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PETITIONER: H.S. SRINIVASA RAGHAVACHAR ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/04/1987

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1518            1987 SCR  (2)1189  1987 SCC  (2) 692        JT 1987 (3)    26  1987 SCALE  (1)885

ACT:     Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961--Sections 44, 48(8) and 48A--Right of landlord to resume land if bona fide  required for  personal  cultivation--Taken  away  by  Karnataka  Land Reforms  (Amendment)  Act,  1974--Whether   constitutionally valid--Amendment law aimed at agrarian reform--Advocates not to be prevented from appearing before Tribunals  functioning under the Act--Tribunals functions under the Act--Whether to be manned by judicial personnel.     Administrative law--Statutory Tribunals--Whether to be a lay  tribunal or judicial tribunal--Some  disputes  required trained  judicial mind, many do not require  application  of trained judicial mind-Land Tribunals under Section 48(8)  of Karnataka  Land  Reforms Act, 1961 do  not  require  trained judicial personnel.     Advocates    Act,   1961/Indian   Bar   Councils    Act, 1926--Section 30/ Section  14---Advocates--Right of  appear- ance  before   Tribunals-Section  48(8)  of  Karnataka  Land Reforms Act, 1961 not to be enforced so as to prevent  Advo- cates from appearing before Tribunals under the Act.     Constitution  of  India, 1950--Articles 31-A,  31-B  and 31-C,  39(b)  and  (c) and  Ninth  Schedule--Karnataka  Land Reforms  (Amendment)  Act,  1974   Constitutional   validity of--Law clearly aimed at agrarian reform.

HEADNOTE:     The  Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 1961 was  substantially amended  by the Amendment Act I of 1974 and it was  included in  the Ninth Schedule as was the principal Act.  Section  5 was  amended and the provisos were omitted. Sections 14  and 16 were deleted. Section 44 was mended. New sub-section  (1) provided that:-               "All  lands  held by or in the  possession  of               tenants  (including  tenants  against  whom  a               decree or order for eviction or a  certificate               for resumption is made or issued)  immediately               prior  to  the  date of  commencement  of  the               Amendment Act, other than lands               1190               held  by  them under  leases  permitted  under               Section  5 shall, with effect on and from  the

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             said  date, stand transferred to and  vest  in               the State Government. ’’     A  new  Section  48 providing for  the  constitution  of Tribunals  was  introduced. Sub-section (8)  of  Section  48 provided  that  no legal practitioner shall  be  allowed  to appear  in any proceeding before the Tribunal.  Section  48A dealt  with the procedure to be adopted by the  Tribunal  in its  enquiry  into applications made under  Section  45  for registration of a person as an occupant.     The  provision  for an appeal from the decision  of  the court  and the further right of revision under  the  amended Act  were  taken away and there was no right  of  appeal  or revision  against  the decision of the  Tribunal.  The  1974 Amending  Act  took away the right which was  saved  by  the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried woman,  minor and  disabled  person to create a tenancy or  lease  of  the land.  The more important right which was taken away by  the 1974  Amendment was the right of the landlord to resume  the land if he bona fide required the land for personal cultiva- tion  or  for  a non-agricultural purpose.  This  right  was denied by the Amending Act even if the income by the  culti- vation  of the land which he was entitled to resume was  the principal source of income for the maintenance of the  land- lord.     The  Writ Petitions challenging the amendments filed  by the appellants were dismissed by the High Court.     In the appeals, it was contended on behalf of the appel- lants  that the 1974 Amendment insofar as it took  away  the right  of  a landlord to resume possession of  the  tenanted land  where  he  bona fide required the  land  for  personal cultivation and had no other principal source of income  was ultra  vires,  notwithstanding its inclusion  in  the  Ninth Schedule. as it offended the basic structure of the  Consti- tution. that the provision for the constitution of a  Tribu- nal consisting of persons with unspecified qualifications in the place of a court was similarly ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature, and that Section 48(8) which excluded legal practitioners from appearing before the Tribunals  was repugnant  to  Section  30 of the Advocates  Act,  1961  and Section  14  of the Indian Bar Councils Act.  1926  and  the State Legislature was not competent to make a law  repugnant to laws made by Parliament pursuant to entries 77 and 78  of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and  that important  questions  which  fail  for  consideration  under Section  48A should not be left to a Tribunal consisting  of mem- 1191 bers  nominated by the State Government with no  regard  for any qualification.     It  was also contended that the 1974 Amendment  Act  was not  a law pertaining to agrarian reform; nor was it  a  law directed towards securing that the ownership and control  of the material resources of the community were so  distributed as best to subserve the common good or that the operation of the  economic system did not result in the concentration  of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. that far  from setting out to achieve these goals, the  Amendment Act set out in quite opposite direction by seeking to reduce to  destitution small landlords whose sole means of  liveli- hood was the tenanted land which they were allowed to resume for  personal  cultivation, that the original Act  was  very fair  as it recognised poverty amongst landlords as well  as poverty amongst tenants and afforded a measure of protection to  the  poorer sections of the landlords,  and  that  Waman Rao’s  case to the extent it upheld Articles 31-A, 31-B  and

