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PETITIONER: HANS RAJ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/10/1984

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. MADON, D.P.

CITATION:  1985 AIR   69            1985 SCR  (1)1040  1985 SCC  (1) 134        1984 SCALE  (2)632

ACT:      Punjab Civil Service (Premature Retirement) Rules 1975, Rule 3  (1) (a)-Premature  retirement of government servant- Qualifying  service   wrongly  computed-Whether   the  order complies with the primary pre-requisites of the rule.      (ii)  Premature   Retirement  of   government  servant- Impugned order  did not  mention that power was exercised in public interest-Whether  amounts to  non application of mind and vitiates the order.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant   joined  service  as  a  clerk  in  the erstwhile Patiala  and East  Punjab States  Union (PEPSU) on 2nd Sept. 1949 Being a temporary employee. he was discharged from service on 30th September 1953. On 22nd February, 1954, he was  again recruited  as a clerk and later on promoted as senior clerk. The PEPSU government sanctioned condonation of break from  Oct. 1,  1953 to Feb. 21, 1954 in the service of the appellant  under  Note  to  sub-para  (iii)  of  para  3 Annexure B’  of the Pepsu Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955  for  the  purpose  of  issuing  quasi-permanent Certificate only.  On the  reorganisation of Punjab State in 1966 the  appellant came to be allocated to Punjab State. On 20th August.  1975 the  Deputy Commissioner  of Bhatinda, in exercise of  the power  conferred by  Rule 3(1)  (a) of  the Punjab Civil  Services (Premature  Retirement)  Rules,  1975 passed an order prematurely retiring the appellant  from  service on tho Ground that he had completed more than 25 years of service. The appellant challenged the said order before the  High Court  on the  ground (i) That he could not have been  retired under Rule 3(1) as he had not completed 2 S years  of service;  and (ii)  that the  impugned order  of premature  retirement   suffered  from   the  vice  of  non- application of  mind inasmuch  as it  did not state that the power of prematurely retiring the appellant was exercised in public interest.  The  respondent  contended  (i)  that  the appellant had  completed  more  than  25  years  of  service because the break in service was condoned by the PEPSU Govt; and  (ii)   that  the  power  of  prematurely  retiring  tho appellant was  exercised in  public interest. The High Court dismissed the  Writ Petition  holding that once The break in service was  condoned, the  appellant had completed 25 years

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of service  and therefore  the pre-requisite for exercise of power under Rule 3(1) (a) was satisfied.      The appellant  contended before this court (1) that the order sanctioning the condonation of break in service of the appellant was for 1041 the limited  purpose of  granting quasi-permanent status and issuing  quasi-permanent   certificate  only  and  that  the condonation of  break in service did not qualify for pension as observed  by the Accountant General of Punjab in his memo addressed to  the S.D.O.  Bhatinda and  therefore  the  High Court was  in error in holding that the appellant had put in 25 years  of qualifying  service on the date of the impugned order; and  (ii) the order suffers from tho vice of complete non-application of  mind in as much as in the impugned order there is  not the  slightest  whisper  that  the  power  was exercised in public interest.      Allowing the appeal by the appellant, ^      HELD; (1)  Rule 3(1)  (a) of  the Premature  Retirement Rules confers  power on  the appropriate authority to retire any employee,  if it  is of  the opinion  that it  is in the public interest  to do so, on the date on which he completes 25 years  of qualifying  service or  attained  50  years  of stage. Therefore,  the appropriate authority must first male up its  mind that  it is  in public  interest to  retire the employee Once  having reached  that  satisfaction,  it  must further find  out whether  the concerned employee has on the relevant date  completed 25  years of  qualifying service or whether he  has attained  the age of 50 years. In the former case it  is not  25 years  of service  but it is 25 years of qualifying service  which must  have been  completed on  the date of  premature retirement. The power can be exercised on the date  on which one of the two alternative fact situation becomes available  or on any date thereafter. The expression ’qualifying service’  has been  defined in  rule 2(3) of the Premature Retirement  Rules to  mean ’service qualifying for pension’. Condition  No. 2 in para 4.23 of Chapter IV of the Punjab Civil  Services Rules, which deal with condonation of interruption or  break in service while computing qualifying service for  pension, provides  that interruption in service may be  condoned if  amongst others,  service preceding  the interruption is not less than five years. [1046D-F; 1047A]      Sub para  (iii) of  para 3,  Annexure  of  Pepsu  Civil Services  (Temporary  Service)  Rules,  1955  provides  that before a  certificate of  quasi-permanent  capacity  can  be issued, the  Government servant  should have  on the crucial date rendered  service  for  more  than  three  years.  