http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5312-5318 of 2001

PETITIONER: Honnamma & Ors

RESPONDENT: Nanjundalah since dead by his Lrs & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/03/2008

BENCH: TARUN CHATTERJEE & HARJIT SINGH BEDI

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5312-5318 OF 2001

HARJIT SINGH BEDI,J.

1.      These appeals by special leave are directed against the  judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated 27th July, 2000  whereby the orders of the Appellate Tribunal conferring  occupancy rights on the appellants, have been reversed.  The  tenant-claimants are before us in these appeals. 2.      The facts of the case are as under:- 3.      One Nanjundegowda since deceased filed an application  on 2nd January. 1976 before the Land Tribunal, Nagamangala  in Form No.7 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961  (hereinafter called the "Act") claiming occupancy rights on  specified surveys numbers in Village Anakanahalli.  He  thereafter filed an application on 8th April, 1981 seeking to  amend Form No. 7 on the plea that some of the survey  numbers given therein had not been correctly re-produced.   This application was straightaway allowed by the Land  Tribunal without notice to the opposite party and the  necessary changes in Form No. 7 including some land falling  in the Revenue Estates of Villages Mylanahalli and  Honnenahalli were made.  The landowner, K. Balalingaiah  (now represented by his legal representatives) was the owner of  the land in question.  One  Javarappa had also filed an  application in Form 7 in the year 1975 for the same piece of  land for which Nanjundegowda had filed his application in the  year 1981.  Javarappa’s application was dismissed by the  Land Tribunal. He thereafter filed a Writ Petition in the High  Court which too was dismissed on 4th December, 1980. After  the rejection of the aforesaid application Balalingiah sold the  land in dispute to the respondents herein.  The purchasers  were impleaded as parties before the Land Tribunal and they  contested the claim of Nanjundegowda on various grounds.  The tribunal, after taking evidence, documentary as well as  oral, concluded that the claim of tenancy rights made by  Nanjundegowda was untenable and accordingly rejected the  claim.  This order was challenged by Nanjundegowda by way  of a writ petition but on the constitution of the Land Reforms  Appellate Authority by an amendment of the Act, the writ  petition was remitted to the Appellate Authority for disposal.   The Appellate Authority crystallized the points for  consideration as under: 1.      Whether the lands in dispute are  agricultural lands

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

2.      Whether the action of the Land Tribunal  permitting amendment of form No. 7 on  8.4.1981 by including the lands in  Milanahalli and Honnenahalli was valid

3.      Whether the inclusion of Survey No. 12   of Milanahalli village in form no. 7 by  the amendment application dated  8.4.1981 was valid

4.      Whether the lands in question were  tenanted or not on 1.3.1974

5.      Whether the appellant was in  occupation as  a tenant of the lands in  question as on 1.3.1974

6.      Whether the order of the Land Tribunal  was correct and whether it was liable to  be interfered with

and after an elaborate discussion of the evidence, allowed the  appeal with respect to the land except that covered by survey  Nos.64 and 12 of villages Anakanahalli and Mylanahalli  respectively vide order of 3rd June 1988 observing that the  land was agricultural in nature that Nanjundegowda was  indeed a tenant on the land mentioned in Form No. 7 as his  uncle Kallumaligegowda had brought him from Kenchanahalli  to Anakanahalli where the land was situated and built a house  for him with a promise to give the lands to him, and that after  the death of Kallumaligegowda, his relatives had assured  Nanjundegowda that he could work on the land and bring  credit to his uncle’s family.  The Authority also held that the  amendment application pertaining to Form No. 7 filed on 8th  April, 1981 could not be said to be beyond limitation.  K.  Balalingaiah filed a revision petition against the order of the  Tribunal before the High Court of Karnataka (CRP No. 3582 of  1988). One Smt. Lakshmamma, a respondent herein, also filed  a revision petition against the order of the Tribunal before the  High Court of Karnataka (CRP No. 3553 of 1988). The High  Court dismissed the revision petitions for non prosecution by  its order dated 20th September, 1991 and an application for re- call of the order too was dismissed. One Ramegowda, also filed  a revision petition before the High Court against the order of  the tribunal (L.L.R.P No 1 of1997) which too was dismissed by  order dated 29th January, 1997. Some of the alleged  purchasers (respondents herein) again filed revision petitions  before the High Court challenging the order of the Appellate  Authority. The High Court observed that the three points  which arose for consideration were:     

(1)Whether the Land Reforms Appellate  Authority was right in concluding that  the amendment application dated  8.4.1981 was rightly allowed except to  the extent indicated in the appellate order

(2) Whether the dismissal of CRP No.  3582 and CRP No. 3553 of 1988 for non-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

prosecution and the dismissal of LRRP 1  of 1997 by challenging the impugned  order constitutes res-judicata as against  the petitioners herein

