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PETITIONER: HARJIT SINGH MANN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S. UMRAO SINGH AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/12/1980

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR  701            1980 SCR  (2) 501  1980 SCC  (1) 713  CITATOR INFO :  OPN        1990 SC1889  (5)  F          1991 SC2001  (12,23,26)

ACT:      Representation of  the People  Act, 1951  sections  33, 36(4) ’Defect of substantial Character’-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was a  voter in  the  Constituency  from which the  Respondent was  elected as  a member of the State Legislative Assembly.  His nomination  paper was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that it was filed beyond the time  prescribed for filing nomination paper and that he had not  made and  subscribed an  oath on it, as required by law.      In his  petition before  the High  Court the  appellant contended that (1) the filing of nomination paper late by 10 minutes could  not be  a ground for rejecting the nomination paper and  it was  not a  defect  of  substantial  character within the  meaning of  section 36(4)  of the  Act, (2)  the allegation that  he had filed to make and subscribe the oath before the  Returning officer as required by Art. 173 of the Constitution was  not true and (3) the respondent was guilty of corrupt practice of bribery. The High Court rejecting all the contentions, dismissed the petition.      Dismissing the appeal, this court ^      HELD :  1(a) It  is the  requirement of  law  that  the Returning officer should mention the time of presentation of the nomination  papers. The  endorsement  by  the  Returning officer shows that the nomination paper was presented on May 18, 1977  at 15.10 by the proposer, and that the endorsement to that  effect was  duly signed  by the  Returning officer. [504 E-F]      (b) It  is  not  correct  to  say  that  the  delay  in presentation of  the nomination  paper was  not a ground for its  rejection  as  it  was  not  a  defect  of  substantial character  within  the  meaning  of  Section  36(4)  of  the Representation of  the People  Act. In the face of the clear requirement of  section 36(2)(b)  of the Act, any other view would make  the requirement  for  the  presentation  of  the nomination  paper  before  the  last  date  and  within  the

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specified period of time, unworkable for it will not then be possible to draw a line upto which the delay in the delivery of  the   nomination  papers   could  be  condoned.  If  the requirement of  the law in that respect is not observed, and its breach  is considered  to be a defect which was not of a substantial character  it may  be permissible  to go  to the extent of  arguing that  the nomination  paper may  be filed even upto  the date  and time  fixed for the scrutiny of the nominations.  That   would  not  only  cause  administrative inconvenience but  put the  other  candidate  to  a  serious disadvantage  for   they  would   not  be  able  to  prepare themselves for  any objection  they may like to raise to the validity of  the nomination,  at the time of scrutiny of the nominations. [505 H, 506 A-C] 502      (c) The requirement that the nomination papers shall be delivered between   the  hours  of  eleven  O’clock  in  the forenoon and three O’clock in the afternoon is mandatory and the Returning  officer has  no  option  but  to  reject  the nomination paper  as required  by Section 36(2) of thee Act. [505 G-H]      (2) The  trial court  held that the oath ar affirmation which was required to be made or subscribed by the candidate had not  been  made  and  subscribed  at  the  time  of  the presentation of  the nomination papers. As the appellant was not able  to produce  the  certificate  of  his  making  and subscribing the  oath or  affirmation before  the  Returning officer thereafter,  in the  manner alleged by him, there is nothing wrong with the view taken by the trial court that he did not really do so [508 A-B, D-E]      (3) It  is an essential ingredient of the definition of corrupt practice  of  "bribery"  that  the  gift,  offer  or promise should  be by  the candidate  or his agent or by any other person  with the  consent  of  the  candidate  or  his Election Agent.  The trial  court rightly took the view that it was  necessary for  the purpose  of proving  the  corrupt practice of  bribery to  establish that there was an element of "bargaining"  in what  the respondent was alleged to have done for  two villages.  When the  element  of  bargain  was completely  absent   from   the   allegation   against   the respondent, the  trial court  was justified  in holding that the alleged corrup practice had not been established. [809G, 510H, 511A, D-E]      Ghasi Ram  v. Dal  Singh and  others [1968]  3 SCR 102, Amir Chand  v. Surendra  Lal Jha  and others  10 ELR  57, Om Prabha Jain  v. Abnash  Chand and  another [1968] 3 SCR 111; Bhanu Kumar  Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and others [1971] 3 SCR 522; Chaitanya Kumar Adatiya v. Smt. Sushila Dixit and others [1976] 3 SCC 97, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 720 of 1978.      Appeal under  section 116-A  of the  Representation  of People Act  1951 from  the Judgment and Order dated 7-2-1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in E.P. No. 15/77.      Hardev Singh for the Appellant.      P. P.  Rao, O.  P. Sharma,  R. Venkataramiah  and R. C. Bhatia for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SHINGHAL J.  This appeal  by election petitioner Harjit Singh Mann  is directed  against the  judgment of the Punjab and Haryana  High Court  dated February  7, 1978, dismissing

