the constitutional amendments was rightly upheld in Sri  Sankari Prasad Singh Deo’s(1) and Sajjan Singh’s(2) cases and I find no reason for over-ruling them. The  First, Fourth and Seventeenth amendment Acts  are  sub- jected  to  bitter  attacks  because  they  strike  it   the entrenched  property  rights.   But  the  abolition  of  the zemindari   was  a  necessary  reform.   It  is  the   First Constitution  Amendment Act that made this reform  possible. No legal argument can restore the outmoded feudal  zemindari system.   What has been done cannot be undone.   The  battle for  the  past  is lost.   The  legal  argument  necessarily shifts.   The  proposition  now  is  that  the  Constitution Amendment  Acts must be recognized to be valid in  the  past but  they must be struck down for the future.  The  argument leans  on  the ready made American doctrine  of  prospective overruling. Now  the First, Fourth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth  Amendment

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Acts  take away and abridge the rights conferred by Part  M. If they are laws they are necessarily rendered void by  art. 13(2).   If  they are void, they do not legally  exist  from their  very  inception.  They cannot be valid from  1951  to 1967 and invalid thereafter.  To say that they were valid in the  past and will be invalid in the future is to amend  the Constitution.   Such  a  naked power  of  amendment  of  the Constitution  is not given to the Judges.  The argument  for the  petitioners  suffers from a double fallacy,  the  first that the Parliament has no power to amend Part III so as  to abridge or take away the entrenched property rights, and the second that the Judges have the power to make such an amend- ment. I  may add that if the First and the Fourth  amendments  are valid, the Seventeenth must necessarily be valid.  It is not possible to say that the First and Fourth amendments  though originally invalid have now been validated by  acquiescence. If  they  infringed art. 13(2),t they were void  from  their inception.   Referring  to the 19th amendment  of  the  U.S. Constitution, Brandeis, J. said in Leser v. Garnett(3)               "This   Amendment   is   in   character    and               phraseology  precisely  similar to  the  15th.               For  each  the  same method  of  adoption  was               pursued.   One cannot be valid and  the  other               invalid.   That  the 15th is  valid,  although               rejected  by six states,  including  Maryland,               has been recognized and acted on    for half a               century.......... The suggestion that the  15th               was incorporated in the Constitution,               (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89.   (2) [1965]  1  S.C.R.               933.               (3)   258 US 130 : 66 L.Ed.. 505, 51 1.               922               not in accordance with law, but practically as               a  war  measure, which has been  validated  by               acquiescence, cannot be entertained." Moreover  the Seventeenth amendment has been acted upon  and its validity has been upheld by this Court in Sajjan Singh’s case.  If the First and the Fourth Amendments are  validated by acquiescence, the Seventeenth is equally validated. Before concluding this judgment I must refer to some of  the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly  in the  course  of debates on the  draft  Constitution.   These speeches  cannot  be  used  as  aids  for  interpreting  the Constitution.  See State of Travancore-Cochin and others  v. The Bombay Co. Ltd.(’-). Accordingly, I do not rely on  them as aids to construction.  But I propose to refer to them, as Shri  A K. Sen relied heavily on the speeches of Dr.  B.  R. Ambedkar.   According to him, the speeches of  Dr.  Ambedkar show  that  he  did not regard  the  fundamental  rights  as amendable.    This  contention  is  not  supported  by   the speeches.   Sri Sen relied on the following passage  in  the speech of Dr. Ambedkar on September 17, 1949               "We  divide the articles of  the  Constitution               under three categories.  The first category is               the  one which consists of articles which  can               be, amended by Parliament by a bare  majority.               The second set of articles are articles  which               require  two-thirds majority.  If  the  future               Parliament  wishes  to  amend  any  particular               article  .which is not mentioned in  Part  III               or-  art. 304, all that is necessary for  them               is  to  have two-thirds  majority.   They  can               amend it.               Mr. President : Of Members present.

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             Yes.  Now, we have no doubt put articles in  a               third  .category  where for  the  purposes  of               amendment the .mechanism is somewhat different               or  double.  It requires two  thirds  majority               plus ratification by the, States."(2) I understand this passage to mean that according to Dr.  Am- bedkar an amendment of the articles mentioned in  Part.  III and  368 requires two-thirds majority plus  ratification  by the  States He seems to have assumed (as reported) that  the provisions of Part III fall within the. proviso to art. 368. But  he  never said that part III was s  not  amendale.   He maintained consistently that  all   the  articles   of   the Constitution are amendable under art. 368    On November  4, 1948, be. said :               "The  second means adopted to  avoid  rigidity               and  legalism  is the provision  for  facility               with which the               (1)   (1952] S.C.R. 1112.               (2)   Constituent  Assembly Debat Vol.  IX  p.               1661.               923               Constitution could be amended.  The provisions               of the Constitution relating to the  amendment               of the Constitution divide the Articles of the               Constitution  into  two groups.   In  the  one               group are placed Articles relating to (a)  the               distribution of legislative powers between the               Centre and the States, (b) the  representation               of  the  States  in Parliament,  and  (c)  the               powers  of I the Courts.  All  other  Articles               are placed in another group.  Articles  placed               in the second group cover a very large part of               the   Constitution  and  can  be  amended   by               Parliament  by  a double majority,  namely,  a               majority  of not less than two-thirds  of  the               members  of each House present and voting  and               by a majority of the total membership of  each               House.   The amendment of these Articles  does               not require ratification by the States.  It is               only  in  those Articles which are  placed  in               group  one  that an  additional  safeguard  of               ratification by the States is introduced.  One               can  therefore  safely  sky  that  the  Indian               Federation will not suffer from the faults  of               rigidity  or  legalism.   Its   distinguishing               feature is that it is a flexible Federation.               The  provisions relating to amendment  of  the               Constitution  have  come  in  for  a  virulent               attack  at  the hands of the  critics  of  the               Draft  Constitution.  it  is  said  that   the               provisions   contained  in  the   Draft   make               amendment difficult.  It is proposed that  the               Constitution  should be amendable by a  simple               majority  at  least  for  some.  years.    The               argument is subtle and ingenious.  It is  said               that this Constituent Assembly is not  elected               on adult suffrage while the future  Parliament               will be elected on adult suffrage and yet  the               former  has been given the right to  pass  the               Constitution  by a simple majority while  ’the               latter has been denied the same right.  It  is               paraded as one of the absurdities of the Draft               Constitution.   I  must repudiate  the  charge               because it is without foundation.  To know how               simple   are  the  provisions  of  the   Draft

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             Constitution   in  respect  of  amending   the               Constitution   one  has  only  to  study   the               provisions  for  amendment  contained  in  the               American    and   Australian    Constitutions.               ’Compared to them those contained in the Draft               Constitution will be found to be the simplest.               ’The  Draft Constitution has  eliminated  the-               elaborate  and difficult procedures such as  a               decision-  by a convention or  are  ferenduni.               The   Powers  of  amendments  left  with   the               Legislatures  Central and Provincial.   It  is               only, for amendment-, or specific  matters-and               they  are only few, that the  ratification  of               the State Legislatures is required.               924               All  other  Articles of the  Constitution  are               left  to be amended by Parliament.   The  only               limitation  is  that  it shall be  done  by  a               majority,  of not less than two-thirds of  the               members of each House present and voting and a               majority  of  the total  membership   of  each               House.  It is difficult to conceive a  simpler               method of amending the Constitution."(,’)               On  December 9, 1948 , Dr. Ambedkar said  with               reference to art. 32:               "The  Constitution  has invested  the  Supreme               Court with these rights and these writs  could               not  be  taken  away  unless  and  until   the               Constitution  itself is amended by means  left               open to the legislature."(2) On  November-  25, 1949, Dr. Ambedkar strongly  refuted  the suggestion  that fundamental rights should’ be absolute  and unalterable.  He said:               "The condemnation of the Constitution  largely               comes  from-two quarters, the Communist  Party               and  the Socialist Party.......... The  second               thing  that  the Socialists want is  that  the               Fundamental    Rights   mentioned    in    the               Constitution must be absolute and without  any               limitations so that if their Party comes  into               power, they would have the unfettered  freedom               not merely to criticize, but also to overthrow               the  State............  Jefferson,  the  great               American statesman who played so great a  part               in  the making of the  American  Constitution,               has  expressed some- very weighty views  which               makers  of  Constitution can never  afford  to               ignore.   In one place, he has said:- ’We  may               consider each generation as a distinct nation,               with a right, by the will of the majority,  to               bind   themselves,  but  none  to   bind   the               succeeding    generation,   more   than    the               inhabitants  of another country.   In  another               place,   he   has   said:   ’The   idea   that               institutions  established for the use  of  the               nation cannot be touched or modified, even  to               make them answer their end, because of  rights               gratuitously  supposed  in those  employed  to               manage  the min the trust for the public,  may               perhaps  be a Salutary provision  against  the               abuses  of  a  monarch,  but  is  most  absurd               against  the nation itself.  Yet  our  lawyers               and priests generally inculcate this doctrine,               and  suppose that preceding  generations  held               the earth more freely than we do; had a  right

