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PETITIONER: HARBHAJAN SINGH DHALLA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/11/1986

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR    9            1987 SCR  (1) 114  1986 SCC  (4) 678        JT 1986   765  1986 SCALE  (2)728  CITATOR INFO :  F          1991 SC 814  (2)

ACT:     Suit against an ambassador of a foreign  state--Doctrine of immunity and the maxim Par in Parem N-on habet  jurisdic- tionem-Central  Government refusing to grant  permission  to sue  the Embassy "on political grounds"---Propriety  of  the order--Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908, Sections 86  and  87 scope and nature of--Administrative orders and Principle  of Natural  Justice, following of--Right of a citizen to  carry on  the work of maintenance and repairs and Court’s duty  to safeguard his right.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant,  an Indian national who  had  undertaken general  maintenance  work  and repairs at  the  Embassy  of Algeria  and at the residence of the then ambassador in  New Delhi in the year 1976, in order to recover certain  alleged payments  due  from the Embassy sought the  consent  of  the Central  Government under section 86(4)(aa) of the  Code  of Civil  Procedure which was refused on  "political  grounds". Hence the writ petition by the aggrieved citizen. Allowing the petition, the Court,     HELD:  1.1 Immunity of foreign States to he sued in  the domestic forum of another State was and still is part of the general international law and international order. In  India where  the rule of law prevails, the foreign State ought  to he entitled to such immunities but to no more as are enjoyed by the domestic state before its own Tribunal. [119E, 120H]     Mirza  Ali  Akbar Kashani v. United  Arab  Republic  and Anr., [1966] 1 SCR 319, followed.     Cristina  1938 A.C. 485 at 498; and Rahimtoola v.  Nizam of Hyderabad and Anr., 1958 Appeal Cases 379 at 418,  quoted with approval.     Mirza  Ali  Akbar Kashani v. United  Arab  Republic  and Anr., AIR 960 Calcutta 768, approved. 115     1.2 Indian Constitution guarantees the right of a  citi- zen  to  carry  on his business and carry  on  trade  freely subject to certain limitations as contained in the  relevant provisions  of  the Constitution. In the instant  case,  the

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petitioner had the right to be paid his reasonable remmuner- ation  or  dues in accordance with the law  subject  to  the bargain  between  the  parties and subject  further  to  any reasonable prohibitions or restrictions under the law of the country.  The disputes that has arisen have to  he  resolved both  under  the principles of Lex Loci Contractus  and  lex Situs.  Since the disputes have not been  judicially  deter- mined nor the claim held frivolous, a foreign State in  this country  if  it fulfills the conditions stipulated  in  sub- section  (2)  of section 86 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure would he liable to he sued. That would be in conformity with the Principles of international law as recognised as part of our domestic law and in accordance with the Indian Constitu- tion and human rights. [118G-119B, 122G]     1.3  It is true that the provisions both of sections  86 and  87 of the Code of Civil Procedure are intended to  save the foreign states from harassment which would he caused  by the  institution  of a suit but except in  cases  where  the claim appears to he frivulous patently, the Central  Govern- ment should normally accord consent or give sanction against foreign  states unless there are cogent political and  other reasons.  Normally, however, it is not the function  of  the Central Government to attempt to adjudicate upon the  merits of  the case intended to be made by the litigants  in  their proposed  suits. It is the function of the courts of  compe- tent  jurisdiction and the Central Government  cannot  under section 86 of the Code usurp that function. The power  given to  the Central Government must he exercised  in  accordance with  the  principles of natural justice and  in  consonance with the principle that reasons must appear from the  order. [123H-124C]     Maharaj  Kumar Tokendra Bir Singh v. Secretary,  to  the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and Anr.,  AIR 1964 SC 1663, followed.     