14 May 1954
Supreme Court


Case number: Appeal (crl.) 7 of 1953






DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/05/1954


CITATION:  1954 AIR  465            1955 SCR  313  CITATOR INFO :  R          1957 SC 478  (11)  R          1957 SC 510  (14)  RF         1957 SC 896  (12)  R          1960 SC 475  (4,9,13,16)  RF         1961 SC   4  (4,15)  R          1961 SC 705  (17)  R          1961 SC1602  (12)  F          1961 SC1731  (13)  RF         1964 SC 381  (38)  R          1965 SC1107  (60)  R          1966 SC1788  (10,14)  RF         1967 SC 212  (27)  RF         1967 SC 669  (21)  RF         1968 SC1232  (15,53,82,95)  RF         1970 SC 564  (185)  RF         1973 SC 106  (147)  RF         1973 SC1461  (227,450,566,1847,1848,1998)  R          1974 SC 366  (56)  E&D        1974 SC 543  (13)  R          1974 SC1660  (18)  R          1978 SC 851  (39)  RF         1978 SC1296  (12)  E          1980 SC 350  (4)  R          1982 SC1126  (10,11)  RF         1983 SC1019  (29,30)  F          1987 SC1802  (9)  R          1990 SC 560  (13,31)  RF         1991 SC 672  (29)

ACT: Constitution   of   India-Art.   19(1)(f)   and   (g)-Cotton Textile,   (Control  of  Movement)  Order,  1948,   cl.   3- Promulgated  under  s. 3 of  Essential  Supplies  (Temporary Powers)  Act,  1946-PermitRequirement of-to  dispose  of  or transport cotton textiles-Whether violation of Art. 19(1)(f) and  (g)-Essential  Supplies (Temporary  Powers)  Act,  1946 (XXIV   of  1946)  ss.  3,  4,6-Whether  ultra   vires   the Legislature on ground of delegation Of legislative powers-s. 6-Whether  repeals or abrogates-pre-existing laws-Effect  of the  section  -Delegation-Essential  power  of  legislation- Whether   can   be,  delegated-Principles   underlying   it-



Requirements.of  permit  by clauses 3 and 4 of  the  Control Order--Whether  in  conflict  with ss. 27,  28,  41  of  the Railway Act. 381

HEADNOTE: Clause 3 of the Cotton Textile (Control of Movement)  Order, 1948, promulgated by the Central Government under section  3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, does not  deprive  a  citizen  of the  right  to  dispose  of  or transport cotton tex- B tiles purchased by him.  It requires him  to  take  a. permit from the  Textile  Commissioner  to enable  him to transport them.  The requirement of a  permit in  this  respect cannot be regarded as  an  A  unreasonable restriction on the citizen’s right under sub-clauses (f) and (g) of article 19(1) of the Constitution. The  policy underlying the Control Order is to regulate  the transport of cotton textiles in a manner that will ensure an even  distribution of the commodity in the country and  make it available at a fair price to all.  The grant or a refusal of  a  permit  is  to be governed  by  the  policy  and  the discretion  given  to  the Textile  Commissioner  is  to  be exercised  in such a way as to effectuate this policy.   The conferment of such a discretion cannot be called invalid and if there is an abuse of power there is ample power in Courts to undo the mischief. Messrs.   Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State  of  Uttar Pradesh (([1954] S.C.R. 803) distinguished. It  was settled by the majority judgment in the  Delhi  Laws Act  case ([1951]’S.C.R. 747) that the essential  powers  of legislation cannot be delegated. The  Legislature must declare the policy of the law and  the legal  principles which are to control any -given cases  and must  provide a standard to guide the officials or the  body in power to execute the law. The  Legislature has laid down such a principle in  the  Act and that principle is the maintenance or increase in  supply of   essential   commodities  and  of   securing   equitable distribution and availability at given prices. The  preamble and the body of the sections in the  Essential Supplies   (Temporary   Powers)  Act,   1946,   sufficiently formulate  the  legislative  policy and the  ambit  and  the character of the Act is such that the details of that policy can  only  be  worked  out by delegating  that  power  to  a subordinate authority within the framework of that policy. Therefore  section  3  of the Act is  not  ultra  vires  the Legislature  on  the  ground of  delegation  of  legislative power. Section  4 of the Act enumerates the classes of  persons  to whom  the power could be delegated or sub-delegated  by  the Central  Government  and it is not correct to say  that  the instrumentalities have not been selected by the  Legislature itself.  Accordingly section 4 of the Act is not ultra vires on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative powers. Shannon v. Lower Maintand Dairy Products Board ([1938] A.C. 708) applied. 382 The requirements of a permit by clause 3 and the  provisions of  clause 4 of the Central Order which empower the  Textile Commissioner  to  direct  a  carrier  to  close  booking  or transport of cloth  apparel, etc., are not in conflict  with sections  27, 28 and 41 of the Railways Act.  These  clauses merely  supplement the relevant provisions of  the  Railways