Note appended  to  the  para  provides  that  broken  periods  of temporary service  will  not  count  for  purposes  of  this instruction unless  the breaks  are condoned specifically by the Government  in consultation  with the Finance Department and the service thus rendered continues. It further provides that while  condoning break  in service  for the  purpose of issuing quasi-permanent  capacity certificate,  it should be made clear  to the  persons concerned  that the  condonation will not entitle them to any benefits regarding the fixation of pay,  seniority, pension,  gratuity  etc.  and  that  the periods condoned  will be ignored and not counted as service actually rendered. [1049D-E]      (2) It  thus becomes crystal clear that the certificate issued  by   Rajpramukh  under   the  PEPSU  Civil  Services (Temporary Service)  Rules, 1955  condoning break in service was for  the  limited  purpose  of  issuing  quasi-permanent capacity certificate.  Not only  that the codonation was for

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this 1042 limited purpose  but the  negative is clearly spell out when it is  specifically provided  that the  condonation will not enable a person in whose favour the certificate is issued to claim any  pension or  gratuity etc.  In  other  words,  the condonation will  not render  the earlier  service if  it is otherwise not  includible in  the computation  of qualifying service to  so  claim  it.  For  the  purpose  of  computing qualifying service  for pension  the period  for which there was interruption  will remain  a break in service and as the earlier service  as provided  by Para 4.23, condition No. 2, was for  a period  less than  five years, the same cannot be taken into account for computing qualifying service Thus the conclusion is  incapable that  the qualifying  service which the appellant  is shown  to  have  rendered  commenced  from February 22.  1954. Inevitably, therefore on August 20, 1975 he had  not completed  25 years  of qualifying  service  and therefore, the  primary prerequisite  for exercises of power is not  satisfied and  the appellant  could  not  have  been compulsory   retired    from   service.   The   High   Court unfortunately overlooked  the basic requirement for exercise of power  namely, completing  25 years of qualifying service and proceeded  on the  basis  that  rendering  25  years  of service will permit exercise of power. There is a marked and not  worthy   distinction  between  service  and  qualifying service. [1049F-G & ; 1050A-C]      (3) The  impugned order  merely  recites  that  as  the appellant has completed more than 25 years of service, he is retired from the service from tho date of the order. Silence about recital  of public  interest is  both conspicuous  and glaring probably as the power was exercised by an officer of the rank  of Deputy  Commissioner who was blissfully unaware of it.  The argument  of the respondent that the appropriate authority exercised  the power  to compulsorily  retire  the appellant in public interest in view of an entry made in the annual confidential  report of  the appellant  for the  year 1971-72  that   his  conduct   was  unsatisfactory  and  his integrity was  doubtful, is  not convincing for two reasons: (i) that no record was placed before the Court to show as to whether the  adverse entry  was  ever  communicated  to  the appellant; and  (ii) his  record previous  and subsequent to the year  1971-72 was  not placed  before us. Therefore, the impugned order also suffers from the vice of non-application of  mind.   Accordingly,  tho  impugned  order  compulsorily retiring the  appellant from  service is illegal and invalid and must be quashed and set aside. [1050F, G, 1051A-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1251 of 1978,      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  1st November, 1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6461 of 1976      N. D. Garg and R. K. Garg for the Appellant.      S. K. Bagga for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 1043      DESAI, J.  Appellant joined  service as  a Clerk in the Civil Supplies  Department of the erstwhile Patiala and East Punjab States  Union (’PEPSU’  for short)  on  September  2, 1949. He was a temporary employee and he was discharged from service on  September 30, 1953. On February 22, 1954, he was

