15 December 1999
Supreme Court
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H.C.OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THRO REG. Vs SARNAM SINGH

Bench: S.SAGHIR AHMAD,D.P.WADHWA
Case number: C.A. No.-007266-007266 / 1999
Diary number: 12583 / 1998
Advocates: Vs JITENDRA MOHAN SHARMA


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PETITIONER: HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SARNAM SINGH & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/12/1999

BENCH: S.Saghir Ahmad, D.P.Wadhwa,

JUDGMENT:

     S.  SAGHIR AHMAD, J.

     Leave granted.

     Sarnam  Singh (respondent No.1), who shall hereinafter be  referred to as respondent, was compulsorily retired from service  by  order  dated  12.11.1997 passed  by  the  State Government  on  the recommendation of the High  Court  which itself,  incidentally,  is  the appellant before  us.   This Court  in All India Judges’ Association vs.  Union of India, (1992)  1  SCC  119,  had   issued  certain  directions  for improvement  of the service conditions of the members of the subordinate  judiciary  in the country.  The Union of  India and  various States thereafter filed a Review Petition which was  considered and disposed of by this Court on August  24, 1993  by  Judgment  since  reported  as  All  India  Judges’ Association  and Ors.  vs.  Union of India & Ors., (1993)  4 SCC 288.  It may be pointed out that by the earlier Judgment in  the main case of All India Judges’ Association  (supra), one  of  the  directions  related   to  the  enhancement  of superannuation  age of all the subordinate Judicial Officers upto  60  years.  This question was also considered  in  the Review  Petition  and while rejecting the contention of  the Union  of  India  and other States that  age  of  retirement should  not be enhanced to 60 years, this Court, inter alia, observed as under:-

     "30.    There  is,  however,   one  aspect  we  should emphasise  here.  To that extent the direction contained  in the  main  judgment under review shall stand modified.   The benefit  of the increase of the retirement age to 60  years, shall  not  be  available   automatically  to  all  judicial officers  irrespective  of their past record of service  and evidence  of their continued utility to the judicial system. The  benefit will be available to those who, in the  opinion of  the  respective  High  Courts,   have  a  potential  for continued  useful service.  It is not intended as a windfall for  the  indolent,  the  infirm   and  those  of   doubtful integrity,  reputation  and  utility.    The  potential  for

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continued  utility  shall  be   assessed  and  evaluated  by appropriate  Committees  of  Judges of the  respective  High Courts  constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of  the High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the  Judicial  officer’s past record of  service,  character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters.

     31.   The High Court should undertake and complete the exercise  in case of officers about to attain the age of  58 years  well  within  time  by following  the  procedure  for compulsory retirement as laid down in the respective Service Rules  applicable to the judicial officers.  Those who  will not  be found fit and eligibile by this standard should  not be given the benefit of the higher retirement age and should be  compulsorily  retired at the age of 58 by following  the said  procedure  for  compulsory retirement.   The  exercise should  be undertaken before the attainment of the age of 58 years  even in cases where earlier the age of superannuation was  less  than 58 years.  It is necessary to make it  clear that  this assessment is for the purpose of finding out  the suitability of the concerned officers for the entitlement of the  benefit of the increased age of superannuation from  58 years  to 60 years.  It is in addition to the assessment  to be  undertaken for compulsory retirement and the  compulsory retirement  at  the  earlier stage/s  under  the  respective Service Rules."

     Pursuant to the above directions, the High Courts, all over   the   country,  before   allowing  Officers  of   the subordinate judiciary to continue in service upto the age of 60  years, scrutinised the work, conduct and performance  of all  Officers who were about to attain the age of 58  years, to  determine  whether  they  were  fit  to  be  allowed  an extension in service or were fit to be compulsorily retired. This scrutiny was done in accordance with the procedure laid down  by the respective Service Rules relating to compulsory retirement as applicable to the Judicial Officers.

     This  exercise was done in the case of respondent also who  was  compulsorily retired from service  principally  on account  of the adverse remark given by the then  Inspecting Judge  who  had made a surprise inspection of the  Moradabad Judgeship  on April 18, 1995, in cognito, which was followed by the annual inspection by the Inspecting Judge (Mr.Justice R.B.   Mehrotra)  from  22nd  May  to  28th  May,  1995.   A reference  to the surprise inspection as also to the regular inspection  shall  be made later as we intend to consider  a more important aspect first on which the whole appeal can be disposed of finally.