Act and do not supersede them.’ Section  6  of  the  Act does not  either  expressly  or  by implication repeal any of the provisions of the  preexisting laws  ;  nor  does it abrogate   them.   Those  laws  remain untouched  and  unaffected  so far as the  statute  book  is concerned.  The repeal of a statute means that the  repealed statute  must  be regarded as if it had never  been  on  the statute  book.   The effect of section 6 is  not  to  repeal those laws or abrogate them but simply to by-pass them where they  are inconsistent with the provisions of the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary  Powers) Act, 1946 or the  orders  made thereunder.   Even  assuming that the  existing  law  stands repealed  by  implication, such abrogation or repeal  is  by force of the legislative declaration contained in section  6 and is not by force of the order made by the delegate  under -section  3. Accordingly there is no delegation involved  in the  provision  of section 6 and it cannot  be  held  uncon- stitutional on that ground.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  7  of 1953.  Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order of  the High   Court  of  Judicature  at  Nagpur  dated  the   15th. September,  1952, in Criminal Case No. 45 of 1951  from  the Order of the Court of the Magistrate 1st Class, Hoshangabad, in Criminal Case No. 75 of 1949. H.J.  Umrigar,  Rameshwarnath and Rajinder  Narain  for  the appellants. T.   L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (T.  P. Naik and I. N. Shroff, with him) for the respondent.   1954. May 14.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MEHAR  CHAND  MAHAJAN C.J.--The facts giving  rise  to  this appeal are these: The appellant, Harishankar Bagla, and  his wife,  Smt.   Gomti Bagla, were arrested at Itarsi,  by  the Railway Police on the 29th November, 1948, for contravention of  section 7 of the Essential Supplies  (Temporary  Powers) Act,  1946,  read  with clause (3) of  the  Cotton  Textiles (Control of Movement) 383 Order., 1948, having been found in possession of new  cotton cloth  "  weighing  over  six maunds  which  cloth,  it  was alleged,was  being  taken  by them  from  Bombay  to  Kanpur without  any  permit.  After  various  vicissitudes  through which the chalan passed the case was eventually withdrawn by the  High Court to itself on the 3rd of September,’1951,  as it  involved  a decision of constitutional issues.   By  its order dated the 15th September, 1952, the High Court  upheld the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary  Powers) Act, 1946, as constitutional.   It  also upheld the constitutionality of the impugned Order.  Section 6 of the Act was held to be inconsistent with the provisions of   the   Railway   Act   but  it   was   held   that   its unconstitutionality  did not affect the prosecution in  this case.   The High Court directed that the prosecution  should proceed  and  the records sent back to the trial  Court  for being  dealt with in accordance with law.  Leave  to  appeal was  given  both to the appellants and  the  respondent  and requisite  certificates  under articles 132 and 134  of  the Constitution  were  granted.   This appeal  along  with  the connected appeal No. 6 of 1953 is before us on the basis  of the said certificates. Mr. Umrigar, who appeared in this and the connected  appeal,



