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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3535 of 2006

PETITIONER: HAMZA HAJI

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/08/2006

BENCH: DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.5600-5601 OF 2004)

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

1.              Leave granted.   

2.              In the year 1968, the appellant herein claims to  have purchased an extent of 22.25 hectares of land blocked in  Survey No.2157 in Palakkayam Village, Mannarghat Taluk.    The deed was accompanied by a sketch showing the property  conveyed.   It is seen that the appellant disposed of almost the  entire property by way of assignments mostly in the years  1971 and 1972 and by way of a gift of 5 acres to his brother.    Thus, he was left with no property allegedly acquired under  the sale deed No. 2685 of 1968 of the Mananarghat sub  Registry.    

3.              On 10.5.1971, The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting  and Assignment) Act, 1971 (for short "the Act") came into  force.   In the year 1979, the appellant filed an application,  O.A. No.247 of 1979, before the Forest Tribunal, Manjeri,  under Section 8 of the Act seeking a declaration that the  application scheduled property was not a private forest liable  to be vested in the Government.   He scheduled 8.10 hectares  equivalent to 20 acres in Sy. No. 2157, Agali Village,  Mannarghat Taluk in the application.   He claimed exemption  under Section 3(2) of the Act and in the alternative, claimed  that even if  the land was private forest, the same was held by  him as owner under his personal cultivation and with intent to  cultivate and that it is within the ceiling limit applicable to him  under the Kerala Land Reforms Act and hence the same may  be declared to be exempt from vesting under Section 3(3) of  the Act.   Through the forest authorities, the State of Kerala  filed objections to the original application.   It was contended  that the land was private forest; that the Madras Preservation  of Private Forests Act applied to the same; and it continued to  be a forest under the Act and hence the prayer under Section  3(2) of the Act was unsustainable.   The claim under Section  3(3) of the Act was also opposed on the plea that the appellant  had no valid title to the land, that it was not cultivated and  that the appellant had no intention to cultivate the same.   By  order dated 17.12.1980, the Forest Tribunal held that the land  was forest to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests  Act applied immediately prior to 10.5.1971, the appointed day

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and it continued to be forest under the Act.   The Tribunal  accepted the evidence of the officer examined on behalf of the  State to find that the area was full of forest tree growth.    Thus, the claim of the appellant under Section 3(2) of the Act  was negatived.   The claim of the appellant was upheld by the  Tribunal under Section 3(3) of the Act by rejecting the plea of  absence of title in the appellant based on a pending litigation  as set up by the State.  It upheld the title and possession of  the appellant as per the deed of purchase, Document No. 2685  of 1968 put forward by him.   It held that the extent claimed  did not exceed the extent of ceiling area applicable to the  appellant under Section 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.    It, therefore, excluded the 20 acres scheduled to the  application and declared it as not vested in view of Section 3(3)  of the Act.   The State filed an appeal, MFA No.328 of 1981,  against the said decision in the High Court under Section 8A  of the Act.   The High Court, on 8.3.1983, dismissed the  appeal at the stage of admission on the ground that a specific  ground of challenge to the finding based on Section 3(3) of the  Act had not been raised in the memorandum of appeal.   The  order of the Forest Tribunal in that sense became final.

