IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 907___OF 2009

(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.3336 of 2006)

Hari Ram      ...   Appellant  Vs.

State of Rajasthan & Anr.     ...   Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal raises certain questions which are  

fundamental to the understanding and implementation  

of the objects for which the Juvenile Justice (Care  

and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter  

referred to as the ‘Juvenile Justice Act, 2000’)  

was enacted. The said law which was enacted to deal  

with offences committed by juveniles, in a manner  

which  was  meant  to  be  different  from  the  law

applicable  to  adults,  is  yet  to  be  fully  

appreciated by those who have been entrusted with  

the responsibility of enforcing the same, possibly  

on account of their inability to adapt to a system  

which, while having the trappings of the general  

criminal  law,  is,  however,  different  therefrom.  

The  very  scheme  of  the  aforesaid  Act  is  

rehabilitatory in nature and not adversarial which  

the  courts  are  generally  used  to.  The  

implementation of the said law, therefore, requires  

a complete change in the mind-set of those who are  

vested with the authority of enforcing the same,  

without  which  it  will  be  almost  impossible  to  

achieve the objects of the Juvenile Justice Act,  

2000.

3. The  appellant,  Hari  Ram,  was  arrested  along  

with several others on 30.11.1998, for the alleged  

commission  of  offences  under  Sections  148,  302,  

149, Section 325 read with Section 149 and Section  

323/149  Indian  Penal  Code.   After  the  case  was  

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committed for trial, the Additional Sessions Judge,  

Didwana,  by  his  order  dated  3rd April,  2000,  in  

Sessions Case No.54 of 1999 determined the age of  

the accused to be below 16 years on the date of  

commission of the offence and after declaring him  

to be a juvenile, directed that he be tried by the  

Juvenile Justice Board, Ajmer, Rajasthan.  

4. This appeal has been filed against the common  

order dated 7th December, 2005, passed by the  

Jodhpur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in  

Crl. Revision Petition No.165 of 2000, filed by  

the Respondent No.2 herein and in Crl. Revision  

Petition No.199 of 2005 filed by the appellant,  

also being aggrieved by the said common order.  

While  Crl.  Revision  No.199  filed  by  the  

appellant  herein  challenging  the  framing  of  

charges  was  dismissed,  Crl.  Revision  No.165  

filed by the State of Rajasthan was allowed  

holding that the appellant was not a juvenile  

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and the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act,  

2000, were not, therefore, applicable to him.

5. According  to  the  appellant’s  father,  the  

appellant’s date of birth is Kartik Sudi 1,  

Samvat Year 2039, which is equivalent to 17th  

October, 1982, whereas the offence was alleged  

to have been committed on 30th October, 1998,  

which mathematically indicates that at the time  

of commission of the offence, the appellant had  

completed  16  years  and  13  days  and  was,  

therefore,  excluded  from  the  scope  and  

operation of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.  

Furthermore, the medical examination conducted  

in respect of the appellant by a Medical Board  

indicated that his age at the relevant time was  

between 16 and 17 years.   After considering  

the various decisions of this Court indicating  

the manner in which the age of a juvenile is to  

be determined, the High Court observed that the  

inescapable conclusion which could be arrived  

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at is that on the date of the incident, the  

accused-appellant herein was above 16 years of  

age and was, therefore, not governed by the  

provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986  

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1986 Act’).

6. It is the said order of the High Court which  

has been impugned in this appeal.

7. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Sushil Kumar  

Jain, learned Advocate, submitted that the High  

Court had acted in a highly technical manner in  

holding that the appellant was not a juvenile  

and had in the process defeated the very object  

of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, which is  

aimed at rehabilitating juvenile offenders in  

order to bring them back to main-stream society  

and to give them an opportunity to rehabilitate  

themselves as useful citizens of the future.  

In fact, the definition of “juvenile” in the  

1986 Act was altered in the Juvenile Justice  

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Act,  2000,  to  include  persons  who  had  not  

completed 18 years of age.  In other words, the  

age until which a male child in conflict with  

law would be treated as a juvenile was raised  

from 16 years to 18 years.

8. Mr.  Jain  submitted  that  the  learned  Single  

Judge  of  the  High  Court  appears  to  have  

misconstrued the decisions cited before him in  

the case of  Santenu Mitra vs.  State of West  

Bengal, [(1998) 5 SCC 697] and  Umesh Chandra  

vs.  State of Rajasthan  [(1982) 2 SCC 202],  

wherein the admissibility of certain records,  

including school records maintained by private  

institutions, under Section 35 of the Indian  

Evidence Act, 1872 was under consideration.  On  

the other hand, Mr. Jain referred to an earlier  

decision of this Court in the case of  Mohd.  

Ikram Hussain vs.  State of U.P. & Ors. [1964  

(5)  SCR  86],  where  certain  copies  from  the  

school registers were looked into and it was  

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held that the same amounted to evidence under  

the Indian Evidence Act as the entries in the  

school registers were made long before the same  

were  used  by  way  of  evidence.   This  Court  

observed that the said entries were reliable as  

they had been made ante litem motam.  Mr. Jain  

also referred to certain observations made in  

Umesh Chandra’s case (supra) while interpreting  

Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act to the  

effect that there is no legal requirement that  

a public or other official book should be kept  

only  by  a  public  officer  and  all  that  is  

required is that it should be regularly kept in  

discharge of official duties.