     The  principal  contention  urged by Mr.   P.P.   Rao, learned   Senior  Counsel,  appearing  on  behalf   of   the respondent is that pursuant to the directions issued by this Court  in its Judgment in All India Judges’ Association  vs. Union  of  India  and  others, (1992) 1 SCC  119,  the  U.P. Government framed new Rules, namely, U.P.  Judicial Officers (Retirement  on  Superannuation)  Rules,   1992  which  were notified on 20.10.1992 by which the age of retirement of the Judicial  Officers was raised from 58 years to 60 years.  It is  contended  that  since the State Government  itself  had framed  new Rules by which the age of retirement was  raised from 58 years to 60 years, the age of retirement fixed under Fundamental  Rule  56,  contained in  Financial  Hand  Book, Volume  II,  Part  2 to 4, would not be  applicable  to  the Judicial  Officers as it is specifically provided in the new

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Rules  that they shall have effect notwithstanding  anything to  the  contrary  contained in Rule 56 of  the  Fundamental Rules.   Mr.  P.P.  Rao contends that the age of  retirement having been raised from 58 years to 60 years, the respondent had  a right to continue in service till the age of 60 years and  the  rule  of scrutiny envisaged by this Court  in  its Judgment  dated August 24, 1993 [(1993) 4 SCC 288] would not be applicable.

     Mr.  Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on  behalf of the High Court has, on the contrary, contended that though the State Government had made a specific Rule by which  the age of retirement of Judicial Officers was raised from  58 years to 60 years, a scrutiny had still to be  done to find out their suitability to continue till the age of 60 years  in terms of the directions issued by this Court which had  specifically provided that continuance upto the age  of 60  years would not be automatic and only those Officers who are  found  suitable would alone be allowed the  benefit  of extension.   It  is  further submitted that  the  directions issued  by this Court have to be read as supplemental to the Rules  already made by the State Government.  Regarding  the overriding provision under the Rules, it is submitted by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi that the new Rules override all other earlier rules relating to the age of retirement of Judicial Officers but  do not intend to override the directions issued by this Court  in All India Judges Association’s case, (1992) 1  SCC 119.

     The direction relating to the age of retirement in the All  India Judges Association’s case, (1992) 1 SCC 119,  was to the following effect :

     "(iii)  Retirement age of judicial officers be  raised to  60  years  and  appropriate steps are  to  be  taken  by December 31, 1992."

     Acting  upon these directions, the State Govt.  framed the  U.P.  Judicial Officers (Retirement on  Superannuation) Rules,  1992,  under Article 309 of the Constitution.   They came  into force on October 20, 1992.  Rules 2 and 4 of  the aforesaid  Rules which are relevant for the present case are quoted below :

     "2.   Overriding  effect  -- The provisions  of  these Rules  shall  have  effect notwithstanding anything  to  the contrary  contained  in  Rule 56 of  the  U.P.   Fundamental Rules,  contained in the Financial Hand Book Volume II Parts 2  to  4 or any other Rules made by the Governor  under  the proviso  to  Article 309 of the Constitution or orders,  for the time being in force.

     4.  Retirement -- A Judicial Officer shall retire from service  on superannuation in the afternoon of the last  day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years."

     The   above   Rules   indicate   that   the   age   of superannuation  of Judicial Officers was fixed at 60  years. It  was  also specifically provided that these  Rules  would have  effect  notwithstanding  anything   to  the   contrary contained  in  Rule 56 of the U.P.  Fundamental Rules  which

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provided  that the age of superannuation of a Govt.  servant would  be  58 years.  All Judicial Officers working  in  the subordinate  courts  are, undoubtedly, Govt.   servants  and like all other Govt.  servants, they retired from service on attaining  the  age of 58 years in terms of Rule 56  of  the Fundamental  Rules.  But on account of the directions issued by  this  Court in the All India Judges  Association’s  case (1992)  1  SCC 119, the Govt.  of Uttar Pradesh, as  pointed out  earlier,  framed new Rules specially for  the  Judicial Officers  and provided that their age of retirement would be 60  years.  In order to give effect to the new Rules, it was specifically  provided  that these Rules would  have  effect notwithstanding  anything  to  the   contrary  contained  in Fundamental  Rule  56.  The directions issued by this  Court were thus fully implemented and the State Govt., by bringing out  new  Rules, and that too with effect from  October  20, 1992,  acted within the time limit fixed by this Court.  The age  of superannuation thus having been raised from 58 years to 60 years, all Judicial Officers in the State would retire on attaining the age of 60 years and not earlier.

     We  may  now  examine the contention  of  Mr.   Rakesh Dwivedi that before allowing them to continue in service for another two years, that is from 58 to 60 years, there should have  been a scrutiny of their service record and only those who  were  found suitable for continuance in  service  alone should  have  been  given  that  benefit  in  terms  of  the directions  issued  by  this Court in  the  Review  Judgment [(1993) 4 SCC 288].

