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PETITIONER: HARBHAJAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KARAM SINGH AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/09/1965

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SARKAR, A.K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1966 AIR  641            1966 SCR  (1) 817  CITATOR INFO :  D          1969 SC 329  (9)  D          1977 SC1494  (4)  R          1978 SC1814  (13)

ACT: East Punjab (Consolidation and Prevention of  Fragmentation) Act, 1951-s. 42-Whether State Government has power to review an order passed on an application under s. 42.

HEADNOTE: In  accordance with a scheme for consolidation  of  holdings under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of  Fragmentation)  Act,  1948, parcels  of  land  were  re- allotted   to  the  appellant  and  the  first   and   eight respondent.   Being dissatisfied with the allotments,  these two  respondents preferred appeals at first under  s.  23(3) and  then under a. 23(4) of the Act.  The first  appeal  was dismissed, but in the second appeal, the first  respondent’s claim  was  partially  allowed by  the  Assistant  Director, Consolidation of Holdings. The appellant then moved the State Government under s. 42 of the  Act for revision of the Assistant Director’s order  and in   doing  so,  submitted  two  copies  of  the   requisite application  under s. 42 On the first copy, the Director  of Consolidation  of  Holdings  passed an  order  on  the  17th February,  1958,  that  application should be  put  up  with previous  papers.  On the second copy he passed an order  on the   3rd   April,   1958,   dismissing   the   application. Thereafter,  on  the  first copy,  the  Director  beard  the parties and by an order dated 29th August 1958, allowed  the appellant’s   application  and  set  aside   the   Assistant Director’s order. The first respondent then filed a petition in the High Court under  Art. 226 for a writ to quash the Director’s order  of the 29th August, 1958, and this petition was allowed on  the ground  that in view of his order dated the 3rd April  1958, dismissing the application, the Director we.-; not competent to pass the order of the 29th August 1958. On appeal to this Court. HELD :The order of the Director dated the 29th August, 1958, was ultra vires and without jurisdiction. [820 A-B]

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There  is no provision in the Act granting express power  of review to the State Government with regard to an order under s. 42 of the Am In the absence of any such express power, it is manifest that the Director could not review his  previous order   of  3rd  April  1958,  dismissing  the   Appellant’s application under s. 42. [819 H] Drew v. willis, [1891] 1 Q.B. 450, Hession v. Jones,  [1914] 2  K.B.  421 and Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu  Hegada,  A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 244. Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh, 401,A. 54, referred to Patel  Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao  Khanderao  Jambekar and Anr., [1965] 2 S.C.R. 328. followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 447 of1963. Sup.C-I/65 818 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated April  19, 1960 of the Punjab High Court in  Letters  Patent Appeal No. 128 of 1960. Gopal Singh, for the appellant. K.   R. Chaudhuri, for respondent No. 1. O.   P. Malhotra and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2 to The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami  J. This appeal is brought by Special  Leave  from the judgment and decree of the Punjab High Court dated  19th April, 1960 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 128 of 1960. In  the  year  1955, consolidation  proceedings  under  East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of  Fragmenta- tion) Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) were started in the  village  Bholpur of District Ludhiana.   In  accordance with  the provisions of the Act, a scheme for  consolidation of holdings was published on 29th March, 1956.  On 14th May, 1956 that scheme was confirmed under s. 20 of the Act.   The Consolidation  Officer  accordingly re-allotted  parcels  of land  to the appellant and respondents Nos.  1 and 8 in  the village of Bholpur.  Being dissatisfied with the  allotment, respondents 1 and 8 preferred appeals under s. 21(3) of  the Act  but  these  appeals were dismissed  by  the  Settlement Officer.   Respondents 1 and 8 thereafter preferred  further appeals under s. 21(4) of the Act to the Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings.  The Assistant Director partially allowed  the appeal of respondent No. 1 by his  order  dated 29th  October, 1957 but dismissed the appeal  of  respondent No. 8. On 10th February, 1958, the appellant moved the State Government under s. 42 of the Act for revision of the  order passed by the Assistant Director in the appeal of respondent No. 1. The Revision Petition was ultimately accepted on 29th August,  1958  by the Director, Consolidation  of  Holdings. The  Director  held  that the original  order  made  by  the Assistant Director on 29th October, 1957 was contrary to the scheme  and was based upon a mistake of fact.  The  Director accordingly allowed the Revision Petition of Harbhajan Singh on 29th August, 1958. It appears that Harbhajan Singh had filed two copies of  the application  under  s.  42 of the Act and on  one  copy  the Director  of  Consolidation of Holdings passed an  order  on 17th  February, 1958 that the application should be  put  up with previous papers.  On                             819 the  second copy of the application the Director  passed  an order on 3rd April, 1958 to the following effect :-

