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PETITIONER: HARI KHEMU GAWALI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,BOMBAY AND ANOTHER.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/05/1956

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. MUKHERJEE, BIJAN KR. (CJ) JAGANNADHADAS, B. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA IMAM, SYED JAFFER

CITATION:  1956 AIR  559            1956 SCR  506

ACT:        Bombay  Police Act, 1951 (Bombay Act XXII of 1951), s.  57--        Constitutional validity-Restrictions on individual right  to        reside   in   and  move  freely  in  any  part   of   India-        Reasonableness-Order  of  externment-Grounds of  the  order-        Validity-Sufficiency of evidence on which the order is made-        Whether can be examined by the Court-Constitution of  India,        Art. 19(1)(d), (e) and (5).

HEADNOTE:        Section 57, of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 provides that  if        a  person  has been convicted of certain  offences  detailed        therein,  "the Commissioner, the District Magistrate or  the        Sub-Divisional  Magistrate specially empowered by the  State        Government in this behalf, if he has reason to believe  that        such  person  is  likely  again to  engage  himself  in  the        commission  of an offence similar to that for which  he  was        convicted, may direct such person to remove himself  outside        the  area  within the local limits of his  jurisdiction,  by        such  route  and within such time as the  said  officer  may        prescribe and not to enter or return to the area from  which        he was directed to remove himself".        Under  the  provisions  of  the said  section  an  order  of        externment was passed against the petitioner who  challenged        the order on the grounds that s. 57 contravened clauses  (d)        and  (e)  of  Article 19(1) of the  Constitution,  that  the        provisions   of  the  said  section   imposed   unreasonable        restrictions on the petitioner’s fundamental rights of  free        movement and residence and that the order passed against him        was  illegal inasmuch as it was based on  vague  allegations        and inadmissible material.        Hold, per S. R. DAS C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and        JAFER IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS J. dissenting)        (1)  Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 is not uncon-        stitutional, because, it is an instance of the State  taking        preventive  measures in the interests of the public and  for        safeguarding individual rights, by preventing a person,  who        has been proved to be a criminal from acting in a way  which        may  be a repetition of his criminal propensities,  and  the

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      restrictions  that it imposes on the individual’s  right  to        reside  in  and  move  freely  in  any  part  of  India  are        reasonable  within the meaning of clause (5) of Art.  19  of        the Constitution.        (2)  The  restrictions cannot be said to be unreasonable  on        the ground that the person dealt with under s. 57 of the Act        may be        507        directed to remove himself altogether outside the limits  of        the  State of Bombay as the Act extends to the whole of  the        State, because, unless the person makes himself so obnoxious        as  to  render  his presence in every part of  the  State  a        menace to public peace and safety, every District  authority        would not think of acting in the same way in respect of  the        same person.        (3)It  cannot be laid down as a universal rule  that  unless        there  isa  provision  for an  Advisory  Board  which  could        scrutinise  the material on which the officers or  authority        contemplated by s.  57  had taken action against  a  person,        such a legislation would be   unconstitutional.        (4)  The provisions in ss. 55, 56, 57 and 59 of the Act  are        not  invalid on the ground that only the general  nature  of        the  material  allegations against the person  externed  are        required to be disclosed and that it would be difficult  for        him  to get the matter judicially examined.  The  provisions        are  intended to be used in special cases requiring  special        treatment,  that is, cases which cannot be dealt with  under        the preventive sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure.        (5)The  legality  of the order of externment cannot  be  im-        pugned on the ground that there was not sufficient  evidence        to  bring the charge home to the petitioner,  because  these        are all matters which cannot be examined by this Court in an        objective  way,  when the legislature has provided  for  the        subjective  satisfaction of the authorities or officers  who        have  been entrusted with the duty of enforcing the  special        provisions of the Act.        Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay ([1952] S.C.R.  737),        followed.        Per  JAGANNADHADAS  J:-Section 57 of the  Act  is  constitu-        tionally invalid because:        (1)Clause (a) of s. 57 of the Act not being confined to off"        serious  in their nature or with reference to the  attendant        circumstances   within  the  Chapters   specified   therein,        prevention of the repetition thereof cannot be considered  a        reasonable  restriction.   It is in excess of  what  may  be        considered justifiable.        (2)The  previous  commission of an offence of  the  category        specified,  without any reference to the  time,  environment        and other factors has no rational relation to the  criterion        of "reasonableness in the interest of public".        (3)The  exercise  of  the power not  being  limited  by  the        consideration  of non-availability of witnesses is also  not        rationally  related to the criterion of  "reasonableness  in        the interest of the public".        Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay ([1952] S.C.R.  737),        distinguished.

JUDGMENT:        ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 272 of 1955.        66        508        Petition under.  Article 32 of the Constitution of India for        the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

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      Purshottam Trikamdas, V. R. Upadhya, J. B. Dadachanji and S.        N. Andley, for the petitioner.        M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B. Sen and R.  H.        Dhebar, for the respondents.        1956.  May 8. The Judgment of S. R. Das C.J. and Venkatarama        Ayyar, B. P. Sinha and Jafer Imam JJ. was delivered by Sinha        J. Jagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment.        SINHA J.-This petition under article 32 of the  Constitution        challenges  the  vires of certain provisions of  the  Bombay        Police Act, XXII of 1951, which hereinafter will be referred        to  as  "The Act" with particular reference  to  section  57        under which the externment order dated the 8th November 1954        was  passed against the petitioner by the first  respondent,        the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch (1), C.I.D.,        Greater  Bombay.   The  second respondent is  the  State  of        Bombay.   The  petitioner,  who claims to be  a  citizen  of        India, was born in Bombay and had been, before the order  of        externment  in question, residing in one of the quarters  of        the City of Bombay.  He keeps bullock carts for carrying  on        his  business of transport and cows for selling  milk.   The        petitioner  alleges that the Prohibition Police of the  City        instituted  twelve prohibition cases against him  which  all        ended either in his discharge or acquittal.  An  "externment        order"  was passed against him in August 1950.   That  order        was set aside by the Government in December 1950, on  appeal        by  the petitioner.  In December 1953 an order of  detention        was  passed against him under the Preventive Detention  Act,        1950, and he was detained in the Thana District prison.   He        moved  the  High Court of Bombay under article  226  of  the        Constitution  against the said order of detention.-  He  was        released  from  detention  before  the  said  petition   was        actually   heard  by  the  High  Court.    Thereafter,   the        petitioner along with others was charged with possession  of        liquor.  The case went        509        on for about two years when he was ultimately discharged  by        the  Presidency Magistrate on the 24th February 1955 as  the        prosecution witnesses were not present on the date fixed for        hearing  of the case.  On the night of the 9th October  1954        the  petitioner  was arrested along with  his  companions  a        little  after  midnight  by  members  of  the  police  force        designated  "Ghost Squad", which was a special wing  of  the        Crime  Branch of the C.I.D., on the allegation made  by  the        police  that they were seen running away on the sight  of  a        police  van and that they were chased and arrested and  were        found in possession of knives and other weapons.  In October        1954  the petitioner was served with a notice under  section        57  read  with section 59 of the Act.  It is  convenient  at        this  stage to set out the said notice in extenso, which  is        Exhibit A to the petition filed in this Court:-        "Notice under section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951.        Name, address & age: Hari alias Dada Khemu Gawali,                                         Hindu aged about 37 years."        Occupation:    Bullock cart owner.        Residence:     Room  No. 45, 1st floor, Haji  Kassam  Chawl,        Lamington Road.        Under section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bombay  Act        XXII  of 1951), you are hereby informed that  the  following        allegations are made against you in proceedings against  you        under section 57 of the said Act.        In   order  to  give  you  opportunity  of  tendering   your        explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed        11  a.m.  on 25-10-1954 to receive your explanation  and  to        hear  you and your witnesses, if any, in regard to the  said        allegations.   I, N. P. Paranjapye, Superintendent,  C.B.I.,

