REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5440 OF 2000

Hari Ram & Another    …Appellants

Versus

The State of Haryana and Others   …Respondents

WITH

Civil Appeal No. 5442 of 2000 Civil Appeal No. 5443 of 2000 Civil Appeal No. 5444 of 2000 Civil Appeal No. 5441 of 2000 Civil Appeal No. 5445 of 2000 Civil Appeal No. 5449 of 2000

AND Civil Appeal No. 5446 of 2000

JUDGEMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.

This  group  of  eight  appeals  involves  identical  

controversy and, hence, all these appeals were heard together  

and are being disposed of by a common judgment. As a matter

of  fact,  five  appeals  (5440/2000,  5442/2000,  5443/2000,  

5444/2000  and  5445/2000)  have  been  disposed  of  vide  

common judgment  dated   August  13,  1998   by the  Division  

Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.  The other three  

appeals  (5449/2000  5441/2000   and  5446/2000)  have  been  

disposed of by the High Court vide  separate judgments dated  

March  26,  1998,  May  18,  1998  and  August  13,  1998  

respectively.   

2. The  facts  have  been  set  out  in  the  impugned  

judgments  and,  therefore,  we  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  

repeat  the same. Suffice,  however,  to say that  large tract  of  

land  admeasuring  184.56  acres  situate  at  Narnaul  was  

proposed to be acquired for Urban Mini Estate by the Haryana  

Urban Development Authority (HUDA) and, for the said public  

purpose,  notification under Section 4 of  the Land Acquisition  

Act,  1894 (for  short,  ‘Act’)  was issued on October  30,  1992.  

Many owners whose lands were sought  to  be acquired  filed  

objections under Section 5-A of the Act before the concerned  

Land  Acquisition  Officer.  Pursuant  to  these  objections,  land  

admeasuring 11.55 acres was excluded and declaration under  

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Section 6 of the Act was made in respect of 173.01 acres on  

October  28,  1993.   Seventy  eight  landowners  filed  32  writ  

petitions in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging  

the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act on diverse  

grounds.  Inter alia, in these writ petitions, the writ petitioners  

also prayed for release of their respective lands. At this stage, it  

may also be noticed that although declaration under Section 6  

was made in respect of 173.01 acres but award was passed for  

land admeasuring 172.57 acres only as the State Government  

is  said  to  have  decided  to  release  land  of  13  landowners  

admeasuring 0.44 acres for which ultimately release order was  

passed on February 28, 1997.

3. Reverting back to the writ petitions, it transpires that  

during  their  pendency,  Chief  Administrator,  HUDA-cum-

Director,  Urban Estates  stated before  the  Division Bench on  

January  8,  1998  that  HUDA  was  prepared  to  appoint  a  

committee  to  inspect  the  site  and  make  recommendations  

whether the land of the writ petitioners could be released or not.  

Accordingly,  a  Joint  Inspection  Committee  was  constituted  

comprising of Superintending Engineer, HUDA, Gurgaon; Land  

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Acquisition  Officer,  Gurgaon  and  District  Town  and  Country  

Planner,  Narnaul  under  the  Chairmanship  of  Administrator,  

HUDA, Gurgaon. The Committee carried out spot inspection of  

the  land  owned  by  the  petitioners  and  submitted  its  report  

before the Division Bench on February 13, 1998. Insofar as the  

present  appellants  are  concerned,  the  Joint  Inspection  

Committee  did  not  recommend  release  of  their  land  from  

acquisition. The High Court took into consideration the report  

submitted  by the Joint  Inspection  Committee  and keeping in  

view the recommendations made by it ordered release of land  

in favour of 22 owners and dismissed the writ petition of other  

petitioners including the present appellants.

4. It  is  pertinent  to  mention  here  that  at  least  four  

petitioners  whose  writ  petitions  were  dismissed  by  the  High  

Court on the ground that Joint Inspection Committee had not  

recommended  release  of  their  land,  later  on  applied  under  

Section 48 of the Act and by separate orders the Government  

released their land from  acquisition. It also appears that some  

of the owners although did not challenge the acquisition in the  

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court  but  represented to the Government  for  release of  their  

land from acquisition and their lands were also released.

5. During the pendency of  these appeals,  this Court  

vide order dated August 19, 2008, keeping in view the earlier  

orders  passed  by  this  Court  and  the  affidavit  in-reply  dated  

June  27,  2008  (filed  in  Court  on  July  8,  2008)  by  Financial  

Commissioner  and  Principal  Secretary  to  Government  of  

Haryana,  Town  and  Country  Planning  and  Urban  Estate  

Department,  Chandigarh  and  the  available  material  granted  

liberty to the appellants to make representation(s) to the State  

Government for release of their land from acquisition and the  

State  Government  was  directed  to  consider  such  

representation(s)  and  pass  appropriate  order/s  within  time  

granted therein.