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31-C  and the validity of the legislations impugned  therein required re-consideration. Dismissing the appeals, this Court,     HELD:  1. No provision of the Amending Act  offends  the basic structure of the Constitution. [1204G-H]     2.  The 1974 Amending Act took away the right which  was saved by the original Act in favour of the widow.  unmarried women,  minor  and disabled person to create  a  tenancy  or lease of the land. The more important right which was  taken away by the 1974 Amendment was the right of the landlord  to resume  the land if he bona fide required the land for  per- sonal   cultivation  or  for  a  non-agricultural   purpose. [1201E-F]     3.  It  is too late in the day to contend that,  in  the existing system of economic relations, ownership of land  to the  tiller of the land is not the best way of securing  the utmost  utilisation  of  land, a material  resource  of  the community for the common good of the entire community. It is now well recognised that in the absence of common  ownership of  land in the existing system of economic  relations,  the greatest incentive for maximum production is the feeling  of identity  and security which is possible only if the  owner- ship of the land is with the tiller. It is in recognition of this  principle that ’landlordism’ was sought to be  totally done away with by the amendment of Section 5 of the Act,  by the  omission of Sections 14 and 16 and by the amendment  of Section 44. [1204C-E] 1192     4. If between a landlord who did not himself  personally cultivate the land and a tenant who so cultivated the  land, the legislature preferred the cultivating tenant, it is  not possible  to  hold  that such preference is not  part  of  a programme  of  agrarian  reform pursuant  to  the  Directive Principles  contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) of the  Con- stitution. There is not the slightest doubt that the  amend- ment  was a law clearly aimed at agrarian reform  to  secure these  Directive  Principles.  It is true that  one  of  the conditions  subject to which alone a landlord  could  resume land  for personal cultivation under Section 16 of  the  Act was that the income from the land proposed to be  cultivated by the landlord on resumption should be the principal source of  income  for  the maintenance of the  landlord,  but  the question of resumption of land from a tenant would not arise unless a tenant was already cultivating the land. If, there- fore,  a  tenant  is already cultivating the  land  and  if, presumably,  that is the source of his livelihood, there  is no reason why he should be dispossessed to enable a landlord whose source of livelihood it was not until then to make  it his principal source of maintenance hereafter. [ 1204E-G]     5.1 The mal-functioning of some of the Tribunals  cannot possibly  vitiate the provision relating to the constitution of  the Tribunal and entrustment of the decision of  certain issues to the Tribunal. There can be no doubt that while the decision of some disputes require a trained Judicial mind to be  applied to it, there are many other questions  which  do not  require the application of any trained  judicial  mind. The disputes contemplated by Section 48A do not appear to be disputes  of  a nature where the application  of  a  trained judicial mind is absolutely essential. [ 1205C, D]     5.2  Land Tribunals have functioned very well in some of the  States where under the respective State Acts more  com- plicated questions than ones under Section 48A were entrust- ed to the Land Tribunals. The failure of the Land  Tribunals to  function  efficiently in the State has  apparently  been taken  note  of by the Legislature itself and  the  Act  has

