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PETITIONER: HASMUKH S/O BHAGWANJI M. PATEL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/08/1980

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1981 AIR   28            1981 SCR  (1) 353  1981 SCC  (2) 175  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1982 SC1500  (12)  R          1986 SC 687  (73)

ACT:      Writ of  habeas  corpus,  issuance  of-Conservation  of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, Section  3-Concept of  grounds of detention explained- Filing of  counter-affidavit by an officer who authenticated the detention  order passed  by the Home Minister and issued The same  under the  rules of  business is  perfectly valid- Introductory facts  or history of the case in the grounds of detention cannot  be considered  as irrelevant-Delay  of  17 days excluding  the time  taken for communication in transit in the  overall facts  of the case is not so unreasonable as to amount to an infraction of the constitutional imperatives in Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE:      Lallu Jogi Patel was detained on January 31, 1980 by an order of  detention dated  January 30,  1980 passed  by  the Minister of  Home Affairs,  Gujarat State under Section 3(1) of the  Conservation of  Foreign Exchange  and Prevention of Smuggling Activities  Act, 1974  and issued  by  the  second respondent a Deputy Secretary of Government of Gujarat, Home Department. The  order was  expressed in  the  name  of  the Governor of  Gujarat. On  the  same  date,  the  grounds  of detention were  served on  the detenu. The detenu prayed for copies of  the statements  and documents  relied upon in the grounds of  detention on  February 15,  1980. On February 1, 1980  the   detenu’s  Advocate   sought  permission  for  an interview with  the detenu to seek instructions from him for drafting his  representation. On February 20, 1980 the State Government  informed  the  Advocate  that  his  request  for interview with the detenu had been granted. After consulting the Collector of Customs, the Home Department also, supplied to the  detenu the documents running into 461 pages on March 7, 1980  which were actually received by the detenu on March 11, 1980.  that is  after a  delay of 17 days, excluding the time taken in transit etc.      Dismissing the petition, the Court ^      HELD: (1)  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  original

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detention order  was, in  fact, passed  by the Home Minister against whom no personal mala fides are alleged and the said order was  authenticated  and  issued  under  the  Rules  of Business by the Deputy Secretary, Home Department (Special), the latter’s  swearing the  counter-affidavit in the case is valid. [360 F-G]      (2) The  introductory facts  or  history  of  the  case incorporated  in   the  grounds   of  detention   cannot  be considered  as   irrelevant  matters  which  went  into  the consideration of the detention order. [360G-H]      (3) A  democratic Constitution is not to be interpreted merely from  a lexicographer’s  angle but with a realisation that  it  is  an  embodiment  of  the  living  thoughts  and aspirations of  a free people. The concept of "grounds" used in  the  context  of  detention  in  Article  22(5)  of  the Constitution and in sub- 354 section (3)  of Section  3 of  COFEPOSA, therefore,  has  to receive an interpretation which will keep it meaningfully in tune with  a contemporary notions of liberty and fundamental freedoms guaranteed  in Article  19(1), 21  and  22  of  the Constitution. [361 A-C]      (4) In  Khudiram Das  v. West  Bengal the Supreme Court held that  the constitutional imperatives enacted in Article 22(5) are  two-fold: (i)  The detaining  authority must,  as soon as  may be,  that is, as soon as practicable after. the detention, communicate  to the  detenu the  grounds on which the order  has been  made; (ii) the detaining authority must afford the  detenu the  earliest  opportunity  of  making  a representation against  the detention  order and  that these two are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an  executive authority  can  preventively  detain  a person; the  grounds under  Article 22(5) mean all the basic facts and  materials on  which the  order  of  detention  is based, therefore,  all the  basic facts  and materials which influenced the  detaining authority  in making  the order of detention must be communicated to the detenue. [361 D-G]      (5) While  the expression  "grounds" in  Article 22(5), and for  that matter,  in  Section  3(3)  of  the  COFEPOSA, includes not  only conclusions  of fact  but  also  all  the "basic facts"  on which  those conclusions are founded, they are different  from subsidiary  facts or further particulars or the  basic facts.  