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PETITIONER: H.   C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/04/1960

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER SARKAR, A.K. SUBBARAO, K.

CITATION:  1960 AIR 1073            1960 SCR  (3) 742  CITATOR INFO :  F          1961 SC  82  (6,14)  D          1963 SC1047  (28)  R          1974 SC 669  (9)  R          1977 SC 441  (24)  R          1978 SC 215  (30)  R          1981 SC 711  (7)  RF         1986 SC1785  (5)  R          1992 SC1888  (8)

ACT: Transport  Business-Stage  carriages-Exclusion  of   Private operators-Competence  of  Parliament to  create  monopolies- Grant  of  monopoly to State for  transport  business-Scheme framed   by   State   for   State   Transport,   Undertaking Legality--Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), Ch.   IVA, ss. 68C, 68D (2)-Constitution of India, Arts.  12,  13(3)(a) 19(1)(g),  19(6), 298, Seventh Schedule, List II, entry  26, List III, entries 21, 35.

HEADNOTE: In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the  Motor- Vehicles  Act,  1939,  the General  Manager  of  the  Mysore Government Road Transport Department published a scheme  for the  exclusion of private operators on certain routes  in  a specified area and reservation of those routes for the State Transport  Undertaking.   The  scheme was  approved  by  the Government  under  s,  68D(2) of the  Act  after  the  Chief Minister  of  the  State had given  an  opportunity  to  the operators  affected  by the scheme to  make  representations objecting to it, The petitioners who were 743 private operators challenged the validity of the scheme  and the  action  taken by the Government pursuant to it  on  the grounds,  inter  alia,  (1)  that  the  petitioners  have  a fundamental  right to carry on the business of plying  stage carriages  and that the provisions of Ch.  IVA of the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which provide for the right of the State to exclusive right to carry on motor transport business  are invalid,(2)that by Ch.  IVA Parliament had merely  attempted

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to  regulate the procedure for entry by the State  into  the business  of motor transport in the State, and that  in  the absence of legislation expressly undertaken by the State  in that  behalf, that State was incompetent to enter  into  the arena  of  motor  transport business  to  the  exclusion  of private  operators,  and (3) that the  scheme  violated  the equal  protection  clause of the Constitution  because  only fourteen out of a total of thirty one routes on which  stage carriages  were  plied  for public  transport  in  the  area specified were covered by the scheme : Held,  (1) that the expression " commercial  and  industrial monopolies " in entry 21 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India is wide enough to include grant or  creation of commercial or industrial monopolies  to  the State and citizens as well as control of monopolies. (2)  that  it is competent for the Parliament to  enact  Ch. IVA  of  the Act under entry 21 read with entry 35  of  List III. (3)that the scheme framed under s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act  may  be regarded as "law" within the  meaning  of  Art. 19(6)  of  the  Constitution, made by  the  State  excluding private  operators from notified routes or  notified  areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g). (4)that  on  a  true reading, the  scheme  in  question  was approved in relation to the fourteen notified routes and not in relation to a notified area and that as a scheme under s. 68C  of  the Act may be one in relation to an  area  or  any route or portion thereof, the scheme could not be challenged as discriminatory.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 2 of 1960. Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. A.   V.  Viswanatha  Sastry and B. B. L.  Iyengar,  for  the petitioner. G.   S.  Pathak,  R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen,  for  the respondents. C.   K.  Daphtary,  Solicitor-General of  India  and  B.R.L. Iyengar, for the Intervener (D.  R. Karigowda). 1960.  April 28.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH,  J.-The petitioners pray for a writ quashing a  scheme approved under s. 68D(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the Government of the State of 744 Mysore and for a writ restraining the respondents, i.e., the State of Mysore, the General Manager, the Mysore  Government Road   Transport  Department  and  the  Regional   Transport Authority,  Bangalore,  from taking action pursuant  to  the scheme. The petitioners are operators of Stage carriages on  certain routes  in the sector popularly known as " Anekal area "  in the  Bangalore District.  On January 13, 1959,  the  General Manager,  Mysore Government Road Transport  Department,  who will hereinafter be referred to as the 2nd respondent,  pub- lished  a scheme in exercise of the powers conferred  by  s. 68C  of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the  exclusion  of private operators on certain routes and reservation of those routes  for  the State transport undertaking in  the  Anekal area.   The  Chief  Minister of the Mysore  State  gave  the operators  affected by the scheme an opportunity  of  making oral representations and on perusing the written  objections

