24 September 1964
Supreme Court


Case number: Appeal (crl.) 211 of 1962






DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/09/1964


CITATION:  1965 AIR  932            1965 SCR  (1) 323

ACT:   Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Amendment Act,  1950 (Act  52  of 1950) Proviso to S.  17(4)-Central  legislation extended  to Part B State-Notification  under  corresponding State   law   not   expressly   repealed-whether   survives- Subordinate  legislation  whether  can  survive  repeal   of parent    law-Association  of persons whether  ’person’  for purpose    of   prosecution-Liability   of   President    of Association.

HEADNOTE:    The Indian Scrap Order, 1943, passed under the Defence of India  Rules,  was after the expiration of the  said  Rules, preserved by the Essential Supplies Act, 1946.  By (Central) Act 52 of 1950, the said Act was extended, inter alia to the Part  B State of Madhya Bharat.  That State already had  its corresponding law on the subject, namely, the Madhya  Bharat Essential Supplies Act, 1948, under which the Madhya  Bharat Scrap Order, 1949 had been issued.  While extending the Cen- tral  legislation to the Part B States, Act 52 of 1950  also laid  down, in s. 17(4) that the "corresponding law" in  the State would stand repealed, with a proviso that the  orders, directions  etc.,  issued  under  the  repealed  law   would continue.   The  appellant who was President  of  the  Scrap Dealers  Association,  Indore,  was  prosecuted  under   the allegation that the Association had sold scrap iron at rates higher  than those fixed under the Indian Scrap Order.   The defence  taken  was that the prices at which the  sales  had been effected were those fixed by -a notification dated 26th August,  1949  under  the Madhya Bharat  Scrap  Order  which continued  in  force.  The appellant was  acquitted  by  the trial Court but was convicted by the High Court and appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The  contentions  of  the appellant were :  (1)  The  Madhya Bharat  Scrap Order had not been expressly repealed  by  the Indian  Scrap Order and therefore it continued by  force  of the  proviso to s. 17(4) of the Act 52 of 1950, and, in  any case, the notification dated 26th August, 1949, continued in force as an independent piece of subordinate legislation. (2)  The  appellant  as  President  of  the  Scrap   Dealers Association  which was an unincorporated body could  not  be



held  liable for a sale in excess of the authorised  maximum price effected by a Munim or Munims of the Association. HELD  :  (i) The Central notification by  which  the  Indian Scrap Order was extended to Madhya Bharat, no doubt, did not expressly provide for the repeal of the Madhya Bharat  Scrap Order,  but  the  provisions  of the  two  Orders  were  not identical   and   they   could   not,   therefore,   operate simultaneously.   It  was  therefore  obvious  that  on  the extension  to Madhya Bharat of the Indian Scrap  Order,  the Madhya  Bharat Scrap Order was repealed and replaced by  the Indian law. [331D]. (ii) The notification in question could not survive even  if it  was  treated  as an  independent  piece  of  subordinate legislation  under the State law.  According to  Craies,  if the statute under which by-laws are made is repealed,  those bye-laws  are  impliedly  repealed and  cease  to  have  any validity   unless  the  repealing  statute   contains   some provision   preserving   the  validity   of   the   by-laws, notwithstanding the repeal.  As the parent 324 order  under which the notification dated August  26,  1949, was made had been repealed without a saving, the effect  was that the said notification also stood repealed. (333D; 333G- H; 334H]. (iii)     The definition of ’person’ in the General  Clauses Act  includes  within that term an  unincorporated  body  of persons.   In the present case it was the  Association  that was given the facility of obtaining scrap at more favourable prices  than  dealers,  and  it  was  that  body  which  was subjected to control in the shape of having to sell what  it had  purchased from controlled sources at specified  prices. The  argument could not be accepted that the Association  as such  could  not be penalised for  selling  at  unauthorised rates.   The appellant as President of the  Association  was liable  to be convicted by virtue of s. 8 of  the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary  Powers)  Act,  1946  which  made   the abetment  of contravention of any order under the Act,  also an offence. [335C-D,E-F]. Watson  v.  Winch. [1916] 1 K.B. 688 and Craies  on  Statute Law. 6th Edn. 332, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals  Nos. 211 to 217 of 1962. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated May,  5,  1962,  of the Madhya Pradesh  High  Court  (Indore Bench) at Indore, in Criminal Appeals Nos. 216, 222 and  227 to 231 of 1961. C.   B. Agarwala and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant. B.   Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ayyangar J. These seven appeals are connected as they relate to  the  same appellant and the point involved  in  each  is identical.   They are before us by virtue of  special  leave granted  by this Court and are directed against  the  common judgment  of  the Indore Bench of the High Court  of  Madhya Pradesh  convicting the appellant of a contravention of  the Indian Iron & Steel (Scrap Control) Order, 1943. The  accused, the appellant before us, was the President  of the   Scrap  Dealers  Association  at  Indore  and  he   was prosecuted  before the learned Additional  City  Magistrate, Indore  City  in seven sets of criminal cases filed  by  the State of Madhya Pradesh alleging contravention of S. 8(4) of