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since been amended making provision for an appeal and  revi- sion. The failure of some of the Land Tribunals to  function efficiently  cannot be said to be sufficient  to  stigmatise wholesale, the functioning of all the Tribunals  constituted under  the  Act and invalididate the provisions of  the  Act relating to Tribunals. [1205D-F]     6.1 Section 48(8) will not be enforced so as to  prevent Advocates  from appearing before the  Tribunals  functioning under the Act, since this provision is repugnant to  Section 30  of the Advocates Act, 1961 and Section 14 of the  Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and the State 1193 Legislature is not competent to make a law repugnant to laws made  by Parliament pursuant to Entries 77 and 78 of List  I of  the  Seventh  Schedule of  the  Constitution.  [1205G-H; 1206A]     6.2  In  regard  to decisions already  rendered  by  the Tribunals, it is not necessary to re-open them on the ground that  legal practitioners were not allowed to appear  before the Tribunals in those cases. [1205B]     7.  It is not necessary either to re-consider or  to  go behind  the decision in Waman Rao’s case for the purpose  of this case. [1202D]     Waman  Rao & Ors. v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCR 1  and Jaswant Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 Punjab &  Haryana 221, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE jURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.  3828- 3832 of 1983 etc.     From  the Judgment and Order dated  31.8.82/1.9.1982  of the   Karnataka High Court in W.P. Nos. 19486, 23347  23348, 23349 and 25366 of 1981.     B.R.L,  Iyengar,  Soli J. Sorabjee, S.K.V.  lyenger  and Mrs.  Shyamala Pappu, S. Lakshminarasu, K. Ram  Kumar,  Mrs. Indira Sawhney and P.R. Ramasesh for the Appellants. M. Veerappa and Ashok Sharma for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     CHINNAPPA  REDDY, J. The question raised in the  several appeals  is  primarily that of the vires of sec. 44  of  the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 as amended by the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act I of 1974. In order to appreci- ate the submissions made to us, it will be useful to set out the relevant provisions of the Act before it was amended  by Act I of 1974. Section 2(6) as it stood before the amendment defined  "basic holding" as meaning land which was equal  to two  standard acres. "Ceiling area" was defined  as  meaning land which was equal to eighteen standard acres. "Court" was defined to mean the court of Munsif within the local  limits of whose jurisdiction the land was situate. "Family holding" was  defined  as meaning land equal to six  standard  acres. "Small holder" was defined to mean a land owner owning  land not exceeding two basic holdings 1194 whose total net annual income including the income from such land did not exceed one thousand two hundred rupees. "Stand- ard acre" was defined to mean one acre of the first class of land  or an extent equivalent thereto consisting of any  one or  more classes of land specified in Part A of  Schedule  1 determined  in accordance with the formula in Part B of  the said  Schedule.  Chapter  II (Sections 4  to  43)  contained ’General  provisions relating to Tenancies’ and Chapter  III (Sections 44 to 62) dealt with ’Conferment of owner-ship  on

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tenants’. Section 5 prohibited the creation or  continuation of  any tenancy in respect of any land after  the  appointed day and barred the leasing of land for any period  whatsoev- er.  It  was, however, provided that (a)  any  small  holder might  create or continue a tenancy or lease the land  owned by  him and (b) any land owner who was a minor, a widow,  an unmarried  woman, a person incapable of cultivating land  by reason of any physical or mental disability or a soldier  in service in the Armed Forces of the Union or a seaman,  might create  or continue the tenancy or lease the land  owned  by him or her. It was further provided that tenancies of resum- able lands could be continued until the dispossession of the tenants under s. 14 and of non-resumable land until the date of  vesting under s. 44. Section 14 provided for  resumption of  lands from tenants. Sub-section 1, 4 and 6 s. 14 may  be usefully  extracted  here. Sub-sections 2, 3 and  5  do  not appear to be necessary for the purposes of the present case. Sub-Sections 1, 4 and 6 were as follows:-               ’14.      Resumption     of     land      from               tenants--(1)Notwithstanding anything contained               in  sections  22 and 43, but  subject  to  the               provisions of this section and of sections 15,               16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 41, a landlord may,  if               he  bona fide requires land, other  than  land               referred  to  in the first proviso  to  clause               (29) of sub-section (A) of section 2,               (i) for cultivating personally, or               (ii)  for any non-agricultural  purpose,  file               with the Court a statement indicating the land               or lands owned by him and which he intends  to               resume  and such other particulars as  may  be               prescribed. On such statement being filed. the               Court shall, as soon as may be after giving an               opportunity  to be heard to the  landlord  and               such  of his tenants and other persons as  may               be affected, and, having due regard to  conti-               nuity,  fertility  and  fair  distribution  of               lands,  and after making such other  inquiries               as the Court deems necessary,               1195               determine  the land or lands, which the  land-               lord  shall be entitled to resume,  and  shall               issue  a  certificate to the landlord  to  the               effect  that  the land or lands  specified  in               such certificate has been reserved for resump-               tion;  and thereupon the right to resume  pos-               session  shall be exercisable only in  respect               of the lands specified in such certificate and               shall not extend to any other land.               Explanation:- Subject to such rules as may  be               prescribed. the Court within the  jurisdiction               of which the greater part of the land held  by               the  landlord is situated shall be  the  Court               competent  to issue a certificate  under  this               section."               (2)  X     X     X     X    X    X     X     X               X               (3) x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x               (4)  In respect of tenancies existing  on  the               appointed  day,  as soon as may be  after  the               expiry  of fifteen months from  the  appointed               day,  as  soon as may be after  the  statement               under sub-section(1) is filed, the Court shall               after such inquiry as it deems fit,  determine               the  lands which will be  non-resumable  lands