6. In pursuance of the order dated August 19, 2008,  

the  appellants  made  representations  before  the  State  

Government.  The lands owned by them admeasure between  

300 sq. yards to 1600 sq. yards. However, the representations  

made by the appellants came to be rejected on September 29,  

2008 on the basis of the policy dated October 26, 2007.

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7. We heard learned counsel for the parties at quite  

some length on various dates. The principal grievance raised  

by the appellants is that they have been discriminated by the  

State Government in not releasing their land although land of  

similar  situated  persons  in  identical  facts  and  circumstances  

has  been  released.  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Govind  Goel,  

learned counsel for the respondents justified the action of the  

State  Government  and  submitted  that  by  an  elaborate  and  

speaking  order,  the  State  Government  has  rejected  the  

appellants’ prayer of release of their land from acquisition and  

there is no infirmity in the said order.  Mr. Govind Goel, learned  

counsel  contended  that  plea  regarding  discrimination  is  

fallacious as release of land of few owners after the impugned  

judgment cannot  provide permissible basis for  advancing the  

plea of  discrimination, especially in the absence of  any legal  

right for release. In this regard, he relied upon decisions of this  

Court in the case of  Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority,   

Jaipur v.  Daulat  Mal Jain & Others1,  Jalandhar Improvement  

Trust  v.  Sampuran  Singh2,  Union  of  India  and  Another  v.  

1 (1997) 1 SCC 35 2 (1999) 3 SCC 494

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International  Trading  Co.  and  Another3,  Ved  Prakash  and  

Others  v.  Ministry of Industry, Lucknow and Another4,  Anand  

Buttons  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Haryana  and  Others5,  and  Vishal  

Properties (P) Limited  v.  State of Uttar Pradesh and Others6.   

He also referred to decisions of this Court in Sube Singh and  

Others v. State of Haryana and Others7 and Jagdish Chand &  

Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr.8.

8. Mr.  Govind  Goel,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents also submitted that development planning and the  

parameters  of  release  of  constructed  area  along  with  

proportionate  area  were  kept  in  view  while  considering  the  

representations made by the appellants. He would submit that  

instead  of  disturbing  the  entire  layout  plan  and  leaving  the  

released area on the spot, the appellants have been offered a  

fully developed plot in the same sector of a size of land to which  

they became entitled on the basis of the constructed area in  

their land.

3 (2003) 5 SCC 437 4 (2003) 9 SCC 542 5 (2005) 9 SCC 164 6 (2007) 11 SCC 172 7 (2001) 7 SCC 545 8 (2005) 10 SCC 162

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9. The only question that falls for our consideration in  

this  group  of  appeals  is  whether  the  action  of  the  State  

Government  in  rejecting  the  appellants’  representations  for  

withdrawal from acquisition of their land is an ultra vires act and  

discriminatory?   

10. Section 48 of the Act empowers the Government to  

withdraw from the acquisition of the land provided possession  

has not been taken. The said power is given to the Government  

by a statutory provision and is not restricted by any condition  

except that such power must be exercised before possession is  

taken. The statutory provision contained in Section 48 does not  

provide  for  any  particular  procedure  for  withdrawal  from  

acquisition.  

11. Before we consider the question further, a look at  

the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents  

at this stage would be appropriate.  In the case of  Secretary,   

Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur1, the question that arose  

before this Court was whether High Court was right in directing  

allotment  of  the  lands  to  the  respondents  therein  since  

allotment made to others had become final and denial thereof  

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to the respondents would amount to violation of equality clause  

enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Dealing with the said  

question, this Court observed :

“13.  ………The intention behind the government actions and  purposes  is  to  further  the  public  welfare  and the  national  interest.  Public  good is synonymous with protection of  the  interests of  the citizens as a territorial  unit  or  nation as a  whole.  It  also  aims  to  further  the  public  policies.  The  limitations  of  the  policies  are  kept  along  with  the  public  interest to prevent the exploitation or misuse or abuse of the  office or the executive actions for personal gain or for illegal  gratification.

14.  The so-called public policy cannot be a camouflage for  abuse  of  the  power  and  trust  entrusted  with  a  public  authority  or  public  servant  for  the  performance  of  public  duties. Misuse implies doing of something improper.”