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             to   impose   laws  on  us,   unalterable   by               ourselves, and               (1)   Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 7, pp.               35-6, 43-4.               (2)   Constituent  Assembly  Debates  Vol.  7,               953.                                    925               that we, in the like manner, can make laws and               impose  burdens on future  generations,  which               they  will  have no right to alter;  in  fine,               that the earth belongs to the dead and not the               living.  I admit that what Jefferson has  said               is  not merely true, but is  absolutely  true.               There  can be no question about it.   Had  the               Constituent   Assembly  departed   from   this               principle  laid  down by  Jefferson  it  would               certainly   be  liable  to  blame,   even   to               condemnation.   But I ask, has it?  Quite  the               contrary.    One  has  only  to  examine   the               provision  relating  to the amendment  of  the               Constitution.   The  Assembly  has  not   only               refrained from putting a seal of finality  and               infallibility   upon  this   Constitution   by               denying  to the people the right to amend  the               Constitution  as  in Canada or by  making  the               amendment  of the Constitution subject to  the               fulfilment   of   extraordinary   terms    and               conditions as in America of Australia but  has               provided a most facile procedure for  amending               the  Constitution.   I challenge  any  of  the               critics of the Constitution to prove that  any               Constituent  Assembly  anywhere in  the  world               has,  in  the  circumstances  in  which   this               country  finds itself, provided such a  facile               procedure  for the amendment of the  Constitu-               tion.  If those who are dissatisfied with  the               Constitution   have  only  to  obtain  a   2/3               majority and if they cannot obtain even a two-               thirds  majority in the parliament elected  on               adult   franchise  in  their   favour,   their               dissatisfaction  with the Constitution  cannot               be   deemed  to  be  shared  by  the   general               public.’(1)               On November 11, 1948, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru               said:               "And  remember this, that while we  want  this               Constitution to be as solid and as permanent a               structure  as  we can  make  it,  nevertheless               there  is  no  permanence  in   Constitutions.               There should be a certain flexibility.  If you               make anything rigid and permanent, you stop  a               Nation’s  growth, the growth of  living  vital               organic  people.   Therefore  it  has  to   be               flexible."(2) The  views  of Jefferson echoed by Ambedkar and  Nehru  were more powerful expressed by Thomas Paine in 1791               "There never did, there never will, and  there               never   can,  exist  a  parliament,   or   any               description of men, or any generation of  men,               in any country, possessed of the               (1)   Constituent Assembly Debates Vol.  I  1,               pp. 975-6.               (2)   Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 7,  p.               322.               926

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             right or the power of binding and  controuling               posterity   to  the  end  of  time’,   or   of               commanding  for ever how the world.  shall  be               governed,   or  who  shall  govern  it-,   and               therefore   all   such   clauses,   acts    or               declarations  by  which  the  makers  of  them               attempt to do what they have neither the right               nor  the  power  to  do,  nor  take  power  to               execute,  are  in themselves  null  and  void.               Every  age and generation must be as  free  to               act  for itself in all cases as the  ages  and               generations which preceded it.  The vanity and               presumption  of governing beyond the grave  is               the  most  ridiculous  and  insolent  of   all               tyrannies.   Man  has  no  property  in   man;               neither  has any generation a property in  the               generations which are to follow.  The  parlia-               ment  of  the people of 1688 or of  any  other               period,  had no more right to dispose  of  the               people  of the present day, or to bind  or  to               controul them in any shape whatever, than  the               parliament  or the people of the  present  day               have to dispose of, bind or controul those who               are  to  live a hundred or  a  thousand  years               hence.   Every  Generation is,  and  must  be,               competent  to  all  the  purposes  which   its               occasions require.  It is the living, and  not               the  dead, that are to be accommodated.   When               man  ceases  to be, his power  and  his  wants               cease  with  him;  and having  no  longer  any               participation  in the concerns of this  World,               he  has no longer any authority  in  directing               who  shall  be  its  governors,  or  how   its               government   shall   be  organized,   or   how               administered." (See ’Rights of Man’ by  Thomas               Paine, unabridged edition by H. B. Bonner, pp.               3 & 4). For  the reasons given above, I agree with Wanchoo, J.  that the writ petitions must be dismissed. In  the  result, the writ petitions  are  dismissed  without costs. Ramaswami,  J.  I have perused the judgment  of  my  learned Brother Wanchoo, J. and I agree with his conclusion that the Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964  is  legally valid,  but in view of the importance.of the  constitutional issues  raised in this case I would prefer to state, my  own reasons in a separate judgment. In  these petitions which have been filed under Art.  32  of the    Constitution,   a   common   question   arises    for determination, viz.,. whether the Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 which amends Art. 31 A and 3 1 B of the Constitution is ultra vires- and unconstitutional, . 927 The  petitioners are affected either by the Punjab  Security of Land Tenures Act, 1954. (Act X of 1953) or by the  Mysore Land  Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 1  1965 which were added to the 9th Schedule of the Constitution  by the impugned Act and, their contention is that the  impugned Act being unconstitutional and invalid , the validity of the two Acts by which they are affected cannot be saved. The  impugned  Act consists of three  sections.   The  first section.  gives  its  short title.  Section  2  (i)  adds  a proviso  to  Cl.. ( 1 ) of Art.. 3 I-A  after  the  existing proviso.  This proviso reads, thus:               "Provided further that where any law makes any

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             provision for the acquisition by the State  of               any  estate  and  where  any  land   comprised               therein is held by a person under his personal               cultivation,  it shall not be lawful  for  the               State  to acquire any portion of such land  as               is within the ceiling limit applicable to  him               under  any law for the time being in force  or               any building or structure standing thereon  or               appurtenant  thereto, unless the law  relating               to  the acquisition of such land, building  or               structure,    provides    for    payment    of               compensation at a rate which shall not be less               than the market value thereof."               Section  2(ii) substitutes the following  sub-               clause for sub-cl. (a) of cl. (2) of Art. 31-A               "(a)   the  expression  ’estate’   shall,   in               relation  to  any local area,  have  the  same               meaning  as  that  expression  or  its   local               equivalent-has  in the existing  law  relating               force in that area and all to land tenures  in               also include-               (i)   any  jagir,  inam  or  muafi  or   other               similar grant and in the States-of Madras  and               Kerala, any ianmam right;               (ii)  any land held under ryotwari settlement;               (iii) any  land  held or let for  purposes  of               agriculture  or for purposes  ancillary  there               to, including wast land, forest land, land for               posture   or  ones  of  buildings  and   other               structures  occupied by cultivators  of  land,               agricultural labourers and village artisans;" Section  3 amends the 9th Schedule by adding 44  entries  to it. In  dealing with the question about the validity of the  im- pugned Act, it is necessary to consider the scope and effect of the provisions contained in-Art. 368 of the Constitution, because  the  main controversy in the  present  applications turns upon:the- 928 decision  of the question as to what is the construction  of that Article.  Article 368 reads as follows:               "An  amendment  of this  Constitution  may  be               initiated  only by the introduction of a  Bill               for the-purpose in either House of Parliament,               and when the Bill is passed in each House by a               majority of the total membership of that House               and by a majority of not less than  two-thirds               of  the  members  of that  House  present  and               voting, it shall be presented to the President               for  his  assent and upon  such  assent  being               given  to  the Bill,  the  Constitution  shall               stand amended in accordance with the terms  of               the Bill .               Provided that if such amendment seeks to  make               any change               (a)   Article  5,  article  55,  article,  73,               article 162 or               article    241, or               (b)   Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of  Part               VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or               (c) any of the Lists in the Seventh  Schedule,               or               (d)   the   representation   of   States    in               Parliament, or               (e)   the provisions of this article,