The distinction  between "basic facts" which are  essential factual  constituents of  the "grounds" and their  further  particulars  or  subsidiary  details  is important. While  the "basic  facts" being  integral part of the "grounds"  must, according  to Section  3(3) of COFEPOSA "be communicated to the detenu, as soon as may be, after the detention, ordinarily  not later  than  five  days,  and  in exceptional circumstances  and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 15 days from the date of detention", further particulars of those grounds, in compliance with the second constitutional  imperative spelled  out from  Article 22(5) in  Khudi Ram’s  case, are required to be communicated to  the   detenu.  as  soon  as  may  be  practicable,  with reasonable expedition. It follows, that it in a case the so- called "grounds  of detention"  communicated to  the  detenu lack the  basic or primary facts on which the conclusions of fact stated  therein are founded, and this deficiency is not made good  and communicated to the detenue within the period specified in Section 3(3), the omission will be fatal to the validity  of   the  detention.   If,  however,  the  grounds communicated are elaborate and contain all the "basic facts" but are not comprehensive enough to cover all the details or particulars of  the "basic  facts", such  particulars  also,

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must be  supplied to  the detenu,  if asked for by him, with reasonable expedition,  within a  reasonable time.  What  is "reasonable time  conforming  with  reasonable  expedition", required  for   the  supply   of  such  details  or  further particulars, is  a question of fact depending upon the facts and  circumstances   of  the   particular   case.   In   the circumstances of  a given case, if the time taken for supply of such  additional  particulars,  exceeds  marginally,  the maximum fixed  by  the  statute  for  communication  of  the grounds it  may still be regarded "reasonable", while in the tacts of another case, even a delay which does not exceed 15 days, may be unjustified, and amount to an infraction of the second constitutional  imperative pointed out in Khudi Ram’s case. [362 C-H, 363 A]      In the  instant case  there is  no breach  of the first constitutional imperative  embodied in  Article  22(5).  The grounds supplied  to the  detenu were elaborate and full and contained all  the "basic  facts" although  they did not set out all  the details  or particulars  of those "basic facts" relied upon or referred to therein. [363 A-B] 355      (6) In the totality of the circumstances of the present case, the  period of 17 days taken in considering the supply of the  copies was  not an  unreasonably long  period  which could amount  to a  denial of  the detenu’s right to make an effective representation  and, therefore,  infraction of the constitutional  imperatives   in  Article   22(5)   of   the Constitution. Firstly, the detenu was indulging in smuggling out silver from India and exporting it to the Gulf countries in a  big way  and the  smuggling activity attributed to the detenu  had   international   ramifications   resulting   in consultation  with   several  authorities   supervising  the Customs. The  Government had  to consult  the  Collector  of Customs and  even summon and discuss in a high level meeting before ordering  the supply  of the  copies.  Secondly,  the documents and  statements of  which the  copies were  sought covered more  than 461  pages. Preparation  of such  a bulky record could  be time consuming if the aid of some appliance like the  Zerox machine  were not  available to  prepare the copies by mechanical process. Thirdly, in spite of the grant of the  request of  the detenu’s  lawyer  to  interview  the former and  the supply of the copies the detenu did not make any representation  to the  detaining authority  or for  the consideration of  the Advisory  Board which  is  a  relevant circumstance  to  be  taken  into  account  for  determining whether the  delay in  supplying the  copies has,  in  fact, prejudiced the detenu’s right to make a speedy and effective representation. [363 C-E, H, 364 A-D-G]      Khudi Ram v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 832, Golam v.  The State  of West  Bengal, W.P. 270 of 1974 dated 12-9-74; Prabhu  Dayal Deorah  etc. v.  District Magistrate. Kamrup & Ors., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 183. referred to.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 449 of 1980.            (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      Soli J.  Sorabjee, M.G. Karmali, Vineet Kumar and Mukul Mudgal for the Petitioner.      J.L. Nain and M.N. Shroff for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court Was delivered by,      SARKARIA, J.-This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.      On January,  31, 1980,  an order  of  detention,  dated

