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PETITIONER: HANS RAJ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RATTAN CHAND, ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/04/1967

BENCH: MITTER, G.K. BENCH: MITTER, G.K. WANCHOO, K.N. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1780            1967 SCR  (3) 365  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1979 SC 993  (4)  F          1989 SC1179  (17)  D          1991 SC1581  (8)

ACT: Provincial Insolvency Act (Punjab Act 5 of 1920) ss. 4 & 68- application against act of receiver alleging property, taken over by him not of insolvent-whether an application under s. 4 or s. 68-Whether Iimiation of 21 days it s. 68 applies.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant’s  brother was adjudicated insolvent  by  the Insolvency  Judge,  Barnala, Punjab on the  23rd  November., 1954.   Two  days  later  it  Receiver  in  insolvency   was appointed  by the Court and was directed to take  possession of  the  property  of the insolvent On  the  26th  and  27th November,  1954  the  receive  took  possession  of  various properties  and  on the 21st December, 1954,  the  appellant filed  an  objection application alleging that some  of  the property  belonged  to  him  and  was  exclusively  in   his possession.   He  therefore  prayed  for  its  release   and restoration  to  him.   The  insolvency  Judge  -rejected  a contention that the application was time-barred under s.  68 of the Act but held that the property did not belong to  the appellant.   After first and second appeals to the  District Judge,  and  a single Bench of the High  Court,  a  division Bench allowed a Letters Patent Appeal on the ground that the appellant’s  application  was.  incompetent  as  barred   by limitation. In  appeal to this Court the question for determination  was whether  the appellant’s application was one under s. 68  of the Provincial Insolvency Act, and as such having been  made beyond  the period of 21 days  from the date of the  act  of the  receiver complained of, was covered by the  proviso  to that  section.  It was contended on behalf of the  appellant that the application was one under s. 4 of the Act in  which there is no mention of any period of limitation. HELD  :  The  application  was  one  under  s.  68  and  was incompetent  on the ground of limitation after the lapse  of 21 days from November 25, 1954. A  person complaining of the act of the receiver may  either

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apply  under  68 or proceed under the ordinary  law  of  the land.   Section  4 does not prescribe  any  application  for relief  under that section.  Its object is to,.  define  the limit,%  of jurisdiction of the courts exercising powers  in insolvency.   A question as to whether an insolvent has  any interest in the property attached by the receiver would fall within  the  purview of s. 4, but the  application  for  the adjudication  of  such  a question when  the  receiver  acts otherwise  than under the order of a court would be  covered by s. 68 and as such the period of limitation of  twenty-one days would be attracted to any such application.  Sub-s. (1) and  sub-s. (2) of s. 4 both start with the phrase  "subject to the provisions of this Act" and even if it. was  possible to construe that s. 4 envisaged the making of an application for  relief, such application would be subject to s.  68  of the Act. [370F; 372E-G] Daulat  Ram v. Bansla A.I.R. 1937 Lahore page 2,  approved-, Venkatarama   v.  Angathayammal  A.I.R.  1933  Madras   471, Heerabai   v.  Official  Receiver  A.I.R.  1963  A.P.   296; disapproved. Vellayappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar I.L.R. 47  Madras 446, G.   N. Godbole v. Mr. Nani Bai A.I.R. 1938 Nagpur 546, Muthupalaniappa 366 v.   Raman  Chettiar  A.I.R.  1941 Madras  75;  Mul  Raj  v. Official  Receiver A.I.R 1937 Lahore 297, Ganda Ram v.  Shiv Nand  Ganesh Das A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 757; and Ma, Sein Nu  v. U. Mg.  Mg.  A.I.R. 1934 Rangoon 97; Bhairo Prasad v. S.  P. C.  Dass, A.I.R. 1919 Allahabad 274, Hussain,’  v.  Muhammad Zamir  Abdi  A.I.R. 1924 Oudh. 294 and Mul Chand  v.  Murari Lal, I.L.R. 36 Allahabad 8; referred to Nathu   Ram   v.   Madan  Gopal,   A.I.R.   Allahabad   408; distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL No. 1000 of 1, 964. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated November 28,  1962 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 212 of 1961. Bishan  Narain  and  B. P. Maheshwari,  for  the  appellant. Naunit Lal, for respondent Nos.  1 to 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter,  J.  This is an appeal by a  certificate  against  a judgment of    a  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court   at Chandigarh  in Letters Patent Appeal No. 212 of  1961.   The High  Court  allowed  the  appeal on  the  ground  that  the application out of which it arose was incompetent as  barred by limitation and, in our opinion, it did so correctly.  The short question before us is, whether application leading  to this appeal was one under s. 68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act,  and as such having been made beyond the period  of  21 days from the date of the act of the receiver complained of, was  covered by the proviso to that section ? In  substance, the  argument  on  behalf  of the  appellant  was  that  the application was one under s. 4 of the Act in which there  is no mention of any period of limitation. The  facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are  as follows  :-Brij  Lal  and Hans Raj  were  brothers.   On  an application having been made by the creditors of Brij Lal in the year 1949, the insolvency Judge, Barnala adjudicated him as   an  insolvent,  on  23rd  November,  1954.   Two   days thereafter, one Mohinder Lal was appointed as a receiver  in