1.4  There is no provision of any appeal from the  order of the Central Government in either granting or refusing  to grant  sanction under section 86 of the Code. This  sanction or  lack  of  sanction may, however, be  questioned  in  the appropriate proceedings in court but inasmuch as there is no provision of appeal, it is necessary that there should he on objective  evaluation  and examination  by  the  appropriate authority of relevant and material factors in exercising its jurisdiction  under  section 86 by the  Central  Government. There is an implicit re- 116 quirement of observance of the Principles of natural justice and-also  the  implicit requirement that  decision  must  be expressed  in such a manner that reasons can be spelled  out from such decision. [124H-I25B]     1.5 Though this is an administrative order, in a case of this nature, there should be reasons. If the  administrative authorities  are enjoined to decide the rights of  the  par- ties,  it  is essential that such  administrative  authority should  accord fair and proper bearing to the person  to  be affected  by the order and give sufficiently clear  and  ex- plicit  reasons. Such reasons must be on  relevant  material factors  objectively  considered. There is no claim  of  any privilege  that  disclosure of reasons would  undermine  the political or national interest of the country. [125C]     1.6  The  expression ’political ground’  covers  a  wide range  and  connotes without further particulars  vague  and fanciful attitude. The refusal by the Central Government  to accord  its sanction to sue the foreign ambassador, in  this case, is not in accordance with law.[124F, 125C]

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JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 67 of 1985 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) Dr. Gaurl Shanker (Amicus Curiae) for the Petitioner.     Madhu Sudan Rao, Mrs. Kittu Kumarmangalam and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI  MUKHARJI,  J. Harbhajan  Singh  Dhalla,  the petitioner  herein asserts that he is going from  piller  to post to collect Rs.27,000 which according to him is due from the Algerian Embassy, he further asserts that this is a case where a little man’s small claim is attempted to be thwarted by technical device. He is an Indian National. He had under- taken general maintenance work at the Embassy of Algeria  in India and at the residence of the then Ambassador of Algeria in  New Delhi in the year 1976. He claims that his  rightful dues  in  respect  of  the said work  runs  into  more  than Rs.28,500. He says that he has been deprived of the same. He states  that  he  is in search of a remedy  but  the  remedy alludes  him and his claim remains uninvestigated and  unde- cided. 117     The petitioner narrates his story that he had written to fail  and sundry to extend some help in obtaining  his  dues but nothing tangible has resulted so far. The petitioner had approached  the  Ministry of External Affairs  for  granting permission  to sue the Algerian Embassy for  recovering  his dues. After numerous letters and passage of number of  years in the processing of his request,, he received a letter from the  Ministry of External Affairs dated 26th November,  1983 which  is  Annexure ’A’ to the petition.  It  states,  inter alia.  "After  due  consideration the  Government  of  India regrets  that permission to sue the State of Algeria  cannot be given on political grounds".     It may be mentioned that according to the petitioner  he had  done the jobs of building  maintenance,  reconditioning and  renovation  work at the Embassy of Algeria and  at  the residence  of  the then Ambassador of Algeria  in  the  year 1976.  He completed the work assigned to him  and  submitted the  bills for Rs.29,000 which were not settled in toto  and he  claimed  that even the sum of  Rs.11,380  had  not-been. settled by the Embassy. The balance, according to the  peti- tioner,  accumulated to Rs.27,000 at the rate of 18%  inter- est.  A representation was made to the Ministry of  External Affairs.’  The  Ministry delayed action and  then  allegedly took  up  the matter with the Algerian Embassy who  in  turn intimated the Ministry that according to the accounts  main- tained  by the Embassy all bills pertaining to work done  by the petitioner had been settled by the Embassy. The  Embassy further  claimed to have issued a cheque beating cheque  No. 245273 amounting tO Rs.17,500 in favour of the petitioner on 17th  June,  1976 which, according to the Embassy,  was  en- cashed by the petitioner the same day. This fact was  sought to  be  corroborated by the State Bank of  India  with  whom enquiries were made by the Ministry of External Affairs. The petitioner, however, claimed that though he received payment against  this cheque, he had handed over the amount  to  the Financial Attache of the Embassy who paid him only Rs.3,330. The petitioner alleged further that when he went to get  the remaining  amount, the financial attache had pointed  a  re- volver  at-him  and threatened him with  dire  consequences. (See  Annexure ’A’ to .the affidavit of the  petitioner  af- firmed  on  17th March, 1986--p.31 of the  Paper-Book).  The

