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PETITIONER: HIMAT LAL K. SHAH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, AHMEDABAD & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/09/1972

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) RAY, A.N. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

CITATION:  1973 AIR   87            1973 SCR  (2) 266  1973 SCC  (1) 227  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1973 SC 106  (140)  D          1974 SC1940  (46)  RF         1975 SC1505  (2)  R          1989 SC1988  (31)

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950, Arts. 19(1) (a), (b) and  (d)- Right of citizens to hold public meetings on public streets- If fundamental right. Bombay  Police  Act, 1951, s. 33(1) (O) and r.  7  of  Rules framed   thereunder-Rule  requiring  prior  permission   for holding  meetings-Rules  if  ultra  vires  section-Rule,  if violates fundamental rights.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  whose application for permission to  hold  a public meeting on a public street was rejected contended  in a writ petition in the High Court, (1) that the rules framed by  the  first respondent under s.33(1) (O)  of  the  Bombay police Act. 1951,  were ultra vires section in that the sub- section does not authorise framing of rules requiring  prior permission for holding meetings and (2) that the sub-section and  the  rules  were violative of  the  fundamental  rights guaranteed  under art.19(1) (a)and (b) of the  constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition. HELD  : (per Curiam) : Rule 7 of the rules is  void.  [283F; 293E; 299D] (Per   S.  M.Sikri,  C.J.,  A.N.   Ray  and  P.   Jaganmohan Reddy,JJ): (1)The  impugned rules are not ultra vies s/33 (1)  in  so far  as they require prior permission for holding  meetings, [280B-C] Sub-section 33 (1) (0) proceeds on the basis that the public has a right to hold assemblies and take processions on  and, along  sawn though It is necessary to regulate  the  conduct and  behaviour  or  action  of’  persons  constituting  such assemblies  or processions in order to safeguard the  rights of citizens and in order to preserve public order.  The word ’regulate’  would  include  the  power  to  prescribe   that

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permission in writing should be taken a few days before  the holding of a meeting on a public street.  The impugned rules do  not prohibit the holding of meetings but only  prescribe that permission should be taken. [275B-E] (2)(a)  Section 33(1) (0) does not violate Art.  19(1)  (b), and  Art.  19(i) (a) is not attracted to the facts  of  ’the case.  The dub-section has nothing to do with the  formation of assemblies and processions but only deals with persons as members  of  assemblies  and  processions.   The  subsection enables  the  Commissioner  to make rules  to  regulate  the assemblies and processions.  Without such rules, in  crowded public streets, it would be impossible for citizens to enjoy their  various rights.  Indeed, the section may be  said  to have been enacted in aid of the rights under Art. 19 (1)  (a) and 19(1) (d). [281B-D] (b)It  could not be contended by the ’respondent  that  as under the Common Law of England no one has a right to hold a meeting  on a highway, and the same law prevails  in  India. and therefore, the word ’regulate’ means a right to prohibit the  holding  of  a meeting also.  In  India,  the  law  has developed  on  slightly different lines, and  a  citizen  in India had, before the Constitution, a right to hold meetings on public streets subject to the control of the appropriate authority  regarding the time and place of the meetings  and subject to considerations of public 267 order  While  prior  to  the  coming into  force  of   the Constitution, the right to assemble could have been abridged or  taken  away by law, after the coming into force  of  the Constitution,  the  right  cannot  be  abridged  except   by imposing reasonable restrictions.  There is nothing wrong in requiring  prior permission to be obtained before holding  a public  meeting a public street, for the Tight  which  flows from  Art. 19(1)(b) is not a right to hold a meeting at  any place and time.  But, the State can only make regulations in aid  of the right of assembly of each citizen and  can  only impose  reasonable  restrictions in the interest  of  public order. in the present case, however, r. 7 does not give  any guidance  to the officer authorised by the  Commissioner  of Police  as  to  the circumstances in  which  he  can  refuse permission to hold a public meeting.  The officer cannot  be expected  to read the marginal note to s. 33 or to  look  at the  scheme of the Act to spell out the limitations  on  his discretion.   Therefore, the rule, which  confers  arbitrary powers  on the authorised officer must be struck down.   The other  rules  which  merely  lay  down  the  procedure   for obtaining   permission  cannot  survive,  but,  it  is   not necessary  to  strike them down, for, ’without  r.  7,  they cannot operate.  Rule’s 14 and 15 deal both with processions and  public  meetings  and  their validity,  in  so  far  as processions  are concerned, is not affected. [281D-G;  282H; 283A-C] Parthasaradiayyangar-  v.  Chinnakrishna  Ayyangar,   I.L.R. [1882] 5 Mad. 304, Sundram Chetti v. The Queen I.L.R. [1883] 6 Mad. 203, Sudagopachariar v. A. Rama Rao, I.L.R. [1903] 26 Mad.  376, Vijiraghava Chariar v. Emperor, I.L.R. [1903]  26 Mad,  554 Hasan v. Muhameed Zaman, 52 J.A. 61, Chandu  Sajan Patil v. Nyahalchand, A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 192, Shaikh Piru  Bux v. Kalandi Pati, (Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1966 dated  October 29,  1968,  Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., [1955]  1  S.C.R. 107,  C.S.S.  Motor  Service v. State of  Madras,  [1952]  2 M.L.J. 894, Railway Board v. Narinjan Singh, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 548,  Babulal Parata v. State of Maharashtra, [1961]  S.C.R. 423, Cox v. Louisiana, 13 L. Ed. 21, 471, Hagua v. C.I.O. 83 L. Ed. 1423, Blackwell’s Law of Meetings (9th Edn. P.  5)

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and Dicey’s Law of the Constitution (10th Ed.) p.p.  271-72, referred to, (Per  K. K. Mathew J.): (1) What s. 33 (1) (O)  provides  is making of rules  for regulating’ the conduct and  behaviour, or  action  of persons constituting  assemblies.   The  sub- section  presupposes, an assembly and authorises the  making of  rules for ’regulating’ the conduct, behaviour or  action of the persons who arc members thereof.  A power to regulate implies  the  continued  existence of that which  is  to  be regulated.  The power normally doe,, not include a power  to prohibit.  The juxtaposition, of the words ’regulating’  and ’prohibiting’  in s. 33 (1) (x) and the express rant  of  a power to prohibit to the rule making authority in s. 33  (1) (p)  and (q) indicate that the context in which r. 7  occurs shows  that a power to prohibit is not contemplated  by  the power  to regulate.  But r. 7 impliedly gives power  to  the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold a public meeting.   Therefore,  r. 7 is ultra vires s.  33  (1)  (0). [285B-E, F-H] Toronto  v. Virgo [1896] A.C. 88, Ontario v.  Canada  [1896] A.C.  348 and Birmingam and Midland Motor Motor Omnibus  Co. Ltd. v. Worcestershire County Council, [1967] 1 W.L.R.  409, referred to. (2)Also  the  right  to hold public meeting  in  a  public street  is  a  fundamental right and r. 7,  which  gives  an unguided discretion dependent on the subjective whim of  the authority  to  grant or refuse permission to,  hold  such  a meeting, cannot be held to be valid. [293E] Freedom of assembly is an essential element of a  democratic system.  The basic assumption in a democratic polity is that Government shall 268 based  on the consent of the governed.  But the  consent  of the governed implies not only that the consent shall be free but  also that it shall be grounded on adequate  information and  discussion.   At  the root of  this  concept  lies  the citizens  right  to meet face to face with  others  for  the ,discussion of their ideas and problems, and public  streets are  the  ’natural’  places for expression  of  opinion  and dissemination of ideas. [291E-H] Public procession are prima facie legal but a public meeting is  not  one  of  the uses  for  which  highways  have  been dedicated.  Public meeting in open places and public streets form’&  part of the tradition of our national life.  In  the pro-Independence  days such meetings have been held in  open spaces and public streets and the people have come to regard it as a part of the privileges and immunities.  The  framers of  the  Constitution were aware that public  meetings  were being  held in public streets and that the public have  come to  regard  it as part of their. rights  and  privileges  as citizens,  perhaps erroneously, but this error was  grounded on the solid substratum of continued practice over the years and communist error farit jus.  In the U.S. also the  basis of’  a  citizens  privilege to use  streets  and  parks  for communication of views, was the continued de facto  exercise of the right over a number of years, and fundamental  rights in  India  of free speech and assembly are modelled  on  the Bill  of  Rights of the U.S. Constitution.   But  a.  public meeting  will be a nuisance if it appreciably obstructs  the road.   The real problem is reconciling the city’s  function of  providing for the. exigencies of traffic in its  streets and for the recreation of the public in its parks, with  its other  obligations of providing adequate places  for  public discussion  in  order to safeguard the guaranteed  right  of public  assembly.   The state and local authorities  have  a