4.              Due to widespread complaints and emerging public  opinion, the Government realised that quite a number of  applications before Forest Tribunals for exemption or  exclusion were got allowed by unscrupulous elements with the  connivance of the Forest Authorities and even of counsel  engaged by the State before Forest Tribunals and before the  High Court.  Hence, an amendment to the Act was brought  about with effect from 19.11.1983, conferring a right on the  Custodian of Vested Forests to apply for review of the  decisions of Forest Tribunals and conferring power on the  State Government to file appeals or applications for review in  certain other cases before the concerned court and for other  incidental matters.   Pursuant to this availability of power, the  State filed R.P. No.219 of 1987 on 14.3.1987, before the Forest  Tribunal seeking a review of the decision of the Forest  Tribunal dated 17.12.1980.  It is seen that a commission was  taken out in these proceedings presumably on the dispute  whether the property scheduled was under cultivation or was  part of a dense forest.   On 14.3.1988, the Forest Tribunal  dismissed the review petition on the ground that its order  sought to be reviewed, had merged with the judgment of the  High Court in MFA No.328 of 1981, which, as we have already  noticed, was dismissed at the admission stage.   Whether the  view of the Forest Tribunal that it could not review the order in  exercise of power under Section 8B of the Act, notwithstanding  the dismissal of the appeal from its decision at the stage of  admission, need not be considered at this stage.    The fact  remains that the Forest Tribunal dismissed the review  petition.

5.              On 30.3.1989 the appellant approached the High  Court with O.P. No.2926 of 1989 invoking Article 226 of the  Constitution of India praying for a writ of mandamus directing  the State and the Forest Officials to restore to him the 20  acres of land in implementation of the order of the Forest  Tribunal in O.A. No.247 of 1979.   Though the State and the  Forest Authorities opposed the prayer, by order dated  28.8.1990, the High Court allowed the writ petition and issued  a writ of mandamus directing the State to restore to the  appellant the 20 acres of land.   It may be noted that the forest  authorities had not filed a counter-affidavit in that writ  petition, though at the hearing, the Government pleader  appearing on behalf of the State had submitted that there was

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difficulty in surveying and identifying the land to be restored.    Since the land could not be restored within the time fixed by  the High Court, the State and the forest officers obtained an  extension of time to comply with the writ of mandamus issued  by the High Court.

6.              It appears that at this stage the Custodian realised  that the very approach of the appellant to the Forest Tribunal  was a fraudulent attempt to knock off forest land vested in the  State and on the date he made the application before the  Forest Tribunal, the appellant had no vestige of right in the  application schedule property, he having sold or transferred  the entire extent of land allegedly purchased by him under  document No.2685 of 1968, the title he put forward when he  approached the Forest Tribunal.   On 1.1.1991, nearly eight  years after the dismissal of MFA No.328 of 1981 by the High  Court at the stage of admission, the State filed RP No.17 of  1991 for a review of the order in the appeal, accompanied by  an application for condoning the delay of seven years eight  months and twenty six days in filing the review.   Without  considering the merits of the case or the nature of the attempt  made by the appellant as put forward by the State in the  petition for review, the High Court on 18.11.1993, dismissed  the petition for condoning the delay in filing the review petition  on the ground that no sufficient cause had been made out for  condoning such a long delay.   Consequently, the High Court  dismissed the review petition without going into the merits of  the same.   Though the State of Kerala filed an application for  special leave to appeal in this Court as a SLP) No.16318 of  1994, the same was not entertained by this Court and it was  rejected on 3.10.1994.

7.              The appellant thereafter moved an application  under the Contempt of Courts Act before the High Court,  which was numbered as CCC 274 of 1997.  He complained of  non-restoration of the land.  In the face of the contempt of  court proceedings initiated and entertained by the High Court,  the State and the  forest authorities purported to handover as  per a mahazar and plan, 20 acres of land to the appellant and  produced the mahazar and the plan before the High Court.    Taking note of this, the High Court by order dated 24.10.1997,  closed the contempt of court proceedings recording that the  mandamus earlier issued by the High Court had been obeyed. 8.              The attempt to handover 20 acres of fragile forest to  the appellant, generated considerable public opinion and  protest that it ultimately forced the State and the forest  authorities, to approach the High Court again with a petition  for review.   On 2.11.2000, a petition for review was filed as  CMP No.456 of 1991 in RP No.17 of 1991 in MFA No.328 of  1981 to review the order of the Division Bench dated  18.11.1983, whereby the High Court refused to condone the  delay in filing the review petition against the order in MFA  No.328 of 1981. Another review petition was filed to review the  order in OP No.2926 of 1989 issuing the writ of mandamus  directing restoration.  Yet another review petition was filed to  review the order in the contempt of court case CCC No.274 of  1997. One other review petition was filed to review the order in  MFA No.328 of 1981 itself which was not numbered  presumably on the objection that it was really a petition to  review an order on a review petition.  Meanwhile a body of  citizens filed a writ petition, OP No.20946 of 1997 praying for  the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent  State not to assign, release or surrender 20 acres of evergreen  forest to the appellant, and for a writ of prohibition restraining  the appellant from carrying on any felling activity in the

