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PETITIONER: HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR  & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       26/03/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Delay condoned .      This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court, made on 1.7.1996 in LPA  No. 1213/95  confirming the  order  of  the  learned single judge in CWJC No.2311/95.      The admitted  position is that the petitioner No.1 came to be  appointed as Assistant, Petitioner No.2 as Driver and petitioner Nos. 3 to 5 as peons on different dates, viz., on August 1,  1988, November  10, 1989, May 31, 1987  and April 22, 1992.  They were  appointed in the co-operative Training institute, Deoghar  by its  principal. They  are  admittedly daily wage  employees. Their  services came to be terminated by the principal. Calling that termination in question. they filed a  writ petition in the High Court. The main grievance of the  petitioners before  us is  that termination of their services is  in violation  of section  25F of the Industrial Disputes  Act,   1947.  The   question  for   consideration, therefore, is  whether the  petitioners can  be said to have been ‘retrenched’ within the meaning of section 25 F  of the Industrial Disputes  Act? Every Department of the Government cannot be  treated to  be "industry".  When the appointments are  regulated  by  the  statutory  rules,  the  concept  of "industry" to  that extent stands excluded. Admittedly, they were not appointed to  the post in accordance with the rules but were engaged on the basis of need of the work . They are temporary employees  working on  daily  wages.  Under  these circumstances, their  disengagement from  service cannot  be construed to be a retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. The  concept of  "retrenchment" ,  therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeks to contend that in the High Court, the petitioners did not contend that it is a case of  retrenchment but  termination of  their services is arbitrary. Since they are only daily-wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary.      The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.