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      C.I.D.,  therefore require you to appear before me at H.  P.        0.  Annexe I (place) on the said date viz. 25-10-1954 at  11        a.m.  for the said purpose and to pass a bond in the sum  of        Rs. 500 with’ one surety in like amount for your  attendance        during the inquiry of the said proceedings.  Should you fail        to appear before me and to pass the        510        bond as directed above, I shall proceed with the inquiry  in        your absence.  Take note:         Allegations:-        1.   That  you  have  been  convicted  of  offences  as  per        particulars mentioned below:-        -------------------------------------------------------------        serial Court &   date of     section    sentence     police          no   District   convinction  of law              station &                                                          case No.        -------------------------------------------------------------        1.      H. C.   14-10-1938    304/109     6 yrs.  Nagpada Ps               Bombay                 I. P. C.    R.I.    C. R. No.                                      324/109     2 yrs.     127/38                                      I.P. C.     R.I. (Con-                                                     currently).        2.   That you were arrested on 29-3-1948 in connection  with        Nagpada  P.S.C.R.  No. 273 of 1948 u/s 143, 147,  148,  149,        353, I.P.C. wherein you along with one Ramchandra Ishwarbhai        and  others  committed  rioting and criminal  assault  on  a        public servant, viz. a police constable No. 4459/D to  deter        him  from  the execution of his lawful duties but  you  were        discharged  in  the  said case due  to  lack  of  sufficient        evidence.        3.   That you were again arrested on 2-5-1948 in  connection        with  Nagpada P.S.C.R. No. 353 u/s 143, 144, 146, 147,  148,        149,  324, I.P.C. wherein you along with one  Rajaram  Khemu        Gawli  and  7  others committed rioting  armed  with  deadly        weapons,  viz.,  lathis, sodawater bottles etc.  and  caused        hurt to one Gopal Khemu Gawli but you were discharged in the        said case for want of sufficient evidence.        4.   That you were again arrested on 3-6-1949 in  connection        with  Nagpada  P.S.C.R. No. 336 of 1949 u/s 143,  147,  149,        225,  225-B,  332, I.P.C. wherein you along  with  one  Shri        Vithal  Baloo  and  others committed  rioting,  assaulted  a        public  servant, viz. a police officer (Shri S. K.  Kothare)        to  deter  him from the lawful discharge of his  duties  and        made  3  persons  in the lawful custody  of  the  police  to        escape,  but  were discharged in the said case for  want  of        sufficient evidence.         5.  That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954  at  about        12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viz.        511        (1)Amir  Masud (2) Francis Sherao & China (3) Antoo  Narayan        (4)  Abdul  Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama  (6)  Narayan        Tukaram  and  (7)  Rajaram  Vishnoo  out  of  whom   persons        mentioned  at Nos.  I and 6 are, previous convicts and  that        at  the time of arrest you and persons mentioned at Nos.  1,        2,  3  and 4 were, armed with deadly weapons to  wit,  clasp        knives,  iron bar and a lathi, and thus you were  reasonably        suspected  to  be out to commit an  offence  either  against        property or person; And that you are likely again to  engage        yourself  in  the commission of a  similar  offence  falling        either under Chapter XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code.                                         Sd. N. P. Paranjapye                           Superintendent    of    Police,     Crime                           Branch (I), C.I.D.        L.T.I. of Hari  Dada Khemu Gawli.        The petitioner appeared before the Superintendent on the 8th

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      November  1954  with his counsel and filed a  long  petition        containing  allegations running into  16 paragraphs  showing        cause against the order of externment proposed to be  passed        against  him.   That  petition is  Ex.   B.  The  petitioner        accepted the correctness of the allegation contained in  the        first  paragraph  of Ex.  A set out above,  but  denied  the        truth  of  the other allegations made  therein  against  him        which  he characterised as based on "old prejudice and  sus-        picion".  As regards his conviction referred to in the first        paragraph aforesaid, he stated:-        "I  had unfortunately a conviction in 1938 when was  a  mere        youth.   I  have  lived a clean  and  honourable  life  ever        since."        Then he goes on to make reference to the other cases charged        against  him  and claimed that he had  been  "discharged  in        those cases for want of sufficient evidence".        The  first respondent aforesaid ultimately passed the  order        of externment which is Exhibit C to the petition, on the 8th        November 1954.  After reciting the previous conviction which        was  for offences under Chapter XVI, Indian Penal  Code  and        that  the  petitioner  was likely again  to  engage  in  the        commission        512        of  similar offences and saying that he was satisfied  about        the  matters  contained in the previous  notice,  the  first        respondent  directed the petitioner under section 57 of  the        Act  to remove himself outside the limits of Greater  Bombay        within two days from the date of the final order in the case        pending against him, as noted in the order, for a period  of        two  years from the date of the order, and not to  enter  or        return  to  the  said area of  Greater  Bombay  without  the        permission in writing of the Commissioner of Police, Greater        Bombay,  or  the  Government  of  Bombay.   The   petitioner        preferred an appeal to the Government of Bombay against  the        said  order  of externment.  But the appeal  was  dismissed.        Substantially on those allegations this Court has been moved        under article 32 of the Constitution.        The  first  respondent has sworn to the affidavit  filed  in        this Court to the effect that the petitioner has been  fully        heard  by the authorities before the order impugned in  this        case was passed.  It is further stated in the affidavit that        in  the  previous  case in which  the  petitioner  had  been        convicted  be bad been found guilty along with  his  brother        Rajaram of having caused the death of a person who had given        evidence  against  them  in a  previous  trial.   The  first        respondent further stated in the affidavit that the material        examined  by  him before passing the order  impugned  showed        that  since  1948  the  petitioner  had  been  resorting  to        violence  and was concerned in a number of  cases  involving        acts of violence, namely:-        1.   In March 1948 a police constable was assaulted.  Though        the  petitioner  was one of the persons concerned  with  the        crime, he was not charge-sheeted because sufficient evidence        was not forthcoming against him.        2.   In April 1948 the petitioner’s brother had charged  him        and  eight others with having thrown sodawater  bottles  and        used   lathis.   The  Presidency  Magistrate,  17th   Court,        Mazgaon,  Bombay, had to adjourn the case several times  for        recording  evidence  of witnesses who  remained  absent  and        ultimately  the court refused to grant  further  adjournment        for the        513        production  of witnesses and the case ended in  a  discharge        for want of evidence.        3.   In  May  1949 the police had-  arrested  three  persons