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again recruited  as a  clerk in the Consolidation department of PEPSU. In course of time, he was promoted as senior clerk and came  to be  allocated to  Punjab State on the merger of PEPSU with  erstwhile Punjab  State. The Deputy Commissioner of Bhatinda  transferred the  appellant and  posted  him  as Assistant in  his office  after obtaining concurrence of the Subordinate Service Selection Board, Punjab with effect from January 1,  1962. On  the reorganisation  of Punjab State in 1966, the  appellant came  to be  allocated to Punjab State. After declaration  of national  emergency, the  Governor  of Punjab in  exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Art. 309  of the  Constitution and all other powers enabling thereto and  with  the  previous  approval  of  the  Central Government under  sub-section (7)  of sec.  115 of the State Reorganisation Act,  1956 and sub-sec. (6) of the Sec. 82 of the Punjab  Reorganisation  Act  1966  framed  Punjab  Civil Services  (Premature   Retirement)  Rules,  1975  (Premature Retirement Rules  ’for short). Rule 3 conferred power on the appropriate authority  to order  premature retirement of the Government servant governed by the rules. It reads is under:           "3 (1) (a): The appropriate authority shall, if it      is of  the opinion  that it is in public interest to do      so, have  the absolute  right, by  giving any  employee      prior notice in writing, to retire that employee on the      date  on  which  he  completes  twenty  five  years  of      qualifying service  or attains fifty years of age or on      any date thereafter to be specified in notice.           (b) The  period of  such notice  shall not be less      than three months:           Provided that  where at least three months’ notice      is not  given or  notice for  a period  less than three      months is  given, the  employee shall  be  entitled  to      claim a  sum equivalent  to the  amount of  his pay and      allowances at  the same  rates at  which he was drawing      them immediately  before the  date of  retirement for a      period of  three months or, as the case may be, for the      period by which such notice falls short of three months 1044           (2) Any  Government employee  may, after giving at      least three  months’ previous  notice in writing to the      appropriate authority  retire from  service on the date      on which  he completes  twenty five years of qualifying      service or  attains fifty  years of  age or on any date      thereafter to be specified in the notice;           Provided that  no employee  under suspension shall      retire from  service except  with the specific approval      of the appropriate authority."      In exercise  of the  power conferred  by rule 3(1) (a), Deputy  Commissioner,   Bhatinda  passed  an  order  of  the premature retirement of the appellant dated August 20. 1975. It reads as under:      "No. 173                               Dated 20.8. 1975           Under Rule  3(1) (a)  of the Punjab Civil Services      (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975, Shri Hans Raj, Sub-      Divisional Assistant,  S D.O.  (Civil) office, Bhatinda      who has  completed more than 25 years service is hereby      retired from service from the date of order.           2. He  shall be  entitled to  three months  pay in      lieu of  notice as  is admissible  under proviso  below      rule 3 (1) (b) of the Rules ibid.           3. He shall further be entitled to the benefits of      retiring pension  and death  cum  retirement  gratuity,      admissible under the rules.                                                         Sd/-      Deputy Commissioner,

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    Bhatinda."      The appellant  was accordingly  prematurely retired  by the  appropriate   authority  on  the  ground  that  he  has completed more than 25 years of service and that even though he was  prematurely retired, he was entitled to the benefits of retiring  pension  and  death  cum  retirement  gratuity, admissible under  the rules.  The appellant  questioned  the validity, legality and correctness of the order of premature retirement in  C.W.P. No.  6461 of 1976 in the High Court of Punjab  and   Haryana  at  Chandigarh.  It  was  inter  alia contended before  a Division Bench of the High Court that on the 1045 relevant date,  the appellant  had not completed 25 years of qualifying service  and therefore,  he could  not have  been retired under  Rule 3(1).  It was  also contended  that  the impugned order  of premature  retirement suffered  from  the vice of  non-application of  mind in  as much as it does not state that  the power  of prematurely retiring the appellant was exercised  in public  interest. It  was urged  that  the power to  prematurely retire  a Government servant conferred by Rule  3 postulates  two pre-requisites  (i) that it is in public interest to prematurely retire the Government servant and (ii) that either he has completed 25 years of qualifying service  or  he  has  attained  50  years  of  age.  