03 November 1978
Supreme Court
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H.P GUPTA Vs MANOHAR LAL AND ORS.

Bench: TULZAPURKAR,V.D.
Case number: Appeal Criminal 38 of 1976


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PETITIONER: H.P  GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MANOHAR LAL AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/11/1978

BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  443            1979 SCR  (2) 208  1979 SCC  (2) 486

ACT:      Criminal Procedure  Code (Act 11 of 1974) 1973 Scope of sec. 456(2)-  Whether  the  Court  of  appeal  after  having disposed of the appeal has the power to order restoration of possession of  immovable  property  ?.-Construction  of  the words "while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision" in S. 456 of the Code.

HEADNOTE:      Respondents 1  to 4  were convicted  by a  Metropolitan Magistrate under  S. 447  I.P.C. for  trespassing and taking forcible possession  of the immovable property, which was in possession  of   the  appellant.  The  said  conviction  was confirmed by  the Court  of Sessions.  As the Magistrate did not pass  any order  for restoration  of possession under s. 456 (1)  Crl. P.C.,  the appellant  made an  application two weeks after  the  confirmation  of  the  conviction  to  the Appellate  Court   for  restoration  of  possession  of  the property under  s. 456  (2)Crl. P.C.  which was ordered. But the Delhi  High Court  while allowing  the application under Art. 227  of the  Constitution r/w  s. 482 Crl. P.C. made by the respondents 1 to 4 set aside the order of restoration of possession holding  that "the  language of  sub-s. (2) of s. 456 Cr.  P.C. is  plain and  unambiguous and leaves no doubt that the  Court of  appeal, confirmation, or revision has no power to  pass any  order of  restoration after  the appeal, reference  or   re  vision   has  been   disposed  of".  The construction placed  by the  High Court  on the words "while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision" occurring in s. 456 (2) Cr. P.C. was challenged by the appellant.      Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court ^      HELD: (1)  The appellate  or  revisional  Court  acting under s. 456 (2) will have jurisdiction or power to pass the order for  restoration of  possession at any time but it has to be  exercised with  discretion within  reasonable time of the disposal  of the appeal, reference or revision. [213G-H, 214A]      (2) The  language of  sub sec.  (2) of  Section 456 Cr. P.C. clearly  shows that  the same  is applicable  to a case where a  conviction has been recorded by the trial Court and the trial  Court has through mistake or inadvertence omitted

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to make  an order for restoration of possession of immovable property to tho  complainant  or has  refused  to  pass  such  order  either because the  offence was  not attended  by criminal force or show of  force or  by criminal  intimidation or  because the application in  that behalf was made after expiry of 30 days and an  appeal or  revision either against the conviction or the order refusing restoration has been preferred; in such a case sub-s.  (2) provides  that the  appellate Court  or the revisional Court  while disposing of such appeal or revision may make  an order  restoring possession  of  the  immovable property to the complainant [213D-F]      3. Under  Sub. sec (1) of Section 522 of the 1898 Code, the Trial  Court could order restoration of possession "when convicting such person or at any 209 Time within  one month  from the  date  of  the  conviction" whereas under  the   new s.  456 the limitation of one month has been  relegated to  a proviso  to sub-s.  (1) of s. 456. Sub-s. (2)  of the  present s.  456 corresponds  to  old  s. 522(3), but  there has been a change in the phraseology with a view to resolve the conflict of views between various High Courts that  obtained under  the old  Code on  the  question whether the  limitation of  30 days  was applicable  to  the Court of appeal, reference or revision. [211E-F, 212A-B]      The  change   in  phraseology   clearly  suggests  that Parliament did not intend to prescribe any limitation on the powers of the appellate Court or revisional Court; the words are not "when convicting" or "when upholding the conviction" but the  words are "while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision"  and these  would mean  in continuation  of the disposal of  the appeal,  reference or  revision  and  these words cannot  be regarded  as importing  a limitation on the power to  effect that such order must be incorporated in the body on  the judgment  disposing of the appeal, reference or revision. [2l3F-G]      Abdul Mannan and Ors. v. Taiyab Ali A.I.R. 1947 Cal 390 Krishnan Moothan  v. V.  K. A.  Krishnankutty Moothan A.I.R. 1960,  Kerala  348,  Nihal  Singh  v.  Emperor  A.I.R.  1939 Allahabad 662  Basanta Kumar  Maity v.  Kenaram Maity A.I.R. 1953 Cal.  393 Fida  Hussain .  Salfaraz Hussain A.I.R. 1933 Patna 617  and Savlaram  Sadoba Navle  v. Dhyaneshwar Vishnu Chinke,  A.I.R. 1942 Bom 148. referred to