     This  Court, while issuing directions for raising  the age  of  superannuation of Judicial Officers from 58  to  60 years had fixed a time limit within which appropriate action was  to be taken by the State Governments.  It was  provided that  appropriate  steps in that direction may be  taken  by December   31,  1992.   Instead  of  complying  with   those directions, many of the States, including the Union of India filed  Review  Petitions in which various  contentions  were raised  for recalling the earlier direction for raising  the age  of superannuation.  The contentions raised by the State Governments  as also by the Union of India were not accepted and  it  was  provided  that the age  of  superannuation  of Judicial  Officers  would be 60 years.  Since all the  State Governments  had not, by that time, made a statutory rule to give effect to the directions of this Court, it was provided that  the benefit of extension in the age of  superannuation would  be  available  to  those officers only  who,  in  the opinion of the High Court, had meticulous service record and were  officers  of integrity.  This benefit, it was  further provided,  was  not  intended to serve as a  "windfall"  for officers  of doubtful integrity, reputation or utility.   It was  left  to the High Courts to consider the work,  conduct and  performance  of the Judicial Officers to  assess  their merit  and  to decide whether they were fit to  continue  in service  beyond  58  and upto the age of  60  years.   These directions were qualified by the following words :

     "The directions issued are mere aids and incidental to and  supplemental  of the main direction and intended  as  a transitional measure till a comprehensive national policy is evolved."

     These   observations  indicate   that  the   procedure indicated by this Court for evaluating the work, performance

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and  conduct  of Judicial Officers, before allowing them  to continue in service upto the age of 60 years, was evolved as a temporary measure and was not to be adopted as a permanent feature.   The  choice  was  thus  left  to  the  Appointing Authority.   If  the  Appointing Authority itself  had  made necessary Service Rules extending the age of retirement, the above  procedure  was to be given up as the  Officers  would continue  in  service in accordance with the  Service  Rules made  by the Appointing Authority in the respective  States. If  it  was  not done, then the Judicial  Officers  were  to continue  in service till the age of 60 years in  accordance with  the  directions  of this Court in  the  earlier  case, provided  the  Officers,  on  a scrutiny  of  their  service records,  in  accordance with the directions issued  in  the Review  Petition,  were  found suitable for the  benefit  of extended service.

     As pointed out above, the State Govt., acting upon the directions  of this Court in the earlier case [(1992) 1  SCC 119],  made new Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution, and  that too within the time fixed by this Court, by  which the  age  of retirement of all Judicial Officers was  raised from 58 to 60 years.  In view of these Rules, which also had the  overriding effect over F.R.  56, the Judicial  Officers in the State of U.P.  became entitled to continue in service upto  the age of 60 years.  The directions of this Court for scrutiny  of  their service records before allowing them  to continue  in service beyond 58 years, being of a  transitory character,  yielded place to the new Rules made by the State Govt.  under Article 309 of the Constitution and, therefore, it  was no longer incumbent upon the High Court to resort to the  procedure  of  scrutiny of the service records  of  all Judicial  Officers  before  allowing  them  the  benefit  of extension  in the age of retirement.  The contention of  Mr. Rakesh  Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf of  the High Court, that the directions of this Court  about the  scrutiny  of  the  service record  should  be  read  as supplemental  to the new Service Rules cannot be accepted as this  Court itself had indicated clearly that the directions were intended to serve as a "transitional measure".

     A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rajat Baran Roy & Ors.  vs.  State of W.B.  & Ors.  (1999) 4 SCC 235, relating to  the  Judicial Service of the State of West  Bengal,  has taken  a similar view and has held that if a Rule is made by the  State  Govt.   extending the age of retirement  of  the Judicial  Officers,  the  directions of this  Court  in  the Review Petition for scrutiny of the service record would not be applicable as the Judicial Officers, by virtue of the new Rule,  would  continue upto the age of superannuation  fixed under the new Rule.

     In  the  instant  case,  the  service  record  of  the respondent  was  scrutinised by the High Court at  the  time when  he was completing 58 years of age to decide whether he was fit to be continued in service upto the age of 60 years. This exercise was undertaken by the High Court in accordance with  the  directions  issued by this Court  in  the  Review Petition.  The High Court overlooked the vital fact that the new Rules already made by the State Government under Article 309  of  the  Constitution provided  specifically  that  the Judicial  Officers  would retire on attaining the age of  60 years.   That  being so, it was no longer necessary for  the High  Court  to have scrutinised the service record at  that stage.   The  respondent,  in  view of the  new  Rules,  was

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entitled  to  continue in service upto the age of 60  years. The order of compulsory retirement passed by the State Govt. on  the  recommendation  of  the   High  Court  was   wholly erroneous.