the  Iron & Steel (Scrap Control) Order, 1943 by selling  or causing  to  be sold scrap iron to  different  customers  on different  dates  at a rate higher than  was  authorised  by notification  dated September 30, 1952 issued by  the  Steel Controller  under the said order.  He was acquitted  by  the Additional  City Magistrate but on appeals preferred by  the State Government, the learned Judges set aside the acquittal and convicted him of the offences and sentenced him to pay a fine of 325 Rs. 100 in each case with imprisonment in default of payment of fine.     It is the correctness of this judgment of the High Court that is  canvassed  before  us by  the  appellant  in  these appeals. To  appreciate  the  points raised by the  appellant  it  is necessary to narrate briefly the history of the  legislation on  the topic of control over the price at which  scrap  was permitted to be sold by dealers.   The Defence of India Act, 1939 enabled the Central Government     to   frame    rules, among others, "for maintaining   supplies      and  services essential to the life of the community       (vides. 2)." In pursuance thereof Rule 81 (2) of the Defence of India  Rules empowered the Central Government "so far as appears to  them to  be  necessary or expedient for . . . . .  .  maintaining supplies  and  services essential to the life  of  the  com- munity" to provide by order, inter alia, (a) for controlling the  pi-ices  or rates at which articles or  things  of  any description  whatever may be sold......... and for  relaxing any  such  prices or rates".  By virtue of this  power,  the Central  Government  promulgated  the Iron  &  Steel  (Scrap Control) Order, 1943 (hereinafter referred to as the  Indian Scrap  Order)  on February 25. 1943.  This  Order  to  whose provisions we shall have to make some reference later  would normally  have lapsed on the expiry of six months after  the revocation  of the proclamation of emergency because of  the provisions of s. 102(3) (a) of the Government of India  Act, 1935.   In  order  to  avoid  this  result,  the   Emergency Provisions  Continuance Ordinance, 1946 was  promulgated  on September  25,  1946  which  continued  several  orders   in relation to the control of production, distribution etc.  of essential  commodities, and Indian Scrap Order  among  them, and this ordinance was replaced by a permanent  legislation- the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act  24 of   1946)  which  also  contained  a  provision   for   the continuance of the Control Orders in force [vide s.  17(2)]. Section  8(4) of the Indian Scrap Order prohibited the  sale of  scrap  in excess of the prices fixed  therefore  by  the Controller.  It is not disputed that the sales in regard  to which  the appellant has been prosecuted were in  excess  of the maximum there specified. Several  defences were raised but of these those  which  now survive  are only two: (1) The legal effect of the  parallel provisions  on the same subject viz., control over the  sale price  of scrap which were in force in the Part B  State  of Madhya  Bharat which comprised Indore, and (2)  Whether  the appellant as the President of the Scrap Dealers  Association which was an unincorporated body could be held liable for, a sale in excess of the sup./64--8 326 authorised  maximum price effected by a Munim or  Munims  of the Association. We shall now proceed to narrate in brief outline the history