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             leased to tenants for purposes of this Act.               (5) x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x               (6)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained   in               sub-section (5), where the landlord belongs to               any of the following categories, namely:-               (i) minor;               (ii) a person incapable of cultivating land by               reason of any physical or mental disability,               (iii) a widow;               (iv) an unmarried woman;               Then, the application to the Court for posses-               sion  of  land shall be made,  within  fifteen               months from the appointed day or one year from               the date on which--               (a)  in the case of category (i),  he  attains               majority;               1196               (b) in the case of category(ii), he ceases  to               be subject to such physical or mental disabil-               ity;               (c) in the case of category (iii), she  remar-               ries;               (d) in the case of category (iv), she marries,               whichever is later:                         Provided that where land is held  by               two or more joint landlords, the provisions of               this  sub-section shall not apply  unless               all  such landlords, belong to the  categories               specified  in  clauses (i) and  (ii)  and  the               application shall be made within one year from               the  date on which any one of  such  landlords               ceases  to belong to any such category and  an               application  by any one of  the  joint-holders               shall  be deemed to be a valid application  on               behalf of all the joint holders:                         Provided further that where a person               belonging  to any of the categories  specified               in clause (i) or (ii) of this subsection, is a               member  of a joint family, the  provisions  of               this  sub-section shall not apply  unless  all               the members of the joint family belong to  the               categories specified in clauses (i) and  (ii),               but  where the share in the joint family of  a               person belonging to any of such categories has               been separated by metes and bounds before  the               filing of the statement under sub-section (i),               if the Court on inquiry is satisfied that  the               share  of such person in the  land  separated,               having regard to the area, assessment, classi-               fication and value of the land is in the  same               proportion as the share of that person in  the               entire  joint  family property, and not  in  a               larger proportion, the provisions of the  sub-               section shall be applicable to such person."               (7) x     x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x               (8)  x      x     x     x      x      x      x               x     x Section  15 provided for resumption of land by soldiers  and seamen.  Section  16 prescribed the  conditions  restricting resumption  of land under s. 14. It is necessary to  extract the whole of s. 16. It was as follows:-               "16. Conditions restricting resumption of land               under  section 14. The right of a landlord  to               resume  for  cultivating the  land  personally               under  section  14, shall be  subject  to  the

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             following conditions, namely:-               1197               (1)  If the landlord owns land  not  exceeding               two  basic  holdings he shall be  entitled  to               resume  one  half of the land  leased  to  the               tenant:                   Provided that the right to resume by  such               landlord  shall  be subject to  the  condition               that  in the case of a protected tenant,  such               tenant, shall be left with at least one stand-               ard  acre  of the land actually held  by  him,               which-ever is less.               (2)  If the landlord owns land  exceeding  two               basic holdings, he shall be entitled to resume               one-half  of  the area leased to  the  tenant,               provided  that the total area resumed  by  the               landlord  does not exceed three  family  hold-               ings.               (3)  No  landlord.who  has  been   cultivating               personally  land exceeding three family  hold-               ings  shall  be entitled to  resume  any  land               leased.               (4) The right to resume land under clauses (1)               to (3) shall be subject to the further  condi-               tion  that the land resumed from all the  ten-               ants holding under the landlord together  with               the’ extent of land, if any, cultivated by the               landlord personally and any non-resumable land               held  by  him shall not  exceed  three  family               holdings.               (5) In respect of lands cultivated with  plan-               tation crops, the landlord shall not be  enti-               tled to resume more than one-half of the  land               leased to a tenant.               (6) If more tenancies than one are held  under               the same landlord, then the landlord shall  be               entitled  to  resume land  only  from  tenants               whose tenancy or tenancies are the shortest in               point of duration:                   Provided that the landlord shall be  enti-               tled to resume lands held by protected tenants               only if the required extent of land cannot  be               resumed  from  tenants  other  than  protected               tenants:                   Provided  further that where such  tenancy               or  tenancies  shortest in point  of  duration               shall  on  resumption leave with  the  tenants               land in extent which will be less than a               1198               basic holding, the resumption shall be made in               respect of tenancy or tenancies next longer in               point of duration.               (7) The right to resume land by the  landlord,               other than a landlord owning land not  exceed-               ing  two basic holdings, shall be  subject  to               the  further  condition that in  the  case  of               protected tenants, each protected tenant shall               be  left  with  a basic holding  or  the  land               actually held by him, whichever is less.               (8)  The right to resume land from any  tenant               shall be exercisable under s. 14 only once.               (9) The income by the cultivation of the  land               of which he is entitled to resume shall be the               principal source of income for the maintenance               of the landlord.

