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PETITIONER: HARI SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1984

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR 1020            1984 SCR  (3) 417  1984 SCC  (2) 624        1984 SCALE  (1)625  CITATOR INFO :  F          1984 SC1380  (1)

ACT:      Land Acquisition  Act, 1894-s.  4  and  s.6-Acquisition proceedings (Notification  u/s.4 incorporating order u/s. 17 (4) exempting  application of  s. 5A and notification u/s. 6 containing order  u/s. 17  (1) authorising Collector to take possession  issued   and  published  in  official  Gazette)- Validity of  acquisition proceedings  challenged by  way  of writ petition  after a  period  of  over  two  years-Whether petition could be dismissed on ground of delay-Whether court could interfere when facts alleged in petition are disputed.

HEADNOTE:      On January  8,  1980  the  respondent  State  issued  a notification under Sec. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for  acquisition of  60 adjoining  plots of land of two small villages  for  construction  of  a  market  yard.  The notification also  contained an order of the Government made under Sec. 17(4) of the Act directing that Sec. 5A would not apply  to   the  said   proceedings.  The  notification  was published in  the Official  Gazette dated  January 9,  1980. That notification was followed by another notification dated January 9,  1980 issued  under  Sec.  6  of  the  Act.  This notification contained  an order  made under  Sec. 17 (1) of the Act  authorising the Collector to take possession of the plots.  The  notification  was  published  in  the  official Gazette dated  January 10, 1980. The possession of the plots was taken  in course  of the  acquisition proceedings. In or about June  1982 notices were issued by the Collector to the interested persons  for determining the compensation payable to them.  By filing  a writ  petition in  the High Court the appellants  questioned   the  validity  of  the  acquisition proceedings in  regard to certain plots on the grounds that: (1) they had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and were prejudiced  by the  order made  under sec.  17 (4); (2) there was  no urgency sufficient in law to sustain the order made under  Sec. 17  (4); and  (3) Sec.  17 (4) would not be applicable because  on a  part of a plot of land there was a house. The  High Court  dismissed the  writ petition.  Hence this appeal.      Dismissing the appeal,

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^      HELD: In  a small  place where these plots are situate, the acquisition of these lands would be the talk of the town in a  shortwhile and  it is  difficult to  believe that  the appellants who  are residents  of that  place would not have known till July 1982 that the impugned notification had 418 been published  in 1980. Any interference in this case filed after two  and a half years with the acquisition proceedings is likely  to cause  serious public  prejudice. This  appeal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay alone. [420G- H]      Appellant No. 1 claims to be the owner of plot No. 249. On behalf  of the respondents it is urged that appellant No. 1 is  recorded only  as a  co-tenure holder  alongwith  five others and  they have  not impeached the notifications. With regard to  the allegations about the existence of a house on this plot,  it is  seen that  the said  fact is  denied. The respondents  rely  upon  some  statements  recorded  by  the revenue authorities  suggesting that  there was  no house on this plot  on the  date  of  the  notification.  This  is  a disputed question  of fact. Appellant No. 2 who claims to be the owner  of plot No. 261 is stated to have purchased it on November 17,  1980 after  the  impugned  notifications  were published. The  title of  appellant No. 3 to plot No. 133 is denied by  R.K. Kannaujia,  Secretary, Krishi  Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh.  In this State of affairs where there are disputed questions  of facts  it cannot  be  said  that  the appellants have  made out  any case  for interference  under Article 226 of the Constitution. [421B-D]      There is  no ground  to held  that the order made under section 17 (4) of the Act exempting the operation of section 5-A of the Act is bad in law even though there appears to be some administrative  delay in commencing the construction of the Market Yard. [421F-G]      State of  Punjab v.  Gurdial Singh  &  Ors.,  [1980]  1 S.C.R. 1071, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5313 of 1983.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the 17th January, 1983 in CMWP. No. 8397 of 1982.      Shanti Bhushan and S. Markandeya for the Appellant.      Gopal  Subramaniam   and  Mrs.   S.  Dikshit   for  the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  About 45  plots of land of Kheragarh village and  about 15  adjoining plots  of  land  of  Nagala Udaiya  village  situated  in  the  district  of  Agra  were notified under  section 4  (1) of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act  No. 1  of 1894)  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) for  acquisition for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of  the Market Yard of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh under a notification dated January 8, 1980 issued by  the Government  of the State of Uttar Pradesh. As the plots of land in question which 419 were agricultural  lands  were  urgently  required  for  the aforesaid purpose and the Government was of the view that it was necessary  to direct  that section 5-A of the Act should not  apply   to  the   said  acquisition   proceedings,   it simultaneously made an order under section 17 (4) of the Act