9. In support of his submissions, Mr. Jain lastly  

referred to the decision of this Court in the  

case  of  Rajinder  Chandra vs.  State  of  

Chhattisgarh & Anr. [(2002) 2 SCC 287], wherein  

in paragraph 5 this Court observed as follows :

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“5. It  is true  that the  age of  the  accused  is  just  on  the  border  of  sixteen years and on the date of the  offence  and  his  arrest  he  was  less  than 16 years by a few months only.  In Arnit Das v. State of Bihar [(2005)  5 SCC 488] this Court has, on a review  of judicial opinion, held that while  dealing  with  the  question  of  determination  of  the  age  of  the  accused for the purpose of finding out  whether  he  is  juvenile  or  not,  a  hypertechnical approach should not be  adopted  while  appreciating  the  evidence  adduced  on  behalf  of  the  accused in support of the plea that he  was a juvenile and if two views may be  possible  on  the  said  evidence,  the  court should lean in favour of holding  the  accused  to  be  a  juvenile  in  borderline cases.  The law, so laid  down by this Court squarely applies to  the facts of the present case.”    

10. Mr.  Jain  emphasised  that  this  was  also  a  

similar case in which the record, according to  

the date of birth indicated by his father and  

another witness – Narain Ram, shows that he was  

just 13 days older than the cut-off limit of 16  

years provided in Section 2(h) of the 1986 Act.

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11. Mr. Jain submitted that since the incident is  

alleged to have taken place as far back as on  

30th October, 1998 and more than 10 years have  

elapsed  since  then  and  the  definition  of  

“juvenile” had since been amended to include  

children who had not yet attained the age of 18  

years, the High Court should not have taken  

such a hypertechnical view and should not have  

interfered  with  the  order  of  the  Additional  

Sessions  Judge,  Didwana,  declaring  the  

appellant to be a juvenile.

12. On behalf of the respondents it was submitted  

that even on the basis of the age as disclosed  

by the appellant’s father, the appellant was  

over 16 years of age on the date of commission  

of the offence and could not, therefore, be  

treated to be a juvenile as defined in the 1986  

Act.   It  was  submitted  that  the  documents,  

which  were  produced  in  support  of  the  

appellant’s claim to be a minor, show him to  

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have crossed the age of 16 years on the date of  

commission of the offence and the High Court  

had  merely  corrected  the  error  of  the  

Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Didwana,  in  

calculation of the appellant’s age.  According  

to the respondents, the order of the High Court  

impugned in the present appeal did not call for  

any interference and the appeal was liable to  

be dismissed.

13. As  indicated  in  the  very  beginning  of  this  

judgment, the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, was  

enacted  to  deal  with  offences  allegedly  

committed by juveniles on a different footing  

from adults, with the object of rehabilitating  

them.  The need to treat children differently  

from  adults  in  relation  to  commission  of  

offences had been under the consideration of  

the  Central  Government  ever  since  India  

achieved  independence.   With  such  object  in  

mind, Parliament enacted the Juvenile Justice  

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Act,  1986,  in  order  to  achieve  the  

constitutional goals contemplated in Articles  

15(3),  39(e)  and  (f),  45  and  47  of  the  

Constitution  imposing  on  the  State  a  

responsibility of ensuring that all the needs  

of children are met and that their basic human  

rights are fully protected.  Subsequently, in  

keeping with certain international Conventions  

and in particular the Convention on the Rights  

of the Child and the United Nations Standard  

Minimum  Rules  for  the  Administration  of  

Juvenile Justice, 1985, commonly known as the  

Beijing  Rules,  the  Legislature  enacted  the  

Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of  

Children)  Act,  2000  to  attain  the  following  

objects :

(i) to  lay  down  the  basic  principles  for  administering justice to a juvenile or  the child;

(ii) to make the juvenile system meant for a  juvenile or the child more appreciative  of the developmental needs in comparison  

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to criminal justice system as applicable  to adults;

(iii) to bring the juvenile law in conformity  with the United Convention on the Rights  of the Child;

(iv) to prescribe a uniform age of eighteen  years for both boys and girls;

(v) to  ensure  speedy  disposal  of  cases  by  the  authorities  envisaged  under  this  Bill  regarding  juvenile  or  the  child  within a time limit of four months;

(vi) to spell out the role of the State as a  facilitator  rather  than  doer  by  involving  voluntary  organizations  and  local  bodies  in  the  implementation  of  the proposed legislation;

(vii) to create special juvenile police units  with  a  humane  approach  through  sensitization  and  training  of  police  personnel;

(viii) to enable increased accessibility to a  juvenile  or  the  child  by  establishing  Juvenile  Justice  Boards  and  Child  Welfare  Committees  and  Homes  in  each  district or group of districts;

(ix) to  minimize  the  stigma  and  in  keeping  with  the  developmental  needs  of  the  juvenile or the child, to separate the  Bill into two parts – one for juveniles  in conflict with law and the other for  the  juvenile  or  the  child  in  need  of  care and protection;

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(x) to provide for effective provisions and  various alternatives for rehabilitation  and  social  reintegration  such  as  adoption,  foster  care,  sponsorship  and  aftercare  of  abandoned,  destitute,  neglected  and  delinquent  juvenile  and  child.”   

The said Act ultimately came into force on 1st  

April, 2001.