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      including  Rajaram aforesaid, the petitioner’s  brother  for        being  concerned  in sale of illicit  liquor.   While  those        arrested  persons were being taken to the police  lorry  for        being taken to the police station, the petitioner and  other        persons  forcibly  rescued those arrested persons  from  the        custody  of the police.  But the case ultimately  failed  in        August 1950 because the witnesses failed to turn up to  give        evidence against the accused including the petitioner.        4.   At  about 12-50 a.m. on 9th October 1954,  the  Special        Squad,  Crime  Branch, C.I.D., Bombay, while  proceeding  on        their  rounds noticed the petitioner and seven others  armed        with an iron bar and lathi.  On seeing the police van,  they        started  running  away and were chased and arrested  by  the        police  force.   On  arrest the  petitioner  and  his  other        associates   were  found  carrying  "clasp   knives".    The        petitioner  and  three of the seven  arrested  persons  were        found  smelling of alcohol.  The -petitioner was  placed  on        his trial for offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act  and        the  Bombay  Police Act.  He was acquitted  by  the  learned        trial Judge because of discrepancies in the evidence of some        of  the  prosecution  witnesses.   The  respondent   further        averred that after examining all the material against him in        the light of his previous conviction under sections  304/109        and  324/109, Indian Penal Code, he was satisfied  that  the        petitioner. was likely again to engage in the commission  of        offences  similar to those for which he had been  previously        convicted.   Accordingly he passed the order  of  externment        against the petitioner, as set out above.        In  support  of  the petition which was  heard  -along  with        Petitions  Nos.  439 and 440 of 1955 (in  which  the  orders        impugned  had  been passed under section 56 of the  Act  and        which  are  being disposed of by a  separate  judgment)  the        leading argument by Shri Purshotham raised the contentions,-        (1)  that section 57 of the Act contravened clauses (d)  and        (e)  of  article  19(1) of the  Constitution  and  that  the        provisions        514        of  that section imposed unreasonable restrictions   on  the        petitioner’s   fundamental  rights  of  free  movement   and        residence;  and (2) that the order passed under  section  57        against the petitioner is illegal inasmuch as it is based on        vague allegations and inadmissible material, for example, on        orders  of  discharge or acquittal.  Each of the  two  broad        grounds  has  been elaborated and several points  have  been        sought  to  be made under each one of those heads.   It  has        been  contended  that the police have been vested  with  un-        limited  powers  in  the sense that  any  person  whom  they        suspect  or  against  whom they have their  own  reasons  to        proceed can be asked to remove, not only from any particular        area,  like  Greater Bombay, but from the  entire  State  of        Bombay.   Even if one order does not ask a person to  remove        himself  out of the entire State, each authority within  its        respective local jurisdiction can ask a particular person to        go  out of that area, so that that person may  find  himself        wholly displaced without any place to go to.  Unlike the law        relating to preventive detention, there is no provision  for        an Advisory Board which could examine the reasonableness  of        the  order proposed to be passed or already passed, so  that        there  is  no check on the exercise of power by  the  police        authorities under the-Act, however flagrant the abuse of the        power  may  have  been.   It  is  also  contended  that  the        provisions as regards hearing by the police authorities  and        appeal to the State Government are illusory.  The police  is        both the prosecutor and the judge and the remedy provided by        the Act is a mere eye-wash.  It is also pointed out that all

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      kinds  of offences have been clubbed together which have  no        rational  connection with one another.  Reliance was  placed        on  certain observations made by this Court in a  number  of        decisions,,  viz.,  Chintaman  Rao v. The  State  of  Madhya        Pradesh(1);  The  State of Madras V. V.  G.  Row(2);  Thakur        Raghubir  Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer(3);  Messrs  Dwarka        Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U. P.(4); and Ebrahim  Vazir        Mavat v. State of Bombay(5).        (1)[19SO]  S.C.R.  759. (2) [1952] S.C.]&. 597.  (3)  (1953]        S.C.R. 1049. (4) (1954] S. CB. 803.        (5)  [1954] S.C.R. 983.        515        Section 57 of the Act which is particularly impugned in this        case is in these terms:-        "Removal of persons convicted of certain offences.        If a ,person has been convicted-        (a)  of  an  offence under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII  of  the        Indian Penal Code, or        (b)  twice  of  an  offence under section 9  of  the  Bombay        Beggars  Act,  1945,  or  under  the  Bombay  Prevention  of        Prostitution Act, 1923, or        (c)  thrice  of  an offence within a period of  three  years        under section 4 or 12-A of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling        Act, 1887, or under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949,        the  Commissioner,  the  District  Magistrate  or  the  Sub-        Divisional  Magistrate  specially  empowered  by  the  State        Government in this behalf, if he has reason to believe  that        such  person  is  likely  again to  engage  himself  in  the        commission  of an offence similar to that for which  he  was        convicted, may direct such person to remove himself  outside        the  area  within the local limits of his  jurisdiction,  by        such  route  and within such time as the  said  officer  may        prescribe, and not to enter or return to the area from which        he was directed to remove himself.        Explanation-For  the  purpose of this  section  Can  offence        similar  to  that for which a person  was  convicted’  shall        mean-         (i)  in  the  case  of a person  convicted  of  an  offence        mentioned in clause (a), an offence falling under any of the        Chapters of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in that  clause,        and        (ii) in  the  case  of  a person  convicted  of  an  offence        mentioned  in clauses (b) and (c), an offence falling  under        the  provisions  of the Acts mentioned respectively  in  the        said clause&".        In  order  to attract the provisions of  this  section,  two        essential conditions must be fulfilled, viz.; (1) that there        should  have been a previous conviction under  Chapter  XII,        XVI or XVII, Indian Penal Code, or two previous  convictions        under the Acts mentioned        516        in clause (b), or three previous convictions within a period        of  three years under the Acts mentioned in clause (c);  and        (2)  that the authority named should have reason to  believe        that  a  person  coming within the purview  of  any  of  the        clauses  (a), (b) and (c) is likely again to engage  himself        in the commission of an offence similar to that for which he        had  been  previously  convicted; that is  to  say,  for  an        offence falling under any of the three chapters mentioned in        clause  (a),  or if he had been twice  convicted  under  the        Beggars  Act,  or  the Prevention of  Prostitution  Act,  or        thrice convicted under the Prevention of Gambling Act or the        Prohibition   Act;  so  that,  a  previous  conviction   for        "offences  relating to coin and Government stamps" has  been        equated  with  one for "offences affecting the  human  body"

