01 April 1964
Supreme Court
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HOCHTIEF GAMMON Vs INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BHUBANESHWAR, ORISSA AND ORS.

Bench: GAJENDRAGADKAR,P.B. (CJ)
Case number: Appeal Civil 1827 of 1969


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PETITIONER: HOCHTIEF GAMMON

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BHUBANESHWAR, ORISSA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/04/1964

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1964 AIR 1746            1964 SCR  (7) 596  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC1216  (4)  RF         1975 SC2226  (1,7)

ACT: Industrial     Dispute--Addition    and     Summoning     of Parties--Reference-Powers  of Industrial  Tribunal-Test  and Limitation-Whose  liability  to pay Workmen’s  claim-Who  is Employer-Disputes, whether different and  substantial-Indus- trial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Ss., 10, 18.

HEADNOTE: On reference of an industrial Dispute between the appellants and  the respondents, its workmen, the office of the  Indus- trial  Tribunal issued notice not only to the appellant  and ;its  workmen, the respondents but also to  Hindustan  Steel Ltd.   This  was  done  apparently because  a  copy  of  the notification  of  the  Government containing  the  order  of reference  had been served on the said Hindustan Steel  Ltd. The Hindustan Steel Ltd. appeared and urged that it was  not concerned  or  interested in the dispute and should  not  be added  a party to the reference.  The  appellant  contended, inter  alia, that the interests of Hindustan Steel Ltd.  and the  appellant were common in the pending  proceedings,  and the material documents which may have to be proved were with the said concern.  The Tribunal considered the question  and held  that  it would decide the matter later;  meanwhile  it directed Hindustan Steel to be present during the hearing of the   reference   on  merits.   The   appellant,   who   was dissatisfied  with  this  order  as  it  wanted  a  specific direction  to  add  Hindustan  Steel  as  a  party  to   the reference,  moved  the  High Court under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution.   This writ petition failed as the High  Court held that the petition was premature as the Tribunal had not yet passed a final order under Leave: Held:     (i)  S.  18(b) as it originally  stood  postulates that  the Tribunal had an implied power to  summon  parties, other  than parties to the industrial dispute to  appear  in the proceedings before it. (ii) Where  certain points of dispute have been referred  to the  Industrial  Tribunal  for adjudication,  it  may  while dealing  with the said points deal with  matters  incidental

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thereto,  and  than  parties to the  industrial  dispute  to appear  in the proceed the Tribunal feels that some  persons who are not joined to the reference should be brought before it, it may be able to make an order in that behalf under  s. 18 (3)(b) as it now stands. (iii)     Section  10(5)  has  now conferred  power  on  the appropriate  Government  to  add  to  the  reference   other establishments,  groups  or classes of establishments  of  a similar  nature, if it is satisfied that establishments  are likely  to  be interested in, or affected by  such  dispute. The  appropriate  Government  may  add  them  to  the   said reference either at the time when the reference is initially made   or  during  the  pendency  of  the   said   reference proceedings;  but in every case, such additions can be  made before the award is submitted.  Now, if such 597 persons are added to the reference, the Industrial  Tribunal may in exercise of its powers under s. 18 (3)(b) summon them to appear before it. (iv) The material words in s. 18 (3)(b) are the same as they were  originally included in s. 18(b), and so,  the  implied power  which could be exercised by the  Industrial  Tribunal under s. 18(b) can now be exercised by it under s. 18(3)(b). If the Tribunal thinks that the parties who were summoned to appear  before it were so summoned without proper cause,  it may  record its ,opinion to that effect and then  the  award which it pronounces would not be binding on them. (v)  What the Tribunal can consider in addition to the  dis- putes specified in the order of reference, are only  matters incidental to the said disputes and that naturally  suggests certain  obvious  limitations on the implied  power  of  the Tribunal  to  add  parties  to  the  reference  before   it, purporting to exercise its implied power under s.  18(3)(b). If it appears to the Industrial Tribunal that a party  named in the order of reference does not completely or  adequately represent  the  interest either of the employer  or  of  the employee,  it  may  direct  the  joining  of  other  persons necessary  to  represent such interest.   Similarly  if  the union specified in the reference does not represent all  the employees  it may be open to the Tribunal to add such  other unions  as it may deem necessary.  The test always must  be, is  the  addition  of  the  party  necessary  to  make   the adjudication itself effective and enforceable?  It is in the light of this test that the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties must be held to be limited. P.  G.  Brooks, Receiver appointed by the Trustees  for  the mortgagee debenture holders of the Madras Electric  Tramways (1904) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 369, Radhakrishna Mills Ltd., Peelamadu, Coimbatore Ltd.  v. Special  Industrial Tribunal, Madras, A.I.R. 1954  Mad.  606 and  Anil Kumar Upadhaya v. P. K. Sarkar, A.I.R., 1961  Cal. 60, referred to (vi) The  question on whom would rest the liability  to  Pay the  respondents’ claim as a result of contract between  the appellant  and Hindustan Steel raises an entirely  different dispute  and  such dispute would be wholly  foreign  to  the industrial  dispute which has been referred to the  Tribunal for adjudication. (vii)     The question as to who is the employer as  between the  appellant and Hindustan Steel is a substantial  dispute between  them  and cannot be regarded as incidental  in  any sense.   Where the appropriate Government desires  that  the question as to who the employer is should be determined,  it generally  makes  a  reference  in  wide  enough  terms  and includes  as parties to the reference different persons  who