14. Section 2(k) of the said Act defines a juvenile  

or  child  as  a  person  who  has  not  completed  

eighteenth years of age. A broad distinction  

has, however, been made between juveniles in  

general and juveniles who are alleged to have  

committed  offences.  Section  2(l)  defines  “a  

juvenile in conflict with law” as a juvenile  

who is alleged to have committed an offence.  

Determination of age, therefore, assumes great  

importance  in  matters  brought  before  the  

Juvenile Justice Boards. In fact, Chapter II of  

the  Juvenile  Justice  Act,  2000,  deals  

exclusively with juveniles in conflict with law  

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and  provides  a  complete  Code  in  regard  to  

juveniles  who  are  alleged  to  have  committed  

offences which are otherwise punishable under  

the general law of crimes.

15. Section 4 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000,  

provides for constitution of Juvenile Justice  

Boards  for  every  district  in  a  State  to  

exercise and discharge the duties conferred or  

imposed on such Boards in relation to juveniles  

in conflict with law.

16. Section  18  of  the  Act  prohibits  joint  

proceedings  and  trial  of  a  juvenile  and  a  

person who is not a juvenile and the punishment  

that can be awarded to a juvenile is enumerated  

in Section 15.  

17. Since the application of the Juvenile Justice  

Act,  2000,  to  a  person  brought  before  the  

Juvenile Justice Board (hereinafter referred to  

as ‘the Board’) depends on whether such person  

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is  a  juvenile  or  not  within  the  meaning  of  

Section 2(k) thereof, the determination of age  

assumes  special  importance  and  the  said  

responsibility has been cast on the said Board.  

Subsequently,  after  the  decision  of  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of  

Pratap Singh vs.  State of Jharkhand & Another  

[(2005) 3 SCC 551], the legislature amended the  

provisions of the Act by the Amendment Act,  

2006, by substituting Section 2(l) to define a  

“juvenile in conflict with law” as a “juvenile  

who is alleged to have committed an offence and  

has not completed eighteen years of age as on  

the  date  of  commission  of  such  offence”  

(emphasis supplied) and to include Section 7-A  

which reads as follows:-

“7A.  Procedure to be followed when claim  of juvenility is raised before any court.-  (1)  Whenever  a  claim  of  juvenility  is  raised before any court or a court is of  the opinion that an accused person was a  juvenile on the date of commission of the  offence, the court shall make an inquiry,  take  such  evidence  as  may  be  necessary  

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(but not an affidavit) so as to determine  the age of such person, and shall record a  finding whether the person is a juvenile  or  a  child  or  not,  stating  his  age  as  nearly as may be:  

Provided  that  a  claim  of  juvenility  may  be  raised  before  any  court  and  it  shall  be  recognised  at  any  stage,  even  after final disposal of the case, and such  claim shall be determined in terms of the  provisions contained in this Act and the  rules  made  thereunder,  even  if  the  juvenile has ceased to be so on or before  the date of commencement of this Act.  

(2) If the court finds a person to be a  juvenile on the date of commission of the  offence  under  sub-section  (1),  it  shall  forward  the  juvenile  to  the  Board  for  passing  appropriate  order,  and  the  sentence if any, passed by a court shall  be deemed to have no effect.”  

(Emphasis supplied)  

18. Section  7-A  makes  provision  for  a  claim  of  

juvenility to be raised before any Court at any  

stage,  even  after  final  disposal  of  a  case  and  

sets out the procedure which the Court is required  

to adopt, when such claim of juvenility is raised.  

It provides for an inquiry, taking of evidence as  

may  be  necessary  (but  not  affidavit)  so  as  to  

determine  the  age  of  a  person  and  to  record  a  

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finding  whether  the  person  in  question  is  a  

juvenile  or  not.  The  aforesaid  provisions  were,  

however, confined to Courts, and proved inadequate  

as far as the Boards were concerned. Subsequently,  

in  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of  

Children)  Rules,  2007,  which  is  a  comprehensive  

guide  as  to  how  the  provisions  of  the  Juvenile  

Justice Act, 2000, are to be implemented, Rule 12  

was  introduced  providing  the  procedure  to  be  

followed by the Courts, the Boards and the Child  

Welfare Committees for the purpose of determination  

of age in every case concerning a child or juvenile  

or  a  juvenile  in  conflict  with  law.  Since  the  

aforesaid  provisions  are  interconnected  and  lay  

down the procedures for determination of age, the  

said Rule is reproduced hereinbelow:

“12.  Procedure  to  be  followed  in  determination of Age.- (1) In every case  concerning  a  child  or  a  juvenile  in  conflict with law, the court or the Board  or  as  the  case  may  be  the  Committee  referred  to  in  rule  19  of  these  rules  shall determine the age of such juvenile  

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or child or a juvenile in conflict with  law within a period of thirty days from  the date of making of the application for  that purpose.

(2) The Court or the Board or as the  case  may  be  the  Committee  shall  decide  the  juvenility  or  otherwise  of  the  juvenile or the child or as the case may  be  the  juvenile  in  conflict  with  law,  prima  facie  on  the  basis  of  physical  appearance  or  documents,  if  available,  and send him to the observation home or  in jail.