urged  the  following  points  for  our  consideration   and decision: (1)  That  sections  3  and  4  of  the  Essential  Supplies (Temporary  Powers)  Act, 1946, and the  provisions  of  the Cotton Cloth Control Order contravened the fundamental right of the appellants guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and (g)  of the Constitution; (2)  That  section  3 of the Essential  Supplies  (Temporary Powers)  Act, 1946, and in particular section 4  were  ultra vires, the Legislature on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power;  (3) That section 6 having been found ultra vires, section 3 was  inextricably  connected  with  it  and  that  both  the sections  should  have  been declared ultra  vires  on  that ground; and (4)  That  the impugned Control Order  contravened  existing laws, viz., the provisions of section 27,28 and 384 41  of  the Indian Railways Act, and was thus  void  in  its entirety. The  respondent  challenged the judgment of the  High  Court that section 6 of the Act was unconstitutional. In  our judgment, none of the points raised by  Mr.  Umrigar have any validity.  On the other hand, we are of the opinion that  the High Court was in error in declaring section 6  of the Act unconstitutional. Sections  3  and  4 of  the  Essential  Supplies  (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, provide as follows:- "3.  (1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to  it to  be necessary or expedient for maintaining or  increasing supplies  of any essential commodity, or for socuring  their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices,  may by   order  provide  for  regulating  or   prohibiting   the production,  supply and distribution thereof and  trade  and commerce therein (2)  Without  prejudice  to  the generality  of  the  powers conferred  by sub-section (1), an order made thereunder  may provide- (a)  for  regulating by licences, permits or  otherwise  the production   or   manufacture   of   any   essential    com- modity;......... (d)  for  regulating by licences, permits or  otherwise  the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity; 4.   The  Central  Government may by notified  order  direct that  the  power  to make orders under  section  3  shall,in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions,  if any,  as may be specified in the direction,  be  exercisable also by- (a)   such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or (b)  such  State  Government or such  officer  or  authority subordinate to a State Government as may be specified in the direction." Section 6 runs thus: "6.  Any  order  made  under section  3  shall  have  effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith 385 contained  in  any  enactment other than  this  Act  or  any instrument  having effect by virtue of any  enactment  other than this Act." Under  powers conferred by section 3 the Central  Government promulgated   on  10th  September,  1948,  Cotton   Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948.  Section’2 of this  order defines the expressions "apparel," " carrier," " hosiery," "



cloth " and " textile commissioner." Section 3 of the  order runs as follows:- "3. No person. shall transport or cause to be transported by rail, road, air, sea or inland navigation any cloth, yarn or apparel except under and in accordance with- (i)  a  general permit notified in the Gazette of  India  by the Textile Commissioner, or (ii) a  special  transport  permit  issued  by  the  Textile Commissioner." Section  8  provides that the Textile Commissioner  may,  by notification  in the Gazette of India, prescribe the  manner in  which  any application for a  special  transport  permit under this Order shall be made.  The Central Government  has prescribed  forms for application for obtaining permits  and the conditions under which permits can be obtained. The  first  question canvassed by Mr. Umrigar was  that  the provisions  of section 3 of the Control Order infringed  the rights of a citizen guaranteed in subclauses (f) and (g)  of article  19(1)  of  the  Constitution.   These   sub-clauses recognise the right of a citizen to dispose of property  and to carry on trade or business.  The requirement of a  permit to  transport  by rail cotton textiles to a  certain  extent operates  as a restriction on the rights of a person who  is engaged  in  the  business of purchase and  sale  of  cotton textiles.   Clause  (5) of article 19 however  permits  such restrictions  to be placed provided they are in  the  public interest.   During the period of emergency it was  necessary to impose control on the production, supply and distribution of  commodities essential to the life of the community.   It was  for  this  reason  that  the  Legislature  passed   the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 50 386 authorising the Central Government to make orders from  time to time controlling the production, supply and  distribution of  essential  commodities.  Clause 3 of the  Control  Order does  not  deprive a citizen of the right to dispose  of  or transport cotton textiles purchased by him.  It requires him to take a permit from the Textile Commissioner to enable him to  transport  them.  The requirement of a  permit  in  this regard cannot be regarded as an unreasonable restriction  on the citizen’s right under sub-clauses (f) and (g) of article 19(1).   If  transport of essential commodities by  rail  or other  means  of conveyance was left uncontrolled  it  might well have seriously hampered the supply of these commodities to  the public.  Act XXIV of 1946 was an  emergency  measure and  as stated in its preamble, was intended to provide  for the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the  production, supply and distribution of, and  trade  and commerce in, certain commodities.  The number of commodities held  essential are mentioned in section 2 of the  Act,  and the requirement of a permit to transport such commodities by road  or  rail or other means of transport  cannot,  in  any sense  of  the  term, be said, in a  temporary  Act,  to  be unreasonable  restriction on the citizen’s rights  mentioned in clauses (f) and (g) of article 19(1).  The High Court was therefore   right  in  negativing  the   contention   raised regarding  the invalidity of the Control Order as  abridging the  rights  of  the  citizen under  article  19(1)  of  the Constitution. Mr. Umrigar further argued that the Textile Commissioner had been given unregulated and arbitrary discretion to refuse or to  grant a permit, and that on grounds similar to those  on which  in Dwarka Prasad v. The State of Uttar  Pradesh  (1), this  Court declared void section 4(3) of the Uttar  Pradesh