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the petition  by which  he had  challenged the  election  of Umrao Singh,  respondent No.  1, hereinafter  referred to as the respondent,  from the Nakodar constituency of the Punjab Legislative  Assembly.   The  result  of  the  election  was declared on June 14, 1977, according to which the respondent was declared  elected as he secured the highest votes at the poll. 503      Appellant Harjit  Singh  Mann  could  not  contest  the election as  his nomination  papers  were  rejected  by  the Returning Officer  on May 19, 1977, which was the date fixed for the  scrutiny of  the nominations. That was taken as one of the  grounds for  filing the election petition, the other ground being the commission of some corrupt practices by the respondent. The  respondent traversed  the allegations.  The trial court  examined some of the preliminary objections and framed eight  issues. The  first two  issues were decided in favour of  the appellant.  As regards issue No. 3, the trial court held that a part of the allegation of corrupt practice which was sought to be incorporated in the amended petition, could not  be taken  into consideration as the amendment was applied for  after the  expiry of  the period of limitation; and it  was therefore ordered to be deleted. The correctness of the  above findings has not been challenged before us. In fact we  are required to consider the trial court’s findings only on  issues Nos. 4, 5 and 6, which have all gone against the appellant. Issues Nos. 7 and 8 have not been pressed for our consideration. We shall therefore concern ourselves with three issues  (Nos. 4,  5 and  6) and  deal with them one by one.      Issue No. 4 was to the following effect,-      "Whether Jit Ram proposer of the petitioner reached the      office of  the Returning Officer at 2.50 p.m. and filed      the nomination  papers of  the petitioner  before  3.00      p.m. on  18-5-1977 and  whether the endorsement made on      the nomination  papers that  the nomination papers were      received at  3.10 p.m.  was wrongly  made  and  thereby      illegally  rejected   the  nomination   papers  of  the      petitioner on 19-5-1977 ? If so, to what effect."      The appellant’s  allegation in  this respect  was  that although Jit Ram (P.W. 7), who had proposed his candidature, reached the office of the Returning Officer after depositing the necessary  security in  the bank at 2.50 p.m. on May 18, 1977, and the Returning Officer placed the nomination papers on his  table, he  wrongly asked  Jit Ram  to take  back the nomination papers  saying that  the time for filing them had expired. It  was further  alleged that the Returning Officer got annoyed  when Jit  Ram protested  that he  had filed the nomination papers  in time,  and that  he wrongly noted down the time  of presentation  of the nomination papers as 15.10 hours. As  has been  stated, the trial court has disbelieved the averment of the petitioner in this respect and found the issue against him.      We have  gone through  the statement  of Jit Ram P.W. 7 who,  according  to  the  appellant’s  case,  presented  the nomination papers to 504 the Returning  Officer. The  witness has however admitted in cross-examination that  when he  was trying  to deliver  the nomination papers,  the  Returning  Officer  "said  that  he objected to  the delivery  of the  nomination papers  as the time was over". The witness no doubt claimed that he reached the office  of the  Returning Officer,  after depositing the security at  about 2.45  p.m. and  that when  the  Returning Officer told  him that  the  time  for  the  filing  of  the