It  was accordingly  Contended   that  if   the  pre-requisites  for exercise of  power, are not satisfied, the order would be ab initio void  and would not have the effect of bringing about the termination  of service  There  were  other  contentions raised on behalf of the appellant before the High Could with which we are not concerned in this appeal.      A return  was filed on behalf of the respondents by the third  respondent-Deputy   Commissioner,  Bhatinda  who  has passed the Impugned order. It was stated that the conduct of the applicant  in the year 1971-72 was found unsatisfactory. His  integrity  was  found  doubtful.  It  was  specifically contended that  the appellant  was prematurely  retired from service on  his completion  of more than 25 years of service and the  computation that  he  had  completed  25  years  of service was  correct  because  the  break  in  service  from October 1,  1953 to  February 21,  1954 was  condoned by the PEPSU Government  vide Revenue  Department Letter  No. RD-13 (25) SS-/  56-7101 dated  June 28,  1956 and  that once  the break in  service was condoned, the appellant on the date of premature retirement  had completed  25 years  of qualifying service. A  bald statement  was  made  that  the  power  was exercised in  public interest  but  the  impugned  order  is wholly silent on this material point.      A division  Bench of  the High  Court rejected the writ petition observing  that once  the  break  in  service  from September, 1953  to February  20,  1954  was  condoned,  the appellant had  completed  25  years  of  service  and  after recording the  statement of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the Memo No. Xll IN XI/ Misc. file/75-76/1618-19 dated  January  1,  1976  issued  by  the Accounts Officer  attached to  the Office  of the Accountant General, Punjab  and addressed to the Sub-Divisional Officer (c), Bhatinda  stating therein  that  the  services  of  the appellant for  the period  from October  l, 1953 to February 21, 1954  does not  qualify for  pension as service prior to the break was for a period less than 1046 five years,  would not  be given  effect  to  and  thereupon concluded that the pre-requisite for exercise of power under rule 3(1)  (a) was  satisfied. Hence  this appeal by special

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leave.      Mr. N.  D. Garg,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant convassed two  contentions before  us: (1)  that  the  order dated August  28, 1956 issued in the name of the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU  sanctioning the condonation of break in service of the appellant for the period October 1, 1953 to February 20, 1954  was  for  the  limited  purpose  of’  granting  quasi- permanent status  and  issuing  quasi-permanent  certificate only and  for no  other purpose and therefore the Accountant General rightly  held  that  the  condonation  in  break  of service did  not qualify  for pension and therefore the High Court was  in error in holding that the appellant had put in 28 years  of qualifying  service on the date of the impugned order; and  (2) the  order suffers from the vice of complete non-application of  mind inasmuch  as in  the impugned order there is  not the  slightest  whisper  that  the  power  was exercised in public interest.      Rule 3(1) (a) of the Premature Retirement Rules confers power on  the appropriate  authority to retire any employee, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so,  on the  date on  which  he  completes  25  years  of qualifying service  or attained  50 years of age. This power of premature  retirement can  be exercised firstly in public interest and  secondly, if  one of  the  two  conditions  is satisfied namely  that either  the employee  who  is  to  be retired has  completed 25 years of qualifying service on the date on which he is to be retired or he has attained the age of 50 on that date. The power can be exercise on the date on which one  of the  two alternative  fact  situation  becomes available  or   on  any   date  thereafter.  Therefore,  the appropriate authority must first make up its mind that it is in public  interest to  retire  the  employee.  Once  having reached that  satisfaction, it must further find out whether the concerned employee has on the relevant date completed 25 years of  qualifying service  or whether he has attained the age of  50 years.  The respondents  in this case assert that the appropriate  authority has  retired the  appellant as it was of  the opinion  that it was in public interest to do so and on  the relevant  date the  appellant had  completed  25 years of qualifying service.      