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             the   amendment  shall  also  require  to   be               ratified by the Legislatures of not less  than               one-half of the States by resolutions to  that               effect  passed by those.  Legislatures  before               the  Bill making provision for such  amendment               is presented to the President for assent." It is necessary at this stage to set out briefly the history of Arts. ..31-A and 31-B.  These Articles were added to  the Constitution  with  retrospective  effect by  s.  4  of  the Constitution  (First Amendment) Act, 1951.  Soon  after  the promulgation  of  the Constitution, the political  party  in power,  commanding  as  it did a majority of  votes  in  the several State legislatures as well as in Parliament, carried out  radical  measures of agrarian reform in Bihar,  may  be referred to as Zamindari Abolition Acts.  Certain zamindars, feeling themselves aggrieved, attacked the validity of those Acts  in courts of law on the ground that  they  contravened the ’fundamental rights conferred on them by Part III of the Constitution.   The  High Court of Patna held that  the  Act passed iii Bihar was unconstitutional while the High  Courts of   Allahabad  and  Nagpur  upheld  the  validity  of   the corresponding  legislation  in  Uttar  Pradesh  and   Madhya Pradesh respectively (See Kameshwar Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh by enacting   legislation which 929 v.   State of Bihar(1) and Surya Pal v. U.P.  Government(1). The   parties  aggrieved by these respective  decisions  had filed appeals by special leave before this Court.At the same time  petitions had also been preferred before  this   Court under  Art.  32  by certain  other  Zamindars,  seeking  the determination of the same issues It was atstage that  the Union Government, with a view to put an endall        this litigation and to remedy what they considered to be  certain defects  brought to light in the work of  the  Constitution, brought  forward a bill to amend the  Constitution,  which,. after  undergoing  amendments in  various  particulars,  was passed  by the require majority as the  Constitution  (First Amendment) Act, 1951 by which Arts. 31-A and 31-B were added to  the  Constitution.   That was the first  step  taken  by Parliament  to  assist the process of legislation  to  bring about agrarian reform, by introducing Articles 31-A and  31- B.   The  second  step in the same direction  was  taken  by Parliament in 1955 by amending Art. 31-A by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.. The object of this  amendment was  to widen the scope of agrarian reform and to confer  on the  legislative  measures adopted in that  behalf  immunity from   a   possible  attack  that  they   contravened’   the fundamental  rights  of  citizens.   In  other  words,   the amendment  Protected the legislative measures in respect  of certain   other  items  of  agrarian  and   social   welfare legislation,  which  affected  the  proprietary  rights   of certain citizens.  At the time when the first amendment  was made,  Art. 31-B expressly provided that none, of the,  Acts and  Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule, nor  any  of the  provisions thereof, shall be deemed to be void or  ever to   have  become  void  on  the  ground  that   they   were inconsistent  with  or  took: away or abridged  any  of  the rights   conferred   by  Part  III,  and   it   added   that notwithstanding  any judgment, decree or order of any  Court or  tribunal  to  the contrary, each of the  said  Acts  and Regulations  shall  subject to the power  of  any  competent legislature to repeal or amend, continue in force.  At  this time, 19 Acts were listed in Schedule 9, and they were  thus effectively validated.  One more Act was added to this  list by  the  Amendment Act of 1955, so that as a result  of  the

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second amendment, the Schedule contained 20 Acts which  were validated. It  appears that notwithstanding these  amendments,  certain other  legislative measures adopted by different States  for the  purpose of giving effect to the agrarian policy of  the party in power, were effectively challenged.  For  instance, the Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala(3), the  validity of  the  Kerala  Agrarian Relations Act  (IV  of  1961)  was challenged  by writ petitions filed under Art. 32, and as  a result of the majority decision of this Court, the whole Act was struck down. The decision of this (1) A-I-R. 1951 Pat.  91  (2) A.I.R. 1951 All. 674. (3)[1962] Supp.  1 S.CR. 829.. 930 Court was pronounced on December 5, 1961.  In A. P. Krishna- swami Naidu v. The State of Madras(1) the  constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (146.  58 of 1961) was the subject matter of debate, and  by the decision of this Court pronounced, on March 9, 1964,  it was  declared  that the whole Act was invalid.   It  appears that  the  Rajas  than  Tenancy Act  III  of  1955  and  the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling and Holdings) Act 27 of  1961  had  been  similarly  declared  invalid,  and   in consequence,  Parliament  thought  it necessary  to  make  a further amendment in Art: 31-B so as to gave the validity of these  Acts which had been struck down and of other  similar Acts  which were likely to be challenged.  With that  object in view, the impugned Act has enacted S. 3 by which 44  Acts have  been added to Schedule 9. It is therefore  clear  that the  object  of  the  First,  Fourth  and  the   Seventeenth Amendments  of  the  Constitution  was  to  help  the  State Legislatures  to give effect to measures of agrarian  reform in  a  broad and comprehensive sense in the interests  of  a very  large  section of Indian ,citizens  whose  social  and economic   welfare  closely  depends  on  the   persuit   of progressive agrarian policy. The first question presented for determination in this  case is  whether  the impugned Act, in so far as it  purports  to take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights conferred by   Part   III  .or  the  Constitution,falls   within   the prohibition  of Art. 13 (2) which provides that "the  State, ’shall,  not make any law which takes away or  abridges  the rights   conferred  by  this  Part  and  any  law  made   in contravention  of  this clause shall to the  extent  of  the Contravention,  be void".  In other words, the argument,  of the  petitioners  was  that  the law  to  which  Art,  13(2) applies, would include a law passed by Parliament by  virtue of its constituent power to amend the Constitution, and  so, its  validity will have. to be tested by Art. 13(2)  itself. It was contended that the State" includes Parliament  within Art. 12 and "law" must include, a constitutional  amendment. It  was  said that it was the deliberate  intention  of  the framers  of the Constitution, who realised the  sanctity  of the  fundamental rights conferred by Part III, to make  them immune from interference not only by ordinary laws passed by the legislatures in the country but also from constitutional amendments.   In my opinion, there is no substance  in  this argument.-   Although   "law"   must   ordinarily    include constitutional law, there is ’a juristic distinction between ordinary  law  made  in exercise of  legislative  power  and constitutional law which is Made in exercise of  constituent power.  In a written federal form of Constitution there is a clear  and  well-known distinction between the  law  of  the Constitution and ordinary law made by the legislature on the basis of separation of powers and

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(1)[1964]7 S.C.R.82.                             931 pursuant to the power of law-making conferred by the Consti- tution  (See Dicey on ’Law of the Constitution, Tenth:  Edn. p. 110, Jennings, ’Law and the Constitution’ pp. 62-64,  and ’American  Jurisprudence’, 2nd Edn.  Vol. 16, p.  181).   In such   a   written  Constitution,  the  amendment   of   the Constitution  is  .a substantive, constituent act  which  is made  in the exercise, of the sovereign power which  created the  Constitution and which is effected by a special  means, namely,  by a predesigned fundamental procedure  unconnected with  ordinary legislation.  The amending power  under  Art. 368 is hence sui generis and cannot be, compared to the law- making  power of Parliament pursuant to Art. 246  read  with List  I  and 111.  It follows that the expresSion  "law"  in Art.  13(2)  of  the Constitution  cannot  be  construed  as including  an  amendment  of the Constitution  which  is  by Parliament in exercise of, its sovereign constituent  power, but  must  mean law made by Parliament  in  its  legislative capacity :pursuant to the powers of law-making given by  the Constitution itself  under Art. 246 read with Lists I and In of the 7th Schedule.  It is also clear, on the same line  of reasoning,  that ’law’ in Art. 13(2) cannot be construed  so as  to include ’law’ made by Parliament under Arts. 4,  169, 392,  5th  Schedule Part D and 6th Schedule para  2  1.  The amending power of Parliament exercised under these  Articles stands  on  the same as the  constitutional  amendment  made under  Art.  U8 so far as Art. 13(2) is concerned  and  does not fall within the definition of law within the meaning  of this last article. It is necessary to add that the definition of ’law’ in  Art. 13(3) does not include in terms a constitutional  amendments though  it includes "any Ordinance,, order,  bye-law,  rule, regulation,  notification, custom or usage ". It  should  be noticed  that  The  language. of Art. 3  6  8  is  perfectly general  and empowers Parliament to amend  the  Constitution without  any exception Whatsoever.  H I ad it been  intended by  the  Constitution-makers  that  the  fundamental  rights guaranteed  under Part III should be completely outside  the scope  of  Art. 368, it is reasonable to  assume  that  they would  have made an express  provision to that  effect.   It was  stressed by the petitioners during the course ’of  the, argument that Part III is headed as ’Fundamental Rights" and that  Art.  32 "guarantee’s’ the right to move  the  Supreme Court  by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of  rights conferred by Part M. But the expression "fundamental" in the phrase  "Fundamental  Rights"  means that  such  rights  are fundamental  vis-a-vis the laws of the legislatures and  the acts of the executive authorities mentioned in Art. 12.   It cannot be suggested, that the expression "fundamental" lifts the  fundamental  rights  above  the  Constitution   itself. Similarly,  the  expression "guaranteed’ in Art.  32(1)  and 32(4)  means  that the right to move the Supreme  Court  for enforcement of fundamental rights without 932 exhausting  the, normal channels through the High Courts  or the  lower courts is guaranteed.  This expression also  does not place the fundamental rights above the Constitution. I  proceed  to consider the next question  arising  in  this case, the scope of the amending power under Art. 368 of  the Constitution.  It is contended on behalf of the  petitioners that  Art. 368 merely lays down the procedure for  amendment and  does not vest the amending power as such in any  agency constituted under that article.  I am unable to accept  this argument  as  correct  Part XX  of  the  Constitution  which

