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PETITIONER: HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: V. S. KRISHNAMURTHY AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/08/1978

BENCH:

ACT:      Constitution of  India 1950  - Article 371-D and Andhra Pradesh Administrative  Tribunal  Order  1975  -  Scope  and effect of-An  officer of  the High  Court and  a Subordinate Judge compulsorily  retired-Administrative Tribunal held the retirement orders  invalid-Administrative  Tribunal  whether has jurisdiction  to entertain,  deal  with  or  decide  the representation by  a member  of the staff of the High  Court or of subordinate judiciary-Scope of Articles 229 and 235.

HEADNOTE:      Article 371-D (3) inserted by the Constitution (Thirty- Second  Amendment)  Act  1973,  empowers  the  President  to constitute an  Administrative  Tribunal  for  the  State  of Andhra Pradesh  to exercise  such  jurisdiction  powers  and authority  which   immediately  before   the  amendment  was exercisable by  any Court,  tribunal or authority in respect of appointment, allotment or promotion to posts in the Civil Services of  the State, under the State or under the control of  any  local  authority  within  the  state.  Clause  (10) provides that  the provisions  of the  Article and any order made  by   the  President   thereunder,  shall  have  effect notwithstanding any  other provision  of the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force.      Para. 6  of the  Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order, 1975  issued by  the President, setting up the Andhra Pradesh Administrative  Tribunal, provides that the Tribunal shall have  ’all  the  jurisdiction,  powers  and  authority exercisable by  all  Courts  with  respect  to  appointment, allotment or  promotion to  any public  post,  seniority  of persons appointed. allotted or promoted to such post and all other conditions of service of such persons’.      ’The first  Respondent in C.A. No. 2826/77 was a former employee of  the High  Court. He  originally belonged to the High Court  service. After  being  on  deputation  with  the Central and  State Governments  for some  years he re joined the High  Court service as Assistant Registrar and was later promoted as Deputy Registrar. ’The Chief Justice of the High Court in  exercise of  his powers  under Article  229 of the Constitution read  with the relevant rules, passed an order, dated January  3, 1969, compulsorily retiring the respondent from service,  who by then had attained the age of 50 years. His  writ   petition  assailing  the  orders  of  compulsory retirement, was  dismissed by  the High  Court on the ground that the  jurisdiction of  the High Court which was hitherto being exercised  under Article  226 of  the Constitution  to correct orders  of the  Chief Justice  on the administrative side with regard to conditions of service of officers of the High Court,  vested in the Administrative Tribunal by reason or clause  6 (1)  of the  A.P. Administrative Tribunal order

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made  by   the  President   under  Article   371-D  of   the Constitution.      The respondent  thereafter  moved  the  Andhra  Pradesh Administrative Tribunal,  which set aside the impugned order on the ground, that it was arbitrary. 27 and amounted  to a  penalty of  dismissal  or  removal  from service and,  as such,   as  hit by  Article 311(2)  of  the Constitution.      The respondent  in C.A.  No. 278/78 was a member of the Andhra  Pradesh   State  Judicial   Service  working   as  a Subordinate Judge.  He was  prematurely  retired  in  public interest  by  an  order  of  the  State  Government  on  the recommendation of the High Court.      The  respondent’s  contention,  that  in  the  case  of Subordinate Judges,  the High  Court  being  the  appointing authority, the Governor had no power or jurisdiction to pass an order  of premature  retirement, of a member of the State Judicial Service,  was accepted  by the  Tribunal,  and  the impugned order was set aside.      In  the   appeals  against   both  the  orders  of  the Administrative Tribunal,  it was contended before this Court by the  appellants that  Article 371-D  of the  Constitution should be  construed  harmoniously  with  the  basic  scheme underlying Chapters V and VI in Part VI of the Constitution; and so  construed, the general expression, such as "class or classes of  posts‘’, "Civil  Services of  the State" etc. in Clause (3) of this Article will not include posts/members of the High Court staff and the Subordinate Judiciary, with the result  that  the  impugned  orders  of  the  Administrative Tribunal are without jurisdiction and nullities.      On the  other hand, the respondents contended that. the phrase "any  Civil Service  of the  State" in  clause (3) of this Article  interpreted in  its widest sense, includes the members  of   the  High  Court  staff  and  the  Subordinate Judiciary; that  even it  such an interpretation is contrary to the Constitutional scheme of securing independence of the judiciary, such a result was intended to be brought about by insertion of  Article 371-D,  the non-obstante  provision in Clause (10) of which gives it an over riding effect.      Allowing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1. The entire scheme or Chapters V and VI in Part VI of  the Constitution  epitomised in Arts. 229 and 235 has been assiduously  designed by the Founding Fathers to ensure independence  of   the  High   Court  and   the  Subordinate Judiciary. [43F]      (a) In  regard to  servants and  officers of  the  High Court, Article  229 of  the Constitution  makes the power of their appointment, dismissal, removal, suspension, reduction in rank,  compulsory retirement  etc. including the power to prescribe their  conditions of service, the sole preserve of the Chief  Justice and no extraneous executive authority can interfere with  the exercise  of that  power  by  the  Chief Justice or  his nominee  except to  a  very  limited  extent mentioned in  the provisos. In conferring such exclusive and supreme powers  on the  Chief Justice  the object  which the Founding Fathers  had in view was to ensure the independence of the High Court. [37F-G]      (b) The  control over  the Subordinate Judiciary vested in the High Court under Article 23 5 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in  extent  and  effective  in  operation.  It comprehends a  wide variety  of matters  and is  a  complete control subject  only to  the power  of the  Governor in  me matter of appointment, dismissal or removal. [41B-C]

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28      (c) Since  retirement, simpliciter,  in accordance with the terms  and conditions  of service,  does not  amount  to dismissal or  removal or reduction in rank under Article 311 or under  the service rules, it is for the High Court in the exercise of  its ’control’  under  Article  235,  to  decide whether or  not a  judge of the Subordinate Judiciary should be prematurely  or compulsorily retired. Though in form such an administrative  decision of the High Court is advisory in substance and effect. it is well-nigh peremptory. [42D, 43B]      M. Gurumoorthy v. Accountant General Assam and Nagaland and Ors. [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 420, Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1967] 1 S.C.R. 77, Chandramouleshwar v. Patna High Court  [1970] 2  S.C.R. 666;  State of  Assam v.  Ranga Mohammed [1967] 1 SCR 454; State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi  [1966] 1  SCR   771; Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab [1975] 1 S.C.R. 814; Punjab and Haryana High Court v. State of  Haryana (Sub  nom Narendra Singh Rao) [1975] 3 SCR 365; State  of Assam v. S. N. Sen [1971] 2 SCR 889; State of Assam v.  Kuseswar Sukla  [1970] 2 SCR 923: State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo  Pati Tripathi  and Anr.  [1978] 2  SCC 102;  Tara Singh v.  State of  Rajasthan A.I.R.  1975 SC 1487; State of Haryana  v.  Inder  Prakash  Anand  A.I.R.  1976  S.C.  1841 referred to.      2. The phrase "any civil service of the State" commonly employed in  sub clauses  (a), (b)  and (c) of clause (3) of Article  371-D   is  a   general,  undefined   and  flexible expression and  is capable of bearing meaning more than one. If it  is construed  loosely, in  its widest  sense so as to include in  it the  High Court  staff and the members of the Subordinate Judiciary,  the result  will be that the control vested in  the Chief  Justice over  the staff  of  the  High Court, and  in the High Court over the subordinate judiciary will  become   shorn  of   its   substance,   efficacy   and exclusiveness; and after being processed through the conduit of the  Administrative Tribunal, will pass on into the hands of the  Executive Government,  which, under  clause  (5)  of Article 371-D is the supreme authority, having full power to confirm or not to confirm, modify or annul the orders of the Tribunal. Such  a  construction  will  lead  to  internecine conflict and  contradiction, rob  Articles 229  and  235  of their content  make a mockery of the Directive Principles in Article 50  and the  fundamental concept of the independence of the  judiciary, which the Founding Fathers have with such anxious  concern   built  into   the  basic  scheme  of  the Constitution. Parliament  could never  have intended  such a strange result. [53E-H]      3. (a)  In its  strict, narrow sense, the phrase ’Civil service of  the State.  will not take in members of the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary. [49 A-C]      (b) Non-use  of the  expressions. "judicial  service of the  State"   and  "District   Judges"  (which   have   been specifically defined  in Article  236),  and  "Officers  and Servants of  the High  Court", which  have  been  designedly adopted  in   Articles  235   and  229,   respectively,   to differentiate these  in the  scheme of the Constitution from the other  Civil  Services  of  the  State,  gives  a  clear indication that posts held by the High Court Staff or by the Subordinate Judiciary  have been advisedly excluded from the purview of Clause (3) of Article 371-D. [55 B-C]      4. In such a situation. the Court must eschew the wide, literal interpretation  which will  defeat or  render otiose the scheme  of Chapters V and VI, Part VI, particularised in Articles 229  and 235,  and instead,  choose the alternative interpretation according  to which members of the High Court

