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PETITIONER: HARGOVlND PANT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR. RAGHUKUL TILAK & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1979

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) UNTWALIA, N.L. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1109            1979 SCR  (3) 972  1979 SCC  (3) 458  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC 399  (12)  RF         1987 SC1953  (6)

ACT:      Constitution  of   India,  1950-Art.  319(d)-Scope  of- Governor-If an  "employee" of  the  Government  of  India-If could be  regarded as  "employed  under  the  Government  of India"-Employed-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      Article 319(d)  of the  Constitution provides  that  on ceasing to  hold office a member, other than the Chairman of a State  Public Service  Commission, shall  be eligible  for appointment as the Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Service  Commission or as the Chairman of that or any other State  Public Service Commission but not for any other employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State.      The first respondent, who was a member of the Rajasthan State Public  Service Commission  during the  years 1958-59, was later  appointed as  Governor of the State of Rajasthan. The petitioner  contended that  by virtue  of Art. 319(d) of the  Constitution   the  respondent  was  ineligible  to  be appointed as  Governor of a State because he was a member of the State Public Service Commission earlier.      On the  question whether, by reason of Art. 319 (d) the respondent was  ineligible for  employment either  under the Government of  India or  under the Government of a State and whether the  office of  Governor was an employment under the Government of India. ^      HELD: 1.  The office  of Governor  of a State is not an employment under  the Government  of India  and it  does not therefore come within the prohibition of cl.(d) of Art. 319. The appointment  of the  first  respondent  as  Governor  of Rajasthan could not be held to be invalid. [982 F].      2. Howsoever  wide and expansive a meaning one may give to the  words "employment under the Government of India" the office of Governor cannot come within that term. [978 F].

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    3. The  word "employment"  is not  a word with a single fixed  meaning  but  has  many  connotations.  If  the  term "employment" is  construed in  the narrow  sense of employer employee relationship the office of Governor would not be an employment within  the meaning  of Art.  319(d) because  the Governor of a State is not an employee or servant of anyone. He occupies  a high  constitutional  office  with  important constitutional functions  and duties. The executive power of the State is vested in him and every executive action of the Government is  required to  be expressed  to be taken in his name. He  constitutes an integral part of the legislature of the State though not in the fullest sense and is also vested with the  legislative power  to promulgate  ordinances while the Houses  of the  Legislature are  not in session. He also exercises the  sovereign power  to grant pardons, reprieves, respite etc. He is vested with the power to summon 973 each House  of the  Legislature, or to prorogue either House or to  dissolve the  legislative assembly and this power may be exercised by him from time to time. No bill passed by the Houses of  the Legislature  can  become  law  unless  it  is assented to  by him  and before assenting to the bill he may return the  bill, (provided  it is  not a money bill) to the Houses of  Legislature for reconsideration. He has the power to reserve for consideration of the President any bill which in his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the power of  the High  Court as  to endanger the position which that Court  is by the Constitution designed to fill. Another important function  of his  is  to  make  a  report  to  the President where  he finds  that a  situation has  arisen  in which the  Government of  State  cannot  be  carried  on  in accordance with  the provisions  of the  Constitution. It is the Governor’s  report which  generally forms  the basis for the  President   taking  action   under  Art.  356,  of  the Constitution. These  powers and  functions of  the  Governor make it  clear that  he is not an employee or servant in any sense of the term. [978 H; 979 A-B].      4. Though  the Governor  is appointed by the President, which means in effect and substance the Government of India, it  does  not  make  him  an  employee  or  servant  of  the Government of India. Every person appointed by the President is not  necessarily an  employee of the Government of India. [979 G].      5. The  fact that  the Governor holds office during the pleasure of  the President  does not  make the Government of India  an   employer  of   the  Governor.   It  is   only  a constitutional provision  for determination  of the  term of office of  the Governor.  The Governor  is the  head of  the State and  holds a  high constitutional office which carries with it important constitutional functions and duties and he cannot  be  regarded  as  an  employee  or  servant  of  the Government of India. If the word "employment" were construed to mean relationship of employer and employee, the office of Governor would  not been  "employment" within the meaning of cl.(d) of Art. 319. [979 H].      6. An employment can be said to be under the Government of India  if the  holder or  incumbent of  the employment is under the  control of the Government of India vis-a-vis such employment. If  this  test  is  applied  to  the  office  of Governor, it  is impossible  to hold  that the  Governor  is under the  control of the Government of India. His office is not subordinate  or subservient  to the government of India. He is  not amenable  to the  directions of the Government of India, nor is he accountable to them for the manner in which he  carried   out  his  functions  and  duties.  His  is  an