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property including the clearing of natural growth.   One other  writ petition was filed allegedly by the assignees from the  appellant.   The Division Bench of the High Court heard all  these review petitions together along with the two writ  petitions filed by strangers.   The High Court found that the  appellant had secured an order from the Forest Tribunal by  playing a fraud on it and since fraud vitiates the entire  proceedings it was a fit case where the High Court should  exercise its jurisdiction invoking Article 215 of the  Constitution of India and set at naught, the order of the Forest  Tribunal found to be vitiated by fraud.   Thus, the High Court  allowed the claim of the State and that of the writ petitioners  and setting aside the order of the Forest Tribunal in OA  No.247 of 1979, dismissed that application filed by the  appellant before the Forest Tribunal.   The High Court also  directed the State to take back the 20 acres of land said to  have been put in the possession of the appellant during the  pendency of the contempt of court case.  This decision of the  High Court is challenged by the appellant, the applicant before  the Forest Tribunal, in these appeals.

9.              It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the  High Court had far exceeded its jurisdiction and has acted  illegally in setting aside the order of the Forest Tribunal which  had become final long back and which had been given effect  to, that too, by the intervention of the High Court.   It is  submitted that the High Court had no jurisdiction or authority  to set at naught the two earlier orders of Division Benches of  co-equal strength and that too at this belated stage and thus  the order suffered from patent illegality.   On facts it was  contended that the finding that the order was procured by the  appellant by playing a fraud on the Tribunal was not justified  and no occasion arose for the High Court to exercise its  jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India,  assuming it had such a jurisdiction to interfere with the earlier  orders.   On behalf of the State it is contended by learned  senior counsel that fraud vitiates everything, that if an order is  vitiated by fraud, it does not attain finality and it can be set at  naught by a proper proceeding and on the facts and in the  circumstances of the case, the High Court was fully justified in  setting aside the order of the Forest Tribunal.   It is submitted  that the High Court has only followed the ratio of the decisions  of this Court and there is nothing illegal in the decision  rendered by the High Court.  On facts, fraud was writ large  and this was a case where the High Court ought to have  interfered and the interference made was fully justified.    Counsel further submitted that since the appellant had come  with unclean hands and had obtained a relief by playing a  fraud on the court, this was a fit case where this Court should  decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article  136 of the Constitution of India, sought to be invoked by the  appellant.  It was submitted that the appeals deserve to be  dismissed.

10.             It is true, as observed by De Grey, C.J., in Rex Vs.  Duchess of Kingston [ 2 Smith L.C. 687] that:  "’Fraud’ is an intrinsic, collateral act, which  vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts  of justice.  Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial  acts ecclesiastical and temporal".    In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, it is stated that: "in applying this rule, it matters not  whether the judgment impugned has  been pronounced by an inferior or by the  highest Court of judicature in the realm,

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but in all cases alike it is competent for  every Court, whether superior or inferior,  to treat as a nullity any judgment which  can be clearly shown to have been  obtained by manifest fraud."   

It is also clear as indicated in Kinch Vs. Walcott [1929  APPEAL CASES  482] that it would be in the power of a party  to a decree vitiated by fraud to apply directly to the Court  which pronounced it to vacate it.  According to Kerr,  "In order to sustain an action to impeach  a judgment, actual fraud must be shown;  mere constructive fraud is not, at all  events after long delay, sufficient\005\005\005  but such a judgment will not be set aside  upon mere proof that the judgment was  obtained by perjury."    