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virtual.  monopoly of every open space at which  an  outdoor meeting  can be held, and they can close the street-,,  ,and park,,  entirely  to public meetings, the  practical  result would  be that it would be impossible to hold  any  open-air meetings  in  any  large  city.  and  the  conferment  of  a fundamental  right of public assembly would then  become  an exercise in futility. [290A-C-; 292A-H] However,  the power of the appropriate authority--to  impose reasonable  regulations, in order to assure the  safety  and convenience of the people in the use of public highways  has never  been  regarded as inconsistent with  the  fundamental right  of  assembly.  A system of licensing as  regards  the time  and  the manner of holding public meetings  on  public streets  will  not  be regarded as  an  abridgement  of  the fundamental  right of public assembly or of free  speech  if definite standards are provided by the law for the  guidance of  the  licensing  authority.  But ’in r. 7,  there  is  no mention  of  the  reasons for which  an  application  for  a licence  can be rejected.  The vesting of  such  unregulated discretionary power in a licensing authority has a ways been considered is bad. [293B-D] Saghir  Ahmad  v’  The State of U.P. and, Others,  [1965]  1 S.C.R.  707,  Ex-parte Laws, [1888] 21 Q.B.D. 191,  Reg.  v. Cuninghame Craham and Burns, (1886-90) Cox’s Cr.  Law Cases, Vol. 16. 420, [1912] 2 Car s. 674, 677, Gill v., Carson  and Nield,  [1917]  2 K.B. 674, 677, De Morgan  v.  Metropolitan Board  of Works, [1880] 5 Q.B.D, 155, Beatty  v.  Gillhanks. [1882] 9 Q.B.D. 308 Burden v. Rigler and another (1911) L.R. I K.B. 377. Harrison v. Duke of Ratland, (1893) 1 Q.B.  142, Manzur  Hasan  v. Muhammad Zaman 52 I.A.  61,  Chandu  Salan Patil  v.  Nyahal  Chand A.I.R. 1950 Bom.  192,  Lowdens  v. Keaveney, (1903) 2 I.R. 82, Davis v. Messachusetts. 167 U.S. 43  (1097) Hague v., C.I.O. 307,U.S. 496, Kunz v. New  York, 340  U.S.  290 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,  394  U.S.  147, Express  Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and Another v. The  Union of India and Others, [1959] S.C.R. 12, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 208, NAACR v. 269 Button,  371  U.S. 415 (1968), Dicey’s Law  of  Constitution (10th  Ed.) pp. 271-72, Halsbury’s Law of England  (Hailsham Ed.)  Vol.  16  p. 362 Public Meetings  and  Processions  by Goodhart,  Cambridge Law of Journal (1936-38), Vol.  6,  171 referred to. (Per M. H. Beg, J.): (1) In view of the definition of public street in s. 2(15) of the Bombay Police Act, which is  wider than the commonly accepted meaning of a ’public street’  and the  purposes  for which it is deemed to be  dedicated,  the public  can  hold  a meeting at a place  falling  under  the definition   of  street.   The  term  ’public  meeting’   is generally used for a gathering of persons who stand or  take their  seats at a particular place so as to be addressed  by somebody.  ;Such  a  meeting, if held  on  a  highway,  must necessarily interfere with the user of the highway by others who want to use it for the purpose for which the highway  is dedicated.  If this is so, the Commissioner of Police  could be  authorised to regulate it in the manner contemplated  by r.  7,  provided there are  sufficient  safeguards,  against misuse of such a power. [297C-E; 298E-G] (2)In  the matter of holding public: meetings on a  public street  the  law in India is not different from  the  law  n England.   There is no separate. right of  ’public  meeting’ let  alone  a constitutional fundamental right  attached  to public  streets  which  are  dedicated  for  the  particular purpose  of.  passing and repassing.  Any recognition  of  a right to hold a meeting will obviously be inconsistent  with

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the  purpose  for  which public streets  ire  dedicated.   A meeting held on a highway will not necessarily be  ’illegal. it may be sanctioned by custom or rest on permission; but  a mere  erroneous  assumption can never form the  basis  of  a right  unless buttressed by something stronger.  It is  also true  that there is a well recognised right of  taking,  out processions on public thoroughfares in India as an  incident of the well-. understood right of their user by the  public. But,  the right to take out a procession is  different  from the  right  to hold a public meeting and the,  former  could root  be converted and expanded into the latter.  The  right to hold a public meeting may be linked with or even flow out of  rights  under Art. 19(1) (a) and (b), yet the  right  to hold a meeting at a particular. place must rest on the proof of  user  of that place for the exercise of  a,  fundamental right  and, the right to such a user must be established  in each  particular case quite apart from and independently  of the fundamental, rights, guaranteed by Art. 19(1).  The  law in U.S. as laid down in Hague v. C.I.O. (307 U.S. 496)  also appears to be that whatever rights can be properly exercised by  members  of the public on a public thoroughfare  may  be exercised there but the others could be exercised in a  park where  a  public  meeting could  be  held.   Even  otherwise whatever  may be the law in U.S., there is no authority  for the  proposition  that there is an  unconditional  right  of holding a public meeting at every public place, much less on a  public  thoroughfare or street in India  as  a  necessary incident of the. fundamental rights either of free speech or of assembly. [294D-G; 295B-D297E-H] Although,  the  right to hold a public meeting at  a  public place  may not be a fundamental right by itself, yet, it  is so closely connected with fundamental rights that a power to regulate  it  should  not be left in a  nebulous  state.  it should  be hedged round with sufficient  safeguards  against its misuse even if it is to be exercised by the Commissioner of  Police.   But,  r.  7 is so  worded  as  to  enable  the Commissioner  to give or refuse permission to hold a  public meeting  at  a  place failing within the  definition  of  "a street"  without  giving reasons for either a refusal  or  a permission.  it will, therefore. be possible for him,  under the  guise  of powers given by this rule.  to  discriminate. when  the rule does not indicate the circumstances in  which permission  may be given or refused.  The rule of  law  that the  Constitution  contemplates  demands  the  existence  of adequate means to check posibili- 270 ties of misuse of every kind of power lodged in officials of the  St-ate.  Therefore, the rule should be struck  down  as contravening Art. 14, although, if the repercussions on  the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) and (b) were also  taken into  account,  it could be struck down as  an  unreasonable restriction on those rights as well. [298G-H; 299A-G] Saghir  Ahmmed  v.   State of U.P., A.I.R.  1954  S.C.  720, Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Shri Mahadeoji Maharaj,  [1965] 2  S.C.R. 242, Lakshmidhar Misra & Ors. v.  Bengalal  A.I.R. 1950  P.C. 56 Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Ed.) Vol.  19, p. 73 Blackwell’s Law of Meetings (9th Ed.) p. 5 and Dicey’s Law of Constitution (10th Ed.) pp. 271-72, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 1970. Appeal  by  certificate from the judgment and  order  dated

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December 12, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad  in Special Criminal Application No. 42 of 1969. M.   K. Ramamurthi, J. Ramamurthy, for the appellant. B.   Sen, P. Ramesh and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents. The  Judgment of Sikri C.J., Ray and Jaganmohan  Reddy,  JJ. was delivered by Sikri, C.J. Mathew, and Beg, JJ.  delivered separate opinions. Sikri,  C.J.  This  appeal by  certificate  granted  by  the Gujarat  High Court raises an important question as  to  the right of citizens in India to hold public meetings on public streets,  and the restrictions which can be placed  on  that right. On August 30, 1969 the appellant made an application to  the Police  Commissioner,  Ahmedabad, for permission to  hold  a public  meeting near Panch Kuva Darwaja, Ahmedabad, on  Sep- tember 4, 1969 at 8.00 p.m. in connection with the All India students’ strike sponsored by All India Students Federation, to be organised on September 5, 1969. On  September 2, 1969, this permission was  refused  because the  "application was not sent 5 days before the day of  the meeting  as required by notification of the Commissioner  of Police, No. 982/66 dated February 15, 1966.  "The  appellant was  also informed that "holding a meeting with  or  without loudspeaker, without the permission, amounts to an offence." On  August 30, 1969 the appellant had also applied for  per- mission to hold another public meeting on September 5, 1969. The Deputy Police Commissioner informed him on September  2. 1969,  that the permission "cannot be granted inasmuch as  a meeting  was  held  on 7-8--69 under  a  similar  permission whereafter  certain elements had indulged in rioteering  and caused mischief to private and public properties,  regarding which a crime 271 also  has been registered".  He was also informed  that  "in view  of the present position, it is not possible  to  grant such permission in order to maintain law and order." He  was further asked to note that "holding meeting with or  without a loudspeaker without permission amounts to an offence." The  appellant thereupon filed a petition under Art. 226  of the Constitution, on September 3, 1969, praying inter alia.               (1)   to quash the orders mentioned above;               (2)   to declare s.33(o) read with s.33(y)  of               the Bombay Police Act (hereinafter called  the               Act) void;               (3)   to  declare the rules Nos. 7 to  11,  14               and 15 of the Rules for Processions and Public               Meetings  hereinafter called the Rules)  void;               and               (4)   to  declare  that  the  petitioner   was               entitled to hold public meetings on  September               4,   1969  and  September  5,   1969   without               obtaining permission from the respondent. By the time the case was heard, the two impugned orders  had become  infructuous  by  lapse of  time.   The  High  Court, however.  examined  the other contentions raised  before  it because  it  felt  that  the  organization,  of  which   the appellant was an office bearer, had to organise meetings  on a  number  of  occasions  and every  time  the  question  of applying for permission would arise. The relevant statutory provisions that applied to  Ahmedabad are as follows : Bombay Police Act, 1951               "33(1)  The  Commissioner  and  the   District               Magistrate,  in areas under  their  respective               charges  or any part thereof, may make,  alter

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             or  rescind rules or orders  not  inconsistent               with this Act for;               (n)licensing,  controlling or, in order  to               prevent   the   obstruction,    inconvenience,               annoyance,  risk,  danger or  damage  of   the               residents  or  passengers  in  the   vicinity,               prohibiting the playing of music, the  beating               of  drums, tom-toms or other  instruments  and               blowing  or sounding of horns or  other  noisy               instruments  in  or  near  streets  or  public               places;               (o)regulating the conduct of and  behaviour               or  action of persons constituting  assemblies               and  processions on or along the  streets  and               prescribing  in the case of  processions.  the               routes  by which, the order in which  and  the               times at which the same may pass;               *   *    *    *   *    *               272               (y)prescribing the procedure in  accordance               with which any licence or permission sought to               be obtained or required under this Act  should               be  applied  for  and fixing the  fees  to  be               charged for any such licence or permission." In  exercise  of the powers, conferred by Clauses  (n),  (o) and.  (y)  of sub-section (1) of Section 33  of  the  Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bom.  Act XXII of 1951) read with  Section 4  of the Bombay State Commissioners of Police Act  of  1959 (Bom.   Act  LVI  of  1959),  the  Commissioner  of  Police, Ahmedabad City, with the previous sanction of the Government of Gujarat, made the following rules for conduct,  behaviour and action of persons desirous of conducting processions  or holding or convening public meetings in the areas covered by the Commissionerate of Police, Ahmedabad City.  Rules (1) to (6) deal with processions.  Rule (6) may be reproduced.               "6.   Subject  to  the,  provisions   of   the               foregoing rules and subject to the  imposition               of such conditions as may be deemed necessary,               a  permission  shall be  granted,  unless  the               officer concerned is of opinion that the  pro-               cession proposed to be organised or taken  out               shall  be prohibited, in which case  he  shall               forth with refer the application together with               his  report  thereon  for the  orders  of  the               Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City.               No permission shall be required for a bonafide               religious or marriage procession consisting of               less  than  100 or a funeral procession  of  a               person who has died a natural death." Rules  (7)  to (13) deal with holding  of  public  meetings. Rule (14) and Rule (15) apply to both processions and public meeting.  Rules (7), (8), (9), (11) and (14) are  reproduced below.   Rule  (15)  makes the  infringment   of  rules  and conditions punishable. .lm15 "   (7).   No public meeting with  or  without  loudspeaker, shall be- held on the public street within the  jurisdiction of the Commissionerate of the Police, Ahmedabad City  unless the  necessary permission in writing has been obtained  from the officer authorised by the Commissioner of Police. (8). The,  application for permission shall be made  in writing  and  shall be signed by the persons who  intend  to organise or promote such a meeting. 2 7 3 (9). The  application  shall  be made  to  the  officer