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Staff and the Subordi- 29 nate Judiciary  will not  fall within  the purview of Clause (3) of  Article 371-D. A Such a restricted construction will ensure smooth working of the Constitution; and harmony among its various provisions. [53H, 54A-B]      5. The  officers and servants of the High Court and the members of  the Judicial Service, including District Judges, being outside  the purview  of Clause  (3), the non-obstante provision in  Clause (10) of Article 371-D cannot operate to take away the administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the Chief Justice  or of  the High  Court, as  the case  may be, under Articles  229, 235  and 226  of  the  Constitution  in regard to  a dispute or matter relating to the conditions of service of  a member  of the  High Court  Staff  or  of  the Subordinate Judiciary. [55D]      6. In  view of the above, nothing in the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order, 1975, issued by the President confers   jurisdiction,   power   and   authority   on   the Administrative Tribunal  to entertain,  deal with  or decide the representation by a member of the High Court Staff or of the Subordinate  Judiciary. The  impugned orders. therefore, of the  Administrative Tribunal  in both these appeals, were without jurisdiction, null and void. [55 F-G]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos. 2826/ 77 and 278 of 1978      Appeals by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated  24-8-77   and   19-9-77   of   the   Andhra   Pradesh Administrative Tribunal  in  R.P.  Nos.  203/76  and  319/76 respectively.      L. N.  Sinha, G.  Narayana Rao  and P. P. Singh for the Appellants in both appeals.      Vepa Parthasarathy and A . Subba Rao for Respondent No. 1 in both the appeals.      P. Ramachandra  Reddy,  Adv.  Genl.  A.P.,  T.  I’.  S. Narasimhachari, G.  Narayana Rao  (In C.A.2826/77)  and Mrs. Urmila Sirur  for R. R. 2 and 4 in C.A. No. 2836/77 and R. 2 in C.A. 278/78.      The Court delivered the following order      Respondent 1,  Shri V.  V. S. Krishna Murthy, may if so advised file  a writ  petition in  the High  Court of Andhra Pradesh  for   challenging  the   order  of  his  compulsory retirement passed  by the  Governor  of  Andhra  Pradesh  on September 29,  1975. If  he files  the writ  petition within three weeks from today, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the State  of Andhra  Pradesh, whom respondent 1 proposes to implead to  his writ  petition, shall  file  their  counter- affidavit, if  so advised,  within  three  weeks  after  the filing of the writ petition. If respondent I desires to file a rejoinder he shall do so within a week after the filing of the counter-affidavit. The High Court shall take up the writ petition for  hearing within  six weeks  after the filing of the counter-affidavit. 30      The learned counsel who appeared before us for the High Court as  also the.  learned counsel  who appeared before us for the  State of  Andhra Pradesh  agree that the High Court and the State Government will not raise any objection to the maintainability of  the writ  petition  which  respondent  1 desires to  file for  challenging the  order  of  compulsory retirement" either on the ground of laches or of delay or on

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any other  technical  ground.  All  the  contesting  parties before us  are agreed  that the writ petition to be filed by respondent 1,  as aforesaid,  may be disposed of by the High Court on merits      The Government of Andhra Pradesh shall comply with the. Order passed  by this  Court on  March 22,  1978 within four weeks from to day.      We quash the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal dated  September 19,  1977 in R.P. No. 319 of 1976. We will  give our  reasons in  support  of  that  conclusion later.      The common  Judgment in  C.A. 2826/77  and C.A.  278/78 (C.A.V.) of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA, J.  This judgment  will not  only dispose  of this Appeal  (C.A. 2826 of 1977) but also furnish reasons in support of our short order dated August 4, 1978, by which we allowed Civil Appeal No.278 of 1978.      Both these  Appeals raise a common question with regard to the  interpretation, scope and impact of Article 371-D on Articles 226, 229 and 235 of the Constitution.      In Civil  Appeal 2826 of 1977, appellant 1 is the Chief Justice and  appellant 2 is the High Court of Andhra Pradesh represented by  the Registrar  of that  Court. Respondent 1, Shri L.  V. A.  Dikshitulu is  a former employee of the High Court whose premature retirement is in question. Respondents 2 and  3 are  the Government?  and the  Accountant  General, respectively of Andhra Pradesh.      Respondent 1  was a  permanent employee  of the  former Hyderabad High  Court prior  to November  1,  1956.  He  was confirmed  in  the  post  of  Chief  Superintendent  on  the establishment of  that High Court on October 6, 1956. At the time of his confirmation, he was serving on deputation, with the concurrence  of the  Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court, as  Junior  Law  officer  in  the  Ministry  of  Law, Government of  India. In March 1965, with the concurrence of the Chief  Justice of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh-which was the 31 successor High  Court to  the Hyderabad  High  Court-he  was appointed  as  a  temporary  Deputy  Secretary  in  the  Law Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh.      By  an   order  dated   February  6,  1968,  the  State Government replaced  his services  at the  disposal  of  the Chief Justice. On his reversion from deputation, he rejoined the  establishment   of  the  High  Court  as  Sub-Assistant Registrar on February 8, 1968.      On that  very day, the High Court received a complaint- petition  from   one  Smt.   Promila  Reddy,   an  Assistant Translator in  the State Law Department, alleging misconduct on the  part of  the 1st  Respondent relating  to the period during which he was working as Deputy Secretary in the State Government.      A  preliminary   inquiry  was  conducted  by  the  then Registrar, Shri  S. Ramachandra  Raju (later  Judge of  High Court of Andhra Pradesh), respondent 4 herein. The Registrar submitted his  preliminary inquiry  report to the then Chief Justice.  After  considering  the  report,  the  then  Chief Justice  suspended   the  1st   respondent  and   ordered  a departmental inquiry  against him  by Mr.  Justice  Chinappa Reddy. After  due inquiry  the enquiring Judge found the 1st respondent  guilty   of  misconduct   and  recommended   his suspension from  service for three years. The Chief Justice, however, differed  with the  enquiring Judge  regarding  the punishment,  and   proposed  to  impose  the  punishment  of compulsory retirement  after issue of a show-cause notice to

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that effect.  After considering  the representations made by the 1st  respondent, the  Chief Justice  by an  order, dated January 3, 1969, compulsorily retired him from service.      The 1st  respondent then  moved the  High  Court  under Article 226 of the Constitution by a writ petition (No. 1425 of 1969)  questioning the  order  of  the  State  Government replacing his services with the High Court and assailing the penalty of  compulsory retirement  inflicted upon him by the Chief Justice.  The  High  Court  set  aside  the  order  of reversion of  the first  respondent from  deputation to  the High Court  staff, on  the ground  that there  was a  stigma attached thereto.  It also set aside the order of compulsory retirement, not  on merits,  but  on  the  ground  that  the recommendation  of   the  enquiring   Judge  in   regard  to punishment,   viz.   stoppage   of   increments,   was   not communicated to  him (1st  respondent). The High Court while allowing the  writ petition observed that it will be open to the  State   Government  to   take  action  against  him  in accordance with  the Andhra  Pradesh Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules pertaining to lent officers. 32      After the first respondent’s writ petition (No. 1425 of 1969) was  allowed, the  State Government by an order, dated November 10,  ]970, reinstated the I st respondent as Deputy Secretary with  effect from February 8, 1968, and once again replaced his  services at  the disposal of the Chief Justice with effect  from April  25, 1968.  The State Government did not take  further departmental  action on  the complaint  of Smt. Promila Reddy.      The 1st  respondent then  filed another  writ  petition (No. 5442  of 1970) under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High  Court, impugning  the order,  dated  November  10, 1970, of the State Government. But, the High Court dismissed the same  by a judgment, dated December 30, 1 970. The first respondent’s appeals  (C.A.  476  and  C.A.  1536  of  1971) against the  orders of the High Court in the afore said writ petitions are pending in this Court.      After the dismissal of his writ petition (No. 5442/70), the first  respondent, on reinstatement, joined duty as Sub- Assistant Registrar  in the  High Court.  Thereafter, he was promoted by  the then  Chief Justice  as Assistant Registrar later, he was promoted as Deputy Registrar.      In 1975. A. P. Government Servants Premature Retirement Rules, 1975  came into force. Under the Rules, which amended Andhra Pradesh  Liberalised  Pension  Rules,  1961  and  the Hyderabad Civil  Service Rules,  employees of  the State who have completed 25 years of service or completed 50 years age can be  prematurely retired  after 3 month’s notice or grant of 3  month’s pay  in lieu  of notice. Rule 19 of the Andhra Pradesh  High   Court  Service   Rules  contains  a  similar provision.      Thereafter on  September  19,  1975,  a  Committee  was constituted  under   an  order  of  the  Chief  Justice.  It consisted  of  the  Acting  Chief  Justice  and  two  Judges (Madhava Reddy and Ramachandra Raju, JJ.) of the High Court. The Committee  reviewed the  service records of the servants and officers of the High Court who had reached the age of 50 years. The  1st respondent,  Sri Dikshitulu had attained the age of 50 years on March 12, 1974. The Committee resolved to retire him prematurely, among others, in public interest. By an order,  dated September  26, 1975,  of the  Acting  Chief Justice, purporting to have been passed under Article 229 of the Constitution  read with  Rule 39  of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court  Service Rules,  Rule 3(2)(a)  of Andhra  Pradesh Liberalised Pension  Rules 1961/Rule  292 of  the  Hyderabad