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      (chapter XVI) or "offences against property" (chapter  XVII)        of  the Indian Penal Code.  I Chapter XII contains  sections        230 to 263(A).  Chapter XVI contains section 299 to  section        377 and Chapter XVII contains section 378 to section 462  of        the Code.  In other words, one convicted for  counterfeiting        coin may in terms of the impugned section 57 be said to have        engaged himself in the commission of a similar offence if he        is  likely  to  use criminal force or  to  commit  theft  or        extortion or robbery or dacoity or criminal misappropriation        of  property or criminal breach of trust.  It has  therefore        been  rightly pointed out on behalf of the  petitioner  that        the  range  of  the offences referred to in  clause  (a)  of        section  57 is very wide indeed and that it is difficult  to        point out any rational basis for clubbing them together.   A        person  convicted  under Chapter XII, Indian Penal  Code  of        counterfeiting Indian Coin or Government stamps may  rightly        be  called the enemy of public finance and revenue,  but  is        far removed from a person who may be convicted of murder  or        other  offences  against  human  body  or  against   private        property.  But the legislature in its wisdom has clubbed all        those  offences  together and it is not for  this  Court  to        question  that wisdom provided the provisions of the Act  do        not  impose unreasonable restrictions on right  to  freedom.        Conviction        517        under  the Bombay Beggars Act and the Bombay  Prevention  of        Prostitution  Act  have been clubbed together  under  clause        (b).  and  similarly previous convictions under  the  Bombay        Prevention  of Gambling Act and Bombay Prohibition Act  have        been  clubbed together.  So the previous  convictions  under        the  three  clauses  aforesaid have  been  placed  in  three        different categories.        Article  19 of the Constitution has guaranteed  the  several        rights  enumerated  under that article to  all  citizens  of        India.  After laying down the different rights to freedom in        clause(1), clauses (2) to (6) of that article recognise  the        right  of  the  State.  to  make  laws  putting   reasonable        restrictions on those rights in the interest of the  general        public,  security  of the State, public  order,  decency  or        morality and for other reasons set out in those sub-clauses,        so that there has to be a balance between individual  rights        guaranteed  under  article 19(1) and the exigencies  of  the        State which is the custodian of the interests of the general        public,  public  order, decency or morality  and  all  other        public  interests  which may compendiously be  described  as        social welfare.  For preventing a breach of the public peace        or the invasion of private rights the State has sometimes to        impose  certain  restrictions  on  individual  rights.    It        therefore  becomes the duty of the State not only to  punish        the  offenders against the penal laws of the State but  also        to take preventive action.  "Prevention,is better than cure"        applies  not only to individuals but also to the  activities        of the State in relation to the citizens of the State.   The        impugned  section  57  is an instance of  the  State  taking        preventive  measures in the interest of the public  and  for        safeguarding  individual’s rights.  The section  is  plainly        meant  to  prevent  a person who has been  proved  to  be  a        criminal  from acting in a way which may be a repetition  of        his  criminal propensities.  In doing so the State may  have        to  curb an individual’s activities and put fetters  on  his        complete freedom of movement and residence in order that the        greatest good of the greatest number may be conserved.   The        law  is based on the principle that it is desirable in-  the        larger        518

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      interests  of  society  that the  freedom  of  movement  and        residence  of a comparatively fewer number of people  should        be restrained so that the majority of the community may move        and  live in peace and. harmony and carry on their  peaceful        avocations untrammelled by any fear or threat of violence to        their person or property.  The individual’s right to  reside        in and move freely in any part of the territory of India has        to yield to the larger interest of the community.  That  the        Act is based on sound principle cannot be gainsaid.  Now the        only  question  is whether the provisions  of  the  impugned        section  are  not justified in the larger  interest  of  the        community, or, in other words, whether they impose a  larger        restriction  than  is  reasonably  necessary  to  meet   the        situation envisaged by the section.  From that point of view        we  shall now examine the other arguments advanced  to  show        that the provisions of the impugned section are unreasonable        restrictions  on  individual  right to reside  in  and  move        freely in any part of India.        It has been observed by this Court in the case of ’Gurbachan        Singh v. The State of Bombay(1) at p. 742, as per Mukherjea,        J. (as he then was):-        "It is perfectly true that the determination of the question        as  -to  whether the restrictions imposed by  a  legislative        enactment   upon  the  fundamental  rights  of   a   citizen        enunciated  in  article 19 (1) (d) of the  Constitution  are        reasonable  or not within the meaning of clause (5)  of  the        article would depend as much upon procedural part of the law        as upon its substantive part; and the court has got to  look        in each case to the circumstances under which and the manner        in which the restrictions have been imposed".        In  this case the attack against’ section 57 of the  Act  is        directed both against the procedural part of the law and the        substantive  part.   It has been contended that  the  person        dealt  with  under  section 57 may  be  directed  to  remove        himself altogether outside the limits of the State of Bombay        because the Act extends to the whole of the State of Bombay.        The  provisions of section 57 can be applied either  by  the        Commis-        (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 737.        519        sioner  of  Police for Greater Bombay and  other  areas  for        which a Commissioner may be appointed under section 7 or  by        the  District  Magistrate  or  a  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate        specially empowered by the State Government in that  behalf.        Any one of the aforesaid authorities. has power to direct an        individual  dealt  with under section 57 to  remove  himself        outside   the   area  within  the  local   limits   of   his        jurisdiction.  Hence none of those authorities has the power        to  direct that person to remove himself outside the  entire        State  of Bombay.  The situation envisaged by  the  argument        that  a person may be called upon to remove himself  out  of        the  limits  of  the  entire  State  of  Bombay  would   not        ordinarily arise because the idea underlving the  provisions        of sections 55 to 57 is the "dispersal of gangs and  removal        of  persons convicted of certain offences" as  would  appear        from  the  sub-heading  II in chapter  V,  which  is  headed        "special measures for maintenance of public order and safety        of  State".   A  gang of criminals  or  potential  criminals        operates  or  may  intend to operate  within  certain  local        limits  and the idea behind the provisions of section 57  is        to see to it that a person with previous conviction who  may        have  banded  together  with other such  persons  should  be        disbanded  and  hounded out of the limits  of  his  ordinary        activities,  his associates also are to be  similarly  dealt        with,  so  that  the gang is broken  up  and  the  different