     The  writ petition filed by the respondent, as pointed out  earlier,  has  been allowed by the High  Court  on  the judicial  side,  on the ground that the order of  compulsory retirement  passed  on the recommendation of the High  Court was  based on no material and was, therefore, erroneous.  In view  of the fact that we have already found above that  the respondent  had a right to continue in service upto the  age of  60 years, there does not appear to be any need to  enter into the scrutiny of the reasoning adopted by the High Court for  setting aside the order of compulsory retirement as  we are also of the view that the order of compulsory retirement was  bad, though for different reasons.  But, looking to the importance  of the matter, particularly the adverse  entries recorded  in  the  character roll of the respondent  by  the Inspecting  Judge, we would rather dispose of that issue  as well.

     Chapter  III of the Rules of Court, 1952, (as  amended upto  1.8.1994) made by the Allahabad High Court, deals with the  Executive  & Administrative Business of the Court.   It provides for Inspecting Judges and Administrative Committee. The Rule relating to "Inspecting Judges" provides as under :

     "Inspecting Judge

     The  Chief  Justice  shall  nominate  and  assign  one sessions  division to each Hon’ble Judge as Inspecting Judge of  that  division  for a period of one year.   In  a  given situation,  however, the Chief Justice may assign more  than one sessions divisions to one Inspecting Judge and more than one  Inspecting  Judges to hold the charge of  one  sessions division.

     (a)  In  case of retirement, resignation,  refusal  or death  of any Inspecting Judge, another Hon.  Judge shall be nominated by the Chief Justice.

     (b)  Inspecting Judge shall proceed for inspection  in consultation  with the Chief Justice.  The Inspecting  Judge will  not ordinarily devote more than five working days  for annual inspections."

     The   Rule  relating  to  "Administrative   Committee" provides as under :

     "Administrative Committee

     There  shall be a committee called the  Administrative Committee  composed  of  the Chief Justice,  two  seniormost Judges and six Judges to be nominated by the Chief Justice.

     (a)  The  two  senior most Judges shall  be  permanent members  and six Judges shall be nominated as members by the Chief Justice for a term of three years.

     (b)  The  Chief  Justice  and   in  his  absence   the seniormost  member  of the Committee shall preside over  its meetings.

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     (c) In the case of retirement, resignation, refusal or death of any member of the committee, another Judge shall be nominated by the Chief Justice in his place.

     (d)  In the event of a member being temporarily absent on  leave or otherwise, it will be open to the Chief Justice to assign his work to any other Judge.

     (e)  Each member of the committee shall discharge such functions,  dispose  of  such executive  and  administrative business, as may be allocated to him by the Chief Justice."

     "Matters"  which  are within the jurisdiction  of  the Inspecting Judge are as under :

     "Matters for Inspecting Judges

     (1)  Review  of Judicial work of  subordinate  Courts, tribunals,  district  consumer forums and all other  special courts  and  control of their working  including  inspection thereof,  to  record entries in the character rolls  of  the officers  posted in the division assigned to the  Inspecting Judge.

     (2)  Perusal  of  returns,  calendars,  evaluation  of inspection reports made by the presiding officers in respect of  their  own  offices, audit reports received  from  those courts, tribunals etc.  and to make orders thereon.

     (3)   Any  adverse  remarks  or  strictures  made   by Inspecting  Judge about Judicial work, conduct or  integrity of  any officer under his charge will be communicated to the officer concerned, who may make his representations, if any, within  a  month  and the same shall be  placed  before  the Administrative Committee for consideration and decision.

     (4)  Grant  of earned leave to officers posted in  the sessions division under the charge of the Inspecting Judge.

     (5)  Grant  of casual leave (including special  casual leave)  and permission to leave headquarters to the District and  Sessions Judge, Presiding Officers of the tribunals and special Courts etc.  howsoever designated.

     (6)  Disposal  of appeal against orders of  punishment imposed on and representations etc.  of the employees of the subordinate Courts."

     The  relevant  portion relating to the matters  within the  jurisdiction  of  the   "Administrative  Committee"  is reproduced below :

     "Matters for the Administrative Committee

     1 to 15.  .........

     16.   Decision on the reports of the Inspecting  Judge including  annual  confidential remarks recorded by  him  in respect of an officer in his charge."

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     The  High  Court has also prescribed "Self  Assessment Forms"  which are filled up by the Judicial Officers and are sent to the District Judges.  The High Court has also issued Circular  Letters laying down the appropriate guidelines and instructions  for  the District Judges to record the  Annual Character  Roll  entries.  In Circular Letter  No.   C-54/71 dated 16th April, 1971, it is provided, inter alia, as under :

     "Annual remarks recorded by the District Judges should give  a  correct and full picture of the work,  conduct  and reputation  of the officers.  In case annual remarks do  not properly  assess  the work of the  officers,  administrative lapse  on the part of the District Judge concerned would  be presumed."

