http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 14  

PETITIONER: HAMEEDIA HARDWARE STORES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER S. PEER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: B. MOHAN LAL SOWCAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1988

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) OJHA, N.D. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR 1060            1988 SCR  (3) 384  1988 SCC  (2) 513        JT 1988 (1)   664  1988 SCALE  (1)615  CITATOR INFO :  D          1989 SC 751  (9)  RF         1991 SC2160  (18)  RF         1992 SC2166  (3)

ACT:      Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 Whether it  is necessary  for a  landlord who  institutes  a petition under  section 10  (3)(a)(iii) thereof to establish that his requirements is bona fide or not.

HEADNOTE: %      The respondent’s  brother was  carrying on his business in the  front portion of the ground floor of the premises in question, which  belonged to  the father  of the respondent. The appellant  purchased the  said running business from the brother of  the respondent.  After purchasing  the business, the appellant  became a  tenant  under  the  father  of  the respondent. In  the rear  portion of the ground floor of the premises, one  Mrs. Janaki  Ammal was  residing as a tenant. Mrs. Janaki  Ammal vacated  the said residential portion and the appellant took that portion also on rent from the father of the respondent. The ownership of the premises in question was transferred  in favour  of the respondent by his father. On 9.6.1982,  an agreement  was entered  into in  respect of both the portions specifying that the lease should remain in force till  8.5.1983. After  the expiry  of the said period, the respondent  instituted a  petition for  eviction of  the appellant in  the Court  of  the  Controller  under  section 10(3)(a)(iii) of  the Tamil  Nadu Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control) Act,  1960, on  the ground  that  the  premises  in question were  needed  by  his  wife  for  carrying  on  her business which  she was  carrying  on  somewhere  else.  The appellant contended  inter alia  that the requirement of the wife of  the respondent  was not  bona fide.  The Controller dismissed the petition, holding that the tenancy in question was in  respect of  both the residential and non-residential portions and  the respondents could not seek eviction of the appellant as  the major  portion of the demised premises was of residential  character. Aggrieved  by the decision of the Controller, the  respondent preferred  an appeal  before the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 14  

Appellate Authority.  The Appellate  Authority dismissed the appeal. The  respondent filed a revision petition before the High Court.  The High  Court allowed  the revision  petition holding that  it was  not necessary  for the  respondent  to establish that his requirement was bona fide as the question of the bona fides of a landlord’s requirement did not 385 arise in a case under section 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act. It, however, held   the claim of the respondent to be bona fide. Aggrieved by  the decision  of the High Court, the appellant filed this  appeal before  this Court  for relief by special leave.      Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^      HELD:   The    crucial   question   which   arose   for consideration in  this case  was  whether  a  landlord,  who sought eviction  of a tenant from a non-residential building (other than  a non-residential  building used  for keeping a vehicle  or   adapted  for   such  use)   under  section  10 (3)(a)(iii) of  the Tamil  Nadu Buildings  (Lease  and  Rent Control) Act,  1960 (the  Act) was required to prove that he required the said building for his own use or for the use of any member of his family bona fide. [390C-D]      The Act  was enacted  to amend  and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and non-residential buildings  and the  control of  the rents of such buildings  and the  prevention of unreasonable eviction of the tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Act is an ameliorating piece of legislation. Similar Acts are in force in  almost all  the States  in India. The provision in question-section 10(3)(a)(iii)-has  to be  examined  against this background. [390D;392G]      Having regard  to the  pattern in  which clause  (a) of sub-section (3) of section 10 of the Act is enacted and also the context,  the words "if the landlord required it for his own use  or for  the use of any member of his family", found in sub-clause  (ii) of section 10 (3)(a) of the Act, have to be read  also into  sub-clause (iii) of section 10 (3)(a) of the Act.  Subclauses (ii)  and (iii) both deal with the non- residential buildings.  They could  have been enacted as one sub-clause by  adding a  conjunction ’and’  between the said two sub-clauses,  in which  event the clause would have read thus: ’in  case it  is a  non-residential building  which is used for  the purpose  of keeping  a vehicle  or adapted for such use, if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use  of any member of his family and if he or any member of his  family is  not occupying  any such  building in  the city, town  or village  concerned which  is his  own, and in case it  is  any  other  non-residential  building,  if  the landlord or  any member  of his  family is not occupying for purposes of  a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village  concerned which  is his  own.’ If  the two  sub- clauses are  not so read, it would lead to an absurd result. The non-residential  building referred to in sub-clause (ii) is a  building used  for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, and all other non- 386 residential buildings fall under sub-clause (iii). The State legislature cannot  be attributed with the intention that it required a  more stringent  proof by insisting upon proof of bona fides  of his  requirement or need also when a landlord is seeking  eviction of  a tenant  from a garage than in the case of  a non-residential  building  occupied  by  a  large commercial house  for carrying  on business.  It is no doubt