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are alleged to be the employers.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION,:Civil Appeal No. 611 of  1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated January 10, 1962, of the Orissa High Court in O J.C. No. 128 of 1961. 598 N.   C. Chatterjee, G. Narayanaswamy, J. B. Dadachanji, O.   C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. Janardhan Sharma, for respondent No. 2 S.   V.  Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. B. Pai  and R.   H. Dehbar, for respondent No. 3. April 1. 1964.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-The short question which this,  appeal by  special leave raises for our decision is in relation  to the construction of s. 18 (3)(b) of the Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called ’the  Act’). This question arises in this way.  An industrial dispute  in regard  to the payment of bonus arose between the  appellant Hochtief   Gammon   and  the   respondents,   its   workmen, represented  by the Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela.   This dispute  was  referred for adjudication  to  the  Industrial Tribunal,  Orissa  by the Government of Orissa on  the  14th November,  1960.   After the reference was received  by  the Tribunal, it passed an order on the 17th November, 1960 that notice  of  the reference should be issued  to  the  parties concerned.   Purporting  to give effect to this  order,  the office  of  the  Tribunal issued notices  not  only  to  the appellant  and  the  respondents, but  also  to  the  Deputy General  Manager  of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd.  This  was  so done  apparently because a copy of the notification  of  the Government of Orissa containing the order of references  had been  served  on the said Dy.  General Manager.   After  the notice  issued  by  the Tribunal was  received  by  the  Dy. General  Manager  of the Hindustan Steel  Ltd.  he  appeared before the Tribunal and urged that the Hindustan Steel  Ltd. was  not concerned or interested in the dispute  and  should not be added as a party to the reference. Meanwhile, the appellant made an application to the Tribunal on the 21st March, 1961 and contended that the interests  of M/s  Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were  common  in the  proceedings  pending before the Tribunal, and  so,  M/s Hindustan  Steel Ltd. should be joined as a party.  In  this application, the appellant alleged that M/s Hindustan  Steel Ltd.  was a necessary party, because the material  documents which may have to be proved in the proceedings were with the said concern and, in fact, the enquiry in question would not be  complete  without  the said concern being  joined  as  a party.  The Tribunal then considered the question of joining M/s  Hindustan Steel Ltd. as a party and held that it  would decide  the matter later.  Meanwhile, the Tribunal  directed that M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. which had appeared in response to the notice issued to it should remain present during  the hearing of the reference on the merits. 599 This order did not satisfy the appellant, because it  wanted a specific direction from the Tribunal to add M/s  Hindustan Steel  Ltd.  as a party to the reference.  That is  why  the appellant moved the Orissa High Court under Art. 226 of  the Constitution  and  prayed  that  the  order  passed  by  the Tribunal  refusing  to deal with the matter  should  be  set aside  and  M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be joined  as  a