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authorised  to issue permission not less than 5 days  before the time, at which the public meeting is to start. (11). The  applicant or his representative shall  remain present  during  the  Public  Meeting  with  the  permission granted to him and shall produce the same for inspection  by any Police Officer whenever required. (14). The  organiser or organisers of the procession  or the  public  meeting shall on demand furnish a  security  of such  amount as fixed by the Commissioner of Police  or  any officer  authorised  by the Commissioner of police  in  this behalf,  for  the due observance of the  conditions  of  the permission." Before the High Court, it was urged on behalf of the  appel- lant as follows : "  (1).  Sub-clause (o) of section 3 3 ( 1 ) of  the  Bombay Police  Act does not empower the Commissioner of  Police  to frame rules requiring any person to obtain prior  permission for holding a meeting and the rule so framed is in excess of the rule making power and is Consequently invalid. (2)Sub-clause  (0) of Section 33(1) of the  Bombay  Police Act  suffers  from  the  vice  of  excessive  delegation  of legislative powers, and is ultra vires Article 14 in that it confers  uncontrolled,  naked and arbitrary  powers  on  the Commissioner of Police to grant or refuse permission at  his sweet  will  and pleasure without laying  down  any  guiding principles. (3)Sub-clause  (o) of section 33(1) and the  Rules  framed thereunder  are ultra vires Articles 19(1) (a) and 1 9  (11) (b)  inasmuch  as they put a total ban  on  the  fundamental rights  of  freedom  of  speech  and  freedom  to   assemble peaceably;  and  even  if  it be held  that  the  rules  put restriction on the exercise of the said fundamental  rights, the same are unreasonable." The  High Court held, regarding the first ground,  that  the word  ’regulating’ "implies prohibition and, therefore,  the rule  providing  for prior permission which may  enable  the commissioner  of  Police to prohibit a meeting  from  taking place  would  fall  within the ambit  of  clause  (o).   The provision  contained  in clause (y) would  not  abridge  the meaning of the word ’regulating’ in clause (o)." 19-L348Sup C.I./73 274 The second contention was repelled by the High Court on  the ground   that  "a  detailed  examination  of   the   various provisions   of  the  Act  clearly  indicates   the   policy underlying  the  Act  and provides  clear  guidance  to  the officers  who  have  to exercise  powers  of  framing  Rules conferred onthem."  The  High  Court  observed  that  "it cannot besaid  that clause (o) confers naked,  uncontrolled and arbitrary powers on the Commissioner of Police to  grant or refuse permission at his sweet will and pleasure." Regarding  the third ground it was held that the  Rules  im- posed  reasonable  restrictions  and were  covered  by  Art. 19(2). The  learned counsel for the appellant submitted  before  us the following propositions :- (1)  Rules 7, 13. 14 and 15 promulgated by the  Commissioner of   Police  on October 21, 1965 are ultra vires section  33 (1) (o) of     the  Bombay Police Act, 1951, as in force  in Gujarat, inasmuch has    the   said   provisions   do    not authorise  framing of rules requiring the  prior  permission for holding meetings. (2)Section 33 (1) (o) of the Act is unconstitutional as it infringes Art. 19(1) (a) and (b).  The restrictions are wide enough  to  cover restrictions both within and  without  the

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limit  of  permissible  legislative  action  affecting  such rights. (3)In  any  event  the  section  and  the.  rules   impose unreasonable   restrictions   on   the   fundamental   right guaranteed  to  the appellants under Art. 19(1)  (a)  &  (b) because               (a)   the  ambit  of power  conferred  on  the               Executive is very large and uncontrolled;               (b)   such  power  is  open  to  be  exercised               arbitrarily.               (c)   the restrictions imposed are excessive;               (d)   the  procedure and manner of  imposition               are not fair and just;               (e)   there   are  no  sufficient   safeguards               against  the  misuse of  power  conferred  and               there is no right of representation;               (f)   the  section and the rules  suffer  from               vagueness:               (g)   the restrictions are not narrowly  drawn               to  prevent  the  supposed  evil  and  do  not               satisfy the touchstone for legislation dealing               with basic freedom, namely, precision;               (h)   in delegating powers to the Executive to               impose  restrictions the legislature  has  not               provided  adequate standards to pass  scrutiny               by accepted tests. 275 (4) The, impugned section And rules violate Art.14 as they enable  the  authorities to   discriminate  between  persons without just classification. (5)Section  33(1)(o)  suffers from the vice  of  excessive delegation of legislative powers and is therefore void. Coming to the first point raised by the learned counsel,  it seems  to  us that the word ’regulating In  s.  33(0)  would include  the power to prescribed that permission in  writing should  be taken a few days before the holding of a  meeting on  a  public street.  Under s. 35(o) In(.)  rule  could  be prescribed  prohibiting  all meetings or  processions.   The section  proceeds on the basis that the public has ’a  right to  hold  assemblies and processions on  and  along  streets though it is necessary to regulate the conduct and behaviour or  action  of  persons  constituting  such  assemblies   or processions in order to safeguard the rights of citizens and in  order  to preserve public order.  The  word  ’regulate’. according to Shorter Oxford Dictionary, means, "to  control, govern,  or  direct  by rule or regulations  to  subject  to guidance or restrictions". The  impugned Rules do not prohibit the holding of  meetings but only prescribe that permission should be taken  although it  is  not  stated  on what  grounds  permission  could  be refused.  We shall deal with this aspect a little later. It  was urged before us that according to the Common Law  of England  no one has a right to hold a meeting on  a  highway and the same law prevails in India and, therefore, we should read  the word "regulating" to mean a right to prohibit  the holding of a meeting also.  ’Reference was made to Halsbury, Third Edition, volume 19, where it is stated that "the right of  the  public is a right to pass along a highway  for  the purpose of legitimate travel, not to be on it except so  far as  their presence is attributed to a reasonable and  proper use of the highway as such. (page 73. para 107). On page 276 it is stated that "the right of passage does not include the right torace upon the highway, and to do so is an indictable nuisance,nor is there any right to organise or take part in a processionor  meeting  which   naturally

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results in an obstruction and is an unreasonable user of the highway."  In the footnote it is stated that "the  right  of the  public  on  the highway is ’a right  of  passage  in  a reasonable manner and there is no right to hold meetings  in the highway." Reference was also made to Blackwell’s Law of Meetings  (9th edn. p. 5), wherein it is stated as follows :-               "There appears to exist a view that the public               has a right to hold meetings for political and               other purposes               276               on   the  highway.   This  is   an   erroneous               assumption.   A public highway exists for  the               purpose  of  free, passage  and  free  passage               only,  and for purposes reasonably  incidental               to  this right.  There can be no claim on  the               part of persons who desire to assemble for the               purpose  of holding a meeting to do so on  the               highway.  The claim is irreconcilable with the               purpose for which a highway exists."               It is further stated at p. 6 as follows               "Although there is no right on the part of the               public  to  bold  meetings  on  a  highway,  a               meeting is not necessarily unlawful because it               is held on a highway.  Thus, it has been  held               that  a meeting on a public highway may  be  a               lawful  meeting within s. 1( 1) of the  Public               Meeting  Act  1908.   Whether  or  not  it  is               unlawful  depends  upon the  circumstances  in               which  it  is held, e.g., whether  or  not  an               obstruction  is  caused.  But the  only  clear               right  of  the public on the  highway  is  the               right  to  pass and repass over  it,  although               many other things go by tolerance." We  may  mention  that  Dicey  took  a  slightly   different position.   According  to Dicey’os Law of  the  Constitution (Tenth Edition) pages 271-72               "The right of assembling is nothing more  than               a result of the view taken by the courts as to               individual  liberty of person  and  individual               liberty  of speech.  There is no  special  law               allowing A, B and C to meet together either in               the  open  air  or  elsewhere  for  a   lawful               purpose,  but  the right of A to go  where  he               pleases so that he does not commit a trespass,               and  to  say what he likes to 13 so  that  his               talk is not libellous or seditious, the  right               of B to do the like, and the existence of  the same  rights of C, D, E and F, and so  on  ad               infinitum, lead to the consequence that A,  B,               C,  D  and a thousand or  ten  thousand  other               persons, may (as a general rule) meet together               in any place where otherwise they each have  a               right  to  be for a lawful purpose  and  in  a               lawful manner.  A has a right to walk down the               High  Street or to go on to a common.   B  has               the  same right.  C, D and all  their  friends               have  the  same right to go  there  also.   In               other  words.  A, B, C and D and ten  thousand               such,  have a right to hold a public  meeting;               and  as A may say to B that he thinks  an  Act               ought  to  be passed abolishing the  House  of               Lords, or that the House of Lords are bound to               reject any bill modifying the Consti-               27 7