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January 30,  1980 under Section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for  short, called the COFEPOSA), issued by the second respondent,  Shri   P.M.  Shah,   Deputy  Secretary  to  the Government of  Gujarat, Home Department, was served on Lallu Jogi Patel  (hereinafter referred  to as  the ’detenu’). The Order was  expressed in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. On  the  same  date  (January  31,  1980),  the  grounds  of detention were served on the detenu. 356      The grounds  of detention served on the detenu are very elaborate and  detailed. They  also contain the introductory background including the history of the detenu. It is stated herein that  the detenu was previously detained by an order, dated September  1974 of  the  Government  of  India,  under Section 3  of  the  Maintenance  of  Internal  Security  Act (MISA). On  the repeal  of  MISA  and  the  commencement  of COFEPOSA, a  fresh order, dated December 19, 1974, under the COFEPOSA, was served on the detenu.      The detenu’s  writ petition for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed by the High Court of Gujarat on May 6, 1976 in view of  the Presidential  Order, dated  June 27, 1975, made under Article 359(1) of the Constitution which had suspended the rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. The detenu  was, however,  released on  March 21,  1977.  As stated in  the ’grounds’,  his activities  were  kept  under surveillance by  the Customs  Department. In  or about  July 1979, the  detenu attempted  to smuggle gold, but he was not successful. Calls  booked by the detenu to various telephone numbers  of   other  suspected   smugglers  were,   however, detected.      On November  21, 1979,  the detenu hatched a conspiracy with one Umar Bakshi to smuggle wrist-watches and silver out of the country to Dubai: In pursuance of that conspiracy, on October 9,  1979,  the  detenu  and  the  said  Umar  Bakshi smuggled about  45 slabs  of silver in the vessel "Saraswati Prasad" registered in the name of Ravia Kalan of Daman.      On November  30, 1979,  23 slabs of silver weighing, in aggregate, 692.527 kgs. valued at Rs. 15,65,111, were seized by the  officers of  the Collectorate  of Central Excise and Customs from  a truck  which was  intercepted  near  village Pipodara. The  occupants of  the motor-truck disclosed their identities as  (1) Kailashchandra Shantilal Jain. (2) Mohmed Hussain Hanif  Mohmed Pathan,  the driver  and (3)  Babukhan Istiyarkhan Ahmed  Pathan, the  cleaner. all of Udaipur. The statements of  these persons  recorded under  Section 108 of the  Customs  Act  and  the  other  circumstantial  evidence collected, revealed  that the  detenu  was  engineering  the whole process  of attempting  to smuggle  the silver  out of India in  conspiracy with Umar Bakshi and others. In para 35 of the ’grounds’, it is mentioned:           "The  detaining   authority,   viz.,   the   State      Government considered it against the public interest to      disclose the  sources of  the intelligence  referred in      paragraphs 3. 4. 6 and 30 and 357      further  considered   it  against  public  interest  to      disclose   further    facts   contained    in   various      intelligence  reports  referred  to  in  the  aforesaid      paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 30."      On February 15, 1980, the detenu sent a letter. through the Superintendent Jail, requesting for the supply of copies of statements  and documents  relied upon  in the grounds of detention.      According to  the counter  filed by  Shri Shah,  Deputy

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Secretary to Government of Gujarat, this letter was received by the  State Government  on February  18, 1980.  The  State Government then  on February  22, addressed  a letter to the Sponsoring  Authority   (Collector  of  Customs.  Ahmedabad, enquiring whether  furnishing copies  of documents would not prejudice public interest.      On February  25, 1980,  the Collector wrote back to the State Government  that it  was not  necessary to  supply the copies of  the statements  and documents  asked for  by  the detenu, "as  the grounds  of detention  served on  him  were quite elaborate  to enable  the  detenu  to  make  effective representation". The  Collector sent  copies of the required statements to  the State  Government and the latter received the same on February 29, 1980.      On  March   4,  1980,  the  second  respondent  (Deputy Secretary, Home  Department)  arranged  personal  discussion with the  Collector to  solicit his  considered view.  As  a result, on March 5, 1980, the Collector sent a letter to the State Government,  stating  that  he  had  no  objection  to furnish the detenu with relevant documents.      As per letter, dated March 7, 1980, the Section Officer of the  Home Department  sent the relevant documents running into 461  pages, to  the detenu  through the Superintendent, District Prison,  Rajkot, by registered acknowledgement due. The said  documents were received by the detenu on March 11, 1980 at  Rajkot. Thus,  after excluding  the time  taken  in transit, there  was a  delay of 17 days in furnishing copies to the detenu.      Earlier, on  February 1, 1980, Shri P.K. Nair, Advocate had addressed  a letter  to the  Chief Minister  of  Gujarat asking for  permission for  an interview  with the detenu to seek instructions  from him for drafting his representation. On February  12, 1980, the Secretary to Chief Minister wrote in reply  to the  Advocate, that  his request  for having an interview  with   the  detenu   was  being  looked  into  by Government with  the Home  Department. This  letter  of  the Advocate, according  to the  counter-affidavit filed by Shri Shah, was  received by  him on February 30, 1980 through the Chief Minister’s 358 Secretariat. On  February 20,  1980,  the  State  Government informed the  Advocate that  his request  for interview with the detenu had been granted.      