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Civil Service  Rules and  Rule  2(1)  of  A.  P.  Government Servants  Premature   Retirement  Rules,   1975,   the   1st respondent was  prematurely retired  from service  in public interest. On April 8, 1976, 33 he filed  a Review Petition. The then Chief Justice rejected his Review  Petition. The  rejection was communicated to him by a letter, dated September 13, 1976.      The first  respondent, again,  moved the  High Court on the Judicial  Side by  a writ  petition (No.  58908 of 1976) under Article 226 of the Constitution, praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of his pre nature retirement. This writ  petition came up for preliminary hearing before a Division Bench  of  the  High  Court,  which  by  a  lengthy speaking order  (after hearing  the Government  pleader), on October 29,  1976, dismissed  it on  the preliminary  ground that it  was not  maintainable because  "the jurisdiction of the High  Court which  was hitherto  being  exercised  under Article 226  of the  Constitution to  correct orders  of the Chief Justice  on the  administrative side  with  regard  to conditions of  service of  officers of  the High  Court  now stands vested  in the  Administrative Tribunal  by reason of clause 6(1)  of the  Administrative tribunal  order (made by President) and Article 371-D of the Constitution."      The first  respondent then  on November 16, 1976, moved the Andhra  Pradesh Administrative  Tribunal, impugning  the order of  his compulsory  retirement. In  that petition, the first respondent  inter alia  contended that  Mr. Justice M. Ramachandra Raju,  who sat  in the Committee to consider the case of  the 1st  respondent for  premature retirement,  was biased against  him  and  that  the  impugned  order,  dated September  26,   1975,  on   his  premature  retirement  was arbitrary and  capricious. The  Tribunal, however, set aside the  impugned   order  of  the  1st  respondent’s  premature retirement made by the Chief Justice on the sole ground that it is  arbitrary and  amounts to  a penalty  of dismissal or removal from  service and  is hit  by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution.      Against the aforesaid order, dated August 24, 1977, the appellants have  now come  in appeal  before us  by  special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.      Now, the relevant facts giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 278 of 1978, may be set out. G      The 1  st respondent,  Shri V.  V. S. Krishnamurthy, in that appeal  was, at  the material  time, a  member  of  the Andhra Pradesh  State Judicial  Service. He attained the age of SO  years  on  November  24,  1974.  He  was  prematurely retired, in public interest, by an order dated September 29, 1975 of  the State  Government on  the recommendation of the High Court.  Before the  Government  passed  this  order,  a Committee of  Judges appointed by the High Court, considered the entire 34 service record  of the  1st respondent  and records of other Judicial officers  and decided  to  prematurely  retire  the first respondent in public interest.      The first respondent filed a petition before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative  Tribunal, challenging  the order  of his premature  retirement made  by the  State Government. It was contended  by him that his service record has throughout been good.  Before the  Tribunal the High Court resisted the respondent’s petition  on  the  ground  that  the  order  of premature retirement  be based upon the over-all performance of the  respondent and  the order  had been passed in public interest and was in accordance with the Rules.

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    On behalf  of the  1st  respondent,  a  memorandum  was filed, in  which it  was contended  that since, according to the Andhra  Pradesh State  Judicial Service  Rules, the High Court in  the case  of Subordinate  Judges is the appointing authority, the Governor has no power or jurisdiction to pass an order  of premature  retirement of  a member of the State Judicial Service.  The tribunal accepted this contention and allowed the  Respondent’s petition  without considering  the other contentions  raised in the petition, and set aside the order of the respondent’s premature retirement.      Against that  order of  the Tribunal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh  came in appeal (C.A. 278 of 1978) by special leave to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.      The  first   contention  of   Shri  Lal  Narain  Sinha, appearing for  the appellants,  is that  in the  context  of basic and fundamental principles underlying the Constitution relating to the judiciary including the High Court, officers and servants  of the  High Court and members of the judicial services are  outside the  scope of  Article  371-D  of  the Constitution. It  is  urged  that  the  general  expressions indicating class  or classes  of posts  in Article  371-D(3) must be  given  a  restricted  interpretation  which  is  in harmony with this basic scheme of the Constitution.      The thrust  of the  argument is  that in the absence of clear, unequivocal  words  in  Article  371-D(3)  showing  a contrary intention,  the  Article  cannot  be  construed  as taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 to  review administrative action against a member of the High Court  staff or  the Subordinate  Judiciary. Any  other construction, proceeds  the argument,  will militate against the exclusiveness of the control vested in the Chief Justice under Article  279, and in the High Court under Article 235, over the  High Court  staff or the Subordinate Judiciary, as the case  may be,  and will  make such  control subject  and subservient to the wishes of the Executive 35 Government  which,   in  terms  of  the  Presidential  order constituting the  A Administrative Tribunal, is the ultimate authority to confirm, vary or annul the orders passed by the Tribunal. In support of his contention that the basic scheme of the  Constitution seeks to ensure the independence of the High Court  staff and  the judiciary from executive control, learned counsel  has referred  to Pradyat  Kumar Bose v. The Hon’ble the  Chief Justice  of Calcutta  High  Court(1);  M. Gurumoorthy  v.   Accountant  General  Assam  &  Nagaland  & Ors.,(2); State  of West Bengal v. Nirpendra Nath Bagchi(3); Baldev Raj Guliani & Ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana High Court & Ors.(4);  and State  of U.P.  v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & Anr.(5).      As against  the above, Shri Vepa Sarathy, appearing for the respective  first respondent in C.A. 2826 of 1977 and in C.A. 278  of 1978  submits that when his client filed a writ petition (No.  58908) of  1976  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution in  the High  Court for  impugning the order of his compulsory  retirement passed  by the  Chief Justice, he had served,  in accordance with Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  (original  Side)  Rules,  notice  on  the  Chief Justice and  the Government  Pleader, and in consequence, at the preliminary  hearing   of the  writ petition  before the Division Bench, the Government Pleader appeared on behalf of all the respondents including the Chief Justice and raised a preliminary  objection   that  the  writ  petition  was  not maintainable in  view of  Section 6  of the  Andhra  Pradesh Administrative Tribunal  order made  by the  President under Article 371-D  which had taken away that jurisdiction of the

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High  Court  and  vested  the  same  in  the  Administrative Tribunal. This objection was accepted by the High Court, and as a  result, the  writ petition was dismissed in limine. In these circumstances-proceeds  the argument-the  appellant is now precluded  on principles  of res  judicata and  estoppel from taking  up the  position, that  the Tribunal’s order is without jurisdiction. But, when Shri Sarathy’s attention was invited to  the fact  that no  notice was actually served on the Chief  Justice and  that the  Government Pleader who had raised this  objection, had not been instructed by the Chief Justice or  the High  Court to  put in  appearance on  their behalf, the  counsel did not pursue this contention further. Moreover, this  is a pure question of law depending upon the interpretation of Article 371-D. If the argument holds good, it will make the decision of the (1) [1955] (2) S.C.R. 1331. (2) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 420. (3) [1966] (1) S.C.R. 771. (4) [1977] (1) S.C.R. 425. (5) [1978] (2) S.C.C. 102 =A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 111. 36 Tribunal as  hearing been  given by  an authority  suffering from inherent  lack of  jurisdiction. Such a decision cannot be sustained  merely by  the doctrine  of  res  judicata  or estoppel as urged in this case.      In the  alternative, Shri  Sarathy submitted  that  the subject-matter of  this case will fall within the purview of ‘sub-clause (c) of Clause (3). Of Article 371-D, because (i) compulsory retirement  is a  condition of  service, and (ii) the 1st  respondent was  a person  appointed to  a post in a "civil service of the State" within the contemplation of the said Clause.  According to  Shri Sarathy,  even if  an order issued by  the President  under Clause (3) of article 371-D, abridges, curtails  or takes  away the  powers vested in the Chief Justice  under Article 229, or in the High Court under Articles 226  and 235,  or is contrary to the constitutional scheme of  securing independence  of the  judiciary, such  a result was  intended to be brought about by the amendment of the Constitution as is clear from the non-obstante provision in Clause (10) of this Article. Shri Sarathy further invited our attention  to the  definition of  the expression "public post" given  in the  order of  the  President  issued  under Article 371-D(3).  This definition, according to the learned counsel, is  wide enough  to include  all posts  held by the staff of the High Court and the Subordinate Judiciary.      To appreciate  the contentions  canvassed before as, it is  necessary,  at  the  outset,  to  have  a  look  at  the constitutional scheme  delineated in Chapters V and VI (Part IV), in  general, and the content of Article 229 and 235, in particular.      Chapter  V  is  captioned:  ’The  High  Courts  in  the States". It  provides for  various matters  relating to High Courts, such  as constitution  of High Courts (Article 216). Appointment and  Conditions of  the office  of a Judge (Art. 217), Salaries  of Judges  (Art. 221),  Transfer  of  Judges (Art. 222),  Jurisdiction of  existing High  Courts and  the powers  of   the  Judges   thereof  in   relation   to   the administration of  justice in the Court, including the power to make  rules of  Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court (Art.  225). Article  226 gives power to High Court to issue  certain   Writs  against   any  Government   for  the enforcement of fundamental rights and for the redress of any substantial injury  arising by  reason of any substantive or procedural illegality  Article 228  confers power  on a High Court  to  withdraw  to  its  own  file  cases  involving  a