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             tution  of their House, and as B may make  the               same remark to. any of his friends, the result               ensues that A and ten thousand more may hold a               public   meeting   either   to   support   the               Government  or to encourage the resistance  of               the  Peers.  Here then you have  in  substance               that right of public meeting for political and               other purposes which is constantly treated  in               foreign countries as a special privilege to be               exercised    only    subject    to     careful               restrictions". It  is not necessary to refer to the English authorities  on the       point  because in India the law has  developed  on slightly   different  lines,  especially  with   regard   to processions,  and the Statutes of the country  have  treated the  right  to  take out processions and  hold  meetings  on streets in a similar fashion. In Parthasaradiayyangar v. Chinnakrishna Ayyangar(1) it  was held  that  persons  were  "entitled  to  conduct  religious processions    through  public streets so that they  do  not interfere  with  the  ordinary use of such  streets  by  the public  and subject to such directions as  the  Magistrates’ may lawfully give to prevent obstruction of the thoroughfare or breaches of the public peace." Reference was made in this judgment  (p.  306) to an earlier decision where  the  Sadar Court, in Appeal 141 of 1857 (M.S.D. 1857, p. 219)     had declared  that "the right to pass in procession through  the public  streets of a town in such a way as  the  Magistrate might not object to as dangerous to the public safety, was a right inherent in every subject of the state." In  Sundram  Chetti  v. The  Queen(2),  after  referring  to certain   orders of the Government and judicial opinion, the Court observed :               "  Both  acknowledged the existence  in  every               citizen  of the right to use a public  highway               for  processional  as  well  as  for  ordinary               purpose,%.     Both    recognised    in    the               Magistrate  a power to suspend  and  regulate,               and  in  the police a power  to  regulate  the               exercise of the right." In Sadagopacharior v. A. Rama Rao(3), the head-note reads               "The  right to conduct  religious  processions               through    the  public  streets  is  a   right               inherent  in  every person, provided  he  does               not, thereby, invade the rights of (1) I.L.R. (1882) 5 Mad. 304; 309.  (2) I.L.R. (1883) 6 Mad. 203; 215,219. (3) T.L.R. (1903) 26 Mad. 376. 278               property enjoyed by others, or cause a  public               nuisance  or interfere, with the ordinary  use               of  the streets by the public, and subject  to               directions or prohibitions for the  prevention               of obstructions to thoroughfares or breaches               (if the peace." In   Vijiaraghav’a  Chariar  v.  Emperior(l)  there  was   a difference of opinion.  Benson, J., observed at page 585               "No doubt a highway is primarily intended  for               the use of individuals passing and  re-passing               along   it  in  pursuit  of   their   ordinary               avocations,   but   in  every   country,   and               especially in India, highways have, from  time               immemorial, been used for the passing and  re-               passing   of  processions  as  well   as   ’of               individuals and there is nothing illegal in  a               procession  or  assembly engaging  in  worship

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             while passing along a highway, an more than in               an individual doing so."               Benson, J. further observed at p. 587, as follows  :               "The    practice  of  using  the        public               highways for religious processions has existed               in  India  for thousands of  years.   History,               literature  and  tradition all  tell  us  that               religious  processions to the village  shrines               formed a feature of the national life from the               very earliest times.  That atone is sufficient               to  raise a presumption that it is lawful  and               to throw on those who allege it to be unlawful               the  onus of showing that it is  forbidden  by               law,  but this it admittedly is not.  The  law               recognizes   the   use  of  the   highway   by               processions   as   lawful:   and   gives   the               Magistrate  and  superior officers  of  police               power to direct the conduct of assemblies  and               processions through the public streets and  to               regulate  the use of music in connection  with               them,  and  to  prevent  obstructions  on  the               occasion   of  such  assemblies  and   proces-               sions......   The  law  recognises   religious               processions  as  lawful  just as  much  as  it               recognizes  other  processions........  It  is               more  reasonable  to  suppose  that  he  would               dedicate  the  highway  to  the  purposes  for               which,  in accordance with the custom  of  the               country,  it would he required by the  people.               The  penal  law  of India  extends  a  special               protection  against voluntary disturbances  to               all  assemblies lawfully engaged in  religious               worship.   A procession is but an assembly  in               motion and if it is, a religious  procession.,               it is, in my judgment, (1)  I.L.R. (1903) 26 mad. 554.      279  entitled  to the special protection given  by               the Penal Code assemblies lawfully engaged  in               religious worship." We have referred to these cases in detail because they  were approved of by the Privy Council in Manzur Hasan v. Muhammed Zaman(l). In that case the Privy Council held :                     "In India, there is a right to conduct a               religious  procession  with  its   appropriate               observances through a public street so that it               does  not interfere with the ordinary  use  of               the  street  by  the public,  and  subject  to               lawful directions by the magistrates. A  civil               suit for a declaration lies against those  who               interfere  with a religious procession or  its                             appropriate observance." In Chandu Sajan Patil v. Nvahalehand(2) the Full Bench held that   a  citizen  had  an  inherent  right  to  conduct   a nonreligious   procession through a public road. This  Court  followed the decision of the Privy  Council  in Shaikh  Piru  Bux  v. Kalandi Pati (3 ). It  is  true  these decisions primarily  deal with processions but the  statutes of the country,     notably  the  Police  Acts,  deal   with assemblies and processions on the same basis, and as pointed out by Benson, J., a procession is but   an   assembly    in motion. This Court considered the question of the right of  citizens to  carry on motor transport business on highways in  Saghir Ahmmad    v.  State of U.P.(4). The following  passage  from

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the judgment   of  Venkatarama  Ayyar J.,  in  C.S.S.  Motor Service v. State    Madras(5) was approved :               "The  true position then is, that  all  public               streets and roads vest in the State, but  that               the State holds them as trustees on behalf  of               the  public.  The members of  the  public  are               entitled  as  beneficiaries to use them  as  a               matter of right and this right is limited only               by the similar rights possessed by every other               citizen to use the   pathways.  The  State  as               trustees  on behalf of the public is  entitled               to   impose  all  such  limitations   on   the               character  and extent of the user, as  may  be               requisite  for  protecting the rights  of  the               public  generally;  .... but subject  to  such               limitations the right of a citizen to carry on               business  in  transport  vehicles  on   public               pathways  can  not  be denied to  him  on  the               ground that the State owns     the highways."  (1) 52 I.A. 61             (2) A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 192. (3)  Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1966; Judgment dated October 29, 1968). (4) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707,          (5) [1952] 2 M.L, J. 894 of 280 We  are  unable  to appreciate how  this  passage  militates against the contentions of the appellant.  The Court was not then   concerned  ’with  the  use  of  public  streets   for processions or meetings. It  seems  to us that it follows from the  above  discussion that  in  India a citizen had, before  the  Constitution,  a right  to  hold meetings on public streets  subject  to  the control of the appropriate authority regarding the time  and place of the meeting and subject to considerations of public order.   Therefore, we are unable to hold that the  impugned rules  are ultra vires s. 3 3 (1) of the Bombay  Police  Act insofar  as  they  require  prior  permission  for   holding meetings. This takes us to points, (2) and (3) mentioned above.  It is not  surprising  that the  Constitution-makers  conferred  a fundamental right on all citizens ’to assemble peaceably and without arms’.  While prior to the coming into force of  the Constitution the right to assemble could have been  abridged or  taken  away by law, now that cannot be  done  except  by imposing reasonable restrictions within Art. 19(3).  But  it is urged that the right to assemble does not mean that  that right  can be exercised at any and every place.  This  Court held in Railway, Board v. Narinjan Singh(1) that there is no fundamental right for any one to hold meetings in government premises.  It was observed               "The  fact that the citizens of  this  country               have  freedom of speech, freedom  to  assemble               peaceably and freedom to form associations  or               unions  does not mean that they  can  exercise               those freedoms in whatever place they please." This  is  true  but nevertheless the  State  cannot  by  law abridge  or take away the right of assembly  by  prohibiting assembly on every public street or public place.  The  State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen and can only impose reasonable restrictions  in the interest of public order. This  Court  in Babulal Parate v. State  of  Matharashtra  2 rightly observed :               "The right of citizens to take out processions               or  to  hold public meetings  flows  from  the

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             right in Art. 19(1) (b) to assemble  peaceably               and  without  arms  and  the  right  to   move               anywhere in the territory of India." (1)  [1969] 3 C.R 548, 554. (2) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 423;  438. 281 If the right to hold public meetings flows from Art. 19  (1) (b  and Art. 19 (1) (d) it is obvious that the State  cannot impose unreasonable restrictions.  It must be, kept in  mind that  Art.  19(1)(b), read with Art. 13,  protects  citizens against  State action.  It has nothing to do with the  right to  assemble  on  private streets or  property  without  the consent of the owners or occupiers of the private property. This leads us to consider whether s. 3 3 (1) (o) of the  Act and the rules violate Art. 19(1) (b).  We do not think  Art. 19(1) (a) is attracted on the facts of the case. We  cannot  appreciate how s. 33(1)(o) violates  Art.  19(1) (b).  It enables the Commissioner to make rules to  regulate the  assemblies  and processions.  Without  such  rules,  in crowdedpublic streets it would be impossible for citizens to  enjoy  their various rights. Indeed s. 33(1)(o)  may  be said to have beenenacted in aid of the rights under  Art. 19(1) (a) and 19(1)(d). We  may mention that the sub-section has nothing to do  with the formation of assemblies and processions.  It deals  with persons ,is members of the assemblies and processions. The  real point in this case is whether the  impugned  rules violate Art. 19(1)(b).  Rule 7 does not give any guidance to the  officer authorised by the Commissioner of Police as  to the circumstances in which he can refuse permission to  hold a  public  meeting.   Prima  facie,  to  give  an  arbitrary discretion to an officer is an unreasonable restriction.  It was  urged  that the Marginal Note of s.  33-power  to  make rules  for  regulation of traffic and  for  preservation  of order  in public place, etc.-will guide the officer.  It  is doubtful  whether  a  marginal note can  be  used  for  this purpose, for we cannot imagine the officer referring to  the marginal  note  of the section and then  deciding  that  his discretion  is limited, specially as the marginal note  ends with ’etcetera’.  It is also too much to expect him to  look at  the scheme of the Act and decide that his discretion  is limited. We  may  in this connection refer to  Cox  v.  Louisians(l). After starting that "from all evidence before us it  appears that  the  authorities in Baton Rouge,  permit  or  prohibit parades or street meetings in their completely  uncontrolled discretion" it was observed               "This Court has recognized that the lodging of               such  broad  discretion in a  public  official               allows  him to determine which expressions  of               view  will  be permitted and which  will  not.               This thus sanctions a device for the (1) 13 L.Ed. 2d.471; 486 paras 15,16,17. 282               suppression of the communication of ideas  and               permits the official to act as a censor.   See               Saia v. New York, supra, 334 US at 562, 92 Led               at  1578.   Also  inherent in  such  a  system               allowing  parades  or meetings only  with  the               prior permission of an official is the obvious               danger  to the right of a person of group  not               to  be  denied equal protection of  the  laws.               See  Niemotko  v. Maryland, supra, 340  US  at               272,  284, 95 Led at 270, 277; cf Yick Wo.  v.               Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L ed 220, 6 S Ct 1064.

