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PETITIONER: HARU DAS GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/02/1972

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1972 AIR 1293            1972 SCR  (3) 329  1972 SCC  (1) 639  CITATOR INFO :  F          1990 SC 487  (12)

ACT: West   Bengal  (Prevention  of  Violent   Activities)   Act, (President’s Act 19 of 1970), ss. 12 and 13-Period of  three months from the date ofdetention-Method of computation.

HEADNOTE: The petitioner was arrested and detained on February 5, 1971 under’  s.  3  of the West  Bengal  (Prevention  of  Violent Activities)  Act, 1970.  After receipt of the report of  the Advisory   Board,  the  St-ate  Government   confirmed   the detention order on May 5, 1971. On  the question whether the confirmation was made  one  day after the expiration of the period of 3 months from the date of detention. HELD : The effect of defining a period from such a day until such  a day within which an act is to be done is to  exclude the first day and to include the last day; and therefore, in the present case, the order of confirmation was made  before the  expiration of the period of three month& from the  date of detention. [331 E-F] Young v. Higgon, 6 M & W 50  151 E.R. (Ex.) 317,  Radcliffe v..  Bartholomew, [1892] 1 Q.B. 161, Williams v.  Burges  10 L.J.0.D.  10, Hardy v. Rlye, 9 B & C 603, English v.  Cliff, [1914]  2 Ch. 376, Goldsmiths Co. v. West Metropolitan  Rly. Co. [1904] 1 K.B. 15, Cartwright v., MacCormac, [1963] 1 All E.R. 11, 13, Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co..’ Ltd., [1961] 2 Q.B.  135, Stewart v. Chanman, .[1951] 2 K.B. 792,  In  re.: North,  Ex parte Hasluck, [1895] 2 Q.B. 264  and  Halsbury’s Laws  of Eng-land 3rd ed.  Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95)  refererd to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 287 of 1971. Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ  in thenature or habeas corpus. N. N. Goswami, for the petitioner. D. N. Mukherjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat,  J.  The petitioner was arrested  and  detained  on, February  5,  1971  in pursuance of an  order  of  detention passed  on  that  very day by the  District  Magistrate,  24 Parganas  under  sec.  3(1)  and  (3)  of  the  West  Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities), Act, President’s Act  19 of 1970. There  is no dispute that, as required by the Act, his  case was  referred  to the Advisory Board and on receipt  of  its report that 330 there  was  sufficient cause for his  detention,  the  State Government  under  sec.  12  of the Act  made  an  order  or decision   confirming   .,the  said  detention   order   and continuing   his   detention  thereunder.   The   order   of confirmation and continuation was made on May 5, 1971. The  only  contention raised in this petition was  that  the order  or  decision of confirmation of  the  said  detention order was made one day after the expiration of the period of three  months  from  the date of detention,  that  the  said period of three months would lend on the midnight of May  4, 1971,  and  that  any  confirmation  .and  continuation   of detention made thereafter would not be valid. The question is when can the period of three months from the date of detention be said to have expired.  When a period of time  running  from a given day or event to another  day  or event  is  prescribed by law or fixed by  contract  and  the question  arises  whether  the computation  is  to  be  made inclusively or exclusively of the first-mentioned or of  the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the  purpose  for  which the computation  has  to  be  made. (Halsbury’s  Laws  of England, (3rd. ed.) vol 3 7,  p.  92). There is, however, a volume of authority in England  showing that where a certain thing has to be done within a specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose, is to be excluded  from computation and the day on which such  action is  taken  is to be included.  As early as 1840,  Parke,  B. laid down this rule in Young v. Higgon(1).  In Radcliffe  v. Bartholomew (2) Wills, J., relying on Williams v. Burgess(3) and  Hardy  v.  Ryle (4) held that  a  complaint  under  the Prevention  of Cruelty to Animals Act, filed on June 30,  in respect of an act alleged to have been committed on May  30, was  "within  one  calendar month after the  cause  of  such complaint  shall arise".  He held so on the  principle  that the day on which the cause for the complaint arose had to be excluded  while computing the period within which under  the Act the complaint had to be filed.  In Williams v.  Burgess, (3)  the statute directed warrants of attorney to  be  filed "within  twenty one days after their execution", and it  was held  that a warrant .executed on the 9th day of  the  month would  be  regarded as having been filed in proper  time  if filed on the 30th, the day of execution being one which  had to  be  excluded,.   On the other hand, in a  case  where  a settler  by a settlement, dated May 13, 1892, conveyed  real estate  unto  and  to the use of  the  trustees  upon  trust thereinafter declared and it was thereby declared that  they should  ,stand  possessed of the said premises  during  the term of twenty one years from the date thereof upon trust to apply the rents and (1)  6 M & W 50-151 English Reports (Ex) 317. (2)  [1892] 1 Q.B. 161. (3)  10 L.J. Q.B.10. (4)  9 B & C 603. 331 profits  as  therein mentioned and it was  further  declared

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that them trustees should at the expiration of the said term of  twenty-one years sell the said premises and pursuant  to the said trust for sale the trustees contracted to sell  the real  estate on June 20, 1913, it was held that the term  of twenty-one  years  commenced from the midnight  of  May  12, 1892,  and therefore, the trust was not void for  remoteness on  the ground of exceeding a term of twenty one years  from its creation. [see English v. Cliff (1)]. These  decisions show that courts have drawn  a  distinction between a term created within which an act may be done and a time  limited  for the doing of an act.  The  rule  is  well established  that  where a particular time is given  from  a certain  date within which an act is to be done, the day  on that date is to be excluded. see Goldsmiths’ Company v. The West  Metropolitan  Railway Company (2 ) 1.  This  rule  was followed   in   Cartwright  v.  MacCormack(3),   where   the expression  "fifteen days from-the date of  commencement  of the  policy" in a cover note issued by an insurance  company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to  commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren  v. Dawson  Bentley & Co. Ltd.,(4) a case for  compensation  for injuries  received  in the course of employment,  where  for purposes  of computing the period of limitation the date  of the  accident,  being the date of the cause of  action,  was excluded.  [see also Stewart v. Chanman(5) and In re  North, Ex parte Hasluck(6)].  Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining  a period from such a day until such a  day  within which  an act is to be done is to exclude the first day  and to  include the last day. (see Halsbury’s Laws  of  England, (3rd ed.) vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95) There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here. In  computing  the period of three months from the  date  of detention, which was February 5, 1971, before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the  detention order and continuation of the detention thereunder had to be made,  the  date of the commencement of  detention,  namely, February 5, 1971, has to be excluded.  So done, the order of confirmation was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention. The  contention  raised on behalf of the  petitioner,  thus, cannot  be  sustained.   Accordingly the  writ  petition  is dismissed. V.P.S.                         Petition dismissed. (1)  [1914] 2 Ch 376. (3)  [1963] 1 All E.R. 11 at P. 13. (5)  [1951] 2 K.B. 792. (2)  (1904) 1 K.B. 1, at p. 5. (4)  [1961] 2Q.B. 135. (6)  [1895] 2 Q.B. 264. 332