(3) Whether the order of the Land  Reforms Appellate Authority can be  legally sustained

and then went to examine each of the issues independently.   The court concluded that the amendment application dated 8th  April, 1981 having been filed after the cut off date of 30th  June, 1979 was not maintainable in the light of the Division  Bench judgment of the High Court in Pakeera Moolya vs.  Mari Bhat ( ILR 1999 Kar.  p. 809), as a very limited right for  an amendment had been left with the claimant and that did  not cover the inclusion of land not identified in the original  application and as such the amendment insofar as it dealt  with the land in Village Honnenahalli and partly in Village  Anakanahalli could not be claimed by amendment.   On Point No.2, the High Court opined that the earlier  decisions in CRP No. 3582 and CRP 3553 of 1988 and in LRRP  No. 1 of 1997 did not constitute res-judicata with respect to  the present proceedings. 4.      On the third issue, the High Court found that the  evidence produced by the parties did not justify the conclusion  that the claimant was a person who had been lawfully  inducted on the land in question so as to give him the status  of a deemed tenant as he was not a contractual tenant and  was not paying rent and for this purpose relied on several  judgments of this Court and of the High Court and in  particular on  Chokkannagiri Narayanappa vs. Land  Tribunal    ( 1982 (2) Kar. L.J. p.21).  The High Court  accordingly allowed the revision petition and set aside the  order of the Appellate Authority, thus dismissing the  application filed by Nanjundegowda.  It is in this  circumstance, that the present appeals are before us by way of  special leave. 5.      At the very outset, Mr. S.N. Bhat, the learned counsel for  the appellant has fairly conceded before us that the earlier  proceedings did not constitute res-judicata and the conclusion  drawn by the High Court to that extent was correct.  He has  however argued that the finding on the other two points i.e.  limitation and the deemed tenancy of Nanjundegowda had  been wrongly decided by the High Court and these findings  were required to be set aside.  He has laid special emphasis on  the submission that the deemed tenancy under Section 4 of  the Act did not visualize the payment of any rent and all that  was required for the claimant to assume the status of a  deemed tenant was that he had been cultivating the land  lawfully.  In support of this argument, the learned counsel has  cited Dahya Lala and others vs. Rasul Mahomed Abdul  Rahim and others AIR 1964 SC 1320. 6.      The learned counsel for the respondent has however  pleaded  that by the amendment application dated 8th April,  1981 the applicant had sought to include land which did not  figure in the first application dated 2nd January, 1976 and as  an embargo had been placed by the Act itself under which no  application in Form No. 7 could be entertained after                    30th June,1979, the question of any amendment thereafter  was statutorily barred and that the High Court even otherwise  having found no case in favour of the claimants on facts, no  interference was called for.   7.      We have considered the arguments advanced by learned  counsel.  It is true that the Act itself provides a cut off date in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

the filing of the application in Form No. 7.  It is also true that  the original application had been filed well within time though  the amended application had been filed after the last date  permitted by the statute. In order to examine the nature of the  amendment, and whether in fact it had set up what was a new  case, requires an examination of the application.  It may be  mentioned that in the original application the claim was  limited to land in Village Anakanahalli which was identified as  under: Village                 Survey No.        Extent  Anakanahalli            35                      00-27 49-1    0-37 50                      1-17 52/3                    1-32 71/1                    1-23 31      0-20 64      0-13 81      7-37 75      4-07 75      6-33 13      6-02

          By the amended application dated 8th April, 1981,  however the following amendment was sought:

Village                         Survey No.      Extent

Anakanahalli            35-1                    00-02                         35-2                    0-27 49-1                    0-37                                 50-3                    1-17                                         52-3                    1-32                                         71-1                    1-23                                         31-2a           0-15

       Mylanahalli             12                      1-33 13      6-05

       Honnenahalli            75-1                    7-00                                         75-2c           0-18                                         81c                     5-04

8.        A perusal of the first and the amended application  would reveal that as survey nos. 64, 81, 75, 75, 13 did not  figure in the original application, the proposed amendment  was rejected and that order has been maintained even by the  High Court.  The claim pertaining to survey No. 12 in village  Mylanahalli too has also been rejected for the same reasons.   The amendments have however been allowed with respect to  the other survey numbers and also with respect to a change in  the name of the village(s) on the understanding that a mere  mis-description of the property was to be rectified by  amendment.  To our mind therefore, a mere mis-description  while identifying the land in Form no. 7 as originally filed  would not be hit by the embargo with respect to the last date  of the filing of Form no.7 i.e. on 30th June, 1979.  The  judgment referred to by the High Court is based on a different  set of facts in as much certain items which had not been  included in the original plaint were sought to be included by  amendment, a proposal which the court held could not be  justified.   The observations in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs.  National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon AIR 1969 SC  1267 are meaningful. It has been observed that a party cannot  be refused amendment in a case of a mis-description of   property as the purpose of amendment is to ensure that the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