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independent constitutional  office which  is not  subject to the  control   of   the   Government   of   India.   He   is constitutionally the head of the State in whom is vested the executive power  of the State and without whose assent there can be  no legislation  in exercise of the legislative power of the  State. There  can be  no doubt  that the  office  of Governor is  not an employment under the Government of India and it  does not come within the prohibition of Art. 319(d). [981 A-B].      Pradyat Kumar  Bose v. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, [1955] 2 SCR 1331; Baldev Raj Guliani & Ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana High Court & ors., [1977] 1 SCR 425; Union  of India  v. S.H.  Sheth & Anr [1978] 1 SCR 423; referred to. 974

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1596 of 1978.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  8-11-1977  of  the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 311/77.      Somnath Chatterjee,  Dilip Sinha  and K.R.  Nambiar for the Petitioner.      F.S. Nariman,  (for R. 1), Soli J. Sorabjee, Addl. Sol. Genl. (for  RR 5  and 6) Dr. S.K. Tewari, S.M. Jain and S.K. Jain for Respondent 1, 5 and 6.      V.M. Tarkunde,  C.M.  Mathur,  Manoj  Swarup  and  Miss Lalita Kohli for Respondents 3 and 4.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BHAGWATI, J., This petition for special leave to appeal is directed  against an  order made  by a  Full Bench of the Rajasthan High  Court dismissing  the writ petition filed by the petitioner  for quashing  and setting  aside an order of reversion passed  against him  by the  4th respondent in his capacity as  the Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University of Rajasthan. The  order of reversion was challenged on several grounds, but  they were  all negatived by the Full Bench and the writ  petition was  dismissed on  a preliminary hearing. The petitioner  has raised  the same grounds of challenge in this special  leave petition,  but barring one ground, which calls for a reasoned judgment, we do not think there are any other grounds  which require  detailed consideration  and we reject them  in limine.  The only  ground which  needs to be considered and  which we  propose  to  dispose  of  by  this judgment  is  a  constitutional  one,  namely,  whether  the appointment of  the 1st  respondent as Governor of Rajasthan is valid.  This question  becomes material  because if it is found that the 1st respondent could not be validly appointed as Governor  of Rajasthan and his appointment as Governor is invalid, he  would not  be the  Chancellor of  the Rajasthan University and he would have no authority to appoint the 4th respondent as  Acting Vice-Chancellor under section 12, sub- section (7)  of the  University of  Rajasthan Act and if the appointment of  the 4th respondent as Acting Vice Chancellor is invalid,  the impugned  order of  reversion made  by  him would fall.  We are,  therefore, called  upon to consider in this special  leave petition  whether the appointment of the 1st respondent  as Governor  of Rajasthan is valid. The only ground on  which the  validity of  the appointment  has been assailed is  that the  1st respondent  was a  member of  the Rajasthan Public Service 975 Commission during  1958-59 and  he was, therefore, by reason