Coal  Control  Order,  section 3 of  the  Control  Order  in question should also be declared void.  This argument  again is  not tenable.  In the first place, the  appellants  never applied for a permit and made no efforts to obtain one.   If the permit had been applied for and refused arbitrarily they might then have had a right to attack the law on (1)  A.T.R. 1954 S.C. 225 ; [1954] S.C.R. 80o3. 387 the ground that it vested arbitrary and unregulated power in the  textile commissioner.  The appellants were not hurt  in any way by any act of the textile commissioner as they never applied  for  a permit.  They  were  transporting  essential goods by rail without a permit and the only way they can get any relief is by attacking the section which obliges them to take  a permit before they can transport by  rail  essential commodities.   It may also be pointed out that reference  to the decision of this Court in Dwarka Prasad’s case(1) is not very  opposite  and  has no bearing  on  the  present  case. Section  4(3)  of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control  Order  was declared  void  on  the  ground that  it  committed  to  the unrestrained will of a single individual to grant,  withhold or cancel licences in any way he chose and there was nothing in  the Order which could ensure a proper execution  of  the power or operate as a check upon injustice that might result from  improper execution of the same.  Section 4(3)  of  the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order was in these terms: " The Licensing Authority may grant, refuse to grant,  renew or refuse to renew a licence and may suspend, cancel, revoke or  modify any licence or any terms thereof granted  by  him under  the Order for reasons to be recorded.  Provided  that every  power  which is under this Order exercisable  by  the Licensing  Authority shall also be exercisable by the  State Coal  Controller,  or any person authorized by him  in  this behalf In  the present Control Order there is no such provision  as existed in the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order.  Provisions of  that Control Order bear no analogy to the provisions  of the present Control Order.  The policy underlying the  Order is  to regulate the transport of cotton textile in a  manner that  will ensure an even distribution of the  commodity  in the  country and make it available at a fair price  to  all. The  grant or refusal of a permit is thus to be governed  by this policy and the discretion given to the Textile  Commis- sioner  is  to be exercised in such a way as  to  effectuate this policy.  The conferment of such a discretion (i)  A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 225; [1954] S.C.R. 803. 388 cannot  be  called invalid and if there is an abuse  of  the power  there  is  ample  power in the  Courts  to  undo  the mischief  Presumably,  as appears from the  different  forms published in the Manual, there are directions and rules laid down  by the Central Government for the grant or refusal  of permits. The  next  contention of Mr. Umrigar that section 3  of  the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, amounts  to delegation  of  Legislative power  outside  the  permissible limits  is again without any merit.  It was settled  by  the majority  judgment  in  the Delhi Laws  Act  case  (1)  that essential  powers  of legislation cannot be  delegated.   In other words, the legislature cannot delegate its function of laying  down legislative policy in respect of a measure  and its formulation as a rule of conduct.  The Legislature  must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are  to control any given cases and must provide a  standard to  guide the officials or the body in power to execute  the