Taking the  second contention  first, it  is  incumbent upon the  respondents to  show  that  on  the  date  of  the impugned order,  the appellant  had completed  25  years  of qualifying service. Let there be no confusion that is it not 25 years of service but it is 25 1047 years of  qualifying service  which must have been completed before  the   power  can   be  exercised.   The   expression ’qualifying service’  has been  defined in  Rule 2(3) of the Premature Retirement  Rules to  mean ’service qualifying for pension The  expression ’service qualifying as understood in the rules governing pension in the Punjab Civil Services has been given  various shades of meaning. Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.  II, Chapter  III para  3.12 provides  that  ’the service of  a  Government  employee  does  not  qualify  for pension unless  it conforms  to the three conditions therein mentioned:      First -   The service must be under Government.      Second-   The  employment   must  be   substantive  and                permanent.      Third -   The service must be paid by Government.      The rules  permit condonation  of interruption or break in service.  If there  is a  break, how the service prior to the break  has to be dealt with for the purpose of computing qualifying service  has been  dealt with  in Chapter IV para

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4.23 under  the heading  D-Condonation of  Interruptions and Deficiencies. It  provides  that  ’interruption  in  service (either between two spells of permanent or temporary service or between  a  spell  of  temporary  service  and  permanent service or  vice versa),  in the case of an officer retiring on or  after the 5th January, 1961, may be condoned, subject to the following conditions, therein mentioned. The relevant condition reads as under:           "(2) Service  proceeding the  interruption  should      not be  less than  five years’ duration. In cases where      there are two or more interruptions, the total service,      pensionary benefits  in respect  of which shall be lost      if the  interruptions are  not condoned  should not  be      less than five years."      The question  is whether  the service  rendered by  the appellant despite  the fact  that it  was temporary  for the period September  30, 1953  to February 22, 1954 when he was reinducted  in   service  can   be  included   in  reckoning qualifying service  on the date of the‘ impugned order it is conceded that  if the service prior to the break is ignored, the appellant  had not  completed  25  years  of  qualifying service on  the date  of the impugned order. To recall a few facts, the appellant joined service on September 2, 1949. He was discharged on September 30, 1953. Therefore, the service prior to 1048 the break was of roughly four years and 28 days duration. At any rate it was less than five years in duration. Therefore, Condition No.  2 in  para 4.23  of the  Premature Retirement Rules  would   be  attracted   because  it   provides   that interruption in  service may  be condoned if amongst others, service preceding  the interruption  is not  less than  five years. As  the service prior to the break was less than five years even  if the  interruption  or  break  in  service  is condoned unconditionally,  the  earlier  service  would  not qualify for  being reckoned  as qualifying  service for  the purpose of  pension. This  is exactly  what  the  Accountant General in  his order  dated January 1, 1976 has opined when he said  that in  the case of the appellant service prior to the break  being less than five years duration, such service does  not  qualify  for  pension.  He  accordingly  computed qualifying service  from Feb.  22, 1954 till August 20, 1975 when  the   impugned  order   was  passed.  An  arithmetical computation would  show that the appellant had not completed 25 years of qualifying service on August 20, 1975.      It was  however, contended on behalf of the respondents that as the break in service from Sept. 30, 1953 to February 21, 1954  was condoned,  the appellant  can be  said  to  be continuously in service from September 2, 1949 and therefore on August  20, 1975  he had  completed more than 25 years of qualifying service.  Undoubtedly, the  Raj Pramukh  of PEPSU had sanctioned  condonation of break in service from October 1,  1953  to  February  21,  1954  in  the  service  of  the appellant, Whether  this condonation  would make the service continuous for  the purpose  of treating  earlier service as includible in  computing qualifying service, it is necessary to examine  the purpose, the content and the benefit granted by this order.      The order of the Raj Pramukh reads as under:           "His Highness  the Rajpramukh  has been pleased to      sanction the  condonation of  break from  1.10.1953  to      21.2.1954 in  the service  of Shri Hans Raj, under note      to sub-para  (iii) of para 3, Annexure ’B’ of the Pepsu      Civil Services  (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955 for the      purpose of  issuing quasi-permanent  Certificate  only,