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             (10) If as a result of the resumption of  land               under  section 14, a fragment is created,  the               person entitled to the larger part of the land               shall be entitled to the fragment also.               (10 A) If any person has after the 18th Novem-               ber, 1961 and before the appointed day  trans-               ferred any land, otherwise than by  partition,               then, in calculating the extent of land  owned               by  such person for purposes of the  preceding               clauses,  the  area so  transferred  shall  be               taken  into consideration, and land  exceeding               the  resumable  area so  calculated  shall  be               deemed  to  be non-resumable  land,  and  such               person  shall not be entitled to  resume  such               non-resumable land.               Explanation-For  purposes  of this  clause,  a               land shall be deemed to have been transferred,               if  it has been transferred by act of  parties               (whether by sale, gift, mortgage, with posses-               sion,  exchange, lease or any  other  disposi-               tion) made inter vivas.               ( 10 B) Notwithstanding anything contained  in               clauses  (1) to (10) (both inclusive)., or  s,               142, the extent of land, if any, resumable, by               any  landlord in Bombay Area shall be  subject               to  the restrictions and conditions  specified               in  sections  31A, 3lB and 31C of  the  Bombay               Tenancy  and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948,  as               inserted by the Bombay Tenancy               1199               and  Agricultural Lands (Amendment)  Act  1955               (Bombay  Act 13 of 1956), notwithstanding  the               provisions  of the Bombay Tenancy  (Suspension               of Provisions and Amendment) Act, 1957 (Mysore               Act 13 of 1957).               (10  C) Notwithstanding anything contained  in               clauses  (1) to (10) (both inclusive),  or  s.               142, the extent of land, if any, resumable, by               any  landlord in the Hyderabad Area, shall  be               subject  to  the restrictions  and  conditions               specified  in the Hyderabad Tenancy and  Agri-               cultural  Lands Act, 1950, as in force in  the               Hyderabad Area on the 1st November 1956.               (11)  No landlord who at any time  before  the               appointed day had resumed land from any tenant               for  personal  cultivation  under  the  Bombay               Tenancy  and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948,  or               the  Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands               Act,  1950, shall be entitled to resume  again               under  section 14 any land left with the  same               tenant."               Section 44 provided for the vesting of certain               lands in the State Government. Sub-sec. 1  was               as follows:               "(1) As soon as may be after the determination               of  the non-resumable lands under  sub-section               (4)  of section 14, by each Court,  the  State               Government  may by notification  declare  that               with effect from such date as may be specified               in such notification (hereinafter referred  to               as the date of vesting) all the  non-resumable               lands  determined  by  such  Court  which  are               leased to tenants, whether protected or other-               wise,  and all lands leased to  permanent  and               other tenants referred to in the first proviso