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petitioner  mentioned hereinafter that he had requested  the Ministry of External Affairs to grant permission to sue  the State  of  Algeria  under section 86 of the  Code  of  Civil Procedure  for realisation of the claim with  interest.  The petitioner was given a hearing as required under section  86 of  the Code, according to the respondent, on 2nd  November, 1983, which is, however, denied by the petitioner. 118     According  to the affidavit of the respondent, which  is the  Union  of India, after giving  due  consideration,  the Ministry  was  of the opinion that no prima facie  case  had been made out and it was decided not to grant permission  to the petitioner.     After  receipt  of the official communication  from  the Ministry  as noted above, the petitioner got an  appointment with  Late  Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime  Minister  of India  and requested her for compensation from Prime  Minis- ter’s  relief fund or some loan from any Nationalised  Bank. He  further  alleged that Late Shrimati  Gandhi  helped  the petitioner to get a letter which was addressed to the Minis- try  of  Finance but the appropriate authorities  failed  to acknowledge the grievances and demands of the petitioner. In those circumstances the petitioner has approached this Court for issue of an appropriate writ.     A  rule Nisi having been issued on this application,  an affidavit  on  behalf of the respondent was  filed.  In  the counter-affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, the facts as  mentioned hereinbefore have been reiterated and  it  was stated  in the submission that the petition for recovery  of the  compensation  as claimed was not maintainable.  It  in- volved  the  disputed questions of facts and  there  was  no cause  of action against the Union of India. The  petitioner filed  an  affidavit in reply. There are  certain  annexures indicating as to what happened. For the purpose of disposing of the present application, it is not necessary to refer  to the same.     We  have  heard the parties. We requested Dr.  V.  Gauri Shankar, Senior Advocate of this Court, to help us as amicus curie  since the petitioner was appearing in person. He  has rendered valuable assistance and we record our  appreciation and gratitude for the same.     In this case two aspects require to be emphasized. First is the right of a citizen to carry on his business and carry on  trade  freely subject to limitation under the  law.  Our Constitution guarantees that right subject to certain  limi- tations as contained in the relevant articles of the Consti- tution.  That right of the petitioner in this case was  sub- ject  to the provisions of law controlling,  restricting  or inhibiting  that  right. The petitioner states that  he  had performed  the general maintenance work at the  ’Embassy  of Algeria  and  at  the residence of the  then  Ambassador  of Algeria. He had therefore the right to be paid his  reasona- ble remuneration or dues in accordance with the law  subject to  the bargain between the parties and subject  further  to any reasonable 119 prohibitions  or restrictions under the law of the  country. There  are  disputes in this case as we have noticed  as  to what  is  the amount due, if any, and  further  whether  any amount  was paid as asserted by the Algerian Embassy and  as denied by the petitioner. These disputes have to be resolved in  accordance with the law of this country, both under  the principles of Lex Loci contractus as well as lex situs.  The Union of India has indubitably the jurisdiction and  obliga- tion in the appropriate case to give sanction but the  Union

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cannot  in any arbitrary manner or administratively  adjudi- cate  those disputes or determine the claim. The  petitioner wants to have the disputes adjudicated as he alleges that he has failed to realise the amount which, according to him, is reasonably and lawfully due to him. The communication to the petitioner which is impugned in this application dated  26th November,  1983 states that "permission to sue the State  of Algeria  cannot be given on political grounds". But  in  the affidavit  filed  on behalf of the Union of India  in  these proceedings,  it  is stated that "The Ministry  was  of  the opinion that no prima facie case was made out and the  facts of the case were not superiorily covered under section 86 of Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that under  section 86, paras 86(1) and (2), the Central Government has  discre- tion  to refuse consent as required under that section."  In this  application, the court is not concerned with the  cor- rectness or genuineness or otherwise of his claim or  asser- tion,  except  perhaps  prima  facie  maintainability.  What concerns this Court is whether the. grievances of the  citi- zen  of  this country have been properly and  legally  dealt with.     Immunity  of foreign States to be sued in  the  domestic forum of another State was and perhaps still is part of  the general international law and international order and it  is not  necessary for the present purpose to consider its  ori- gin,  development and the trends in different countries.  As Professor H. Lauterpacht writes in "The British Yearbook  of International  Law  1951"  (Volume 28) on  "The  Problem  of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States" at page 230 the assumption of jurisdiction over foreign states by the domes- tic court was considered at one point of time to be contrary to the dignity of the foreign states and as such  inconsist- ent with the international courtesy and the amity of  inter- national  relations. This has been in the past a  persistent theme of judicial decisions. It may be noted that in so  far as  the  doctrine  of immunity owed its  acceptance  to  the decisions of the courts of the United States it is explained to  some  extent  by the fact that it was  by  reference  to dignity of the states of the Union that their immunity  from suit  was  urged insistently and repetitiously.  