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contains  only Art. 368 is described as a Part dealing  with the  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  and  Art.  368  which prescribes the procedure for amendment of the  Constitution, begins by saying that an amendment of this Constitution  may be  initiated  in  the  manner  therein  indicated.   In  MY Opinion,  the expression "amendment of the Constitution"  in Art.  368 plainly and unambiguously means amendment  of  all the  provisions of the Constitution.  It is unreasonable  to suggest that what Art. 368 provides is only the mechanics of the  procedure to be followed in amending  the  Constitution without indicating which provisions of the Constitution  can be   amended   and  which  cannot.    Such   a   restrictive construction  of the substantive part of Art. 368  would  be clearly  untenable.  The significant fact , that a  separate Part has been devoted in the Constitution for "amendment  of the Constitution and there is only one Article in that  Part shows  that  both the power to amend and  the  procedure  to amend  are  enacted  in Art. 368.   Again,  the  words  "the Constitution  shall  stand amended in  accordance  with  the terms  of  the  Bill" in Art. 368  clearly  contemplate  and provide for the power to amend after the requisite procedure has  been followed.  Besides, the words used in the  proviso unambiguously  indicate  that the substantive  part  of  the article  applied to all the provisions of the  Constitution. It is on that basic assumption that the proviso prescribes a specific  procedure  in  respect of the  amendment  of  ,the articles mentioned in cls. (a) to (e) thereof.  Therefore it must  be held that when Art. 368 confers on  Parliament  the right to amend the Constitution the power in question can be exercised over all the provisions of the Constitution.   How the  power  should  be exercised, has to  be  determined  by reference  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the  proposed amendment  falls under the substantive part of Art. 368,  or whether it attracts the procedure contained in the proviso. It  was  suggested  for the petitioners that  the  power  of amendment  is  to  be  found in Arts. 246  and  248  of  the constitution  read   with  item  97 of List  I  of  the  7th Schedule.  I do not think that it is possible to accept this argument.  Article 246 stats that 933 Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect  to matters  enumerated in List I in the Seventh  Schedule,  and Art. 248, similarly, confers power on Parliament to make any law  with  respect  to  any matter  not  enumerated  in  the Concurrent List or State List.  But the power of  law-making in  Arts. 246 and 248 is "subject to the provisions of  this Constitution".    It   is  apparent  that   the   power   of constitutional amendment cannot fall within these  Articles, because it is illogical and a contradiction in terms to  say that  the  amending power can be exercised and at  the  same time it is "subject to the provisions of, the Constitution". It was then submitted on behalf of the petitioners that  the amending power under Art. 368 is subject to the doctrine  of implied limitations.  In other words, it was contended  that even if Art. 368 confers the power of. amendment, it was not a  general  but  restricted  power  confined  only  to   the amendable  provisions of the Constitution, the  amendability of  such  provision  being  determined  by  the  nature  and character  of the respective provision.  It was argued,  for instance, that the amending power cannot be used to  abolish the  compact  of  the Union or  to  destroy  the  democratic character of the Constitution teeing individual and minority rights.   It was said that the Constitution was a  permanent compact  of  the States, that the federal character  of  the States was individual, and that the existence of any. of the

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States  as part of the federal Compact Cannot4be put an  end to  by  the power of amendment.  It was also said  that  the chapter of fundamental rights of the Constitution cannot  be the subject-matter of any amendment under Art. 368.  It  was contended  that the preamble to the  Constitution  declaring that  India was a sovereign democratic republic  was  beyond the  scope  of the amending Power. it,  was  suggested  that other basic, features of the Constitution were the  Articles relating   to.  distribution  of  legislative  powers,   the Parliamentary  form of Government and the  establishment  of Supreme Court and the High, Courts in the various States.  . I  am  unable to accept this argument as  correct.   If  the Constitution-makers considered that there were certain basic features  of  the Constitution which were permanent  it.  is must  unlikely that they should not have expressly  said  in Art  368 that these basic features were. not amendable.   On the   contrary,  the  Constitution-makers   have   expressly provided.  that Art. 368 itself should be amendable  by  the process indicated in the proviso to that Article.  This cir- cumstance is significant and suggests. that all the articles of  the Constitution are amendable either under the  proviso to  Art. 368 or under the main part of that Article.  In  MY opinion,  there  is  no  room for  an.  implication  in  the construction  of Art. 368.  So far as the federal  character of the Constitution is concerned, it was held by this  Court in State of West Bengal v. Union of Cl/67-14 934 India(1) that the federal structure is not an essential  pan of  our  Constitution and there is no  compact  between  the States  and  them is no dual citizenship in  India.  It  was pointed  out in that case that there was  no  constitutional guarantee  against   the  alteration of  boundaries  of  the States.   By  An. 3 the Parliament is by law  authorised  to form  a new State by redistribution of the territory  of  a. State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State, to increase the area of any State, to diminish the area of any State  to alter the boundaries of any State, and to alter the name  of any  State.   In In Re The Berubari Union  and  Exchange  of Enclaves (2) it was argued that the Indo-Pakistan  agreement with  regard  to Berubari could not be implemented  even  by legislation under Art. 368 because of the limitation imposed by  the  preamble  to  the Constitution  and  that  such  an agreement  could  not be implemented by a  referendum.   The argument was rejected by this Court and it was held that the preamble  could  not,  ’in i any way,  limit  the  power  of Parliament  to  cede parts of the  national  territory.   On behalf  of  the  petitioners the argument  was  s  that  the chapter on fundamental rights was the basic feature, of  the Constitution and cannot be the     subject  of the  amending power under Art 368.  It was  argued  that the  freedoms  of democratic life are secured by the chapter   on  fundamental rig its and dignity of the individual cannot be preserved if any of the fundamental rights is altered or diminished.   It is  not  possible to accept this argument as  correct.   The concepts  of liberty and equality are changing  and  dynamic and hence the notion of permanency or immutability cannot be attached  to any of the fundamental rights.   The  Directive Principles   of   Part  IV  are  as   fundamental   as   the constitutional  rights  embodied  in Part III  and  Art.  37 imposes a constitutional duty upon the States to apply these principles  in making laws.  Reference should in  particular be made to Art. 39(b) which enjoins upon the State to direct its  policy towards securing that the ownership and  control