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of Article  319, clause  (d) of the Constitution, ineligible for any  employment either  under the Government of India or under the  Government of  a State  and since  the office  of Governor is an employment under the Government of India, the 1st respondent  could  not  validly  be  appointed  to  that office.  This  ground  raises  a  question  of  considerable importance relating  to the  applicability of  Article  319, clause (d) to the office of Governor.      We shall have to consider the true nature of the office of  Governor   in  order  to  determine  whether  it  is  an employment under  the Government  of India, but before we do so, we  may first  have a  look at Article 319. This Article consists of  clauses (a)  to (d)  and these  clauses,  on  a combined reading,  impose  prohibition  on  holding  of  any employment under  the Government  of India or the Government of a  State by  the Chairman  or member  of the Union Public Service Commission  or a  State Public Service Commission on his ceasing  to be such Chairman or member. This prohibition has been  enacted in public interest with a view to ensuring that no allurement is held out to the Chairman or members of the Union  Public  Service  Commission  or  a  State  Public Service Commission which would deflect them from the path of rectitude and  duty. The  Union  and  State  Public  Service Commissions are charged inter alia with the duty of advising the Government on various matters relating to civil services and  civil   posts   such   as   methods   of   recruitment, appointments,  promotions  and  transfers  and  disciplinary matters and  it is  of utmost  importance for the efficiency and integrity of the civil services that this duty should be performed by  the Union and State Public Service Commissions objectively, impartially and without being influenced by any extraneous  considerations.   The  Union  and  State  Public Service Commission  have vast  powers of  recruitment to  an immense and  increasing host  of Government  posts and  in a country with  considerable unemployment, these powers may be prone to  be abused  if the office of Chairman and member of the Union and State Public Service Commissions is exposed to executive or  political pressures. The prospect and peril of the executive  or the politician trying to influence overtly or covertly  the Chairman and members of the Union and State Public Service Commissions by dangling the carrot or holding out the possibility of employment under the Government after the expiry of their term of office may corrupt the integrity of the  institution of  the Union  and State  Public Service Commissions. It  is true  that by and large the Chairman and members of  the Union  and State  Public Service Commissions would  be   men  of   proven  merit  and  integrity  and  no allurement, howsoever  attractive, would  deflect them  from doing their duty without fear 976 or  favour,  but  even  so,  the  possibility  of  obtaining employment under the Government in future may consciously or unconsciously induce them to fall in line with the wishes of the executive  or the politician. The office of the Chairman and member  of  the  Union  and  the  State  Public  Service Commissions  must,   therefore,  be  zealously  kept  beyond reproach and above suspicion. It was pointed out as far back as 1924  by the  Royal Commission  on Superior  Services  in India, popularly called the Lee Commission:           "Wherever    democratic     institutions    exist, experience has  shown that  to  secure  an  efficient  civil service it  is essential  to protect  it as  far as possible from political  or  personal  influence  and  give  it  that position of  stability and  security which  is vital  to its successful working as the impartial and efficient instrument

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by which  governments, of whatever political complexion, may give effect  to their  policies.  In  countries  where  this principle has  been neglected, and where the ’spoils system’ has taken  its place,  an inefficient and disorganised civil service has  been the  inevitable result  and corruption has been rampant."      It was  as a  result of this recommendation that Public Service Commissions  were set  up in  the country  with  the objective outlined  by  the  Lee  Commission.  When  Article 285(3) of the Draft Constitution providing for ineligibility of the  Chairman and  members of  the Union  and  the  State Public Service  Commissions for  future employment under the Government was  being debated  in the  Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar pointed out the raison d’etre of that provision in the following words:           "Now I come to the other important matter relating to the  employment or  eligibility  for  employment  of  the members of the Public Services Commission both the Union and State Public  Services Commissions.  Members will  see  that according to  Article 285, clause (3), we have made both the Chairman and  the Members  of the  Central  Public  Services Commission as  well as  the Chairman of the State Commission and the  members of  the State  Commission,  ineligible  for reappointment to the same posts: that is to say, once a term of office  of a Chairman and Member is over, whether he is a Chairman of  the Union Commission or the Chairman of a State Commission, we have said that he shall not be reappointed. I think that  is a  very salutary  provision, because any hope that might be held out for reappointment, or continuation in the same 977      appointment, may  act as a sort of temptation which may induce the Member not to act with the same impartiality that he is  expected to act in discharging his duties. Therefore, that is  a fundamental  bar which  has been  provided in the draft article."      Shri H.V.  Kamath also  spoke in  the same strain while adverting to this topic:           "It is  agreed on  all hands  that  the  permanent services play an important role in the administration of any country.  With   the  independence   of  our   country   the responsibilities of  the services  have become more onerous. They may  make of  mar the  efficiency of  the machinery  of administration call  it  steel  frame  or  what  you  will-a machinery which  is so  vital for  the peace and progress of the country."                x          x         x          x           "If a  Member of  the Public Service Commission is under the  impression that by serving and kowtowing to those in power  he  could  get  an  office  of  profit  under  the Government or  India or in the Government of a State, then I am sure  he would  not be  able to  discharge his  functions impartially or with integrity."                x           x         x          x           "The public  here have sometimes been made to feel that family  or group  interests have  been promoted  at the expense of  the  national;  and  to  protect  the  Ministers against such  a charge,  it is  necessary  that  the  Public Service Commissions  must be  kept completely independent of the executive.... "      It is,  therefore, clear  that the  Constitution makers were anxious  to insulate  the Chairman  and members  of the Union and State Public Service Commissions from executive or political pressures  or influences  and to place them beyond the reach  of any  allurement or  temptation which may cloud