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             "The    order    of    Assistant     Director,               Consolidation of Holdings, under s. 21(4) need               not be amended.  File  Inform." On  the copy of the application on which the order  of  17th February,  1958 was passed, the Director heard  the  parties and  passed  his  order on 29th August,  1958  by  which  he allowed the application of Harbhajan Singh and set aside the order   of  the  Assistant  Director.   Respondent   No.   1 thereafter moved the Punjab High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution  for  quashing  the  order  of  the   Director, Consolidation  of Holdings, made on 29th August, 1958.   The application was allowed by the High Court on 11 th  January, 1960  on  the  ground that the  Director,  Consolidation  of Holdings,  was  not competent to pass the order  dated  29th August, 1958 in view of his previous order dated 3rd  April, 1958  dismissing  the application of Harbhajan  Singh.   The appellant took the matter in appeal under Letters Patent but the appeal was dismissed on 19th April, 1960. The  question  of  law presented for  determination  in  the appeal is, whether the Director, Consolidation of  Holdings, had power to review his previous order dated 3rd April, 1958 dismissing  Harbhajan Singh’s application, and  whether  his subsequent  order  made under s. 42 of the  Act  dated  29th August, 1958 is legally valid ?               S. 42 of the Act states               "The State Government may at any time for  the               purpose   of  satisfying  itself  as  to   the               legality  or  propriety of any  order  passed,               scheme  prepared or confirmed  or  repartition               made  by any officer under this Act  call  for               and  examine, the record of any  case  pending               before or disposed of by such officer and  may               pass  such  order in reference thereto  as  it               thinks fit :               Provided that no order, scheme or  repartition               shall be varied or reversed without giving the               parties   interested  notice  to  appear   and               opportunity to be heard except in cases  where               the  State  Government is satisfied  that  the               proceedings  have  been vitiated  by  unlawful               consideration." There  is no provision in the Act granting express power  of review to the State Government with regard to an order  made under s.  42 of the Act.  In the absence of any such express power, it is 820 manifest  that  the  Director,  Consolidation  of  Holdings, cannot  review  his  previous  order  of  3rd  April,   1958 dismissing the application of Harbhajan Singh under s. 42 of the  Act.   It  follows  therefore that  the  order  of  the Director dated 29th August, 1958 is ultra vires and  without jurisdiction  and the High Court was right in quashing  that order  by  the  grant  of  a writ  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution.               In  Drew  v.  Willis(1),  Lord  Esher,  M.  R.               pointed  out that ,no court (and I  would  add               ’no  authority’) has .... a power  of  setting               aside  an order which has been properly  made,               unless it is given by statute’. In  another case Hession v. Jones(2) Bankes, J. pointed  out that  the court, under the statute, has no power ’to  review an order deliberately made after argument and to entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view to ultimately confirming, or reversing it and observed                "Then as to the inherent jurisdiction of  the