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substantial question  of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Then  comes the  crucial provision  in Article 229, which  is the  fulcrum of  the scheme  of this Chapter. Article  229  bears  the  marginal  heading:  "officers  and Servants and the expenses of High Courts". Clause (1) of the Article provides that "appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief 37 Justice of  the Court  or such other Judge or officer of the Court as  he A  may direct". Then there is a proviso to this clause with  which we are not concerned in the instant case. Clause (2) empowers the Chief Justice or some other Judge or officer authorised  by him  to make  rules  prescribing  the conditions of  service of  officers and servants of the High Court. This  power, of course, is "subject to the provisions of any  law made  by the  Legislature of  the State".  Then, there is a proviso to this Clause, also, which requires that the "Rules made by the Chief Justice or the Judge or officer authorised by  him under  this Clause  shall so  far as they relate to  salaries, allowances,  leave or pensions, require the approval  of the Governor of the State. Clause (3) makes the administrative expenses of a High Court, including all C salaries, allowances  and pensions  payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court, a charge upon the Consolidated Fund of‘ the State.      Now, let  us see  what is  the ambit  and scope  of the power of  "appointment" in Article 229(1). In the context of Art. 229,  read as a whole, this power is of wide amplitude. The word  "appointment" in  Article 229  (  1  )  is  to  be construed according  to axiom  that the greater includes the less.  This   cardinal  canon  of  interpretation  underlies Section 16  of the  General Clauses  Act which has been made applicable by  Article 317(1) of the Constitution. Construed in the  light of  this  juristic  principle,  the  power  of "appointment" conferred  by Article  229(1  )  includes  the power to  suspend, dismiss,  remove or  compulsorily- retire from service.  In short,  in  regard  to  the  servants  and officers of  the High  Court, Article 229 makes the power of appointment, dismissal,  removal, suspension,  reduction  in rank, compulsory  retirement etc.,  including the  power  to prescribe their  conditions of service, the sole preserve of the Chief Justice, and no extraneous executive authority can interfere with  the exercise  of that  power  by  the  Chief Justice or  his nominee,  except to  a very  limited  extent indicated in  the Provisos. In conferring such exclusive and supreme powers  on the  Chief Justice  the object  which the Founding Fathers  had in view, was to ensure independence of the High Court.      The nature and scope of the powers of the Chief Justice under Article  229 has been the subject of several decisions of this  Court. In  Pradyat Kumar  Bose v.  The Hon’ble  the Chief Justice  of  Calcutta  (supra),  two  questions  among others, came  up for  consideration: (i)   Whether the Chief Justice of  a High  Court has  the  power  to  dismiss  from service an  officer of  the High  Court. (ii) If so, whether the Chief  Justice could  pass an  order of  such  dismissal without previous 38 consultation with the Public Service Commission, as provided by Article  320 of the Constitution. The Court answered both the questions in the affirmative.      Dealing with the second question, the Court pointed out that members  of the  High  Court  staff  are  not  "persons serving under  the Government  of a  State", and  that  this phrase-used in Article 320(3)(c)-"seems to have reference to

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such persons  in respect  of whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Government functioning in the  name of  the President  or of  the Governor". It was held that the servants and officers of the High Court do not fall within  the scope of this phrase "because in respect of them the  administrative control  is clearly  vested in  the Chief Justice.  who under the Constitution, has the power of appointment and  removal  and  of  making  rules  for  their conditions of  service". It  was further observed: "The fact that different  phrases  have  been  used  in  the  relevant sections of  the Government  of India  Act  (1935)  and  the Constitution relating  to the  constitutional safeguards  in this  behalf   appears  to   be  meant   to  emphasise   the differentiation of the services of the High Court from other services."      "....Therefore, both  on the ground that Article 320(3) (c) would  be contrary to the implication of Article 229 and on the ground that the language thereof is not applicable to the High  Court staff,  we are  of the  opinion that for the dismissal of  the appellant  by  the  Chief  Justice,  prior consultation with  the Public  Service  Commission  was  not necessary."      It was,  however, conceded  that for  the  purposes  of Article 311. the phrase "a person who is a member of a civil service of  a State"  used  in  that  Article  includes  the officers and servants of the High Court.      The powers  of Chief  Justice under  Article 229  again came  up   for  consideration   before  this   Court  in  M. Gurumoorthy v.  Accountant   General Assam & Nagaland & Ors. (supra). The  Stenographers Service  in the  High Court  was reorganised. Under  the reorganisation  scheme, one of these posts created with the sanction of the State Government, was to be  that of Selection Grade Stenographer. On May 7, 1959, the Chief  Justice appointed the appellant as Secretary cum- Selection Grade  Stenographer after merger of the two posts. The State  Government objected  that the  post of  Secretary could  not   be  merged   with  that   of  Selection   Grade Stenographer. The Accountant General, under the Government’s instructions,  withheld   the  appellant’s   pay-slips.  The appellant moved the High Court by a writ petition, which was dismissed. On appeal, this Court held that the Government 39 had authority  to  sanction  the  post,  but  it  could  not interfere  with   the  A  choice  of  the  incumbent,  which undoubtedly was to be of the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the  Constitution. In  that context,  Grover J., speaking for the  Court, neatly  summed up  the position, which being apposite to the point under discussion, may be extracted:           "The unequivocal  purpose and obvious intention of      the framers of the Constitution in enacting Article 229      is that  in the  matter of appointments of officers and      servants of  a High  Court, it  is the Chief Justice or      his nominee  who is  to be  the supreme  authority  and      there can be no interference by the executive except to      the limited  extent that  is provided  in the  Article.      This  was   essentially  to  secure  and  maintain  the      independence of  the High  Courts. The  anxiety of  the      constitution makers  to achieve  that object  is  fully      shown by  putting the administrative expenses of a High      Court including  all salaries,  allowances and pensions      payable to  or in  respect of  officers and servants of      the court  at  the  same  level  as  the  salaries  and      allowances of  the judges of the High Court nor can the      amount of  any expenditure so charged be varied even by      the legislature.  Clause (1)  read with  clause (2)  of