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1976.      (From the  Judgment and  order dt. 25-9-75 of the Delhi High Court in original Misc. Main No. 118 of 1975).      R. L. Kohli and S. K. Sabharwal for the appellant.      Jairam Singh and N. S. Das Behl for the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      TULZAPURKAR,  J.-The  short  question  raised  in  this appeal by  special leave  is whether  the Court  of  Appeal, after having  disposed of the appeal, has the power to order restoration of  possession of  immovable property  under  s. 456(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ?      The facts  giving rise  to the  aforesaid question  are briefly these:  Respondents 1  to  4  were  convicted  by  a Metropolitan Magistrate  under s. 447 I.P.C. for trespassing and taking  forcible possession  of the  immovable  property which was  in the  possession of  the appellant  Shri H.  P. Gupta. The  Magistrate, however,  did not pass any order for

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restoration of possession under sub-s. (1) of s. 456 Cr.P.C. The respondents  filed an  appeal to  the Court  of Sessions against  their   conviction  which   was  dismissed  by  the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi on January 6, 1975. Two weeks  later  the  appellant  made  an  application  to  the Appellate  Court   for  restoration  of  possession  of  the property 210 under s.  456 (2)  of Cr.  P.C. and  the learned  Additional Sessions Judge ordered its restoration to him on February 1, 1975. The  respondents moved  the  Delhi  High  Court  under Article 227  of the  Constitution read with s. 482 Cr. P. C. being   Criminal Miscellaneous  Petition No.  118  of  1975, challenging the  said order of the Additional Sessions Judge on the  ground that  the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction or power  to pass  the order  after disposing of the appeal. The High  Court set  aside the  impugned order  holding that "the language  of sub-s.(2)  of s.456  Cr. P.C. is plain and unambiguous and  leaves no  doubt that  the Court of appeal, confirmation, or- revision has no power to pass any order of restoration after the appeal, reference or revision has been disposed of."  The construction  placed by the High Court on the words  "while disposing  of  the  appeal,  reference  or revision" occurring in s.456(2) Cr. P.C. is being challenged by the appellant before us in this appeal. Counsel for  the appellant  raised a  two-fold contention in support of  the appeal. In the first place he contended that an appeal  was a  continuation of  the original trial by the Magistrate and  the Court  of Appeal  would possess  all the powers of the trying Magistrate and if the trying Magistrate could order  restoration of  the possession of the immovable property under  proviso to  sub-s. (1)  of  s.456  Cr.  P.C. within one month after the date of conviction, the Appellate Court must  be held  to posses  similar  power  and  it  was pointed out that in the instant case the Appellate Court had ordered  restoration   of  possession  of  the  property  in question to  the appellant  within one  month from  the date when the  respondents’ convictions were confirmed in appeal. Secondly, he  contended that  unlike the trial Court where a limitation of  30 days  has been prescribed under proviso to sub-s. (1),  no period of limitation is prescribed so far as the powers  of Appellate  Court under sub-s.(2) of s.456 Cr. P.C. are concerned, which means that the Appellate Court can pass an  order for  restoration of  possession at  any time, though within reasonable time of recording or confirming the conviction after  having been satisfied that the offence was attended by  criminal force  or show of force or by criminal intimidation. In  any event,  he contended  that the  phrase "while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision" occur ring in  sub-s. (2)  of s.456 Cr. P.C. cannot be interpreted to mean  that the  order of  restoration of  possession must form part of the judgment disposing of the appeal, reference or revision as that was not the intention of the Legislature when it  changed the phraseology of the equivalent provision of the  old Code of 1898. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents laid  considerable stress  on the  words  "while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision" occurring in sub-s. (2)  of s.456 Cr. P.C. and contended that these words imported a  limitation on  the power  of  the  Appellate  or Revisional Court to pass the order for 211 restoration of possession at the time of the disposal of the appeal, reference or revision and such Court could not do so after the disposal of the appeal, reference or revision.      In order  to determine the question raised before us it