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insolvency by the order of the Court and lie was directed to take  possession of the property of the insolvent.  On  26th and  27th  November, 1954 the receiver  took  possession  of various properties of the insolvent and attached some  urban property and agricultural land which are the  subject-matter of  the  present litigation.  Hans Raj  filed  an  objection application  on  21st  December,  1954  alleging  that   the property   detailed   therein  belonged  to  him   and   was exclusively in his possession.  He prayed for release of the property  from attachment and restoration of  possession  to him.   The  receiver pleaded that he  had  taken  possession thereafter at the instance of two creditors.  The insolvency Judge framed two issues, namely, (1) Is 367 the  objector owner of the suit property and  in  possession thereof  and is it accordingly not liable to be attached  by the  receiver ? and (2) whether the objection  petition  was time-barred  ?  The learned Judge decided  the  first  issue against  the objector but held that the application was  not covered by s. 68 of the Act.  In appeal, the District  Judge differed  from  both the findings.  He held that  there  had been no partition of the joint Hindu family of the insolvent and  his brother, but, on the point of limitation  he  found against the objector.  In the result, he accepted the appeal and  dismissed the objection petition.  Hans Raj went up  in Second Appeal to the Punjab High Court.  The learned  single Judge  of  the High Court came to the  conclusion  that  the property  in  dispute  must be deemed  to  be  the  separate property  of  Hans  Raj and held that  the  application  was within time.  Rattan Lal who replaced the original  receiver on  the latter’s death tiled a Letters Patent Appeal to  the High Court.  The High Court, as already noted, held that the Application of Hans Raj was not within time resulting in the dismissal of the objection petition. We must first consider the nature of the application made by the  objector and then find out whether it is covered by  s. 68 of the Act.  Section 4 of the Act on which Great reliance was  placed by learned counsel for the appellant is  one  of the three sections in Part I of the Act i.e. ss. 3, 4 and 5. Section  3 lays down that the District Courts shall  be  the courts having jurisdiction under the Act.  Section 4 defines the jurisdiction of the Court and runs a.-, follows :-               "(1)  Subject to the provisions of  this  Act,               the Court shall have full power to decide  all               questions whether of title or priority, or  of               any  nature whatsoever, and whether  involving               matters of law or of fact, which may arise  in               any  case  of  insolvency  coming  within  the               cognizance  of the Court, or which  the  Court               may  deem it expedient or necessary to  decide               for  the purpose of doing complete justice  or               making a complete distribution of property  in               any such case.               (2)Subject  to the provisions of this Act  and               notwithstanding  anything  contained  in   any               other  law for the time being in force,  every               such  decision shall be final and binding  for               all purposes as between, on the one hand,  the               debtor  and  the debtor’s estate and,  on  the               other  hand, all claimants against him  or  it               and all persons claiming through or under them               or any of them.               (3)Where the Court does not deem it  expedient               or  necessary  to decide any question  of  the               nature referred to in sub-section (1), but has

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             reason  to  believe  that  the  debtor  has  a               saleable interest in any property, the Court               368               may without further inquiry sell such interest                             in  such manner and subject to such  c onditions               as it may think fit."               Section  5  lays down the  general  powers  of               courts  under the Act.  Part 11 which has  the               heading  "Proceedings from the act  of  insol-               vency  to discharge" deals generally with  the               course   of  the  proceedings  in   insolvency               beginning  from the acts of insolvency to  the               order  for discharge of insolvency.  Part  III               is  headed  "administration of  property"  and               deals  with different subjects like method  of               proof  of  debts,  effect  of  insolvency   on               antecedent   transactions,   realisation    of               property, distribution of properly" and lastly               "appeals to court against receiver".  The last               topic  is covered by s. 68 which  provides  as               follows :-               "If  the insolvent or any of the creditors  or               any  other person is aggrieved by any  act  or               decision of the receiver, he may apply to  the               Court,  and the Court may confirm. reverse  or               modify the act or decision complained of,  and               make such order as it thinks just :               Provided   that  no  application  under   this               section   shall  be  entertained   after   the               expiration of twenty-one days from the date of               the act or decision complained of." Part   IV  deals  with  penalties,  Part  V   with   summary administration,  Part  VI  with appeals and  Part  Vll  with topics like costs, power to make rules, etc. Under s. 20 (contained in Part 11) the court when making, an order  admitting the petition may, and where the  debtor  is the petitioner ordinarily shall appoint in interim  receiver of the property of the debtor or of any part thereof and the interim  received, shall thereupon have such of  the  powers conferable  on a receiver appointed under the Code of  Civil Procedure  as the court may direct.  If an interim  receiver is not so appointed, the court may make such appointment  at any  subsequent time before adjudication.  Under s.  21,  at the time of making an order admitting the petition or at any subsequent time before adjudication the court may either  of its  own motion or on the application of any  creditor  make orders  to suit the occasion. namely, direct the  attachment by  actual seizure of the whole or any part of the  property in the possession or under the, control of the debtor, order a  warrant to issue with or without bail for his arrest,  or order  the debtor to reasonable security for his  appearance until final orders are made on the petition.  Under s. 28(2) on  the making of an order of adjudication ’, the  whole  of the property of the insolvent is to vest ill the court or in a receiver as provided in the Act and become divisible among the creditors in terms of the Act.  Under s. 56(1) the court may at the time of the order of adjudication or at any  time afterwards,  appoint  a  receiver for the  property  of  the insolvent, and 369 such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver.   Under subs.  (3)  of  the  section, where  the  court  appoints  a receiver,  it may remove the person in whose  possession  or custody   any  such  property  as  aforesaid  is  from   the

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possession or custody thereof but nothing in this section is to  be  deemed  to authorise the court to  remove  from  the possession  or  custody  of property  any  person  whom  the insolvent has not a present right so to remove.  Under  sub- s. (5) the provisions of this section shall apply so far  as may be to interim receivers appointed tinder s. 20. It  will be noted from the above that S. 4, sub-s. (1)  lays down  the  ambit  of  the powers  of  the  court  exercising insolvency  jurisdiction.  Its primary object is to  empower such  courts  to decide all questions whether  of  title  or priority  or of any nature whatsoever and whether  involving matters  of  law  or fact which may arise  in  any  case  of insolvency  coming within the cognizance of the  court.   In other words, the aim of this provision is that all questions of title or priority arising in insolvency should  primarily be  disposed  of by the insolvency courts so as  to  achieve expedition.   It  will  be  noted at  once  that  resort  to ordinary  courts  of law is not proscribed and at  the  same time the legislature provided that a person could resort  to the  insolvency  court  if the matter  arose  in  insolvency proceedings.   Under sub-s. (2) however every such  decision arrived  at  by  the insolvency court was to  be  final  and binding  for  all purposes as between on the one  hand,  the debtor and the debtor’s estate, and, on the other hand,  all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or  under  them or any of them.  This provision  is  however subject  to  the other provisions of the  Act  and  notwith- standing  anything contained in any other law for  the  time being  in force.  It is also to be noted that  this  section does  not  lay down what procedure or what steps  should  be taken  by  any person who is aggrieved by any order  of  the insolvency court or of any act or omission or commission  of the receiver. Section  20  of  the Act empowers the court  to  appoint  an interim receiver of the property of the debtor as soon as an order is made admitting the petition.  For the  preservation of  the  insolvent’s  property, the court  may  direct  such interim  receiver to take immediate possession of the  whole or  any  part  thereof.  A duty is  therefore  cast  on  the interim  receiver to see that the property of the debtor  is not  lost and for that purpose lie must act quickly.  As  it is  not  possible for him except on the application  of  the debtor to know all the details of the insolvent’s  property, lie  may  take the help of the creditors to  ascertain  what they  are.   In this case, on the day of the making  of  the order for adjudication, the court did not appoint a receiver but  did  so  two  days afterwards  directing  him  to  take possession of the property of the insolvent.  It is possible that the receiver may be misled by the creditors and he  may attach 370 properties  in which as a matter of fact, the insolvent  has no interest.  In such a case, the stranger to the insolvency proceedings is not without a remedy.  He need not resort  to the  ordinary and dilatory proceedings by tiling a suit  and getting an adjudication of title to his property, removal of the  attachment,  etc.  Section 68 is aimed  at  giving  him speedy relief by enabling him to make an application to  the court  straight  way  against any act  or  decision  of  the receiver and asking for appropriate relief.  If however  the party aggrieved seeks to benefit by this provision, he  must also  bring his case within the four corners of the  section and  prefer his application within 21 days from the date  of the act or decision of the receiver complained of. When  the receiver does an act under the express directions or  orders

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of  the court, an application by a third  party  complaining thereof  does not fall within S. 68 because  the  receiver’s act  is a ministerial one.  The aggrieved person is  however not  without  a  remedy.  He can inter  alia  apply  to  the insolvency court for undoing the wrong complained of and the court  can  give such relief as the circumstances  may  call for.   The  jurisdiction of the court and the ambit  of  its powers  are as contained in s. 4 which however does not  Jay down  any  procedure for obtaining such relief.  It  is  not therefore  correct to describe an application for relief  as one under s. 4. Leaving aside the decisions which were cited at the Bar,  it appears to us, on a plain reading of the sections  mentioned above and in particular, ss. 4 and 68, that there can be  no doubt   that  a  person  (like  the  appellant  before   us) complaining   of  the  receiver  taking  possession  of   or attaching  property in which the insolvent has no  interest, must apply for relief within 21 days of the wrongful act  of the  receiver.  He cannot be heard to say that his  applica- tion  is  not under s. 68 but under s. 4 and  thus  seek  to avoid the short period of limitation prescribed under s. 68. Moreover,  subs. (1) and sub-s. (2) of S. 4 both start  with the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Act" and  even if  it  was  possible to construe that s.  4  envisaged  the making of an application for relief, such application  would be subject to S. 68 of the Act. We  may now consider some of the decisions cited at the  Bar for or against the proposition put forward on behalf of  the appellant. The sheet anchor of the appellant’s case is the decision  of the  Allahabad  High Court in Nathu Ram v.  Madan  Gopal(1). There the Official Receiver, in pursuance of an order of the insolvency court, attached a property on 8th June 1929.   On 2nd July following, the son of the insolvent applied to  the insolvency court alleging that the property belonged to  him and  not the insolvent.  The court decided in favour of  the son  but was not called upon to go into the question  as  to whether the application was within time. (1)  A.I.R. 1932 Allahabad 408. 371 This quest-ion of limitation was raised before the  District Judge  and  the  objection was over-ruled by  him.   It  was observed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court:               "The house was attached under an order of  the               Insolvency  Court, and not by any  independent               decision of the Official Receiver.  The actual               attachment was a mere ministerial act done  in               pursuance  of  the order of  the  Court.   The               objector  was not challenging the act  of  the               receiver, who had no voice in the matter,  but               the order of attachment passed by the Court ex               parte.  It seems to us that it was not an  act               or decision of the receiver within the meaning               of  s. 68.  On the other hand, it was a  claim               put  forward by a stranger to  the  insolvency               proceedings  setting  up his  own  independent               title,  and it fell within the scope of s.  4,               Provincial Insolvency Act." The learned Judges distinguished the cases of Bhairo  Prasad vS. P. C. Dass(1) and Hussaini v. Muhammad Zamir Abdi(2)  on the  ground  that in those cases there was no order  of  the court directing attachment but the act complained of was  an act of the receiver himself. In  Bhairo Prasad’s case(1) the Provincial  Insolvency  Act, 1907 was in operation and there a stranger to the insolvency

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complained  of  an act of attachment after the lapse  of  21 days.   A  Division Bench of the Allahabad High  Court  held that  the application was barred by limitation observing  at the same time :               "A stranger to the insolvency is not bound  to               go to the Insolvency Court at all.  He has the               ordinary right, which every individual has, to               seek redress in the ordinary civil courts  for               any  grievance  or trespass to  his  property,               whether  committed by an Official Receiver  or               anybody else, but he can, if he pleases, if he               complains  against  the act of  the  receiver,               apply  under  s. 22 to  the  insolvency  court               itself.  .  . . But similarly  if  he  applies               under s. 22, he must comply with the terms  of               s. 22."               In Mt.  Husaini Bibi’s case(3) certain  houses               were proclaimed for sale on 14th June 1922 and               on  last July the appellant, the wife  of  the               insolvent, put in a claim that the  properties               belonged   to  her.   The   insolvency   court               referred the appellant to the civil court  and               a  suit  was  filed on  4th  July  1922.   The               properties  were sold by the receiver  on  5th               July  before an injunction of the civil  court               restaining  a  sale  could be  served  on  the               receiver.   On 3rd August 1922  the  appellant               applied   to  the  District  Judge   for   the               cancellation   ,if   the   sale.    This   was               dismissed.  The subject of appeal before the               (1)   A.I.R. 1919 Allahabad 274.               (2) A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 294.               CI/67-11               A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 294.               372               High  Court was the order of  dismissal.   The               learned   single  Judge  relied  upon   Bhairo               Prasad’s case(1) and observing that the appli-               cation   presented  on  3rd  of   August   was               apparently  one  under S. 68 of the  Act  held               that  it was barred before the 3rd of  August.               It was further pointed out that a stranger  to               the   insolvency  may  seek  his  redress   in               ordinary civil court when aggrieved by any act               of  the  Official Receiver, or  he  may  apply               under S. 68 of the Act (corresponding to s. 22               of  the previous Act).  Reference may also  be                             made  to an earlier decision of the  A llahabad               High  Court  in Mul Chand  v.  Murari  Lal(2).               There  the  receiver  in   insolvency   seized               certain  movable property on  the  information               laid  by one of the creditors as  property  of               the insolvents.  The appellant before the High               Court  claimed that the property was  his  and               presented  an objecting purporting to  be  one               under  0.  XXI  r. 58 of  the  Code  of  Civil               Procedure.  This was dealt with by the  Second               Additional  Judge of Meerut on the merits  who               after  taking evidence came to the  conclusion               that  the  property  seized  belonged  to  the               insolvents   and  dismissed  the   appellant’s               application.  The Allahabad High Court pointed               out that the appellant’s position was that  of               a person -aggrieved by an act of the  receiver

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             and his remedy was by an application under  S.               22 of Act III of 1907.               These decisions, in our opinion, do not assist               the  appellant on whose behalf it  was  argued               that an application might be made either under               S.  68 or under s. 4 of the Act.  It is  clear               from   the  above  decisions  that  a   person               complaining  of  the act of the  receiver  may               either apply under S. 68 or proceed under  the               ordinary law of the land.  Section 4 does  not               prescribe  any  application for  relief  under               that  section.   Its object is to  define  the               limits   of   jurisdiction   of   the   courts               exercising  powers in insolvency.  It  is  not               correct  to say that a person aggrieved by  an               act of the receiver has the choice, of  making               an  application  under s. 4 or  under  s.  68.               Section  4 comes into operation  whenever  any               question  of the nature mentioned  therein  is               sought   to  be  canvassed  before   a   court               exercising   insolvency  jurisdiction.    Such               questions  may arise because of acts or  deci-               sions  of  the  receiver  complained  of.    A               question  as to whether an insolvent  has  any               interest  in  the  property  attached  by  the               receiver  would fall within the purview of  S.               4, but the application for the adjudication of               such   a  question  when  the  receiver   acts               otherwise  than  under the order  of  a  court               would  be  covered by s. 68 and  as  such  the               period of limitation of twenty-one days  would               be attracted to any such application.               Mr.  Bishan  Narain  referred  us  to  a   few               decisions   of   different  High   Courts   as               illustrating his proposition that applications               are  permissible under s. 4 of the  Provincial               Insolvency  Act.   In Vellayappa  Chettiar  v.               Ramanathan Chettiar (2) cited on behalf of the               (1)      A.I.R.      1919      All.       274.               (2) I.L.R. 36 Allahabad 8.               (3)   I.L.R. 47 Madras 446.               373               appellant,  the  facts were  as  follows.  The               respodent obtained a mortgage decree against a               person  who  was subsequently  adjudicated  an               insolvent  and the Official  Receiver  assumed               jurisdiction  over his properties.  While  the               latter was taking steps to realise the assets,               the  appellant  asserted  that  some  of   the               properties covered by the mortgage decree were               his  and denied the right of the insolvent  to               such properties, at the same time,  preferring               a claim petition before the Official Receiver.               The  Receiver  enquired  into  the  same   and               allowed   it.    Against   that   order,   the               mortgagee-decreeholder filed a petition before               the  District Judge under s. 68 who set  aside               the order of the Official Receiver and further               directed that the claim petition also do stand               dismissed.  The claimant went up in appeal  to               the Madras High Court.  The learned Judges  of               the  Madras High Court said that the whole  of               the  proceedings  was  misconceived  observing               that  the  Official Receiver had no  power  to               make any order in a claim petition as this was

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             not  a power delegated to him under s.  80  of               the   Provincial  Insolvency  Act   of   1920.               According  to the High Court, if the  claimant               wanted to prevent the sale of the property  as               belonging  to  the insolvent, he  should  have               applied  to the District Judge direct to  take               action  under  s. 4 of the Act.   He  did  not               however do so.  In the result, the High  Court               set  aside  all the proceedings in  the  lower               court and left the parties in status quo ante,               commenting  at  the  same time,  that  if  the               claimant  found  that  the  Official  Receiver               proposed to sell the properties he might apply               to  the District Judge under s. 4 of the  Act.               The  last portion of the above  paragraph  was               quoted  as supporting the proposition that  an               application  lay under s. 4 of the Act.   That               is  not what the learned Judges of the  Madras               High Court meant.  In our view, what was meant               was   that   the  claimant   might   make   an               application  to the District Judge  who  would               under s.4 of the Act have jurisdiction to pass               a proper order thereon.                 Our attention was also drawn to the case  of                             Venkatarama v.Angathayammal(1) where t he  above               Madras decision was cited and at more than one               place, the learned Judge used the  expressions               "an  application  under s. 4" and  "an  appeal               under  s.  68".   With  all  respect  to,  the               learned Judge, it seems, to us that these  ex-               pressions were not accurate for s. 68 although               headed  "appeals  to court  against  receiver"               does  not, as a matter of fact, use  the  word               "appeal"  in  the body of  the  section.   The               application  under  s. 68 however  in  reality               amounts  to  an  appeal  to  a  court  from  a               decision  of  the  receiver  but  the  section               itself lays down that the party aggrieved must               "apply to the court".  Similarly, a proceeding               in  which  jurisdiction  under  S.  4  may  be               exercised  is not an application under  S.  4.               The proceeding has to be started by way of  an               application whenever anybody seeks to have  an               adjudication  by  the  court  of  the   nature               described in S. 4.               ((1) A.I.R. 1933 Madras 471.               374               In this connection, our attention was drawn to               several  other decisions; it is not  necessary               to go into the facts of these cases.  In G. N.               Godbole    v.    Mt.     Nani    Bai(1)    and               Muthupalaniappa  V.  Raman  Chettiar(2),   the               expression  "proceedings under S. 4" had  been               used while in Heerabai v. Official Receiver  3               ) the petitioner before the High Court, mother               of  the two insolvents, laid a claim to  1/3rd               share  in  the properties which  the  Official               Receiver  sold on 16th April, 1960  purporting               to  be those of the insolvents.  According  to               the  judgment "the petitioner filed  I.A.  No.               1900  of  1960 on 28-6-1960 purporting  to  be               under   ss.  4  and  68  of   the   Provincial               Insolvency Act." She also filed I.A. No.  1899               of 1960 for condoning the delay in filing this

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             application as ordinarily "the appeal under S.               68 should have been filed by her on or  before               5-7-1960".   The insolvency court held in  the               proceedings under s. 68 that there could be no               condonation  of delay but failed to  ascertain               with reference to the nature of I.A. No.  1900               of  1960  whether it fell under s.  4  of  the               Provincial Insolvency Act.  The learned  Judge               found  that  the petitioner had not  made  any               claim before the Official Receiver and even if               she chose to make any such claim, the Official               Receiver had no power whatever to decide  upon               such claim petitions.  It was observed :               "Therefore,  an application such as  I.A.  No.               1900  of 1960 cannot be taken in any sense  to               be  an appeal against the act of the  Official               Receiver as such.  