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             Court.  Before the Judicature Acts the  Courts               of common law bad no jurisdiction whatever  to               set  aside an order which had been made.   The               Court  of  Chancery  did  exercise  a  certain               limited  power in this direction.  All  Courts               would   have   power  to  make   a   necessary               correction  if the order as drawn up  did  not               express the intention of the Court; the  Court               of Chancery however went somewhat further than               that,  and would in a proper case  recall  any               decree  or  order  before it  was  passed  and               entered;  but after it had been drawn  up  and               perfected  no Court or Judge had any power  to               interfere  with  it.  This is clear  from  the               judgment  of Thesiger L.J. in the case  of  in               re.  St. Nazaire Co. (1879) 12 Ch.  D. 88." The same principle was laid down by the Madras High Court in Anantharaju  Shetty  v. Appu Hegada(3)  in  which  Seshagiri Aiyar, J. observed:               "It is settled law that a case is not, open to               appeal unless the statute gives such a  right.               The power to review must also be given by  the               statute.  Prima facie a party who has obtained               a decision is entitled to keep it  unassailed,               unless the Legislature had indicated the  mode               by  which  it can be set aside.  A  review  is               practically  the hearing of an appeal  by  the               same officer who               (1)  118911 1 Q.B.450.               (3) A.I.R. 1919 Madras 244.  (2) [1914] 2 K.B.               421.                821               decided  the case.  There is at least as  good               reason  for saying that such power should  not               be  exercised unless the statute gives it,  as               for  saying that another tribunal  should  not               hear  an  appeal from the Trial  Court  unless               such a power is given to it by statute." The  same  principle  has  been  affirmed  by  the  Judicial Committee  in Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh(1)  in which a mahal was sold for arrears of revenue.  Two  appeals to  annul the sale were preferred to the Commissioner  under the  Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859, s. 33, as  amended by  the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1868.  One  of  these appeals was by the respondent, a co-sharer of the mahal, and was  dismissed on the ground that the auction purchaser  had not been made a defendant.  A Second Appeal was preferred by the  other co-sharers in the mahal, and in this  appeal  the Commissioner, on March 23, 1900, made an order annulling the sale  on the ground of an irregularity in the  sale  notice. This  order related to the entire mahal.  On June 21,  1900, the  Commissioner  having come to the  conclusion  that  his order of March 23, 1900, was wrong in law, reviewed it,  and made an order upholding the sale.  The respondent  thereupon brought  the suit giving rise to the appeal to the  Judicial Committee praying for a declaration that the order of June-. 21,  1900,  was  ultra vires and  illegal.   The  Additional Subordinate Judge declared that the order setting aside  the sale was a final order and was not open to review.  The High Court   concurred  with  the  decision  of  the   Additional Subordinate  Judge.   While  dismissing the  appeal  of  the defendant-appellant, Lord Atkinson said :               "Their  Lordships are clearly of opinion  that               the  order  of March 23, 1900, was  final  and               conclusive,   and   that,  so   far   as   the

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             Commissioner was concerned, he bad no power to               review  that order in the way in which he  has               reviewed it." The  same  principle  has  been  reiterated  by  this  court recently  in  Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai  etc.  v.  Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Another (2) . In that case respondent No. 1 was a landlord and the appellant was a tenant.  On May 1,  1956,  respondent No. 1 gave a notice to  the  appellant under  s.  14 of the Bombay Tenancy and  Agricultural  Lands Act,  1948  (Bombay  Act  LXVII  of  1948)  terminating  his tenancy.  On December 25, 1956 respondent No. 1 gave another notice to the appellant under s. 31 termination the tenancy. On  July  10, 1957, respondent No. 1  filed  an  application under s. 29 read with s. 14 for recovery of (1) 40 I.A. 54.                             (2) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 328. 822 possession  of  the lands.  By an order dated  December  25, 1957  the Mahalkari allowed respondent No.  1’s  application under  s.  29 read with s. 14 filed on July  10,  1957,  and directed  that the tenancy be terminated and  possession  of the  lands be delivered to respondent No. 1.  The  appellant applied  to  the Collector of Baroda on August 9,  1958  and again  on August 26, 1958 under s. 17A for revision  of  the Mahalkari’s  order  dated December 25, 1957.   On  or  about August  14, 1958, the Collector called for the records  from the  MahaLkari, but the records did not reach the office  of the Collector until December 24, 1958.  On or-about  October 3, 1958 the Collector rejected these revision  applications. On  October  6,  1958 the appellant  again  applied  to  the Collector  for revision of the Mahalkari’s order,  but  this application also was disposed of by the Collector on October 17,  1958.  On November 7, 1958, the local  Congress  Mandal Samiti  passed  a  resolution requesting  the  Collector  to reconsider  his previous orders.  A copy of this  resolution was sent to the Collector on November 10, 1958.  On November 14, 1958, the appellant again applied to the Collector under s.  76A for revision of the Mahalkari’s order.  On  February 17,  1959,  the Collector acting under s. 76A  reversed  the Mahalkari’s  order  and  directed  that  possession  of  the disputed lands be restored to the appellant.  S. 76-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 (Bombay  Act LXVII of 1948) provides as follows :               "Where  no  appeal has been filed  within  the               period provided for it, the Collector may, suo               motu or on a reference made in this behalf  by               the Divisional Officer or the State Government               at any time,-               (a)   call  for the record of any  enquiry  or               the  proceedings of any Mamlatdar or  Tribunal               for the purpose of any order passed by, and as               to  the regularity of the proceedings of  such               Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be, and               (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit               Provided  that no such record shall be  called               for after the expiry of one year from the date               of  such order and no order to such  Mamlatdar               or  Tribunal  shall be modified,  annulled  or               reversed unless opportunity has been given  to               the  interested  parties  to  appear  and   be               heard." An application for revision preferred by respondent No. 1 on March 24, 1959 was dismissed by the Tribunal on February 23, 1961.   An  application under Art. 227 of  the  Constitution pre-