of the parallel provisions relative to control over the sale price of Scrap in the Part B State of Madhya Bharat.   These provisions undoubtedly continued in force in the State  till September 12, 1950 when the Indian Scrap Control Order, 1943 was in terms made applicable in that State and the principal point   raised  by  Mr.  Agarwala  was  whether  a   certain notification  which had been issued under the State law  and was   in  force  on  that  date  continued  in  force   even thereafter.  The State legislation on this topic started  on October  9, 1948 with the promulgation of the Madhya  Bharat Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1948, which was   a  reproduction  of  the  Indian  Essential   Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1946.  When this Ordinance was replaced  in  India  by the  Essential  Supplies  (Temporary Powers)  Act, 1946, the same process was repeated in  Madhya Bharat by the enactment of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)  Act (Samvat 2005) (Madhya Bharat Act III of  1948). Among  the "essential, commodities" dealt with by the  State enactment were iron and steel [vide S. 2(3)(7)].  Section  4 of the Act read:               "4.   Powers  to control  production,  supply,               distribution  etc., of essential  commodities.               (1) The Government so far as it appears to  it               to  be necessary or expedient for  maintaining               or   increasing  supplies  of  any   essential               commodities,  or for securing their  equitable               distribution  and availability at fair  prices               may  by  an  Order notified  in  the  Official               Gazette provide for regulating or  prohibiting               the   production,  supply,  distribution   and               movement  thereof,  and  trade  and   commerce               therein.               (2)   Without  prejudice to the generality  of               the  powers conferred by sub-section  (1),  an               order made thereunder may provide               (c)   For controlling the prices at which  any               essential commodity may be bought or sold; to quote only the material words.  In exercise of the powers thus  conferred  the  Director  of  Civil  Supplies,  Madhya Bharat, to whom the powers in that behalf were delegated  by the State Government, promulgated on June 4, 1949 the Madhya Bharat  Iron, Steel and Scrap (Production,  Procurement  and Distribution) 327 Control  Order, 1949.  Clause 5 of this Order empowered  the Director  of Civil Supplies, Madhya Bharat to  specify  from time  to  time the maximum  prices-wholesale  and  retail-at which  "iron  and steel, scrap or  specified  articles  made thereof" may be sold (a) by a producer, (b) by a  controlled stockholder,  (c)  by  a registered  stockholder  (d)  by  a controlled dealer and (e) by a scrap merchant.  The  several categories  of persons whose sales were thus regulated  were defined  in  the Order.  Acting under  this  provision,  the Director  Civil Supplies issued a notification on  the  same date-June 4, 1949-which read:               "In  exercise of the powers conferred  on  the               Director  under  clause  5(1)  of  the  Madhya               Bharat  Iron,  Steel  and  Scrap  (Production,               Procurement  and Distribution) Control  Order,               1949,   I  hereby  specify  that   the   Price               Schedules  as  may be in force  for  the  time               being  under  ......  Iron  and  Steel   Scrap               Control  Order in the Indian Union in  respect               of   sales   by  producers,   controlled   and               Registered  Stockholders and  Scrap  Merchants



             shall  apply mutatis mutandis to sales by  the               aforesaid  persons in Madhya Bharat;  provided               however,  that  the  Registered   Stockholders               shall sell to Controlled Dealers at II  column               rates   of  the  Government  of  India   Price               Schedule  for  the time being in  force,  that               Iron and Steel which they receive at column  I               rate  from  the producers and  at  column  III               rate,  that Iron and Steel which they  receive               from the Controlled Stockholders at column  II               rates : provided also that controlled  Dealers               in Madhya Bharat shall sell to consumers at  a               profit margin of not exceeding Rs. 30 per ton;               subject  however, in all cases to  such  local               extra  charges  as may be fixed by me  or  the               officers authorised by me in this behalf." It  is only necessary to add that there were similar  Orders passed under the Indian Scrap Order, 1943 in which also  the classification of dealers etc., proceeded on the same lines. The form of the notification by the Steel Controller to  the Government of India, referred to in this notification was on the following lines : There was a schedule to the notification fixing the  maximum prices and it was divided into five columns.  First was  the number  of  the  item, the second  was  the  description  or classification of the material and the next three which were headed  columns I, II and III dealt with  specified  maximum basic  prices  per  ton for sale  at  Calcutta,  Bombay  and Madras.  There were adjustments 328 indicated  for  arriving at the prices chargeable  at  other centres.   Column  I  specified  the  prices  for  sales  by Controlled Sources other than those mentioned in column  11. The  second  column was headed "specified prices  fixed  for sales  by scrap merchants who have been declared  controlled sources" and the ,last or third column specified the maximum for  sales  by  all persons other than  those  mentioned  in columns  I and 11. Different maxima were fixed for  sale  by persons  falling under the three columns, the  first  column price  being the lowest, the second t little higher and  the last which included sales by retail dealers to the consuming public  being  the highest.  It is common  ground  that  the Scrap Dealers Association, Indore of which the appellant was the  President had been declared "a Controlled  Source"’  so that the maximum prices at which members of the  Association which  was  an unincorporated body could  sell,  were  those specified in column II of the schedule.  It is not necessary to  set out the prices at which the actual sales which  wore stated to be in violation-of the law, took place, but it  is sufficient  to  state that admittedly the  servants  of  the Association  sold  scrap iron at prices  higher  than  those fixed in column II and at prices fixed for column III. The first submission of Mr. Agarwala learned Counsel for the appellant was that the sale by the Association at the column ]II price was authorised and legal because of a notification issued  by the Government of Madhya Bharat dated August  26, 1949.   The principal point argued before us in  respect  of this  notification  is as to whether this  notification  was alive  and in force on the date of the sales in  1956  which were the subject of the several prosecutions and whether  it has  survived subsequent Indian legislation extended to  the State  to  which  we shall  advert  presently.   But  before proceeding to do so, it would be convenient to consider  the nature of that notification. The  Scrap  Dealers Association of Madhya Bharat  appear  to