On the other hand, when the               petitioner herein wanted that her share should                             be untouched, it is certainly a case w here  the               petitioner  approached the court to  determine               the  question  of  her  title,  which  it   is               competent  to  do  only  under  s.  4  of  the               Provincial  Insolvency Act.  Therefore, in  my               view, it is idle to contend that I.A. No. 1900               falls within the purview of s. 68, and that it               should  be  taken to be an appeal and  not  an               application   which   is   contemplated    and               competent   under  s.  4  of  the   Provincial               Insolvency Act." It is difficult to accept the soundness of some of the dicta in  the  above  judgment.  The Official  Receiver’s  act  in selling  the  property  on 16-4-1960 may  have  been  wholly wrong,  but  if  the petitioner wanted the same  to  be  set aside, she could either have made an application under s. 68 to the court or she could have filed a suit for relief under the ordinary law of the land.  She could not, after a period of  21  days,  start a proceeding in  the  insolvency  court describing it as one under s. 4 so as to get out of the  bar of  limitation imposed by S. 68.  She need not  have  waited till  the sale of property.  She might have applied  to  the court  as  soon  as  the receiver took  the  first  step  by attaching the property. (1)  A.I.R. 1938 Nagpur 546.                (2) A.I.R.  1941 Madras75. (3)A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 296. 375 In  our  opinion,  Jai Lal, J.  correctly  pointed  out  the correlation   between  ss.  4  and  68  in  Daulat  Ram   v. Bansilal(1).   The appellant had a money decree against  the insolvents which he executed by attachment of a moiety of  a share in a house which he alleged belonged to the  judgment- debtors.   This  was before the order of  adjudication.   An objection  was raised by the respondent, Bansilal,  that  he was a purchaser for consideration of the attached  property. The objection having been allowed, a suit was filed under O. 21,  r.  63  C.P.C.  by  the  attaching  decree-holder   and ultimately decreed, it having been held that the sale by the judgment-debtors  was fraudulent as against  the  creditors. The  receivers  in insolvency then took  possession  of  the property attached by the appellant and sold the same in  the insolvency   proceedings.    Bansilal  thereupon   made   an application under s. 68 on the ground that the action of the receivers  was  illegal.   The District  Judge  allowed  the application holding that the decree passed in the suit under

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O.  21  r.  63 was operative only so far  as  the  execution proceeding’s  were concerned and that it did not  enure  for the benefit of the other creditors.  He therefore set  aside the  sale  by the receivers.  The  creditors  including  the appellant  came up in appeal from the order of the  District Judge.   An objection was raised by the respondents that  no appeal lay without the leave either of the District Judge or of  the  High  Court.  In disposing of  this,  Jai  La],  J. observed :               "I  am  inclined  to  think  that  though  the               District Judge was moved under s. 68 which  is               not  one of the sections mentioned in Sch.  1,               the  investigation,  which he is  expected  to               make  in a case like, the present,  should  be               under s. 4, Provincial Insolvency Act, and any               order  passed by him under s. 4 is  appealable               as of right to this Court." An  observation similar to the above was made, by  the  same learned  Judge in Mul Raj v. Official Receiver (2 )  .  This point was also brought out in Ganda Ram v. Shiv Nand  Ganesh Das(3).  The scope of the two sections was brought out  even more  clearly in a judgment of the Rangoon High Court in  Ma Sein Nu v. U Mg.  Mg.(4) where it was said :               "Now,   s.  4  defines  the  powers   of   the               Insolvency  Court to decide questions  of  law               and  fact arising in  insolvency  proceedings,               but  it does not lay down how the court is  to               be moved to exercise those powers. . . . .  of               course,  the powers of the court  in  deciding               such  an application are defined in s. 4,  but               this does not mean that the application itself               is  made under s. 4, and clearly it cannot  be               for  s. 4 contains no provision as to how  the               court is               (1)   A.I.R. 1937 Lahore page 2.               (3)   A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 757.               (2)   A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 297.               (4)   A.I.R. 1934 Rangoon 97.               376               to  be moved to exercise its powers,  and  for               the  mode  of invoking the  authority  of  the               Court other provisions of the Act, such as ss.               53, 54 and 68, have to be consulted." In the result, we hold that the application being one  under s. 68 was incompetent on the ground of limitation after  the lapse  of  21 days from November 25, 1954.   The  appeal  is therefore dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S.                                         Appeal dismissed. 377