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and  considering  the  oral  representations,  approved  the scheme as framed by the 2nd respondent.  On April 23,  1959, the  scheme  was published in the  Mysore  State  Government gazette’ On June 23, 1959, renewal applications submitted by petitioners  1  to 3 for permits to ply Stage  carriages  on certain  routes covered by the scheme were rejected  by  the Transport  Authority  and  the  2nd  respondent  was   given permanent  permits  operative  as from June  24,  1959,  for plying  buses on those routes.  In Writ Petition No. 463  of 1959  challenging  the  validity of  the  permanent  permits granted to the 2nd respondent, the High Court of Mysore held that  the issue of permits to the 2nd respondent before  the expiry  of  six weeks from the date Of the  application  was illegal.  To petitioners 1 to 3 and certain other  operators renewal   permits  operative  till  March  31,  1961,   were thereafter   issued  by  the  third  respondent.   The   2nd respondent  applied  for fresh permits in pursuance  of  the scheme  approved  on  April  15,  1959,  for  plying   Stage carriages  on  routes specified in the  scheme  and  notices thereof returnable on January 5, 1960, were served upon  the operators  likely  to be affected thereby.   On  January  4, 1960, the five petitioners 745 applied to this court under Art. 32 of the Constitution  for quashing the scheme and for incidental reliefs. The petitioners claim that they have a fundamental right  to carry  on  the business of plying stage  carriages  and  the scheme  framed  by the 2nd respondent and  approved  by  the State   of   Mysore  unlawfully  deprives  them   of   their fundamental  right to carry on the business of plying  stage carriages in the Anekal area.  The diverse grounds on  which the writ is claimed by the petitioners need not be Bet  out, because,  at  the hearing of the petition, counsel  for  the petitioners  has  restricted his argument to  the  following four heads: (1)  that the scheme violates the equal protection clause of the  Constitution, because only fourteen out of a  total  of thirty  one routes on which stage carriages were  plied  for public  transport  in the Anekal area were  covered  by  the scheme  and  that  even  from among  the  operators  on  the fourteen  routes  notified,  two operators  were  left  out, thereby   making  a  flagrant  discrimination  between   the operators even on those fourteen routes; (2)  that  by Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles  Act,  1939, Parliament  had merely attempted to regulate  the  procedure for entry by the States into the business of motor transport in  the State, and in the absence of  legislation  expressly undertaken by the State of Mysore in that behalf, that State was  incompetent to enter into the arena of motor  transport business to the exclusion of private operators; (3)that  the Chief Minister who heard the objections to  the scheme  was biased against the petitioners and that  in  any event,  the  objections  raised by the  operators  were  not considered judicially; and (4)  that  the  Chief  Minister  did  not  give  "   genuine consideration " to the objections raised by the operators to the scheme in the light of the conditions prescribed by  the Legislature. Re. 1: In  column  1 of the scheme " part  of  Bangalore  District, viz,, Bangalore North, Bangalore South, Anekal and  Hosakote Taluks  "  is set out as the area in relation to  which  the scheme is approved; and in 746 column 3, " the routes (with their starting points, termini,