Mr.  Soli   Sorabji,  appearing   for  the  petitioner, challenges the validity of the detention of these grounds:      (1) There  has been  impermissible delay  in furnishing copies of  the documents  and statements  relied upon in the grounds of detention.      (2) There  was unreasonable  delay of  about 20 days in granting interview  to the  detenu with  his  lawyer,  as  a result of which the statutory right of the detenu under rule 14 (xii)  of the  Gujarat Condition  of Detention (COFEPOSA) Order 1975  has  been  rendered  meaningless.  The  combined effect of  these undue  delays (Nos.  1 and  2) is  that the detenu has  been  denied  his  constitutional  right  to  be afforded the  earliest opportunity  of making  an  effective representation against  his detention,  and thus  there  has been  a   violation  of  Articles  21  and  22  (5)  of  the Constitution.      In support of Nos. (1) and (2), the learned counsel has referred to  Khudi Ram  Das; Jayanarayan  Sukul v.  State of West  Bengal;   Madhav  Hayawadanrao   Hoskot  v.  State  of Maharashtra and Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India & Ors.      (3) The counter-affidavit filed in response to the rule nisi issued  by this  Court, has  not been  affirmed by  the

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detaining authority, but by another officer, on the basis of information derived from the record, only.      (4)   Irrelevant    matter   has    been   taken   into consideration.      In reply  to these contentions, Mr. Nain, appearing for the respondent-State has urged these points:      (a) (i) The ’grounds of detention’ which were served on the detenu  simultaneously with the order of detention, were elaborate and  full and  had apprised  the detenu of all the information necessary for making an effective representation against his  detention. "Grounds  of detention",  as held by this Court in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, in Article 22 (5) means only ’conclusions of facts’ and not all the evidence or factual details considered by the 359 detaining authority  in passing  the  impugned  order.  What Article 22  (5) obligates is that the ’grounds of detention’ should be  communicated to  the detenu at the earliest. This constitutional obligation  was  fully  discharged  when  the elaborate grounds  of detention  containing the substance of all the material facts, were served on the detenu.      (ii) In  these circumstances, the detenu had no further constitutional right  to be  supplied with  the details  and sources of  the information  on which the order of detention was passed.  Reference has  also been made to Vakil Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir.      (b) The  detenu as  is apparent  from  the  grounds  of detention is  engaged in  smuggling activity  in a  big way, having  international   ramifications.  Investigations  were going  on  to  unravel  the  entire  gang  of  international smugglers in league with the detenu. The detaining authority had, therefore,  to consider as to whether the disclosure of this information  asked for  by the  detenu, at  that stage, would not  be detrimental  to public  interest, and  if  so, whether it would be in the public interest to invoke Article 22 (6)  of the Constitution to withhold the copies asked for by the  detenu, for  some time.  For this  important purpose consultation with  the Collector  who  was  supervising  the investigations, was  necessary. The  documents of  which the copies were  asked for, also run into several hundred pages. If these  inter-departmental consultations,  preparation and despatch of  the copies  took 17  days, in  a case where the detenu has  been indulging  in smuggling  activity  of  this magnitude, the  delay in  supplying the  copies was  neither inordinate, nor unreasonable. Reference has been made to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2.      (c) The  period of  delay in  allowing  the  detenu  to interview his  lawyer, was of no consequence. First, Article 22 in  terms, denies  to the  detenu the  right to consult a lawyer or  to be  defended by  a counsel of his choice. This concession,  has,   however,  been  conceded  by  the  State Government under rule 14 (xii), and there also, it is not an indefeasible right  as it  is contingent  upon the  grant of permission by  the State  Government. There is a distinction between a  constitutional right  and a  defeasible statutory right. Delay in grant of the interview with the lawyer in no way affects the constitutional right of the detenu to make a representation. Secondly,  no written  request for supply of copies of the documents, prior to February 18, 1980 had been received from  the  detenu  and  the  lawyer’s  request  for interview with the detenu was granted on 360 February 20,  1980.  The  time  taken  for  considering  the lawyer’s request  for interview  cannot be  combined with or added to the period taken for supply of the copies.