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nomination papers  had expired,  some four  other  "persons" standing in  the office  of the  Returning Officer said that "still two  minutes remained  for it  becoming 3 O’clock and some said  that one  minute still remained". The trial court disbelieved that  version of  Jit Ram.  He really  could not even read the time in the clock of the trial court, for when he deposed  that it  was 3.19  p.m., the time accordingly to that clock  was 3.6  p.m. Jit Ram did not therefore have the capacity of  reading or  stating the  time correctly, and it may  in  fact  be  said  that  what  he  deposed  about  the presentation of the nomination papers a couple of minutes or a minute  before 3  p.m. was  nothing but hearsay. The trial court has  examined  the  other  evidence  of  the  parties, including the  statement of  Returning Officer Manohar Singh R.W.1, and  we have  no doubt  that  its  finding  that  the nomination papers  were filed  10 minutes  after 3  p.m.  is fully borne  out by  the  evidence  on  the  record  and  is correct.      It has  to be appreciated that it is the requirement of the law  that the  Returning Officer should mention the time of the  presentation of  the  nomination  papers,  and  that endorsement Ex.  P.W.1/19 has  been proved  by the Returning Officer. It  shows that the nomination papers were presented on May  18, 1977  at 15.10  hours by  the proposer,  and the endorsement to  that effect was duly signed by the Returning Officer. There is no reason to disbelieve that evidence. The fact of  late presentation  of  the  nomination  papers  was reiterated by the Returning Officer in his order of scrutiny Ex. P.W.  1/20 on  May 19,  1977. In  that order  he clearly stated that as the nomination papers was delivered to him on May 18,  1977 after  3 p.m.  i.e.  at  15.10  hours  by  the proposer Shri  Jit Ram,  he rejected  it for that reason and also for  the reason  that the  required oath or affirmation was not  made by the candidate. It may be mentioned that the form of  the nomination  paper prescribed  by the Conduct of Election Rules,  1961, provides  for the  issue of a receipt for the  nomination paper  and the notice of scrutiny, which has  to   be  handed  over  to  the  person  presenting  the nomination paper. The serial number of the nomination paper, the name of the candidate, the name of the constituency, the date and  time of  presentation of  the nomination paper and the date and time fixed for its scrutiny had therefore to be mentioned in  that receipt, and we find from the judgment of the trial court that the 505 non-production of  that receipt by the appellant has rightly been taken  as a  circumstance against  him. On the evidence before it the trial court was justified in finding issue No. 4 against  the appellant  and in holding that the nomination papers were  filed after  the expiry  of the time prescribed for them i.e. at 3.10 p.m.      An attempt  was made  to argue  that the  delay in  the presentation of  the nomination papers in question could not justify  its   rejection  as  it  was  not  a  defect  of  a substantial character within the meaning of sub-s. (4) of s. 36  of   the  Representation   of  the   People  Act,  1951, hereinafter referred  to as  the Act. In order to appreciate the argument  it is  necessary to  make a cross-reference to sub-s.(1) of s. 33 of the Act which provides as follows,      "33(1) On or before the date appointed under clause (a)      of section 30 each candidate shall, either in person or      by his proposer, between the hours of eleven O’clock in      the forenoon and three o’clock in the afternoon deliver      to the returning officer at the place specified in this      behalf  in   the  notice  issued  under  section  31  a

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    nomination paper  completed in  the prescribed form and      signed by  the candidate  and  by  an  elector  of  the      constituency as proposer". It is  therefore the  requirement of  that sub-section that, inter alia,  the nomination  paper shall be delivered to the Returning Officer between the hours of eleven O’clock in the forenoon and  three O’clock  in the  afternoon,  so  that  a nomination  paper  delivered  after  three  O’clock  in  the afternoon cannot be said to comply with that provision of s. 33. Sub-section  (2) of s. 36 of the Act, which provides for the examination  of the nomination papers for the purpose of deciding all  objections made  to any  nomination,  requires that the Returning Officer shall reject any nomination paper on  the   grounds  mentioned  in  the  sub-section.  We  are concerned with ground No. (b) which provides as follows:-      "(b) that there  has been  a failure to comply with any           of the provisions of section 33 or section 34". So as  there was failure to comply with that provision of s. 33 which  required the  delivery  of  the  nomination  paper between the  hours of  eleven O’clock  in the  forenoon  and three O’clock  in the  afternoon, the  Returning Officer had really no option but to reject the nomination paper.      We have  considered the argument that such a defect was not of  a substantial character within the meaning of sub-s. (4) of s. 36 of the 506 Act, but we are unable to uphold it in the face of the clear requirement of  ground (b)  of sub-s. (2) of s. 36, referred to above. It has to be appreciated that any other view would make the  requirement for the presentation of the nomination paper before  the last  date  for  making  nominations,  and within the  specified period of time, unworkable for it will not then  be possible to draw a line upto which the delay in the delivery  of the nomination papers could be condoned. In fact if  the requirement  of the  law in that respect is not observed, and  its breach is considered to be a defect which was not of a substantial character, it may be permissible to go to the extent of arguing that the nomination paper may be filed even  upto the date and time fixed for the scrutiny of the nominations.  