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    Article 229  confers exclusive  power not  only in  the      matter  of   appointments  but   also  with  regard  to      prescribing the  conditions of  service of officers and      servants of  a High Court by Rules on the Chief Justice      of the Court. This is subject to any legislation by the      State Legislature  but only in respect of conditions of      service.  In   the  matter  of  appointments  even  the      legislature  cannot   abridge  or   modify  the  powers      conferred on  the Chief  Justice under  clause (1). The      approval of  the Governor,  as noticed in the matter of      Rules, is  confined only  to such  rules as  relate  to      salaries, allowances, leave or pension. All other rules      in respect  of conditions of service do not require his      approval. Even  under the  Government of India Act, the      power to  make rules  relating  to  the  conditions  of      service of  the staff  of the  High Court vested in the      Chief Justice  of the  Court under  Section 242(4) read      with Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935."      In the  result, this  Court held  that any restrictions imposed by  the Government, while communicating the sanction of the  post, could  not bind  the Chief  Justice in view of Article 229 of the Constitution.      We  now   turn  to   Chapter  IV.   It  is   captioned: "Subordinate Courts".  It consists of Articles which provide for matters  relating inter  alia to appointment and control of persons who man posts in the 40 subordinate judiciary.  According  to  the  scheme  of  this Chapter subordinate  judiciary, has been classified into (i) District Judges;  and members  of  the  ’Judicial  Service’. Article 236  defines  the  expression  "district  judge"  to include "judge  of a  city civil  court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, Chief judge of  a small  cause court, chief presidency magistrate, additional  chief  presidency  magistrate,  sessions  judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge". The Article  defines  "judicial  service"  to  mean  "a  service consisting exclusively  of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district judge."      Article 233  gives the High Court an effective voice in the appointment  of District  Judges. Clause  ( 1  ) of  the Article peremptorily  requires that "appointments of persons to be,  and the  posting and  promotion of, district judges" shall be made by the Governor "in consultation with the High Court." Clause  (2)  of  the  Article  provides  for  direct appointment of District Judges from advocates or pleaders of not less  than seven  years standing, who are not already in the service  of the  State or of the Union. In the matter bf such direct appointments, also, the Governor can act only on the recommendation  of the High Court. Consultation with the High Court  under Article  233 is not an empty formality. An appointment made  in direct or indirect disobedience of this constitutional mandate, would be invalid. (See Chandra Mohan v. State  of U.P.(1);  Chandramouleshwar v. Patna High Court (2) . ’Service’ which under Clause (1) of Article 233 is the first source of recruitment of District Judges by promotion, means the ’judicial services’ as defined in Article 236.      The word  ’posting’ as  used in  Article  233,  in  the context of  ’appointment’ and  ’promotion’, means  the first assignment of  an appointee or promotee to a position in the cadre of  District Judges.  It cannot  be understood  in the sense of ’transfer’. [See Ranga Muhammad’s  case (3)].      Article 234  enjoins that  the rules in accordance with which appointments  of persons other than district judges to

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the judicial  service of  a State  are to  be made, shall be framed by  the Governor  in consultation with the High Court and the  Public Service Commission. The expression "judicial service" in  this Article,  carries the same connotation as. defined in Article 236. (1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 77. (2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 666. (3) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 454 41      Article 235 is the pivot around which the entire scheme of  the  Chapter  revolves.  Under  it,  "the  control  over district courts  and court subordinate thereto including the posting and promotions of, and the grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial service of State" is vested in the High Court.      The interpretation  and scope  of Article  235 has been the subject of several decisions of this Court. The position crystallised by these decisions is that the control over the subordinate judiciary  vested the  High Court  under Article 235 is  exclusive in  nature, comprehensive  in  extent  and effective  in  operation.  It  comprehends  a  wide  variety matters. Among others, it includes:      (a)  (i)   Disciplinary  jurisdiction  and  a  complete control subject  only to  the power  of the  Governor in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank of District Judges, and initial posting and promotion to the cadre of  District Judges.  In the exercise of this control, the High  Court can  hold inquiries  against a member of the subordinate  judiciary,   impose   punishment   other   than dismissal or removal, subject, however, to the conditions of service, and  a right of appeal, if any, granted thereby and to the  giving of  an  opportunities  of  showing  cause  as required by Article 311(2).      (ii) If  Article 235, the word ’control’ is accompanied by the  word "vest" which shows that the High Court alone is made the  sole custodian  of the control over the judiciary. The control  vested in  the High Court, being exclusive, and not dual,  an inquiry  into  the  conduct  of  a  member  of judiciary can  be held  by the High Court alone and no other authority. (State  of West  Bengal v.  Nripendra Nath Bagchi (supra); Shamsher  Singh v.  State of  Punjab(1); Punjab and Haryana High  Court v.  State of  Haryana (sub  nom Narendra Singh Rao) (2)      (iii) Suspension  from  service  of  a  member  of  the judiciary, with view to hold a disciplinary inquiry.      (b) Transfers,  promotions  and  confirmation  of  such promotions of persons holding posts in the judicial service, inferior is that of District Judge. (State of Assam v. S. N. Sen); (3)  State of Assam v. Kuseswar Saikia(4) ) .      (c) Transfers  of District  Judges (State  of Assam  v. Ranga Muhammad  (supra); Chandra  Mouleshwar v.  Patna  High Court (supra) . (1) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 814.      (3) [1971] 2 S.C.C. 889. (2) [1975] 3 S.C.R. 365       (4) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 923. 4-520SCI/78 42      (d) Award  of Selection  grade to  the members  of  the judicial service,  including District  Judges it being their further promotion  after their  initial appointment  to  the cadre. (State of Assam v. Kuseswar Saikia (supra).      (e)  Confirmation   of  District  Judges,  after  their initial appointment.  or promotion  by the  Governor to  the cadre of  District Judges under Article 233, on probation or officiating basis.  (Punjab & Haryana High Court v. State of Haryana (supra).

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    (f) Premature or compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Court  and of  Subordinate Courts (State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & Anr. (supra).      Since in  both these  appeals, orders  of the premature retirement of  the Respondents, viz. Of Shri Dikshitulu made by the  Chief Justice,  and of  Shri Krishnamoorthy  by  the Governor in  consonance with the decision of the High Court, are in question, it will be appropriate to amplify the point a little.  It is  well settled  that compulsory  retirement, simpliciter, in  accordance with the terms and conditions of service,  does   not  amount  to  dismissal  or  removal  or reduction in  rank under  Article 31  l or under the Service Rules because  the Government  servant  does  not  lose  the terminal benefits  already earned  by him (See Tara Singh v. State of  Rajasthan (1);  State of  Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand (2).      In the  last mentioned  case the Government servant was officiating in  the cadre of District Judges. The High Court recommended that  he should  be reverted  to his substantive post of  Senior Subordinate  Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrate and, as such, allowed to continue in service till the age of 58 years.  Contrary to the recommendation or the High Court, the State  Government passed  an order under Rule S.32(c) of the Punjab  Civil Service  Rules, compulsorily  retiring him from service  at the age of 55 years. Holding that the order of compulsory  retirement was  invalid, this  Court stressed that the power of deciding whether a judicial officer should be retained  in, service after attaining the age of 55 years upto the  age of  58 years, vests in the  High Court, and to hold otherwise  "will seriously  affect the  independence of the judiciary  and take  away the control vested in the High Court". The  formal order  of retirement, however, is passed by the  Governor acting  on the  recommendation of  the High Court. that  being "the  broad basis of Article 235". It was explained that "in such cases it is the contemplation in the Constitution, that the Governor as the (1) A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1487. (2) A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1841. 43 head  of   the  State   will  act   in  harmony   with   the recommendation of  the A  High Court". It was concluded that "the  vesting  of  complete  control  over  the  Subordinate Judiciary in  the High Court leads to this that the decision of the  High Court  in matters  within its jurisdiction will bind the  State". In  other words,  while in  form, the High Court’s  decision   to  compulsorily  retire  a  subordinate judicial officer  in the  exercise of  its administrative or disciplinary jurisdiction  under Article 235 is advisory, in substance and effect, it is well-nigh peremptory.      Recently, in  State of  Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi(1), this  Court  succinctly  summed  up  the  whole position as follows:                "The ideal  which inspired the provision that           the  control   over  District  Courts  and  courts           subordinate thereto  shall vest in the High Courts           is that  those wings  of the  judiciary should  be           independent of  the executive.  . . It is in order           to effectuate  that high  purpose that Art. 235 as           construed  by  the  Court  in  various  decisions,           requires  that   all  matters   relating  to   the           subordinate   judiciary    including    compulsory           retirement  and   disciplinary   proceedings   but           excluding the  imposition of  punishments  falling           within the  scope of  Article 311  and  the  first           appointments and  promotions should  be dealt with

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         and  decided  upon  by  the  High  Courts  in  the           exercise of the control vested in them."      In sum,  the entire scheme of Chapters V and VI in Part VI, epitomised  in Articles 229 and 235 has been assiduously designed by  the Founding  Fathers to insure independence of the High Court and the subordinate judiciary.      The stage  is now  set for  noticing the  provision  of Article 371  and the  Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal order, 1975, made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (3) and (4) of this Article. Article 371 was inserted  in the  Constitution with  effect from July 1, 1974 by  the Constitution  (Thirty  second  Amendment)  Act, 1973. This  Article as  its heading  shows,  makes  "special provisions with  respect to  the State  of Andhra  Pradesh." Clause (1)  of  the  Article  authorises  the  President  to provide by order "for equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the State" in matters of  public  employment  and  education.  Clause  (2) particularises the what an order made by the (1) [1978]2 S.C.C. 102. 44 President under clause ( I ), may require to be done. Clause (3), is crucial for the purpose of the instant case; and may be extracted in full. It reads as under:-                (3) The  President may, by order, provide for           the constitution of an Administrative Tribunal for           the State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  to  exercise  such           jurisdiction, powers  and authority (including any           jurisdiction,   power    and    authority    which           immediately  before   the  commencement   of   the           Constitution (Thirty  second Amendment) Act, 1973,           was exercisable  by  any  Court  (other  than  the           Supreme  Court   or  by   any  tribunal  or  other           authority) as  may be  specified in the order with           respect to the following matters, namely:-                (a) appointment,  allotment or  promotion  to           such cases  or  classes  of  posts  in  any  civil           service of  the State, or to such class or classes           of civil  posts under  the State, or to such class           or classes of posts under the control of any local           authority within the State, as may be specified in           the order;                (b) Seniority  of persons appointed, allotted           or promoted  to such  class or classes of posts in           any civil  service of  the State, or to such class           or classes  of civil  posts under the State, or to           such class  or classes  of posts under the control           of any local authority within the State, as may be           specified in the order.                (c)  Such  other  conditions  of  service  of           persons appointed.  allotted or  promoted to  such           class or  classes of  posts i civil service of the           State, or  to such class or classes of posts under           the State,  or to  such class  or classes of posts           under the  control of  any local  authority within           the State,  as may  be  specified  in  the  order.           (emphasis supplied).      Clause (4)  of the  Article further  provides  that  an order  made   under  clause   (3)  may   (a)  authorise  the Administrative  Tribunal   to  receive   representation  for redress of  grievances relating  to any  matters within  its jurisdiction, as the President may specify, and to make such orders thereon  as the  Tribunal may  deem fit;  (b) contain provisions with  respect to  the powers  and authorities and procedure of  the Administrative  Tribunal, (c)  provide for

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the transfer  to  the  Administrative  Tribunal  proceedings relating  to  classes  of  posts  within  its  jurisdiction, pending before  any Court  (other than the Supreme Court) or tribunal   or other  authority;  (d)  contain  supplemental, incidental  and  consequential  provisions  including  those relating to fees, limitation, evidence 45      Under Clause  (5), "the  order  of  the  Administrative Tribunal  finally   disposing  of   any  case  shall  become effective upon  its confirmation  by the State Government or on the  expiry of  three months  from the  date on which the order is made, whichever is earlier."      Then  there  is  a  Proviso  to  this  Clause,  a  most extraordinary provision, which says:-                Provided that  the State  Government may,  by           special order  made in  writing and for reasons to           be specified  there in,  modify or annul any order           of the  Administrative Tribunal  before it becomes           effective and  in such  a case,  the order  of the           Administrative Tribunal  shall have effect only in           such modified form or be of no effect, as the case           may be.      This clause  shows that unlike a Civil Court, or a High Court exercising  jurisdiction under  Article 226  (prior to the enactment  of Article  371D, the Administrative Tribunal set up  by an  order under clause (3) of the Article, is not competent to  pass definitive  or final orders, in the sense that  all   its  decisions   or  orders   are   subject   to confirmation,  modification   or  annulment   by  the  State Government. The Tribunal’s order has no force proprio vigore unless confirmed  by the  State Government  either expressly within three  months of  the date  on which  it was made, or impliedly by  not interfering  with that  order for the said period of  three months.  Then there  is no provision in the Article,  requiring   the  State   Government  to   give  an opportunity of  hearing to  the parties  before modifying or annulling the order of the Tribunal.      Clause  (6)   requires  every   special  order  of  the Government made under Clause (5) to be laid before the State Legislature. Clause (7) clarifies that the High Court or any other Court (other than the Supreme Court) or tribunal shall have no  jurisdiction, power  or authority in respect of any matter subject  to the  jurisdiction, power or authority of, or in  relation to,  the Administrative  Tribunal Clause (8) gives power  to the  President to abolish the Administrative Tribunal, if he is satisfied that its continued existence is not necessary.      Clause (9)  is  a  validating  provision.  As  will  be presently seen,  it was enacted to get over the difficulties created by the judicial decisions on Mulki Rules. 46      Clause  (10)   gives  an   overriding  effect   to  the provisions of  Article 371D  and to  the Presidential orders made thereunder, by enacting:                "(10) The  provisions of  this article and of           any order  made by  the President thereunder shall           have effect notwithstanding anything; in any other           provision of  the Constitution or in any other law           for the time being in force."      In the  context,  we  may  also  have  a  look  at  the provisions of  the Andhra,  Pradesh Administrative  Tribunal order, 1975,  dated the  19th May,   1975  (published as per G.O.Ms. No.  323, General  Administration (SPF-D),  22nd May 1975), made by the President in exercise of his powers under Clauses (3)  and (4)  of Article  371-D. Paragraph 2 of this

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order contains  definitions of  various expressions  used in therein.  Clause  (d)  of  this  paragraph  defines  "person employed" to  mean "an  individual, in  relation to whom the Tribunal  has   jurisdiction  in   respect  of  the  matters specified in  paragraph 6  of this order." Paragraphs 3 to 5 are  not   material  to   the  points  under  consideration. Paragraph  6   is  important.   It  provides  in  regard  to "Jurisdiction, powers  and authority  of the  Tribunal".  It confers on  the Tribunal  "all the jurisdiction,, powers and authority which, immediately before the commencement of this order, were  exercisable by  all Courts  (except the Supreme Court) with  respect to  appointment, allotment or promotion to any public post, seniority of persons appointed, allotted or promoted to such post and all other conditions of service of such persons." Sub-para (2) provides that nothing in sub- paragraph (1)  of this  paragraph  shall  apply  to,  or  in relation to,           (a)  persons appointed on contract for a specified           term or purpose;           (b)  member of the All-India Services;           (c)  persons  on   deputation   with   the   State           Government or any local authority within the State           being persons  in the  services of  the Central or           any other State Government or other authority;           (d)  persons employed, on part-time basis; and           (e) village officers.      Sub-para (3)  is not  relevant. Sub-para (4) makes "the law in  force immediately  before the  commencement of  this order with respect to the practice procedure and disposal of petitions for the issue of directions, orders or writs under article 226 of the Constitution by 47 the  High   Court  of   Andhra  Pradesh"   applicable  (with modifications, if any, made by the Tribunal) to the disposal of petitions by the Tribunal.      There is  a proviso  to this sub-paragraph which is not relevant for  our purpose.  The Explanation appended to this Sub-paragraph  defines  for  the  purpose  of  Paragraph  6, "public post" to mean:-           (a)  all classes of posts in all civil services of           the State;           (b) all  classes of  civil posts  under the State; and           (c)  all classes of posts under the control of any           local. authority within the State.      Paragraph  7   empowers   the   Tribunal   to   receive representations from  persons aggrieved, relating to matters within the  jurisdiction of  the Tribunal.  Then there  is a proviso  directing  the  Tribunal  not  to  admit  any  such representation (a)  unless the  person concerned has availed of the  remedies under  the relevant  rules for  making such representation  to   the  State   Government  or  the  local authority, as  the case  may be, "or to any other officer or other  authority   under  the   State  Government  or  local authority and  has failed;"  or (b) if a period of more than six months  has elapsed  after a  final order  rejecting the representation. The  next  material  provision  is  in  sub- paragraph (3) which provides that where a representation has been admitted  by the  Tribunal "all proceedings for redress of such  grievance pending  before the  State Government  or local authority" shall abate.      Paragraph 8  is not  relevant. Paragraph 9 mandates the Tribunal that  when it passes a final order disposing of any case, it  shall forward the proceedings thereof to the State Government.

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    Paragraph 14  provides for transfer of proceedings from the High  Court and other Courts to the Tribunal, in matters in relation  to which jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal by this order.      The rest  of  the  provisions  of  the  order  are  not relevant to the problem before us.      The ground  is now  clear for considering the question. Whether the officers and servants of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and  persons holding posts in ’the judicial service of the State’,  including ’District  Judges’ are subject to the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal order, 1975 made by the President in exercise of his powers under Clauses (3) and (4) of Article 371D? 48      We have  seen that  the  substantive  provision  is  in Clause (3).  This clause defines the extent and delimits the area of the "jurisdiction, power and authority" with respect to  certain   matters  mentioned   therein,  which   may  be conferred, wholly or in part, on the Administrative Tribunal by an order made by the President, thereunder.      Clause  (4)   only   subserves   and   elucidates   the substantive Clause (3).      It  is  undisputed  that  compulsory  retirement  is  a condition of  service. The question, therefore, narrows down into the  issue. Do  the posts held by officers and servants of the  High Court, and members of the subordinate judiciary fall under  any of the "class or classes of posts" mentioned in sub-clause  (c) of  Clause (3)  of  Article  371D  ?  For reaching  a  correct  finding  on  this  issue,  it  is  not necessary to  dilate on  the Administrative  Tribunal  order made by  the President,  or to  explore  the  scope  of  the expression "public post" defined in Paragraph 6 thereof for, the order  has, merely  for the sake of convenience, adopted this brief  expression to  cover compendiously all the three phrases commonly employed in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Clause (3)  of the  Article. Though the content of the first limb of each of the sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) varies, the rest of  the language employed therein is identical. Each of these three  sub-clauses, in  terms,  relates  to  glass  or classes of-           (i) "posts in any civil service of the State", or           (ii) "civil posts under the State", or           (iii)"posts  under   the  control   of  any  local                authority with in the State". It is  manifest that  posts on the establishment of the High Court or held by the members of the judiciary are not "posts under the control of any local authority". Neither the Chief Justice,  nor   the  High  Court  can  be  called  a  "local authority" within  the meaning  of clause  (iii). As regards (ii), it is conceded even by Shri Vepa Sarathy, that persons holding posts  on the  staff of  the High  Court or  in  the subordinate judiciary  do not  hold their  posts  under  the control of  the State  Government, and, as such, those class or classes of posts do not fall within the purview of phrase (ii), either.      The compass  of the  problem thus  further gets reduced into whether  the phrase "posts in the civil services of the State" commonly  occur ring in sub-clauses (a), ( b) and (c) of Article  371-D (3)  covers posts  held by  the High Court staff and  persons belonging  to the subordinate judiciary ? This  phrase   is  couched   in  general   terms  which  are susceptible of more than one interpretation. 49      The phrase "Civil service of the State" remains more or less an  h amorphous  expression as  it has not been defined