     In  Circular  Letter  No.  17/78 dated  2nd  February, 1978, it is indicated as under :

     "In  evaluating  the judicial work of an officer,  the number  of  his  judgments, orders reversed or  modified  in appeal  or  revision  will not be taken into  account.   The assessment  of judicial work of an officer will be asked  on the quality of his judgments or orders and not on the result of  the  appeals or revisions.  Henceforth, the work  of  an officer  will  be  assessed on the basis of quality  of  his judgments  or  orders and not on the basis of the number  of judgments  or  orders  reversed  or modified  in  appeal  or revision."

     Vide  Circular Letter Nos.  C-10/85 and C-14/89  dated 22nd  March, 1985 and 10th March, 1989, respectively, it was emphasised that :

     "The  District  Judge shall ensure that the  following instructions as contained in various Circular Letters issued by  the  Court  from time to time are followed  strictly  in recording  the  annual  remarks in respect of  the  judicial officers:

     (a)  The annual remarks should be recorded in  respect of  all  the  officers whose work and conduct was  seen  for three months or more during the year.

     (b)  Even if an officer has worked at the station  for period  of  less  than  three months during  the  year,  the District  Judge should send the figures of his disposal  for that  part of the year, so that his full figures of disposal during the whole year may be worked out."

     The  Inspecting  Judges, as set out in the Rules,  are nominated  by  the Chief Justice and a  particular  sessions division  is assigned to them.  The Rules also provide  that the  Chief  Justice  may  assign   more  than  one  sessions divisions  to  one  Inspecting  Judge or  for  one  sessions division,  he may nominate more than one Inspecting  Judges. The  Rules  visualise  that  the Inspecting  Judge  will  be

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appointed  by the Chief Justice strictly in the interest  of administration  of  justice  and the  Chief  Justice,  while appointing  an  Inspecting Judge for a  particular  sessions division  or  assigning more than one sessions divisions  to one  Inspecting  Judge or, for that matter,  appointing  two Inspecting  Judges for one sessions division, will be guided by  relevant  factors  pertaining to the proper  and  smooth running  of  the administration so that the High  Court  may effectively   exercise  its  power  of  control   over   the subordinate  judiciary as contemplated by Article 235 of the Constitution.   Personal  liking for a  particular  sessions division  or convenience of the Judge will not be a relevant factor for his appointment as an Inspecting Judge.

     The  Inspecting  Judge, according to Rules  of  Court, 1952, will proceed to inspect the sessions division assigned to  him only in consultation with the Chief Justice and will not ordinarily devote more than five working days for annual inspection.  The time limit has been fixed purposely so that the  judicial  work  in the High Court, which  is  of  prime importance,  may  not suffer.  This philosophy leads to  the conclusion  that  the  Inspecting Judge would  not  normally sacrifice  the working days in the High Court at the cost of their visit to the Districts.  The Rules set out the matters which  are  within the jurisdiction of the Inspecting  Judge and  those  which  are  within   the  jurisdiction  of   the Administrative  Committee.  According to the scheme set  out in  the Rules as also various circular letters issued by the High Court from time to time, it appears that annual remarks would  be  recorded by the District Judges who would give  a correct and full picture of the work, conduct and reputation of  the  Officers.   The guidelines on the  basis  of  which annual remark would be given have also been laid down by the High Court in the circular letters issued from time to time. The  High  Court,  thereafter, records  the  Character  Roll entry.

     Mr.   Justice  R.B.  Mehrotra, who has since  retired, was  the Inspecting Judge of the Moradabad Judgeship at  the relevant  time.  In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the  appellant in the writ petition while it was pending  in the  High Court, regarding which it is erroneously mentioned by  the  Division Bench that it was not filed, it  has  been stated, inter alia, as under :

     "7.   That the then Inspecting Judge, Moradabad,  Hon. Mr.   Justice  R.B.   Mehrotra, sent a  D.O.   Letter  dated 20.4.95  addressed  to  Hon’ble the  Chief  Justice  stating therein  that His Lordship made a surprise visit to District Judgeship  of  Moradabad  on 18.4.1995.  His  lordship  went around  Civil  Court compound in cognito, made queries  from litigants  and met several Advocates without disclosing  his lordship’s  identity.   The enquiries made by  his  lordship from  litigants  and  Advocates without  knowing  lordship’s identity  revealed  that petitioner and four other  Judicial Officers   whose  names  mentioned  in  the   D.O.    letter dt.20.4.1995  of Hon’ble Mr.  Justice R.B.  Mehrotra command stinking  reputation of being corrupt.  Thereafter,  Hon’ble the  Inspecting  Judge  made  queries  from  District  Judge regarding stinking reputation of being corrupt in respect of the  officer.  The District Judge has confirmed that all the officers  whose names mentioned in the instant D.O.   Letter of  Hon’ble  the  Inspecting  Judge are having  a  very  bad reputation of being corrupt Judicial Officers.  The District Judge  has  expressed his regrets for not having brought  to

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the  aforesaid facts to the knowledge of the Hon’ble  Court. His  Lordship  was  strongly  of the opinion  that  all  the officers  whose  name  mentioned  in  the  D.O.   letter  of Inspecting  Judge,  Moradabad, who had  stinking  reputation should  be transferred and he be given punishment posting to far-fetched stations.