12. In  Jalandhar  Improvement  Trust2,  this  Court  was  

concerned  with  the  claim  of  the  respondents  being  “local  

displaced persons” to a plot each in lieu of the lands acquired  

by the Trust. The plea of the respondents was that Trust had  

made  similar  preferential  allotments  as  “local  displaced  

persons” in favour of other persons. While considering the said  

claim of the respondents, this Court held, “if it was not within  

the scope of the rules then even those allotments in favour of  

other persons will not create a right in the respondents to claim  

equality with them; maybe, if the allotments were made wrongly  

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in  favour of  those persons,  the same may become liable for  

cancellation,  if  permissible in  law, but  that  will  not  create an  

enforceable right on the respondents to claim similar wrongful  

allotments in their favour”.

13. While dealing with the scope of judicial review in the  

matter  of  policy  decision  of  Government,  this  Court  in  

International Trading Co.3 held :  

“14. It is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution applies  also to matters of governmental policy and if  the policy or  any action of the Government, even in contractual matters,  fails  to  satisfy  the  test  of  reasonableness,  it  would  be  unconstitutional.

15. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of  the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or  rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms  of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly  and  should  not  give  the  impression  that  it  was  so  done  arbitrarily  or  by  any  ulterior  criteria.  The  wide  sweep  of  Article  14  and  the  requirement  of  every  State  action  qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the  field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic  requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State,  and  non-arbitrariness  in  essence  and  substance  is  the  heartbeat  of  fair  play.  Actions  are  amenable,  in  the  panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State  must act validly for a discernible reason, not whimsically for  any  ulterior  purpose.  The  meaning  and  true  import  and  concept  of  arbitrariness  is  more  easily  visualized  than  precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is  arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and  circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to  apply  in  such  cases  is  to  see  whether  there  is  any  discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and  if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness.

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16. Where a particular mode is prescribed for doing an act  and there is no impediment in adopting the procedure, the  deviation  to  act  in  a  different  manner  which  does  not  disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable itself  shall  be labelled  as  arbitrary.  Every  State  action  must  be  informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by  reason is per se arbitrary.”

14. In Ved Prakash and Others4, this Court directed the  

concerned authority to consider representations of the owners  

for release of their land from acquisition under Section 48 of the  

Act. This is how the Court considered the matter:

“17. It is no doubt true that conclusion on Point 1 raised in  para 11 of  the judgment  in  the case of  Om Prakash was  recorded  against  the  State  but  ultimately  effective  and  operative order is to be seen in paras 31 and 32 of the said  judgment.  The  ultimate  direction  was  to  consider  the  representations of the appellants for releasing the lands from  acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Act on being satisfied  of the five aspects mentioned in para 31 of the judgment. It  is also made clear in the said paragraph that this Court did  not  express  any  opinion  on  the  question  whether  the  appellants’ lands had such  abadi on the date of Section 4  notification  which  would  attract  the  State  policy  of  not  acquiring such lands and whether such policy had continued  thereafter at the stage of Section 6 notification of 7-1-1992  and whether such policy was still  current and operative at  the time when the appellants’ representations came up for  consideration  of  appropriate  authorities  of  the  State  Government. It is further stated that it will be for the State  authorities to take the informed decision in this connection.  In the same paragraph, it is stated that:  

“We may not be understood to have stated anything  on this aspect, nor are we suggesting that the State  must release these lands from acquisition if the State  authorities  are  not  satisfied  about  the  merits  of  the  representations.”

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This Court went on to say in para 32 that the entire matter is  left at large for the consideration of the State authorities on  the appellants’ representations. It is further stated that if the  representations were made within the given time, then the  appropriate authority of the State Government shall consider  their representations regarding the feasibility of releasing of  such lands from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Act  on the ground that there were “abadis” on these lands at the  relevant time and are governed by any existing State policy  for releasing such lands from acquisition.

18. Thus, it is clear that it was open to the State authorities  to consider regarding the feasibility of releasing such lands  from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Act after taking  into  consideration  the  observations  made  and  directions  given  in  paras  31  and  32  as  aforementioned.  We  have  already noticed above that  the competent  authority  of  the  State  gave  hearing  to  the  appellants,  considered  the  evidence and material placed on record and examined the  contentions  raised  on  behalf  of  the  parties  in  compliance  with the directions given and observations made in paras 31  and 32 of  the judgment  of  this Court.  The State authority  came to the conclusion for the reasons already stated above  that having regard to various aspects including development  scheme, it was found not feasible to release the lands of the  appellants under Section 48(1) of the Act. The High Court  did not find any good ground to disagree with the findings of  fact recorded by the State authority and also found that the  State  authorities  duly  considered  the  directions  given and  observations made by this Court as contained in paras 31  and 32 of the judgment.”     