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of   the  material  resources  of  the  community   are   so distributed  as best to subserve the common good.  Art. 3  8 imposes a duty upon, the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it  may, a  social  order  in which  justice,  social,  economic  and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.  I have already said that the language of Art. 368  is clear and unambiguous in support of, the view that there  is no  implied limitation on the amending power.  In  Principle also   it   aPPears  unreasonable  to   suggest   that   the Constitution-makers  wanted to provide that the  fundamental rights  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  should  never  be touched by way of, amendment.  In modern democratic  thought I there are two main trends-- the liberal idea of individual ’rights (1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371 p 405.    (2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250.                             935 protecting the individual and the democratic idea proper pro claiming  the equality of rights and popular  sovereignty  . The gradual extension of the idea of equality from political to economic and social fields in the modern State has led to the  problems of social security,  economic         planning and industrial welfare legislation.  The implementation  and harmonisation of these. somewhat conflicting principles is a dynamic   task.    The  adjustment   between   freedom   and compulsion, between the rights of individuals and the social interest  and  welfare  must necessarily  be  a  matter  for changing  needs  and  conditions.  The  proper  approach  is therefore  to  look  upon  the  fundamental  rights  of  the individual  as conditioned by the social responsibility,  by the  necessities  of  the  Society,  by  the  balancing   of interests  and not as pre-ordained and  untouchable  private rights. As pointed out forcefully by Laski:               "The   struggle   for   freedom   is   largely               transferred  from  the plane of  political  to               that  of  economic rights.   Men  become  less               interested in the abstract fragment of politi-               cal power an individual can secure than in the               use of massed pressure of the groups to  which               they  belong to secure an increasing share  of               the  social Product.  Individualism gives  way               before  socialism.  The roots of  liberty  are               held to be in the ownership and control of the               instruments  of production by the  state,  the               latter  using  its  power  to  distribute  the               results  of  its  regulation  with  increasing               approximation to equality.  So long, as  there               is  inequality, it is argued, there cannot  be               liberty.               The  historic inevitability of this  evolution               was seen a century ago by de tocqueville.   It               is interesting to compare his insistence  that               the  democratization of political power  meant               equality   and  that  its  absence  would   be               regarded by the masses as oppression with  the               argument  of  Lord  Action  that  liberty  and               equality   are  antitheses.   To  the   latter               liberty  was essentially an autocratic  ideal;               democracy  destroyed individuality, which  was               the very pith of liberty, by seeking  identity               of  conditions.  The modem emphasis is  rather               toward the principle that material equality is               growing  inescapable and that the  affirmation               of  personality  must  be  effective  upon  an

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             immaterial  plane. it is found that  doing  as               one  likes,  subject only to  the  demands  of               peace,    is    incompatible    with    either               international  or municipal  necessities.   We                             pass  from  contract  to relation  as  we  have               passed  from status to contract.  Men  are  so               involved  in intricate networks  of  relations               that the place for their               936               liberty  is in a sphere where their  behaviour               does not impinge upon that self-affirmation of               others which is liberty."  (Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.  IX, 445.). It must :not be forgotten that the fundamental right guaran- teed- by Art. 31, for. instance. is not absolute.  It should be  not that cl. (4) of that Article, provides an  exception to  the  requirements of cl. (2).  ’Clause (4)  relates  ’to Bills- of a State Legislature relating to public acquisition which were pending at the-commencement of fhe  Co’stitution. If  such  a  Bill has been passed and  assented  to  by  the President, the Courts shall have no jurisdiction to question the validity of such law on the of contravention of cl. (2), ie.,   on  the  ground  that  it  does  not-   provide   for compensation  or that it has been enacted without  a  public purpose.  Clause (6) of the, Article is another exception to cl.  (2)  and  provides for ouster of  jurisdiction  of  the Courts.  While cl. (4) relates to Bills pending in the State Legislature  at the encement of the Consistitution, cl.  (6) relates  to  Bills enacted by the State within IS  I  months before commencement of the Constitution i.e., Acts providing for  public acquisition which were enacted not earlier  than July  26,  1948.  If the President certifies’ ’such  an  Act within  3 months from the commencement of the  Constitution, the Courts shall have no jurisdiction to invalidate that Act on  the ground of contravention of cl. (2) of  that  Article Similarly,   the  scheme  of  Art  19  indicates  that   the fundamental  rights guaranted by sub-cls. (a) to (g) of  cl, (1) can be validly regulated in the light of the  provisions contained  in cls. (2) to (6) of Art. 19.  In  other  words, the scheme of Art.19 is two-fold; the fundamental rights  of the citizens are of paramount importance, but even the  said fundamental  rights can be regulated to serve the  interests of   the   general  public  or   other   objects   mentioned respectively in cls. (2) to (6) of Art. 19.  It is right  to state that the purposes for which fundamental rights can  be regulated  which are s specified in cls. (2) to  (6),  could not  have  been  assumed by the  Constitution-makers  to  be static  and  incapable of expansion.  It cannot  be  assumed that  the Constitution-makers intended to forge a  political strait  jacket for generations to come.   The  Constitution- makers  ,  must  have  anticipated  that  in  dealing  with, socioeconomic  problems which the 1egislatures may  have  to face from time to time, the concepts of public interest  and other  important considerations which are the basis of  cls. (2)  to (6), may change and may even expand.  As Holmes’  J. has    said   in   Abrams   v.    United   States   (1)    : "the  .,Constitution  is an experiMent, as all life  is-  an experiment".  It is therefore legitimate to assume that  the Constitution-makers (1)  250 U.S. 616, 630. 937 intended that Parliament should be competent to make  amend- ments  in  these rights so as to meet the challenge  of  the problems  which  may arise in the  course  of  socioeconomic

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progress  and  development  of  the  country.   I  find   it therefore   difficult   to  accept  the  argument   of   the petitioners  thal the Constitution-makers contemplated  that fundamental  rights enshrined in Part III were  finally  and immutably settled and determined once and for all and  these rights are beyond the ambit of any future amendment.   Today at  a time when absolutes are discredited, it must  riot  be too  readily  assumed that there are basic features  of  the Constitution which shackle the amending power and which take precedence  over the general welfare of the nation  and  the need for agrarian and social reform. In construing Art. 368 it is moreover essential to  remember the  nature  and  subject-matter  of  that  Article  and  to interpret it subjectae materies.  The power of amendment  is in  point  of quality an adjunct of sovereignty.  It  is  in truth  the exercise of the highest sovereign :power  in  the State.   If the amending power is an adjunct of  sovereignty it  does  not  Admit  of  any  limitations.   This  view  is expressed by Dicey in "Law of the Constitution", 10th  Edn., at page 148 as follows               "Hence the power of amending the  constitution               has  been  placed, so to  speak,  outside  the               constitution,  and that the legal  sovereignty               of  the United States resides in  the  States’               governments  as  forming  one  aggregate  body               represented  by three-fourths of  the  several               States at any time. belonging to the Union." A  similar view is stated by Lord Bryce in"  "The"  American Commonwealth",  Vol.  1,  ch.   XXXII,  page  366.    Lester Bernhardt Orfield states,as follows in his book he  Amending of the Federal Constitution"               "In  the last analysis, one is brought to  the               conclusion  that  sovereignty  in  the  United               States, if it can be said to exist at all,  is               located  in the amending body.   The  amending               body  has  often  beep  referred  to  as   the               sovereign,  because it meets the fest  of  the               location  of sovereignty.  As  Willoughby  has               said:               ’In  all  those cases in which, owing  to  the               distribution  of  governing  power,  there  is               doubt  as to the political body in  which  the               Sovereignty  rests, the test to be applied  is               the  determination of which authority has,  in               the   last  instance,  the  legal   power   to               determine  its own competence as well as  that               of others’.               938               Applying  the  criteria of  sovereignty  which               were  laid  down  at  the  beginning  of  this               chapter, the amending, body is sovereign as  a               matter  of  both law and fact.   Article  Five               expressly creates the amending body.  Yet in a               certain  manner of speaking the amending  body               may be said to exist as a matter of fact since               it could proceed to alter Article Five or  any               other  part of the Constitution.  While it  is               true  that the sovereign cannot act  otherwise               than  in  compliance with law, it  is  equally               true  that  it creates the law  in  accordance               with which it is to act." In his book "Constitutional Law of the United States",  Hugh Evander Willis says that the doctrine of amendability of the Constitution is based on the doctrine of the sovereignty  of the  people ,and that-it has no such implied limitations  as