real issues are addressed and that in such a case no question  of limitation would arise and the amended plaint must be  deemed to have been instituted on the date on which the  original plaint had been filed.  We are, therefore, of the opinion  that the finding of the High Court on the question of limitation  is erroneous.  9.      Mr. Bhat has also laid great emphasis on the third issue  as to whether the deemed tenancy which Nanjundegowda had  claimed was justified on facts.  He has pointed out that the  appellate authority as the final fact finding body had found in  favour of the deemed tenants on an appreciation of the  evidence that had been adduced and it was not open to the  High Court sitting in revision to upset these findings of fact  unless they were perverse or not possible on the evidence.  It  has also been emphasized that the High Court had relied on  Chokkannagiri Narayanappa’s case (supra)  and observed  that as no rent had been paid by  Nanjundegowda it could not  be said that he could attain the status of a deemed tenant.  He  has however placed reliance on Dahya Lala’s case  (supra)  wherein a Constitution Bench of this court while construing  Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,  1948 (which is para materia with Section 4 of the Act) had  clearly held  that the payment of rent was not visualized in  such a situation.   10.     We have considered the arguments advanced by learned  counsel.  Section 121 provides for an appeal to the Appellate  Tribunal and gives it jurisdiction to confirm, modify or rescind  the order in appeal or its execution or to pass such other order  as may seem legal and just in accordance with the provisions  of the Act.  Section 121A which confers the revisional power  on the High Court reads as under: "121-A Revision by the High Court. -   The High  Court may at any time call for  the records of any order or proceeding  recorded  by the Appellate Authority  under this Act or any other law for the  purpose of satisfying itself as to the  legality of such order or as to the  regularity of such proceeding and may  pass such order with respect thereto as it  thinks fit;

Provided that no such order shall be  made except after giving the person  affected  a reasonable opportunity of  being heard".  

11.      A comparative reading of Sections 121 and 121-A would  show that the High Court’s power has been circumscribed to  satisfying itself as to the legality of the order impugned and to  the regularity of the proceedings.  Mr. Bhat appears to be right  in submitting that interference in revision on facts would be  justified only on very limited grounds such as perversity and  that if the view taken by the Appellate Authority was possible  on the evidence it would be inappropriate on the part of the  High Court to differ in its conclusions.  It bears notice that the  Appellate Authority had placed reliance on a large number of  documents/letters, the landowners had written to  Nanjundegowda.  The Tribunal accordingly found that these  letters, when examined in the light of the other evidence, had  discharged the presumption under Section 133 of the Act with  regard to the correctness of the revenue record which was  admittedly in favour of the landowner.  It appears also that the  High Court was deeply impressed by the fact that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

Nanjundegowda had not been paying rent at the time when  the application in Form No. 7 had been filed.  This finding is  on the face of it erroneous in the light of the Judgment in  Dahya Lala’s case (Supra) .  As already noted above, while  construing Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands Act, which is pari materia with Section 4 of the Act, this  Court observed as under:

   "The Act of 1948, it is undisputed, seeks to  encompass within its beneficent provisions not only  tenants who held land for purpose of cultivation under  contracts from the owners but persons who are  deemed to be tenants also. The point in controversy is  whether a person claiming the status of a deemed  tenant must have been cultivating land with the  consent or under the authority of the owner. Counsel  for the appellants submits that tenancy postulates a  relation based on contract between the owner of land,  and the person in occupation of the land, and there  can be no tenancy without the consent or authority of  the owner to the occupation of that land. But the Act  has by Section 2(18) devised a special definition of  tenant and included therein persons who are not  contractual tenants. It would therefore be difficult to  assume in construing Section 4 that the person who  claims the status of a deemed tenant must be  cultivating land with the consent or authority of the  owner. The relevant condition imposed by the statute  is only that the person claiming the status of a deemed  tenant must be cultivating land "lawfully": It is not the  condition that he must cultivate land with the consent  of or under authority derived directly from the owner.  To import such a condition is to rewrite the section,  and destroy its practical utility. A person who derives  his right to cultivate land from the owners would  normally be a contractual tenant and he will obviously  not be a "deemed tenant". Persons such as licencees  from the owner may certainly be regarded as falling  within the class of persons lawfully cultivating land  belonging to others, but it cannot be assumed  therefrom that they are the only persons who are  covered by the section. The Act affords protection to all  persons who hold agricultural lands as contractual  tenants and subject to the exceptions specified all  persons lawfully cultivating lands belonging to others,  and it would be unduly restricting the intention of the  legislature to limit the benefit of its provisions to  persons who derive their authority from the owner,  either under a contract of tenancy, or otherwise. In our  view, all persons other than those mentioned in  clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4 who lawfully  cultivate land belonging to other persons whether or  not their authority is derived directly from the owner of  the land must be deemed tenants of the lands".

12.     From a perusal of the aforequoted passage all that is  required for the person to claim the status of a deemed tenant  is that the possession must be lawful, but there is nothing  which would necessitate the payment of rent as a condition  precedent for the creation of a deemed tenancy.  We are  therefore of the opinion that the finding of the High Court with  respect to the deemed tenancy under Issue No.3 is also  erroneous.  13.       This appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the  High Court is set aside and that of the Appellate Authority

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

restored.  There will, however, be no order as to costs.