15. In  Anand Buttons Ltd.5, the contention advanced by the  

appellants before this Court was that the decision of the State  

Government in not granting exemption from acquisition to their  

lands was arbitrary, discriminatory and violative  of Article 14 of  

the  Constitution.  Dealing with  the  said  contention,  this  Court  

observed :      

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“13. It is trite law that not only land but also structures on  land can be acquired under the Act. As to whether in a given  set of circumstances certain land should be exempted from  acquisition only for the reason that some construction had  been carried out, is a matter of policy, and not of law. If after  considering all the circumstances, the State Government has  taken the view that exemption of the lands of the appellants  would  render  askew  the  development  scheme  of  the  industrial estate, it is not possible for the High Court or this  Court  to  interfere  with  the  satisfaction  of  the  authorities  concerned. We see no ground on which the appellants could  have maintained that their lands should be exempted from  acquisition.  Even if  three of  the parties had been wrongly  exempted  from  acquisition,  that  gives  no  right  to  the  appellants to seek similar relief.”

16. In  the case of  Vishal  Properties  (P)  Limited6,  this  

Court  reiterated the legal  position that  :  (i)   Article  14 is not  

meant to perpetuate an illegality. It provides for positive equality  

and not negative equality;  (ii) Courts cannot issue a direction  

that  the  same  mistake  be  perpetuated  on  the  ground  of  

discrimination or hardship; (iii) Any action/order contrary to law  

does not confer any right upon any person for similar treatment  

and; (iv) An order made in favour of a person in violation of the  

prescribed procedure cannot form a legal premise for any other  

person to claim parity with the said illegal or irregular order. A  

judicial forum cannot be used to perpetuate the illegalities.

17. In  Sube Singh7,  while  dealing with  the  contention  

that the decision of the State Government in not accepting the  

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prayer  of  the  petitioners  for  exclusion  of  their  property  from  

acquisition is arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as in the  

case of owners of other lands lying within the area notified who  

had sought exclusion of their property on the ground of existing  

structures,  the  prayer  was  accepted  and  the  lands  were  

excluded  from  acquisition  and  the  response  of  the  State  

Government  that  as  per  Policy,  the  State  Government  has  

excluded from acquisition, ‘A’ Class constructions and since the  

constructions on the petitioners’ land were either ‘B’ Class or ‘C’  

Class, their land could not have been excluded, this Court held  

that such policy was not based on intelligible differentia and a  

rational basis germane to the purpose. It was held :  

“10.  ……It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  purported  classification  of  existing  structures  into  ‘A’,  ‘B’  and  ‘C’  Classes is a reasonable classification having an intelligible  differentia and a rational basis germane to the purpose. If  the  State  Government  fails  to  support  its  action  on  the  touchstone of the above principle, then this decision has to  be held as arbitrary and discriminatory. It is relevant to note  here that the acquisition of the lands is for the purpose of  planned  development  of  the  area  which  includes  both  residential  and  commercial  purposes.  That  being  the  purpose of acquisition, it is difficult to accept the case of the  State  Government  that  certain  types  of  structures  which  according to its  own classification are of ‘A’  Class can be  allowed  to  remain  while  other  structures  situated  in  close  vicinity  and  being  used  for  same purposes  (residential  or  commercial) should be demolished. At the cost of repetition,  it may be stated here that no material was placed before us  to show the basis of classification of the existing structures  

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on  the  lands  proposed  to  be  acquired.  This  assumes  importance in view of the specific contention raised on behalf  of the appellants that they have pucca structures with RC  roofing, mosaic flooring etc. No attempt was also made from  the side of the State Government to place any architectural  plan  of  different  types  of  structures  proposed  to  be  constructed on the land notified for acquisition in support of  its contention that the structures which exist on the lands of  the appellants could not be amalgamated into the plan.

11. On the facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case revealed  from the records, we are persuaded to accept the contention  raised on behalf  of the appellants that the rejection of the  request of the appellants for exclusion of their land having  structures on them was not based on a fair and reasonable  consideration of  the matter.  We are of  the view that  such  action of the Government is arbitrary and discriminatory…...”

18. In the case of Jagdish Chand8, this Court issued the  

directions as were given in the case of Sube Singh7 but clarified  

that  these directions  are  given on the  particular  facts  of  the  

case and are not intended for any general application.