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             to clause (29) of sub-section (A) of section 2               in the area within jurisdiction of such  Court               shall  stand  transferred to and vest  in  the               State Government." Section  45  provided  for the registration  of  tenants  as occupants of land on certain conditions. Section 47 provided for the payment of compensation to the land owner in  regard to  the  extinguishment of rights in lands  vesting  in  the State Government under s. 44. Chapter IV (sections 63 to 79) dealt with ’ceiling on land holdings’. Section 63 prescribed the ceiling on the extent of land which any person may  hold either as a land-owner, landlord or tenant or as a mortgagee with  possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity  and partly in another. 1200 Section  68 provided for the vesting of land surrendered  by the  owner in the State Government, Section 72 provided  for payment of compensation for lands surrendered to and  vested in the State Government. We are not concerned with  Chapters V,  VI, VII, and VIII. Chapter IX dealt with ’Procedure  and Jurisdiction  of Court and Appeals’. Section 112  prescribed the  duties of the court and among the duties were  "(g)  to issue  a  certificate relating to reservation  of  land  for resumption under sub-section (1) of s. 14 and (h) to  deter- mine the non-resumable lands under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 14." Sections 113, 114 and 115 provided for enquiry by the  court and the procedure to be adopted. Section 118 provided for an appeal from the Court to the District Court.     The broad scheme of the provisions mentioned or set  out above  was  that there was not only to be a ceiling  on  the holding  of  land, the system of leasing of land was  to  be abolished  and cultivating tenants were to be invested  with rights  of  ownership. However, certain limited  classes  of cases were recognised where leases were permitted on the one hand and on the other tenants were deprived of the right  to remain  in  possession  of the land. It  was  provided  that leases were permissible in cases when the landlord was under some  disability as specified in s. 5. It was also  provided that  a  land owner could seek, subject  to  the  prescribed limits,  resumption  of land from tenants, if he  bona  fide required  the  land for cultivating personally  or  for  any non-agricultural  purpose.  The  right to  resume  land  for personal cultivation was no doubt subject to several  severe conditions, one of the most important of which was that  the income by the cultivation of the land which he was  entitled to  resume should be the principal source of income for  the maintenance of the land owner. In other words, the Act while fixing  a ceiling on the holding of land and generally  con- ferring  ownership  rights on tenants,  did  not  altogether ignore  the  interests of the smaller landlords and  did  in fact  offer some measure of protection to those who  desired to personally cultivate the tenanted land.     The Act was substantially amended in 1974. ’Basic  hold- ing’  and  ’family holding’ ceased to be  defined.  "Ceiling area"  was  defined  to mean the extent of  land  which  the person or family was entitled to hold under s. 63. Section 5 was  amended and the provisos were omitted. It  was  however provided by sub-sec. 2 that the prohibition against creation of tenancies or leases would not apply to tenancies  created by a soldier or a seaman. The savings in respect of a  minor widow  or a minor woman under the original sec. 5 was  taken away.  Section 14 was omitted. Section 16 was also  omitted. Section 44 was amended. The new sub-section 1 of sec. 44  is as follows:- 1201

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             "44(1) All lands held by or in the  possession               of  tenants (including tenants against whom  a               decree or order for eviction or a  certificate               for resumption is made or issued)  immediately               prior  to  the  date of  commencement  of  the               Amendment  Act, other than lands held by  them               under leases permitted under Section 5, shall,               with  effect on and from the said date,  stand               transferred  to and vest in the State  Govern-               ment." A new section 48 was introduced providing for the  Constitu- tion  of Tribunals, a Tribunal for each taluq consisting  of the Assistant Commissioner of the Revenue Division and  four other  members  to be nominated by the State  Government  of whom one shall be a person belonging to the scheduled castes or  scheduled tribes. No qualifications were prescribed  for the  nomination  of persons to membership of  the  Tribunal. Sub-section  8 of section 48 provided that no legal  practi- tioner  shall be allowed to appear in any proceeding  before the  Tribunal.  Section 48A dealt with the procedure  to  be adopted  by  the Tribunal in its enquiry  into  applications made  under s. 45 for registration of a person as  an  occu- pant. Sec. 112A provided for the duties of the Tahsildar and s. 112B provided for the duties of the Tribunal. The  provi- sion  for an appeal from the decision of the court  and  the further  right of revision under the amended Act were  taken away  and there was no right of appeal or  revision  against the  decision  of the Tribunal. Thus, we see that  the  1974 Amending  Act  took away the right which was  saved  by  the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried woman,  minor and  disabled person to create a tenancy or lease the  land. The  more important right which was taken away by  the  1974 Amendment  was the right of the landlord to resume the  land if  he bona-fide required the land for personal  cultivation or  for a nonagricultural purpose. The right to  resume  the land if he bona-fide required the land for personal cultiva- tion  was denied by the Amending Act even if the  income  by the cultivation of the land which he was entitled to  resume was  the principal source of income for the  maintenance  of the landlord.     The principal submission of the learned counsel for  the appellants was that the 1974 amendment in so far as it  took away  the  right of a landlord to resume possession  of  the tenanted  land where he bonafide required the land for  per- sonal  cultivation  and  had no other  principal  source  of income  for his own maintenance, was ultra  vires,  notwith- standing its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, as it offended the basic structure of the Constitution. Another  submission which was 1202 made  by the learned counsel was that the provision for  the constitution  of a Tribunal consisting of persons  with  un- specified  qualifications in the place of a court was  simi- larly  ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature.  The third  submission of the learned counsel was that  s.  47(B) which excluded legal practitioner from appearing before  the Tribunals  was in conflict with s. 30 of the Advocates’  Act and had,’ therefore. to yield.     It is necessary for us to mention here that the  princi- pal  Act was included in the IXth Schedule of the  Constitu- tion  on October 20, 1965 and the Amendment Act of 1974  was similarly included in the IXth the Schedule on September  7, 1974.     We do not think that it is necessary to hark back to the decisions  of this court rendered prior to the one in  Waman