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      persons constituting it may be removed to different parts of        the  State so as to reduce their criminal activities to  the        minimum.   Unless a person makes himself so obnoxious as  to        render  his  presence in every part of the  Bombay  State  a        menace to public interest including public peace and safety,        every Commissioner of Police or’ district Magistrate or Sub-        Divisional.   Magistrate  would not think of acting  in  the        same  way  in  respect of the same person.   Hence,  in  our        opinion, there is no substance in this argument.  It may  be        mentioned in this connection that previous to the  enactment        of the impugned Act there was the Bombay District Police Act        IV  of 1890 which applied to the whole Presidency of  Bombay        except the Greater Bombay (omitting all references to  Sind)        and the City        520        of  Bombay  Police Act, IV of 1902, applied to the  City  of        Bombay  except certain specified sections which  applied  to        the whole of the Presidency of Bombay; so that the two  Acts        aforesaid covered the whole of the State of Bombay as it was        constituted after Independence.  The two Acts aforesaid were        repealed by the impugned Act which consolidated the law  for        the regulation of the Police Force in , the State of  Bombay        which appears from the following preamble of the Act-.-        "Whereas  it  is expedient to amalgamate  the  District  and        Greater Bombay Police Forces in the State of Bombay into one        common  Police  Force  and  to  introduce  uniform   methods        regarding  the  working  and  control  of  the  said   Force        throughout the State".        Broadly speaking, section 46 of Act IV of 1890 and.  section        27  of  Act  IV  of 1902 correspond  to  the  provisions  of        sections 56 and 57 of the Act.        It was next contended that unlike Preventive Detention  laws        there  was no provision in the impugned law for an  Advisory        Board  which  could  scrutinise the material  on  which  the        officers or authorities contemplated by section 57 had taken        action  against  a person.  It cannot be, and has  not  been        laid  down,  as  a universal rule that  unless  there  is  a        provision  for  such an Advisory Board  such  a  legislation        would  necessarily  be condemned as  unconstitutional.   The        very  fact that the Constitution in article 22(4)  has  made        specific  provision  for  an Advisory  Board  consisting  of        persons  of stated qualifications with reference to the  law        for  Preventive  Detention, but has made  no  such  specific        provision  in article 19 Would answer this  contention.   In        this  connection reference may also be made to the  decision        of  this  Court  in the case of N. B. Khare,  v.  State,  of        Delhi(1) which dealt with the constitutionality of the  East        Punjab  Public  Safety  Act of 1949 with  reference  to  the        provisions  of  article  19 of the  Constitution.   In  that        legislation  there  was a provision for  an  Advisory  Board        whose  opinion, however, had no binding force.  The Act  was        not  struck down by this Court.  On the other hand,  in  the        case        (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 519.        521        of State of Madras v. V. G. Row(1), section 15(2)(b) of  the        Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1908, as amended by the        Indian  Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, was  held        to  be unconstitutional as the restrictions imposed  on  the        fundamental  right to form associations were not held to  be        reasonable  in spite of the fact that there was a  provision        for  an  Advisory  Board whose opinion was  binding  on  the        Government.   Hence it cannot be said that the existence  of        an Advisory Board is a sine qua non of the constitutionality        of a legislation such as the one before us.

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      It was next’ contended that the proceedings are initiated by        the  police and it is the police which is the judge  in  the        case  and that therefore the provisions of the Act  militate        against  one of the accepted principles of  natural  justice        that the prosecutor should not also be the judge.  In  order        to  appreciate this argument reference --has to be  made  to        the  provisions of section 59 of the Act; It  provides  that        before  action is taken under sections 55, 56 or 57  of  the        Act, the authority entrusted with the duty of passing orders        under  any  one of those sections or any officer  above  the        rank of an Inspector authorised by that officer or authority        shall inform the person proceeded against in writing "of the        general  nature of the material allegations against him"  in        order  to give him a reasonable opportunity’  of  explaining        his   conduct.   If  that  person  wishes  to  examine   any        witnesses,  be  has to be given an opportunity  of  adducing        evidence.   That  person  has the right to  file  a  written        statement and to appear in the proceeding by an advocate  or        attorney  for the purpose of tendering his  explanation  and        adducing  evidence.   If the person fails to  appear  or  to        adduce  evidence, the authority or officer has the right  to        proceed  with  the  enquiry and to pass such  order  as  may        appear fit and proper.  It is thus clear that the  criticism        against  the  procedure  laid  down in  section  59  is  not        entirely correct.  The evidence or material on ’the basis of        which a person may be proceeded against under any one of the        sections 55,        (1)  (1952] S.C.R. 597.        522        56  or 57 may have been collected by police officers of  the        rank  of  an  Inspector of Police or  of  lower  rank.   The        proceedings., may be initiated by a police officer above the        rank  of  Inspector who has to inform the  person  proceeded        against  of the general nature of the  material  allegations        against him.  But the order of externment can be passed only        by  a Commissioner of Police or a District Magistrate  or  a        Sub-Divisional  Magistrate specially empowered by the  State        Government  in that behalf.  Hence the satisfaction  is  not        that  of the person prosecuting, if that word can at all  be        used in the context of those sections.  The person proceeded        against is not prosecuted but is put out of the harm’s  way.        The   legislature  has  advisedly  entrusted   officers   of        comparatively higher rank in the police or in the magistracy        with  the responsible duty of examining the material and  of        being satisfied that such person is likely -again to  engage        himself in the commission of an offence similar to that  for        which  he  had previously been convicted.   The  proceedings        contemplated by the impugned section 57 or for the matter of        that., the other two sections 55 or 56 are not  prosecutions        for offences or judicial proceedings, though the officer  or        authority charged with the duty aforesaid has to examine the        information laid before him by the police.  The police force        is  charged with the duty not only of detection of  offences        and of bringing offenders to justice, but also of preventing        the commission of offences by persons with previous  records        of conviction or with criminal propensities.  As observed by        Patanjali Sastri, C. J. in the case of State of Madras V. V.        G.  Row(1),  "externment  of  individuals,  like  preventive        detention, is largely precautionary and based on suspicion".        To  these observations may be added the following  words  in        the  judgment  of  Patanjali Sastri,  C.  J.,  (supra)  with        reference  to  the  observations  of  Lord  Finlay  in   Rex        v.   Halliday(2):-        "The court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate        into  circumstances of suspicion on which such  anticipatory