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that  an amendment shall not contain a new grant of ,  power nor be in the form of legislation, nor change "our dual form of  government  nor  change the protection of  the  Bill  of Rights,  nor  make any other change  in  the  Constitution." James G. Randall also enunciates the proposition that when a constitutional  amendment is adopted "it is done not by  the ’general  government, but by the supreme sovereign power  of the  nation  i.e., the people, acting through  State  Legis- latures  or State conventions" and that "the amending  power is ’equivalent to the Constitution-makin power and is wholly above   ’the   authority   of   the   Federal   Government"- (’Constitutional  Pro Under Lincoln’, p. 395). ,  The  legal position  is  summarised  ’by  Burdick at  page  48  of  his treaties "The Law of the American Constitution as follows :               "The result of the National Prohibition  Cases               (253  U.S. 350) seems to be that there  is  no               limit to the power to amend the  Constitution,               except  that  a  State  may  not  without  its               consent  be deprived of its equal suffrage  in               the  Senate.  To out the case most  extremely,               this  means  that by action of  two-third,  of               both   Houses   of  Congress   and   of   the,               legislatures in three-fourths , of the  states               all of the powers of the national-  government               could be surrendered to the States, or all  of               the  reserved  powers of the States  could  be               transferred to the federal government.  It  is               only public opinion acting upon these agencies               which  places  any  check  upon  the  amending               power.   But  the alternative to  this  result               would  be  to  recognize-  the  power  of  the               Supreme  Court to veto the will of the  people               expressed   in  a   constitutional   amendment               without any possibility of the reversal of the               court’s action except through revolution." 939 The matter has been clearly put by George Vedel in Manuel Elementaire De Droit Constitutionnel (Recueil Sirey) at page 117 as follows : "Truly  speaking  no  constitution prohibits  for  ever  its amendment or its amendment in all its aspects. But  it can prohibit for example, the  amendment  (revision) during  a certain time (the Constitution of 1791) or it  can prohibit the amendment (revision) on this or that point  (as in  the Constitution of 1875) which prohibits  amendment  of the   republican   form  of  Government  and   the   present Constitution follows the same rule. But  this prohibition has only a political but no  juridical value.  In truth from the juridical viewpoint a  declaration of   absolute  ,  constitutional  immutability   cannot   be imagined.  The Constituent power being the supreme power  in the   state  cannot  be  fettered,  even  by  itself.    For example,article  95  of our  constitution  stipulates,  "The republican  form  of Government cannot be the subject  of  a proposal for amendment. But  juridically the obstacle which this provision  puts  in the way of an amendment of the republican form of government can be lifted as follows. It is enough to abrogate, by way of amendment (revision) the article  95  cited, above.  After this, the  obstacle  being removed,  a  second amendment can deal with  the  republican form of Government. In   practice,  this  corresponds  to  the  idea  that   the constituent  assembly  of today cannot bind  the  nation  of tomorrow."

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the argument of implied limitation was advanced by Mr. N. C. Chatterji and it was contended that item No. 3 of the  Indo- Pakistan  Agreement  providing for a  division  of  Berubari Union  between India and Pakistan was outside the  power  of constitutional  amendment  and  that the  preamble  to  the, Constitution  did not permit the dismemberment of India  but preserved  the  integrity of the territory  of  India.   The argument  was  rejected by this Court and it was  held  that Parliament  acting  under Art. 368 can make a  law  to  give effect to and implement the Agreement in question or to pass a law amending Art. 3 so as to cover cases of cession of the territory  of  India  and thereafter make a  law  under  the amended Art. 3 to implement the Agreement. (1)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250. 940 There is also another aspect of the matter to be taken  into account.   If the fundamental rights are unamendable and  if Art. 368 does not include any such power it follows that the amendment  of, say, Art. 31 by insertion of Arts.  31-A  and 31-B  can  only  be made by a violent  revolution.   It  was suggested   for  the  petitioners  that  an  alteration   of fundamental   rights  could  be  made  by  convening   a-new Constituent  Assembly outside the frame-work of the  present Constitution, but it is doubtful if the proceeding,., of the new Constituent Assembly will have, ’any legal validity, for the  reason  is that if the Constitution  provides  its  own method  of amendment, any other method of amendment  of  the Constitution   will  be  unconstitutional  and  void.    For instance,  in  George  S.  Hawke  v.  Harvey  C.  Smith,  as Secretairy  of State of Ohio(1) it was held by  the  Supreme Court  of  the U.S.A. that Referendum provisions.  of  State Constitutions’  and  statutes  cannot  be  applied  in   the ’ratification  or  rejection of amendments  to  the  Federal Constitution without violating the requirements of Article 5 of such Constitution and that such ratification shall be  by the  legislatures of the-several states, or  by  conventions therein, as Congress shall decide.  It was held in that case that the injunction was properly issued against the  calling of a referendum election on the act of the legislature of  a State  ratifying an amendment to the  Federal  Constitution. If, therefore, the petitioners are right in their contention that  Art. 31 is not amendable within the frame-work of  the present Constitution, the only other recourse for making the amendment  would, as I have already said, be  by  revolution and  not  through, peaceful means, It cannot  be  reasonably supposed.  that the Constitution-makers contem- plated  that Art. 31 or any other article on fundamental rights should be altered by a-violent revolution and not by peaceful  change. It was observed in Feigenspan v. Bodine (2)               "If  the plaintiff is right in its  contention               of  lack  of power to  insert  the  Eighteenth               Amendment into the United States  Constitution               because of its subject matter. it follows that               there  is no way to incorporate it and  others               of  like character into the  national  organic               law,  except, through revolution.   This,  the               plaintiff   concedes,   is   the    inevitable               conclusion  of  its contention.   This  is  so               starting a proposition that the judicial  mind               may  be pardoned for not readily  acceding  to               it,  and  for  insisting that  only  the  most               convincing    reasons   will   justify    ’its               acceptance." I  am,  therefore, of the opinion that the  petitioners  Are unable  to make good their argument on this aspect  of:  the

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case. It  was then contended for the petitioners,that there  would be anomalies  if  Art. 368 is interpreted to  have  no  implied limita- (1) 64 L. Ed. 871.  (2)264 Fed. 186. 941 tions.  It was said that the more important articles of  the Constitution  can be amended by the procedure  mentioned  in the  substantive  part of Art. 368 but  the  less  important articles  would require ratification by the legislatures  of not  less than half of the States under the proviso to  that Article.  It was argued that the fundamental rights and also Art.  32 could be amended by the majority of  two-thirds  of the  members  of Parliament but Art. 226 cannot  be  amended unless  there  was ratification of the legislatures  of  not less than half- of the States, It was pointed out that Arts. 54  and  55 were more difficult to amend but  not  Art.  52. Similarly, Art.’ 162 required ratification of the States but not  Art. 163 which related to the ’Council of Ministers  to aid  and  advise  the  Governor  in  the  exercise  of   his functions.   In  my  opinion  the  argument  proceeds  on  a misconception.  The scheme of Art. 368 is not to divide  the Articles  of  the Constitution into  two  categories,  viz., important and not so important Article.  It was contemplated by  the Constitution-makers that the amending power  in  the main  part  of  Art. 368 should extend  to  each  and  every article of the Constitution but in the case of such articles which  related to the federal principles or the relation  of the   States  with  the  Union,  the  ratification  of   the legislatures of at least half the States should be  obtained for  any amendment.  It was also contended that if Art.  368 was  construed without any implied limitation  the  amending power  under that Article could be used for  subverting  the Constitution.   Both  Mr.  Asoke,  Sen  and  Mr.   Palkiwala resorted to the method of reduction ad absurdem ’MI pointing out the abuses that might occur if there were no limitations on  the  power to amend.  It was suggested  that  Parliament may,   by   a   constitutional   amendment,   abolish    the parliamentary system of government or repeal the chapter  of fundamental rights or divide India into. two States, or even reintroduce  the rule of a monarch.  It..  is  inconceivable that  ’Parliament  should  utilise the  amending  power  for bringing about any of these contingencies.  It is,  however, not  permissible,  in the first place, to assume that  in  a matter  of constitutional amendment there will be  abuse  of power  and  then utilise it as a test for  finding  out  the scope  of  the  amending power.   This  Court  has  declared repeatedly  that the possibility of abuse is not to be  used as  a test of the existence or extent of a legal power  [See for  example, State of West Bengal v. Union of India(1),  at page  407].   In the second place, the amending power  is  a power,  of  an altogether different kind from  the  ordinary governmental power and if an abuse occurs,, it occurs at the hands of Parliament and the State Legislatures  representing an  extraordinary  majority of the people, so that  for  all practical  purposes it may be said to be the people,  or  at least.  the highest agent of the people, and one  exercising sovereign powers.  It is therefore (1)  [1964]1 S.C.R. 371. 942 anomalous   to  speak  of  ’abuse’  of  a  power   of   this description.  In the last analysis, political machinery  and artificial  limitations  will not protect  the  people  from themselves.   The perpetuity of our democratic  institutions