(3) In every case concerning a child  or juvenile in conflict with law, the age  determination inquiry shall be conducted  by the court or the Board or, as the case  may be, the Committee by seeking evidence  by obtaining -

(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent  certificates, if available; and  in the absence whereof;

 (ii) the  date  of  birth  certificate  from  the  school  (other  than  a  play school) first attended; and  in the absence whereof;  

(iii) the birth certificate given by a  corporation  or  a  municipal  authority or a panchayat;

(b)and only in the absence of either  (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a)  above, the medical opinion will be  sought  from  a  duly  constituted  Medical Board, which will declare  

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the age of the juvenile or child.  In case exact assessment of the age  cannot be done, the Court or the  Board or, as the case may be, the  Committee,  for  the  reasons  to  be  recorded  by  them,  may,  if  considered necessary, give benefit  to  the  child  or  juvenile  by  considering  his/her  age  on  lower  side within the margin of one year.

and,  while  passing  orders  in  such  case  shall,  after  taking  into  consideration  such evidence as may be available, or the  medical  opinion,  as  the  case  may  be,  record a finding in respect of his age  and either of the evidence specified in  any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or  in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall  be  the  conclusive  proof  of  the  age  as  regards  such  child  or  the  juvenile  in  conflict with law.   

(4) if the age of a juvenile or child  or the juvenile in conflict with law is  found to be below 18 years on the date of  offence,  on  the  basis  of  any  of  the  conclusive  proof  specified  in  sub-rule  (3), the Court or the Board or as the  case  may  be  the  Committee  shall  in  writing pass an order stating the age and  declaring  the  status  of  juvenility  or  otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and  these rules and a copy of the order shall  be given to such juvenile or the person  concerned.   

(5)  Save  and  except  where,  further  inquiry or otherwise is required,  inter  alia in terms of section 7A, section 64  

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of the Act and these rules, no further  inquiry shall be conducted by the court  or  the  Board  after  examining  and  obtaining  the  certificate  or  any  other  documentary proof referred to in sub-rule  (3) of this rule.

(6) The provisions contained in this  rule shall also apply to those disposed  of cases, where the status of juvenility  has  not  been  determined  in  accordance  with the provisions contained in sub-rule  (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation  of the sentence under the Act for passing  appropriate order in the interest of the  juvenile in conflict with law.”   

Sub-Rules (4) and (5) of Rule 12 are of special  

significance in that they provide that once the age  

of a juvenile or child in conflict with law is  

found  to  be  less  than  18  years  on  the  date  of  

offence on the basis of any proof specified in sub-

rule (3) the Court or the Board or as the case may  

be  the  Child  Welfare  Committee  appointed  under  

Chapter IV of the Act, has to pass a written order  

stating  the  age  of  the  juvenile  or  stating  the  

status of the juvenile, and no further inquiry is  

to  be  conducted  by  the  Court  or  Board  after  

examining and obtaining any other documentary proof  

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referred to in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12. Rule 12,  

therefore, indicates the procedure to be followed  

to give effect to the provisions of Section 7A when  

a claim of juvenility is raised.

19. One of the problems which has frequently arisen  

after the enactment of the Juvenile Justice Act,  

2000,  is  with  regard  to  the  application  of  the  

definition of “juvenile” under Section 2(k) and (l)  

in  respect  of  offences  alleged  to  have  been  

committed prior to 1st April, 2001 when the Juvenile  

Justice Act, 2000 came into force, since under the  

1986 Act, the upper age limit for male children to  

be  considered  as  juveniles  was  16  years.   The  

question  which  has  been  frequently  raised  is,  

whether a male person who was above 16 years on the  

date  of  commission  of  the  offence  prior  to  1st  

April, 2001, would be entitled to be considered as  

a  juvenile  for  the  said  offence  if  he  had  not  

completed the age of 18 years on the said date.  In  

other words, could a person who was not a juvenile  

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within the meaning of the 1986 Act when the offence  

was committed, but had not completed 18 years, be  

governed by the provisions of the Juvenile Justice  

Act,  2000,  and  be  declared  as  a  juvenile  in  

relation  to  the  offence  alleged  to  have  been  

committed by him?

20. The said question, which is identical to the  

question  raised  in  these  proceedings,  was  

considered in the case of  Arnit Das vs.  State of  

Bihar [(2000) 5 SCC 488], wherein, in the light of  

the definition of “juvenile” under the 1986 Act,  

which was then subsisting, this Court came to a  

finding that the procedures prescribed by the 1986  

Act  were  to  be  adopted  only  when  the  Competent  

Authority  found  the  person  brought  before  it  or  

appearing before it to be under 16 years of age, if  

a boy, and under 18 years of age, if a girl, on the  

date of being so brought or such appearance first  

before the Competent Authority.  This Court also  

came to a finding that the date of commission of  

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offence is irrelevant for finding out whether the  

person is a juvenile within the meaning of Clause  

(h) of Section 2 of the 1986 Act.  In the said  

decision,  this  Court  sought  to  distinguish  the  

earlier decisions in the case of  Santenu Mitra’s  

case  (supra),  Bhola  Bhagat vs.  State  of  Bihar  

[(1997) 8 SCC 720] and Krishna Bhagwan vs. State of  

Bihar [AIR 1989 Pat. 217], which was a Full Bench  

decision.  It also over-ruled the decision of the  

Calcutta High Court in Dilip Saha vs. State of W.B.  