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intermediate  stations and route length) in which the  State transport  undertaking  will introduce its services  to  the exclusion  of  private  operators " are  those  set  out  in statement  1 appended to the scheme.  Statement 1  sets  out the  description of fourteen routes with their  intermediate points, route length, number of buses to be operated and the maximum  number of trips to be performed on each route.   By column  4 " the number of existing stage carriages  on  each route with the number of trips and the names of their opera- tors  "  are  described  " as in  statement  2  appended  ". Statement  2  sets out the names and places of  business  of fifty-six  operators together with the routes  operated  and the  numbers of the stage carriages and trips made by  those operators.  In the Anekal area, there are thirty-one routes, which  are  served by stage carriages  operated  by  private operators, and by the approval of the scheme, only  fourteen of those routes are covered by the scheme’ Section  68C, in so far as it is material, provides  that  a State transport undertaking, if it is of opinion that it  is necessary  in  the  public  interest  that  road   transport services in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should  be  run  and  operated by  itself,  whether  to  the exclusion,   complete  or  partial,  of  other  persons   or otherwise, it may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area  or route   proposed  to  be  covered  and   other   particulars respecting  thereto  as may be prescribed.   Section  68D(1) provides for inviting objections by persons affected by  the scheme.   Sub-section  2  of s.  68D  authorises  the  State Government  after considering the objections and  giving  an opportunity  to  the  objectors to  approve  or  modify  the scheme; and by sub-s. 3, the scheme as approved or  modified and  published  by  the State  Government  in  the  official gazette  shall  "  become  final and  shall  be  called  the approved  scheme and the area or route to which  it  relates shall  be  called  the notified  area  or  notified  route." Counsel for the petitioners contended that exercising powers under s. 68C, the State transport undertaking may prepare  a scheme in respect of an 747 area  or a number of routes in that area, but not  a  scheme for  an area which is to apply to some only and not to,  all routes  on  which  public transport  vehicles  in  the  area operate.  In this case, it is unnecessary to decide  whether it  is open to a State transport undertaking under a  scheme framed for a notified area to limit its application to  some only of the routes, because on a true reading of the scheme, it  is amply clear that the scheme was approved in  relation to  fourteen  notified  routes  and not  in  relation  to  a notified  area.,,  The  approved  scheme  is  in  the   form prescribed  by  the rules, and in the  form  prescribed,  by column  1,  the  area in relation to  which  the  scheme  is approved  is required to be set out.  But a scheme under  s. 68C  must  be  one in relation to an area or  any  route  or portion  thereof  wherein  the transport service  is  to  be undertaken  by  the  State transport  under  taking  to  the exclusion,  either complete or partial, of other  operators. Column  1 of the approved scheme undoubtedly  describes  the area in relation to which the scheme is approved, but by the designation  of  the area, in the scheme,  an  intention  to exclude  either wholly or partially the operators  of  stage carriages from that area is not evinced either expressly  or by  implication.  By column 3, the scheme expressly  directs that  the  State transport undertaking  will  introduce  its service  to  the  exclusion  of  private  operators  on  the

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specified routes.  The scheme must therefore be regarded  as one for the fourteen notified routes and not in relation  to the area described in column 1. Counsel  for the petitioners submitted that an order  passed on  October  22, 1959, by the 3rd  respondent  the  Regional Transport  Authority-rejecting applications for permits  for one  of the fourteen routes to an applicant, indicated  that in the opinion of the third, respondent, the scheme  related to  a notified area and not to notified routes.   The  order states  that.   "  an  approved  scheme  for  the  exclusive operation  in the notified area of Bangalore District  "  by the  second respondent " has come into existence  after  the notification  of  the  route Bangalore to  Nallur,  and  the major, portion of the route applied for lie in the  notified area and as such it was not desirable, to grant any permit 748 to operators to pass through notified area in the intraState route."  The  third respondent may have in  considering  the application  assumed that the scheme related to  a  notified area,  but the true interpretation of the scheme  cannot  be adjudged  in  the  light  of  that  assumption.   The  other document  relied upon is a statement of objections filed  by the  second  respondent on October 24, 1959,  resisting  the application for stage carriage permits to a private operator on the route Siddalaghatta-Bangalore via Nallur.  In para. 4 of  the  statement,  it was submitted that  "  the  existing notification dated October 15, 1959, came under the notified area of the department" of the second respondent " and  that would  overlap  certain  services of  the  department".  But because  in  making his defence, the second  respondent  has referred to the scheme as dealing with " the notified area", the  scheme  will  not  necessarily be hold  to  be  one  in relation to the notified area. The  argument  that  among the  operators  on  the  fourteen routes, two have been selected for special treatment and  on that  account,  the scheme is discriminatory,  has,  in  our judgment,  no substance.  It is averred in para. 13  of  the petition that two persons, Chikkaveerappa operating on route Chikkathirupathi  to Bangalore via Surjapur,  Domsandra  and Agara and Krishna Rao operating on route Bangalore to  Chik- kathirupathi  via Agara and Surjapur are not  amongst  those who  are  excluded  from operating  their  vehicles  on  the notified  routes.  In the affidavit filed by the  State  and the second respondent, it is submitted that the plea of  the petitioners  that the two persons operating stage  carriages on specified routes were not amongst those to be excluded is incorrect,  and that those two persons had been notified  by the  Secretary  of  the third respondent that  they  were  " likely  to  be  affected on giving effect  to  the  approved scheme." Undoubtedly, route-item No. 2 in statement 1 to the scheme  is " Bangalore to Surjapur or any portion thereof  " and  the  route operates via Agara and  Domsandra,  but  the record does not disclose that the two named persons are,  in plying  their  stage carriages, entitled to operate  on  the route  specified with right to stop at the named places  for picking up passengers. 749 It  is not clear on the averments made in the petition  that the  route  on which the stage carriages of  the  two  named persons  ply are identical; even if the routes on which  the stage  carriages  of  these two operators  ply  overlap  the notified route, in the absence of any evidence to show  that they  had  the  right to pick up passengers  en  route,  the discrimination  alleged cannot be deemed to have  been  made out.

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Re. 2: Article   298  of  the  Constitution  as  amended   by   the Constitution  (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. recognises  the executive power of the Union and of each State as  extending to the carrying on of any trade or business.  That power  of the Union is subject in so, far as the trade or business  is not  one  in respect of which Parliament may make  laws,  to legislation by the State and the power of each State, in  so far  as  the trade or business is not one  with  respect  to which  the  State Legislature may make laws, is  subject  to legislation  by  Parliament.  Like  ordinary  citizens,  the Union  and the State Governments may carry on any  trade  or business subject to restrictions which may be imposed by the Legislatures  competent  to  legislate  in  respect  of  the particular  trade or business.  Under Article 19(6)  of  the Constitution  as amended by the First Amendment  Act,  1951, nothing  in sub-cl. (g) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 is  to  affect the  operation of any existing law in so far as  it  related to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to the carrying  on  by  the State or by  a  Corporation  owned  or controlled by the State of any industry or business, whether to  the  exclusion,  complete or  partial,  of  citizens  or otherwise.   The State may therefore carry on any  trade  or business,  and  legislation relating to the carrying  on  of trade or business by ,the State, is not liable to be  called in question on the ground that it infringes the  fundamental freedom of citizens under Art. 19(1)(g).  The Motor Vehicles Act.1939, was enacted by the Central Legislative Assembly in exercise  of  its power under the Government of  India  Act, 1935,  to  legislate in respect of  mechanically  ’propelled vehicles.   Chapter  IVA  containing  ss.  68A  to  681  was incorporated  into that Act by the Parliament by Act 100  of 1956 whereby special provisions 97 750 relating  to  the conduct of transport undertakings  by  the States or Corporations owned or controlled by the State were made.  Section 68A defines the expression " State  transport undertaking  "  as meaning among others an  undertaking  for providing  transport  service  carried  on  by  the  Central Government  or  a  State Government or  any  Road  Transport Corporation  established under Act 44 of 1950.  By  s.  68B, the provisions of that chapter and the rules and orders made thereunder  are  to override Chapter IV and  other  laws  in force.    Section   68C  authorises  the   State   transport undertaking  to  prepare  and  publish  a  scheme  of   road transport   services  of  a  State  transport   undertaking. Section  68D  deals with the lodging of  objections  to  the scheme  framed  under the preceding section,  the  of  those objections and the publication of the final scheme  approved or modified by the State Government.  Section 68F deals with the  issue  of permits to State  transport  undertakings  in respect  of a notified area or notified route  and  provides that  the  Regional  Transport Authority  shall  issue  such permits  to the State transport undertaking  notwithstanding anything  contained  in  Chapter IV.  It  also  enables  the Regional  Transport  Authority,  for giving  effect  to  the approved scheme, to refuse to entertain any application  for the  renewal  of any other permit, to  cancel  any  existing permit, to modify the terms of any existing permit so as  to render  the permit ineffective beyond a specified  date,  to reduce  the number of vehicles authorised to be  used  under the  permit and to curtail the area or route covered by  the permit.   Section 68G sets out the principles and method  of determining  compensation to persons whose existing  permits

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are cancelled. By  Chapter  IVA, the State transport undertaking  which  is either  a department of the State or a corporation owned  or controlled  by  the State on the approval of  a  scheme,  is entitled,  consistently with the scheme, to exclusive  right to,  carry  on  motor  transport  business.   The   Regional Transport Authority is, bound to grant permit for the routes covered  by the,, scheme to the State transport  undertaking if  that  authority applies for the same  and  the  Regional Transport Authority is 751 also  bound  in  giving effect to the  approved  scheme,  to modify  the  terms  of existing permits  and  to  refuse  to entertain  applications  for renewal of permits  of  private operators.   Chapter  IVA is not merely  regulatory  of  the procedure for carrying on business of road transport by  the State;  it enables the State transport undertaking,  subject to  the  provisions  of  the  scheme,  to  exclude   private operators and to acquire a monopoly, partial or complete, in carrying  on  transport business, in a notified area  or  on notified routes. The  authority  of  the Parliament to  enact  laws  granting monopolies  to the State Government to conduct the  business of  road transport is not open to serious challenge.   Entry No.  21 of List III of the Seventh Schedule  authorises  the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures concurrently  to enact   laws  in  respect  of  commercial   and   industrial monopolies,  combines  and  trusts.   The  argument  of  the petitioners that the authority conferred by entry No. 21  in List  III  is  restricted  to  legislation  to  control   of monopolies  and  not to grant or creation of  commercial  or industrial monopolies has little substance.  The  expression "  commercial and industrial monopolies " is wide enough  to include  grant  or monopolies to the State and  Citizens  as well  as  control of monopolies, The expression  used  in  a constitutional enactment conferring legislative powers  must be construed not in any narrow or restricted sense but in  a sense  beneficial  to the widest possible amplitude  of  its powers: Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income- tax,   Bombay  City(1),  The  United  Provinces  v.   Atiqua Begum(2).   Entry No. 26 of List II of the Seventh  Schedule which  invests  the  States  with  exclusive  authority   to legislate in respect of trade and commerce within the State, subject. to the provisions of entry No. 33 of List III, does not  derogate  from the authority conferred by entry  21  of List  III  concurrently  to the  Parliament  and  the  State Legislatures,  to  grant  or create  by  law  commercial  or industrial  monopolies.  The amplitude of the  powers  under the  entry  in the concurrent list  expressly  dealing  with commercial  and industrial monopolies cannot be presumed  to be restricted by the (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829, 836. (2) [1940] F. C. R. 110. 752 generality  of  the expression " trade and commerce  in  the State  List.   If the argument of the  petitioners  and  the intervener that legislation relating to monopoly in  respect of trade and industry is within the exclusive competence  of the State be accepted, the Union Parliament cannot legislate to  create monopolies in the Union Government in respect  of any commercial or trading venture even though power to carry on any trade or business under a monopoly is reserved to the Union  by  the combined operation of Art. 298, and  the  law which  is  protected from the attack that it  infringes  the fundamental freedom to carry on business by Art. 19(6).   We