(See the Seventh Edition, Pages 416-417)

11.             In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 49, paragraph  265, it is acknowledged that,  "Courts of record or of general  jurisdiction have inherent power to vacate  or set aside their own judgements".   

In paragraph 269, it is further stated,  

"Fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment  is a sufficient ground for opening or  vacating it, even after the term at which it  was rendered, provided the fraud was  extrinsic and collateral to the matter tried  and not a matter actually or potentially in  issue in the action.   

It is also stated: "Fraud practiced on the court is always  ground for vacating the judgment, as  where the court is deceived or misled as  to material circumstances, or its process  is abused, resulting in the rendition of a  judgment which would not have been  given if the whole conduct of the case had  been fair".

12.             In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Volume 46,  paragraph 825, it is stated,  "Indeed, the connection of fraud with a  judgment constitutes one of the chief  causes for interference by a court of  equity with the operation of a judgment.   The power of courts of equity in granting  such relief is inherent, and frequent  applications for equitable relief against  judgments on this ground were made in  equity before the practice of awarding  new trials was introduced into the courts  of common law.          Where fraud is involved, it has been held,  in some cases, that a remedy at law by  appeal, error, or certiorari does not  preclude relief in equity from the

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judgment.  Nor, it has been said, is there  any reason why a judgment obtained by  fraud cannot be the subject of a direct  attack by an action in equity even though  the judgment has been satisfied."

13.             The law in India is not different.  Section 44 of the  Evidence Act enables a party otherwise bound by a previous  adjudication to show that it was not final or binding because it  is vitiated by fraud.  The provision therefore gives jurisdiction  and authority to a Court to consider and decide the question  whether a prior adjudication is vitiated by fraud.  In Paranjpe  Vs. Kanade [ILR 6 BOMBAY 148], it was held that it is always  competent to any Court to vacate any judgment or order, if it  be proved that such judgment or order was obtained by  manifest fraud.  In Lakshmi Charan Saha Vs. Nur Ali [ ILR 38  Calcutta 936], it was held that the jurisdiction of the Court in  trying a suit questioning the earlier decision as being vitiated  by fraud, was not limited to an investigation merely as to  whether the plaintiff was prevented from placing his case  properly at the prior trial by the fraud of the defendant.  The  Court could and must rip up the whole matter for determining  whether there had been fraud in the procurement of the  decree.  

14.             In Manindra Nath Mittra Vs. Hari Mondal [24  Calcutta Weekly Notes 133], the Court explained the elements  to be proved before a plea of a prior decision being vitiated by  fraud could be upheld.   The Court said  "with respect to the question as to what  constitutes fraud for which a decree can  be set aside, two propositions appear to  be well established.  The first is that  although it is not permitted to show that  the Court (in the former suit) was  mistaken, it may be shown that it was  misled, in other words where the Court  has been intentionally misled by the  fraud of a party, and a fraud has been  committed upon the Court with the  intention to procure its judgment, it will  vitiate its judgment.  The second is that a  decree cannot be set aside merely on the  ground that it has been procured by  perjured evidence".   

The position was reiterated by the same High Court in Esmile- Ud-Din Biswas and Anr. Vs. Shajoran Nessa Bewa & Ors.  [132 INDIAN CASES 897].  It was held that it must be shown  that fraud was practised in relation to the proceedings in the  Court and the decree must be shown to have been procured by  practising fraud of some sort upon the Court.  In Nemchand  Tantia Vs. Kishinchand Chellaram (India) Ltd. [63 Calcutta  Weekly Notes 740], it was held that a decree can be re-opened  by a new action when the court passing it had been misled by  fraud, but it cannot be re-opened when the Court is simply  mistaken; when the decree was passed by relying on perjured  evidence, it cannot be said that the court was misled.   

