http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  609 of 1997

PETITIONER: Hans Raj

RESPONDENT: State of Haryana

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/02/2004

BENCH: N. Santosh Hegde & B.P. Singh.

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

B.P. Singh, J.

       In this appeal by special leave the appellant Hans Raj has  impugned the judgment and order of the High Court of  Judicature of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated January  21, 1997 in Criminal Appeal No.633 \026 SB of 1986 affirming  the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions  Judge, Kurukshetra dated September 24, 1986 convicting and  sentencing the appellant to seven years rigorous imprisonment  and a fine of Rs.300/- under Section 306 I.P.C.  We have  carefully perused the judgments of the learned Additional  Sessions Judge and the High Court and we are constrained to  observe that the High Court while disposing of the appeal did  not even apply its mind to the facts of the case.  A disturbing  feature noticed by us is that the High Court merely repeated  paragraphs after paragraphs from the judgment of the learned  Additional Sessions Judge as if those conclusions were its own,  reached on an appreciation of the evidence on record.  Many of  the paragraphs are word from word borrowed from the  judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge without  acknowledging that fact.  We are, therefore, left with the  impression that the High Court failed to apply its mind to the  facts of the case as it was required to do, and was content with  repeating what was stated in the judgment of the Trial Court.  In  these circumstances we found it necessary to carefully  scrutinize the evidence on record since the High Court even  though the first court of appeal failed to do so.

       The case of the prosecution is that the wife of the  appellant, namely, Jeeto Rani committed suicide on 24.8.1986  on account of the cruelty and harassment meted out to her by  the appellant herein.

       The case of the prosecution is that in the year 1982 the  appellant married Jeeto Rani, daughter of Munshi Ram, PW-2.   It is also not in dispute that Naro, sister of the appellant was  married to Fateh Chand, PW-3 the brother of the deceased.  The  appellant lived in village Kheri Sahidan with the deceased  while Naro and Fateh Chand resided in the house of Munshi  Ram, PW-2 at village Laha Majri.  The appellant was blessed  with a daughter only seven months before the death of Jeeto.   On August 24, 1986 Munshi Ram, PW-2 father of Jeeto  (deceased) lodged the FIR which was recorded by ASI Chaman  Lal, PW-5 of Police Station Ismailabad at 2.50 p.m.  The  allegations in the FIR were to the following effect.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

       The appellant was addicted to ’Bhang’ and did not pay  any attention towards his domestic affairs.  Whenever Jeeto  attempted to prevent her husband from taking ’Bhang’ she used  to be assaulted by him.  Jeeto (deceased) had reported this  matter to her parents but they all persuaded her to go back to  her matrimonial home.  On Friday last the appellant and Jeeto  (deceased) came to the house of Munshi Ram (PW-2) when the  appellant stated that he would not keep Jeeto (deceased) with  him because his sister Naro was being harassed by Fateh  Chand, PW-3, the brother of Jeeto (deceased).  Munshi Ram  and members of his family persuaded the appellant not to do so  but Jeeto (deceased) was frightened and refused to accompany  her husband.  The appellant and Jeeto (deceased) stayed at the  house of Munshi Ram for two days and on the third day with  great difficulty Munshi Ram, PW-2 persuaded his daughter  Jeeto to accompany the appellant to her matrimonial home.  It  was alleged by Munshi Ram in the FIR that the appellant had  told them that since Fateh Chand, PW-3 was harassing his sister  he would take revenge.   

       On the date of occurrence at about 10 a.m. Munshi Ram,  PW-2 was informed by one Shana Ram that Jeeto was seriously  ill and asked him to reach village Kheri immediately.  The  informant alongwith his brothers and others reached village  Kheri and found that his daughter was dead.  In the report he  stated that he entertained a suspicion that Jeeto had committed  suicide by taking poison being fed up by the beatings and the  harassment caused to her by her husband.

       On the basis of the said report a case was registered and  the matter was investigated by ASI, Chaman Lal, PW-5.  The  medical evidence on record as well as the chemical examiner’s  report established the fact that Jeeto died of poisoning.  Apparently, therefore, the case of the prosecution was that she  had committed suicide by consuming poison.  The record also  discloses that Jeeto was treated by Dr. Ram Gopal Sharma  when she was in a precarious condition at the house of the  appellant.  He gave her an injection and thereafter she was  shifted to his clinic at Ismailabad on his advice.  It appears that  thereafter Dr. Kaushal also treated her but her life could not be  saved.   