During  the debates  preceding the adoption of the Virginian  Convention in 1978, 120 John  Marshall stressed the element of  indignity  inflicted upon a state by making it a defendant in an action. (Elliot, Debates--2nd  Ed. 1836, page 555). It may be  of  historical amusement  specially in the context of  Indian  Constitution and the growth and the history of the Indian Constitution to note that in the leading case of Chisholm v. Georgia,  Dall, Page 419, 425(US) 1793, the main argument for the  defendant state  was that it was a ’degradation of sovereignty in  the states  to  submit to the supreme judiciary  of  the  United States’.  The courts of the United States have gone  to  the length  of relying on the argument of dignity in the  matter of  immunity  of foreign states from taxation.  In  England, ’dignity’, coupled or identified with ’independence’, played an  important  part  as an explanation of  the  doctrine  of immunity of foreign states.      Esher  L.J.  in The Parlement Beige (1880)  L.R.  5P.D. 197,207  had observed: "From all these authorities it  seems to us, although other reasons have sometimes been suggested, that  the  real principle on which the  exemption  of  every sovereign  from  the jurisdiction of every  Court  has  been deduced  is that the exercise of such jurisdiction would  be incompatible  with his regal dignity--that is to  say,  with

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his  absolute independence of every superior authority."  In the said case, Lord Justice Brett at pages 2 14, 220 of  the report referred variously to ’independence and dignity’  and to ’equality and independence’ as the basis of immunity.  To the  same effect are the observations of Lord  Macmillan  in Cristina,  [1938]  A.C. 485 at 498. According  to  Professor Lauterpacht  these  strained  emanations of  the  notion  of dignity  were an archaic survival and therefore these  could not and should not continue as a rational basis of immunity.      The legal development of this aspect has been discussed by  Sompong  Sucharitkul in "State  Immunities  and  Trading Activities  in International Law". Professor H.  Lauterpacht has  also  discussed this aspect in the  said  article  "The Problem  of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States"  in "The British Year Book of International Law 1951 ..      The  problem was also discussed by several High  Courts and this Court. These have been noted in the Bench  decision of  the  Calcutta  High Court in United  Arab  Republic  and another v. Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani, AIR 1962 Calcutta 387.         In  India  where rule of law prevails,  the  foreign State ought to be entitled to such immunities but to no more as are enjoyed by the I domestic State before its own Tribu- nal. This was observed by Ray, J. 121 sitting  singly, as the Chief Justice of India then was,  in Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani v. United Arab Republic and another, AIR 1960 Calcutta 768.     Lord  Denning  in Rahimtoola v. Nizam of  Hyderabad  and Another,  [1958]  Appeal Cases 379 at 418  observed  in  the context of English courts: "There is no reason why we should grant to the departments or agencies of foreign  Governments an  immunity which we do not grant our own, provided  always that the matter in dispute arises within the jurisdiction of our courts and is properly cognizable by them".     Lord Denning noted in the said decision as early as 1957 that  among the decisions of the English courts,  one  would not find consistency on this aspect. Lord Denning was of the view that there was no uniform practice or uniform rule.  It may incidentally be noted that this was the opinion of  Lord Denning expressed in the House of Lords. Viscount Simonds in his  opinion  observed that he should not be taken  to  have assented  to  the  views of Lord Denning upon  a  number  of questions  and authorities in regard to which the  House  of Lords had not the benefit of the arguments of counsel or the judgments of the courts below.     It  is instructive to note what Lord Denning had to  say on matters on which he had expressed views without the  help of  counsel of the parties. Lord Denning concluded at  pages 423-424 of the report as follows:               "My  Lords, I acknowledge that, in the  course               of this opinion, I have considered some  ques-               tions and authorities which were not mentioned               by  counsel. I am sure they gave all the  help               they  could and I have only gone into it  fur-               ther  because  the law on this subject  is  of               great consequence and, as applied at  present,               it  is  held by many to be  unsatisfactory.  I               venture  to think that if there is  one  place               where    it   should   be   reconsidered    on               principle--without  being tied  to  particular               precedents  of  a period that is  past--it  is               here  in this House: and if there is one  time               for it to be done, it is now, when the  oppor-               tunity  offers, before the law gets  any  more               enmeshed in its own net. This I have tried  to