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their judgment  and deflect  them from doing their duty. The Constitution makers  were keen  to ensure  that the Chairmen and  members   of  the   Union  and   State  Public  Service Commissions were  above reproach,  free  from  coercion  and political influence  and they  could, if necessary, stand up against the  executive and  defy any  political pressure. It was with  this end  in view  that  the  Constitution  makers enacted 978 clauses  (a)  to  (d)  of  Article  319  prohibiting  future employment under  the  Government  of  India  or  under  the Government of  a State  for the  Chairmen and members of the Union and State Public Service Commissions.      We are  concerned in  this special  leave petition only with clause  (d) of Article 319 since the 1st respondent was a member  of the  Rajasthan Public Service Commission and it is on  account of  that fact  that it is claimed that he was ineligible to be appointed Governor of Rajasthan. Clause (d) of Article 319 provides: "on ceasing to hold office-a member other than the Chairman of a State Public Service Commission shall be  eligible for  appointment as  the Chairman  or any other member  of the  Union Public  Service Commission or as the Chairman  of that  or any  other  State  Public  Service Commission, but  not for  any other  employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State". It is,  therefore, obvious  that the 1st respondent could be appointed Chairman  or any  other member of the Union Public Service Commission or Chairman of the Rajasthan or any other State Public  Service Commission,  but he was ineligible for any other employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State. Now, it was not the case of the petitioner that the office of Governor was an employment under the Government of a State and the only question which, therefore, requires  to be  considered is whether the office of Governor  can be  said to  be  an  employment  under  the Government of  India. If  it is,  then undoubtedly  the  1st respondent could  not be appointed Governor of Rajasthan and his appointment  would be  invalid. But  we are  of the view that howsoever  wide and  expansive a meaning we may give to the words  "employment .  . under  the Government of India", the office of Governor cannot come within      The first  question that arises on the applicability of the words  "employment...under the  Government of  India" is whether the office of Governor is an ’employment’ within the meaning of  that expression  in clause  (d) of  Article 319. What is  the sense  in which that word has been used in this Article? Semantically,  the word  ’employment’ is not a word with a single fixed meaning but it has many connotations. On the one  side it may bear the narrow meaning of relationship of employer  and employee  and on  the other, it may mean in its widest  connotation any  engagement or any work in which one is engaged. If the former be the sense in which the word ’employment’ is  used in  clause (d)  of  Article  319,  the office of  Governor would  certainly not  be an  employment, because the  Governor of  a State  is  not  an  employee  or servant of any 979 one. He occupies a high constitutional office with important constitutional functions  and duties. The executive power of the State is vested in him and every executive action of the Government is  required to  be expressed  to be taken in his name. He  constitutes an integral part of the legislature of the State  though not  in the  fullest sense,  and  is  also vested with  the legislative  power to promulgate ordinances while the  Houses of  the Legislature are not in session. He