       In the FIR only two allegations were made by Munshi  Ram, PW-2, firstly, that there were frequent quarrels,  sometimes resulting in physical assault, between the appellant  and Jeeto on account of his being addicted to consumption of  ’Bhang’, and secondly, that the appellant was aggrieved by the  fact that his sister was not being properly looked after by his  brother-in-law namely, Fateh Chand, PW-3.

       Munshi Ram was examined by the prosecution as PW-2.   In his deposition he stated that the appellant was addicted to  liquor and bhang and whenever Jeeto attempted to persuade  him to desist from this addiction he used to misbehave with her  and even beat her.  According to him, 8-9 days before her death  Jeeto had come to his house alongwith the appellant.  The  appellant had then complained to him that Jeeto was not good  looking and therefore he was not going to take her back and that  he intended to perform a second marriage.  However, on their  persuasion he stayed at his village for 2-3 days whereafter he  persuaded his daughter Jeeto to accompany the appellant to  village Kheri.  From his cross-examination, it appears that the  case sought to be made out at the Trial that the appellant was  addicted to liquor was not stated in the course of investigation.   Similarly,  Munshi Ram, PW-2 had not stated in the course of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

investigation that the appellant had complained that Jeeto was  not good looking.  It also appears that in the course of  investigation he had not stated about Jeeto having told him that  the accused had been beating her.

       Fateh Chand, PW-3 also deposed in favour of the  prosecution and he also alleged that the appellant was addicted  to liquor and bhang and that he had been told by Jeeto that the  appellant did not want to keep her as he did not find her to be  good looking.  According to Fateh Chand, PW-3 whenever  Jeeto came to their house she used to complain about the  treatment meted out to her by the appellant.  Even the appellant  had told him that he did not like Jeeto.  PW-3 further deposed  that for about a year and a half after marriage the appellant and  Jeeto lived in harmony.  In his statement before the police in the  course of investigation there is no mention about the fact that  the appellant was addicted to liquor.  PW-3 also admitted that  in his statement before the police he did not state that the  accused had told him that his sister was not good looking, nor  did he state that his sister had told him that the accused felt  aggrieved because she was not good looking.  

       The case of the prosecution rests mainly on the evidence  of these two witnesses namely, Munshi Ram, PW-2 and Fateh  Chand, PW-3.  In his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.  the appellant stated that the case against him was false.  He had  kept his wife Jeeto with love and affection and had never  proclaimed that she was not good looking.  She had given birth  to a daughter but thereafter she had been keeping unwell  because of some tension in her mind on account of birth of a  daughter.  Only four days prior to her death she had come from  her parents’ house and thereafter she started vomiting.  Dr. Ram  Gopal Sharma was called from Ismailabad and he gave her an  injection.  Thereafter Jeeto was removed to the clinic of Dr.  Ram Gopal.  Dr. Kaushal was also consulted but he did not give  any hope.  The parents of Jeeto were thereafter informed  through a messenger but by the time they came Jeeto had died.

       The learned Additional Sessions Judge noticed the fact  that Munshi Ram, PW-2 had considerably improved his case at  the trial.  The allegations that the appellant used to taunt Jeeto  because she was not good looking, or that he was going to re- marry, or even regarding beatings to her, were all in the nature  of improvements. His statement at the trial that once the  deceased had come to his house in injured condition did not  find mention in his statement recorded by the police in the  course of investigation.  The allegation that the appellant was  addicted to liquor also did not find recorded in the statement of  the witnesses before the police.  However, the Trial Court was  greatly impressed by the fact that this was clearly a case of  suicide and the appellant had maintained complete silence as to  what was the conversation between him and the deceased  immediately before the deceased was found in a precarious  condition.  According to the Trial Court, law enjoined upon the  husband an obligation to explain the circumstances in which his  wife committed suicide.  Reliance was placed on the  presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.   It observed that in the absence of any suitable answer from the  defence a presumption arose under Section 113-A of the Indian  Evidence Act.  Therefore, the Court found that though there  were improvements in the statements of the prosecution  witnesses, it could not be disbelieved that the appellant treated  his wife with cruelty.  Taking the aid of Section 113-A the trial  court concluded that a presumption of law arose in the given  circumstances. Since Jeeto was led to commit suicide, it must

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

have been due to the abetment on the part of the appellant,   since the story set up by the appellant in his statement under  Section 313 Cr.P.C. was totally unbelievable.  Surprisingly, the  Trial Court observed that the appellant’s remark that his wife  was not good looking and to his liking and that he was going to  re-marry was "a  gravest of abetment on the part of the husband  leading to the wife to commit suicide".  The trial court while  recording this conclusion completely lost sight of its own  finding that this part of the story was clearly an improvement  and that no such allegation was made either in the FIR or in the  course of investigation.  All that was stated in the FIR and in  the course of investigation was that the appellant was aggrieved  of the fact that his sister Naro was not properly treated by Fateh  Chand, PW-3 who was the brother of Jeeto.  The only other  allegation found in the FIR is that the appellant was addicted to  ’Bhang’ and whenever Jeeto objected to it, it resulted in a  quarrel and sometimes physical assault on Jeeto.