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 14  

true that the Court, while construing a provision should not easily read  into it words not expressly enacted, but having regard to  the context  in which a provision appears and the object of  the  statute  in  which  the  said  provision  is enacted, the Court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. [398C-H; 399A]      In the  present case,  by insisting on the proof of the bona fide  of the  requirement of the landlord, the Court is not doing any violence to the statute nor embarking upon any legislative action.  The Court  is only construing the words of the  statute in  a reasonable  way having  regard to  the context. [399E]      By merely  proving that  the premises  in question is a non-residential building and that the landlord or any member of his  family is  not  occupying,  for  the  purpose  of  a business which  he or  any member  of his family is carrying on, any  residential building  in the  city,town or  village concerned which  is his  own, the  landlord  cannot  in  the context in  which section  10  (3)(a)(iii)  appears,  get  a tenant evicted.  He must  show in  view  of  clause  (e)  of section 10 (3) that his claim is bona fide. The word ’claim’ means "a  demand for  something as  due", or "to seek or ask for on the ground of right", etc. In the context of the Rent Control Law,  which is  enacted for  the purpose  of  giving protection to the tenants against unreasonable evictions and for  the   purpose  of   making  equitable  distribution  of buildings amongst  persons who are in need of them, in order to prove  that his  claim is  bona fide,  a landlord  should establish that  he deserves  to be  put in possession of the premises which  is  in  the  occupation  of  a  tenant.  Any decision on  the question  whether a landlord deserves to be put in  possession of  a premises  in the  occupation  of  a tenant should  naturally depend  upon the  bona fides of the landlord’s requirement  or need.  The word ’claim’ in clause (e) of  section 10(3)  of  the  Act  should,  therefore,  be construed as  ’the  requirement’  of  the  landlord  or  his deservedness. Since  clause (e)  of section 10(3) of the Act is also  applicable to  a petition  filed  under  sub-clause (iii) of  section 10(3)(a)  of the Act, it becomes necessary to examine  whether the  requirement of the landlord is bona fide; otherwise,  a landlord  will be able to evict a tenant to satisfy  his  whim  by  merely  proving  the  ingredients mentioned in  section  10(3)(a)(iii)  of  the  Act.  If  the requirement of  "claim" being  "bona fide"  as contained  in section 10(3)(e) is construed 387 to mean that genuineness of the need of the landlord for the non-residential building  is not  to be  considered and  the circumstances that  the landlord  on the  date of making the application is  factually carrying  on business  and has  no non-residential building of his own in his occupation in the city,  town   or  village  concerned,  is  to  be  construed sufficient to  make his  claim bona  fide, the tenancy of no non-residential  building   will  be   secure.  It  will  be preposterous  to   attribute  such   an  intention   to  the legislature. The need of the landlord should be genuine. The landlord should  bona fide need the premises for his own use and occupation  or for  the occupation by any of the members of his  family, as  held by  this Court  in Phiroze  Bamanji Desai v. Chandra Kant M. Patel and Ors., [1974] 3 S.C.R. 267 and Mattulal  v. Radhe  Lal, [1975]  1 S.C.R.  127. [399F-H; 400A-G]      The High  Court was  in error  in this  case in holding that the  landlord need  not prove  that his requirement was bona fide  but that  his claim  was bona fide as provided in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 14  

clause (e)  of section 10(3) of the Act. The High Court made a distinction  between  ’requirement’  and  ’claim’  without there being a difference. [400H; 401A]      The Court  was of  the view that M/s. Mahalakshmi Metal Industries v.  K. Suseeladevi,  [1982] 2  Mad. L.J.  333; M. Abdul Rahman v. S. Sadasivam, [1984] 1 Mad. L.J. 410 ’and A. Khan Mohammed  v. P. Narayanan Nambiar & Ors., 99 Law Weekly 965, relied upon by the respondent, were wrongly decided and were liable  to be  over-ruled. The  Court overruled them. A landlord seeking eviction of a tenant from a non-residential premises under  section 10(3)(a)(iii)  of the  Act should in order to  succeed in  his petition,  establish that he bona- fide requires  the premises in addition to proving the other ingredients referred  to therein.  The judgment  of the High Court set  aside. Since  the High  Court had  approached the case from  a wrong  angle, the Court directed the High Court to decide the case afresh in the light of what the Court had said in  this appeal.  Case remanded  to the  High Court  to decide it  afresh. If  the High  Court found  that the  case should be  remanded to  the Trial Court to enable any of the parties to  lead evidence  on  the  question  of  bona  fide requirement of  the landlord, it might remit the case to the Trial Court. [401B-D]      Mahalakshmi Metal Industries v. K.Suseeladevi, [1982] 2 Mad. L.J.  333; M.  Abdul Rahman  v. S.  Sadasivam, [1984] 1 Mad. L.J.  410, and  A. Khan Mohammed v. P.Narayanan Nambiar and others, 99 Law Weekly 965, overruled. 388      Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and Others, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896; Neta Ram  v. Jiman  Lal, [1962]  2 Supp. S.C.R. 623; Nathala Sampathu Chetty v. Sha Vajingjee Bapulal, [1967] 1 Mad. L.J. 289; Madras  District  Central  Co-operative  Bank  Limited, Mylapore Branch,  Madras-4 v.  A. Venkatesh,  99 Law  Weekly 714; M/s.  Thilagaraj Match  Works, through  its partner  S. Chidambaram v.  C. Sundresan,  [1985] 1  Mad, Law J. 106; P. Thanneer-Malai Chettiar  v. S.J. Dhanraj and another, [1986] Mad. L.J. 115; Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 All. E.R.  155 at  164;  M.  Pentiah  and  Ors.  v.  Muddala Veeramallappa  and   Ors.,  [1961]  2  S.C.R.  255  at  314; Bangalore Water  Supply & Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa JUDGMENT: Chandrakant M. Patel & Ors., [1974] 3 S.C.R.267 and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 S.C.R.127,referred to.