15.             It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this  question since the matter has come up for consideration  before this Court on earlier occasions.  In S.P. Chengalvaraya  Naidu (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs & Ors.  [(1993) Supp. 3 SCR 422], this Court stated that,

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"it is the settled proposition of law that a  judgment or decree obtained by playing  fraud on the court is a nullity and non  est in the eyes of law.  Such a  judgment/decree --- by the first court or  by the highest court --- has to be treated  as a nullity by every court, whether  superior or inferior.  It can be challenged  in any court even in collateral  proceedings."    

The Court went on to observe that the High Court in that case  was totally in error when it stated that there was no legal duty  cast upon the plaintiff to come to Court with a true case and  prove it by true evidence.  Their Lordships stated,  "The courts of law are meant for  imparting justice between the parties.  One who comes to the court, must come  with clean hands.  We are constrained to  say that more often than not, process of  the Court is being abused.   Property \026  grabbers, tax \026 evaders, Bank \026 loan \026  dodgers, and other unscrupulous persons  from all walks of life find the court- process a convenient lever to retain the  illegal-gains indefinitely.  We have no  hesitation to say that a person, whose  case is based on falsehood, has no right  to approach the Court.  He can be  summarily thrown out at any stage of the  litigation".   

In Ram Preeti Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High School and  Intermediate Education & Others [(2003) Supp. 3 SCR 352],  this Court after quoting the relevant passage from Lazarus  Estates Ltd. Vs. Beasley [(1956) 1 All ER 341] and after  referring to S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. Vs.  Jagannath (Dead) by LRs & Ors. (supra) reiterated that fraud  avoids all judicial acts.  In State of A.P. & Anr. Vs. T.  Suryachandra Rao [(2005) 6 SCC 149], this Court after  referring to the earlier decisions held that suppression of a  material document could also amount to a fraud on the Court.   It also quoted the observations of Lord Denning in Lazarus  Estates Ltd. Vs. Beasley (supra) that,  "No judgment of a Court, no order of a  minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been  obtained by fraud.  Fraud unravels  everything."   

16.             According to Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, 14th  Edn., Volume 1, paragraph 263: "Fraud indeed, in the sense of a Court of  Equity, properly includes all acts, omissions,  and concealments which involve a breach of  legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence,  justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or  by which an undue and unconscientious  advantage is taken of another."

In Patch Vs. Ward [1867 (3) L.R. Chancery Appeals 203], Sir  John Rolt, L.J. held that: "Fraud must be actual positive fraud, a

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meditated and intentional contrivance to keep  the parties and the Court in ignorance of the  real facts of the case, and obtaining that  decree by that contrivance."

This Court in Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar Vs. State of  Maharashtra & Ors. [2005 (7) SCC 605] held that: "Suppression of a material document would  also amount to a fraud on the court.   Although, negligence is not fraud, it can be  evidence of fraud."