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will be  necessary to  consider the  equivalent provision of the old  Code of 1898 which was contained in s. 522 thereof. Section 522 ran thus:-           "522. Power  to restore  possession  of  immovable      property.-(1) Whenever  a person  is  convicted  of  an      offence attended  by criminal force or show of force or      by criminal  intimidation and  it appears  to the Court      that by  such  force  or  show  of  force  or  criminal      intimidation any  person has  been dispossessed  of any      immovable property,  the Court,  may, if  it thinks fit      when convicting  such person  or at any time within one      month from  the date of the conviction order the person      dispossessed to  be restored  to the  possession of the      same.           (2) No  such order  shall prejudice  any right  or      interest to  or in  such immovable  property which  any      person may be able, to establish in a civil suit.           (3) An order under this section may be made by any      Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision." It will  appear clear  that under  sub-s. (1)  of  aforesaid provision  the   trial  Court  could  order  restoration  of possession "when  convicting such  person  or  at  any  time within one  month from  the date  of the conviction" whereas under the  new s.  456 the  limitation of one month has been relegated to a proviso to sub-s. (1) of s.456. Sub-s. (2) of the present  s.456 corresponds  to old  s.529 (3), but there has been  a change  in the  phraseology and  the reasons for such change have been explained ,. the Law Commission in its 41st Report in para 43.24 thus:           "43.24. Sub-section  (3) of  section 522  provides      that an  order under sub-section (1) may be made by any      Court of  appeal, confirmation,  reference or revision.      This is  to me..  t cases  where the  trial  Court  has      failed to  make an  order under  sub-section (1) and it      appears to the Court of appeal or revision that such an      order ought  to be  made in  the interests  of justice.      There is  a conflict  of decisions  as to  whether  the      period of  one month  from the  date of  the conviction      which is  mentioned in  sub-section (1) also applies to      the Court  of appeal  or revision. This conflict should      be set  at rest  by a  slight re-wording of sub-section      (3) indicating  that the Court of appeal, confirmation,      reference or revision may make an 212      order while  disposing  of  the  appeal,  reference  or      revision, as the case may be." It will  thus appear  clear that  with a view to resolve the conflict of  views between various High Courts that obtained under the old Code of the question whether the limitation of 30 days  was applicable to the Court of appeal, reference by revision the  phraseology was altered while enacting the new provision. The  Calcutta High Court Abdul Mannan and Ors. v. Taiyab Ali (1) and the Kerala High Court Krishnan Moothan v. V. K. A. Krishnakutty Moothan(2) had taken the view that the Court of  appeal, confirmation, reference or revision acting under s.  522(3) must  pass  the  order  of  restoration  of possession when  upholding the  conviction or  at  any  time within one  month from  the date  of the  order  in  appeal, reference or  revision upholding  the order  of  conviction. This was  contrary to  the view  taken by the Allahabad High Court in  Nihal Singh  v. Emperor(3)  where it was held that there was  no limitation  of one  month  from  the  date  of conviction for  passing the order under sub-s. (3) of s. 522 as there  was for  an order under sub-s. (1) and, therefore, where  an   order  for  restoration  of  possession  of  the