&      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No.1014 of 1988.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  25.1.1988  of  the Madras High Court in C.P.P. No. 215 of 1986.      Mrs. Nalini  Chidambaram,  Ms.  Setia  Vaidalingam,  N. Thiagarajan and Ms. Radha for the Appellant.      S. Srinivasan for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH,  J.   The  question   which  arises  for consideration in  this case  is whether a landlord who seeks eviction of  a tenant from a non-residential building (other than a  non-residential building which is used for keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use) under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the  Tamil Nadu  Buildings (Lease  and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter  referred to  as ’the Act’) is required to prove that  he requires the said building for his own use or for the  use of  any member  of his  family bona fide in the proceedings instituted before the Controller.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 14  

    The appellant  is a partnership firm represented by its partner, 5.  Peer Mohammed.  The  respondent’s  brother  was carrying on business in hardware in the front portion of the ground floor of the premises bearing No. 157, Kutcheri Road, Mylapore, Madras-4. The appellant purchased the said running business from  the brother  of the  respon-dent on 5.7.1974. The said building, however, belonged to the father 389 of  the  respondent.  After  purchasing  the  business,  the appellant became a tenant under the father of the respondent by paying  an advance of Rs.1,500 and agreeing to pay a rent at the  rate of Rs.450 per month for the portion in which it commenced to  carry on  the business. In the rear portion of the ground  floor of  the premises one Mrs. Janaki Ammal was residing as  a tenant.  Mrs. Janaki  Ammal vacated  the said residential portion  in  October,  1974.  With  effect  from 5.10.1974 the  appellant took  the portion  vacated by  Mrs. Janaki Ammal  also on rent from the father of the respondent by paying  Rs.525 as  advance and  agreeing to pay a monthly rent of  Rs.175. The  rent of  this  portion  was  increased subsequently  to   Rs.315  per   month.  On  25.11.1980  the appellant received a notice from an advocate, who was acting on behalf  of the  father of  the respondent terminating the tenancy of  the appellant  in respect  of both  the portions with effect  from 31.12.1980  and requiring the appellant to deliver possession  of the  two portions of the ground floor of the  premises in question to the father of the respondent on the ground that he needed the premises for the occupation of his  son. The appellant sent a reply denying the right of the respondent’s  father to  evict the  appellant  from  the premises. Thereafter  it is stated that the ownership of the premises in  question  was  transferred  in  favour  of  the respondent by  his father.  Thereafter the  respondent asked the appellant to increase the rent payable for the premises. In order  to avoid litigation, the appellant agreed to pay a consolidated amount of Rs.1,000 per month by way of rent for both the  portions in  the year  1981 and also paid a sum of Rs.7,500 as  advance. On  9.6.1982 an  agreement was entered into in  respect of  both the  portions specifying  that the lease should remain in force till 8.5.1983. After the expiry of the  said period,  it is  stated,  the  respondent  again demanded enhanced  rent. On the appellant not complying with the said  demand the  respondent instituted  a petition  for eviction of  the appellant in the Court of the Controller at Madras under  section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act on the ground that the  premises in  question were  needed by his wife for carrying on  pawn broker  business which she was carrying on elsewhere. The appellant resisted the petition. It was inter alia contended  by the appellant that the requirement of the wife of  the respondent  was not  bona fide and the petition was liable  to be  dismissed. After  trial,  the  Controller dismissed the  petition holding that the tenancy in question was in  respect of  both the residential and non-residential portions and  that the respondent could not seek eviction of the appellant  as the  major portion of the demised premises was of  residential character.  Aggrieved by the decision of the Controller the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority.  The Appellate  Authority dismissed the appeal. Thereupon the respon- 390 dent preferred  a revision petition before the High Court of Madras inCivil  Revision Petition  No.  215  of  1986.  That petition was  allowed by  the High Court holding that it was not necessary  for the  respondent  to  establish  that  his requirement was bona fide as the question of bona fides of a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 14  