have  made  a representation to the  State  Government  that though  the  dealers in Scrap as constituent  units  of  the Association were treated as a Controlled Source and  secured advantages thereby and were bound to sell at prices fixed in column II, still the Association should ’be accorded special privilege  and be permitted to sell at prices fixed for  the residuary   class   of   dealers  in   column   III.    This representation  was  considered  by  an  Advisory  Committee appointed by the State Government and a direction was  given that "a change be made to the extent that at present for the goods which is sold to consumers by the Scrap Association                             329 at the regional headquarters they will be allowed to  charge column  III rates on the goods instead of column II  rates." It is stated that the Association has been selling at  these rates ever since.  There is no doubt that if this  direction stood,  and  we  need only add that  the  validity  of  this direction was not challenged by the respondent as beyond the powers of the State Government, the appellant could not have been guilty of the offence with which he was charged. But   the  question  is  whether  this  direction  or   this modification of the prices fixed under s. 5(1) of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Control Order by incorporating the notification by  the Steel Controller of the Government of India  in  its text,  subsisted in 1956 when the sales which are stated  as being  in  contravention  of the Indian  Scrap  Order,  took place. We  have  already seen that the notification dated  June  4, 1949  which we have extracted earlier, was issued under  the Madhya Bharat Iron and Steel etc., Control Order, 1949  pro- mulgated  under the Madhya Bharat Essential  Supplies  (Tem- porary  Powers) Act, 1948.  The Madhya Bharat Act,  however, stood repealed by virtue of the provisions of the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary Powers) Amendment Act, 1950 (Act 52  of 1950) under which the Essential Supplies (Temporary  Powers) Act, 1946 was extended to the Part B States as and from such dates as might be specified by the Central Government. -By a notification issued by the Central Government the  Essential Supplies  Act, 1946 was made applicable to the Part B  State of  Madhya Bharat from August 17, 1950.  The effect of  this extension was provided for by s. 10 of Act 52 of 1950  which enacted :               "1O.   Amendment  of section 17, Act  XXIV  of               1946.  After sub-section (3) of section 17  of               the said Act, the following sub-section  shall               be inserted, namely               (4)   If  immediately before the day on  which               this  Act comes into force in a Part B  State,               there is in force in that State any law  which               corresponds  to this Act,  such  corresponding               law shall on that day stand repealed in so far               as   it  relates  to  any  of  the   essential               commodities governed by this Act:               Provided  that  any Order made  and  in  force               immediately before that day in the said  State               shall continue in force and be deemed to be an               Order   made   under   this   Act,   and   all               appointments   made,   licences   or   permits               granted, and directions issued, under any such               Order and in force immediately before that day               shall likewise continue in 330               force  and  be deemed to be made,  granted  or               issued in pursuance of this Act." If  the  main  part of sub-s. (4) stood  alone  without  the