That would  not only  cause administrative inconvenience but  put the  other candidates  to  a  serious disadvantage  for   they  would   not  be  able  to  prepare themselves for  any objection  they may like to raise to the validity of  the nomination  at the  time of the scrutiny of the nominations.  We have  no hesitation therefore in taking the view  that the  failure to  comply with  the requirement that the  nomination papers  shall be  delivered between the hours of eleven O’clock in the forenoon and three O’clock in the afternoon  is mandatory  and the  Returning Officer  was justified in  rejecting the  nomination  paper  in  question because of  its breach.  A similar  provision in an election rule has been stated to be mandatory in Rogers on Elections, Volume III, twentyfirst edition, at page 74, and it has been observed that  the rule  must be  "literally complied with". Reference in  this connection  may be  made  to  Cutting  v. Windsor. There Avory J., referred to the requirement of r. 7 in  Part   II  of   the  third  Schedule  to  the  Municipal Corporations Act,  1882. according  to which  the nomination paper had  to  be  delivered  before  five  O’clock  in  the afternoon of  the last  day for  the delivery  of nomination papers, and  rejected the  argument that  what had  occurred there was a pure technicality. He held as follows,-           "So far  as rule  7 provided  for the  time within      which nomination  papers must  be delivered at the town      clerk’s office  it was mandatory. It was not within the

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    discretion of  the town  clerk  to  receive  nomination      papers after the hour specified in the rule, nor was it      competent to  that Court  to say that the delivery of a      nomination paper  after the prescribed time constituted      a good  nomination. Mr.  Windsor had  never  been  duly      nominated and  his election  must be declared void. Mr.      Cutting was  the only  other candidate  and he  must be      declared to have been duly elected". 507 Horridge J.,  agreed with  him saying  that if  Windsor  had never been  nominated it was impossible for the Court to say that his election was in accordance with the principles laid down in  the body  of  the  Act.  The  same  view  has  been expressed in  Parker’s Conduct  of Parliamentary  Elections, 1970, on page 137,-           "The returning  officer has no power to extend the      time for  delivery (see  Howes v. Turner, 1 C.P.D. 680,      Cutting v. Windsor, 40 Times L.R. 395)". The matter has been dealt with in Parliamentary Elections by A. Norman  Schofield, second edition, on pages 149-150 under the rubic "Delivery at wrong time" and it has been held that the requirement in that respect is mandatory.      So as  the provision of s. 36 regarding the delivery of the nomination papers between the hours of eleven O’clock in the forenoon  and three  O’clock in  the afternoon  was  not complied with,  the Returning  Officer had  no option but to reject the  nomination paper  in question  as required by s. 36(2) (b)  of the  Act and the finding of the trial court in that respect is quite correct.      Issue No.  5 raises  the question whether the appellant reached the  office of the Returning Officer at 3.45 p.m. on May 18, 1977, and took oath in the presence of the Returning Officer  who,   however,  failed   to  make   the  necessary endorsement on the nomination paper.      It is  not in  controversy that it was obligatory under cl. (a) of Art. 173 of the Constitution for the appellant to make and  subscribe, before  a  person  authorised  in  that behalf by  the Election  Commission, an  oath or affirmation according to  the form  set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule, and that he could not be qualified to be chosen to fill a  seat in the Legislature of a State without doing so. The importance  of that  requirement of the Constitution has been reiterated in sub-s. (2) of s. 36 of the Act for ground No. (a)  thereof provides  that the  Returning Officer shall reject a  nomination paper  on the  ground that  on the date fixed for  the scrutiny  of nomination  the  candidate  was, inter alia,  not qualified  to be chosen to fill the seat in the Legislative Assembly under Art. 173 of the Constitution. The requirement  for the  making and subscribing the oath or affirmation was therefore clearly mandatory.      The appellant  tried to  establish  the  plea  that  he reached the  office of the Returning Officer at 3.45 p.m. on May 18, 1977, and took 508 oath in  the presence of the Returning Officer who, however, failed to  make the  necessary endorsement  to that  effect. That averment was denied on behalf of the respondent, and we find that  the trial  court has  adequately dealt  with  the evidence  on   the  record  in  that  respect.  It  will  be sufficient for  us to  mention that  the Election Commission took care to point out the importance of the requirement for the making  and subscribing the oath or affirmation in their "Handbook for  Returning Officers",  and directed  that  the "authorised  person"   before  whom   that  was  done  would "forthwith give  a certificate to the candidate" that he had