landlord’s requirement  did not  arise for  consideration at all in  case falling under secti10 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. It, however,  held that the claim of the respondent was bona fide. Accordingly,  the  High  Court  allowed  the  revision petition and  directed the  appellant to  quit  and  deliver vacant  possession  of  the  premises  in  question  to  the respondent. This  appeal by  special leave  is filed against the judgment of the High Court of Madras.      The crucial  question which arises for consideration in this case  is whether  it is  necessary for  a landlord, who institutes a  petition under  section 10(3)(a)(iii)  of  the Act, to  establish that his requirement is bona fide or not. As can be seen from the long title of the Act it was enacted by the  State Legislature  to amend  and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and non-residential buildings  and the  control of rents of such buildings and  the prevention  of unreasonable  eviction  of tenants therefrom  in the State of Tamil Nadu. Section 10 of the Act  provides that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution  of a  decree or otherwise except in accordance with the  provisions of  section 10  or sections 14 to 16 of the Act. The material portion of sub-section 3(a) of section 10 of  the Act,  which is relevant for purposes of this case reads thus:           "10(3)(a).  A   landlord  may,   subject  to   the           provisions of  clause (d), apply to the Controller           for an  order directing  the  tenant  to  put  the           landlord in possession of the building.           (i) in  case it  is a residential building, if the           landlord required it for his own occupation or for           the occupation  of any member of his family and if           he or  any member of his family is not occupying a           residential building  of his own in the city, town           or village concerned;           (ii) in  case it  is  a  non-residential  building           which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle           or adapted  for such use, if the landlord required           it for his own use or for the use of any member of           his family  and if  he or any member of his family           is not  occupying any  such building  in the city,           town or village concerned which is his own; 391           (iii) in  case it  is  any  other  non-residential           building, if  the landlord  or any  member of  his           family is not occupying for purposes of a business           which he  or any  member of his family is carrying           on, a  non-residential building  in the city, town           or village concerned which is his own;           .............................................           (e) The  Controller shall, if he is satisfied that           the claim  of the  landlord is  bona fide, make an           order directing  the tenant to put the landlord in           possession of  the building on such date as may be           specified by  the Controller and if the Controller           is  not  so  satisfied  he  shall  make  an  order           rejecting the application."      For purposes  of sub-section  (3) of  section 10 of the Act the  buildings are classified into two categories by the Act,  namely,   residential  buildings  and  non-residential buildings. Sub-clause  (i) of  clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section  10 of  the Act  provides  that  a  landlord  may subject to  the  provisions  of  clause  (d)  apply  to  the Controller for  an order  directing the  tenant to  put  the landlord in  possession of  a residential  building, if  the landlord required  it for  his own  occupation  or  for  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 14  

occupation of  any member  of his  family and  if he  or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his  own in  the city,  town or  village concerned.  Sub- clause (ii)  of clause  (a) of sub-section (3) of section 10 of the  Act  relates  to  eviction  from  a  non-residential building which  is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted  for such  use. If  the landlord  required such a building for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and  if he  or  any  member  of  his  family  is  not occupying any  such building  in the  city, town  or village concerned which  is his own he can apply for the eviction of the tenant therefrom. Sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub- section (3)  of section 10 of the Act deals with other kinds of non-residential  buildings. If the landlord or any member of his  family is  not occupying  for purposes of a business which he  or any member of his family is carrying on, a non- residential building  in the city, town or village concerned which is  his own, a landlord may, subject to the provisions of  clause  (d),  apply  to  the  Controller  for  an  order directing the  tenant to  put the  landlord in possession of such a  building. It  may be  stated here that the words ’if the landlord  required it  for his own use or for the use of any member  of his family’ are not to be found in sub-clause (iii) of  section 10(3)(a) of the Act. Clause (e) of section 10(3) of  the Act,  however, provides  that  the  Controller shall, if he is 392 satisfied that  the claim  of the landlord is bona fide make an order  directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  landlord  in possession of  the building on such date as may be specified by the  Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. Clause (e) of section  10(3) applies  to all  cases of eviction falling under section  10(3) of  the Act.  The decision in this case depends upon the effect of the omission of the words ’if the landlord required  it for  his own use or for the use of any member  of  his  family’  in  sub-clause  (iii)  of  section 10(3)(a) of the Act. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that reading  sub-clause (ii)  and (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the  Act together, which relate to the eviction from non- residential buildings,  the words  ’if the landlord required it for  his own  use or  for the  use of  any member  of his family’ which  are  found  in  sub-clause  (ii)  of  section 10(3)(a) should  be read  into sub-clause  (iii) of  section 10(3)(a) also  and that a landlord should establish in order to succeed  in a  petition for  eviction filed under section 10(3)(a)(iii)  of  the  Act  that  his  requirement  or  the requirement of  a member  of his  family is bona fide. It is also argued  in the alternative that the word ’claim’ in the words ’that  the claim  of the  landlord is  bona  fide’  in clause (e)  of section  10(3) of  the Act refers only to the requirement of  the landlord  and to  nothing else.  On  the other hand  it is  urged on behalf of the respondent relying upon three decisions of the High Court of Madras in (i) M/s. Mahalakshmi Metal  Industries v.  K. Suseeladevi,  [1982]  2 Mad. L.J.  333; (ii) M. Abdul Rahman v. S. Sadasivam, [1984] 1 Mad.  L.J. 410  and (iii) A. Khan Mohammed v. P. Narayanan Nambiar &  Others, 99  Law Weekly 966 that there was no need for  a   landlord  to   establish  the  bona  fides  of  his requirement or  the requirement  of a  member of  his family when a  petition is filed under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and it is enough if his claim is proved to be bona fide. The High  Court has  upheld the  said plea of the respondent relying upon  the said  three decisions.  The correctness of these  three  decisions  is  questioned  before  us  by  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 14  