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also  exercises   the  sovereign  power  to  grant  pardons, reprieves,  respites  or  remissions  of  punishment  or  to suspend,  remit  or  commute  the  sentence  of  any  person convicted of  any offence  against any  law  relating  to  a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. He is vested  with the  power  to  summon  each  House  of  the Legislature or  to prorogue  either House or to dissolve the legislative assembly  and this power may be exercised by him from time  to time.  He is  also entitled  to address either House of  the Legislature  or both Houses assembled together and he  may send  messages to  the House  or Houses  of  the Legislature with  respect to  a bill  then  pending  in  the legislature or  otherwise. No  bill passed  by the Houses of the Legislature  can become  law unless it is assented to by him and before assenting to the bill he may return the bill, provided it  is not  a money  bill  to  the  Houses  of  the Legislature for  reconsideration. He  has also  the power to reserve for consideration of the President any bill which in his opinion  would, if  it became  law, so derogate from the powers of  the High  Court as to endanger the position which that court is by the Constitution designed to fill. There is also one  highly significant role which he has to play under the Constitution  and that  is of  making a  report where he finds that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State  cannot be  carried  on  in  accordance  with  the provisions of  the Constitution. It is the Governor’s report which generally  forms the  basis for  the President  taking action under  Article 356  of the  Constitution. It  will be seen from  this enumeration of the constitutional powers and functions of  the Governor  that he  is not  an employee  or servant in  any sense  of the term. It is no doubt true that the Governor  is appointed  by the  President which means in effect and  substance the  Government of  India, but that is only a mode of appointment and it does not make the Governor an employee  or servant  of the  Government of  India. Every person appointed  by the  President is  not  necessarily  an employee of  the Government  of India.  So also  it  is  not material that  the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the  President: it  is  a  constitutional  provision  for determination of  the term  of office of the Governor and it does not  make the  Government of  India an  employer of the Governor. The  Governor is the head of the State and holds a high constitutional  office which  carries with it important constitutional  functions   and  duties   and   he   cannot, therefore, even by stretching the language 980 to a  breaking point,  be regarded as an employee or servant of  the   Government  of  India.  If,  therefore,  the  word ’employment’ were construed to mean relationship of employer and employee,  the office of Governor would certainly not be an ’employment’  within the meaning of clause (d) of Article 319.      But  if  we  accept  the  wider  meaning  of  the  word ’employment’ as  connoting any  engagement or  any  work  in which one  is engaged  as in the expression self-employment’ the office  of Governor  would clearly  be  an  ’employment’ within the meaning of clause (d) of Art. 319. That, however, would not  be enough  to attract  the applicability  of this provision. There is a further requirement which is necessary and that is that the employment must be under the Government of India. Now, what is the meaning of this expression "under the  Government   of  India"?  Fortunately,  there  are  two decisions of  this Court  which throw  some  light  on  this question. The first is the decision in Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon’ble  the Chief  Justice of Calcutta High Court where

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the question  was as  to whether the officers and members of the staff  of the  High Court  could be  said to  be persons "serving under  the Government of India or the Government of a State,  in a  civil capacity" so as to be within the scope of Article  320(3) (c)  which requires consultation with the appropriate  Public   Service  Commission   in  disciplinary matters. This  Court  speaking  through  Jagannadhadas,  J., pointed out:  "the  phrase  ’a  person’  serving  under  the Government of  India or the Government of ’a State’ it seems to have  reference to  such persons  in respect  of whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Governments functioning  in the  name of the President or of the Governor  or of  a Rajpramukh. The officers and staff of the High  Court cannot  be said  to fall within the scope of the  above   phrase  because   in  respect   of   them   the administrative  control  is  clearly  vested  in  the  Chief Justice-". The question which arose in the other decision in Baldev Raj Guliani & ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana High Court & ors. was a similar one and it related to the applicability of Article  320(3) (c)  to Judicial  officers in  the State. Here, in  this case  also the  Court took the same view and, after referring  to the  earlier decision  in Pradyat  Kumar Bose’s case with approval, held that "just as the High Court staff are not serving under the Government of the State, the Judicial officers  are also  not  serving  under  the  State Government",  because   they   are   "entirely   under   the jurisdiction of  the High  Court for  the purpose of control and discipline". It will, 981 therefore, be  seen that  the employment  can be  said to be under the  Government of India if the holder or incumbent of the employment  is under  the control  of the  Government of India vis-a-vis  such employment.  Now, if  one applies this test to  the office  of Governor,  it is  impossible to hold that the  Governor is under the control of the Government of India. His  office is  not subordinate or subservient to the Government of India. He is not amenable to the directions of the Government  of India,  nor is he accountable to them for the manner in which he carries out his functions and duties. His is  an independent  constitutional office  which is  not subject to  the control  of the  Government of  India. He is constitutionally the head of the State in whom is vested the executive power  of the State and without whose assent there can be  no legislation  in exercise of the legislative power of the  State. There  can, therefore,  be no  doubt that the office of Governor is not an employment under the Government of India  and it  does not  come within  the prohibition  of clause (d) of Article 319.      We may  point out  that the  Governor of a State is not the only  constitutional functionary whose employment is not under the  Government. There are under the Constitution many other high  functionaries, such  as Judges  of  the  Supreme Court and  the High  Courts, who  do not hold any employment under the  Government of India, although they exercise State power.  This   Court,  while  examining  the  constitutional position of  a High Court Judge, pointed out in the Union of India v.  S. H.  Sheth &  Anr.(1) that a High Court Judge is not a  Government  servant:  there  is  no  relationship  of employee  and   employer  subsisting  between  him  and  the Government. He  is a holder of a constitutional office which has important constitutional functions and duties. One of us (Bhagwati, J.)  pointed out  in that case at page 463 of the Report that a High Court Judge:           "..... is  as  much  part  of  the  State  as  the executive Government.  The State  has in  fact three organs,