17.             Thus, it appears to be clear that if the earlier order  from the Forest Tribunal has been obtained by the appellant  on perjured evidence, that by itself would not enable the Court  in exercise of its power of certiorari or of review or under  Article 215 of the Constitution of India, to set at naught the  earlier order.  But if the Court finds that the appellant had  founded his case before the Forest Tribunal on a false plea or  on a claim which he knew to be false and suppressed  documents or transactions which had relevance in deciding  his claim, the same would amount to fraud.  In this case, the  appellant had purchased an extent of about 55 acres in the  year 1968 under Document No. 2685 of 1968 dated 2.6.1968.   He had, even according to his evidence before the Forest  Tribunal, gifted 5 acres of land to his brother under a deed  dated 30.1.1969.  In addition, according to the State, he had  sold, out of the extent of 55.25 acres, an extent of 49.93 acres  by various sale deeds during the years 1971 and 1972.   Though, the details of the sale deeds like the numbers of the  registered documents, the dates of sale, the names of the  transferees, the extents involved and the considerations  received were set out by the State in its application for review  before the High Court, except for a general denial, the  appellant could not and did not specifically deny the  transactions.  Same is the case in this Court, where in the  counter affidavit, the details of these transactions have been  set out by the State and in the rejoinder filed by the appellant,  there is no specific denial of these transaction or of the extents  involved in those transactions.  Therefore, it stands  established without an iota of doubt as found by the High  Court, that the appellant suppressed the fact that he had  parted with almost the entire property purchased by him  under the registered document through which he claimed title  to the petition schedule property before the Forest Tribunal.   In other words, when he claimed that he had title to 20 acres  of land and the same had not vested in the State and in the  alternative, he bona fide intended to cultivate the land and  was cultivating that land, as a matter of fact, he did not have  either title or possession over that land.  The Tribunal had  found that the land was a private forest and hence has vested  under the Act.   The Tribunal had granted relief to the  appellant only based on Section 3(3) of the Act, which provided  that so much extent of private forest held by an owner under a  valid registered document of title executed before the  appointed day and intended for cultivation by him and that  does not exceed the extent of the ceiling area applicable to him  under Section 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, could be  exempted.  Therefore, unless, the appellant had title to the  application schedule land and proved that he intended to  cultivate that land himself, he would not have been entitled to  an order under Section 3(3) of the Act.  It is obvious that when  he made the claim, the appellant neither had title nor

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possession over the land.  There could not have been any  intention on his part to cultivate the land with which he had  already parted and of which he had no right to possession.   Therefore, the appellant played a fraud on the Court by  holding out that he was the title holder of the application  schedule property and he intended to cultivate the same, while  procuring the order for exclusion of the application schedule  lands.  It was not a case of mere perjured evidence.  It was  suppression of the most vital fact and the founding of a claim  on a non-existent fact.   It was done knowingly and  deliberately, with the intention to deceive.  Therefore, the  finding of the High Court in the judgment under appeal that  the appellant had procured the earlier order from the Forest  Tribunal by playing a fraud on it, stands clearly established.   It was not a case of the appellant merely putting forward a  false claim or obtaining a judgment based on perjured  evidence. This was a case where on a fundamental fact of  entitlement to relief, he had deliberately misled the Court by  suppressing vital information and putting forward a false  claim, false to his knowledge, and a claim which he knew had  no basis either in fact or on law.  It is therefore clear that the  order of the Forest Tribunal was procured by the appellant by  playing a fraud and the said order is vitiated by fraud.  The  fact that the High Court on the earlier occasion declined to  interfere either on the ground of delay in approaching it or on  the ground that a Second Review was not maintainable,  cannot deter a Court moved in that behalf from declaring the  earlier order as vitiated by fraud.

18.             The High Court, as a court of record, has exercised  its jurisdiction to set at naught the order of the Forest  Tribunal thus procured by the appellant by finding that the  same is vitiated by fraud.  There cannot be any doubt that the  court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 215 of the  Constitution of India has the power to undo a decision that  has been obtained by playing a fraud on the court.  The  appellant has invoked our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the  Constitution of India.  When we find in agreement with the  High Court that the order secured by him is vitiated by fraud,  it is obvious that this Court should decline to come to his aid  by refusing the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under  Article 136 of the Constitution of India.  We do not think that  it is necessary to refer to any authority in support of this  position except to notice the decision  in Ashok Nagar Welfare  Association and another vs.  R.K. Sharma and others   [(2001) Supp. 5  SCR 662).