appellant.      We have  already noticed that the object of the Act was to prevent unreasonable evictions of tenants from buildings. The Act  is an  ameliorating piece  of legislation.  Similar acts are  in force  in almost  all the  States in India. The provision in  question has  to  be  construed  against  this background. The Act has been in force from 1960.      In Moti  Ram v. Suraj Bhan & Other, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896 this Court was required to construe section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East  Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction  Act, 1949 which at the relevant  time provided  that a  landlord might apply to the Controller for directing a tenant to 393 put the  landlord in  possession of the building in question if he  required it  for the re-construction of that building or for  its replacement  by  another  building  or  for  the erection  of   other  buildings.   In  that  case  the  Rent Controller and  the Appellate  Authority  had  rejected  the claim of  the landlord  on the  ground that the landlord had not established  that the premises in question were required by him  bona fide.  The High  Court while accepting that the requirement in  question must  be shown to be bona fide held that on  the evidence  the findings of the Courts below that the landlord’s  requirement  was  not  bona  fide  were  not correct. The High Court accordingly directed the eviction of the tenant  in question.  This  Court  while  affirming  the decision of  the High  Court held  that the landlord had, in fact, made  out that  he required the premises bona fide for purposes of  re-construction. Thus  it is  seen that  in the context  of   a  law  enacted  for  preventing  unreasonable evictions this  Court read into a ground on which a landlord could seek  the eviction  of his  tenant that  the  landlord should establish  that his requirement was bona fide. A mere desire on  the  part  of  the  landlord  to  re-construct  a building was  not sufficient  to evict  a  tenant  from  the premises. He  had to  establish that  he needed the premises bona fide  for re-construction  it. In  a later  case, i.e., Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, [1962] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 623 which arose under the  provisions of  the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban  Rent Restriction  Ordinance, one of the grounds on which  the landlord sought the eviction of the tenants in occupation of  the premises  involved in  that case was that the  premises   were  in  a  state  of  disrepair  and  were dilapidated and,  therefore, the  landlord wished to rebuild on the premises after dismantling the structure. On the said issue the  Rent Controller held that in deciding whether the tenant should  be ordered to hand over the possession to the landlord the  Courts must  have  regard  to  the  bona  fide requirement of  the landlord  which meant that the desire to rebuild the premises should be honestly held by the landlord but that  the condition  of  the  building  also  played  an important part  in determining  whether the landlord had the intention genuinely  and the landlord was not using the said excuse as  a device  to get  rid of  the  tenants.  In  that connection the  Rent Controller  observed that  the state of the building,  the means of the landlord and the possibility of the  better yield  by way of rent should be kept in mind. The Controller,  holding that  the claim of the landlord was not bona fide, decided the said issue against him. On appeal the Appellate  Authority held  that the  shops and  chobaras were in  good condition  and that  the landlord  was not, in good faith,  wanting to replace the building, when he had no means to  build it.  The High  Court, however,  allowed  the revision petition  filed before  it holding  that  upon  the evidence on record it had been established

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 14  

394 beyond doubt  that the  landlord  genuinely  and  bona  fide required the  premises for re-building. On appeal by special leave to  this Court,  this Court  observed  that  the  very purpose of the Rent Restriction Act would be defeated if the landlords were  to come  forward and  to get  tenants turned out, on  the bare  plea that  they wanted to reconstruct the house without  first establishing,  that the  plea was  bona fide with  regard to all circumstances, viz. that the houses needed reconstruction  or that they had means to reconstruct them. Accordingly,  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  was reversed and  the petitions  for  eviction  were  dismissed. Following the  observations made  in the  above decisions in Nathella Sampathu  Chetty v. Sha Vajingjee Bapulal, [1967] 1 Mad. L.J.  289 a  Division Bench of the High Court of Madras construed section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act thus:           "Section 10  of the  Madras Buildings  (Lease  and           Rent Control)  Act, 1960, provides for eviction of           tenants  in   certain  circumstances.  Sub-section           3(a)(iii) of  the section  allows  a  landlord  to           apply to  the Controller  for an order directing a           tenant to put him in possession of the building if           the landlord  is not  occupying  for  purposes  of           business  which   he  is   carrying  on,   a  non-           residential building  in the city, town or village           concerned which  is his own. The second proviso to           this clause is to the effect that where a landlord           has already  obtained  possession  of  a  building           under this  provision, he shall not be entitled to           apply  again   for  possession   of  another  non-           residential building of his own. If the conditions           of these  provisions are satisfied, the Controller           may make  an order  as asked  for by  the landlord           provided he is further satisfied that the claim of           the landlord is bona fide.                        (underlining by us)      In  the   Madras  District  Central  Co-operative  Bank Limited, Mylapore  Branch, Madras-4  v. A. Venkatesh, 99 Law weekly 714  a single  Judge of the High Court disagreed with the  views  expressed  by  another  single  Judge  in  Abdul Rahman’s case (supra) and observed thus:                "The  question   now  is   whether  an  order           directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  landlord  in           possession should  be made.  It is  pointed out by           the learned  counsel for  the respondent  landlord           following a  ruling of  this Court in Abdul Rahman           v. S. Sadasivam, that there is no jurisdiction for           the Rent  Controller to  go into  the question  of           bona fide requirement 395           in a  claim under  s. 10(3)(a)(iii)  of  the  Act.           Ramanujam, J. took the view that a distinction has           to  be   made  between   the  two   sections,   s.           10(3)(a)(i) and  s. 10(3)(a)(iii)  in view  of the           word ’require’, occurring in s. 10(3)(a)(i) and in           the absence  of that  word, in s. 10(3)(a)(iii) in           other words,  what the learned Judge points out is           that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to go           into the  question whether  the requirement of the           landlord is  bona fide, as the Rent Controller has           to pass  an order of eviction in case the landlord           is not occupying for the purpose of business which           he is carrying on, any non-residential building in           the city  which is  his  own.  The  learned  Judge           further pointed out that when the provisions of s.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 14  