     After dictation of the aforesaid report by Hon’ble the Inspecting  Judge, Moradabad Session, a Confidential  report from  District Judge, Moradabad was received by his lordship and the same were also sent to Hon’ble the Chief Justice for his  lordship’s kind perusal and orders.  The District Judge in  his D.O.  letter dated 20.4.95 has informed the  Hon’ble the  Inspecting  Judge  in respect of  the  petitioner  that though  there  is  no  complaint against  Sri  Sarnam  Singh (petitioner),   Special  Judge    (Essential   Commodities), Moradabad, he also has connections with the said a cocous of lawyers and public-men.  His reputation is also very bad.

     The  District Judge had also requested to his lordship to  transfer the officer whose names mentioned in his report (including  petitioner)  from this Judgeship immediately  so that  pubic  confidence  in judiciary may  be  restored  and judicial discipline be maintained in the Judgeship.

     Under  orders  of  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  these officers  including  the petitioner have  been  transferred. The  petitioner  was transferred from Moradabad  to  Aligarh vide   Court’s  notification   No.   C-304/DR(S)/1995  dated 29.5.1995."

     It was further stated as under :

     "8.   That  thereafter  Hon’ble   Mr.   Justice   R.B. Mehrotra,  the  Inspecting  Judge,  Moradabad,  made  annual Inspection of this judgeship and submitted his report to the Court  on  16.10.1995.  It is apparent from Inspection  Note that  the  then Hon’ble Inspecting Judge also inspected  the court  of Special Judge (ECA) Moradabad and at that time the petitioner  was the Presiding Officer of that Court.  In his Inspection  Note  Hon’ble the Inspecting Judge had made  the assessment  of  Judicial  performance   of  the  petitioner. Hon’ble  the  Inspecting Judge had made observation that  he had  seen  the  file  of  13  Sessions  Trials  and  6  bail Applications  decided  by him in the month of August,  1994. In all these Sessions Trials the accused had been acquitted. In the six Sessions Trials the accused had been acquitted on the  ground  that prosecution witnesses turned hostile.   In Sessions  Trial  No.  119/89 the accused had been  acquitted u/s  399/402  IPC and section 25 Arms Act.  The Hon’ble  the Inspecting  Judge  after perusal of judgment in the  instant case  has  observed that judgment is sketchy and  no  proper reason   had  been  recorded   discarding  the   prosecution witnesses.

     In Bail Application No.  1980/94 bail had been granted in  case of fire arm injury u/s 302 IPC on the ground that 2 persons fired whereas injury found on person of the deceased was  only one.  Even assuming that bullet fired by the other person did not hit the deceased admittedly the allegation is that  both accused had fired with the intention to kill  the deceased  who  was actually killed.  Hon’ble the  Inspecting

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Judge observed that there was absolutely no justification of granting bail on the aforesaid ground.

     In Bail Application No.  187/95, bail had been granted by  referring  that there was a Judgment of  Justice  Palok. Hon’ble  the Inspecting Judge observed that there was no way of quoting precedent.  The reference of judgment should have been  mentioned  if the Judge wanted to rely on decision  of this   Court.   Mr.   Justice   Palok  Basu  delivered  many judgments  and  on which judgment petitioner  relied  should have also been indicated in the order.

     Hon’ble   the  Inspecting  Judge   likewise  in   Bail Application  No.   3241/94 has also observed that  bail  had been  granted on the basis of parity.  No reference has been mentioned in the order that who was co-accused, who had been granted bail, what was the role assigned to him and what was the  role assigned to the applicant.  Hon’ble the Inspecting Judge  on  persual  of orders passed in the  aforesaid  bail applications  has observed that they are also sketchy.   The judicial  performance  of the petitioner is assessed  to  be poor and unsatisfactory.

     9.   That  the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge  (Hon’ble  Mr. Justice  R.B.  Mehrotra) while giving annual remarks to  the petitioner for 1994-95 had recorded that the officer enjoyed a  stinkingly  bad reputation as revealed in his  lordship’s Surprise  Inspection in cognito dated 18th April, 1995.  The assessment  of  judicial performance of the  petitioner  was adjudged  as  poor and unsatisfactory.  The petitioner  made representation  dated  26.08.1996 to the Court  against  the aforesaid  adverse remarks and same was duly considered  and rejected   by  the  Court.    The  petitioner  was  informed accordingly  through  the  District   Judge,  Aligarh,  vide Court’s D.O.  No.  C-189/CF(A)/97, dated 6.3.1997.