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Rao  & Ors. v. Union of India, [ 1981] 2 SCR 1. One  of  the petitioners who presented his case in person did argue  that Waman  Rao’s case to the extent that it upheld  Arts.  31-A, 31-B and 31-C and to the extent that it upheld the  validity of  the legislations impugned therein required  reconsidera- tion. We do not agree that it is necessary either to  recon- sider  or  to go behind Waman Rao for the purposes  of  this case.  Chandrachud,  CJ. speaking for the  majority  of  the judges of the Constitution Bench stated their conclusions in regard to Arts. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C as follows:-               "(1)  The Constitution (First Amendment)  Act,               1951  which  introduced Article 31A  into  the               Constitution  with  retrospective  effect  and               section  3 of the Constitution (Fourth  Amend-               ment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new clause               (1), sub-clauses (a) to (e), for the  original               clause  (1) with retrospective effect, do  not               damage any of the basic. or essential features               of the Constitution or its basic structure and               are valid and constitutional being within  the               constituent power of the Parliament.                         (2)  Section 5 of  the  Constitution               (First Amendment) Act 1951 introduced  Article               3lB into the Constitution which reads thus:               "3lB x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x                         In   Keshvananda   Bharati    (1973,               Suppl.,  SCR 1) decided on April 24,  1973  it               was  held by the majority that Parliament  has               no power to amend the Constitution so as to               1203               damage  or  destroy  its  basic  or  essential               features or its basic structure. We hold  that               all amendments to the Constitution which  were               made  before April 24, 1973 and by  which  the               9th  Schedule to the Constitution was  amended               from time to time by the inclusion of  various               Acts  and Regulations therein, are  valid  and               constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution               made  on or after April 24, 1973 by which  the               9th  schedule to the Constitution was  amended               from time to time by the inclusion of  various               Acts  and  Regulations therein,  are  open  to               challenge on the ground that they, or any  one               or more of them, are beyond constituent  power               of the Parliament since they damage the  basic               or  essential features of the Constitution  or               its basic structure. We do not pronounce  upon               the validity of such subsequent constitutional               amendments   except   to  say  that   if   any               Act/Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by               a  Constitutional amendment made on  or  after               April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 31A, or  by               Article 31C as it stood prior to its amendment               by  the 42nd Amendment, the challenge  to  the               validity of the relevant Constitutional Amend-               ment by which that Act or Regulation is put in               the  9th  Schedule,  on the  ground  that  the               Amendment  damages  or  destroys  a  basic  or               essential features of the Constitution or  its               basic  structure as reflected in Articles  14,               19 or 31, will become otiose.                        (3) Article 31 C of the Constitution,               as it stood prior to its amendment by  section               4  of the Constitution (42nd  Amendment)  Act,               1976,  is  valid to the extent  to  which  its

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             constitutionality  was upheld in  Keshavananda               Bharati. Article 31C, as it stood prior to the               Constitution  (42nd  Amendment) Act  does  not               damage any of the basic or essential  features               of the Constitution or its basic structure.                        (4) All the Writ Petitions and Review               Petitions  relating  to the  validity  of  the               Maharashtra  Agricultural Lands  Ceiling  Acts               are dismissed with costs."     In  the course of the submissions, the  learned  counsel suggested that the 1974 Amendment Act was not a law pertain- ing  to  agrarian  reform; nor, it was said, was  it  a  law directed towards securing that the ownership and control  of the material resources of the community were so  distributed as best to subserve the common good or that the operation of the economic system did not result in the concentration of 1204 wealth  and means of production to the common detriment.  It was suggested that the 1974 Amendment ’Act far from  setting out to achieve these goals set out in quite opposite  direc- tion  by  seeking to reduce to destitution  small  landlords whose  sole means of livelihood was the tenanted land  which they were allowed to resume for personal cultivation. It was said  that the original Act was very fair as  it  recognised poverty amongst landlords as well as poverty amongst tenants and afforded a measure of protection to the poorer  sections of the landlords. We are unable to agree with the submission that  the  Amendment is not aimed at agrarian reform  or  at securing the objectives mentioned in Arts. 39(b) and (c)  of the Constitution. It is too late in the day to contend that, in  the existing system of economic relations, ownership  of land to the tiller of the land is not the best way of secur- ing  the utmost utilisation of land, a material resource  of the  community for the common good of the entire  community. It  is now well recognised by leading economists  everywhere that  in the absence of common ownership of land and in  the existing  system of economic relations, the greatest  incen- tive  for maximum production is the feeling of identity  and security which is possible only if the ownership of the land is  with the tiller. It is obviously in recognition of  this principle  that ’landlordism’ was sought to be totally  done away with by the amendment of s. 5 of the Act, by the  omis- sion  of secs, 14 and 16 and by the amendment of s.  44.  If between a landlord who did not himself personally  cultivate the land and a tenant who so cultivated the land, the legis- lature  preferred the cultivating tenant, we are  unable  to hold  that  such preference is not part of  a  programme  of agrarian  reform pursuant to the Directive  Principles  con- tained in Arts. 39(b) and (c).  We do not have the slightest doubt that the amendment was a law clearly aimed at agrarian reform,  to  secure the Directive  Principles  contained  in Arts.  39(b) and (c). It is true that one of the  conditions subject  to  which alone a landlord could  resume  land  for personal  cultivation  under s. 16 of the Act was  that  the income from the land proposed to be cultivated by the  land- lord on resumption should be the principal source of  income for the maintenance of the landlord. But it is important  to notice that the question of resumption of land from a tenant would not arise unless a tenant was already cultivating  the land.  If,  therefore, a tenant is already  cultivating  the land  and if, presumably, that is the source of his  liveli- hood,  there is no reason why he should be  dispossessed  to enable  a  landlord whose source of livelihood  it  was  not until  then to make it his principal source  of  maintenance hereafter. We do not think that any provision of the  Amend-