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             It  is  clearly unconstitutional to  enable  a               public official to determine which expressions               of  view will be permitted and which will  not               or to engage in invidious discrimination among               persons  or groups either by use of a  statute               providing  a  system  of  broad  discretionary               licensing  power  or,  as in  this  case,  the               equivalent of   such  a  system  by  selective               enforcement of an extremely    broad               prohibitory statute."               "It is, of course,       undisputed       that               appropriate, limit-               ed  discretion, under properly drawn  statutes               or  ordinances,  concerning the  time,  place,               duration, of manner of use of the streets  for               public    assemblies   may   be   vested    in               administrative  officials, provided that  such               limited   discretion   is   "exercised    with               ’uniformity  of method of treatment  upon  the               facts of each application, free from  improper               or  inappropriate considerations and from  un-               fair   discrimination’.   .  .  and   with   a               systematic,  consistent  and  just  order               of   treatment,   with   reference   to    the               convenience    of    public   use    of    the               highways........ Cox v. New Hampshire,  supra,               312  US at 576, 85 L ed-at 105, 133 ALR  1396.               See Poulos v. New Hampshire, supra.               "But  here  it is clear that the  practice  in               Baton Rouge allowing unfettered discretion  in               local  officials in the regulation of the  use               of  the  streets  for  peaceful  parades   and               meetings  is  an  unwarranted  abridgment   of               appellant’s  freedom  of speech  and  assembly               secured  to  him by the  First  Amendment,  as               applied  to  the  States  by  the   Fourteenth               Amendment." These  extracts clearly bring out the dangers of  conferring arbitrary discretionary powers. We may make it clear that there is nothing wrong in  requir- ing  previous  permission to be obtained  before  holding  a public meeting on a public street, for the right which flows from Art. 283 19 (1) (b) is not a right to hold a meeting at any place and time.  It is a right which can be regulated in the  interest of all so that all can enjoy the right. In  our view rule 7 confers arbitrary powers on the  officer authorised by the Commissioner of Police and must be  struck down.   The other Rules cannot survive because  they  merely lay  down the procedure for obtaining permission but  it  is not  necessary to strike them down for without Rule  7  they cannot  operate.   Rule  14  and  Rule  15  deal  both  with processions  and  public  meetings.  Nothing  we  have  said affects  the  validity  of  these  two  rules  as,  far   as processions are concerned. In view of this conclusion it is not necessary to decide the other   points  raised  by  the  learned  counsel  for   the appellants. A  number  of other American cases were referred to  in  the course of arguments but we do not find it useful to refer to an  of them in detail.  It is, however, interesting to  note that  in  the  United States of America  the  right  to  use streets  and parks And public places "has from ancient  time been  a  part  of the  privileges,  immunities,  rights  and

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liberties  of citizens.  The privilege of a citizen  of  the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of  views  on  national questions may be  regulated  in  the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and  must be  exercised  in subordination to the general  comfort  and convenience,  and in consonance with peace and  good  order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged  or denied."  (vide Roberts, J., in Hague v. C.I.O. (83  L.  Ed. 1423 at 1436-37)].  This passage was cited with approval  in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (22 L. Ed. 2.nd, 162 at 168). In  the result we set aside the judgment of the High  Court, allow  the appeal and declare that r. 7 of the Rules  framed by  Commissioner  of  Police,  Ahmedabad,  is  void  as   it infringes Art. 19(1)(b) of the Constitution.  We need hardly say  that  it will be open to the  Commissioner  of  Police, Ahmedabad, to frame a proper rule or rules. MATHEW, J. I agree with the conclusion of my Lord the  chief Justice but my reasons for that conclusion are different. The  appellant filed an application tinder Art. 226  of  the Constitution  in  the High Court of  Gujarat  at  Ahmedabad, praying   for  a  declaration  that  orders   contained   in Annexures,  A  and  ’B’ to that application,  by  which  the Deputy Commissioner of Police Special Branch Ahmmadabad  the 2nd respondent refused to grant permission to the  appellant to  hold public meetings near Panch Kuva Darwaja on the  4th and 5th September 1969, were invalid and that rules 7 to 11, 14 and 15 framed under s.3(1) 284 of  the  Bombay Police Act, 1951, as applied  to  Saurashtra area  in  Gujarat which prescribe the requirement  of  prior permission  and the method of applying for the same, etc., were  ultra  vires  the sub-section  and  violative  of  his fundamental  right under Art. 19(1) (a) and (b).  The  Court found that the principal prayer in the application,  namely, the challenge to the validity of the two orders, had  become infructuous  by  lapse  of time as the dates  on  which  the intended meetings were to be held had long since passed  but considered  the  question whether rules 7 to 11, 14  and  15 were  intra  vires  section 33(1)  and  whether  they  would violate  the fundamental rights of the applicant under  Art. 19(1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution.  The Court  dismissed the application holding that the rules were intra vires  the sub-section  under which they were framed and that they  did not  violate the fundamental rights of the petitioner  under Art.  19 (1) (a) or (b) This appeal is by  certificate  from that judgment. Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, provides               "33(1)  The  Commissioner  and  the   District               Magistrate,  in areas under  their  respective               charges  or any part thereof, may make,  alter               or  rescind rules or orders  not  inconsistent               with this Act for;               xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx               (o)   regulating the conduct of and  behaviour               or  action of persons constituting  assemblies               and  processions on or along the  streets  and               prescribing  in the case of  processions,  the               routes  by which, the order in which  and  the               times at which the same may pass;"               Rule 7 of the Rules framed by the Commissioner               of Police under s. 33 (1) (o) provides :               "7.  No public meeting with or  without  loud-               speaker,  shall be held on the  public  street               within the jurisdiction of the Commissionerate               of Police, Ahmedabad City unless the necessary

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             permission  in writing has been obtained  from               the, officer authorised by the Commissioner of               Police." The appellant submitted that S. 33(1)(o) did not empower the Commissioner  or  the District Magistrate to  frame  a  rule requiring a person to obtain prior permission for conducting a  public meeting on a public street, as such a  rule  would imply  that the Commissioner or the District Magistrate  has power to refuse permission for. holding such a meeting as  a power to permit 28 5 normally  implies a power not to permit and so, the rule  is bad.  (It  was under rule 7 that  the  Commissioner  refused permission  to hold meetings on the 4th and  5th  September, 1969). What  the  sub-section  provides  is  making  of  rules  for ’regulating’ the conduct and behaviour, or action of persons constituting  assemblies.   The sub-section  presupposes  an assembly  and authorises the making of rule  for  regulating the  conduct,  behaviour or action of the  persons  who  are members  thereof.   Rule  7 impliedly  gives  power  to  the Commissioner  to refuse permission to hold a public  meeting and,  when a meeting is prohibited, there is no question  of regulating  the  conduct,  behaviour or  action  of  persons constituting  assembly,  as, ex-hypothesi, no  assembly  has been  constituted.   The  sub-section  does  not   authorise framing  of  rules  to regulate the  conduct,  behaviour  or action or persons before an assembly is constituted.  Before an assembly is constituted, every member of the public is  a potential member of it, because every such member, if he  so choose. right become a member of the assembly.  Does,  then, the  sub-section authorise the making of rules  to  regulate the  conduct,  behaviour  or action of  every  such  member, before he becomes a member of the assembly ? I think not. A  power to "regulate’ does not normally include a power  to prohibit (see Toronto v. Virao(l), Ontario v. Canada(2).   A power  to regulate implies the continued existence  of  that which  is to be regulated (see Birmingham and Midland  Motor Omnibus  Col.  Ltd. v. Worcestershire County Council().   If rule  I  authorises the Commissioner to  prohibit  a  public meeting,  is  it  consistent  with  the  sub-section   which authorizes only "regulating the conduct.,. . . " ? When  the Legislature wanted to give the rule making authority a power to frame rules prohibiting an activity, it has taken care to do  so by the appropriate word . For  instance,  sub-section (p)  of  s.  33(1) speaks of  "prohibiting  the  hanging  or placing  of  any  cord or pole across a street.  .  .  .  ", subsection (q) of  s.  33 (1) relates  to  "prohibiting  the placing  of  building materials   in any street".  In  these sub-sections,  the word ’prohibit’ is used to show that  the rule  making authority has power to pass a rule  prohibiting the activities therein mentioned.  Similarly sub-section (x) of  s. 3 3 (1) provides for "regulating or  prohibiting  the sale  of  any ticket The juxtaposition of these words  is  a further  indication  to show that the  legislature  intended different connotations to the words.  I am not saying that a power  to  regulate can never include a power  to  prohibit. But the context here does not compel such (1) [1896] A.C. 88. (2) [1896] A.C. 348. (3) [1967] 1 W.L.H. 409. 286 a  reading.   Rule  7 is, therefore, ultra  vires  the  sub- section.   Even if the rule is ultra vires  the  sub-section the  appellant will not be entitled to hold public  meetings