         10(3)(a)(i) and  s.  10(3)(a)(iii)  use  different           expressions,  it   should  be   taken   that   the           Legislature  intended  these  provisions  to  have           different operations.  With respect to the learned           Judge, I  may point  out that  the mere absence of           the word  ’require’ in  s. 10(3)(a)(iii) would not           necessarily  lead   to  the   inference  that  the           Legislature  did   not  intend   that   the   Rent           Controller should  go into  the question  of  bona           fides  of  the  requirement  of  the  landlord  in           respect of  the requirement  of a  non-residential           premises under  s. 10(3)(a)(iii)  of the  Act.  My           reasons for  holding so  are  as  follows:  S.  10           enumerates certain grounds for the eviction of the           tenant. In  other words  eviction under  the  Rent           Control Act  can be  effected only  on the grounds           mentioned in  s. 10. The landlord may have a right           to evict  the tenant  under the  general  law.  S.           10(3)(a) says  that the  landlord may,  subject to           the provisions of Cl. (d), apply to the Controller           for an  order directing  the  tenant  to  put  the           landlord  in   possession  of  the  buildings.  S.           10(3)(a)(i) deals  with residential  buildings. S.           10(3)(a)(ii) deals  with non-residential buildings           used  for   purpose  of   keeping   vehicles.   S.           10(3)(a)(iii) is  in  respect  of  non-residential           buildings. S. 10(3)(b) gives a right to religious,           charitable,   educational    or    other    public           institutions, to  institute proceedings before the           Controller  if   the  institution   requires   the           building.   S.    10(3)(c)   is   for   additional           accommodation. S.  10(3)(d) speaks  of tenancy for           specified period  agreed between  the landlord and           the tenant  and it  prohibits  the  landlord  from           applying, before  the expiry  of such  period. Now           after these sections, S. 10(3)(e) runs thus:                ’The Controller  shall, if  he  is  satisfied           that the claim 396           of  the  landlord  is  bona  fide  make  an  order           directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  landlord  in           possession of  the building on such date as may be           specified by  the Controller and if the Controller           is  not  so  satisfied  he  shall  make  an  order           rejecting the application.’                I find  in the judgment of Ramanujam, J. this           S. 10(3)(e)  has not been adverted to. S. 10(3)(e)           applies  to   Ss.  10(3)(a)(i),  10(3)(a)(ii)  and           10(3)(a)(iii)  and   also  to   Ss.  10(3)(b)  and           10(3)(c). If  the Legislature  intended  that  the           provisions of  S. 10(3)(a)(i) and S. 10(3)(a)(iii)           to  have  different  operations,  the  Legislature           would not  have stated  in S.  10(3)(e)  that  the           Controller should  be satisfied  that the claim of           the landlord  is bona  fide, before  he  makes  an           order directing  the tenant to put the landlord in           possession,  and   the  further   words  ’if   the           Controller is  not so  satisfied, he shall make an           order rejecting the application’ very clearly show           that the  Controller  should,  before  passing  an           order for  eviction, be  satisfied with  the  bona           fide of the claim, or else he should dismiss it."      The main  ground on which the learned Judge who decided the above case disagreed with the decision in Abdul Rahman’s case (supra)  is that in Abdul Rahman’s case (supra) section