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immovable property  was passed  by the  Magistrate more than one month after the conviction under s. 447 I.P.C., the High Court in revision could set aside that order and itself pass an order  for the restoration of possession. In a later case Basanta Kumar  Maity v.  Kenaram Maity(4)  the Calcutta High Court took  the view  that the  Sessions Judge as a Court of Reference has power to pass an order under s. 522 even after one month of conviction and there was nothing to prevent his validating the  order of  the Magistrate  (passed beyond one month of  the conviction  which was  a just  order  and  the Sessions Judge  not having  done so,  the High  Court, as  a Court of  revision, had  power under  s. 522 to make much an order. In Fida Hussain v. Sarfaraz Hussain(5) the Patna High Court took view that there was nothing in s. 522(3) to limit the jurisdiction  of an appellate Court to the passing of an order within  one month either of the original conviction or the appellate  order and  that it was left tn the discretion of the  appellate or  revisional Court,  not to exercise its power under this section in cases where there has been undue or excessive delay in moving the Court for its use: in other words  the  appellate  or  revisional  Court  will  use  its discretion in  exercising power  within reasonable  time. In Savlaram Sadoba Navle v.      (1) A.I.R. 1947 Cal 390.      (2) A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 348.      (3) A.I.R. 1939 All. 662.      (4) A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 393.      (5) A.I.R. 1933 Patna 617. 213 Dhyaneshwar Vishnu Chinke (1) the Bombay High Court took the view  that although there be not before the Court any appeal or revision  against the  conviction of the accused, and the Magistrate had  rightly dismissed  the  application  for  an order for  possession under  s. 522(1)  because it  was made more than a month after the conviction, still the High Court can under  sub-s. (3) of s. 522 make an order for possession in a  proper case  in revision  against the order dismissing the application  for possession  and in taking this view the Bombay High  Court followed the view of the Patna High Court in ILR 12 Patna 787 and ILR 4 Patna 438 and of the Allahabad High Court  in AIR  1939 All. 662. It was with a view to set at rest  the  aforesaid  conflict  of  views  that  the  Law Commission recommended the change in the phraseology and the Parliament accepting  the recommendation  enacted sub-s. (2) of s. 456 thus:           "456(2) Where the Court trying the offence has not      made an  order under  sub-section  (1),  the  Court  of      appeal, confirmation or revision may, if it thinks fit,      make  such   order  while   disposing  of  the  appeal,      reference or revision, as the case may be." The language  of sub-s.  (2) clearly  shows that the same is applicable to a case where a conviction has been recorded by the trial  Court and  the trial Court has through mistake or inadvertence omitted  to make  an order  for restoration  of possession of  immovable property  to the complainant or has refused to  pass such  order either  because the offence was not attended  by criminal  force or  show  of  force  or  by criminal intimidation  or because  the application  in  that behalf was  made after  expiry of  30 days  and an appeal or revision either against the conviction or the order refusing restoration has  been preferred;  in such a case sub-s.. (2) provides that  the appellate  Court or  the revisional Court while disposing of such appeal or revision may make an order restoring  possession  of  the  immovable  property  to  the complainant. The change in phraseology clearly suggests that

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Parliament did not intend to prescribe any limitation on the powers of the appellate Court or revisional Court: the words are not "when convicting" or "when upholding the conviction" but the  words are "while disposing of the appeal, reference or revision"  and these  would mean  in continuation  of the disposal of  the appeal,  reference or  revision  and  these words cannot  be regarded  as importing  a limitation on the power to  the effect that such order must be incorporated in the body  of the judgment disposing of the appeal, reference or revision.  In other  words, the  appellate or  revisional Court acting under s. 456(2) will have jurisdiction or power to pass      (1) A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 148. 214 the order  for restoration  of possession at any time but it has to  be exercised  with discretion within reasonable time of the disposal of the appeal, reference or revision.      In our  opinion the  view taken  by the  High Court  is clearly erroneous.  We accordingly  allow  the  appeal,  set aside the  impugned order  passed  by  the  High.  Court  on September 25, 1975 and restore that passed by the Additional Sessions Judge on February 1, 1975. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 215