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party  to  the  reference before it.   This  writ  petition, however,  failed, because the High Court took the view  that it  was  premature.   The  High  Court  observed  that   the Industrial  Tribunal had not yet passed a final order  under s.  18(3)(b)  of  the Act, and so,  without  expressing  any opinion  on  the  merits  of  the  controversy  between  the parties,   the  High  Court  treated  the   application   as incompetent   because  it  was  premature.    Against   this decision,  the appellant has come to this Court  by  special leave; and on its behalf, Mr. Chatterjee has contended  that the  Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to add a party  to the  proceedings  before  it and that  on  the  merits,  M/s Hindustan  Steel Ltd. should be added as a necessary  party. That is how the main question which arises for our  decision is to determine the scope and effect of the provisons of  s. 18(3)(b) of the Act. In  dealing with this question, it is necessary to  consider the  provisions  of  s. 18(b) in the Act  as  it  was  first enacted, and then consider the provisions of s. 18(3)(b)  as they  now  stand.   Under  the  original  Act,  section   18 consisted  of  four clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d).   We  are concerned  in  the present appeal with clause (a)  and  (b). Section 18(a) and (b) read thus: -               "A  settlement  arrived at in  the  course  of               conciliation proceedings under this Act, or an               award  which  is declared by  the  appropriate               Government to be binding under sub-section (2)               of section 15 shall be binding on:               (a) all parties to the industrial dispute               (b)  all other parties summoned to  appear  in               the  proceedings  as parties to  the  dispute,               unless the Board of Tribunal, as the case  may               be, records the opinion that they were so sum-               moned without proper cause". The  first  question which we have to consider  is,  did  s. 18(b),  as it then stood, postulate an implied power in  the Tribunal  to add persons as parties to the  proceedings  who are other than those who were parties to the industrial dis- pute?   It  will be noticed that clause (a)  refers  to  all parties to the industrial dispute, whereas clause (b) refers to  all other parties summoned to appear.  The word  "other" seems to suggest that the parties summoned to appear to whom clause 600 (b)  refers  are  not  identical with  the  parties  to  the industrial  dispute specified by clause (a) Section 2(k)  of the  Act  defines an ’industrial dispute’,  inter  alia,  as meaning  any  dispute or difference  between  employers  and workmen;  so  that parties to the industrial  dispute  under clause  (a) would mean persons between whom the dispute  has arisen  as  prescribed  by  s.  2(k),  and  so,  clause  (b) contemplates  persons other than those who are actually  and directly involved in the dispute which is the subject-matter of  reference  under section 10.  Thus, s.  18(b)  seems  to contemplate   that  persons  other  than  parties   to   the industrial dispute may be summoned before the Tribunal. That  takes  us to the question as to who can  summon  these parties’?  Section 11(3) of the Act prescribes, inter  alia, that  the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are  vested in  a  Civil Court under the Code of Civil  Procedure,  when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (d); clause (a) refers to enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; cl. (b) has  reference to  the  power  to compel the production  of  documents  and material   objects;  cl.  (c)  is  in  respect  of   issuing