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      action must be largely based".        (1) (1952] S. C.R, 597, 609.        (2) [1917] A.G. 260, 269.        523        It  is  thus clear that in order to take  preventive  action        under  section 57 of the Act the legislature  has  entrusted        police  officers  or  magistrates of  the  higher  ranks  to        examine  the  facts and circumstances of each  case  brought        before  them by the Criminal Investigation Department.   But        the  legislature  has provided  certain  safeguards  against        tyrannical  or wholly unfounded orders being passed  by  the        higher ranks of the police or the magistracy.        It  was  next  contended  that  the-provisions  relating  to        hearing any evidence that may be adduced by the police or by        the  person  proceeded against and right of  appeal  to  the        State  Government  conferred by section 60 of  the  Act  are        illusory..  We cannot agree that the right of appeal to  the        State Government granted to the person proceeded against  by        an order under section 57 is illusory because it is expected        that  the State Government which has been charged  with  the        duty  of  examining  the  material  with  a  view  to  being        satisfied that circumstances existed justifying a preventive        order of that nature, will discharge its functions with  due        care  and  caution.   Section  61  has  provided  a  further        safeguard  to  a  person  dealt with  under  section  57  by        providing  that  though an order passed  under  section  55,        section  56 or section 57, or by the State Government  under        section 60 on appeal shall not be called in question in  any        court,  he  may challenge such an order in a  court  on  the        ground  (1)  that  the authority making  the  order  or  any        officer authorised by it had not followed the procedure laid        down in section 57, or (2) that there was no material before        the  authority concerned upon which it could have based  its        order,  or  (3) that the said authority was hot  of  opinion        that  witnesses  were  unwilling to  come  forward  to  give        evidence in public against the person proceeded against.  In        this  connection it was argued on behalf of  the  petitioner        that  section  59 only required the general  nature  of  the        material  allegations  against  the person  externed  to  be        disclosed  and  that,  as it did  not  further  provide  for        particulars  to  be supplied to such a person, it  would  be        very  difficult  for  him to avail of at  least  the  second        ground         68        524        on which section 61 permits him to get the matter judicially        examined.   But  in the very nature of things it  could  not        have  been otherwise.  The grounds available to an  externee        had necessarily to be very limited in their scope because if        evidence  were available which could be adduced  in  public,        such  a  person  could be dealt with  under  the  preventive        sections  of  the Code of Criminal Procedure,  for  example,        under   section  107  or  section  110.   But  the   special        provisions  now under examination-proceed on the basis  that        the person dealt with under any of the sections 55, 56 or 57        is of such a character as not to permit the ordinary laws of        the land being put in motion in the ordinary way, namely, of        examining  witnesses  in  open court who  should  be  cross-        examined by the party against whom they were deposing.   The        provisions  we are now examining are plainly intended to  be        used  in special-, cases requiring special  treatment,  that        is,  cases which cannot be dealt with under  the  preventive        sections  of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   Reliance  was        placed  on a number of decisions of this Court  referred  to        above on behalf of the petitioner to show that the terms  of

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      section  57 impugned in this case could not come within  the        permissible  limits laid down by the Constitution in  clause        (5)  of  article  19.   But  arguments  by  analogy  may  be        misleading.  It has been repeatedly said by this Court  that        it  is  not safe to pronounce on the provisions of  one  Act        with  reference to decisions dealing with other  Acts  which        may not be in pari materia.  The case nearest to the present        one  is  the decision of this Court in  Gurbachan  Singh  v.        State  of  Bombay(1),  where section 27(1) of  the  City  of        Bombay  Police Act was under challenge and the Court  upheld        the constitutionality of that section.  If anything, section        57  impugned  in  this  case provides  a  surer  ground  for        proceeding  against  a potential criminal in so  far  as  it        insists  upon a previous conviction at least.  At  least  in        clauses  (b) and (c) it insists upon more than one  previous        order  of conviction against the person  proceeded  against,        thus showing that the authority dealing with such a        (1)  (1952] S.C.R. 737.        525        person  had  some solid ground for suspecting  that  he  may        repeat  his criminal activities.  It has not been  contended        before us that the decision of this Court referred to  above        does  not  lay down the correct law or that it was  open  to        challenge  in  any  way.   We  do  not  think  it  necessary        therefore to consider in detail the other cases relied  upon        on behalf of the petitioner.        It now remains to consider the legality of the order itself.        The bona fides of the order have not been questioned.   What        has been urged against the legality of the order impugned is        that  it  is  based  on  previous  orders  of  discharge  or        acquittal.  It is said that those orders were passed because        there  Was not sufficient evidence to bring the charge  home        to  the accused.  The insufficiency of the  evidence  itself        may have been due to witnesses not being available to depose        in  open  court  or they may have been  overawed  and  their        testimony tampered with.  These are all matters which cannot        be  examined  by this Court in an objective  way,  when  the        legislature has provided for the subjective satisfaction  of        the authorities or officers who have been entrusted with the        duty  of enforcing those special provisions of the Act.   It        cannot  be laid down as a general proposition of law that  a        previous  order  of discharge or acquittal cannot  be  taken        into account by those authorities when dealing with  persons        under  any one of the provisions we have been  examining  in        this case. it is not for us to examine afresh the  materials        and to be satisfied that the order impugned is correct.  But        the  materials  placed  on the record of this  case  in  the        affidavit sworn to by the officer who was responsible for  -        the order impugned show at least one thing, namely, that the        petitioner has not been a victim of an arbitrary order.        For  the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, no grounds  have        been  made  out  for issuing any writ or  direction  to  the        authorities  concerned or for quashing the orders  impugned.        The application is therefore dismissed.        526        JAGANNADHADAS J.-I regret ’I am unable to persuade myself to        agree  with  the  view, which has commended  itself  to  the        majority of the Court, as to the constitutional validity  of        section  57(a)  of the Bombay Police Act, 1951  (Bombay  Act        XXII of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).  This is        a  provision  which prima facie  infringes  the  fundamental        right  of  a citizen under article 19(1)(d) and (e)  of  the        Constitution.  It can be supported only if, having regard to        all  the  circumstances, it is possible to  reach  a  satis-        factory  conclusion that the imposition of the  restrictions