[AIR 1978 Cal. 529], where the Calcutta High Court,  

while  interpreting  the  provisions  of  the  West  

Bengal  Children’s  Act,  1959,  which  is  a  pari  

materia enactment, took the view that the age of  

the  accused  at  the  time  of  commission  of  the  

offence  is  the  relevant  age  for  attracting  the  

provisions of the said Act and not his age at the  

time of trial.

21. The question which fell for decision in  Arnit  

Das’s  case  (supra),  once  again  fell  for  the  

23

consideration of this Court in the case of Pratap  

Singh’s case (supra), where the decision of this  

Court  in  Umesh  Chandra’s  case  (supra),  which  

expressed  a  view  which  was  contrary  to  that  

expressed in Arnit Das’s case (supra), was brought  

to  the  notice  of  the  Court,  which  referred  the  

matter  to  the  Constitution  Bench  to  settle  the  

divergence  of  views.   In  fact,  the  Constitution  

Bench formulated two points for decision, namely,  

(a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the  reckoning date for determining the age of  the alleged offender as juvenile offender  or  the  date  when  he  is  produced  in  the  Court/competent Authority?

(b) Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable  in a case where a proceeding is initiated  under the 1986 Act and was pending when  the Act of 2000 was enforced with effect  from 1.4.2001?   

22. While  considering  the  first  question,  the  

Constitution  Bench  had  occasion  to  consider  the  

24

decision  of  the  three  Judge  Bench  in  Umesh  

Chandra’s case (supra), wherein it was held that  

the relevant date for applicability of the Act so  

far  as  age  of  the  accused,  who  claims  to  be  a  

child, is concerned, is the date of occurrence and  

not the date of trial.  Consequently, the decision  

in Arnit Das’s case (supra) was over-ruled and the  

view  taken  in  Umesh  Chandra’s  case  (supra)  was  

declared to be the correct law.  On the second  

point, after considering the provisions of Sections  

3 and 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, along  

with the definition of “juvenile” in Section 2(k)  

of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as contrasted  

with the definition of a male juvenile in Section  

2(h) of the 1986 Act, the majority view was that  

the 2000 Act would be applicable to a proceeding in  

any Court/Authority initiated under the 1986 Act  

which is pending when the 2000 Act came into force  

and the person had not completed 18 years of age as  

on 1.4.2001.  In other words, a male offender, who  

25

was  being  proceeded  with  in  any  Court/Authority  

initiated under the 1986 Act and had not completed  

the age of 18 years on 1.4.2001, would be governed  

by the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.

23. In  his  concurring  judgment,  S.B.  Sinha,  J.,  

while considering the provisions of Section 20 of  

the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, observed that for  

the purpose of attracting Section 20 it had to be  

established that (i) on the date of coming into  

force the proceedings in which the petitioner was  

accused was pending; and (ii) on that day he was  

below the age of 18 years.  The unanimous view of  

the Constitution Bench was that the provisions of  

the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, have prospective  

effect  and  not  retrospective  effect,  except  to  

cover  cases  where  though  the  male  offender  was  

above 16 years of age at the time of commission of  

the offence, he was below 18 years of age as on  

1.4.2001.  Consequently, the said Act would cover  

earlier cases only where a person had not completed  

26

the age of 18 years on the date of its commencement  

and not otherwise.

24. The  said  decision  in  Pratap  Singh’s  case  

(supra) led to the substitution of Section 2(l) and  

the introduction of Section 7A of the Act and the  

subsequent introduction of Rule 12 in the Juvenile  

Justice Rules, 2007, and the amendment of Section  

20 of the Act.  

25. Read with Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A and Rule 12,  

Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as  

amended  in  2006,  is  probably  the  Section  most  

relevant in setting at rest the question raised in  

this  appeal,  as  it  deals  with  cases  which  were  

pending  on  1st April,  2001,  when  the  Juvenile  

Justice Act, 2000, came into force.  The same is,  

accordingly, reproduced hereinbelow :

“20.  Special  provision  in  respect  of  pending  cases.-Notwithstanding  anything  contained in this Act, all proceedings in  respect of a juvenile pending in any court  in any area on the date on which this Act  

27

comes into force in that area, shall be  continued in that court as if this Act had  not  been  passed  and  if  the  court  finds  that  the  juvenile  has  committed  an  offence, it shall record such finding and  instead of passing any sentence in respect  of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to  the  Board  which  shall  pass  orders  in  respect  of  that  juvenile  in  accordance  with the provisions of this Act as if it  had been satisfied on inquiry under this  Act  that  a  juvenile  has  committed  the  offence.

[Provided that the Board may, for any  adequate  and  special  reason  to  be  mentioned  in  the  order,  review  the  case  and pass appropriate order in the interest  of such juvenile.

Explanation.-  In  all  pending  cases  including trial, revision, appeal or any  other criminal proceedings in respect of a  juvenile  in  conflict  with  law,  in  any  court, the determination of juvenility of  such  a  juvenile  shall  be  in  terms  of  clause  (1)  of  section  2,  even  if  the  juvenile ceases to be so on or before the  date of commencement of this Act and the  provisions of this Act shall apply as if  the said provisions had been in force, for  all  purposes  and  at  all  material  times  when the alleged offence was committed.]”