law.   The  essential legislative function consists  in  the determination  or  choice of the legislative policy  and  of formally  enacting  that  policy  into  a  binding  rule  of conduct.  In the present case the legislature has laid  down such  a principle and that principle is the  maintenance  or increase in supply of essential commodities and of  securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices.  The principle  is  clear and offers sufficient guidance  to  the Central Government in exercising its powers under section 3. Delegation  of  the kind mentioned in section 3  was  upheld before  the Constitution in a number of decisions  of  their Lordships  of the Privy Council, vide Russell v.  The  Queen (2),  Hodge v. The Queen (3), and Shannon v. Lower  Mainland Dairy  Products Board (4)and since the coming into force  of the  Constitution  delegation  of this  character  has  been upheld in a number of decisions of this Court on  principles enunciated  by the majority in the Delhi Laws Act case  (1). As  already. pointed out, the preamble and the body  of  the sections  sufficiently formulate the legislative policy  and the ambit and character of I I) [1951] S.C.R. 747. (2)  7 A.C. 829. (3)  9 A.C. II7. (4)  [I938] A.C. 708. 389 the Act is such that the details of that policy can only  be worked  out  by delegating them to a  subordinate  authority within the framework of that policy.  Mr. Umrigar could  not very  seriously  press the question of’  the  invalidity  of section  3  of the Act and it is  unnecessary  therefore  to consider this question in greater detail. Section  4  of the Act was attacked on the  ground  that  it empowers  the Central Government to delegate its  own  power to-make  orders under section 3 to any officer or  authority subordinate  to  it or the Provincial Government or  to  any officer   or   authority  subordinate  to   the   Provincial Government  as  specified  in the  direction  given  by  the Central  Government.  In other words, the delegate has  been authorized to further delegate its powers in respect of  the exercise  of the powers of section 3. Mr. Umrigar  contended that  it  was  for the Legislature  itself  to  specify  the particular authorities or officers who could exercise  power under  section 3 and it was not open to the  Legislature  to empower  the  Central  Government to  say  what  officer  or authority  could  exercise  the power.   Reference  in  this connection was made to two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America-Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1) and Schechter v. United States (2).  In both these cases  it was  held  that  so long as the policy is laid  down  and  a standard  established  by  a  statute,  no  unconstitutional delegation  of legislative power is involved in  leaving  to selected  instrumentalities the making of subordinate  rules within  prescribed limits and the determination of facts  to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. These  decisions in our judgment do not help the  contention of  Mr.  Umrigar as we think that section 4  enumerates  the classes of persons to whom - the power could be delegated or sub-delegated  by  the  Central Government  and  it  is  not correct  to  say that the instrumentalities  have  not  been selected  by the Legislature itself.  The decision of  their Lordships  of  the  Privy Council  in  Shannon’s  case  (3), completely  negatives  the contention raised  regarding  the invalidity of section 4. (1) 293 US 388.               (3) [1938] A.C. 708. (2)  295 U.S. 495.



390 In  that case the Lt.Governor in Council was-given power  to vest  in a marketing board the powers conferred  by  section 4A(d)  of the Natural Products Marketing (British  Columbia) Act,  1936.   The  attack  on  the  Act  was  that   without constitutional  authority it delegated legislative power  to the Lt.Governor in Council.  This contention was answered by their  Lordships  in these terms: " The third  objection  is that  it  is  not  within  the  powers  of  ’the  Provincial Legislature to delegate so-called legislative powers to  the Lt.-Governor  in Council, or to give him powers  of  further delegation   This  objection  appears  to  their   Lordships subversive  of the rights which the  Provincial  Legislature enjoys while dealing with matters falling within the classes of  subjects  in  relation to  which  the  Constitution  has granted legislative powers.  Within its appointed sphere the Provincial   Legislature   is  as  supreme  as   any   other Parliament;  and it is unnecessary to try to  enumerate  the innumerable  occasions  on which  Legislatures,  Provincial, Dominion  and Imperial, have entrusted various  persons  and bodies with similar powers to those contained in this Act." The  next  contention  that the provisions  of  the  Textile Control  Order operate as an implied repeal of sections  27, 28  and  41  of the Indian Railways Act  and  are  therefore invalid  is  also not well founded.  The  requirement  of  a permit  by  clause (3) and provisions of clause (4)  of  the Order  which  empower the Textile Commissioner to  direct  a carrier to close the booking or transport of cloth, apparel, etc., are not in direct conflict with sections 27, 28 and 41 of the Railways Act.  The Railways Act does not exclude  the placing  of a disability on a railway administration by  the Government  or  any  other authority.   This  clause  merely supplements the relevant provisions of the Railways Act  and does  not  supersede them.  Similar  observations  apply  to clause  (5) which enables the Textile Commissioner to  place an  embargo  on the transport of certain textiles  from  one area to another.  There is nothing in the provisions of  the order   which  in  any  way  overrides  or  supersedes   the provisions  of  the different sections of the  Railways  Act referred to above. 391 The  last  contention of Mr. Umrigar that section  6  having been declared invalid, section 3 is inextricably mixed  with it  and should also have been declared invalid is  also  not valid,  because  apart from the grounds given  by  the  High Court  for  holding  that  the  two  sections  were  not  so interconnected  that  the invalidity of one would  make  the other  invalid, the High Court was in error in holding  that section 6 was unconstitutional.  Section 6 of the Act  cited above declare, that an order made under section 3 shall have effect   notwithstanding  anything  inconsistent   therewith contained  in  any  enactment other than  this  Act  or  any instrument  having effect by virtue of any  enactment  other than this Act.  In other words it declares that if there  is any  repugnancy  in an order made under section 3  with  the provisions of any other enactment, then notwithstanding that inconsistency  the provisions of the Order will  prevail  in preference  to the provisions of other laws which  are  thus inconsistent with the provisions of the Order.  In the  view of  the High Court the power to do something which may  have the  effect  of repealing, by implication, an  existing  law could  not be delegated in view of the majority decision  of this  Court in In Re: Delhi Laws Act (1), where it was  held that  to repeal or abrogate an existing law is the  exercise of  an essential legislative power.  The learned  Judges  of