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will depend not upon special mechanisms or devices, nor even upon  any  particular  legislation,  but  rather  upon   the character  and intelligence and the good conscience  of  our people  themselves.   As  observed  by  Frankfurter,  1.  in American Federation of Labour v. American Sash & Door Co.(1)               "But  a democracy need rely on the  courts  to               save  it  from  its own unwisdom.   If  it  is               alert-and  without  alertness  by  the  people               there  can be no enduring democracy unwise  or               unfair legislation can readily be removed from               the  statute books.  It is by  such  vigilance               over its representatives that democracy proves               itself" I pass on to consider the next objection of the  petitioners that the true purpose and object of the impugned Act was  to legislate in respect of land and that legislation 1n respect of land falls within the jurisdiction of State  legislatures under Entry 18 of List 11, and the argument was. that  since the  State  Legislatures alone can make laws in  respect  of land, Parliament had no right to pass the impugned Act.  The argument  was based on the assumption that the impugned  Act purports to be, and in fact is, a piece of land legislation. It  was urged. that the scheme of Arts. 245 and 246  of  the Constitution ’clearly showS that Parliament has no right  to make a law in respect of land, and since the impugned Act is a  legislative measure in relation to land, it is in  Valid. In  my opinion, the argument is based upon a  misconception. Whet the impugned Act purports to do is not to make any land legislation  but  to protect and  validate  the  legislative measures  in  respect  of agrarian  reforms  passed  by  the different State Legislatures in the country by granting them immunity from attack based on the plea that they  contravene fundamental   rights.   The  impugned  Act  was  passed   by Parliament  in exercise of the amending power  conferred  by Art.  368 and it is impossible to accept the  argument  that the  constitutional  power of amendment can be  fettered  by Arts.  245  and  246 or by the legislative  Lists.   It  was argued for, the petitioners that Parliament cannot  validate a law Which it has no Power to enact.  The proposition holds good where the validity on impugned Act turns on whether the subject-matter  falls within or without the jurisdiction  of the  legislature which passed it.  But to make a  law  which contravenes  the  Constitution constitutionally valid  is  a matter  of  constitutional amendment, and as such  it  falls within  the  exclusive power of Parliament  and  within  the amending  power conferred by Art. 368.  I am accordingly  of the opinion that the petitioners are unable to (1)  335 U.S. 538,556. 943 substantiate  their argument on this aspect of the case.   I should like to add that in Lesser v. Garnett(1), in National Prohibition Cases(2 ) and in United States v. Sprague(3),  a similar   argument  Was  advanced  to  the  effect  that   a constitutional amendment was not valid if it was in the form of  legislation.   But  the argument  was  rejected  by  the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. in all the three cases. It  remains  to deal with the objection of  the  petitioners that  the  newly  inserted articles 31-A  and  31-B  require ratification of the State legislatures under the proviso  to Art. 368 of the Constitution because these articles  deprive the  High  Courts of the power to  issue  appropriate  writs under  Art. 226 of the Constitution.  I do not "think  there is  any substance in this argument.  The impugned  Act  does not  purport  to change the provisions of Art.  226  and  it cannot be, said even to have that effect directly or in  any

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substantial measure.  It is manifest that the newly inserted articles do I not either in terms or in effect seek to  make any  change in Art. 226 of the Constitution.   Article  31-A aims   ’at   saving  laws  providing  for   the   compulsory acquisition by the State of a certain kind-of property  from the  operation  of  article 1 3  read  with  other  relevant articles  in  Part  III,  while  article  31-b  purports  to validate  certain  specified  Acts  g  Regulations,  already passed,  which, but for such a; provision , would be  liable to be impugned under Art. 13 It is therefore’ not correct to say that the powers of High Courts to issue writs is, in’any way, affected. The jurisdiaction ’of the High Courts remains just the same as it Was before.  Only’a certain  category-of cases has been excluded from the purview of Part III and the High  Courts  can  no longer intervene,  not  because  their Jurisdiction or powers have been curtailed in any manner  or to. any but because there would be no occasion hereafter for the  exercise  of  their power in such  cases.   As  I  have already  said,  the  effect  of  the  impugned  Act  on  the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art. 226 of the, Con- stitution is not direct but only incidental in character and therefore the contention " of the petitioners on this  point against the validity of the impugned Act must be rejected. It  is  well-settled  that  in  examining  a  constitutional question  of  this character, it is legitimate  to  consider whether  the impugned legislation is a legislation  directly in  respect of the subject-matter covered by any  particular article  of  the Constitution or whether  touches  the  said articles only incidentally or indirectly.  In A. K.  Gopalan v.  The State of Madras (4), kania , C.J., had  occasion  to consider  the validity of the argument that, the  Preventive detention  order resulted in the detention of the  applicant in  a  cell, and so, it contravened his  fundamental  rights guaranteed by (1)  258 U. S. 130. (2)253 U.S. 350. (3)  282 U.S. 716. (4)  [1950] S.C.R 88- 101. 944 Art.  19(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g)., Rejecting  this argument,  the learned Chief Justice observed that the  true approach  in  dealing  with  such a  question  was  only  to consider the directness of the legislation and not what will be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the  mode of the detenu’s life.  On that ground alone, he was inclined to    reject    the   contention   that   the    order    of detention.contravened  the fundamental rights guaranteed  to the petitioner under Art. 19(1).  At page 100 of the report, Kania, C.J., stated as follows :               "As the preventive detention order results  in               the  detention of the applicant in a  cell  it               was  contended on his behalf that  the  rights               specified in Article 19(1) (a), (b), (c), (d),               (e)  and  (g)  have been  infringed.   It  was               argued that because of his detention he cannot               have  a free right to speech as and  where  he               desired  and  the same argument was  urged  in               respect of the rest of the rights mentioned in               sub-clauses   (b),  (c),  (d)  (e)  and   (g).               Although  this argument is advanced in a  case               which  deals  with  preventive  detention,  if               correct,  it should be applicable in the  case               of   punitive  detention  also  to   any   one               sentenced to a term of imprisonment under  the               relevant section of the Indian Penal Code.  So

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             considered,  the  argument  must  clearly   be               rejected.  In spite of the saving clauses  (2)               to  (6), permitting abridgement of the  rights               connected   with   each  of   them,   punitive               detention under several sections of the  Penal               Code,  i.e., for theft, cheating, forgery  and               even ordinary assault, will be illegaL  Unless               such  conclusion necessarily follows from  the               article, it is obvious that such  construction                             should be avoided.  In my opinion, suc h  result               is.   clearly   not   the   outcome   of   the               Constitution.   The  article has  to  be  read               without  any pre-conceived notions.  So  read,               it  clearly means that the legislation  to  be               examined must be directly in respect of one of               the  rights mentioned in the sub-clauses.   If               there is a legislation directly attempting  to               control  a citizen’s freedom of speech or  ex-               pression,  or his right to assemble  peaceably               and  without arms, etc., the question  whether               that  legislation  is saved  by  the  relevant               saving  clause of article 19 will arise.   If,               however,  the legislation is not  directly  in               respect  of  any of these subjects but  as  a,               result of the operation of other  legislation,               for  instance,  for  punitive  or   preventive               detention,  his right under any of these  sub-               clauses  is  abridged,  the  question  of  the               application of article 19 does not arise.  ’Me               true approach is only to consider the  direct-               ness  of the legislation and not what will  be               the  result of the detention otherwise  valid,               on the mode of the detenu’s               945               life.  On that , short ground, in my  opinion,               this  argument about the infringement  of  the               rights  mentioned in article  19(1)  generally               must fail.  Arty other construction put on the               article, it seems to me , will be unreason- It is true that the opinion thus expressed by Kania, C.J. in the case of A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(-) did  not receive,  the  concurrence of the other learned  Judges  who heard the said case.  Subsequently, however, in Ram Singh  & Others v. The State of Delhi & Anr.(2) the said observations were  cited  with  approval by the Full  Court.   The  same. principle  was accepted by this Court in Express  Newspapers (Pvt.)  Ltd.  v.  The Union of  India(’),  in  the  majority judgment in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The State of Assam (4 ) and   in   Naresh  Shridhar  Mirajkar  v.   The   State   of Maharashtra("),.  Applying the same principle to the present case,   consider that the effect of the impugned Act on  the powers  of  the High Court under Art. 226  is  indirect  and incidental  and  not direct.  I hold that the  impugned  Act falls  under  the substantive part of Art. 368  because  the object of the impugned Act is to amend the relevant Articles in Part III which confer fundamental rights on citizens  and not -to change the power of the High Courts under Art. 226. In this connection I should like to refer to another  aspect of  the  matter.   The question about the  validity  of  the Constitution  (First Amendment) Act has been considered  by, this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and  State of Bihar(6).  In that case, the validity  of  the said  Amendment Act was challenged, firstly, on  the  ground that the newly inserted Arts. 31 -A and 31-B sought  to make