19. It is an admitted case of the respondents that prior  

to  October  26,  2007,  the  State  of  Haryana  had  no  uniform  

policy  governing  the  release  of  land  from  acquisition  under  

Section  48  of  the  Act.  Although  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents submitted that  matter  relating to release of  land  

from acquisition  was  governed  from time to  time by  various  

guidelines/parameters  set  out  in  intra-office  communications  

governing individual acquisition, no such guidelines/parameters  

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have  been  placed  on  record  except  a  letter  dated  June  26,  

1991 sent by the Chief Administrator, HUDA to the Additional  

Director,  Urban  Estate,  Haryana,  Manimajra  and  the  Chief  

Controller  of  Finance,  HUDA, Manimajra pertaining to  review  

progress of the various schemes of HUDA which reads thus :

“1. That  a  land  bank  should  be  created  in  the  current  financial  year.  Chief  Controller  of  Finance,  HUDA  should  discuss the matter with Additional Director, Urban Estate for  financial planning, so that land bank could be treated.

2. That  during the current  year  2000 acres more land  can be acquired provided additional amount is advanced for  the purpose.

3. That  financial  fore-cast  should  be  prepared  every  month  for  land  lying notified  under  section  6  of  the  Land  Acquisition Act, should acquired. (sic)

4. That  existing  factories  should  not  be  acquired  and  should be released from the proceedings of  the section 4  notification. Constructed area of ‘A’ and ‘B’ grade should be  left out of acquisition.

5. That survey of existing construction be done before  the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

6. That  the  area  which  is  liable  to  be  left  out  and  of  acquired (sic) should be left out at the time of decision on the  report  under  section  5-A  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  No  notification earlier issued under Land Acquisition Act should  lapse.

7. That  reference  under  section  18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  should  not  be  delayed.  Pendency  of  reference has financial implication.”

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20. The  only  guideline  discernible  from  the  aforesaid  

letter dated June 26, 1991 is that survey of existing construction  

should be done before notification is issued under Section 4 of  

the  Land Acquisition  Act;  that  existing  factory should  not  be  

acquired  and  it  should  be  released  from the  proceedings  of  

Section 4 notification and that constructed area of ‘A’ and ‘B’  

grade  should  be  left  out  of  acquisition.  In  Sube Singh7, this  

Court has already held that classification on the basis of nature  

of construction cannot be validly made and such policy is not  

based on intelligible differentia and a rational basis germane to  

the purpose. The policy articulated in the letter dated June 26,  

1991, thus, hardly helps the respondents. Rather it is seen that  

neither  the  aforesaid  policy  nor  any  other  policy  has  been  

followed  by  the  State  Government  while  releasing  land  of  

various  landowners  whose  lands  have  been  acquired  in  the  

same  acquisition  proceedings.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  only  

policy that seems to have been followed is : you show me the  

face and I’ll  show you  the rule.  Insofar  as policy  of  2007 is  

concerned, apparently that has not been applied to any of the  

landowners whose land was acquired along with the appellants’  

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land under the same acquisition proceedings and released later  

on. We are pained to observe that when this Court directed to  

the  State  Government  vide  order  dated  August  19,  2008  to  

consider release of the land of the appellants from acquisition,  

obviously the State Government was required to consider the  

representations  of  the  appellants  by  applying  the  same  

standards as were applied to  other  landowners whose lands  

were  acquired  for  the  same  purpose  and  under  the  same  

acquisition  proceedings  and  released  later  on.  However,  the  

representations  made  by  the  appellants  were  rejected  by  

relying upon the policy dated October  26,  2007 which on its  

face is erroneous and unsustainable in law.

21. Now, we advert to the few instances of landowners  

who filed writ  petitions before the High Court  challenging the  

same notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of  the Act  and in  

whose matters Joint Inspection Committee did not recommend  

release  of  their  lands  from  acquisition  and  the  High  Court  

dismissed  their  writ  petitions,  yet  later  on  their  lands  were  

released  from  acquisition  by  the  State  Government  on  the  

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representations made by them in exercise of its power under  

Section 48 of the Act.

Land of Smt. Ram Kala :

She is owner of land admeasuring 600 sq. yards. There is  

no construction in the said plot. She challenged the acquisition  

notifications vide CWP No. 18087 of 1995. The writ petition was  

dismissed  by  the  High  Court  by  common  judgment  dated  

August  13,  1998 as  the  Joint  Inspection Committee had not  

recommended release of her land. She then applied for release  

of her land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. Vide  

order  dated November  6,  2001,  her  land was released.  The  

said order reads thus :

“From:

Director, Urban Estate Department, Haryana, Panchkla.