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    provided that  his service  was not  discontinued as  a      result of  resignation or  his employment elsewhere and      further  provided  that  the  incumbent  has  not  been      confirmed already."      This order  has been  made in  exercise of  the  powers      conferred 1049 by sub-para  (iii) or  para 3  of Annexure  ’B’ to the PEPSU Civil Services  (Temporary Service)  Rules, 1955. Sub Rule 2 (b) of  the aforementioned  rules  defines  ’quasi-permanent service’ to mean ’temporary service commencing from the date on which a declaration issued under rule 3 takes effects and consisting of  periods of  duty and leave (other than extra- ordinary leave)  after  that  date.  Rule  3  provides  that Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi- permanent service; (i) if he has been in continuous Government service for more than 3 years, and (ii) if the appointing authority, being satisfied  as to  his character  for employment  in  a quasi-permanent capacity,  has issued  a declaration to that effect,  in   accordance  with   such  instruction   as  the Rajpramukh may  issue from  time to  time. Annexure ’B’ sets out instructions  regulating the  issue  of  declaration  of quasi-permanent eligibility to temporary employees under the PEPSU Civil  Services (Temporary  service) Rules, 1955. Para (HI) of  sub-para (3)  provides that before a certificate of quasi-permanent  capacity  can  be  issued,  the  Government servant should have on the crucial date rendered service for more than  three years.  Note appended  to the para provides that ’broken periods of temporary service will not count for purposes of  this instruction unless the breaks are condoned specifically by  the Government  in  consultation  with  the Finance Department and the service thus rendered continues.’ It further  provides that  while condoning  break in service for  the   purpose  of   issuing  quasi-permanent   capacity certificate,  ’it  should  be  made  clear  to  the  persons concerned that  the condonation will not entitle them to any benefits regarding  the fixation of pay, seniority, pension, gratuity etc.  and that the periods condoned will be ignored and not  counted as  service  actually  rendered.’  It  thus becomes  crystal   clear  that  the  certificate  issued  by Rajpramukh  under   the  PEPSU   Civil  Services  (Temporary Service) Rules,  1955 condoning break in service was for the limited  purpose   of   issuing   quasi-permanent   capacity certificate. Not  only that  the condonation  was  for  this limited purpose  but the  negative is clearly spell out when it is  specifically provided  that the  condonation will not enable a person in whose favour the certificate is issued to claim any  pension or  gratuity etc.  In  other  words,  the condonation will  not render  the earlier  service if  it is otherwise not  includible in  the computation  of qualifying service to  so claim it. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission  made on  behalf of the respondents and which unfortunately found  favour with the High Court that because the Rajpramukh  of PEPSU  had condoned break in service, the appellant  was  in  continuous  uninterrupted  service  from September 2, 1949. For the purpose of computing qualifying 1050 service  for   pension  the   period  for  which  there  was interruption will  remain a  break in  service  and  as  the earlier service  as provided  by para 4.23, condition No. 2, was for  a period  less than  five years, the same cannot be taken into  account for  computing qualifying  service. Thus the conclusion  is inescapable  that the  qualifying service which the appellant is shown to have rendered commenced from February 22,  1954. Inevitably, therefore on August 20, 1975

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he had  not completed  25 years  of qualifying  service  and therefore, the  primary pre-requisite  for exercise of power is not  satisfied and  the appellant  could  not  have  been compulsory   retired    from   service.   The   High   Court unfortunately overlooked  the basic requirement for exercise of power  namely completing  25 years  of qualifying service and proceeded  on the  basis  that  rendering  25  years  of service will permit exercise of power. There is a marked and noteworthy  distinction   between  service   and  qualifying service.      Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the concession made by  the respondents before the High Court that the memo issued by  the Accountant  General shall not be given effect to is hardly of any legal consequence. It is the duty of the Accountant General  to compute  the qualifying  service  for pension. He  was satisfied that under the relevant rules the appellant had  not completed  25 years of qualifying service on the  date of  the impugned  order. He  dearly pointed out that  condonation  in  break  in  service  is  of  no  legal consequence as  far as  computation of qualifying service is concerned. Therefore,  that concession  has to be ignored as of no consequence.      Mr. Garg next urged that the impugned order made by the competent authority suffers from the vice of non-application of mind  inasmuch as  it has not been stated in the impugned order that the power was exercised in public interest. There is substance  in this  contention. The impugned order merely recites that  as the  appellant has  completed more  than 25 years of  service, he  is retired  from the service from the date of  the order. Silence about recital of public interest is both  conspicuous and glaring probably as the power was a exercised by  an officer  of the rank of Deputy Commissioner who was  blissfully unaware  of it. The return is also filed by the  same officer. In the return filed in this court, the only contention  worth noting  is that  as  the  High  Court Judgment is  clear, convincing  and unassailable  this Court should  not  interfere  in  exercise  of  its  extraordinary jurisdiction because  no case  of injustice  is made out. In para 5  (c) of  the return  filed in  the High Court, it has been stated 1051 that the  impugned order  is legal  and  the  appellant  was retired on  completion of  his 25  years of service. In para (d) it  is stated  that the  order retiring  the  petitioner prematurely was passed in public interest. The attempt seems to be  to merely  reproduce the language of the rule without any attempt  at bringing  the case  within the parameters of the relevant  rule. If  the power  was exercised  in  public interest, one  would have  expected some whisper about it in the impugned  order, However  when a specific contention was taken that the power was not exercised in public interest, a routine averment  was made  that it  was exercised in public interest. When  this contention  was canvassed  before  this Court, the  respondents tried  to repel it by saying that in the annual  confidential report  for the  year  1971-72,  an entry has  been made  that the  conduct of tho appellant was unsatisfactory and his integrity was found doubtful. This is tho only  entry relied  upon to substantiate the charge that as  the  appellant  had  rendered  himself  undesirable  for further  continuance  in  service  and  therefore  power  to compulsorily retire him was exercised in public interest, We remain unconvinced  for two  reasons: (1) that no record was placed before us to show as to whether the adverse entry was ever communicated  to  the  appellant  and  (2)  his  record previous and  subsequent to  the year 1971-72 was not placed

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before us.  Thus there  remains  a  stray  entry  only.  The material for  making the  entry 3 years prior to the date of the impugned  order has  not been  placed before us. And the more disturbing  part is  that the entries in the subsequent years have  not been shown to us. It therefore, appears that reference to public interest in the return was an attempt at paying lip  sympathy to  the provision  of the relevant rule rather than a serious application of mind while dealing with the career  and the  consequent starvation  heaped upon  the appellant by the impugned order. We are therefore, satisfied that the order also suffers from the vice of non-application of mind.      However, we  propose  to  rest  this  judgment  on  the finding that the pre-requisite for the exercise of power was not satisfied  inasmuch as  the appellant  was not  shown to have completed 25 years of qualifying service on the date of the  impugned   order.   Therefore,   the   impugned   order compulsorily retiring  the appellant from service is illegal and invalid  and must be quashed and set aside. In this view of the  matter, we  find it difficult to agree with the view taken by the High Court. 1052      Accordingly, this  appeal succeeds  and is  allowed and the judgment  of the High Court is quashed and set aside and it is  hereby declared  that the impugned order dated August 20, 1975 compulsorily retiring the appellant from service of the Punjab  Government is  illegal and invalid and is hereby quashed.  A  necessary  declaration  must  follow  that  the appellant  continues   in  service  uninterruptedly  and  is entitled to  all the  benefits to  which he  would have been entitled, had he continued in service. The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellant. M.L.A.                                       Appeal allowed. 1053