     10.   That  during  his surprise  Inspection,  Hon’ble Inspecting Judge also contacted various sections of lawyers, a  good  number of lawyers were opposed to strike  and  were appearing  in Court but due to strike the work by and  large remained  paralysed for one and half months and only  urgent bail  applications were being attended by District Judge and other  officers to whom bail applications were  transferred. His  lordship tried to persuade the Lawyers to withdraw  the strike  so that their grievances if any may be looked in it. His  lordship was given to understand by section of  lawyers supporting the strike that strike would be called of."

     The  original  service  record of the  respondent  was placed  before us which reveals that respondent, at no time, was  given  any adverse remarks during the entire tenure  of his  service.  The High Court had itself, while disposing of the writ petition, scrutinised the

     service record of the respondent and observed as under :

     "It appears that petitioner joined, as already stated, U.P.   Higher Judicial Service on 23.4.1984.  He was  posted as Additional District Judge Moradabad from June, 1992 under Sri Tej Shankar, the then District Judge, Moradabad, who was later  on  elevated to the Bench.  He was also posted  under

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Sri  Bhagwandin,  the then Distt.  Judge Moradabad who  also was  elevated to the Bench later on.  It may be stated  that the  petitioner  was posted with (three) Distt.  Judges  who were  later on elevated to the Bench namely, Sri  N.S.Gupta, Sri  Bhagwandin  and  Sri  Tej  Shankar,  and  according  to petitioner there was no complaint to all those 3 (three) the then District Judges against his work and conduct."

     It was further observed by the High Court as under :

     "It may be mentioned that in the year 1984-85 the then Administrative  Judge  Hon’ble Mr.Justice N.N.  Mithal  gave remark  that  petitioners relations with members of the  Bar are  reported  to  be  good, the District  Judge  rated  the officer  as  good  and  the   officer  was  transferred   on administrative grounds from Etawah.  In the year 1985-86 the same  Administrative  Judge has certified integrity  of  the petitioner  and has given remark that the officer took pains to  dispose  of old Sessions Trials and Special cases  under the  Dacoity  Affected  Areas  Act  and  his  judgments  are properly written and expressed in good language.

     In  the year 1986-87 there is no adverse entry against the  petitioner.  There is remark that he has taken interest in  disposal  of  old cases both Civil  and  Criminal.   His judgments  on  facts  and law are sound, well  reasoned  and expressed  in  good language.  The officer has good  control over  his  office and possesses administrative capacity  and tact.   Relations  with the members of the Bar are  cordial. On overall assessment Sri P.K.  Jain the then District Judge (subsequently   elevated  to  the   Bench)  had  rated   the petitioner  to be good officer.  In the year 1987-88 more or less the entry is similar, to that of 1986-87.

     In  the  year 1988-89 the entry of the  petitioner  is recorded  by  Sri  N.S.   Gupta,  the  then  District  Judge (subsequently  elevated to the Bench).  He has given  remark to  the  petitioner  that the integrity of  the  officer  is beyond  doubt,  judgments on facts and law are  sound,  well reasoned  and  expressed  in good language and on  over  all assessment the officer has been rated as good.

     In  the  year  1988-89 good entry has  been  given  to petitioner by the then District Judge Sri P.P.  Gupta and in the  year  1990-91 also the petitioner has been  given  good entries, and his integrity has been certified.  More or less similar  entry is awarded to petitioner in the year 1991-92. In  the year 1992-93 Sri Tej Shankar the then District Judge Moradabad  (subsequently  elevated to the Bench)  has  given good  entry to the petitioner and his integrity is stated to be  beyond  doubt.   Similar  entry has been  given  by  Sri Bhagwan  Din the then District Judge (subsequently  elevated to  the  Bench) in the year 1993-94.  Similarly in the  year 1994-95  Sri  Bhagwan Din the then District Judge  Moradabad has  stated  that  the integrity of the officer  was  beyond doubt  and  on overall assessment the officer was  rated  as good, before the visit of Hon’ble the then Inspecting Judge.

     We  have  perused  the entire service  record  of  the petitioner and there is nothing adverse against him."