To Administrator, HUDA Gurgaon.

Memo No.S-1-2001/8226 Dated

Subject:- Release of land in Sector 1 Narnaul (Smt. Ram      Kala w/o Hari Singh).

On the above subject, in reference to your letter  bearing Memo No.1650 dated 23.01.01.

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2. In  this  regard,  you  are  informed  that  the  Government has agreed for release the land of Smt. Ram  Kala w/o Shri Han Singh, Rio  Narnaul,  bearing  Khasra  No.872/ 1278, 1055/3, area 600 sq. yards, falling in Sector 1,  Narnaul for residential purpose on the usual  conditions.  The  condition  of  recovery  of  development  charges  proportionately would be applicable on the party.

3. In pursuance of letter bearing memo No.2280- 72  dated  04.08.86  and  letter  memo  No.23640-63  dated  ‘18.9.2000 and by keeping in view the instructions, first of all  the amount of development charges is to be recovered from  the party and thereafter to send the sanctioned agreement to  the Head Office for finalizing the agreement.

4. Party  would  be  required  to  comply  with  conditions of release as per the agreement to be executed.

Thus,  you  are  requested  to  send  the  agreement  after  getting  it  executed  from  the  party  with  regard to all general conditions.

Sd/- Additional Director

Urban Estate Department        Haryana, Panchkula.”

Land of Mani Ram :

He is owner of plot of land admeasuring 800 sq. yards.  

According to him, the plot had some commercial and residential  

construction.  He  challenged  the  acquisition  notifications  vide  

CWP No. 14583 of 1995. His writ petition was dismissed by the  

High Court on May 11, 1998 on the basis of the report of the  

Joint Inspection Committee as it did not recommend release of  

his  land.  He,  thereafter,  applied for  release of  his  land from  

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acquisition  to  the  State  Government  under  Section  48.   His  

representation  was  accepted  and  release  order  came to  be  

issued (except road portion) on July 9, 2003 on the condition  

that he would utilize the land for conforming use.

Land of Sumitra Devi :

She  is  owner  of  plot  of  400  sq.  yards  having  no  

construction at all. She challenged the acquisition notifications  

along with one of the appellants herein - Hari Ram (Civil Appeal  

No. 5440 of 2000) and one Naresh Kumar. Insofar as Naresh  

Kumar is concerned, who was owner of land admeasuring 500  

sq.  yards,  the  Joint  Inspection  Committee  recommended  

exclusion  of  his  land from acquisition  and,  accordingly,  High  

Court granted relief to Naresh Kumar. However, insofar as Hari  

Ram and Sumitra Devi are concerned, their  writ  petition was  

dismissed  as  the  Joint  Inspection  Committee  had  not  

recommended  their  land  to  be  released  from  acquisition.  In  

respect  of  the  land owned by Sumitra  Devi,  Joint  Inspection  

Committee gave its report thus:

“The land of the petitioner measures 400 sq. yards in  area, the location of which is shown on tentative layout plan  at No. 19C. The plot is vacant at site except boundary wall.  The  details  of  plot  are  shown  in  the  site  sketch  plan  at  

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Annexure  19C.  The  committee  does  not  recommend  its  release.”

As regards Hari Ram (one of the appellants), the report  

reads thus :

“The land of the petitioners measure 400 sq. yards in  area, the location of which is shown on tentative layout plan  at no. 19B. A small room (6’ x 6’) along with boundary wall  stand constructed at site prior to notification of land u/s 4.  The small room is not inhabited by anyone. The construction  details are shown in the site sketch plan at Annexure 19B.  The  committee  does  not  recommend  its  release  from  acquisition.”

Smt. Sumitra Devi then made representation to the State  

Government  for  release  of  her  land  from  acquisition  under  

Section 48 of the Act. Initially part of the land was released from  

acquisition but later on by order dated February 7, 2004, her  

entire land stood released from acquisition.

22. The State Government  had also  released land of  

few landowners whose lands were acquired under  the same  

acquisition  notifications  and  there  was  no  challenge  to  the  

acquisition  by  them  but  they  made  representation  under  

Section 48 of the Act for release of their lands and that prayer  

was acceded to.  One of  such instances is that  of landowner  

Vinod Kumar who is owner of the land admeasuring 800 sq.  

yards having construction of one room and kitchen. His land  

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was released from acquisition by the State Government on May  

6, 1999 by the following order ;

“From:

Director, Urban Estate Department,  Haryana, Panchkula.