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directing that  section 5-A  would not  apply  to  the  said proceedings and  incorporated the  said order  also  in  the notification issued.  under section  4 (1)  of the  Act. The notification was  published in  the Official  Gazette  dated January 9,  1980. This  was followed by a notification dated January 9,  1980 under section 6 of the Act published in the Official Gazette  dated January  10, 1980. That notification contained an  order made  under section  17 (1)  of the  Act authorising the Collector to take possession of the plots on the expiration  of fifteen  days from the publication of the notice under  section 9 (1) of the Act though no award under section 11 of the Act had been made. The above said plots of land which  were in  all about  60 in  number belonged  to a number of  persons. The  total extent of land proposed to be acquired was  about 41.46  acres. The  possession of all the plots of  land was  also taken  in the  course of  the  said acquisition proceedings. In or about June 1982, notices were issued by  the Collector  to various persons having interest in the  said plots  under section  9 (3)  of the Act for the purpose of  determining the  compensation payable  to  them. After the  issue of  the said  notices, three  persons  Hari Singh (appellant  No. 1), Pooran Chand (appellant No. 2) and Munna Lal  (appellant No.  3) filed a writ petition in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8397 of 1982 on the file of the High Court  of   Allahabad  questioning   the  validity   of  the acquisition proceedings  as  regards  6  plots  of  land  in Kheragarh village out of the total of about 60 plots of land which had been acquired by the State Government in the above said proceedings. Appellant No. 1 claimed to be the owner of plots Nos 249, 250 and 252. Appellant No 2 claimed to be the owner of  plot No.  261 and appellant No 3 claimed to be the owner of  plots Nos.  133 and  134. Appellant  No. 1 pleaded that there  was a house situated on plot No. 249 and that he had also installed a flour mill on it. They all pleaded that they had  no knowledge  of the  acquisition proceedings  and were prejudiced  by the  order made  under section 17 (4) of the Act exempting the operation of section 5-A of the Act in the case  of these  proceedings. They  further pleaded  that there was  no urgency sufficient in law to sustain the order made under  section 17  (4) of  the Act  as nothing had been done on the lands for nearly two years. Appellant No. 1 also pleaded that 420 section 17 (4) of the Act would not be applicable because on a part  of his land there was a house. They also applied for an   interim    order   restraining   the   Collector   from dispossessing them  from the plots in question. On September 9, 1982 the High Court made an interim order restraining the respondents from dispossessing the appellants from the plots until  further   orders,  unless   they  had   already  been dispossessed. But  on  January  17,  1983,  the  High  Court rejected the  writ petition  at the stage of admission after hearing the  advocates for  both the parties. This appeal by special leave  is filed  by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution on against the order of the High Court.      The High  Court has not given any reasons for its order dismissing the writ petition. The order reads: ’Rejected’.      We have  been taken  through the writ petition, counter affidavits and  other papers  filed in the High Court and in this Court.      At the  out set  we are  of  the  view  that  the  writ petition filed  in July,  1982 questioning  the notification issued in  January, 1980  after a  delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It  is no  doubt true  that the appellant have pleaded

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that they  did not  know anything  about  the  notifications which had  been published  in the  Gazette till they came to know of  the notices  issued under  section 9 (3) of the Act but they  have not  pleaded that there was no publication in the locality  of the  public notice  of the substance of the notification as  required by  section 4  (1) of  the Act. It should be  presumed  that  official  acts  would  have  been performed duly  as required by law. It is significant that a large number of persons who own the remaining plots have not challenged  the  acquisition  proceedings.  The  only  other petition in which these proceedings. are challenged is Civil Misc. Writ  Petition No.  11476 of  1982 on  the file of the High Court filed subsequently by Amar Singh and four others. Moreover in  a small  place like Kheragarh where these plots are situate,  the acquisition  of these  lands would  be the talk of  the town  in a  shortwhile and  it is  difficult to believe that  the appellant  who are residents of that place would not  have known  till July,  1982  that  the  impugned notification had been published in 1980. Any interference in this case  filed  after  two  and  a  half  years  with  the acquisition proceedings  is likely  to cause  serious public prejudice. This appeal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay alone. 421      Now even  on merits there appears to be no substance in the case of the appellants.      At the  hearing of  this appeal,  the  appellants  have confined their  case to plots Nos. 249, 261 and 133 and have given up  their case  in regard  to plots  Nos. 250, 252 and 134.      Appellant No. 1 claims to be the owner of plot No. 249. On behalf  of the respondents it is urged that appellant No. 1 is  recorded only  as a  co-tenure holder  alongwith  five others and  they have  not impeached the notifications. With regard to  the allegation  about the existence of a house on this plot,  it is  seen that  the said  fact is  denied. The respondents  rely  upon  some  statements  recorded  by  the revenue authorities  suggesting that  there was  no house on this plot  on the  date  of  the  notification.  This  is  a disputed question  of fact. Appellant No. 2 who claims to be the owner  of plot No. 261 is stated to have purchased it on November 17,  1980 after  the  impugned  notifications  were published. The  title of  appellant No. 3 to plot No. 133 is denied by  R. K  Kannaujia, Secretary,  Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh.  In this state of affairs where there are disputed questions  of fact  it  cannot  be  said  that  the appellants have  made out  any case  for interference  under Article 226 of the Constitution.      On behalf  of  the  appellants  reliance  is,  however, placed on  a decision  of this  Court in  State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh & Ors.(I) In that decision the main point made out was that the acquisition proceedings had been engineered mala fide  by a  State Minister.  We do  not have  any  such allegation in the present case. In the circumstances of this case we  do not  find that  there is any ground to hold that the order made-under section 17 (4) of the Act exempting the operation of  section 5-A  of the  Act is  bad in  law  even though there  appears to  be some  administrative  delay  in commencing  the   construction  of  the  Market  Yard.  Some photographs of  the land  produced before  us, however, show that the work of construction has already been commenced.      We do  not, therefore, find that there is any ground to interfere with  the order  of the  High Court dismissing the writ petition.  The appeal  fails and  it is  dismissed with costs.

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H.S.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 422