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anywhere  in  the  Constitution.  Contrasted  with  it,  the expressions "judicial  service of  the State"  and "District Judge" have  been specifically  defined in  Article 236, and thus  given   a  distinctive,   definite  meaning   by   the Constitution-makers.  Construed   loosely,  in   its  widest general sense.  this elastic  phrase  can  be  stretched  to include the  ’officers and  servants of  the High  Court’ as well as  members of the Subordinate Judiciary. Understood in its  strict   narrow  sense,   in  harmony  with  the  basic constitutional scheme  embodied in  Chapters V  and VI, Part VI, and  centralised in  Articles 229  and 235,  thereof the phrase will not take in High Court staff and the Subordinate Judiciary. Shri  Vepa Sarthy  canvasses for  adoption of the expansible interpretation  which will  cover the  High Court staff and  the subordinate  judiciary, while Shri Lal Narain Sinha urges  for acceptance of the restricted but harmonious construction of  the said phrase. A choice between these two rival constructions  of the  phrase "civil  services of  the State" is to be made in the light of well settled principles of interpretation  of  Constitutional  and  other  statutory documents.      The primary  principle  of  interpretation  is  that  a Constitutional or  statutory provision  should be  construed "according to  the intent  of they  that  made  it"  (Coke). Normally, such  intent is  gathered from the language of the provision. If  the language  or the  phraseology employed by the legislation  is precise  and plain  and thus  by itself, proclaims the  legislative intent  in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may  follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean,  or evocative  or  can  reasonably  bear meaning more  than  one,  the  rule  of  strict  grammatical construction ceases  to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent.  In such  a case,  in order to ascertain the true  meaning of  the terms  and phrases employed, it is legitimate for  the Court  to go  beyond  the  arid  literal confines of  the provision  and to  call in  aid other well- recognised rules  of construction,  such as  its legislative history, the  basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each  portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the  legislation, the  object sought  to be achieved, and the consequences  that may  flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation.      Where two  alternative constructions  are possible, the Court must  choose the  one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth, harmonious working, and  eschew the  other which  leads  to  absurdity, confusion. Or friction, contradiction 50 and conflict  between various  provisions, or undermines, or tends to  defeat or  destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment.  These canons  of construction  apply to  the interpretation  of  our  Constitution  with  greater  force, because the  Constitution is  a living, integrated organism, having a  soul and consciousness of its own. The pulse beats emanating from the spinal cord of its basic framework can be felt all  over its  body, even  in the  extremities  of  its limbs.  Constitutional   exposition  is  not  mere  literary garniture; nor  a mere  exercise in  grammar. As  one of  us (Chandrachud, J.  as he  then was)  put  it  in  Keshvananda Bharati’s case, "while interpreting words in solemn document like the  Constitution, one  must look  at  them  not  in  a school-masterly  fashion,   not  with  the  cold  eye  of  a lexicographer, but  with the  realization that they occur in ’a single  complex instrument  in which  one part  may throw

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light on  the other’  so that  the construction  must hold a balance between all its parts."      Keeping in  mind the  principles enunciated  above,  we will first  leave a  peep into  the historical background of the provisions in Article 371 D.      The  former  State  of  Hyderabad  comprised  of  three linguistic areas:  Telengana, Marathwada  and  Karnatak.  In 1919, the Nizam issued a Firman promulgating what came to be known as  Mulki Rules.  The Nizam  confirmed these  Rules by another Firman  issued in  1949. Those  Rules provided inter alia 15  years’ residence  in  the  State  as  an  essential qualification for public employment.      In 1955, the Rajpramukh in exercise of his powers under Article  309,   Proviso,  of  the  Constitution  framed  the Hyderabad General Recruitment Rules, 1955 in supersession of all the  previous rules  o the  subject. One  of these Rules laid down  that domicile  certificate would be necessary for appointment to  a State  or subordinate  service,   and  the issue of  such certificate  depended upon  residence in  the State for a period of not less than 15 years.      On November  1, 1956,  as a  result of  the coming into force  of  the  States  Reorganisation  Act,  the  State  of Hyderabad was trifurcated. Telengana region became a part of the newly  formed State  of Andhra Pradesh, while Marathwada and Karnatak  regions ultimately became parts of Maharashtra or Mysore States.      With these  prefatory remarks,  we may  now notice  the Statement of  objects and  Reasons for the Bill which became the Constitution  (32nd Amendment)  Act 1972. This Statement may be quoted in extenso:           "When the  State of  Andhra Pradesh  was formed in      1956,  certain   safeguards  were   envisaged  for  the      Telengana area in the matter of development and also in      the matter of 51      employment opportunities and educational facilities for      that   residents of that area. The provisions of clause      (1) of Article 371 of the Constitution were intended to      give effect  to certain  features of  these safeguards.      The Public  Employment (Requirement  as  to  Residence)      Act, 1957,  was  enacted  inter  alia  to  provide  for      employment opportunities  for  residents  of  Telengana      area. But  in 1969  (in the  case, A.  V. S.  N. Rao v.      Andhra Pradesh  1970 (1) S.C.R. 115), the Supreme Court      held  the   relevant  provision   of  the   Act  to  be      unconstitutional  in  so  far  as  it  related  to  the      safeguards envisaged for the Telengana area. Owing to a      variety of  causes, the  working of the safeguards gave      rise to  a certain  amount of dissatisfaction sometimes      in the  Telengana area and sometimes in the other areas      of the  State. Measures  were devised from time to time      to resolve  the problems.  Recently several  leaders of      Andhra Pradesh  made a  concerted effort to analyse the      factors  which   have   been   giving   rise   to   the      dissatisfaction  and   find  enduring  answers  to  the      problems with  a view  to  achieving  fuller  emotional      integration of  the people  of Andhra  Pradesh. On  the      21st September  1973, they  suggested certain  measures      (generally known as the Six-Point Formula) indicating a      uniform approach  for promoting accelerated development      of the  backward areas of the State so as to secure the      balanced development  of the  State as  a whole and for      providing equitable opportunities to different areas of      the State  in the  matter of  education, employment and      career prospects  in public  services. This formula has

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    received wide  support in  Andhra Pradesh  and has been      endorsed by the State Government.      2. This  Bill has  been brought  forward to provide the      necessary constitutional authority for giving effect to      the Six  Point Formula  in so  far as it relates to the      provision of  equitable  opportunities  for  people  of      different areas of the State in the matter of admission      to educational  institutions and  public employment and      constitution  of   an  Administrative   Tribunal   with      jurisdiction  to   deal  with   certain  disputes   and      grievances relating  to public  services. The Bill also      seeks  to   empower   Parliament   to   legislate   for      establishing a  Central University  in  the  State  and      contains provisions  of an incidental and consequential      nature including  the provision  For the  validation of      certain appointments made in the past. 52      As   the    Six-Point   Formula    provides   for   the      discontinuance of  the Regional  Committee  constituted      under clause  (1) of  article 371  of the Constitution,      the Bill also provides for the repeal of that clause."         (Parenthesis and emphasis in Para 1 added).      It will  be seen  from  the  above  extract,  that  the primary purpose  of enacting  Article 371D was two-fold: (i) To promote "accelerated development of the backward areas of the State of Andhra so as to secure the balanced development of the  State as  a whole",  and (ii)  to provide "equitable opportunities to  different areas of the State in the matter of education,  employment and  career  prospects  in  public service.      To achieve  this primary  object, Clause (1) of Article 371D empowers  the  President  to  provide  by  order,  "for equitable  opportunities   and  facilities  for  the  people belonging to  different parts  of the State in the matter of public employment  and in  the matter  of education". Clause (2) of  the Article  is  complementary  to  Clause  (1).  It particularises the  matters which an order made under Clause (1) may  provide.  For  instance,  its  sub-clause  (c)  (i) enables the  President to  specify in his order, "the extent to which,  the manner in which and the conditions subject to which", preference  or reservation shall be given or made in the matter of direct recruitment to posts in any local cadre under the  State Government  or under  any local  authority. Sub-clause (c)  further makes  it clear that residence for a specified period  in the local area, can be made a condition for recruitment  to any  such local  cadre. Thus, Clause (4) also, directly  is designed to achieve the primary object of the legislation.      From the  foregoing conspectus  it is  evident that the evil which  was sought  to be  remedied, (viz.,  inequitable opportunities and  facilities for  the people  belonging  to different parts of the State of Andhra Pradesh in matters of public  employment  and  education)  had  no  causal  nexus, whatever, with  the  independence  of  the  High  Court  and subordinate judiciary  which the  Founding Fathers have with solemn concern  vouchsafed in Arts. 229 and 235. Nor did the public agitation  which led to the enactment of Article 371D make any  grievance against  the basic  scheme of Chapters V and VI in Part VI of the Constitution.      The Statement  of objects and Reasons does not indicate that there  Was any  intention, whatever, on the part of the legislature to impairer derogate from the scheme of securing independence of  the Judiciary  as enshrined in Articles 229 and 235. Indeed, the amendment or 53