proviso,  the effect would have been not merely a repeal  of the Madhya Bharat Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948  which was "a corresponding law" which was in force  in that  State,  but  with that  repeal,  all  the  subordinate legislation enacted thereunder including the Control  Orders as  well as the Orders of the Director fixing  prices  would also  have  stood  repealed.   By  virtue  of  the  proviso, however, notwithstanding the repeal of the parent enactment, the  Orders  made  under it were continued and  were  to  be deemed to have been made under the Indian Act. Mr.  Agarwala  laid considerable stress on the  proviso  and urged  that by reason of its language it continued in  force not merely the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order of June 4, 1949 and the  price fixation by the Director under s. 5 ( I) of  that Order on the same date, but also the variation in the prices to be charged by the Association effected by the  Government Order  dated  August  26,  1949  which  enabled  that  body, notwithstanding its being a dealer specified in column II to sell at prices fixed for persons falling under column M.  We need  not  pause to consider whether the  direction  or  the notification  dated August 26, 1949 is "a  direction  issued under  any  such order" within the proviso to s.  17(4)  but shall  proceed  on  the  basis that  it  is,  accepting  the construction   suggested  by  learned  Counsel.    But   the replacement  of the Madhya Bharat law on this topic  by  the law in force in India did not stop with that effected by Act 52  of 1950.  By a notification of the Government  of  India dated  September 12, 1950, the Indian Scrap Order, 1943  was extended to Madhya Bharat.  It is really the legal effect of this extension that calls for scrutiny in these appeals. The notification by which the Indian Scrap Order was extend- ed to Madhya Bharat, no doubt, did not expressly provide for the  repeal of the "Madhya Bharat Scrap Iron &  Steel  etc., Order,  1949", but if the two Control Orders cannot  operate simultaneously,  it would be obvious that the  Indian  Scrap Order  would have repealed and replaced the State  law.   In the first place, even if the provisions contained in the two sets  of Orders were in identical terms, it might be  proper to  hold that the Indian Scrap Order replaced the State  law in order to give some meaning and effect to the extension of the  Indian Scrap Order to Madhya Bharat.  But that  is  not the position here.  There are 331 marked differences between the provisions of the two  Orders such  that  it would not be possible for the  two  to  stand together.   For instance, Rule 3 of the Indian  Scrap  Order prohibits  producers from acquiring or agreeing  to  acquire scrap  except and in accordance with a written order of  the Controller  etc.  There is no rule corresponding to this  in the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order.  In line with this, in Rule 6 of the Madhya Bharat Order which corresponds to Rule 8(4) of the  Indian  Scrap Order, there is  no  prohibition  against acquisition for a higher price than the maximum fixed,  such as  is  to be found in Indian Order.  Again, Rule 7  of  the Madhya  Bharat  Order relating to the  restrictions  on  the movement  of  scrap has no corresponding provisions  in  the Indian Scrap Order.  Illustrations of this type of variation may  be  multiplied,  but  this is  unnecessary  as  it  was conceded  that  the provisions contained in the  two  orders were not identical.  What we desire to emphasise is that the two orders, though achieving substantially the same  object, are not identical in their provisions.  If that is so, it is obvious that on the extension to Madhya Bharat of the Indian Scrap  Order,  the  Madhya Bharat Scrap  Order  would  stand repealed and be replaced by the Indian law.