 26. The Proviso and the Explanation to Section 20  

were added by Amendment Act 33 of 2006, to set at  

rest any doubts that may have arisen with regard to  

28

the  applicability  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  Act,  

2000, to cases pending on 1st April, 2001, where a  

juvenile, who was below 18 years at the time of  

commission  of  the  offence,  was  involved.   The  

Explanation which was added in 2006, makes it very  

clear  that  in  all  pending  cases,  which  would  

include  not  only  trials  but  even  subsequent  

proceedings  by  way  of  revision  or  appeal,  the  

determination of juvenility of a juvenile would be  

in terms of Clause (l) of Section 2, even if the  

juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on or before 1st  

April, 2001, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000,  

came  into  force,  and  the  provisions  of  the  Act  

would apply as if the said provision had been in  

force for all purposes and for all material times  

when the alleged offence was committed.  In fact,  

Section  20  enables  the  Court  to  consider  and  

determine  the  juvenility  of  a  person  even  after  

conviction by the regular Court and also empowers  

the Court, while maintaining the conviction, to set  

29

aside the sentence imposed and forward the case to  

the Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing  

sentence in accordance with the provisions of the  

Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.

27. At this point it may be noted that the decision  

of the Constitution Bench in  Pratap Singh’s case  

(supra) was rendered at a point of time when the  

amendments  to  Sections  2(l)  and  20  and  the  

introduction  of  Section  7-A  had  not  yet  been  

effected,  nor  was  Rule  12  of  the  2007  Rules  

available.  Several decisions on the applicability  

of the 2000 Act to children who were above 16 but  

below 18 years on the date of commission of the  

offence  have  been  rendered  after  the  Juvenile  

Justice  Act,  2000,  came  into  force  and  several  

others  were  rendered  after  the  amendments  were  

introduced in the said Act by Amendment Act 33 of  

2006 and the introduction of the 2007 Rules.  The  

decisions  rendered  by  this  Court  and  the  High  

Courts prior to 1st April, 2001, when the Juvenile  

30

Justice Act, 2000, came into force and thereafter  

can,  therefore,  be  divided  into  two  groups.  The  

decision in Pratap Singh’s case (supra) and in the  

case of Munney @ Rahat Jan Khan vs. State of U.P.  

[(2006) 12 SCC 697] fall into the first category,  

whereas  the  decisions  in  Jameel vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra [(2007) 11 SCC 420],  Vimal Chadha vs.  

Vikas Chaudhary [(2008) 8 SCALE 608],  Babloo Pasi  

vs.  State of Jharkhand [(2008) 13 SCALE 137] and  

Ranjit Singh  vs. State of Haryana [(2008) 9 SCC  

453] fall into the second category. Although, the  

Constitution Bench decision in Pratap Singh’s case  

(supra) and  Munney’s case (supra) are not really  

relevant since they have been rendered prior to 22nd  

August, 2006, when the Amending Act 33 of 2006 came  

into force, they assume a modicum of significance  

since they have been referred to and relied upon  

even after the Amending Act and the 2007 Rules came  

into  force  on  22.8.2006  and  26.10.2007,  

respectively.

31

28. Of the decisions rendered after the amendments  

effected in 2006 to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000,  

the first decision of note is that of Jameel’s case  

(supra)  rendered  on  16.1.2007  wherein  the  

amendments to the Act effected by the Amendment Act  

33 of 2006, which came into effect on 22.8.2006,  

were not even noticed. The next decision rendered  

on 27.5.2008 is in the case of Vimal Chadha’s case  

(supra), wherein, although, the amendment of the  

Act and the introduction  of the Juvenile Justice  

Rules, 2007, were brought to the notice  of the  

Court,  the  same  were  not  considered  and  the  

decision was rendered in the light  of the decision  

rendered in  Pratap Singh’s case (supra) and other  

cases decided prior to 1.4.2001.

29. The next decision rendered on the same point  

on  11.9.2008  was  the  decision  in  Ranjit  Singh’s  

case (supra) wherein also the amendments to Section  

2(l) and 20 and the introduction of Section 7-A in  

32

the  Juvenile  Justice  Act,  2000,  and  the  

introduction  of  the  2007  Rules  had  not  been  

considered and the decision passed sub silentio.

30. Similar was the situation in Babloo Pasi’s case  

(supra) decided on 3.10.2008 which basically  dealt  

with Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000  

and Rule 22 of the Jharkhand Juvenile Justice (Care  

and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003, which is  

pari  materia   with  Rule  12  of  the  2007  Rules.  

While deciding the said case, the Hon’ble Judges  

did  not  also  have  occasion  to  consider  the  

amendments effected to the Juvenile Justice Act,  

2000, by the Amendment Act 33 of 2006 which had  

just come into force on 22.8.2006.

31. None of the aforesaid decisions are of much  

assistance in deciding the question with regard to  

the applicability of the definition of “Juvenile”  

in Section 2(k) and 2(l) of the Juvenile Justice  

Act,  2000,  as  amended  in  2006,  whereby  the  

33

provisions of the said Act were extended to cover  

juveniles who had not completed 18 years of age on  

or before the coming into force of the Juvenile  

Justice Act, 2000 on 1.4.2001 (Emphasis supplied).  