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commissions for the examination of witnesses; and clause (d) is  in respect of such other matters as may  be  prescribed. It  is  thus  clear ’chat the power to add a  party  to  the proceedings pending before a Tribunal which may be exercised under  the  Code of Civil Procedure under 0.1 r. 10  is  not included  in s. 11(3), and there is no other  section  which confers such a power on the Tribunal Therefore, if s.  18(b) contemplates   that  persons  other  than  parties  to   the industrial  dispute  can be summoned, there is  no  specific provision  conferring power on the Tribunal to summon  them, and that inevitably suggests that the power must be read  as being implicit in s. 18(b) itself. In this connection, it is necessary  to refer to s. 10 as it then  stood.  Section 10(1) then consisted of three  clauses which read thus: - "If  any  industrial dispute exists or is  apprehended,  the appropriate Government may, by order in writings:-               (a)   refer   the  dispute  to  a  Board   for               promoting a settlement thereof; or               (b)   refer   any  matter  appearing   to   be               connected with or relevant to the dispute to a               Court for inquiry; or               (c)   refer   the  dispute  to  Tribunal   for               adjudication". It is significant that so far as the reference to the Tribu- nal is concerned, s. 10(1)(c) empowered the appropriate Gov- ernment  to  refer the dispute to the Tribunal,  and  unlike clause  (b), this clause did not take within its  sweep  any matter 601 appearing  to be connected with or relevant to the  dispute; so  that  in  regard to the power  to  refer  an  industrial dispute to the Government Tribunal for its adjudication, the appropriate Government could make a reference of the dispute itself and was not expressly clothed with the power to refer any  matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant  to, such  a  dispute.  The result of these  relevant  provisions clearly  seems to be that if the Industrial Tribunal,  while dealing  with an industrial dispute, came to the  conclusion that  persons other than those mentioned as parties  to  the industrial dispute were necessary for a valid  determination of the said dispute, it had the power to summon them; and if such persons were summoned to appear in the proceedings, the award that the Industrial Tribunal may ultimately  pronounce would be binding on them.  Since in cases where persons were added  as  parties to an industrial dispute were  likely  to raise the question as to whether the joinder of the  parties was  justified or not, s. ’18(b) required that the  Tribunal should  record its opinion as to whether these  persons  had been  summoned without proper cause.  Thus, we are  inclined to take the view that Mr. Chatterjee is right in  contending that  s. 18(b) as it ,originally stood, postulates that  the Tribunal had an implied power to summon parties, other  than parties  to  the  industrial  dispute,  to  appear  in   the proceedings  before it.  That naturally raises the  question about the extent of this power. In  dealing with this question, it is necessary to  bear  in mind  one  essential fact, and that is that  the  Industrial Tribunal  is  a  Tribunal  of  limited  jurisdiction.    Its jurisdiction is to try an industrial dispute referred to  it for  its  adjudication by the appropriate Government  by  an order  of reference passed under s. 10.  It is not  open  to the  Tribunal  to  travel materially  beyond  the  terms  of reference,  for  it  is  well-settled  that  the  terms   of reference determine the scope of its power and  jurisdiction

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from case to case.  Section 10 itself has been  subsequently amended from time to time.  Act 18 of 1952 made  substantial amendments  in s. 10.  One of these amendments was  that  s. 10(1)(d)  now empowers the appropriate Government  to  refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant  to, the dispute, whether it relates to any  matter specified in the Second Schedule, or the Third Schedule,  to a  Tribunal  for  adjudication.  In other  words.  under  s. 10(1)(d),  the  appropriate  Government  can  refer  to  the Industrial Tribunal not only a specific industrial  dispute, but  can  also refer along with it matters appearing  to  be connected  with, or relevant to, the said dispute.  In  that sense.  the  power of the appropriate  Government  has  been enlarged  in regard to the reference of industrial  disputes to the Tribunal. 602 Section 10(4) which was also added by the same amending  Act provides,  inter alia, that the jurisdiction of  the  Indus- trial  Tribunal would be confined to the points  of  dispute specified by the order of reference, and adds that the  said jurisdiction may take within its sweep matters incidental to the  said points.  In other words, where certain  points  of dispute  have been referred to the Industrial  Tribunal  for adjudication,  it may, while dealing with the  said  points, deal  with natters incidental thereto, and that  means  that if, while dealing with such incidental matters, the Tribunal feels that some persons who are not joined to the  reference should be brought before it, it may be able to make an order in that behalf under s. 18(3)(b) as it now stands. Section  10(5)  has now conferred power on  the  appropriate Government  to add to, the reference  other  establishments, groups or classes of establishments of a similar nature,  if it  is satisfied that these establishments are likely to  be interested  in,  or  affected by, such  dispute.   In  other words,  if industrial dispute is referred to a Tribunal  for adjudication, and in area within the territorial jurisdicton of the appropriate Government there are other establishments which  would  be  affected  by, or  interested  in,  such  a dispute, the appropriate Government may add them to the said reference either at the time when the reference is initially made,   or  during  the  pendency  of  the  said   reference proceedings;  but in every case, such additions can be  made before  the  award is submitted.  Now, if such  persons  are added  to  the  reference, the industrial  Tribunal  may  in exercise  of  its powers under s. 18(3)(b)  summon  them  to appear before it. Section 18(b) with which we began, has also been amended  by Act  36  of  1956, and it has now  been  renumbered.   As  a result.  s. 18(b) is now included in s.  18(3)(b).   Section 18(3)  provides,  inter- alia, that an award  passed  by  an Industrial  Tribunal which has become enforceable  shall  be binding on:               (a)   all parties to the industrial disputes;               (b)   all other parties summoned to appear  in               the  proceedings  as parties to  the  dispute,               unless the, Tribunal records the opinion  that               they were so called without proper cause. The material words in s. 18(3)(b) are the same as they  were originally  included in s.18(b), and so, the  implied  power which could be exercised by the Industrial Tribunal under s. 18(b) can now be exercised by it under s. 18(3)(b).  If the, Tribunal thinks that the parties who were summoned to appear before  it  were so summoned without proper  cause,  it  may record  its opinion to that effect and then the award  which it’. pronounces would not be binding on them.