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    (d) Lastly,  the  delay  in  supply  of  copies  or  in granting the  interview with  the lawyer  did not in any way prejudice the  detenu. The  copies  were  demanded  and  the interview with the lawyer were sought, professing that these were  required  for  the  purpose  of  making  an  effective representation. But  this professed  purpose  was  merely  a pretence because  the copies  were  neither  necessary,  nor intended to  be used for any such purpose. Despite the grant of these  twin requests  and the  despatch of  the copies on March 7  and their  receipt on  March 17,  the detenu  never filed any representation, although the Advisory Board was to meet shortly  thereafter on  March  24,  1980.  Instead,  he rushed to  this Court  and filed  the writ-petition on March 17, 1980.  This conduct  of the  detenu is  not  making  any representation, despite opportunity, shows that no prejudice has been  caused to  him merely  by the fact that the copies were despatched  to him  after  17  days  of  receiving  his request.      (e) Under  the statute  even "grounds" of detention can be communicated  to the  detenu, in exceptional cases within 15 days  of the  detention. If  the  "grounds"  communicated within the  prescribed period  are elaborate  then supply of further particular  is only two days after the expiry of the fifteen  days   period  prescribed   for  communicating  the "grounds"  in  exceptional  cases.  cannot  be  said  to  be unreasonably belated.      Contentions 3  and 4 canvassed by Shri Sorabji need not detain us.  Shri Nain  has produced  for the  perusal of the Court the  original official  record from  which it is clear that the detention order was passed by the Home Minister. It was authenticated  and issued under the Rules of Business by Shri P.M.  Shah, Deputy Secretary. Home Department (Special) who  has  sworn  the  counter-affidavit  in  this  case.  No personal mala  fides are  alleged against  the Minister.  It was, therefore.  not necessary  for the Minister to file the counter himself. Contention 3 is, therefore, overruled.      What the  learned counsel characterises as "irrelevant" matter incorporated  in the  grounds of detention are really introductory facts  or history  of the  case. We, therefore, negative contention 4, also.      Indeed, the  main arguments  of the learned counsel are Nos. (1)  and (2)  that there has been unreasonable delay in supplying the 361 copies of  the material documents and statements relied upon or referred  to in  the grounds  of detention. To appreciate these contentions,  it is  necessary to have a clear idea of the import and scope of the expression ’grounds’ used in the context of ’detention’ in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and  in   sub-section  (3)  of  Section  3  of  COFEPOSA.  A democratic constitution is not to be interpreted merely from a lexicographer’s  angle but with the realisation that it is an- embodiment  of the  living thoughts and aspirations of a free people. "A constitution" said Benjamin Cardozo, "states or ought  to state  not rules  for  the  passing  hour,  but principles  for   an  expanding   future".  The  concept  of "grounds", therefore, has to receive an interpretation which will keep  it meaningfully  in tune   with  the contemporary notions of  liberty and  fundamental freedom  guaranteed  in Articles 19  (1), 21  and 22  of the Constitution. It is not necessary to  notice all  the numerous  cases in  which this expression in  the context of Article 22 (5) has come up for consideration. It  will suffice to make a brief reference to a few  of them  which are in point. In Golam v. The State of West Bengal,  this Court held that in the context of Article

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22  (5)   ’grounds’  does  not  merely  mean  a  recital  or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Section 3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to  a bare  statement of  conclusions of fact. It means  something  more.  That  ’something’  is  the  factual constituent  of   the  ’grounds’  on  which  the  subjective satisfaction of  the authority  is based.  This decision was approved by  a larger  Bench in Khudaram Das v. West Bengal, ibid, wherein  Bhagwati, J.  speaking for  the Court,  said: "The constitutional  imperatives enacted  in Article  22 (5) are two-fold:  (i) the  detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made;  and (ii) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the  earliest opportunity  of making a representation against the  detention order.  These are  the barest minimum safeguards  which  must  be  observed  before  an  executive authority  can   preventively  detain   a  person".  