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      as  provided thereunder is in the interests of  the  general        public and reasonable.  The fact that our Constitution which        declares fundamental rights also permits a law of preventive        detention  under very limited safeguards and that such  laws        have  taken  the  pattern of the exercise of  power  by  the        Government or by its officers for specified purposes on  the        basis  of their subjective satisfaction, has made -us  prone        to  reconcile ourselves to other kinds of  restrictive  laws        affecting  personal liberty though based on  the  subjective        satisfaction of executive officers, if only they provide for        certain minimum safeguards such as supply of grounds,  right        of  representation, and the scope for review by  a  superior        authority  or by an advisory body.  If one is to adopt  this        standard as furnishing the sine qua non of what is a reason-        able  law of preventive restriction of personal liberty,  it        may  be  possible to say that the provision  under  question        satisfies  the  test.  But the law of  preventive  detention        stands  on  a very exceptional footing in  our  Constitution        inasmuch   as  it  is  specifically  provided  for  in   the        Constitution.  The same Constitution has left the imposition        of  other restrictions on personal liberty to be  judged  by        the   courts   with   reference   to   the   standards    of        reasonableness,  in  the  interests of  the  public.   While        undoubtedly  the above three safeguards may be taken as  the        minimum required to satisfy the standard of  reasonableness,        I  am not prepared to assume that they are  sufficient.   It        appears  to me that the constitutional validity of  laws  of        preventive restriction, as opposed to the laws of        527        preventive  detention, have to be judged with  reference  to        standards which this Court has generally accepted as regards        the validity of restrictions on the other fundamental rights        under article 19(1) of the Constitution.  As repeatedly held        by  this Court, a proper balance must be struck between  the        fundamental  right of the citizen and the social control  by        the State in order to evolve the permissible restriction  of        the fundamental right under the Constitution.        Now  there can be no doubt that the ordinary  provisions  in        the  Criminal Procedure Code enabling the executive to  take        preventive  measures  are  often  enough  felt   inadequate,        particularly  in  large cities and towns wherein  there  are        -loose  congregations  of  population.   In  a  general  way        therefore it may be said that to arm the executive  officers        with  powers  for preventive action  against  commission  of        offences  is not in itself unreasonable.  Section 57 of  the        Act appears in Chapter V of the Act beaded "Special measures        for maintenance of public order and safety of State" and  is        under  the  sub-head II "Dispersal of gangs and  removal  of        persons  convicted  of certain offences".   The  substantive        provisions  under  head  II  are sections  55,  56  and  57.        Section  55  relates  to control  and  dispersal  of  gangs.        Section  56  relates to removal of persons about  to  commit        offences  and  section  57 relates  to  removal  of  persons        previously  convicted of certain offences.  Sections 56  and        57 of the Act run as follows:         "56.  Whenever it shall appear in Greater Bombay and  other        areas  for  which a Commissioner has  been  appointed  under        section 7 to the Commissioner and in other area or areas  to        which  the  State  Government may, by  notification  in  the        Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this section,  to        the  District Magistrate, or the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate        specially  empowered by the State Government in that  behalf        (a) that the movements of acts of any person are causing  or        calculated  to  cause  alarm, danger or harm  to  person  or        property,  or  (b)  that there are  reasonable  grounds  for

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      believing  that  such person is engaged or is  about  to  be        engaged in the commission of an offence involv-        528        ing force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter        XII,  XVI  or  XVII  of the Indian Penal  Code,  or  in  the        abetment  of  any such offence, and when in the  opinion  of        such  officer witnesses are not willing to come  forward  to        give  evidence in public against such person by  reason  of,        apprehension  on their part as regards the safety  of  their        person  or  property, or (c) that an  outbreak  of  epidemic        disease is likely to result from the continued residence  of        an  immigrant, the said officer may, by an order in  writing        duly  served  on him or by beat of drum or otherwise  as  he        thinks  fit, direct such person or immigrant so  to  conduct        himself as shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence        and  alarm or the outbreak or spread of such disease  or  to        remove  himself outside the area within the local limits  of        his  jurisdiction by such route and within such time as  the        said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the        said area from which he was directed to remove himself.        57.  If a person has been convicted-        (a)  of  an  offence under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII  of  the        Indian Penal Code, or        (b)  twice  of  an  offence under section 9  of  the  Bombay        Beggars  Act,  1945,  or  under  the  Bombay  Prevention  of        Prostitution Act, 1923, or        (c)  thrice  of  an offence within a period of  three  years        under section 4 or 12-4 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling        Act, 1887, or under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949,                the  Commissioner,  the District Magistrate  or  the        Sub-Divisional  Magistrate specially empowered by the  State        Government in this behalf, if -be has reason to believe that        such  person  is  likely  again to  engage  himself  in  the        commission  of an offence similar to that for which  he  was        convicted, may direct such person to remove himself  outside        the  area  within the local limits of his  jurisdiction,  by        such  route  and within such time as the  said  officer  may        prescribe and not to enter or return to the area from  which        he was directed to remove himself.        Explanation:-For the purpose of this section "an        529        offence  similar to that for which a person  was  convicted"        shall mean-        (i)in the case of a person convicted of an offence mentioned        in clause (a), an offence falling under any of the  Chapters        of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in that clause, and         (ii)     in  the case of a person convicted of  an  offence        mentioned  in clauses (b) and (c), an offence falling  under        the  provisions  of the Acts mentioned respectively  in  the        said clauses".        Section  58 of the Act provides that a direction made  under        sections  56 and 57 not to enter a particular area shall  be        for such period as may be specified thereunder and shall  in        no case exceed a period of two years from the date on  which        it is made.  This Court has, in Gurbachan Singh v. The State        of  Bombay(1) pronounced on the constitutional  validity  of        section  27(1)  of  the City of Bombay Police  Act  of  1902        (Bombay Act IV of 1902) which, word for word, is almost  the        same  section  56  of  the Act  above  quoted  omitting  (c)        thereof.   As  I understand that judgment, the view  of  the        Court as to the reasonableness of that provision is based on        the fact that under the said section it is essential for the        exercise  of the power, that in the opinion of  the  officer        concerned, witnesses are not willing to come forward to give        evidence in public against the person concerned by reason of