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abridgement of‘  this basic  scheme was  never an  issue  of debut in  Parliament when, the Constitution (32nd Amendment) Bill was considered.      One test  which may  profitably be applied to ascertain whether the  High Court  staff and the Subordinate Judiciary were intended  to be included in Clause (3) of Article 371D, is: Will  the exclusion  of the  judiciary from the sweep of this Clause  substantially affect  the scope  and utility of the Article  as an instrument for achieving the object which the Legislature had in view? The answer cannot but be in the negative.  The   High  Court   staff  and   members  of  the Subordinate Judiciary  constitute only  a  fraction  of  the number  of  persons  in  public  employment  in  the  State. Incidently, it  may be  mentioned that  one of  the  primary purposes of this Article, viz., to secure equitable share in public employment  to people  of certain  local areas in the State on  the basis  of the  Mulki Rules  requiring 15 years residence in  those areas,  could be  achieved  under  those Rules which,  as subsequently  clarified by  this  Court  in State of  Andhra Pradesh. v. V. V. Reddy(1) continued to be- in force as valid law in the territories of the former State of Hyderabad State, even after the constitution of the State of Andhra Pradesh.      Let  us   now  apply   another  test   which   in   the circumstances  of   the  case  will  be  decisive.  In  that connection, we have to see what consequences will flow if we give this  general, undefined  and flexible  phrase,  "Civil services  of  the  State"  in  Article  371D(3),  the  wider construction so as to include in it the High Court staff and the members  of the  subordinate judiciary.  The  inevitable result of  such an  extensive construction  will be that the control vested  in the  Chief Justice  over the staff of the High Court,  and in  the High  Court  over  the  Subordinate Judiciary will  become shorn  of its substance, efficacy and exclusiveness; and after being processed through the conduit of the  Administrative Tribunal, will pass on into the hands of the  Executive Government.  which, under Article 371D(5), is the  supreme authority,  having full  power to confirm or not to  confirm, modify or annul the orders of the Tribunal. Such a  construction will  lead to  internecine conflict and contradiction, rob  Articles 229  and 235  of their content, make a  mockery of the Directive Principle in Article 50 and the  fundamental   concept  of   the  independence   of  the judiciary, which the Founding Fathers have with such anxious concern built  into the  basic scheme  of the, Constitution. Parliament, we  are sure,  could never  have intended such a strange result.  In our  quest for  the  true  intention  of Parliament, therefore,  we must  eschew  this  wide  literal interpretation      (1) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 823 54 which will defeat or render otiose the scheme of Chapters IV and V,  Part VI  particularised in Articles 229 and 235, and instead, choose  the alternative interpretation according to which members  of the  High Court  staff and the subordinate judiciary will  not fall  within the  purview of  the phrase "civil  services   of  the   State".   Such   a   restricted construction will  ensure smooth working of the Constitution and harmony amongst its, various provisions.      It is  true that this very phrase in the context of the provision in  Article 311 includes the employees of the High Court and  members of  the judicial services. But it must be remembered that  the provisions  of Article  311  are  of  a general nature.  They give  constitutional recognition  to a fundamental principle  of natural  justice,  by  making  its

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protection available  uniformly tc  all Government servants. That is  why in  the context of that Article this phrase has been spaciously  construed. As against this, Article 371D is a special provision which marks a departure from the general scheme of the Constitution. The area of the departure cannot be extended  beyond what  is unmistakably  and  specifically delineated by  the words  employed therein. A phrase used in the context  cf a  general provision  may not carry the same meaning when employed in the context of a special provision, particularly when  that phrase  has no where been defined in the enactment.  "Words used  with reference  to one  set  of circumstances",  said  Lord  Blackburn  in  Edinburn  Street Tramways   Co. v.  V. Torbin(1),  "may convey  an  intention quite different from what the self-same set of words used in reference to  another set  of circumstances  would or  might have produced". This holds true even when the same words are used in different contexts in the same enactment. Therefore, in a  special provision  like Article  371D as  its  heading itself proclaims- which derogates from the general scheme of the Constitution  for a  specific purpose, general undefined phrases are  not to be interpreted in their widest amplitude but strictly  attuned to  the context  and purpose  of‘  the provision.  Conversely,   had  it   been  the  intention  of Parliament to  include ’officers  and servants  of the  High Court’ and  members of  the ’judicial services of the State’ and of  the cadre of ’District Judges’, in the phrase ’civil services of  the State’  occurring in  Clause (3) of Article 371D, and thereby depart from the basic scheme of Chapters V and VI  Part VI,  the language commonly employed in the sub- clauses should have read like this:-           "Class or  classes of  posts in the civil services      of the  State including posts. in the "judicial service      of the State " (1)[1877] 3 Appeal Cases 58, 68. 55      and of "District Judges" in the State; class or classes      of   posts of "officers and servants of the High Court"      ...."      In  our  opinion,  non-use  of  the  phrases  "judicial service of the State" and "District Judges" (which have been specifically defined  in Article  236),  and  "officers  and servants of  the High  Court",  which  has  been  designedly adopted  in   Articles  235,   and  229,   respectively,  to differentiate them  in the  scheme of  the Constitution from the other  civil  services  of  the  State,  gives  a  clear indication that posts held by the High Court staff or by the Subordinate  Judiciary  were  advisedly  excluded  from  the purview of Clause (3) of Article 371D. The scope of the non- obstante  clause   in  sub-article   (10)  which   gives  an overriding effect  to this  Article is conterminous with the ambit of the preceding clauses.      The ’officers  and servants  of the High Court’ and the members of  the Judicial Service, including District Judges, being outside  the purview  of Clause  (3), the non-obstante provision in  Clause (10)  cannot operate  to take  away the administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or of  the High  Court, as  the case  may be, under Articles 229, 235  and 226  of the  Constitution in  regard to  those public servants  in matters  or disputes  falling within the scope of  the said  Articles. Clause  (10) will prevail over any provisions  of the  Constitution, other than those which are outside the ambit of Article 371-D, such as Articles 229 and 235.  Provisions not otherwise covered by Article 37t-D, cannot be  brought within  its sweep  because  of  the  non- obstante Clause  (10). It  follows as  a necessary corollary

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that nothing  in the order of the President constituting the Administrative  Tribunal,   confers  jurisdiction   on   the Tribunal   to   entertain,   deal   with   or   decide   the representation by a member of the staff of the High Court or of the Subordinate Judiciary.      For the  foregoing reasons,  we hold  that the impugned order dated  August 24, 1977 of the Administrative Tribunal, having been  passed  without  jurisdiction,  is  a  nullity. Accordingly, we allow Civil Appeal No. 2826 of 1977, leaving the parties to pay and bear their own costs.      The reasons  given above  apply mutatis  mutants to the case of  Krishnamurthy in  Civil Appeal  No. 278 of 1978 and furnish the  basis of  our short order dated August 4, 1978, by which  we had  accepted that appeal. In this Appeal (C.A. No. 278/78)  however, the  respondent’s costs  in this Court will be  borne by  the appellant  in terms  of this  Court’s order dated 10-2-78 in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 626 of 1978.      In view  of the  orders dated  28th November,  1977 and 22nd March, 56 1978, passed in stay applications Nos. 4804 of 1977 and 1744 of 1978 respectively, and in terms of those orders we direct that  since  the  appeals  have  been  allowed,  the  excess payment, if  any, made  pursuant to the stay orders shall be adjusted towards pension that may be due to the respondents. The  adjustment  shall  be  made  in  easy,  convenient  and reasonable instalments. N.V.K.                                      Appeals allowed. 57