the  High Court thought that the conferment of power of  the widest amplitude to make an order inconsistent with the pre- existing laws is nothing short of a power to repeal.  In our opinion  the  construction placed on section 6 by  the  High Court is not right.  Section 6 does not either expressly  or by implication repeal any of the provisions of  pre-existing laws;  neither  does it abrogate them.   Those  laws  remain untouched  and  unaffected  so far as the  statute  book  is concerned.  The repeal of a statute means as if the repealed statute was never on the statute book.  It is wiped out from the statute book.  The effect of section 6 certainly is  not to  repeal  any one of those laws or  abrogate  then;.   Its object is simply to by-pass them where they are inconsistent with  the  provisions of the Essential  Supplies  (Temporary Powers) (I)  [1951) S.C.R, 747. 392 Act,  1946, or the orders made thereunder.  In other  words, the orders made under section 3 would be operative in regard to  the, essential commodity covered by the Textile  Control Order  wherever there is repugnancy in this Order  with  the existing  laws  and to that extent the  existing  laws  with regard to those commodities will not operate.  By-passing  a certain  law  does  not  necessarily  amount  to  repeal  or abrogation  of  that law.  That law remains  unrepealed  but during the continuance of the order made under section 3  it does  not  operate in that field for the  time  being.   The ambit  of its operation is thus limited without there  being any  repeal of any one of its provisions.   Conceding,  how- ever,  for  the  sake of argument that to the  extent  of  a repugnancy  between  an order made under section 3  and  the provisions  of  an  existing  law,  to  the  extent  of  the repugnancy, the existing law stands repealed by implication, it  seems  to us that the repeal is not by any  Act  of  the delegate,  but the repeal is by the legislative Act  of  the Parliament itself.  By enacting section 6 Parliament  itself has declared that an order made under section 3 shall;  have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency in this order  with any   enactment  other  than  this  Act.   This  is  not   a declaration made by the delegate but the Legislature  itself has declared its will that way in section 6. The  abrogation or  the  implied  repeal  is by  force  of  the  legislative declaration  contained in section 6 and is not by  force  of the order made by the delegate under section 3. The power of the delegate is only to make an order under section 3.  Once the  delegate  has made that order its power  is  exhausted. Section 6 then steps in wherein the Parliament has  declared that  as  soon as such an order comes into being  that  will have  effect  notwithstanding  any  inconsistency  therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act.   Parliament being  supreme, it certainly could make a law abrogating  or repealing by implication provisions of any pre-existing  law and  no exception could be taken on the ground of  excessive delegation to the Act of the Parliament itself.  There is no delegation  involved in the provisions of section 6  at  all and that section could not be held to be unconstitutional on that ground, 393 The  result therefore is that in our opinion the  provisions of sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Essential Supplies  (Temporary Powers)  Act,  1946, are constitutional  and.  the  impugned order  is also constitutional.  Accordingly’ this appeal  is dismissed,  and  the  trial Court  is  directed  to  proceed expeditiously with the case in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed.