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PETITIONER: GWALIOR RAYON SILK MFG. (WVG.) CO. LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CUSTODIAN OF VESTED FORESTS PALGHAT AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1990

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR 1747            1990 SCR  (2) 401  1990 SCC  Supl.  785     JT 1990 (2)   130  1990 SCALE  (1)689

ACT:     Kerala  Private  Forests (Vesting and  Assignment)  Act, 1971:  Sections 2(f)(1)(i)(C), 3(1) and (2):  ’Private  For- est’--Vesting   in   Government--’Any   other   agricultural crop’--Does  not  include  all species  of  trees  including eucalyptus plantations--Only fruit bearing trees are exclud- ed--Land planted with eucalyptus--Held vested in  Government --Object of the Act explained.     Kerala  Land Reforms Act, 1963 (As amended by  Amendment Act  35 of 1969): Section 2(47)(iv): Scope and  meaning  ac- corded  to  ’Private Forest’--Held  inapplicable  to  Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971: The Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949--Object of.     Statutory    interpretation:   Words   defined   in    a statute--Judicial interpretation of--Does not afford a guide to construction of the same words in another statute  unless the statutes are pari materia legislations.     Legislative  intention--Ascertainment of--Judges  should not  only  listen to the voice of the legislature  but  also listen attentively to what the legislature does not say.     Words  and Phrases: ’Agriculture’, ’Agricultural  Crop’, ’Garden’ and ’Nilam ’--meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     The appellant company was maintaining a large eucalyptus plantation  for  captive consumption in  its  production  of Rayon  Grade  Pulp. The State of Kerala claimed  that  as  a consequence  of  the  Kerala Private  Forests  (Vesting  and Assignment)  Act,  1971, the eucalyptus plantation  being  a ’private forest’ stood transferred to and vested in it.  The company  resisted the State’s claim on the ground  that  the term  ’private forest’ excludes the  eucalyptus  plantation. The  High Court decided the question in favour of the  State and against the appellant. 402     In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on  behalf of  the appellant that since the eucalyptus  plantation  was covered  by the expression ’any other agricultural crop’  in section  2(47)(iv) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963  the similar  expression  used in section  2(f)(1)(i)(C)  of  the

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Vesting Act, 1971 must also carry the same meaning. Dismissing the appeal, this Court.     HELD:  1.  Judicial interpretation given  to  the  words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to  construc- tion  of the same words in another statute unless the  stat- utes are pari materia legislations. [408G]     1.1  The  definition of ’private forest’ in  the  Kerala Land  Reforms Act is not just the same as the definition  of ’private forest’ in the Vesting Act. Indeed, there is a vast difference  between the two. Two separate  definitions  have been provided in the Vesting Act; the first is applicable to the  Malabar district where the Madras Preservation of  Pri- vate  Forests Act, 1949 applied immediately before  the  ap- pointed  day;  the second concerned is in  relation  to  the remaining  areas in the State of Kerala. The  definition  of ’private forest’ as is applicable to the Malabar district is not  general in terms but limited to the areas and lands  to which  the  Madras Preservation of Private Forests  Act  ap- plied,  and  exempts there from lands described  under  sub- clauses  (A) to (D). This significant reference to this  Act in  the  definition of ’private forest’ in the  Vesting  Act makes all the difference in the case. The scheme of this Act appears to be that if the land is shown to be private forest on  the  date  on which the Act came into  force,  it  would continue  to be a forest, even if there was  subsequent  re- plantation. [408H; 409A-D]     1.2  The lands involved in this appeal were all  forests as defined in the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to transplant the  meaning accorded  to ’private forest’ from the Kerala  Land  Reforms Act to the Vesting Act. [409E-F]     State  of  Kerala v. Anglo American D.T.T.  Co.,  [1980] Ker. L.T. 215 and State of Kerala v.K.C. Moosa Haji,  A.I.R. 1984 Ker. 149 referred to.     Malankara  Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of  Kerala  & Ors., [1973] 1 SCR 399, Held inapplicable. 403      State  of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.)  Co. Ltd., [1974] 1 SCR 671, referred to.     2.  The term ’agriculture’ and ’agricultural crop’  have wider  as  well as narrower connotation. The  wider  concept covers  both the primary or basic as well as the  subsequent operations. It takes within its fold among other things, the products  of  the land which have some  utility  either  for consumption  or  for  trade and  commerce  including  forest products  such as timber, sal and piyasal, trees,  casuarina plantations,  tendu  leaves, coconuts etc. Of  course  there must  be  present all throughout the basic idea  that  there must  be cultivation of the land in the sense of tilling  of the  lands, sowing of the seeds, planting and  similar  work done in the land. The forest growth or spontaneous growth of any product, plants or trees, however, would be outside  the characteristic  of  agricultural  products  or   operations. [407D-F]     Commissioner  of 1. T. West Bengal v. Raja  Benoy  Kumar Sahas Roy, [1958] SCR 101, referred to.     2.1 Under Section 3(1), private forests vest in  Govern- ment.  Subsection  (2) however, excludes from  such  vesting lands  within the ceiling limits applicable to an  owner  if they  are  under his personal cultivation.  Cultivation  for this purpose ’includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species’.  The  explanation to sub-section  (2)  makes  this aspect  beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation  of any  kind of tree, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber  or

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pulp  are  not vested under section 3 sub-section  (2).  The legislature  has thus excluded from vesting under section  3 sub-section  (2) the trees of every variety. But while  pro- viding  for  exclusion  under  sub-clause  (C)  of   section 2(f)(1)(i), the legislature could not have again thought  of trees  or plants of all kinds. It seems to  have  considered only  fruit-bearing  trees and not of  other  species.  Sub- clause (C) refers to lands which are principally  cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It next refers  to lands which are principally cultivated with any other  agri- cultural  crop. If the legislature had intended to’ use  the term  ’agricultural  crop’  in a wide sense so  as  to  take within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or other- wise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb  denot- ing only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. Therefore, there is no indication that the words ’any other agricultur- al crop’ in sub-clause (C) are quite wide enough to  compre- hend all species of trees including eucalyptus  plantations. These words exclude only fruit-bearing trees. [410H; 41  1A- D] State of Kerala v. Amalgamated Malabar Estates, A.I.R. 1980 404 Ker.  137;  State of Kerala v.  Malayalam  Plantation  Ltd., A.I.R. 1981 Ker. 1 and State of Kerala v.K.C. Moosa Haji & Ors.,  A.I.R. 1984 Ker. 149, approved.     3.  In  seeking legislative intention, judges  not  only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen atten tively to what the legislature does not say. [410G-H]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  698  of 1980.     From the Judgment dated the 2.5.1979 of the Kerala  High Court in M.F.A. 346 of 1978.     M.M.  Abdul Khader, Darshan Singh and Praveen Kumar  for the Appellant.     P.S. Poti, P.K. Pillai (N.P.), T.T. Kunnhikannan and Ms. Malini Poduval for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.  JAGANNATHA  SHETTY, J. This appeal by leave  from  a Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court raises a  short question  of  construction  of the plain  words  of  a  term ’private forest’ as defined in a statutory enactment  called "The Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 197 1  (called  shortly "The Vesting Act"). The High  Court  has decided the question in favour of the State and against  the appellant.  The  judgment of the High Court has  since  been reported  in AIR 1980 Kerala 137. The view expressed by  the High  Court has been subsequently affirmed by  another  Full Bench  in State of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd.,  AIR 1981  Kerala  1  and reiterated by a larger  Bench  of  five Judges in State of Kerala v.K.C. Moosa Haji & Ors., AIR 1984 Kerala 149,     Losing  the  construction argument,  the  appellant  has appealed to this Court.     The facts of the case are immaterial for the purpose  of this judgment, save to state in the barest outline that  the appellant is the Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One of its industrial under- takings  is located in Bilakootam, Mavoor in Kozhikode  Dis- trict, Kerala State. This establishment pro-

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405 duces  Rayon Grade Pulp, using Bamboo Eucalyptus  and  other species of wood as basic raw material. It has a large  euca- lyptus plantation coveting thousands of acres, maintained as captive raw material for use in the factory. The State  says that  as  a consequence of the Vesting Act,  the  eucalyptus 8plantation  being a private forest and not excluded  there- from is vested in the State with no fight, title and  inter- est  subsisting with the company. The claim of the  company, however, is that the term ’private forest’ as defined  under the Vesting Act, excludes the eucalyptus plantation.     ’Private forest’ has been defined in the Vesting Act  as well as under the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964) as amended  by Amendment Act 35 of 1969 ("The KLR Act").  Since counsel for the appellant largely depends upon the  judicial construction  of the definition of ’private forest’  in  the KLR  Act, it is necessary that we should set  out  hereunder both the definitions placed alongside with each other: THE KERALA PRIVATE FORESTS         THE KERALA LAND REFORMS (VESTING AND ASSIGNMENT)           ACT (ACT 1 OF 1964) AS ACT, 1971                          AMENDED BY THE KERALA                                    LAND REFORMS (AMENDME-                                    NT ACT 35/1969) (Act 26 of 1971) (AS AMENDED BY ACT 5 OF            2. Definitions.  In this 1978)                              Act unless the context                                    otherwise requires- 2. Definitions: In this Act        (47) ’private forest’ unless the context otherwise       means a forest which is requires-                          not owned by the Govern                                    ment but does not inclu-                                    de- (f) ’private forest’ means (1) in relation to the Mala-       (i) areas which are waste bar district referred to in        and are not enclaves sub-section (2) of Section         within wooded areas; 5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956                          (ii) areas which are                                    gardens or nilams; (Central Act 37 of 1956) (i) any land to which the          (iii) areas which are Madras Preservation of Pri-        planted with tea, coffee, vate Forests Act, 1949 (Madras     cocoa, rubber, cardomom Act XXVIII of 1949) applied        or cinnamon; and immediately                        (iv) other areas which are                                     culti- 406 before the appointed day excluding-                         vated with (A) Lands which are gardens or     pepper, arecanut coco- nilams as defined in the Kerala    nut, cashew or other Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of       fruit bearing trees or 1964)                              are cultivated with any                                    other agricultural crop;. (B) Lands which are used princi- pally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardomom, or cinnamom and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultiva- tion of such crops or for the pre- paration of the smae for the market. Explanation--Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and