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changes  in Arts. 132 and 136 in Ch.  IV of Part V and  Art. 226  in Ch.  V of Part VI.  The second ground was  that  the amendment  was invalid because it related to legislation  in respect  of  land.  It was also urged, in the  third  place, that  though  it  may be open to  Parliament  to  amend  the provisions  in  respect of fundamental rights  contained  in Part ITT, the amendment made in that behalf would have to be tested  in  the  light of provisions of Art.  13(2)  of  the Constitution.  The  argument was that the law to which  Art. 13(2)  applied would include a law passed by  Parliament  by virtue  of its constituent power to amend the  Constitution, and  so, its validity will have to be tested by  Art.  13(2) itself.  All these arguments were rejected by this Court and it  was  held  in that case  that  the  Constitution  (First Amendment)  Act was legally valid.  The same question  arose for consideration in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan  (7) with regard to the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)  Act,  1964.  In that case,  the  petitioners  in their (1)   [1950 S.C.R. 88. (2) [1951] S.C.R. 451,456. (3)  [1959] S.C.R. 12,129-30. (4)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 809, 864. (5) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744.            (6)  [1995]  1    S.C.R. 89. (7)  [1963] 1 S.C. R. 933.               946               Writ  Petitions in this Court  contended  that               the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)’  Act               was constitutionally invalid since the  powers               Prescribed  by  Art. 226 which is in  Ch.   V,               Part VI of the Constitution Were likely to  be               affected  by  the Seventeenth  Amendment,  and               therefore  the  special  procedure  laid  down               under Art. 368 should have been followed.   It               was  further contended in that case  that  the               decision  of this court in Sankari  Prasads(1)               case   should  be  reconsidered.   ’Both   the               contentions  were re-, rejected by this  Court               by’  a majority Judgment and it was held  that               the  Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)  Act               amended the fundamental rights solely with the               object of assisting the State Legislatures  to               give effect to the socioeconomic policy of the               party  inpower and its effect on Art. 226  was               incident  and insignificant and  the  impugned               Act therefore fell under the substantive  part               of Art. 368 and did not attract the proviso to               that  article.  It was further held.  by  this               Court that there Was no justification for  re-               considering  Sankari  Prasad’s(1)  case.    On               behalf of the respondents it was submitted  by               the  Additional Solicitor- Generat  that  this               was a very strong     case    for     the               application of the principle of stare decisis. In               my  opinion, this contention must be  accepted               as  correct.If  the  arguments  urged  by  the               petitioners are to prevail it would leadto the               inevitable  consequence  that  the  amendments               made  to the Constitution both in 1951 and  in               1955  would be rendered invalid and.  a  large               number of decisions dealing with the  validity               of the Acts included in the 9th Schedule which               were pronounced by this Court ever since,  the               decision in Sankari Prasad’s(1) case was  dec-

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             lared,  would also-have to be  overruled.   It               was  also  pointed out  that  Parliament,  the               Government  and the people have acted on  the,               faith of the decision of this Court in Sankari               Prasad’s(1)  case and titles to property  have               been   transferred,  obligations   have   been               incurred  and rights have been acquird in  the               implementation of the legislation included  in               the 9th Schedule.               The,  effect  of land reform  legislation  has               been clearly summarised in ch.  VIII of  Draft               Outline on Fourth Plan as follows               "Fifteen  years  ago when the First  Plan  was               being  formulated, intermediary  tenures  like               zamindaris, jagirs and inams covered more than               40  per  cent of the area.  There  were  large               disparities  in  the ownership  of  land  held               under ryotwari tenurer which covered the other               60  per cent area; and’ a substantial  portion               of the land was cultivated through tenants at-               will  and  share-croppers-who paid  about  one               half the produce as rent.  Most holdings  were               small  and  fragmented. Besides, there  was  a               large  population  of  landless   agricultural               labourers.    In   these   conditions,    the,               principal.  measures recommended for  securing               the objec-               (1)[1952] S.C.R. 89.-               947               tives of the land policy were the abolition of               intermediary  tenures, reform of  the  tenancy               system,  including  fixation of fair  rent  at               one-fifth  to one-fourth of the  grossproduce,               security of I tenure for the tenant,  bringing               tenants  into  direct  relationship  with  the               State and investing in them ownership of land.               A ceiling on land holding was also  recmmended               so  that  some  surplus  land,  may  be   made               available  for redistribution to the  landless               agricultural workers.  Another important  part               of,  the  progamme     was  consolidation   of               agricultural holdings and increse in the size-               of  the operational unit to an economic  scale               through cooperative methods.               Aboiition  of Intermediaries.-During the  past               15  years, progress has been made  in  several               directions.  Theprogramme for the abolition of               intermediaries    has   been    carried    out               practically  all over, the country.  About  20               million tenants of former intermediaries  came               into  direct relationship with the  State  and               became   owners  of  their  holdings.    State               Governments are now engaged in the  assessment               and payment of compensation.  There were  some               initial delays but a considerable progress hag               been  made in this direction in  recent  years               and it is hoped that the issue of compensatory               bonds will be completed in another two years.               Tenancy  Reform.-TO deal with the  problem  of               tenants-at-will  in the ryotwari areas and  of               ’sub’-tenants  in the zamindari areas, a  good               deal  of  legislation  has  been  enacted.   .               Provisions   for  security  of   tenure,   for               bringing  them into direct relation  with  the               State   and   converting  them   into   owners

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             have’been  made  in  several  States.   As   a               result,  about  3 million tenants  and  share-               croppers have acquired ownership of ’More than               7 million acres.               Ceiling on Holdings.  Laws imposing ceiling on               agri,cultural  holdings bave been  enacted  in               all-  the  States.In the former  Punjab  area,               however the State Government has the power  to               settle  tenants  on  land  in  excess  of  the               permissible  limit although it has not  set  a               ceiling on  ownership.  According to available               reports over 2 million acres of surplus  areas               in  excess  of the ceiling limits  have,  been               declared    or   taken   possession   of    by               Government." It  is  true  that the principle of stare  decisis  may  not strictly  apply  to, a decision on a  constitutional  point. There  is  no restriction in the Constitution  itself  which prevents this Court from reviewing its earlier decisions  or even to depart from them in the interest of public good.  It is  true  that  the  problem  of  construing  constitutional provisions cannot be adequately solved by merely adopting 948 the  literal construction of the words used in, the  various articles.  The Constitution is an organic document and it is intended  to  serve as a guide to the solution  of  changing problems  which  the Court’ may have to face  from  time  to time.   It  is manifest that in a  progressive  and  dynamic society  the character of these problems is bound to  change with the inevitable consequence that the relevant words used in  the  Constitution  may also  change  their  meaning  and significance.   Even so., the Court is reluctant  to  accede to,  the  suggestion that its earlier  decisions  should  be frequently  reviewed or departed from.  In such a  case  the test should be : what is the nature of the error alleged  in the earlier decision, what is its impact on the public  good and  what is the compelling character of the  considerations urged  in  support  of  the contrary view.   It  is  also  a relevant factor that the earlier decision has been  followed in,  a large number of cases, that titles to  property  have passed  and  multitude of rights and obligations  have  been created  in  consequence of the earlier  decision.   I  have already  dealt  with  the merits of the  contention  of  the petitioners with regard to the validity of the impugned  Act and  I have given reasons for holding that the impugned  Act is  constitutionally  valid  and  the  contentions  ,of  the petitioners are unsound.  Even on the assumption that it  is possible  to  take  a different view and to  hold  that  the impugned  Act is unconstitutional I am of opinion  that  the principle  of state decisis must be applied to  the  present case   and   the   plea  made  by   the,   petitioners   for reconsideration  of Sankari Prasad(1) case and the  decision in   Sajjan  Singh  v.  State  of  Rajasohan(2)  is   wholly unjustified and must be rejected. In  Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966, it was contended  by  Mr. Nambyar   that  the  continuance  of  the  Proclamation   of Emergency   under Art. 352 of the Constitution was  a  gross violation  of  power  because the emergency  had  ceased  to exist.   It was also contended  that Art. 358 should  be  so construed  as to confine its operation on to legislative  or executive action relevant to the Proclamation of  Emergency. It was submitted that the Mysore State was rot a border area and  the  land  reform  legislation of  that  State  had  no relevant-connection  with the Proclamation of Emergency  and the  fundamental  rights  conferred by  Art.  19  cannot  be

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suspended  so far as the petitions are concerned.  I do  not think  that it is necessary to express any opinion on  these points  because  the Writ Petition must fail  on  the  other grounds  which I have already discussed above.  It  is  also not  necessary for me to express an opinion on the  doctrine of prospective overruling of legislation. For  the  reasons already expressed I hold  that  all  these petitions fail and should be dismissed, but there will be no order as to Petitions dismissed. Costs. G.C. (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 89. (2)  [1965] S.C.R. 933. 949