To Administrator,  Haryana, Panchkula.  Gurgaon.

Memo No.3506 dated 06.05.1999

Subject:- Release of land in Sector 1 Narnaul —Shri       

                         Vinod Kumar

On  the  above  subject,  in  reference  to  your  letter  bearing Memo No. T.P.-98/21765 dated 24.12.98.

In this matter, the Government has decided to return  the land of Khasra No.1052 measuring 800 sq. yards/ built  up area belonging to Shri Vinod Kumar Gupta in Sector 1  Narnaul  by  releasing  from  acquisition  proceedings.  All  conditions  would  be  applicable  on  the  applicant  and  the  applicant would have to pay the proportionate development  charges  of  this  land  to  Haryana  Urban  Development  Authority.  So  you  are  requested  to  get  the  agreement  executed from the party for all conditions.

   Sd/-           Addl. Director

 Urban Estate Department                    Haryana, Panchkula.”

23. There  are  various  orders  placed  on  record  

evidencing  release  of  lands  from  acquisition  by  the  State  

Government  out  of  same  acquisition  proceedings.  It  is  not  

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necessary to  multiply  such orders;  reference to  one of  such  

orders would suffice. As early as on  February 28, 1997, land of  

13 landowners was released from acquisition. The said release  

order reads thus :

“From

The Director,  Urban Estate Deptt., Haryana  Panchkula.

To

The Administrator Haryana Urban Development Authority Gurgaon.

Memo No.: 1-971

Dated: 28.02.1997

Sub: FOR RELEASING THE LAND ACQUIRED IN  SECTION 1 NARNAUL

In connection with aforesaid subject.

In this connection a decision has been taken by the  Government and it has agreed to release the land/ structure  of  the  below  mentioned  applicants  acquired  in  sector-1  Narnaul. A1 the conditions of release will be applicable on  the  applicants  and  they  will  also  have  to  pay  the  development  charges  to  HUDA  according  to  rules.  An  agreement be also got executed from the parties regarding  conditions of release.  All  the parties will  have to withdraw  their cases from the court. The details of the land released is  as under:-

Sr. No. Name of Party Khasra No. Area

1. Rao Gulab Singh s 1273 300 Sq. Yard 2. Sh. Surender Singh 1294 300 - do-

son Sh. Surajbhan

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3. Smt. Krishna Devi 1294 300 –do- w/o Bhup Singh

4. Sh. Ravinder Singh 1294 300 –do- s/o Sh. Naresh Singh

5. Sh. Om Parkash Son 1297/2 300 –do- of Sh Mukh Ram   1100, 1101

6. Sh. Ranbr Singh   1297/2 210 –do- son of Sh. Khushi Ram

7. Smt. Babli Devi and   1097/2 300 -do- Ram Chander   1100, 1101

8. Sh Bhm Singh s/o   1384 300 Sq.Yard Harwai Lal

9. Mewa Singh   1320 150 –do- 10. Matadin&Prithvi Singh 1320 300 –do- 11. Sh. Rohtash    1265/2 240 –do- 12. R.K.Punia    1057/2 400 –do- 13. Sh. K.K. Yadav    1058 1200 -do-

You may also verify, if  you so like the detail  of the  land released by the Govt. by its decision from the original  record from the Land Acquisition Officer, Gurgaon. Copy of  the letter Sr. No._________ Dated ________ from the Land  Acquisition Officer Gurgaon alongwith a copy of  the list  of  released land is attached herewith.

Dy. Director      Urban Estate Deptt. Haryana

Panchkula.”    

24. As  a  matter  of  fact,  lands  of  more  than  40  

landowners out of the same acquisition proceedings have been  

released by the State Government under Section 48 of the Act.  

Some of  the release orders have been passed in respect  of  

landowners  who  had  not  challenged  the  acquisition  

proceedings and some of them had challenged the acquisition  

proceedings before the High Court and whose cases were not  

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recommended  by  Joint  Inspection  Committee  for  withdrawal  