The effect of the proviso to Section 7-A introduced  

by the Amending Act makes it clear that the claim  

of juvenility may be raised before any Court which  

shall be recognized at any stage, even after final  

disposal  of  the  case,  and  such  claim  shall  be  

determined in terms of the provisions contained in  

the  Act  and  the  Rules  made  thereunder  which  

includes the definition of “Juvenile” in Section  

2(k) and 2(l) of the Act even if the Juvenile had  

ceased to be so on or before(emphasis supplied) the  

date of commencement of the Act. The said intention  

of the legislature was reinforced by the amendment  

effected by the said Amending Act to Section 20 by  

introduction  of  the  Proviso  and  the  Explanation  

thereto, wherein also it has been clearly indicated  

that  in  any  pending  case  in  any  Court  the  

34

determination of juvenility of such a juvenile has  

to be in terms of clause 2(l) even if the juvenile  

ceases  to  be  so  “on  or  before  the  date  of  

commencement of this Act” (emphasis supplied) and  

it was also indicated that the provisions of the  

Act would apply as if the said provisions had been  

in force for all purposes and at all material times  

when the alleged offence was committed.

32. Apart from the aforesaid provisions of the 2000  

Act, as amended, and the Juvenile Justice Rules,  

2007, Rule 98 thereof has to be read in tandem with  

Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as  

amended by the Amendment Act, 2006, which provides  

that  even  in  disposed  of  cases  of  juveniles  in  

conflict  with  law,  the  State  Government  or  the  

Board could, either  suo motu or on an application  

made  for  the  purpose,  review  the  case  of  a  

juvenile,  determine  the  juvenility  and  pass  an  

appropriate order under Section 64 of the Act for  

the immediate release of the juvenile whose period  

35

of  detention  had  exceeded  the  maximum  period  

provided in Section 15 of the Act, i.e., 3 years.

33. In addition to the above, Section 49 of the  

Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 is also of relevance and  

is reproduced hereinbelow :

“49.  Presumption  and  determination  of  age.-(1) Where it appears to a competent  authority  that  person  brought  before  it  under any of the provisions of this Act  (otherwise than for the purpose of giving  evidence) is a juvenile or the child, the  competent authority shall make due inquiry  so as to the age of that person and for  that purpose shall take such evidence as  may  be  necessary  (but  not  an  affidavit)  and  shall  record  a  finding  whether  the  person is a juvenile or the child or not,  stating his age as nearly as may be.

(2) No order of a competent authority  shall  be  deemed  to  have  become  invalid  merely  by  any  subsequent  proof  that  the  person in respect of whom the order has  been made is not a juvenile or the child,  and  the  age  recorded  by  the  competent  authority  to  be  the  age  of  person  so  brought before it, shall for the purpose  of this Act, be deemed to be the true age  of that person.”

36

34. Sub-Section  (1)  of  Section  49  vests  the  

Competent Authority with power to make due inquiry  

as to the age of a person brought before it and for  

the said purpose to take such evidence as may be  

necessary (but not an affidavit) and shall record a  

finding as to whether the person is a juvenile or a  

child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be.  

Sub-Section  (2)  is  of  equal  importance  as  it  

provides  that  no  order  of  a  Competent  Authority  

would be deemed to have become invalid merely on  

account of any subsequent proof that the person, in  

respect of whom an order is made, is not a juvenile  

or a child, and the age recorded by the Competent  

Authority  to  be  the  age  of  the  person  brought  

before it, would, for the purpose of the Act, be  

deemed to be the true age of a child or a juvenile  

in conflict with law.  Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 12  

indicates that the age determination inquiry by the  

Court  or  Board,  by  seeking  evidence,  is  to  be  

derived from :

37

(i) the  matriculation  or  equivalent  certificates, if available, and in the  absence of the same;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the  school (other than a play school) first  attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the  birth  certificate  given  by  a  corporation or a municipal authority or  a Panchayat;

35. Sub-Clause (b) of Rule 12(3) provides that only  

in  the  absence  of  any  such  document,  would  a  

medical  opinion  be  sought  for  from  a  duly  

constituted Medical Board, which would declare the  

age of the juvenile or the child.  In case exact  

assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or  

the Board or as the case may be, the Child Welfare  

Committee, for reasons to be recorded by it, may,  

if considered necessary, give benefit to the child  

or juvenile by considering his/her age on the lower  

side within a margin of one year.

36. As  will,  therefore,  be  clear  from  the  

provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as  

38

amended by the Amendment Act, 2006 and the Juvenile  

Justice Rules, 2007, the scheme of the Act is to  

give children, who have, for some reason or the  

other,  gone  astray,  to  realise  their  mistakes,  

rehabilitate themselves and rebuild their lives and  

become  useful  citizens  of  society,  instead  of  

degenerating into hardened criminals.   

37. Of the two main questions decided in  Pratap  

Singh’s  case  (supra),  one  point  is  now  well  

established  that  the  juvenility  of  a  person  in  

conflict with law has to be reckoned from the date  

of the incident and not from the date on which  

cognizance was taken by the Magistrate.  The effect  

of the other part of the decision was, however,  

neutralised  by  virtue  of  the  amendments  to  the  

Juvenile  Justice  Act,  2000,  by  Act  33  of  2006,  

whereunder the provisions of the Act were also made  

applicable  to  juveniles  who  had  not  completed  

eighteen years of age on the date of commission of  

the  offence.  The  law  as  now  crystallized  on  a  

39

conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A, 20 and  

49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all  

doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18  

years on the date of commission of the offence even  

prior  to  1st April,  2001,  would  be  treated  as  

juveniles,  even  if  the  claim  of  juvenility  was  

raised after they had attained the age of 18 years  

on or before the date of commencement of the Act  

and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted.