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made and subscribed the oath before him on the date and hour mentioned in  the certificate.  It has  been emphasised that the certificate  would be given to the candidate without his applying for  it, for that would avoid all controversy later on as  to whether  he had taken the oath or not. Annexure VI provides for  the issue  of that  certificate in the portion which appears  just below the perforated portion of the form of oath  or affirmation  prescribed by  the Constitution. It may be  pointed out  in this  connection that  the appellant admitted in  his statement  that he  was given a slip by his proposer Jit  Ram P.W.  7, in which it was mentioned that he should  take   oath  or  make  the  affirmation  before  the Returning Officer  on May  19, 1977.  It is  therefore quite clear that  the oath  or affirmation  had not  been made  or subscribed at the time of the presentation of the nomination papers, and  as the  appellant was  not able  to produce the certificate  of  his  making  or  subscribing  the  oath  or affirmation before  the Returning Officer thereafter, in the manner alleged  by him, there is nothing wrong with the view taken by  the trial  court that he did not really do so, and we do  not think  it necessary to reappraise the evidence in that connection.      Issue  No.  6  dealt  with  the  question  whether  the respondent was  guilty of  the corrupt  practice of  bribery alleged in  paragraph 11  of the  petition. The  allegations were amended  by the  appellant, but  a part  of  them  were ordered to  be deleted  and there  is no  grievance in  that respect. The  remaining  allegation  was  to  the  following effect,-           "11. That  after the last Parliament Elections and      installation of  Janta Party  Government at the Centre,      it became  evident that  the State  Government would be      toppled and  the Ministers  of  the  Previous  Congress      Government and  specially respondent  No. 1 with a view      to bribe  the voters  or the  Constituency, he  started      giving large sum of dis- 509      cretionary grants  in the  Constituency. To  name a few      Bara Pind, Littran, Dalla etc. He used his influence in      the Department  that the funds were released during the      Elections. This was done with the object of influencing      the electors  of those  villages to  vote in  favour of      respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 went to village Bara      Pind on  25-5-1977 at  5.00 p.m. and in the presence of      Master Jasmel  Singh handed  over a cheque No. K-314781      dated 29-4-1977  for a  sum of  Rs. 20,000/- out of the      accounts of  Punjab State  Sports Council  to the  lady      Sarpanch Smt.  Banti and  Biant Kaur and gave a lecture      requesting the  co-villagers to  vote for him, since he      had given the money. On 27-5-1977 respondent No. 1 went      to village  Littran at  4 p.m. and gave a cheque of Rs.      5,000/- in the presence of about 50 villagers including      Chanan Singh  Mistri to  S. Balwant Singh Bali a cheque      No. K-314782  and called upon those present to vote for      him. The  cheque was  issued out  the funds  of  Punjab      State Sports Council". It is  hardly necessary  to say  that the  allegations  were traversed by  the respondent  and the trial court found that they had  not been  established. The  corrupt practice which was thus  alleged against  the respondent  was one  under s. 123(1) (a)  (b), according  to  which  any  gift,  offer  or promise by  a candidate  or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to  any person  whomsoever, with  the object, directly or  indirectly of  inducing an  elector to  vote or

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refrain from voting at an election is a corrupt practice. In view of  the allegations mentioned above, it appears that it was not the allegation of the appellant that the gift, offer or promise  was made  as a  reward to  an elector for having voted or refrained from voting within the meaning of sub-cl. (ii), and it could only be said to fall under sub-clause (b) of s.  1(A) as the allegation was that the bribery was meant to induce  the electors  to vote  for the  respondent. It is nonetheless an essential ingredient of the definition of the corrupt practice  of  "bribery"  that  the  gift,  offer  or promise should  be by  the candidate  or his agent or by any other person  with the  consent  of  the  candidate  or  his election agent.  Part VI  of the  Act  deals  with  disputes regarding  elections   and  Part   VII  deals  with  Corrupt Practices and  Electoral Offences.  