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             do. Whatever the outcome, I hope I may say, as               Holt  C.J.  once did after he  had  done  much               research  on his own: "I have  stirred  "these               points, which wiser heads in time may settle."               (Emphasis supplied).               122                   With  the observations of Lord Denning  on               the  question  of  immunity  of  the   foreign               states,  the  other  Law  Lords  disassociated               themselves. Mr. Justice Bachawat, speaking for               the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court,               rejected  the contention urged by  counsel  in               United Arab Republic and another v. Mirza  Ali               Akbar Kashani (supra) . that the foreign State               enjoyed the same immunity as a domestic  state               enjoyed and no more. This decision came up  in               appeal  before this Court in Mirza  Ali  Akbar               Kashani  v.  United Arab  Republic  and  Anr,,               [1966]  1 SCR 3 19 and this Court  upheld  the               Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court  and               held  that section 86(1) of the Code of  Civil               Procedure as it stood at the relevant time was               the statutory provision coveting a field which               would otherwise be covered by the doctrine  of               immunity under International Law and save  and               except in accordance with the procedure  indi-               cated in section 86 of the Code a suit against               a foreign State would not lie.                   Section 86 at the material time controlled               the suits against foreign States and  provided               that  no  foreign state might be sued  in  any               Court  otherwise  competent to  try  the  suit               except with the consent of the Central Govern-               ment  certified in writing by a  Secretary  to               that  Government  save  and  except,   certain               specified type of suits, with which we are not               concerned  in this appeal. Sub-section (2)  of               section 86 of the Code stipulates inter  alia,               that  no such sanction shall be given,  unless               the foreign State is in possession of  immova-               ble  property situate within those limits  and               is to be sued with reference to such  property               or  for money charged thereon or by itself  or               another  trade within the local limits of  the               jurisdiction of the courts in India.                   In this case the petitioner had a right to               carry  on the work of maintenance and  repairs               in this country. This right is granted to  him               under  the Constitution and he  trades  within               the  local limits of the courts in  India  and               the  foreign State which he wants to  sue  has               immovable  property situate within the  limits               of  this country. There is dispute  about  the               petitioner’s claim. That dispute has not  been               judicially  determined. It has not  been  held               that the claim of the petitioner is frivolous.               In  that view of the matter, it appears to  us               that  a  foreign State in this country  if  it               fulfils  the  conditions  stipulated  in  sub-               section (2) of section 86 of the Code would be               liable to be sued in this country. That  would               be in conformity with the principles of inter-               national  law  as recognised as  part  of  our               domestic  law and in accordance with our  Con-               stitution and human fights. the power given to

