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PETITIONER: HOUSING BOARD HARYANA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HOUSING BOARD COLONY WELFAREASSOCIATION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/09/1995

BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR   92            1995 SCC  (5) 672  JT 1995 (6)   293        1995 SCALE  (5)89

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Faizan Uddin, J. 1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3.  The   appellant  Housing   Board  is  a  statutory  body constituted  for   the  purposes   of  providing  cheap  and economical housing  facilities. The land for construction of tenements is provided by Haryana Urban Development Authority (hereinafter HUDA)  which is also a statutory body. The land is  acquired   by  the   appellant-Board  from   HUDA  under stipulation with  regard to  enhancement in the price of the land consequent  upon judicial pronouncement. The appellant- Board invited  applications for  allotment  of  houses/flats from the  economically weaker  section, belonging to LIG/MIG category. The  appellant -Board  issued allotment letters to various appellant  specifically mentioning  in clause (9) of the allotment  letters that as a result of the land award or arbitration proceedings, etc. if there is an increase in the cost, the  Board may  enhance  the  price  of  the  dwelling houses/flats allotted to them. This condition was reiterated in Clause 2 (W) of the Hire Purchase Tenancy Agreement (Form A) entered  into under  Section 11 (4) of the Housing Board, Haryana  (Allotment,   Management  &  Sale  of  Tenements  ) Regulations. 1972.  It was also provided that there shall be no enhancement  in the  price after a period of 7 years from the date  of allotment.  According to the appellant - Board, this Clause  2(W)  of  Form  ’A’  of  the  Regulations  was, however, amended by a notification dated 26.5.1985 whereby a proviso was inserted to the effect that the restriction of 7 years shall  not be  applicable when  the escalation  in the price is  due to  judicial  pronouncement  or  award  of  an arbitrator. 4. Consequent upon the judicial pronouncements enhancing the compensation granted to the land owners, HUDA also raised an additional  demand   on  5.3.1992   on  the  appellant-Board

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demanding   a    sum   amounting    to   Rs.    27,96,011.80 (approximately) for  the land  given to the appellant-Board. In pursuance  of this demand by HUDA, the appellant-Board in turn,  issued  additional  demand  letters  to  its  various allottees of  the houses/flats towards the enhanced price of the land  as per terms of the agreement and the regulations. In order  to avoid payment of interest on the demand by HUDA the appellant-Board  paid the  entire amount to HUDA in May, 1992 including  the interest  that had accrued till the date of said payment. 5.   Three complaints were made before the District Consumer Forum, Kurukshetra  by the  respondents herein  in the three appeals against  aforementioned additional  demand raised by the appellant-Board  by contending that in view of Clauses 2 (W) of  the agreement  the additional  demand was  barred by time having  been made  after  more  than  7  years  of  the allotment of  houses/flats. The appellant-Board defended the said  complaints   by  disputing  the  jurisdiction  of  the Consumer Forum  to entertain such a complaints besides other grounds of  attack. The  appellant-Board took the stand that there was no ’service’ rendered within the meaning of clause ’O’  of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  2  of  the  Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter the Act) nor there was nay ’deficiency’ in the service within the meaning of clause (g) of Section  2 (1) of the Act. According to the appellant the dispute, if  any, related  to an alleged breach of the terms of contract for which the remedy lies in the Civil Court and not in the Consumer Forum. 6.   The  District  Forum  by  its  order  dated  22.10.1992 rejected the objections and defence set up by the appellant- Board, allowed  all the  three complaints  and  quashed  the additional  demand   made  by   the   appellant-Board.   The appellant-Board filed  three separate  appeals on 30.11.1992 before the State Commission against the aforementioned order dated 22.10.1992  quashing the additional demands. The State Commission took  the view that all the three appeals as were filed beyond  the  prescribed  period  of  limitation  under Section 15  of the  Act  and  as  no  sufficient  cause  for condonation was  pleaded, dismissed all the three appeals as barred by  time. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned order of the  State Commissions  passed in First Appeals Nos. 389, 390, and 391 of 1992, the appellant-Board preferred Revision Petitions before  the National  Consumer Disputes  Redressal Commission, New  Delhi (hereinafter  ’National  Commission’) being Revision  Petition Nos.  66 to  68/1993. The  National Commission maintained  the order  of  State  Commission  and dismissed all  the three  revisions by  a common order dated 7.1.1993 impugned in these appeals. 7.   Learne counsel  for the  appellant-Board submitted that the President of the District Forum had pronounced the order dated 22.10.1992  in open Court and after such pronouncement of the  order he proceeded on leave. Since the President had not signed  the said  order before  proceeding on leave, the same was not made available to the appellant. The said order was however,  attested and  certified   on 30.10.1992 a copy whereof was  furnished to  the appellant  only on 3.11.1992. Since 29.11.1992  was a  Sunday the appeals before the State Commission  were  filed  on  30.11.1992.  According  to  the learned counsel  for the  appellant the  appeals were  filed within one  month from  30.10.1992, the  date on  which  the attested and certified copy of the order was supplied to the appellant. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  venemently urged that  according to  sub-rule (10)  of Rule  4  of  the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 it was obligatory on the part  of the  District Forum to furnish signed and dated