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 14  

10(3)(e) of  the Act,  which applied  to all  the three sub- clauses, namely  (i), (ii)  and (iii) in section 10(3)(a) of the Act  had not  been adverted  to. The  learned Judge also held that  the mere absence of the word ’require’ in section 10(3)(a)(iii) of  the Act  did not  necessarily lead  to the inference that  the Legislature  did  not  intend  that  the Controller should  not go into the question of bona fides of the requirement  of the  landlord in a petition for eviction filed under  that provision.  Another learned  Judge of  the Madras High Court has taken the same view in M/s. Thilagaraj Match Works,  through  its  partner  S.  Chidambaram  v.  C. Sundaresan, [1985] 1 Mad. Law J. 106. It is observed in that case thus:                "In the present case, the Appellate Authority           has not  adverted to  these features at all and in           one place  he observes  that the  bona fide of the           claim of  the landlord is extraneous and it should           not be tested too severely. This exposes his wrong           approach to  the question  of bona fide which is a           relevant  one.  The  very  ingredient  of  section           10(3)(e) of  the Act requires that the question of           bona fide  has got  to be  tested and it has got a           due place while 397           adjudicating  a   petition  for  eviction  by  the           landlord under the concerned provisions. It is not           the desire  of the  landlord, but there must be an           element of  need for  the landlord before it could           be stated  that he  requires the  premises for his           own occupation.  The features  referred to  above,           cannot be  eschewed as  irrelevant, for  after all           bona fide  will have  to be  proved in an ordinary           manner like  any other  fact  in  issue,  and  the           entire gamut  of facts and circumstances has to be           adverted to on this question. As already stated, I           am not  expressing any opinion over these features           on merits,  and it  is for the Appellate Authority           to advert to them and adjudicate upon the question           afresh one way or the other. The discussions above           oblige me to interfere in revision and accordingly           the revision  is allowed  and  the  matter  stands           remitted to  the Appellate  Authority for  him  to           consider it afresh taking note of all the relevant           features and  factors of  the case on the question           of bona  fides, and  pass appropriate orders. Both           the counsel  represent that  for  the  purpose  of           comprehensive adjudication  of the matter, further           evidence has  to be  adduced. I  take note  of the           request of  both the counsel and I direct that the           Appellate Authority  will permit  the  parties  to           place further  evidence and  he  will  decide  the           matter afresh  after such  evidence is placed, the           Appellate Authority will do well to dispose of the           matter expeditiously  and in  any event  within  a           period of three months from the date of receipt of           the copy of this order."      In P.  Thanneermalai Chettiar  v. S.J.  Dhanraj, [1986] Mad. L.J.  115 another  learned Judge  of the  High Court of Madras has construed section 10(3)(e) of the Act thus:                "It is  not disputed that section 10(3)(e) of           Act 18  of 1960  is  applicable  to  the  case  of           residential building  as well  as  non-residential           building and  it is  provided therein  that if the           Controller is  satisfied that  the  claim  of  the           landlord is  bona fide,  he shall  make  an  order

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 14  

         directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  landlord  in           possession of  the building;  otherwise, he has to           reject  the  application.  In  the  instant  case,           considering the various circumstances and also the           fact that  the petitioner  was residing in a house           of his  own at  Devakottai where  he has  got vast           extent of  properties and was carrying on business           along with other members of his family, the 398           claim of  the  petitioner  that  he  required  the           premises for  his own  use and  occupation is  not           proved and  in any  event there is no bona fide in           the same"      The main  ground on which the learned Judge who decided Abdul Rahman’s  case (supra)  held that it was not necessary to establish the bona fide equipment of the landlord when he made an application for eviction under section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the  Act was that, the word ’require’ was not to be found in section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. We are of the view that having regard  to the  pattern in  which clause  (a) of sub- section (3) of section 10 of the Act is enacted and also the context, the  words ’if the landlord required it for his own use or  for the  use of  his any member of the family’ which are found  in sub-clause (ii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act have to  be read  also  into  sub-clause  (iii)  of  section 10(3)(a) of  the Act.  Sub-clause (ii)  and (iii)  both deal with the  non-residential buildings.  They could  have  been enacted as  one sub-clause  by adding  a  conjunction  ’and’ between the  said two  sub-clause, in which event the clause would have  read thus:  ’in case  it  is  a  non-residential building which  is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any  member of  his family  is  not  occupying  any  such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; and  in case  it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes  of a  business which  he or  any member of his family is  carrying on,  a non-residential  building in  the city, town  or village  concerned which  is his own.’ If the two sub-clauses  are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result. The  non-residential building  referred to  in  sub- clause (ii)  is a  building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use and all other non- residential buildings fall under sub-clause (iii). The State Legislature cannot  be attributed with the intention that it required a  more stringent  proof by insisting upon proof of bona fides  of his  requirement or need also when a landlord is seeking  eviction of  a tenant  from a garage than in the case of  a non-residential  building which  is  occupied  by large commercial house for carrying on business. The learned counsel for the respondent was not able to explain as to why the State  Legislature gave  greater protection  to  tenants occupying premises  used for keeping vehicles or adapted for such use  than to  tenants occupying  other  types  of  non- residential buildings.  It is  no doubt  true that the Court while construing  a provision should not easily read into it words which  have not  been  expressly  enacted  but  having regard to  the context  in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is 399 enacted the  court should construe it in a harmoneous way to make it meaningful.      In Seaford  Court Estates  Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 All. E.R. 155 at 164. Lord Denning L.J. said:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 14  