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      apprehension  on their part as regards the safety  of  their        own  person or property.  This is clear from  the  following        passage at page 743 of the report:        "The law is certainly an extraordinary one and has been made        only to meet those, exceptional cases where no witnesses for        fear of violence to their person or property are willing  to        depose   publicly  against  certain  bad  characters   whose        presence in certain areas constitutes a menace to the safety        of the public residing therein".        The  provisions of section 57 of the Act are  totally  diff-        erent.  This section can be invoked without the  requirement        of  non-availability of witnesses or of any opinion in  that        behalf being arrived at by the officer concerned.        (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 737.        530        All  that is sufficient for the use of this section is  that        the  person concerned should have been previously  convicted        of certain specified offences and that the officer concerned        has  reason to believe that such person is likely  again  to        engage himself in the commission of a similar offence.   The        powers  under  this section can, therefore,  be  invoked  in        every  case  where  there is  likelihood  of  repetition  of        offence  by a person who has been previously convicted of  a        similar   offence  if  the  offence  is  of  the   specified        categories,  even  though witnesses may be willing  to  come        forward.  I am not prepared to accept the idea that in  such        a  situation  it  would be right  or  reasonable  to  clothe        executive officers with the power to take preventive  action        restraining the liberty of the citizen instead of taking the        chance  of  the  offence being  committed  and  leaving  the        deprivation  of  his  liberty to the  ordinary  channels  of        criminal  prosecution  and punishment.  It is true  that  in        some matters anticipatory prevention is better than ex  post        facto punishment.  But in a State where personal liberty  is        a guaranteed fundamental right, the range of such preventive        action  must  be limited to a narrow compass.  What  may  be        called the police power of the State in this behalf must  be        limited  by the consideration that the offence likely to  be        committed is of a serious nature, that the likelihood of its        commission  is very probable, if not imminent, and that  the        perpetrator  of  the crime, if left to commit,  it,  may  go        unpunished   under  the  normal  machinery  on  account   of        witnesses not being willing to come forward.  Section 151 of        the  Criminal Procedure Code authorises a police officer  to        arrest any person when he knows of his design to commit  any        cognizable offence and to send him to the nearest Magistrate        for such action which he considers fit or as may be feasible        under  sections 107 to 110 of the Criminal  Procedure  Code.        Section 57 of the Act constitutes a very wide departure from        such  a provision and there must be clear justification  for        so  serious  an  encroachment  on  personal  liberty  as  is        contemplated  therein.   A provision of the kind  might  not        only  be  justified but may be called for,  if  confined  to        serious offences-        531        serious either because of their -nature or of the  attendant        circumstances-and if witnesses are likely to be  terrorised.        I  am  unable to see why a person who  may  have  previously        committed  any offence of a minor character and in  ordinary        circumstances, under Chapters XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian        Penal  Code,  should  not  be left  alone  to  the  ordinary        channels  of prosecution.  It appears to me that the  proper        balance between the fundamental right and social control  is        not  achieved by vesting the power in executive officers  in        such  wide  terms  as  in section 57 of  the  Act.   Such  a

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      provision would lead to serious encroachment on the personal        liberty  of a citizen.  While, of course, abuse of power  is        not  to be assumed to test its reasonableness, neither is  a        power  given in wide terms and prima facie unreasonable,  to        be considered reasonable on an assumption of its proper use.        I am also unable to see that the fact of previous commission        of any such offence without any limitation as to the  period        of  time  that way have elapsed, or the  circumstances  with        reference   to  -which  such  an  ,offence  may  have   been        committed,   is  any  relevant  consideration   to   justify        restriction on personal liberty by way of preventive action.        I  am  not  aware  that, there is  any  accepted  theory  of        criminology  which justifies the view that a person who  has        committed  an offence has any inherent tendency to repeat  a        similar  offence-apart  from environment,  heredity  or  the        like.   In  a trial for the commission of an  offence  prior        conviction  is ruled out as inadmissible.  On an  evaluation        of the tendency to repeat a crime, I. do’ not see how it  is        permissible material except in cases where repeated previous        commission of offences indicates a habit.  It has been  said        that the power under section 57 of the Act will be exercised        only  when the officer concerned has before him  not  merely        the  fact’ of previous conviction but other material on  the        basis of which he has reason to believe that the person con-        cerned is likely to engage himself in the commission of  the        offence.   But this ultimately is a question  of  subjective        satisfaction.  It is not open to review by a Court It  would        be difficult to postulate how far        69        532        such a factor, as previous conviction, might have prejudiced        a  fair  consideration  of the  other  material  before  the        officer.   To  my  mind the law  -which  permits  subjective        satisfaction to prevail on such material must be  considered        unreasonable.  In my view, therefore., though the procedural        portion of the law as provided in sections 59 and 61 of  the        Act  may not be open to serious criticism,  the  substantive        portion  of  the  law relating to content of  the  power  as        provided under section 57 of the Act cannot be held to be in        the  nature  of reasonable restriction  of  the  fundamental        right, for three reasons.        1.   Clause (a) of section 57 of the Act not being  confined        to offences serious in their nature or with reference to the        attendant   circumstances  within  the  Chapters   specified        therein,  prevention  of the repetition  thereof  cannot  be        considered  a  reasonable restriction.  It is in  excess  of        what may be considered justifiable.        2.   The previous commission of an offence ,of the  category        specified,  without any reference to the  time,  environment        and other factors has no rational relation to the  criterion        of "reasonableness in the interest of public".        3.   The  exercise  of the power not being  limited  by  the        consideration  of non-availability of witnesses is also  not        rationally  related to the criterion of  "reasonableness  in        the interest of the public".        For all the above reasons I consider that section 57 of  the        Act is constitutionally invalid.                                   ORDER.        BY THE COURT-In accordance with the Judgment of the majority        this Petition is dismissed.        Petition dismissed.        533