Mr. Agarwala, however, submitted that this would not  follow because  according to him the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order  had some sort of higher efficacy or stood on a footing  superior to  the  Indian  Scrap Order by reason of  its  having  been continued by the proviso to s. 17(4) to Act 24 of 1946,  the argument being that the notification etc., should be  deemed to  be one under the Essential Supplies  (Temporary  Powers) Act  itself.  This argument, even if sound, does not  really help  the appellant, for the Indian Scrap Order  itself  was preserved  by  a  saving of the same  type  and  couched  in exactly  the,  same  language  in  the  Essential   Supplies (Temporary  Powers) Ordinance, 1946 and the Act of the  same name  of  1946  [vide s. 17(2) & (3) of  Act  24  of  1946]. Besides, just as an order made or notification issued. under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 could be amended,  modified or cancelled, even if the  Madhya  Bharat Scrap Control Order and the notifications issued  thereunder are  deemed to have been passed under the Act of 1946  which is  what  learned  Counsel contends, they  could  surely  be modified.   amended   or  replaced  by   other   subordinate legislation  originating  from  the same  parent  Act.   The Indian Scrap Order, 1943 was one such, because it is  deemed to have been made under that 332 Act.   When  the Indian Scrap Order was extended  to  Madhya Bharat,  the  result was that it  effectively  replaced  the Madhya Bharat Order on the same topic. Even granting that the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order of June  4, 1949 was repealed on the extension to that territory of  the Indian  Scrap Order, Mr. Agarwala urged that  the  direction contained in the notification of the State Government  dated August 26, 1949 was a special law which stood unaffected  by the  extension of the Indian Scrap Order to  Madhya  Bharat. That  when  the Indian Scrap Order was extended  it  carried with it the notifications issued by the Controller from time to  time and that after the extension of the Scrap Order  to Madhya Bharat, all sales of scrap would have to be  effected only   in   conformity  with  the  prices   fixed   by   the ’notifications   issued  under  the  Scrap  Order  was   not contested.   Nor  was it disputed that on the terms  of  the notifications  issued  fixing the prices  at  which  several classes  of  dealers might effect sales  tinder  the  Indian Scrap Order, the Association of which the appellant was  the President  would have fallen under column 11 and would  have been  bound to sell scrap only at the prices fixed  in  that column.  But it was submitted that the fact that even before the extension of the Indian Scrap Order to Madhya Bharat  in September,   1950   tinder  the  very  provisions   of   the notification  dated June 4, 1949 itself the  maximum  prices fixed  in  Madhya Bharat were only those prescribed  by  the Controller  in  India and that the deviation  in  regard  to these prices permitted to the Association was thus in effect a   local  modification  of  the  Indian  Order   and   that consequently the direction issued by the State Government on August  26,  1949  and which was continued  even  after  the repeal  of the Madhya Bharat Temporary Powers Act,  1948  by reason of the proviso to s. 17 (4) of the Act 24 of 1946 was not  affected by the extension of the Indian Scrap Order  to Madhya  Bharat.   We find ourselves unable  to  accept  this argument.  The concession allowed to the Association by  the notification  dated August 26, 1949 could be looked at  from one  of two alternative positions.  The direction  could  be viewed as in effect a modification of the prices fixed under S. 5 (1) of the Madhya Bharat Order by the Director so  that in law it should be deemed to have been incorporated in that



price  fixation and became, as it were, the price  fixed  by the Controller.  The effect of this would be that in  Madhya Bharat  before the extension of the Indian Scrap Order,  the maximum  prices chargeable by the specified type  of  dealer falling under 333 column  It  would be those applicable to dealers  in  column III.   If this were the true position, the result  would  be that  when  the Indian Scrap Order was  made  applicable  to Madhya  Bharat  without  a saving or  special  provision  as regards  sales by the Association, it would  supersede  that law  and the special classification effected by  the  Madhya Bharat law would cease to be in force.  In this respect  the fact  that  the prices fixed in Madhya Bharat for  sales  by dealers etc., specified in the three column corresponded  to those  fixed  by the Controller in India,  would  be  wholly irrelevant,  for  the authority by which  the  fixation  was effected  would  be traceable to Madhya Bharat and  not  the Indian law. The  other alternative would be that the notification  dated August 26, 1949 was an independent piece of subordinate law- making  under the Essential Commodities Act and  the  Madhya Bharat Scrap Order, and it was this aspect that was stressed by  Mr. Agarwala.  Even if that be so, the  appellant  would derive  no  advantage from this, because there  has  been  t repeal  not merely of the Madhya Bharat  Essential  Supplies Act  no doubt with a saving but of the Madhya  Bharat  Scrap Order without a saving and on the repeal of the Scrap  Order under which the Subordinate rule or regulation was  effected the latter would also stand repealed.  As explained by  Lord Reading C.J. in Watson v. Winch(1):               "It  has been long established that,  when  an               Act  of  Parliament is repealed,  it  must  be               considered  (except as to transactions  passed               and    closed)    as   if   it    had    never               existed..........  It  would follow  that  any               bye-law  made under a repealed statute  ceases               to have any validity unless the repealing  Act               contains   some   provision   preserving   the               validity  of the bye-law  notwithstanding  the               repeal." Admittedly   there  is  no  saving  clause  either  in   the notification  of the Central Government by which the  Indian Scrap Order was extended to Madhya Bharat nor, of course, in the Scrap Order itself.  As the parent order under which the notification was made his been repealed without a saving the effect  must be that the notification dated August 26,  1949 must,  if  it  were held to be  an  independent  subordinate legislation,  be  held  also to  have  been  repealed.   Mr. Agarwala  next referred us to s. 24 of the  General  Clauses Act No. X of 1897 and urged that the notifica- (1) [1916] 1 K.B. 688, 690. 334 tion   would  be  a  bye-law  that  would   have   continued notwithstanding the repeal of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act runs thus:               "24.  Where any Central Act or Regulation,  is               after  the commencement of this Act,  repealed               and  re-enacted with or without  modification,               then,   unless  it  is   otherwise   expressly               provided,   any   appointment,   notification,               order,  scheme, rule form or bye-law, made  or               issued  under the repealed Act or  Regulation,               shall,  so far as it is not inconsistent  with               the  provisions re-enacted, continue in  force