It  was explained that  ’grounds’ under  Article 22 (S) mean all the basic facts and materials on which the order of detention is based, therefore,  all the  basic facts  and materials which influenced the  detaining authority  in making  the order of detention, must  be  communicated  to  the  detenu.  It  was further clarified  that such  "basic  facts  and  materials" would be  different from  "other particulars"  spoken of  in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of M.I.S.A. 362      Earlier,  in  Prabhu  Dayal  Deorah  etc.  v.  District Magistrate, Kamrup  & Ors.,  Mathew, J.,  speaking  for  the majority, elucidated the position, thus:           "The detenu  has a  right under  Article 22 (5) of      the  Constitution   to   be   afforded   the   earliest      opportunity of  making  a  representation  against  the      order of  detention. That constitutional right includes      within its  compass the  right  to  be  furnished  with      adequate  particulars   of  the  grounds  of  detention      order."      From  these  decisions  it  is  clear  that  while  the expression "grounds"  in  Article  22  (IS),  and  for  that matter, in  Section 3 (3) of the COFEPOSA, includes not only conclusions of  fact but also all tho ’basic facts’ on which those conclusions  are  founded,  they  are  different  from subsidiary facts  or further particulars of the basic facts. The distinction  between "basic  facts" which  are essential factual constituents  of the  "grounds"  and  their  further particulars or  subsidiary details  is important.  While the "basic facts"  being integral  part of  the "grounds"  must, according to  Section 3  (3) of COFEPOSA "be communicated to the  detenu,  as  soon  as  may  be,  after  the  detention, ordinarily not  later than  five days,  and  in  exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than  15 days  from the  date of  detention",  further particulars of  those grounds, in compliance with the second constitutional imperative spelled out from Article 22 (S) in Khudi Ram’s  case, are  required to  be communicated  to the detenu, as  soon as  may  be  practicable,  with  reasonable expedition. It  follows, that  if in  a case  the so  called "grounds of  detention" communicated  to the detenu lack the basic or  primary facts  on which  the conclusions  of  fact stated therein  are founded, and this deficiency is not made good and  communicated  to  the  detenu  within  the  period specified in  Section 3  (3), the  omission will be fatal to the validity  of the  detention. If.  however,  the  grounds communicated are elaborate and contain all the "basic facts" but are not comprehensive enough to cover all the details or

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particulars of  the "basic  facts", such  particulars,  also must be  supplied to  the detenu,  if asked for by him, with reasonable expedition,  within a  reasonable time.  What  is ’’reasonable time  conforming with  reasonable  expedition", required  for   the  supply   of  such  details  or  further particulars, is  a question of fact depending upon the facts and  circumstances   of  the   particular   case.   In   the circumstances of  a given case, if the time taken for supply of suck  additional  particulars,  exceeds  marginally,  the maximum fixed  by  the  statute  for  communication  of  the grounds 363 it may still be regarded "reasonable". while in the Pacts of another A  case, even a delay which does not exceed 15 days, may be  unjustified, and  amount to  an  infraction  of  the second constitutional  imperative pointed out in Khudi Ram’s case (Supra).      In the instant case, the grounds supplied to the detenu were elaborate and full and contained all the "basic facts", although they did not set out all the details or particulars of those  "basic facts"  relied upon or referred to therein. There  was  thus  no  breach  of  the  first  constitutional imperative embodied  in Article  22 (5). The short question, therefore, for  consideration is:  Was the period of 17 days (exclusive of  the time  taken for communication in transit) for the  supply of  the further,  particulars of  the  basic facts to  the detenu  "unreasonable" in the circumstances of the case  ? In  the instant case, several causes contributed to this "delay". Firstly, this is a case in which the detenu was,  according   to  the  allegations  in  the  grounds  of detention and  the averments  in the counter affidavit filed by  Shri   P.  M.  Shah,  Deputy  Secretary  (Home)  to  the Government of  Gujarat, indulging  in smuggling  out  silver from India  and exporting  it to the gulf countries in a big way. This  silver which  was the  subject  of  this  illegal activity,  was   of  huge   value.  