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one   exercising   executive   power,   another   exercising legislative power  and the  third exercising judicial power. Each is  independent and  supreme within its allotted sphere and it  is not  possible to  say that one is superior to the other. The  High Court, constituted of the Chief Justice and other Judges, exercising the judicial power of the State and is coordinate in position and status with the Governor aided and advised by the council of Ministers, 982      who exercises  the executive  power and  the Lgislative Assembly together  with the  Legislative  Council,  if  any, which exercises  the legislative power of the State. Plainly and unquestionably,  therefore, a  High Court  Judge is  not subordinate either  to the  executive or to the legislature. It would,  indeed, be  a constitutional  heresy to so regard him. He  has a  constitutional function  to discharge, which includes adjudication  of the question whether the executive or the  legislature has over-stepped the limits of its power under the  Constitution.  No  doubt  Article  217,  cl.  (1) provides for appointment of a person to the office of a High Court Judge  by the  President, which  means in  effect  and substance the  Central Government,  but that  is only laying down a mode, of appointment and it does not make the Central Government an employer of a High Court Judge. In fact a High Court  Judge   has  no   employer:  he   occupies   a   high constitutional office which is coordinate with the executive and the legislative."      These observations  apply equally  to the  office of  a Judge of the Supreme Court. We are mentioning this merely to bring home, through comparable constitutional functionaries, the  validity  of  the  proposition  that  holders  of  high constitutional offices  exercising State  power and  drawing salaries  from   State  coffers   may  nevertheless  be  not employees or  servants or  holders of  employment under  the Government.      We are,  therefore, of  the view  that  the  office  of Governor  of   a  State  is  not  an  employment  under  the Government of  India and it does not, therefore, come within the prohibition  of clause  (d) of  Article 319  and on this view, the  appointment of the 1st respondent as the Governor of Rajasthan cannot be held to be invalid.      We may  point out  that in  the course  of the argument there was  much discussion about the paramount public policy underlying the  need to ban appointment of holders of public offices after  retirement to  higher offices and posts under the Government.  We do  not wish to expand on this policy or to say  more on  the merits of this contention, but we think it would  be appropriate  to sound  a note  of caution  that Ceaser’s wife must be above suspicion, that purity of public offices of  high status is a constitutional value in itself, that nothing  should be  done which may create an impression that a  holder of  a public  office can  look forward  to  a higher  appointment  after  retirement  if  he  pleases  the Government of  the day  and that  no  appointments should be made which may lend sup- 983 port  to  the  criticism  of  favourtism  or  patronage  and consequential weakening  of credibility.  The confidence  of the  community   in  the   key   instrumentalities   is   of considerable significance  in the maintenance of the rule of law.      These were  the reasons  for which  we made  our  order dated  23rd  November,  1978  rejecting  the  special  leave petition and  confirming the  order passed by the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court.

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P.B.R. 984