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603 Reverting then to the question as to the effect of the power which is implied in s. 18(3)(b), it is clear that this power cannot  be  exercised  by  the Tribunal  so  as  to  enlarge materially  the  scope  of  the  reference  itself,  because basically  the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with  an industrial  dispute  is -derived solely from  the  order  of reference  passed  by the appropriate  Government  under  s. 10(1).   What the Tribunal can consider in addition  to  the disputes  specified  in  the order of  reference,  are  only matters, incidental to the said disputes; and that naturally suggests certain obvious limitations on the implied power of the  Tribunal  to add parties to the  reference  before  it, purporting to exercise its implied power under s.  18(3)(b). If it appears to the Tribunal that a party to the industrial dispute named in the order of reference does not  completely or  adequately represent the interest either on the side  of the employer, or on the side of the employee, it may  direct that  other persons should be joined who would be  necessary to  represent  such interest.  If the employer  named  in  a reference  does  not fully represent the  interests  of  the employer  as such, other persons who are interested  in  the undertaking  of the employer may be joined.   Similarly,  if the  unions specified in the reference do not represent  all the  employees  of the undertaking, it may be  open  to  the Tribunal to add such other unions as it may deem  necessary. The  test  always  must be, is the  addition  of  the  party necessary  to  make the adjudication  itself  effective  and enforceable?   In other words, the test well be,  would  the non-joinder  of the party make the  arbitration  proceedings ineffective  and unenforceable?  It is in the light of  this test  that the implied power of the Tribunal to add  parties must be held to be limited. This  question has been considered by the Madras High  Court in  two  reported  decisions.  In  P.  G.  Brooks,  Receiver appointed by the Trustees for the mortgage debenture holders of  the Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. v.  The  Indus- trial Tribunal, Madras & Ors.,(1) the Division Bench of  the said High Court has held that s. 18(b) by necessary implica- tion gives power to the Tribunal to add parties.  It can add necessary  or proper party.  He need not be the employer  or the employee.  In that particular case, the party added  was the  Receiver and it was found that unless the Receiver  was added as a party to the reference proceedings, the adjudica- tion itself would become ineffective.  In the words used  by the judgement, the party added was not a rank outsider or  a disinterested spectator, but was a Receiver who was  vitally concerned with the proceedings before the Tribunal and whose presence was necessary to make the ultimate award effective, valid and enforceable. (1)  A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 369. 604 In Radhakrishna Mills Ltd.  Peelamedu, Coimbatore Dt. v. The Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Ors.(1) a single Judge of  the  Madras High Court followed  the  earlier  decision, though in this case, a party that was summoned by the Tribu- nal had been added to the reference by the State  Government under s. 10(5) of the Act. In  Anil  Kumar  Upadhaya  v. V. P.  K.  Sarkar  &  Ors.(2), learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has accepted the  same view.  In that case, the Trustee of the  Provident Fund  in question who had not been impleaded  originally  to the  reference were summoned by the Tribunal and  the  Court held  that in the absence of the Trustees, the  award  would have become nugatory.  It would be noticed that in all these