38. The  instant  case  is  covered  by  the  amended  

provisions of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A and 20 of the  

Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.  However, inasmuch as,  

the appellant was found to have completed the age  

of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged  

occurrence, the High Court was of the view that the  

provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, would  

not apply to the appellant’s case.  Of course, the  

High Court, while deciding the matter, did not have  

the benefit of either the amendment of the Act or  

the  introduction  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  Rules,  

40

2007.  Even otherwise, the matter was covered by  

the decision of this Court in the case of Rajinder  

Chandra’s case (supra), wherein this Court,  inter  

alia,  held  that  when  a  claim  of  juvenility  is  

raised and on the evidence available two views are  

possible,  the  Court  should  lean  in  favour  of  

holding the offender to be a juvenile in borderline  

cases.  In any event, the statutory provisions have  

been altered since then and we are now required to  

consider the question of the claim of the appellant  

that his date of birth was Kartik Sudi 1, Samvat  

Year 2039, though no basis has been provided for  

the fixation of the said date itself in the light  

of  the  amended  provisions.   Often,  parents  of  

children, who come from rural backgrounds, are not  

aware of the actual date of birth of a child, but  

relate the same to some event which may have taken  

place  simultaneously.   In  such  a  situation,  the  

Board and the Courts will have to take recourse to  

the procedure laid down in Rule 12, but such an  

41

exercise is not required to be undertaken in the  

present  case  since  even  according  to  the  

determination of the appellant’s age by the High  

Court the appellant was below eighteen years of age  

when  the  offence  was  alleged  to  have  been  

committed.

39.  Having  regard  to  the  views  expressed  

hereinabove, we are unable to sustain the impugned  

order  of  the  High  Court  in  holding  that  the  

provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, would  

not be applicable to the appellant’s case since he  

was allegedly 13 days above the age prescribed.

40. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested  

on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 Act was in force and  

under  Clause  (h)  of  Section  2  a  juvenile  was  

described to mean a child who had not attained the  

age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained  

the age of eighteen years. It is with the enactment  

of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, that in Section  

42

2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a  

child who had not completed eighteen years of age  

which was given prospective prospect.  However, as  

indicated hereinbefore after the decision in Pratap  

Singh’s case (supra), Section 2(l) was amended to  

define a juvenile in conflict with law to mean a  

juvenile  who  is  alleged  to  have  committed  an  

offence and has not completed eighteen years of age  

as  on  the  date  of  commission  of  such  offence;  

Section  7A  was  introduced  in  the  2000  Act  and  

Section 20 thereof was amended whereas Rule 12 was  

included in the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, which  

gave retrospective effect to the provisions of the  

Juvenile  Justice  Act,  2000.  Section  7A  of  the  

Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, made provision for the  

claim of juvenility to be raised before any Court  

at any stage, as has been done in this case, and  

such claim was required to be determined in terms  

of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the  

Rules framed thereunder, even if the juvenile had  

43

ceased  to  be  so  on  or  before  the  date  of  

commencement of the Act. Accordingly, a juvenile  

who had not completed eighteen years on the date of  

commission of the offence was also entitled to the  

benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as if  

the provisions of Section 2(k) had always been in  

existence  even  during  the  operation  of  the  1986  

Act.

41. The said position was re-emphasised by virtue  

of the amendments introduced in Section 20 of the  

2000 Act, whereby the Proviso and Explanation were  

added  to  Section  20,  which  made  it  even  more  

explicit  that  in  all  pending  cases,  including  

trial,  revision,  appeal  and  any  other  criminal  

proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict  

with law, the determination of juvenility of such a  

juvenile would be in terms of clause (l) of Section  

2 of the 2000 Act, and the provisions of the Act  

would apply as if the said provisions had been in  

force when the alleged offence was committed.

44

42. In the instant case, there is no controversy  

that the appellant was about sixteen years of age  

on the date of commission of the alleged offence  

and had not completed eighteen years of age. In  

view  of  Sections  2(k),  2(l)  and  7A  read  with  

Section 20 of the said Act, the provisions thereof  

would apply to the appellant’s case and on the date  

of the alleged incident it has to be held that he  

was a juvenile.

43.  The appeal has, therefore, to be allowed  on  

the ground that notwithstanding the definition of  

“juvenile” under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986,  

the  appellant  is  covered  by  the  definition  of  

“juvenile” in Section 2(k) and the definition of  

“juvenile in conflict with law” in Section 2(l) of  

the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended.   

44. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside  

the order passed by the High Court and in keeping  

with the provisions of Sections 2(k), 2(l),7A and  

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20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and Rules 12  

and 98 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, hold  

that since the appellant was below 18 years of age  

at  the  time  of  commission  of  the  offence  the  

provisions of the said Act would apply in his case  

in full force.

45. The  matter  is  accordingly  remitted  to  the  

Juvenile  Justice  Board,  Ajmer,  for  disposal  in  

accordance with law, within three months from the  

date of receipt of a copy of this order, having  

regard to the fact that the offence is alleged to  

have been committed more than ten years ago.  If,  

however, the appellant has been in detention for a  

period which is more than the maximum period for  

which a juvenile may be confined to a Special Home,  

the Board shall release the appellant from custody  

forthwith.  

     ________________J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)

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________________J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

New Delhi Dated: 05.05.2009

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