              "When a defect appears, a judge cannot simply           fold his  hands and  blame the  draftsman. He must           set to  work on  the constructive  task of finding           the intention of Parliament ..... and then he must           supplement the  written word  so as to give ’force           and life’  to the  intention  of  the  legislature           ..... A judge should ask himself the question how,           if the  makers of  the  Act  had  themselves  come           across this ruck in the texture of it, they should           have straightened  it out? He must then do as they           would have  done.  A  judge  must  not  alter  the           material of  which the Act is woven but he can and           should iron out the creases."      This rule  of construction  is quoted  with approval by this Court  in M.  Pentiah and Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors., [1961] 2 S.C.R. 295 at 314 and it is also referred to by  Beg, C.J. in Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Board, etc. v.  R. Rajappa  & Ors.,  [1978] 3  S.C.R. 207.  In  the present case  by insisting on the proof of the bona fides of the requirement  of the landlord, the Court is not doing any violence to  the statute  nor embarking upon any legislative action. The  Court is  only  construing  the  words  of  the statute in a reasonable way having regard to the context.      We are  of the  view that  by merely  proving that  the premises in  question is a non-residential building and that the landlord  or any  member of  his family is not occupying for the  purpose of a business which he or any member of his family is  carrying on any residential building in the city, town or  village concerned  which is  his own,  the landlord cannot in the context in which section 10(3)(a)(iii) appears get a  tenant evicted. He must show in view of clause (e) of section 10(3)  that his claim is bona fide. The word ’claim’ means "a  demand for something as due" or "to seek or ask or for on  the ground  of right"  etc. In  the context  of Rent Control Law  which is  enacted for  the  purpose  of  giving protection to tenants against unreasonable evictions and for the purpose  of making  equitable distribution  of buildings amongst persons  who are  in need  of them in order to prove that his claim is bona fide a landlord should establish that he deserves to be put in possession of the premises which is in the occupation of a tenant. Any decision on 400 the question  whether a  landlord  deserves  to  be  put  in possession of  a premises  in the  occupation  of  a  tenant should  naturally   depend  upon   the  bona  fides  of  the landlord’s requirement  or need.  The word ’claim’ in clause (e) of  section 10(3)  of  the  Act  should,  therefore,  he construed as  ’the  requirement’  of  the  landlord  or  his deservedness. ’Deserve’  means ’to have a rightful claim’ or ’a just claim’. Since clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act is also  applicable to  a petition  filed  under  sub-clause (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act it becomes necessary to examine whether  the requirement  of the  landlord  is  bona fide. Otherwise a landlord will be able to evict a tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in section  10(3)(a)(iii) of  the Act.  Take a  case where a landlord for  some oblique  reason wishes  to get rid of his tenant from  a  non-residential  building  of  the  category mentioned in  section 10(3)(a)(iii)  and to  achieve his aim fakes to  start money-lending  business (for which indeed no specified separate portion in a building may be needed) in a building not  belonging to  him and  to create evidence even actually lends money to some of his friends or relatives and a week  thereafter applies for eviction of the tenant on the ground that  he is  carrying on  business and  has  no  non-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 14  

residential building  of his  own in  his occupation  in the city, town  or village concerned. Apparently, the conditions prescribed in  the aforesaid sub-clause (iii) are fulfilled. If the requirement of "claim" being "bona fide" as contained in section 10(3)(e) is construed to mean that genuineness of the need of the landlord for the non-residential building is not to be considered and the circumstances that the landlord on the  date of making the application is factually carrying on business  and has  no non-residential building of his own in his  occupation in the city, town or village concerned is to be  construed sufficient to make his claim bona fide, the tenancy of  no non-residential  building will  be secure. It will be  preposterous to  attribute such an intention to the legislature. Such  a contingency  should be  avoided  as  it would be against the very object of the Act itself. The need of the  landlord should  be genuine.  That is  the object of enacting clause  (e) of  section 10(3) of the Act. When once we reach  the above  conclusion it  is not  enough that  the landlord should merely desire to use or occupy the premises. What is  necessary is that he should bona fide need them for his own  use and  occupation or for occupation by any of the members of  his family  as held  by this  Court  in  Phiroze Bamanji Desai  v. Chandrakant  M. Patel  &  Ors.,  [1974]  3 S.C.R. 267  and Mattulal  v. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 127. The learned  Judge who  decided the  case out  of which this appeal arises  was, therefore,  in error in holding that the landlord need  not prove  that his requirement was bona fide but that  his claim  was bona fide as provided in clause (e) of section 10(3) of the 401 Act. The  learned  Judge  has  made  a  distinction  between ‘requirement’ and  ‘claim’ in the present case without there being a difference.      In the  circumstances we  are of  the  view  that  M/s. Mahalakshmi’s case  (supra), M.  Abdul Rahman’s case (supra) and A.  Khan  Mohammed’s  case  (supra)  have  been  wrongly decided. They  are liable  to be  overruled. We  accordingly overrule them. We hold that a landlord seeking eviction of a tenant  from   a  non-residential   premises  under  section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act in order to succeed in his petition should establish  that he bona fide requires the premises in addition  to  proving  the  other  ingredients  referred  to therein. The  judgment of the High Court which has proceeded on a  wrong basis has, therefore, to be set aside. Since the High  Court   while  allowing   the  revision  petition  has approached the  case from  a wrong angle, it is necessary to direct the  High Court  to decide  it afresh in the light of what we  have stated  above. We,  therefore, set  aside  the judgment of  the High  Court and remand it to the High Court again to  decide it afresh. If the High Court finds that the case should  be remanded to the Trial Court to enable any of the parties  to lead  evidence on  the question  of the bona fide requirement  of the  landlord it  may remit the case to the Trial Court.      The appeal  is accordingly  allowed. There  shall be no order as to costs. S.L.                                    Appeal allowed. 402