The  smuggling  activity attributed to  the detenu  had international  ramifications. The Collector  of Customs was supervising the investigations that were  going on at several places, in several countries, to unearth  and detect  all the persons who were involved in this  large   scale  organised  smuggling  of  international dimensions. It  was, therefore,  not  unreasonable  for  the detaining authority  to consult  the Collector of Customs as to the  possible detrimental  effect of  the supply  of  the copies, at  that stage,  on the  investigations  which  were still going  on. Such a query from or consultations with the Collector was  necessary, to  enable the detaining authority to make  up its  mind as  to whether  or not,  it  would  be advisable to  withhold in  the public interest the supply of the copies asked for by the detenu or any part thereof under Article 22  (6). Indeed,  at-one stage,  the Collector wrote back that  the supply of the copies, at that stage, would be detrimental to the investigations which were in progress and it also  might endanger  the safety  of  the  witnesses  and informants.  The   Government,   therefore,   summoned   the Collector and  discussed the  matter at a high level meeting and then  directed  the  Collector  to  supply  the  copies. Secondly, the  documents or  statements of which copies were sought covered  more than  461 pages.  Preparation of such a bulky record  could be  time consuming,  if the  aid of some appliance like  the ZEROX  machine  were  not  available  to prepare the copies by mechanical process. 364      The third  reason for  delay-which is  in the nature of and explanation-given  by the  respondent is that it has not

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caused any  prejudice to the right of the detenu ’to make an effective representation,  since the  grounds  of  detention communicated to  him were elaborate and full. Indeed, in the counter-affidavit  an   alter  native  stand  taken  by  the respondent is,  that the  detaining authority  was not under any constitutional  or statutory obligation to supply copies of  these   additional   materials   because   the   grounds communicated to  the detenu  were elaborate.  Shri Nain  has also tried to support this reasoning.      In view  of the  law enunciated  in Khudi  Ram’s  case, ibid,  this   stand  taken  by  the  respondent  is  utterly unsustainable.      Be that as it may, in the totality of the circumstances of this  present case  we do  not think  that the  period of about 17  days taken in considering the supply of the copies was an  unreasonably long  period which  could amount  to  a denial  of   the  detenu’s   right  to   make  an  effective representation.  In   considering  the   reasonableness   or otherwise of  the time  taken in  supplying the  copies, the circumstance  that   the  grounds   of   detention   already communicated to  the detenu  were very elaborate and full is not altogether irrelevant. The copies were despatched to the detenu by registered post on March 7, 1980 and were received by him  on March  11, 1980 at Rajkot. The Advisory Board was scheduled to  meet shortly thereafter on March 24, 1980. The detenu was  also allowed  by an  order, dated  February  20, 1980,  to   be  interviewed  by  his  lawyer.  Although  the Government took more than two weeks to consider the lawyer’s request to  interview the detenu, the fact remains that this permission was  granted only  two days after the despatch of the  detenu’s   application  for  obtaining  copies  of  the additional documents  or materials. In spite of the grant of the detenu’s  lawyer’s request for interview with his client and the  supply of  the copies,  the detenu did not make any representation  to   the  detaining  authority  or  for  the consideration of the Advisory Board. This is also a relevant circumstance  to  be  taken  into  account  for  determining whether the  delay in  supplying the  copies, has,  in fact, prejudiced the detenu’s right to make a speedy and effective representation.      According to  the petitioner  his lawyer  by a  letter, dated February 1, 1980, sought an interview to enable him to draft his  representation. But  no application for obtaining copies of the material documents had been made by the detenu till February  15118, 1980,  when it  was put in a course of communication to the 365 Government, while  permission for  interview with the lawyer was granted on the 20th February.      In short, on a consideration of all the circumstance of this particulars  case, we  are of opinion that the delay of 17 days in question, was not so unreasonable as to amount to an infraction  of the  constitutional imperatives in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution.      These, then,  are the  reasons in support of our order, dated May 9, 1980 by which we dismissed the writ petition. S.R. Petition dismissed. 366