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823 ferred  by respondent No. 1 on June 15, 1961 was allowed  by the High Court on November 5, 1963.  In this state of facts, it  was held by this court that in the absence of any  power of  review  the  Collector had no power  to  reconsider  his previous  decisions dated October 3, October 4  and  October 17,  1958  and the subsequent order of the  Collector  dated February  17, 1959 re-opening the matter was illegal,  ultra vires  and without jurisdiction.  The majority  judgment  of this Court states :               "Though s. 76A, unlike s. 76, does not provide               for   an  application  for  revision  by   the               aggrieved  party, the appellant properly  drew               the   attention  of  the  Collector   to   his               grievances  and  asked  him  to  exercise  his               revisional   powers  under  s.  76A.    Having               perused the applications for revision filed by               the   appellant,  the  Collector  decided   to               exercise  his suo motu powers and  called  for               the record on August 14, 1958 within one  year               of the order of the Mahalkari.  But before the               record  arrived and without looking  into  the               record, the Collector passed orders on October               3,  October 4 and October 17,  1958  rejecting               the  applications  for  revision.   By   these               orders,  the Collector decided that there  was               no   ground   for   interference   with    the               Mahalkari’s  order.......... All these  orders               were  passed by the Collector in the  exercise               of  his  suo motu power  of  revision.   These               orders as also the previous order calling  for               the  record could be passed by  the  Collector               only  in the exercise of his revisional  power               under s. 76-A.  As he refused to modify, annul               or  reverse  the order of  the  Mahalkari,  he               could pass these orders without issuing notice               to the 2nd respondent.  These orders passed by               the   Collector   in  the  exercise   of   his               revisional  powers  were  quasi-judicial,  and               were  final.   The Act does  not  empower  the               Collector  to  review an order passed  by  him               under s. 76A.  In the absence of any power  of               review,  the Collector could not  subsequently               reconsider  his  previous decisions  and  hold               that  there  were  grounds  for  annulling  or               reversing   the   Mabalkari’s   order.     The               subsequent  order dated February 17, 1959  re-               opening  the matter was illegal,  ultra  vires               and  without  jurisdiction.   The  High  Court               ought  to  have  quashed  the  order  of   the               Collector  dated  February 17,  1959  on  this               ground." We are of the opinion that the same principle applies to the present case and the Director, Consolidation of Holdings had no 824 power  to  review his previous order dated 3rd  April,  1958 rejecting the application of Harbhajan Singh under s. 42  of the  Act.   It  follows that the  subsequent  order  of  the Director, Consolidation of Holdings dated 29th August,  1958 allowing the application of Harbhajan Singh was ultra  vires and illegal and was rightly quashed by the High Court. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed. 825

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