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copy of  the order  free of charge to the appellant and that such a  copy was  furnsihed to  the appellant  on 30.10.1992 and,  therefore,   the  appeals   filed  before   the  State Commission on  30.11.1992, would  be within  the  prescribed limitation under  Section 15  of the  Act and  there was  no question or making any application for condonations of delay in  filing  the  appeals.  He  further  submitted  that  the appellant-Board could not have filed the appeals against the order  of   the  District   Forum  on   the  basis  of  mere pronouncement thereof  in the open Court unless the contents of the  order were  made available  to the appellant for the purposes of preparing the appeal and challenging the same in the  higher   Forum.  Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant, therefore, urged  that the  State Commission  as well as the National  Commission  both  committed  a  serious  error  in dismissing the  appeals and the revisions on the ground that the same  were barred  by time  and no  sufficient cause for condonation of delay was pleaded. 8.   Before considering  the merits of  the submissions made by the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  it  would  be appropriate first  to  look  into  the  relevant  provisions relating to  the limitation.  Section 15  of the Act makes a provision for  appeal and  prescribes the limitation for the same. It reads as under:      15. Appeal.-- Any person aggrieved by an      order made  by the  District  Forum  may      prefer an  appeal against  such order to      the State  Commission within a period of      thirty days  from the  date of an order,      in  such  form  and  manner  as  may  be      prescribed.           Provided  further  that  the  State      Commission may entertain an appeal after      the expiry  of the said period of thirty      days if  it is  satisfied that there was      sufficient  cause  for  not  finding  it      within that period. 9.   Further the  State Government  made  Rules  under  Sub- Section (2)  of Section  30 of  the Act known as the Haryana Consumer Protection  Rules, 1988  (hereinafter  referred  as Rules). Sub-rule  (10) of Rules 4 and Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 which  are  relevant  for  purposes  of  these  appeals  are reproduced hereunder:      Rule 4  (10). -- "Orders of the District      Forum shall  be signed  and dated by the      members   of   the   District      Forum      constituting  the  Bench  and  shall  be      communicated  to  the  parties  free  of      charge."      Rule 8 (3). -- "Each memorandum shall be      accompanied by the certified copy of the      order of  the  District  Forum  appealed      against and such of the documents as may      be  required   to  support   grounds  of      objection mentioned in the Memorandum." 10.   Reading of  the provisions  of Section  15  reproduced above goes  to show  that any  person aggrieved  by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal to the State Commission within  a period  of 30 days from the date of the order.  But  under  the  proviso  the  State  Commission  is enjoined with  the discretion  to entertain  the appeal even after the expiry of the period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there  was sufficient  cause for  not filing the appeal within 30  days from  the date of order. Section 15 does not prescribe any other requirement for the purposes of filing a