Section 79  of  the  Act provides that  both in  Parts VI and VII, unless the context otherwise requires,  the definitions  mentioned in  it would govern the interpretation of those parts. Clause 510 (b) of  the section  defines the  expression’ candidate’  as follows,-           "’Candidate’ means a person who has been or claims      to have  been duly  nominated as  a  candidate  at  any      election". It has  therefore to be seen whether the respondent had been duly nominated  as a  candidate at the election in question, or whether  he claimed to be duly nominated at that election at the  time when  the corrupt  practice was alleged to have been  committed  by  him.  It  is  nobody’s  case  that  the respondent laid  any such  claim at  any point of time until his nomination  paper was scrutinised; and he was held to be a validly  nominated candidate only after the nomination was scrutinised by  the Returning  Officer on  May 19,  1977. He could not  therefore be  said to be a ’candidate’ within the meaning of  s. 123  read with  s. 79  of the  Act until that date.  The  allegation  in  paragraph  11  of  the  election petition was  to the  effect that the cheque of Rs. 20,000/- was delivered  at village  Bara Pind on May 25, 1977 and the votes were  solicited  on  that  date.  As  regards  village Littran, the allegation was that a cheque of Rs. 5,000/- was delivered on  May 27,  1977 and  votes were solicited. It is not disputed  however that  the precise evidence against the respondent was that he made an order for the delivery of Rs. 20,000/- on  April 17,  1977 in respect of village Bara Pind and on  April 29, 1977 in respect of village Littran, in his capacity as the Minister for Revenue. Both these orders were therefore made  before the respondent was a candidate at the election in  question and  it is not disputed before us that he ceased  to be  a minister  on April 30, 1977, when Punjab was brought  under the  President’s rule. So even if it were assumed that  the respondent sanctioned the two payments for the purpose  of gaining  popularity in Bara Pind and Littran villages, with  an eye  to  his  ultimate  candidature  from Nakodar Assembly  constituency, it  cannot be  said that his action amounted  to a  gift, offer  or promise  by him  as a "candidate" at  the election  in question so as to amount to the corrupt  practice of  bribery under cl. (1) of s. 123 of the Act.  As regards  the alleged distribution of cheques on May 25  and May 27, 1977, it will be enough to say that even if it were presumed that the respondent was allowed to do so after he  ceased to  be a  Minister, the  mere  delivery  of cheques could  not possibly  amount to  bribery when, as has been stated,  there was  no element  of bargain in regard to it.      It may  be mentioned  that the trial court rightly took

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the view  that it  was necessary  for the purpose of proving the corrupt practice 511 of bribery  to  establish  that  there  was  an  element  of "bargaining" in what the respondent was alleged to have done for Bara  Pind and Littran. Reference in this connection may be made  to the  decision of  this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and  others where  it was  held with  reference to the decision in Amirchand v. Surendra Lal Jha and others that if a Minister  redress the  grievances of a class of the public or people of a locality or renders them any help, on the eve of an  election, it  is not  a  corrup  practice  unless  he obtains promises  from the  voters in return, as a condition for his  help. It was also held that the "evidence must show clearly that  the promise or gift directly or indirectly was made to  an elector  to vote  or refrain  from voting  at an election", and  that "if  there was  good evidence  that the Minister bargained  directly or  indirectly for  votes,  the result might  have been  different". The  decision in  Ghasi Ram’s case  (supra) was followed in Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand  and   another,  Bhanu  Kumar  Shastri  v.  Mohan  Lal Sukhandia and  others and  Chaitanya Kumar  Adatiya v.  Smt. Sushila Dixit and others. It was therefore necessary for the appellant to  plead and  prove  that  there  was  bargaining between the  respondent and the voters and he did what he is alleged to  have done  in Bara  Pind and  Littran  for  that reason but, as the trial court has pointed out, there was no such allegation  in  the  election  petition.  So  when  the element of bargain was completely absent from the allegation against the  respondent, the  trial court  was justified  in holding that  the alleged  corrupt  practice  had  not  been established. The  trial court has considered the evidence on the record in this respect and its finding on issue No. 6 is quite correct  and nothing  worthwhile has been urged before us to require its reconsideration.      As there  is no  merit in  this appeal, it is dismissed with costs. N.K.A.                                     Appeal dismissed. 512