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on the street in question unless the appellant has the right in law to do so.  It was, therefore, argued on behalf of the appellant  that every citizen has the fundamental  right  to hold public meetings on a public street. The respondents, however, submitted that, in India, the  law is, that there is no right, let alone a fundamental one,  to hold  public meeting on public street.  In Saghir Ahmmad  v. The State of U.P. and others(1), this Court said :               "According  to  English law,  which  has  been               applied all along in India, a highway has  its               origin,  apart from statute,,  in  dedication,               either express or implied, by the owner of the               land  of  a right of passage over  it  to  the               public and the acceptance of that right by the               public". The only right acquired by the public is a right to pass and repass  it at their pleasure for the purpose  of  legitimate travel. Ex-parte Lewis(2), Wills, J. speaking for- the Court said               "A  claim on the part of persons so minded  to               assemble  in  any numbers, and for so  long  a               time as they please to remain assembled,  upon               a  highway, to the detriment of others  having               equal  right, is in its nature  irreconcilable               with the, right of free passage, and there is,               so  far as we have been able to ascertain,  no               authority  whatever in favour of it.   It  was               urged  that the right of public  meeting,  and               the right of occupying any unoccupied land  or               highway  that might seem appropriate to  those               of  her  Majesty’s subjects who wish  to  meet               there,  were,  if  not  synonymous,  at  least               correlative.    We  fail  to  appreciate   the               argument." In  Reg. v. Omninghame Graham and Burns(:) the  Commissioner of Police, in the exercise of his powers vested in him under the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, issued an order that  "no organised  procession  shall  be  allowed  to  approach  the Trafalgar Square on Sunday the 13th instant".  It was argued that  he  had no power to forbid an  orderly  meeting.   But Charles, J. in charging the jury said :               "I  can find no warrant for telling  you  that               there  is a right of public meeting either  in               Trafalgar   Square   or   any   other   public               thoroughfare.   So  far as I know the  law  of               England,  the use of public  thoroughfares  is               for  people  to pass and  repass  along  them.               That is the (1)  [1965]  1 S.C.R. 707, 715.  (2) (1888) Law  Reports  21 Q.B.D. 191 (3)  (1886-90)  Cox’s Criminal Law Cases.  Vol. 16,  420,29- 30. 287               purpose  for  which  they  are,  as  we   say,               dedicated  by the owner of them to the use  of               the  public and they are not dedicated to  the               public  use for any other purpose that I  know               of  than  for the purpose of passing  and  re-               passing;" A  meeting  held  on  a highway,  although  it  might  be  a trespass.  against  the Authority in which  the  highway  is vested is not,, on that ground, wrongful against the members of the public.  As far as they are concerned the meeting  is a  wrong  only  if  it is a nuisance.   As  the  public  are entitled to the unobstructed use of the highway for  passing

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and  repassing, any meeting which appreciably obstructs  the highway would seem to constitute such a nuisance.  The  test is  whether it "renders the way less commodious than  before to  the  public".   The  fact  that  sufficient  alternative passage  space is left is no defence.  "It is no defence  to show  that...... though a part of the highway actually  used by the passengers is obstructed, sufficient available  space is  left." (1) Moreover, it is not necessary to  prove  that any one has been obstructed; the placing of obstructions  on a public road or street in a manner calculated to create  an obstruction  to traffic is an offence although no person  or carriage may have been actually    obstructed.   In Gill  v. Carson and IV Nield(2) Viscount Reading,     C.J. said               "In  my judgment it is not necessary to  prove               that a person has been actually obstructed, it               is  quite sufficient to prove  circumstances               from  which the justices can conclude that  in               the ordinary course persons may be obstructed,               and  that the actual use of the road was  cal-               culated to obstruct even though no person  was               proved to have been obstructed." Applying  these  rules  to the special  facts  of  a  public meeting in the highway, it would appear that such a meeting, however  reasonable and desirable its purposes may be, is  a nuisance if it causes any appreciable obstruction, and  that it is not necessary to prove that in fact, any one has  been prevented  from passing. In De Morgan v. Metropolitan  Board of Works(3) it was held that although there is a  widespread belief  that the general public has a right to hold  meeting on  a common, no such right was known to the law.   When  it was  argued that such meetings were always permitted,  Lush. J.  is  reported  to  have said  that  "such  uses  did  not constitute a right or prove anything more than an excused or licensed  trespass".  It may be stated, therefore.  that  if every unlicensed public meeting is a trespass, as against  a person (1) Halsburly, Hailsham ed., Vol. xvi, p. 355 (2) [1917] 2 K.B. 674, 677. (3) [1880] 5 Q.B.D. 155, 157. 288 or  body  of persons in whom the surface of the  highway  is vested, then this obviously may limit the so called right of public meeting to the ’Vanishing point. Dicey in his Law of the Constitution(1) has observed’:               "A has a right to walk down the High Street or               to  go on to a common.  B has the same  right.               C, D and all their friends have the same right               to go there also.  In other words, A, B, C and               D,  and  ten thousand such, have’ a  right  to               hold a public meeting; is It  might not follow that because A, B, C. D, etc.,  have  a right to walk down the   High  Street,  they  have  a  legal right to hold a public meeting.    Beatty  v.   Gillbanks(2) which dicey cites as the leading case   on the law of public meeting was not directly concerned with this question as the appellants  there who were leading a procession through  the street  intended to hold their meeting on private  premises. Dicey has himself pointed out in the Appendix to the  eighth edition of the book as follows : (3)               "Does there exist any general right of meeting               in  public  places?  The answer is  easy.   No               such right is known  to the law of England.               "......  But  speaking in  general  terms  the               Courts do  not recognise certain spaces as set               aside for that end.  In this respect, again, a

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             crowd  of a thousand people stand in the  same               position as an individual person.  If A  wants               to deliver a lecture, to make a speech, or  to               exhibit  a show, he must obtain some  room  or               field  which  he  can  legally  use  for   his               purpose.   He  must not invade the  rights  of               property-i.e., commit a trespass.  He must not               interfere with the convenience of the  public-               i.e., create a nuisance.               "The  notion that there is such a thing  as  a               right of meeting in public places arises  from               more   than   one   confusion   or   erroneous               assumption.  The, right of public meeting-that               is, the right of all men to come together in a               place where they may lawfully assemble for any               lawful  purpose, and especially for  political               discussion-is  confounded  with  the   totally               different  and falsely alleged right of  every               man  to  use  for the  purpose  of  holding  a               meeting any place which in any sense is  open               to the public.  The two rights, did they  both               exist, are essentially different, and in  many               countries are (1)  A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., 271-272. (2)  [1882] 9 Q.B.D. 308. (3)  Appenx  to Law of the Constitution 8th ed, Note’  V  on Question  connected with th.- right of public meeting",  pp. 498-499.                             289               regulated  by totally different rules.  It  is               assumed again that squares, streets, or roads,               which   every  man  may  lawfully   use,   are               necessarily  available  for the holding  of  a               meeting.   The assumption is false.   A  crowd               blocking  up  a highway  will  probably  be  a               nuisance  in  the legal, no less than  in  the               popular sense of the term, for they  interfere               with  the ordinary citizen’s right to use  the               locality in the, way permitted to him’ by law.               Highways, indeed, are dedicated to the  public               use,  but they must, be used for  passing  and               going  along them, and the legal mode  of  use               negatives  the claim of politicians to  use  a               highway  as a forum, just as it excludes.  the               claim  of actors to turn it into an  open  air               theatre.The crowd who collect, and the persons               who  cause a crowd, for whatever  purpose,  to               collect     in    a    street,    create     a               nuisance.......... In  Burden  v. Rigle’r and another(1), the  evidence  showed that  the urban authority. had tacitly licensed the  meeting and  so it was not a trespass as against them., No  evidence was  also  adduced that the meeting caused  any  appreciable obstruction on the highway and so there was no proof of  any nuisance.   The  Court  held that the  fact  that  a  public meeting  is  held upon a highway does not make  the  meeting unlawful  whether  it is unlawful or not  depends  upon  the circumstances  in which it is held e.g., whether or  not  an obstruction  is  caused, The Court further, held  that  even though  there  is no right to hold a meeting on  a  highway, i.e.,  no  absolute  legal right, it  does  not  necessarily follow  that,  if a meeting is held, it may not  be  lawful. And  after  referring to the decision-in  Ex-parte  Lewis(2) already referred to, the Court said that the convenors of a meeting cannot, under all circumstances, insist on holding a

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meeting. In Harrison v. Duke of Rutland(3), Lord Esher M. Observed:               "Highways  are no doubt dedicated prima  facie               for the purpose of   passage;  but things  are               done upon them by everybody    which       are               recognised  as  being  rightly  done,  and  as               constituting  a reasonable and usual  mode  of               using a highway as such." In Halsbury’s Laws of England(4), it is said , that. it is a nuisance  organise ’or take part in a procession or  meeting which  naturally  results  in  an  obstruction  and  is.  an unreasonable use of the highway (1) [1911] L.R. 1 K.B.337 (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 707. 715. (3) [1893] Q.B. 142, C.A. at 146 (4) Hailssham Edition , Vol xvi, p. 362 " Highway". 290 Public  processions  are prima facie legal.  If A, B  and  C have  each a right to pass and repass on the highway,  there is nothing illegal in their doing so in concert, unless  the procession is illegal on some other ground (see Manzur Hasan v.   Muhammed   Zaman(l)   and   Chandu   Sajan   Patil   v. Nyshalchand(2).   "As ’the public interest is paramount,  it is  sometimes  suggested that, on the analogy  of  a  public meeting,   any  procession  which  causes   an   appreciable obstruction to the highway must be a public nuisance.  This, however,  is not so.  As a public meeting is not one of  the uses  for  which  the highway has been  dedicated,-it  is  a nuisance  if it appreciably obstructs the road.  It is  no defence to show that sufficient available space is left if a part   of  the  highway  actually  used  by  passengers   is obstructed.  But, and this is most important, in the case of a  procession, the test is whether in all the  circumstances such  a procession is a reasonable user of the highway,  and not  merely whether it causes an obstruction.  Thus to  take an obvious illustration, the temporary crowding in a  street occasioned by people going to a circus or leaving it is  not a  nuisance,  for if such a temporary obstruction  were  not permitted  then  no popular show, could ever be  held"  (see Goodhart,   Public   Meetings   and   Processions(3).    The distinction  between the use of a highway to hold  a  public meeting  and the use of it to conduct procession thereon  is pointed  out  by the author and he takes the  view  that  no person  has  a  right to use a highway  for  holding  public meeting  even though no nuisance is created.   According  to him,  under  the  law, a person can use a  highway  for  the purpose  for which it has been dedicated i.e., to  pass  and repass  and any other unlicensed use, however  desirable  it may be from other standpoints, is legally wrongful. In Lowdens v. Keaveney(4), Gibson, J. said that a procession is  prima  facie  legal  and  that  it  differs  from   "the collection of a stationary crowd" but that a procession  may become a nuisance if the right is exercised unreasonably  or with reckless disregard of the rights of others. Justice  Holmes,  while he was Chief Justice of  the  Massa- chusetts Supreme Court said               "For    the    legislature    absolutely    or               conditionally  to forbid public speaking in  a               highway   or  public  park  is  no   more   an               infringement of the rights of a member of  the               public  than for the owner of a private  house               to   forbid   it  in  his  house.    When   no               Proprietary rights interfere, the  legislature               may and the right of the public (1)  52 T.A. 61.