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             the  Central Government must not be  exercised               arbitrarily  or on whimsical grounds but  upon               proper  reasons and grounds. The order  merely               states that the               123               Government  could not grant the permission  to               sue the State of Algeria on political grounds.               In respect of a building where a masonary work               was  supervised by a contractor or  an  archi-               tect,  how the dignity of a foreign. state  or               relationship  between the two countries  would               be jeopardised or undermined or endangered, it               is difficult to comprehend or understand  from               this  reason nor are the reasons explained  or               demonstrated in the counter-affidavit filed on               behalf   of  the  respondent-Government.   The               reasons given in the counter-affidavit on  the               other  hand are different namely (a) the  gov-               ernment  found no prima facie ground  and  (b)               the  claim was outside the provisions of  sec-               tion  86 of the Code of Civil  Procedure.  The               second ground now stated is patently erroneous               and  contradictory to the ground mentioned  in               the  letter  dated 26th  November,  1983.  One               should  have thought that the political  rela-               tionship  between the two countries  would  be               better served and the image of a foreign State               be better established if citizens’  grievances               are  judicially investigated. This would  also               be in consonance with human rights.                   Sub-section (6) of section 86 enjoins that               opportunity being given before passing of  the               order. There is dispute in this application as               to  whether  such reasonable  opportunity  was               given.  The respondent-Union of India  asserts               that such opportunity was given. No  satisfac-               tory evidence of such opportunity being  given               was produced before us.                   The law on this aspect of sovereign  immu-               nity  in  England is regulated  by  the  State               Immunity  Act, 1978 which introduced  or  con-               ferred  a  number of exceptions to  the  basic               rule  of immunity. Although the Act  .was  de-               signed  in  part  to  implement  the  European               Convention of State Immunity, it goes  consid-               erably  further  than the  Convention  in  re-               stricting  immunities- See in this  connection               Diecy  & Morris ’The Conflict of  Laws,’  10th               Edition page 157 (Volume 1).                   Dr. Gauri Shankar had drawn our  attention               to Maharaj Kumar Tokendra Bir Singh v.  Secre-               tary, to the Government of India, Ministry  of               Home  Affairs  and another, A.I.R.  1964  S.C.               1663  which  deals with the  conditions  under               which  sanction under section 87B of the  Code               are obtained and observed that in granting the               consent,  the  Central Government was  not  to               adjudicate upon the correctness of the  claim.               The  Court noted that the power  conferred  on               the  Central  Government to refuse  to  accord               consent to the proposed suit shall be careful-               ly  exercised. These principles would  be  ap-               plicable to the facts of this case. It is true               that these provisions both of sections 86  and               87  are  intended to save the  foreign  states

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             from harassment which would be               124               caused by the institution of a suit but except               in cases where the claim appears to be  frivu-               lous  patently, the Central Government  should               normally  accord  consent  or  give   sanction               against foreign states unless there are cogent               political and other reasons. Normally,  howev-               er,  it  is not the function  of  the  Central               Government  to attempt to adjudicate upon  the               merits of the case intended to be made by  the               litigants  in their proposed suits. It is  the               function of the courts of competent  jurisdic-               tion  and the Central Government cannot  under               section  86 of the Code usurp  that  function.               The power given to the Central Government must               be exercised in accordance with the principles               of natural justice and in consonance with  the               principle  that reasons must appear  from  the               order. We may note that in the counter-affida-               vit we do not find any such cogent reasons  or               due consideration.                   It is well to bear in mind the two princi-               ples on which sovereign immunity rest. So  far               as  the  principle expressed in maxim  par  in               parem  non habet jurisdictionem  is  concerned               with the status of equality. The other princi-               ple  on  which immunity is based  is  that  of               non-intervention  in the internal  affairs  of               other states. See in this connection  Brownlie               "Principles of Public International Law" Third               Edition 322-325. Much has happened in  differ-               ent States since Marshall, C.J. of the  United               States in The Schooner Exchange v. Mc  Faddon,               [1812] 7 Cranch 116; Green, p. 237 Briggs,  p.               413;  Bishop, p. 659 explained  the  principle               and said that a state within its own territory               as being "necessarily exclusive and absolute".               