     The  High  Court,  thereafter, proceeded  to  consider various  aspects  of the matter, including the fact that  at

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the  time  when Mr.  Justice R.B.  Mehrotra made a  surprise Inspection  of the Moradabad Judgeship, the lawyers were  on strike,  and ultimately recorded a finding that the impugned adverse  entry was unjustified, arbitrary and based on  non- existent  facts  and was, therefore, liable to quashed.   We uphold  the  findings  of  the High Court,  but  we  do  not subscribe  to  the  view that before an  adverse  entry  was recorded  in  the Character Roll, an opportunity of  hearing was,  by  any  principle,  required  to  be  given  to   the respondent.   [See:  Major General I.P.S.  Dewan vs.   Union of India & Ors.  (1995) 3 SCC 383, in which R.L.  Butail vs. Union  of India (1970) 2 SCC 876 = (1971) 2 SCR 55 has  been followed.]  The  decision  of  this  Court  in  Sukhdeo  vs. Commissioner,  Amravati  Division, Amravati &  Anr.   relied upon  by  the  respondent regarding Adverse Remarks  in  the service record cannot be pressed into aid as in that case it was  held  that Adverse Remarks suffered from  inconsistency and lack of bona fides.  We may also point out that the High Court  in  its  judgment  was wrong  in  observing  that  no counter-affidavit  on  behalf of the appellant was filed  as counter-affidavits  both  on behalf of the State  Govt.   as also  on behalf of the appellant were filed at the stage  of writ petition, copies whereof have been placed before us.

     The  role of Inspecting Judges and the manner in which they  are  to assess the work of the Judicial Officers  were considered  by this Court in High Court of Punjab &  Haryana through R.G.  vs.  Ishwar Chand Jain and Another JT 1999 (3) SC  266,  in which one of us (Brother Wadhwa, J.),  speaking for the Court, said :

     "Since  late  this  Court is watching the  spectre  of either  judicial officers or the High Courts coming to  this Court  when  there  is  an  order  pre-maturely  retiring  a judicial  officer.   Under Article 235 of  the  Constitution High  Court  exercises  complete  control  over  subordinate courts  which  include District Courts.  Inspection  of  the subordinate  courts  is one of the most important  functions which  High Court performs for control over the  subordinate courts.   Object  of such inspection is for the  purpose  of assessment  of the work performed by the subordinate  judge, his  capability, integrity and competency.  Since judges are human  beings  and  also prone to all  the  human  failings, inspection provides an opportunity for pointing out mistakes so that they are avoided in future and deficiencies, if any, in   the  working  of   the  subordinate  court,   remedied. Inspection should act as a catalyst in inspiring subordinate judges  to  give best results.  They should feel a sense  of achievement.   They  need  encouragement.  They  work  under great  stress  and man the courts while working under  great discomfort  and  hardships.  A satisfactory judicial  system depends largely on the satisfactory functioning of courts at grass  root level.  Remarks recorded by the inspecting judge are  normally endorsed by the Full Court and become part  of the Annual Confidential Reports and are foundations on which the  career  of  a  judicial  officer  is  made  or  marred. Inspection of subordinate court is thus of vital importance. It  has  to be both effective and productive.  It can be  so only   if  it  is  well   regulated  and  is  workman  like. Inspection of subordinate courts is not a one day or an hour or  few minutes affair.  It has to go on all the year  round by monitoring the work of the court by the inspecting judge. The casual inspection can hardly be beneficial to a judicial system.   It  does more harms than good.  As noticed in  the case  of R.  Rajiah (JT 1988 (2) SC 567) there could be  ill

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conceived  or motivated complaints.  Rumour mongering is  to be  avoided  at  all costs as it seriously  jeopardizes  the efficient working of the subordinate courts."

     These   are  extremely   important  observations   and constitute  important guidelines for assessing the work of a Judicial  Officer.   These  observations also  indicate  the attitude  with which the Inspecting Judge should objectively consider  the work and conduct of the Judicial Officers  who sometimes   have   to  work   under  difficult  and   trying circumstances.   The  same views were earlier  expressed  in State  Bank  of  India & Ors.  vs.  Kashi Nath Kher  &  Ors. (1996)  8 SCC 762 = AIR 1996 SC 1328.  [See also :  Union of India  vs.  N.R.  Banerjee (1997) 9 SCC 287;  State of Uttar Pradesh  vs.   Yamuna Shanker Mishra (1997) 4 SCC 7 as  also Swatantra  Singh vs.  State of Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 14 = AIR 1997  SC  2105 on the question as to what precisely  is  the object and purpose of writing Annual Confidential Report.]

     We  would conclude the discussion by referring to  the observations  of  this  Court in M.S.Bindra  vs.   Union  of India,  JT  1998 (6) SC 34 = (1998) 7 SCC 310, which are  as under :

     "To  dunk  an  officer into the  puddle  of  "doubtful integrity" it is not enough that the doubt fringes on a mere hunch.   That  doubt  should be of such a  nature  as  would reasonably  and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable man  on  the  given material.  Mere  possibility  is  hardly sufficient  to  assume that it would have  happened.   There must  be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man to  entertain  doubt regarding that possibility.  Only  then there  is  justification  to ram an officer with  the  label "doubtful integrity".

     For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in  this appeal which is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.