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(3)  Cambridge Law Journal (1936-38), 6, 171. (2)  A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 192. (4)  (1903) 2 I.R. 82. 291 .lm15 to  enter  upon the public place by putting an  end  to  the dedication  to public use.  So it may take the less step  of limiting the public use to certain purposes." This  dictum  was quoted and approved by the U.  S.  Supreme Court Davis v. Massachusetts(1).  But later decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have politely distinguished the case.  In Hague v.  C.I.O.(2),  Justice  Roberts,  speaking  for   the majority, said               "Wherever  the title of streets and parks  may               rest,  they  have immemorially  been  held  in               trust  for the use of the public and time  out               of  mind,  have  been  used  for  purposes  of               assembly,   communicating   thoughts   between               citizens,  and  discussing  public  questions.               Such use of the streets and public places has,               from  ancient  times,  been  a  part  of   the               privileges,  immunities, rights and  liberties               of  citizens.  The privilege of a  citizen  of               the United States to use the streets and parks               for   communication  of  views   on   national               questions may be regulated in the interest  of               all; it is not absolute but relative, and must               be  exercised in subordination to the  general               comfort and convenience and in consonance with               peace and good order; but it must not, in  the               guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." This  dictum  has  been  followed in Kunz  v.  New  York  (3 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (4 ). Freedom  of  assembly is an essential element of  any  demo- cratic  system.   At  the  root of  this  concept  lies  the citizens’  right  to meet face to face with others  for  the discussion   of   their   ideas   and    problems-religious, political,,   economic   or  social.   Public   debate   and discussion  take  many forms including the  spoken  and  the printed word, the radio and the screen.  But assemblies face to  face  perform a function of vital  significance  in  our system,  and are no less important at the present  time  for the  education  of the public and the formation  of  opinion than  they  have  been  in  our  past  history.   The  basic assumption  in a democratic polity is that Government  shall be based on the consent of the governed.  But the consent of the governed implies not only that the consent shall be free but  also that it shall be grounded on adequate  information and discussion.  Public streets are the ’natural’ places for expression of opinion and dissemination of ideas.  Indeed it may  be  argued that for some persons these places  are  the only  possible  arenas for the effective exercise  of  their freedom of speech and assembly. (1) U.S. 43 (1897). (2) 307 U.S. 496, 515-516. (3) 340 U.S. 490. (4) 394 U.S. 147, 152. 292 Public meeting in open spaces and public streets forms  part of  the  tradition  of our national  life.   In  the  pre- Independence  days  such  meetings have been  held  in  open spaces and public streets and the people have come to regard it as a part of their privileges and immunities.  The  State and  the  local authority have a virtual monopoly  of  every open  space  at which an outdoor meeting can be  held.   If,

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therefore.,  the State or Municipality can  constitutionally close  both  its streets and its parks  entirely  to  public meetings,  the  practical result would be that it  would  be impossible to hold any open air meetings in any large  city. The real problem is that of reconciling the city’s  function of  providing for the exigencies of traffic in  its  streets and for the recreation of the public in its parks’ with  its other  obligations, of providing adequate places for  public discussion  in  order to safeguard the guaranteed  right  of public  Assembly.  The assumption made by Justice Holmes  is that  a city owns its parks and highways in the  same  sense and  with the same rights a private owner owns his  property with the right to exclude or admit anyone he pleases.   That may  not  accord with the concept of  dedication  of  public streets  and parks.  The parks are held for public  and  the public  streets  are  also  held  for  the  public.   It  is doubtless  true  that  the  State  or  local  authority  can regulate its property in order to serve its public purposes. Streets and public parks exist primarily for other  purposes and the social interest promoted by untrammeled exercise  of freedom  of  utterance and assembly in  public  street  must yield to social interest which prohibition and regulation of speech   are   designed  to  protect.   But   there   is   a constitutional difference between reasonable regulation  and arbitrary exclusion. The  framers  of  the Constitution were  aware  that  public meetings  were  being held in public streets  and  that  the public  have come to regard it as part of their  rights  and privileges  as citizens.  It is doubtful whether, under  the common  law  of  the  land, they  have  any  such  right  or privilege but, nobody can deny the de facto exercise of  the right in the belief that such a right existed.  Common error facit  jus  (common error makes the law).   This  error  was grounded  on  the solid substratum of  continued  practice,. over  the years.  The conferment of a fundamental  right  of public  assembly would have been an exercise in utility,  if the Government and the local authorities could legally close all the normal places, where alone, the vast majority of the people could exercise the right.  Our fundamental rights  of free speech and assembly are modelled on the Bill of  Rights of  the Constitution of the U.S.A [ see  Express  Newspapers (Private)  Ltd.  and  Another  v. The  Union  of  India  and others(1)] (1)  [1959] S.C.R 12, 121. 293 would  be  relevant then to look to the ambit and  reach  of those rights in the United States to determinE their content and  range in India.  On closer analysis, it will  be  found that  the  basis  of Justice Roberts’  Dictum  in  Hague  v. C.I.O.(1)  is the continued de facto exercise of  the  right over  a number of years.  I think the same reasoning can  be applied here. The power of the appropriate authority to impose  reasonable regulation in order to assure the, safety and convenience of the  people  in the use of public highways  has  never  been regarded  as  inconsistent  with the  fundamental  right  of assembly.  A system of licensing as regards the time and the manner  of holding public meetings on public street has  not been regarded as an abridgement of the fundamental right  of public  assembly  or  of  free  speech.   But  a  system  of licensing  public meeting will be upheld by Courts  only  if definite. standards are provided by the law for the guidance of   the  licensing  authority.   Vesting   of   unregulated discretionary power in a licensing authority has always been considered  as bad [see the cases on the point discussed  in

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the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Niemotko v. MarylaNd(2)]. If there is a fundamental right to hold public meeting in a public street, then I need hardly say that a rule like  Rule 7, which gives an unguided discretion, practically dependent upon the  subjective whim of an authority to grant or refuse permission to hold a public meeting on public street, cannot be held to be valid.  There is no mention in the rule of the reasons  for  which  an  application  for  licence  can   be rejected.   "Broad  prophylactic rules in the area  of  free expression   and   assembly  are  suspect.    Precision   of regulation  must  be the touch stone in an area  so  closely touching our precious freedoms" [see NAACP v. Button(3). I would allow the appeal. BEG, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of Mylord  the Chief Justice and my learned brother Mathew.   I would  like  to  indicate why, despite  my  difficulties,  I conclude  that Rule 7 of the rules made under Section  33(0) of the Bom  bay Police Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ’the  Act’),  is void.  The difficulties I  refer  to  arise mainly  from two considerations : firstly, it is  abundantly clear  that there is no separate right of "public  meeting", let  alone a constitutional fundamental right so  described, and, in any case, there, is no such right attached to public streets  which are dedicated for the particular  purpose  of passing and repassing with which any recognition of a  right to hold a meeting on a public thoroughfare will obviously be in- (1) 307 U.S. 496.             (2) 340 US. 268 (3)  371 US. 415. 438 (1963) 294 consistent; and, secondly, although Rule 7 apparently  gives a wide discretionary power to give, or to refuse  permission to  hold  a  meeting on a "public street",  so  that  it  is capable  of  being  misused  or  so   used  as  to  enable unjustifiable  discrimination, yet, it is possible  to  find some  guidance, as the High Court of Gujarat found,  in  the preamble  as  well  as  in  Section  33  (0)  of  the   Act. Therefore,  it  may be possible to rely here,  as  the  High Court   had  done,  upon  the  presumption  that  even   the appar ently  wide discretionary powers vested by Rule  7  in the  Commissioner  of Police, a  highly  responsible  police officer, will not be abused.  It is certainly arguable  with some force that the power of the High Court; (to strike down an  improper exercise is a sufficient safeguard against  its misuse so that it may not be necessary to strike down Rule 7 at all.  Furthermore, in (the case before us, a good  enough reason  was given by the Commissioner to justify a  refusal. We are, however, also concerned with the validity of Rule  7 which  may be relied upon for future refusals or  grants  of permission which will, it is urged, effect the  petitioner’s rights. There  is  doubt that a "public street", as it  is  commonly understood,  is really dedicated for the use of  the  public for the purpose of passing, and repassing on it and not  for any  other purpose.  In this respect, it appears to me  that the  law  in  this country, as laid down by  this  Court  in Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P.(1) and the Municipal.   Board, Manglaur v. Sri Mahadeoji Maharaj(2), is not different  from the  Law  in  England found stated  in  Halsbury’s  Laws  of England (3) , as follows :               "The  right of the public is a right to  ’pass               along’ a highway for the purpose of legitimate               travel,  not to ’be on’ it, except so  far  as               their presence is attributable to a reasonable

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             and proper user of the highway as such". A right to use a public highway for the purpose of  carrying on  transport  business  or other forms  of  trade  such  as hawking, or, to take out a procession through it, is  really incidental  to  a reasonable user of the  highway  by  the,- public.  It would be fully covered by the purpose for  which the public road is deemed to be dedicated.  But. as  regards the supposed right to hold a "Public meeting" on a  highway, it  appears  to  me that  the  following  observations  from Blackwell’s  "Law of Meetings" (9th Edn..p. 5), could  apply equally well here :               "There appears to exist a view that the public               has a right to hold meetings for political and               other  purposes  on the highway.  This  is  an               erroneous assumption. (1) Alit 1954 S.C. 720.       (2) [1965] S.C.R. p. 242. (3) Halsbury’s Laws of England ’Third Edn.  Vol, 19, p. 73. 295               A  public  highway exists for the  purpose  of               free passage only, and for purposes reasonably               incidental  to  this right.  There can  be  no               claim  on  the part of persons who  desire  to               assembly for the purpose of holding a  meeting               to  do  so on the highway.  The claim  is  ir-               reconcilable  with the purpose for which   a               highway exists". I  do not find it possible to accept the view that a  merely erroneous  assumption  can ever form the basis  of  a  right unless buttressed by something stronger. No doubt a meeting held on a highway will not necessarily be illegal.  It may be sanctioned by custom or rest on  permis- sion,  from  an authority prescribed by statute,  to  put  a particular part of the public highway to an exceptional  and extraordinary  user for a limited duration even though  such user may be inconsistent with the real purpose for which the highway  exists.   The right has, however, to  be  shown  to exist or have a legal basis, in every case in which a  claim for  its exercise is made, with reference to the  particular part of the highway involved. The  Privy Council pointed out, in Lakshmidhar Misra &  Ors. v.  Bangalal  & Ors.(1), the right to user of  a  particular piece  of land for a particular purpose, such as  holding  a fair, may be part of the customary law of locality.  Thus, a customary  right  to  use a  highway  for  special  purposes sometimes may exist provided the ingredients of such a right are  established  although the customary right  may  not  be consistent  with  the  purpose  for  which  the  highway  is dedicated.   Proof of such a customary right attaching to  a particular  part of a highway must, however, be a matter  of evidence  in every case.  It seems clear to me that  we  are not  concerned  with  such rights as they were  not  set  up anywhere  in the case be-fore us, and, even if such a  right had  been  set  up,  it  could  only  be  adjudicated   upon satisfactorily in a civil suit. No doubt Dicey’s Law of the Constitution (10th Edn. p.  271- 272)  contains  a passage which deals with the  right  of  a subject  to  pass. through a highway and to  proceed  to  "a common"  together  with others in procession and to  hold  a public  meeting,  for political or  other  purposes  without obtaining the prior permission of any authority to  exercise such  a  right.   I am, however, unable to  read  into  this passage  the further right of holding a public meeting on  a highway  or  public  street.  It seems to me  that  what  is referred to there is only the right to pass through (1)  AIR 1950 P.C. p. 56