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ing Act offends the basic structure of the Constitution. In regard to the constitution of the Tribunal, it was argued that 1205 very important questions fell for consideration under s. 48A and it was wholly wrong that the decision of such  questions should be left, not to a judicial Tribunal, but to a  Tribu- nal consisting of members nominated by the State  Government with  no  regard for any qualification.  Our  attention  was invited  to  several decisions of the Karnataka  High  Court where the functioning of such iII-constituted Tribunals  was exposed and castigated. It is true that it was commented  in some of those cases that the Tribunals were functioning in a most  unjudicial manner. quite often without applying  their minds at all to the questions at issue and in some cases, in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. We are unable to see how the mal-functioning of some of the  Tribu- nals  can  possibly vitiate the provision  relating  to  the Constitution  of  the Tribunal and the  entrustment  of  the decision  of certain issues to the Tribunal. We do not  want to  enter  into a discussion of the question whether  a  lay Tribunal  cannot  function more  efficiently  than  judicial Tribunal in resolving certain peculiar questions. There  can be no doubt that while the decision of some disputes require a trained judicial mind to be applied to it, there are  many other questions which do not require the application of  any trained  judicial mind. The disputes contemplated by s.  48A do not appear to be disputes of a nature where the  applica- tion of a trained judicial mind is absolutely essential.  We also notice that Land Tribunals have functioned very well in West Bengal and Kerala where under the respecting State Acts more  complicated questions than the ones under s.  48A  are entrusted to Land Tribunals. The failure of the Land  Tribu- nals  to function efficiently in the State of Karnataka  has been apparently taken note of by the Legislature itself  and the  Act  has  since been amended making  provision  for  an appeal and revision. So much to the credit of the  Karnataka Legislature.  But we do not see how the failure of  some  of the land Tribunals to function efficiently can be said to be sufficient  to stigmatise wholesale, the functioning of  all the  Tribunals constituted under the Act and  to  invalidate the provisions of the Act relating to Tribunals.       The  last  submission was in regard to sub-sec.  8  of sec. 48 which prohibited legal practitioners from  appearing in  proceedings before the Tribunals. The argument was  that s.  48(8) was repugnant to s. 30 of the Advocates Act,  1961 and  s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act. It was said  that the State Legislature was not competent to make a law repug- nant  to laws made by Parliament pursuant to Entries 77  and 78  of List 1 of the 7th Schedule of the  Constitution.  The submission of the learned counsel is fully supported by  the judgment of a Full Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in  Jaswant  Kaur  v. State of Haryana, AIR  1977  Punjab  & Haryana 22 1. We adopt the reasoning of 1206 the High Court of Punjab & Haryana and direct that s.  48(8) will not be enforced so as to prevent Advocates from appear- ing  before  the  Tribunals functioning under  the  Act.  In regard to the decisions already rendered by the Tribunals we do  not  think that it is necessary to reopen  them  on  the ground  that legal practitioners were not allowed to  appear before  the Tribunals in those cases. All the civil  appeals are,  therefore,  dismissed,’ in the  circumstances  without cost. N.P.V.                                    Appeals dismissed.

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