       Having gone through the evidence on record we are  satisfied that the prosecution has sought to improve its case at  the trial by introducing new facts and allegations which were  never stated in the course of investigation.  All that appears to  have been satisfactorily established is that the appellant was  addicted to ’Bhang’ and that frequent quarrels took place when  his wife Jeeto objected to his taking ’Bhang’.   Though it is  stated in the FIR that the appellant had complained about the  treatment meted out to his sister Naro by Fateh Chand, there is  evidence of Fateh Chand, PW-3 himself that he was living  happily with Naro, his wife, who happened to be the sister of  the appellant.  One fails to understand why the appellant should  make such an allegation when his sister was living happily with  Fateh Chand, PW-3.  As to the frequent assaults on the  deceased by the appellant and her reporting the matter to her  father and brother, there appears to be no reason why, if these  facts were true, no such allegation was made in the course of  investigation by the prosecution witnesses PWs 2 and 3.   We  are, therefore, satisfied that the prosecution has been able to  establish its case only to the extent that the appellant was  addicted to ’Bhang’ which was opposed by his wife Jeeto and  on account of such opposition there used to be frequent quarrels  and may be on some occasions Jeeto was assaulted by the  appellant.  Beyond this we find the other  allegations made by  the prosecution to be unacceptable.  

The question then arises as to whether in the facts and  circumstances of the case the appellant can be convicted of the  offence under Section 306 I.P.C. with the aid of the  presumption under Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence Act.   Any person who abets the commission of suicide is liable to be  punished under Section 306 I.P.C. Section 107 I.P.C. lays down  the ingredients of abetment which includes instigating any  person to do a thing or engaging with one or more person in any  conspiracy for the doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission  takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to the  doing of that thing, or intentional aid by any act or illegal  omission to the doing of that thing.  In the instant case there is  no direct evidence to establish that the appellant either aided or  instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered into any  conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide.  In the absence of  direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon Section 113-A  of the Indian Evidence Act under which the Court may presume  on proof of circumstances enumerated therein, and having  regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that the suicide  had been abetted by the accused.  The explanation to Section  113-A further clarifies that cruelty shall have the same meaning

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which means:- "(a)  any wilful conduct which is of such a  nature as is likely to drive the woman to  commit suicide or to cause grave injury or  danger to life, limb or health (whether mental  or physical) of the woman; or

(b)     harassment of the woman where such  harassment is with a view to coercing her or  any person related to her to meet any unlawful  demand for any property or valuable security or  is on account of failure by her or any person  related to her to meet such demand".

Unlike Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a  statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely  on proof of the circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of  the Indian Evidence Act.  Under Section 113-A of the Indian  Evidence Act the prosecution has first to establish that the  woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven  years from the date of her marriage and that her husband (in this  case) had subjected her to cruelty.  Even if these facts are  established the Court is not bound to presume that the suicide  had been abetted by her husband.  Section 113-A gives a  discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption, having  regard to all the other circumstances of the case, which means  that where the allegation is of cruelty it must consider the  nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having  regard to the meaning of word cruelty in Section 498-A I.P.C.   The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven  years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty  by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the  presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband.   The Court is required to look into all the other circumstances of  the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered  by the Court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature  as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause  grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman.  The  law has been succinctly stated in RameshKumar Vs. State of  Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618  wherein this Court observed :   "This provision was introduced by the Criminal  Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with  effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social  demand to resolve difficulty of proof where  helpless married women were eliminated by  being forced to commit suicide by the husband  or in-laws and incriminating evidence was  usually available within the four corners of the  matrimonial home and hence was not available  to anyone outside the occupants of the house.   However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the  presumption is intended to operate against the  accused in the field of criminal law.  Before the  presumption may be raised, the foundation  thereof must exist.  A bare reading of Section  113-A shows that to attract applicability of  Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the  woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide  has been committed within a period of seven  years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the  husband or his relatives, who are charged had  subjected her to cruelty.  On existence and  availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the  court may presume that such suicide had been

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

abetted by her husband or by such relatives of  her husband.  Parliament has chosen to sound a  note of caution.  Firstly, the presumption is not  mandatory; it is only permissive as the  employment of expression "may presume"  suggests.  Secondly, the existence and  availability of the abovesaid three  circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable  the presumption being drawn; before the  presumption may be drawn the court shall have  to have regard to "all the other circumstances of  the case".  A consideration of all the other  circumstances of the case may strengthen the  presumption or may dictate the conscience of  the court to abstain from drawing the  presumption.  The expression \026 "the other  circumstances of the case" used in Section 113- A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect  relationship between the cruelty and the suicide  for the purpose of raising a presumption.  Last  but not the least, the presumption is not an  irrebuttable one.  In spite of a presumption  having been raised the evidence adduced in  defence or the facts and circumstances  otherwise available on record may destroy the  presumption.  The phrase "may presume" used  in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the  Evidence Act, which says \026 "Whenever it is  provided by this Act that the court may  presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as  proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may  call for proof of it".

       The same principle has been reiterated in Sanju Alias  Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371.   

       In the State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal and Anr.  (1994) 1 SCC 73 this Court observed : "We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the  degree of proof is stricter than what is required  in a civil proceedings.  In a criminal trial  however intriguing may be facts and  circumstances of the case, the charges made  against the accused must be proved beyond all  reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof  cannot lie in the realm of surmises and  conjectures.  The requirement of proof beyond  reasonable doubt does not stand altered even  after the introduction of Section 498-A IPC and  Section 113-A of Indian Evidence Act.   Although, the court’s conscience must be  satisfied that the accused is not held guilty  when there are reasonable doubts about the  complicity of the accused in respect of the  offences alleged, it should be borne in mind  that there is no absolute standard for proof in a  criminal trial and the question whether the  charges made against the accused have been  proved beyond all reasonable doubts must  depend upon the facts and circumstances of the  case and the quality of the evidences adduced in  the case and the materials placed on record.   Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater [(1950) 2 All  ER 458,459] has observed that the doubt must  be of a reasonable man and the standard

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

adopted must be a standard adopted by a  reasonable and just man for coming to a  conclusion considering the particular subject- matter".

       Having regard to the principles aforesaid, we may now  advert to the facts of this case.  The learned Trial Judge took the  view that since the wife of the appellant committed suicide and  since the appellant did not disclose as to what conversation  preceded her committing suicide and that there were allegations  of cruelty against the appellant, it must be presumed under  Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act that the suicide had  been abetted by him.  We do not find ourselves in agreement  with the finding of the Trial Court, having regard to the facts  and circumstances of this case and our finding that the  prosecution is guilty of improving its case from stage to stage.   The allegations that the appellant did not like to keep the  deceased with him because she was not good looking, or that he  was addicted to liquor or that the deceased had reported these  matters to her parents and others, or that the appellant intended  to re-marry and had told his wife Jeeto about it, or that the  deceased had once come to her father’s house in an injured  condition, or even the allegations regarding beatings, do not  find place in the statements recorded by the police in the course  of investigation.  These allegations have been made at the trial  for the first time.  All that was alleged in the FIR or even at the  stage of investigation was that there were frequent quarrels  between the husband and wife sometimes resulting in physical  assault, on account of the husband being addicted to  consumption of ’Bhang’.  The other allegation that the  appellant was aggrieved of the fact that his sister Naro was not  being properly treated by Fateh Chand, PW-3, brother of the  deceased, also appears to be untrue because there is nothing on  record to show that there was any disharmony in the marital life  of his sister Naro.  In fact, Fateh Chand, PW-3, her husband,  himself stated on oath that he was living happily with his wife  Naro, sister of the appellant.  On such slender evidence  therefore we are not persuaded to invoke the presumption under  Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act to find the appellant  guilty of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C.

       The Trial Court found that there was material to support  the charge under Section 498-A I.P.C. but did not pass a  sentence under Section 498-A I.P.C. on a finding that the same  will be overlapping, the appellant having been found guilty of  the offence under Section 306 I.P.C.  Having regard to the facts  of the case, we are satisfied that though the prosecution has  failed to establish the offence under Section 306 I.P.C., the  evidence on record justifies the conviction of the appellant  under Section 498-A I.P.C.  

We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence  passed against the appellant under Section 306 I.P.C. and acquit  him of that charge, but we find the appellant guilty of the  offence under Section 498-A I.P.C and sentence him to undergo  rigorous imprisonment for one year on that count.  This appeal  is partly allowed.  The appellant was admitted to bail by this  Court.  His bail bonds are cancelled, and he must surrender to  his sentence, subject to the provisions of Section 428 of the  Code of Criminal Procedure.