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are therefore of the view that Chapter IVA could competently be  enacted by the Parliament under entry No. 21  read  with entry No. 35 of the Concurrent List. The  plea sought to be founded on the phraseology,  used  in Art.  19(6)  that the State intending to carry on  trade  or business  must itself enact the law authorising it to  carry on  trade  or  business is equally  devoid  of  force.   The expression " the State " as defined in Art. 12 is  inclusive of the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States.  Under entry  No. 21 of the Concurrent List, the Parliament being competent to legislate  for creating, commercial or  trading  monopolies, there  is, nothing in the Constitution which deprives it  of the power to create a commercial or trading monopoly in  the Constituent   States.   Article  19(6)  is  a  mere   saving provision:  its  function is not to create a power  but  to, immunise  from  attack  the exercise  of  legislative  power falling  within its ambit.  The right of the State to  carry on  trade  or business to the exclusion of others  does  not &rise  by virtue of Art. 19(6).  The right of the  State  to carry  on  trade  or business is  recognised  by  Art.  298; authority to exclude competitors in the field of such  trade or business is conferred on the State by entrusting power to enact  laws  under  entry  21 of List  III  of  the  Seventh Schedule,, and the exercise of that power in the context  of fundamental rights is secured from attack by Art. 19(6), In  any  event, the expression " law " as, defined  in  Art. 13(3)(a) includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, 753 rule, regulation, notification custom, etc., and the  scheme framed  under  s. 68C may properly be regarded as  "  law  " within the meaning of Art. 19(6) made by the State excluding private  operators from notified routes or  notified  areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g). Be.3: The  plea  that the Chief Minister who approved  the  scheme under  S., 68D was biased has no substance.  Section 68D  of the  Motor  Vehicles Act undoubtedly imposes a duty  on  the State  Government  to  act  judicially  in  considering  the objections and in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the transports undertaking.  Gullapalli Nageswara Rao  v. Andhra   Pradesh  State  Road  Transport   Corporation   and another(1).  It is also true that the Government on whom the duty  to decide the dispute rests, is substantially a  party to  the  dispute but if the Government or the  authority  to whom the power is delegated acts judicially in approving  or modifying  the scheme, the approval or modification  is  not open to challenge on a presumption of bias.  The Minister or the officer of the Government who is invested with the power to  hear objections to the scheme is acting in his  official capacity and unless there is reliable evidence to show. that he  is biased, his decision will not be liable to be  called in question, merely because he is, a limb of the Government. The  Chief Minister of the State has filed an  affidavit  in this  case  stating that the contention of  the  petitioners that he was " biased in favour of the scheme was baseless he has   also  stated  that  he  heard  such   objections   and representation& as were made before him and he had given the fullest  opportunity  to  the  objectors  to  submit   their objections  individually.   The Chief  Minister  has  given. detailed reasons for approving the scheme and has dealt with such of the objections as he says were urged before him.  In the last para. of the reasones given, it is stated that  the Government  have heard all the arguments advanced on  behalf

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of  the operators and " after: giving full  consideration-to them, the Government have come to (1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R.319 754 the conclusion that the scheme is necessary in the  interest of  the  public and is accordingly approved subject  to  the modifications  that it shall come into force on May 1,  1959 ".  In  the  absence of  any  evidence  controverting  these averments, the plea of bias must fail. Be. 4: The  argument that the Chief Minister did not  give  genuine consideration " to the objections raised by operators to the scheme  in  the light of the conditions  prescribed  has  no force.   The  order  of the  Chief  Minister  discusses  the questions of law as well as questions of fact.  There is  no specific reference in the order to certain objections  which were raised in the reply filed by the objectors, but we are, on that account, unable to hold that the Chief Minister  did not  consider those objections.  The guarantee conferred  by s.  68D of the Motor Vehicles Act upon persons likely to  be affected  by  the  intended  scheme is  &  guarantee  of  an opportunity  to  put  forth their objections.  and  to  make representations   to  the  State  Government   against   the acceptance  of  the  scheme.   This  opportunity  of  making representations and of being heard in support thereof may be regarded  as  real  only  if in  the  consideration  of  the objections,   there  is  a  judicial  approach.    But   the Legislature  does  not contemplate an appeal to  this  Court against  the order passed by the State Government  approving or  modifying the scheme.  Provided the  authority  invested with   the  power  to  consider  the  objections  gives   an opportunity  to the objectors to be heard in the matter  and deals  with  the  objections  in the  light  of  the  object intended  to  be secured by the scheme, the  ultimate  order passed by that authority is not open to challenge either  on the ground that another view may possibly have been taken on the objections or that detailed reasons have not been  given for  upholding  or rejecting the contentions raised  by  the objectors. In  the  view  taken by us, the contentions  raised  by  the petitioners  fail  and the petition is  therefore  dismissed with costs.                                  Petition dismissed. 755