19.             The order of the Forest Tribunal in the case on hand  had merged in the decision in MFA No.328 of 1981 rendered  by the High Court.   The governing decision, therefore, was the  decision of the High Court.   When seeking to question the  decision as being vitiated by fraud, the proper course to adopt  was to move the court that had rendered the decision, by an  application.   In a case where an appeal is possible, an appeal  could be filed.   The House of Lords indicated in Kinch Vs.   Walcott  (supra) that it will be in the power of the party to the  decision complaining of fraud to apply directly to the court  which pronounced the judgment to vacate it.   The Full Bench  of the Bombay High court in Guddappa Chikkappa Kurbar  and another  vs. Balaji Ramji Dange  (AIR 1941 Bombay 274)   observed that no Court will allow itself to be used as an  instrument of fraud and no Court, by the application of rules  of evidence or procedure, can allow its eyes to be closed to the  fact that it is being used as an instrument of fraud.   In Hip  Foong Hong vs.  H. Neotia and Company  (1918 Appeal

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Cases 888) the Privy Council held that if a judgment is affected  by fraudulent conduct it must be set aside.   In  Rex vs.  Recorder of Leicester  (1947 (1) K B 726) it was held that a  certiorari would lie to quash a judgment on the ground that it  has been obtained by fraud.   The basic principle obviously is  that a party who had secured a judgment by fraud should not  be enabled to enjoy the fruits thereof.   In this situation, the  High Court in this case, could have clearly either quashed the  decision of the Forest Tribunal in OA No.247 of 1979 or could  have set aside its own judgment in MFA No.328 of 1981  dismissing the appeal from the decision of the Forest Tribunal  at the stage of admission and vacated the order of the Forest  Tribunal by allowing that appeal or could have exercised its  jurisdiction as a court of record by invoking Article 215 of the  Constitution to set at naught the decision obtained by the  appellant by playing a fraud on the Forest Tribunal.   The High  Court has chosen to exercise its power as a court of record to  nullify a decision procured by the appellant by playing a fraud  on the court.   We see no objection to the course adopted by  the High Court even assuming that we are inclined to exercise  our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India  at the behest of the appellant.

20.             In the view that we have taken as above, the plea  that the second review was not maintainable, that the Division  Bench could not have ignored the earlier orders of the High  Court dismissing the appeal at the stage of admission and the  dismissing of the petition for condonation of delay in filing the  first review, are all of no avail to the appellant.  In this case,  the Forest Tribunal had also been moved by way of review and  that tribunal refused to exercise its jurisdiction under Section  8B of the Act and nothing stands in the way of the High Court  setting aside that order on a finding that the original order  from the Forest Tribunal was secured by playing a fraud on  the Tribunal.  Equally, nothing stood in the way of the High  Court reviewing the judgment in O.P. No. 2926 of 1989 in  which a mandamus was issued by the High Court to restore  possession of the application schedule property to the  appellant.  Similarly, nothing stood in the way of the High  Court in allowing O.P. No.  20946 OF 1997 filed by a body of  citizens challenging the restoration of 20 acres of virgin forest  to the appellant in presumed enforcement of the order in O.A.  No. 247 of 1979 and passing the necessary order nullifying the  original order.  The fact that the High Court has chosen to  review the earlier order on the petition for condonation of delay  in filing the first review petition and then to exercise the power  of review cannot be of any moment in the light of the what we  have stated.  In any event, as we have indicated, this is a fit  case where we should clearly decline to exercise our  jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to  come to the aid of the appellant to secure to him the fruits of  the fraud practiced by him on the Forest Tribunal and the  High Court.  Thus, we find no merit in the argument that the  High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the  order of the Forest Tribunal at this distance of time.  

21.             We thus confirm the decision of the High Court and  dismiss these appeals with costs.  We hope that this judgment  will act as an eye opener to the Forest Tribunals and the High  Court exercising appellate jurisdiction in dealing with claims,  (obviously now they are belated claims) for exemption or  exclusion under Section 8 of the Act.  It behoves the Forest  Tribunals and the appellate court to carefully scrutinise the  case of title and possession put forward by claimants as also  the identities of the lands sought to be claimed, while

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entertaining applications under Section 8 of the Act.