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proper and  valid appeal  to the State Commission. The other requirements  for   a  properly     constituted  appeal  are contained in  Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 which contemplates that each  Memorandum   of  Appeal  shall  be  accompanied  by  a certified copy  of the  order of the District forum appealed against and  such other  documents as  may  be  required  to support the grounds of objection mentioned in the Memorandum of  Appeal.  Sub-rule  (10)  of  Rule  4  further  makes  it obligatory that  the order  of the  District Forum shall not only be  signed and  dated by  the members of the   District Forum constituting  the Bench  but  it  enjoins  a  duty  to communicate the  order so  passed signed  and dated  by  the members of  the District  Forum,  to  the  parties  free  of charge. 11.  From the scheme of the Act it becomes apparent that the Consumer Protection  Act 1986  has  been  enacted  with  the object to  provide for  better protection of the interest of the consumers, as a measure for economical and speedy remedy for the  settlement of  their disputes and matters connected therewith. It  is with  this object in view that Rule 4 (10) has also  been made.  It provides  for communication  of the order of the district Forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the burden  of expenses  that may  be incurred for obtaining the certified  copy. If  the rule  itself enjoins a duty for communicating the  order of  the District  Forum duly signed and dated  to the  parties free of charge, there will hardly be an  occasion for  the parties  to make an application for obtaining a  certified copy thereof. Thus, Section 15 of the Act cannot  be read  in isolation  but it  has  to  be  read alongwith Rules  4 (10)   and  8 (3)  of  the  Rules  and  a combined reading  of Section  15 and  the  Rules  reproduced above gives  an impression  that the  purposes,  object  and intention of  these statutory  provisions is  to protect the interest of  the parties before the District Forum by making it obligatory on the District Forum to provide a copy of the order duly  signed and dated by the members of the Bench and the period  of limitation  prescribed  with  regard  to  the filing of an appeal shall be computed as commencing from the date of  communication of  the order in the manner laid down in sub-rule (10) of the Rule 4. 12.   In the  facts and circumstances stated above. The date of pronouncement  of the  order in  the open Court by itself cannot be  the starting  point of  determining the period of limitation under  Section 15  of the  Act. It has also to be shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was duly singed  and dated  by the members of the District Forum constituting the  Bench and the same was communicated to the parties free  of the  charge. That  being so,  it has  to be appreciate that  mere pronouncement  of an order in the open Court will not be enough but under the scheme of the Rules a copy of  the said  order has  also to be communicated to the parties  affected  by  the  aid  order  so  that  the  party adversely affected  therefrom may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of  knowing  that  text,  reasons  and  contents thereof so  as to  formulate grounds  of attack  before  the appellant  or   higher  forums.   In  the  absence  of  such communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order  so as  to challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or the higher Forums. 13.   In the present case as aid before the State Commission the appellant contended that the order was pronounced by the District Forum  in the  open Court on 22.10.1992, it was not signed and  dated as  the President  had proceeded  on leave

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soon thereafter  and therefore, neither the reasons on which the said  order was  based were known nor a copy thereof was furnished to  the appellant-Board  so as to know the reasons and contents  of the  order. It  was also  the case  of  the appellant  that  on  an  enquiry  by  the  counsel  for  the appellant-Board he  was informed  by the Stenographer of the President that the order would be dictatated and typed after the return  of the President and that the copy would be made available to  the  parties  only  on  30.10.1992  under  the signature of  the President  and the  copy was  in fact made available  to   the  counsel   for  the  appellant  only  on 3.11.1992. It  may be  pointed out  that Shri  Tirath Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board before the National Commission  had filed  his own  affidavit affirming these  facts   which  have  not  been  controverted  by  the respondents. On  the contrary  the reply filed in this Court by Shri  K.C. Chug,  President, Housing Board Colony Welfare Association, Kurukshetra  on behalf  of the  respondents has admitted that  in the  present case  free copies  were ready with the  office on  30.10.1992 which  were collected by the counsel for  the answering  respondent on 30.10.1992 whereas the counsel  for the  petitioner got  the same on 3.11.1992. From these facts it is abundantly clear that the copies were duly signed  and dated  by  the  members  of  the  forum  on 30.10.1992. That  being so  the period of limitation in view of the above discussion will commence from the date on which the copies  of the  order were ready and made available i.e. 30.10.1992. In  the present  case  the  appeals  were  filed before  the   State  Commission   on  30.11.1992  and  since 29.11.1992 was  Sunday, the  appeals were prima facie within time. In  these facts and circumstance there was no question of making any application for condonation of delay in filing the appeals as there was no delay at all. 14.   For the  reasons stated  above the appeals succeed and are hereby  allowed. The  impugned orders  of  the  National Commission and  the State  Commission  are  set  aside.  The appeals are  remitted  back  to  the  State  Commission  for disposal on  merits in  accordance with  law. No order as to costs.