In  the days of international trade  and  com-               merce,   international   interdependence   and               international opening of embassies, in  grant-               ing  sanction the growth of a national law  in               this  aspect  has  to be borne  in  mind.  The               interpretation  of the provisions of  Code  of               Civil Procedure must be in consonance with the               basic principles of the Indian Constitution.                   The expression ’political ground’ used  in               the  communication  of  the  Government  noted               before  covers  a wide range as  explained  in               Aiyar’s  Law  Lexicon page  986.  It  connotes               without further particulars vague and fanciful               attitude.                   Corpus  Juris Secundum Vol. 48 page 28  at               pages 30 to 35 deals with the various kinds of               remedies  by a citizen against foreign  state.               In  granting of sanction or refusing  sanction               under section 86, the Central Government  must               bear these factors in mind.                   In this case there is no provision of  any               appeal  from the order of the Central  Govern-               ment  in either granting or refusing to  grant               sanc-               125               tion under section 86 of the Code. This  sanc-               tion  or  lack of sanction  may,  however,  be

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             questioned  in the appropriate proceedings  in               court but inasmuch as there is no provision of               appeal,  it is necessary that there should  be               an objective evaluation and examination by the               appropriate authority of relevant and material               factors  in exercising its jurisdiction  under               section 86 by the Central Government. There is               an  implicit requirement of observance of  the               principles  of  natural justice and  also  the               implicit  requirement  that decision  must  be               expressed in such a manner that reasons can be               spelled out from such decision. Though this is               an  administrative  order in a  case  of  this               nature, there should be reasons. If the admin-               istrative  authorities are enjoined to  decide               the  rights  of the parties, it  is  essential               that  such  administrative  authority   should               accord  fair and proper hearing to the  person               to  be affected by the order and  give  suffi-               ciently  clear  and  explicit  reasons.   Such               reasons  must be on relevant material  factors               objectively  considered- There is no claim  of               any privilege that disclosure of reasons would               undermine  the political or national  interest               of the country.               In  the aforesaid view of the matter we  order               as follows:                    1.  Order  dated 26th November,  1983  at               Annexure  4  to  this Petition’  tion  is  set               aside;               2.  Union of India is directed  to  reconsider               the matter;                    3.  The  Central Government  should  also               explore  the possibilities with  Algerian  au-               thority  of mutual settlement either by  arbi-               tration or by other accepted legal norms;                    4.  The Union of India should  pass  rea-               soned  order in accordance with the  principle               of  natural justice and keeping in  view’  the               trend and the development of the international               law as noted hereinbefore-                    We  further direct that the Central  Gov-               ernment in considering the question of  accord               of  sanction should ignore the  limitation  of               time  that  may  have lapsed in  view  of  the               action  taken  in  obtaining  the  consent  in               accordance with the principles of the  Limita-               tion Act, 1963. As the petitioner is appearing               in person the Union of India should ensure  in               considering the case of the petitioner  giving               him proper legal assistance- The writ petition               is disposed of in the aforesaid manner.                     In  the facts and circumstances  of  the               case, the petitioner is entitled to the  costs               of  this application including the  order  for               costs  by the order dated 5th  February,  1986               passed in this matter-               126