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296 a  public  thoroughfare in order to proceed to  and  hold  a meeting  on  "a common".  There may be a right of  using  "a common"  for  the  purpose of  holding  public  meetings  by custom. In  the Appendix to Dicey’s "Law of the Constitution(),  the position  under  the English law is stated very  clearly  as follows               "Does there exist any general right of meeting               in public places" The answer is easy.  No such               right is known to the Law of England.               "........  But speaking in general  terms  the               courts do not recognise certain spaces as  set               aside for that end.  In this respect, again, a               crowd  of a thousand people stand in the  same               position as an individual person.  If A  wants               to deliver a lecture, to make a speech, or  to               exhibit  a show, he must obtain some  room  or               field  which  he  can  legally  use  for   his               purpose.   He  must not invade the  rights  of               property-i.e. commit a trespass.  He must  not               interfere with the convenience of the  public-               i.e. create a nuisance.               "The  notion that there is such a thing  as  a               right of meeting in public places arises  from               more   than   one   confusion   or   erroneous               assumption.  The right of public  meeting-that               is, the right of all men to come together in a               place where they may lawfully assemble for any               lawful  purpose, and especially for  political               discussion-is  confounded  with  the   totally               different  and falsely alleged right of  every               man  to  use  for the  purpose  of  holding  a               meeting  any place which in any sense is  open               to the public.  The two rights, did they  both               exist, are essentially different, and in  many               countries  are regulated by totally  different               rules.   It  is assumed  again  that  squares,               streets,   or  roads,  which  every  man   may               lawfully  use, are necessarily  available  for               the  holding of a meeting.  The assumption  is               false.   A  crowd blocking up a  highway  will               probably  be a nuisance in the legal, no  less               than  in  the popular sense of the  term,  for               they  interfere  with the  ordinary  citizen’s               right to use the locality in the way permitted               to him by law.  Highways, indeed are dedicated               to  the public use, but they must be used  for               passing  and going along them, and  the  legal               mode of use negatives the claim of politicians               to  use  a highway as a forum,  just  a,-,  it               excludes the claim of actors to turn it (1)  Dicey’s  Law of the Constitution-"8th Edn.  Note  V  on Questions  connected with the right of public  meeting",  p. 498-499, 297 .lm15 into  an open-air theatre.  The crowd who collect,  and  the persons who cause a crowd, for whatever purpose, to  collect in a street, create a nuisance...... Dicey  does deal with a "right of public meeting" as  though it  was an outcome of a right of assembly.  But, he  assumes that an assembly, which is stationary, as distinct from  one which  is  moving, must be held at a place  where  there  is otherwise  a right to hold such an assembly  constituting  a

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"public meeting".  If the term "meeting" signified the  mere meeting  of one citizen with another it could be  said  that such a meeting of many citizens on a particular portion of a public  highway  is included within reasonable user  of  the public highway for the purpose for which it was dedicated so long  as  it does not interfere  unreasonably  with  similar rights  of others.  The term "public meeting",  however,  is generally used for a gathering of persons who stand or  take their  seats at a particular place so as to be addressed  by somebody  who is heard by or expresses the feelings  of  the persons  assembled.   If  the  term  "meeting"  were  really confined  to  what  may  be  called  a  moving  assembly  or procession  a right to hold it could be comprehended  within the right to take out a procession which should, it seems to me,  be distinguished from what is commonly understood as  a right to hold a public meeting.  Such a meeting, if held  on a  highway, must necessarily interfere with the user of  the highway  by  others who want to use it for the  purpose  for which the highway must be deemed to be dedicated. It  is true that there is a well recognised right of  taking out  processions on public thoroughfares in this country  as an  incident of the well understood right of their  user  by the  public.   But,  I find it  very  difficult  to  proceed further and to hold that such a right could be extended  and converted  into  a  right  to hold a  public  meeting  on  a thoroughfares  The  right to hold a public  meeting  may  be linked  with  or  even  flow out  of  rights  under  Article 19(1)(a) to express one’s opinions and 19(1)(b) to  assemble peaceably  and without arms, just as the right to  take  out processions  or  moving  assemblies may spring  from  or  he inextricably  connected with these rights, yet, inasmuch  as the right to hold a meeting at a particular place must  rest on  the  proof of user of that place for the exercise  of  a fundamental right, it appears to me that the right to such a user must be established in each particular case quite apart from  or independently of fundamental rights  guaranteed  by Article  19(1)  of our Constitution. it  involves  something more than the exercise of a fundamental right although  that something  more may be necessary for and connected with  the exercise of a fundamental right 298 In  Hague  v. C.I.O.(1), Roberts, J. no doubt spoke  of  the general  right of the public in America to use "streets  and parks .... for purposes of assembly, communicating  thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions".  But,  I do not find here a recognition of a right to hold a,  public meeting  on a public thoroughfare.  The passage relied  upon by  the  learned Counsel for the appellant  from  this  case referred to rights which could be exercised in "streets  and parks".  A natural interpretation of this passage appears to me  to be that whatever rights can be properly exercised  by members  of  the  public on a  public  thoroughfare  may  be exercised ,there but the others could be exercised in a park where  a public meeting could be held.  Whatever may be  the law in America, we have not been shown any authority for the proposition that there is an unconditional right of  holding a  public  meeting  at every public place, much  less  on  a public  thoroughfare  or  street  in  this  country,  as   a necessary incident of the fundamental rights of either  free speech or of assembly. If  the  position rested me.-rely on the  commonly  accepted meaning  of a "public street" and the purposes for which  it must be deemed to be dedicated it may have been possible  to argue  that Rule 7 itself goes beyond the scope of the  rule making  power  given  by  Section 3 3 (  0)  inasmuch  as  a

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stationary assembly, as a public meeting must necessarily be so long as the assembly last, could not reasonably be within the  purview of Sec. 33(O) of the Act.  But, the  definition of  the  public street in Section 2, sub. s. 15 of  the  Act lays down :               2(15)  "Street" includes any highway,  bridge,               way  over a causeway, viaduct, arch,  quay  or               wharf  or  any road,  lane,  footway,  square,               court,  alley  or passage  accessible  to  the               public, whether a thoroughfare or not". If we bear this definition in mind, it would appear that the public  could conceivably hold a meeting at a place  falling under this definition of a street.  If this is so, could the Commissioner not be authorised to regulate it in the  manner contemplated  by Rule 7 ? I think he could,  provided  there are sufficient safeguards against misuse of such a power. Rule 7 is so worded as to enable the Commissioner to give or refuse  permission  to  hold a public  meeting  at  a  place falling  within  the definition of "a  Street"  without  the necessity  of  giving  reasons for either  a  refusal  or  a permission.  It will, therefore, be possible for him,  under the guise of powers given by this rule, to discriminate.  If he  chooses  to  give  no  reasons  either  for  giving  the permission or for refusing it, it will not be possible (1)  307 U.S. 496, 515-516. 299 for a High Court or this Court to decide, without holding  a trial and taking evidence, what those reasons really are  in a  particular  case.  Such a wide power my  even  enable  an exceptional  user  of  a  public  thoroughfare,   completely inconsistent  with  the  rights of the  public  to  pass  or repass,  to be made of it without  sufficient  justification for it.  The Commissioner may give permission to use a place for  a public meeting on a public street, which may  not  be suitable for it, to influential or powerful persons but deny it to others.  Although, the right to hold a public  meeting at a public place may not be a Fundamental Right by  itself, yet, it is so closely connected with fundamental rights that a  power  to regulate it should not be left  in  a  nebulous state.    It  should  be  hedged’  round   with   sufficient safeguards against its misuse even if it is to be  exercised by  the Commissioner of Police.  He ought to be required  to give reasons to show why he refuses or gives the  permission for such exceptional user of a "street" as it is defined  in the  Act.  The rule should make clear the  circumstances  in which  the permission may be given or  refused.   Therefore, although I have had my serious doubts as to whether we  need declare Rule 7 invalid for a contravention of Art. 19 ( 1  ) (b)  , of the Constitution, yet, on fuller consideration,  I respectfully  concur  with  Mylord  the  Chief  Justice   in declaring  it  invalid because it is capable of  being  used arbitrarily   so   as  to  discriminate   unreasonably   and unjustiably and  thus  to affect the  exercise  of  rights conferred  by Articles 19(1) (a) and (b) without  sufficient means  ’of control over possible misuse of power.  The  Rule of  law our Constitution contemplates demands the  existence of adequate means to check possibilities of misuse of  every kind  of  power lodged in officials of the State.   I  would prefer to ’strike it down for contravening Article 14 of the Constitution  although, if its’ repercussions on the  rights guaranteed  by  Art, 19(1)(a) and (b) were also  taken  into account,  it  could  be  struck  down  as  an   unreasonable restriction on those rights as well. For  the reasons given above, I respectfully agree with  the order proposed by Mylord the Chief Justice.

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V.P.S. 2-L498 Sup CI/73 300