HEAD MASTER,MEENAL A.C. VIDYALAYA Vs SUNITA LAXMAN KOLHE
Bench: C.K. THAKKER,AFTAB ALAM, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-000421-000421 / 2007
Diary number: 33331 / 2006
Advocates: SHIVAJI M. JADHAV Vs
NARESH KUMAR
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.421 OF 2007
Head Master, Meenal Arjun Chavan Vidyalaya .....Appellants Ulhasnagar & Anr.
Versus
Sunita Laxman Kolhe & Anr. ....Respondents
O R D E R
The present appeal arises out of a brief order passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.6446 of 2006. By the said order, a writ
petition filed by the appellant herein (Management before the High Court) under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India was summarily dismissed.
The facts of the case are that the respondent herein was appointed as an
Assistant Teacher in Smt. Meenal Arjun Chavan Vidyalaya, Ulhasnagar on June
16, 1997. According to her, she was continued in service up to December 28, 2001.
From that date onwards, however, she was not allowed to discharge duty and also
not allowed to sign muster roll. Being aggrieved by the said action, she preferred
Writ Petition No.5840 of 2002 in the High Court of Bombay on which rule nisi was
issued. But finally by an order dated August 25, 2005, the writ petition was disposed
of as the High Court felt that appropriate statutory remedy is
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available to the respondent under Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools
(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
In pursuance of the said order, the respondent herein approached the
Maharashtra School Tribunal at Navi Mumbai by filing Appeal No.20 of 2005. The
Tribunal after considering the facts and circumstances as also the evidence led by
both the parties, recorded a finding of fact that the respondent herein was appointed
by the Management and that she had completed more than two years and her
services were terminated only in 2001 i.e. after about four years. In the light of the
findings recorded by the Tribunal, final order was passed by the Tribunal granting
reinstatement.
Regarding back wages, the Tribunal took the view that though the services of the
respondent were terminated in December, 2001. she did not avail of alternative and
equally efficacious remedy under the Act but had approached the High Court by
invoking writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it was only
after the order passed by the High Court granting liberty to the respondent to avail
of the remedy that she had approached the Tribunal in 2005. Considering the said
aspect, the Tribunal granted back wages but not from the date of termination of her
services but from the date of approaching the Tribunal.
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Being aggrieved by the said order, the Management approached the High
Court but the High Court summarily dismissed the writ petition. The said order is
challenged by the Management in the present appeal. On January 08, 2007, the
Court passed the following order:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner is directed to produce all the muster roll records and other records pertaining to the appointment
of the respondent herein including the so called letter of appointment and he acquittance roll of the payment made, within two weeks. Put up after two weeks.”
On January 25, 2007, leave was granted and interim stay was also granted.
Today the matter has been called out for final hearing.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel
for the appellant vehemently contended that the respondent was never appointed on
regular basis on a permanent post by the appellant. The counsel submitted that the
respondent herself was aware of that fact and that is why a prayer was made by her
to issue an order of appointment. According to the counsel, the prayer went to show
that she was not appointed on a permanent post and appointment order was not
issued in her favour. It was also contended that no documentary evidence was
produced by the respondent which would show that there was a permanent
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vacancy in the school and she was appointed on probation and by completion of two
years, she became permanent. It was, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal
committed an error of law in granting benefit to the respondent. It was also
contended that the respondent had forged the so called appointment order and on
that ground also, she was not entitled to an equitable relief of reinstatement. The
High Court in the light of all the contentions ought not to have disposed of the
petition by a 'cryptic order' and ought to have entered into all the questions raised
by the Management.
Finally, it was submitted that even if the Tribunal is held to be right in
setting aside the action of the Management, back wages ought not to have awarded.
It was submitted that this Court in a series of decisions has held that grant of back
wages depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case and no back
wages can be ordered to be paid merely on the ground that the termination was
illegal. It was, therefore, submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal deserves
to be set aside. In any case, the matter must be remitted to the High Court so that it
may be decided in accordance with law by a reasoned judgment.
Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other
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hand, submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal does not call for interference
by this Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It
was submitted that it was not the case of the Management that the respondent was
not working in the school. In fact, the case of the Management was that the
respondent had worked for some time on 'contract basis'. If it is so, it was for the
Management to put forward the relevant record showing that such appointment was
merely on 'contractual basis' and it did not create any right in favour of an
employee. But it was not done.
Our attention was also invited to an application filed by the respondent
herein before the Tribunal demanding the relevant documents which would throw
considerable light on the status of the respondent. In paragraph 3 of the
application, the respondent had prayed to the Tribunal to direct the Management to
produce the following documents:
1) Muster Roll from 1997 to 2002 of primary as well well secondary section.
2) Catalogue of 5th Std. For the academic year 1998- 99.
3) Result sheet of 5th Std.For the academic year 1998- 99.
4) Result sheet and catalogue of 9th Std.For the academic year 2000-01.
5) The Staff approval of the school from the year 1998.
6) Catalogue of 1999-2000 for 9th Std.”
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An order was passed by the Tribunal directing the Management to
produce the documents. Admittedly, no such documents were produced by the
Management and the Tribunal decided the case on the basis of the application made,
order passed and by raising adverse inference against the Management. Moreover,
in spite of the order of this Court as noted above, no documentary evidence for the
period between 1997-2001 has been produced by the Management.
It is true that the High Court has not entered into the merits of the matter
and without issuing notice to the respondent herein, dismissed the petition by a brief
order which reads as under:
“Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
No case is made out to interfere with the impugned order. The view taken by the Tribunal is reasonable and possible view. Petition is therefore, dismissed in limini with no order as to costs.”
In our opinion, it would have been appropriate had the High Court
considered the facts of the case and disposed of the matter. But on the facts and in
the circumstances of the case, in our opinion, this is not a case which calls for
interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
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So far as the provisions of the Act are concerned, they lay down the
procedure for termination of services of a teacher. The Tribunal which is an
authority under the Act entered into the factual aspect and recorded certain
findings. The School Tribunal considered all the facts and recorded a finding of fact
that the respondent was appointed as a teacher in 1997 and was continued till 2001.
In view of the said fact, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had
committed an error of jurisdiction which required to be corrected by the High Court
in exercise of power of superintendence under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
In view of the said fact, in our opinion, though the disposal of High Court
may not be said to be strictly proper, in the light of factual situation, we are of the
view, that the case does not require interference by this Court in its discretionary
and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
Regarding back wages also, in our opinion, the Tribunal was not wrong.
It has not lost sight of relevant facts and has taken into account equitable
consideration. The respondent instead of approaching the Tribunal, approached the
High Court directly and the writ petition was
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dismissed. It, however, took about four years. Obviously, the Management could
not be blamed for such delay. The Tribunal considered the said fact and did not
grant benefit of payment of wages to the respondent teacher for the said four years.
As far as the remaining period is concerned, in view of the fact that in the light of
the statutory provisions, the respondent teacher had become permanent employee of
the appellant institution, the grant of benefit cannot be held to be unreasonable or
otherwise illegal.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and it is
dismissed accordingly with costs.
................. J. [C.K. THAKKER ]
.................J.
[AFTAB ALAM] NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 05, 2008.