from acquisition and whose writ petitions were dismissed. Some  

of these landowners had only vacant plots of land and there  

was no construction at all. In most of these cases, the award  

has been passed and,  thereafter,  the State Government  has  

withdrawn from acquisition. It is not the case of the respondents  

that withdrawal from acquisition in favour of such landowners  

has been in violation of any statutory provision or contrary to  

law.  It  is  also  not  their  case  that  the  release  of  land  from  

acquisition in favour of such landowners was wrong action on  

their  part  or it  was done due to some mistake or a result  of  

fraud  or  corrupt  motive.  There  is  nothing  to  even  remotely  

suggest  that  the  persons  whose  lands  have  been  released  

have  derived  the  benefit  illegally.  As noticed  above,  prior  to  

October 26, 2007, the State Government did not have uniform  

policy concerning withdrawal from acquisition. As regards the  

guidelines provided in the letter dated June 26, 1991, this Court  

has already held that  classification on the basis of  nature of  

construction  cannot  be  validly  made  and  such  policy  is  not  

based  on  intelligible  differentia  and  a  rational  basis.  What  

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appears from the available material  is  that for  release of the  

lands under the subject acquisition, no policy has been adhered  

to.  This leads to an irresistible conclusion that no firm policy  

with regard to release of land from acquisition existed. It is true  

that any action or order contrary to law does not  confer any  

right upon any person for  similar treatment.  It  is  equally true  

that  a  landowner  whose  land  has  been  acquired  for  public  

purpose by following the prescribed procedure cannot claim as  

a matter of right for release of his/her land from acquisition but  

where the State Government exercises its power under Section  

48 of  the Act  for  withdrawal  from acquisition in  respect  of  a  

particular land, the landowners who are similarly situated have  

right of similar treatment by the State Government.  Equality of  

citizens’ rights is one of the fundamental pillars on which edifice  

of rule of law rests. All actions of the State have to be fair and  

for  legitimate  reasons.   The  Government  has  obligation  of  

acting with substantial fairness and consistency in considering  

the  representations  of  the  landowners  for  withdrawal  from  

acquisition whose lands have been acquired under the same  

acquisition proceedings.   The State Government  cannot  pick  

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and  choose  some  landowners  and  release  their  land  from  

acquisition and deny the same benefit to other landowners by  

creating artificial distinction. Passing different orders in exercise  

of its power under Section 48 of the Act in respect of persons  

similarly situated relating to same acquisition proceedings and  

for same public purpose is definitely violative of Article 14 of the  

Constitution and must be held to be discriminatory.  More so, it  

is not even the case of the respondents that release of land  

from acquisition  in  favour  of  various  landowners,  as  noticed  

above, was in violation of any statutory provision or actuated  

with ulterior motive or done due to some mistake or contrary to  

any public interest. As a matter of fact, vide order dated August  

19,  2008,  this  Court  gave  an  opportunity  to  the  State  

Government to consider the representations of the appellants  

for  release  of  their  land  and  pass  appropriate  order  but  the  

State Government considered their  representations in light of  

the policy dated October 26, 2007 ignoring and overlooking the  

fact that for none of the landowners whose lands have been  

released from acquisition,  the policy dated October 26,  2007  

was applied.  The State Government has sought to set up make  

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believe grounds to justify its action that development planning  

has been kept into consideration and that the appellants have  

been offered developed plots of double the area of construction  

while the fact of the matter  is that in some cases where the  

plots were vacant and had no construction, the entire plot has  

been released from acquisition and also the cases where one  

room or two rooms construction was existing, the whole of plot  

has  been  released.   While  releasing  land  of  more  than  40  

landowners having plots of size from 150 sq. yards to 1500 sq.  

yards,  if  development plan did not get materially disturbed in  

the opinion of the State Government,  the same opinion must  

hold good for the appellants’ lands as well.  It is unfair on the  

part of the State Government in not considering representations  

of the appellants by applying the same standards which were  

applied to other landowners while withdrawing  from acquisition  

of  their  land under  the  same acquisition  proceedings.  If  this  

Court  does  not  correct  the  wrong  action  of  the  State  

Government,  it  may  leave  citizens  with  the  belief  that  what  

counts for the citizens is right contacts with right persons in the  

State  Government  and  that  judicial  proceedings  are  not  

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efficacious.  The action  of   State  Government  in  treating  the  

present appellants differently although they are situated similar  

to the landowners whose lands have been released can not be  

countenanced and has to be declared bad in law.

25. Consequently,  these appeals are allowed and the  

order of the State Government dated September 29, 2008 is set  

aside.  The respondent no.1 (State of Haryana) is directed to  

issue appropriate order/s concerning the appellants’  lands on  

the same terms and in the same manner as has been done in  

the matters of Sumitra Devi, Ram Kala, Mani Ram and others.  

Obviously,  the  portion  of  the  lands  which  in  the  layout  plan  

forms part of roads or common sites or public utility area shall  

not be considered for release. No order as to costs.

……………………J                       (D.K. Jain)

…….……………..J         (R. M. Lodha)

New Delhi February 11, 2010.

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