             and  be  deemed to have been  made  or  issued               under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and               until  it  is superseded by  any  appointment,               notification,  order scheme, rule form or  by-               law,  made or issued under the  provisions  so               re-enacted   and  when  any  Central  Act   or               Regulation, which, by a notification under  S.               5 or 5A of the Scheduled Districts Act,  1874,               or  any  like law, has been  extended  to  any               local area, has, by a subsequent notification,               been  withdrawn  from and reextended  to  such               area  or any part thereof, the  provisions  of               such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have               been  repealed and re-enacted in such area  or               part within the meaning of this section." We consider that this submission is entirely without  force. Mr.  Agarwala  fairly conceded that the language  of  s.  24 would not cover a repeal of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order by the  introduction  into the Madhya Bharat territory  of  the Indian Scrap Order. 1943, but he suggested that even  though the  section was in terms inapplicable, he could invoke  the principle  underlying  it.   But  this  argument,   however, proceeds  on  assuming  that S. 24 was  declaratory  of  the common  rule of interpretation and that even in the  absence of  s.  24  the  same principle of  law  would  apply.   The position  apart from a statutory provision such as is  found in  S. 24 of the General Clauses Act, is thus summarised  in Craies on Statute Lent, 6th Edn. 334: "If  the statute under which bye-laws are made is  repealed, those bye-laws are impliedly repealed and cease to have  any validity   unless  the  repealing  statute  contains   sonic provision   preserving   the   validity   of   the   bye-law notwithstanding the repeal.  This follows from the rule .... when an Act of Parliament is repealed it must                             335 be considered (except to transactions passed and closed)  as if it had never existed." This  submission  has,  therefore,  no  merit  and  must  be rejected. The second of the points urged by Mr. Agarwala was that  the Scrap   Dealers  Association  was  an  unincorporated   body consisting wholly of retail dealers and that as each of them individually was a dealer who could himself have sold at the column  M rate, the Association could not be  penalised  for selling  at  that  rate.   As  an  unincorporated  body,  he submitted, it was merely the aggregate of its members and so would have the rights of its constituent units.  There is no force  in this point either.  Apart from the  definition  of "person"  in  the  General  Clauses  Act  as  including   an unincorporated  body of persons, what we are concerned  with is  not  sales  by  individual  dealers  who  composed   the Association,  but sales by and through the Association.   It was the Association that was given the facility of obtaining scrap at more favourable prices than dealers and it was that body  which was subjected to control in the shape of  having to sell what it had purchased from controlled sources at the prices specified in column II. Lastly, it was faintly urged by Mr. Agarwala that the appel- lant  was merely the President of the Association and  could not be held liable for the sales effected by its  employees. There was no dispute that the sales were by the  Association and at prices fixed by that body.  It was also admitted that these  prices  were in excess of the  prices  specified  for sales fixed for the Association. under s. 8 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, "Any person who abets



the  contravention of any order.... shall be deemed to  have contravened that order." In the circumstances, we do not see bow this affords any defence to the appellant. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed. 336