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decisions,  the implied power of the Tribunal to summon  ad- ditional  parties in the reference proceedings  is  confined only  to cases where such addition appeared to be  necessary for  making the reference complete and the  award  effective and enforceable.  Such a power cannot be exercised to extend the scope of the reference and to bring in matters which are not  the subject-matter of the reference and which  are  not incidental to the dispute which has been referred. That takes us to the question as to whether the appellant is justified  in contending that M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is  a necessary  party to the present proceedings before  the  in- dustrial Tribunal, and should, therefore, be added as  such. Mr.  Chatterji has raised two contentions in support of  his plea  that  M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a  necessary  party. The first contention is that if it is ultimately found  that the  respondent’s claim for bonus for the relevant  year  is well  foundecd  as  a result of  the  contract  between  the appellant  and M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd the liability to  pay the  said  bonus would rest, with the said concern  and  not with   the   appellant.    The   appellant,   according   to Mr.Chatterjee,  is  a  firm constituted only  for  a  single venture  for  undertaking  the  execution  of  the  work  of construction  and foundation and civil engineering works  at Rourkela:  it  has been engaged by the said concern  of  M/s Hindustan  Steel  Ltd. as its agent and in  that  behalf  an agreement  has  been  executed  between  the  parties.   Mr. Chatterjee  referred us to some of the relevant  clauses  of this agreement in support of his plea that the liability for bonus,  if  established  by  the  respondents  against   the appellant, would be not the appellant’s but of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd.  We do not propose to examine the merits of  this contention,  because  we  are satisfied  that  even  if  Mr. Chatterjee’s contention is well-founded by reference to  the relevant clauses of the agreement between the parties,  that cannot  make  M/s  Hindustan Steel Ltd.  a  necessary  party within the meaning of s. 18(3)(b). (1) A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 606. (2) A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 60. 605 This contention raises an entirely different dispute between the  appellant and its alleged principal and such a  dispute would be wholly foreign to the industrial dispute which  has In been referred to the Tribunal for its adjudication. The  next  contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee is  that  M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party because it is the, said  concern which is the employer of the  respondents  and not the appellant.  In either words, this contention is that though  in form the appellant engaged the workmen  whom  the respondent union represents, the appellant was actingas  the agent  of  its  principal  and  for  adjudicating  upon  the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal by the State  of Orissa,  it  is  necessary that  the  principal,  viz.,  M/s Hindustan  Steel  Ltd.  ought to be added as  a  party.   In dealing with this argument, it is necessary to bear in  mind the fact that the appellant does not dispute the  respondent Union’s   case  that  the  workmen  were  employed  by   the appellant.  It would have been open to the State  Government to  ask  the Tribunal to consider who was  the  employer  of these workmen and in that case, the terms of reference might have been suitably framed.  Where the appropriate Government desires  that the question as to who the employer is  should be determined, it generally makes a reference in wide enough terms  and  includes as parties to the  reference  different persons who are alleged to be the employers.  Such a  course has not been adopted in the present proceedings, and so,  it

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would not be possible to hold that the question as to who is the  employer  as between the appellant  and  M/s  Hindustan Steel  Ltd.  is  a, question incidental  to  the  industrial dispute  which  has  been referred under  s.  10(1)(d)  This dispute  is a substantial dispute between the appellant  and M/s   Hindustan  Steel  Ltd.  and  cannot  be  regarded   as incidental  in  any sense, and so, we think that  even  this ground is not sufficient to justify the contention that  M/s Hindustan  Steel  Ltd. is a, necessary party  which  can  be added and summoned under the implied powers of the  Tribunal under s. 18(3)(b). The  result is, though we accept Mr.  Chatterjee’s  argument that  s.  18(3)(b) postulates the existence  of  an  implied power in the Tribunal to add parties and summon them, in the present case that power cannot be exercised, because  having regard  to  the  limited nature of the  implied  power,  M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. cannot be regarded as a necessary party under the provisions of s. 18(3)(b).  The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.                                    Appeal dismissal. 606