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playgrounds shall be deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops; (C) lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees or are princi- pally cultivated with any other agricultural crop; (D) sites of buildings and lands appurtenant to and necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of, such buildings; (ii) any forest not owned by the Government, to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 did not apply, inclu- ding waste lands which are encla- ves within wooded areas. 407 (2) in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala, any forest not owned by the Government, including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas. Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, a lane shall be deemed to be a waste land notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered trees or shrubs;"     We may first examine the scope of the definition of  ’private forest’  under  Section 2(47) of the KLR Act. It means  a  forest which  is  not owned by the Government,  excluding  thereby  four kinds  of  areas  specified under sub-clauses (i)  to  (iv).  The latter part of sub-clause (iv) contains the words"  .....   Other areas  cultivated  with any other agricultural crop".  The  terms ’agriculture’  and  ’agricultural  crop’ have wider  as  well  as narrower  connotation. The wider concept covers both the  primary or  basic as well as the subsequent operations. It  takes  within its fold among other things, the products of the land which  have some  utility  either for consumption or for trade  and  commerce including forest products such as timber, sal and piyasal  trees, casuarina plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc. (See: Commis- sioner  of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy  Kumar Sahas  Roy,   [1958]  SCR 101 at 156. Of  course  there  must  be present all throughout the basic idea that there must be cultiva- tion of land in the sense of tilling of the lands, sowing of  the seeds,  planting  and similar work done in the land.  The  forest growth  or  spontaneous growth of any product, plants  or  trees, however,  would  be outside the  characteristic  of  agricultural products or operations. In  Malankara  Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of  Kerala  & Ors.,  [1973]  1  SCR 399, this Court  while  examining  the scheme  of KLR Act with particular reference to Chapter  III therein observed that ’lands under eucalyptus or teak  which are the result of agricultural operations normally would  be agricultural  lands,  but  not lands which  are  covered  by eucalyptus or teak growing spontaneously as in a jungle or a forest.’  This  is the wider concept of  agricultural  crop, perhaps attributed to the latter part of sub-clause (iv)  of the definition under Section 2(47) of the KLR Act. The  latter part of sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(47) of  the KLR 408 Act, counsel for the appellant contended, is practically the same  as  the  second  limb of  sub-clause  (C)  of  Section

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2(f)(1)(i)  of  the Vesting Act. It was claimed  that  since eucalyptus  plantation  is covered by  the  expression  ’any other agricultural crop’ in Section 2(47) sub-clause (iv) of the KLR Act, Section 2(f)(1)(i) sub-clause (C) of the  Vest- ing Act with similar words must also carry the same meaning. It  was  emphasised  that the KLR Act and  the  Vesting  Act constitute  a Code of agrarian reform and they  are  cognate legislations  with the Vesting Act as supplementary  to  the KLR  Act. The expression ’any other agricultural crop’  used in both the enactments while defining ’private forest’  must therefore,  receive the same meaning as otherwise, it  would lead  to  anomalies. This is the line of  argument  for  the appellant.     This  whole line of arguments with respect, is  hard  to accept.  As  Felix Frankfurter, J. said: "Legislation  is  a form  of  literary composition. But construction is  not  an abstract  process equally valid for every  composition,  not even for every composition whose meaning must be  judicially ascertained. The nature of the composition demands awareness of certain presuppositions  ......  And so, the significance of  an  enactment, its antecedents as well .,as  .its  later history, its relation to other enactments, all may be  rele- vant  to  the construction of words for one purpose  and  in one-setting but not for another. Some words are confined  to their history; some are starting points for history.  ’Words are  intellectual  and moral currency. They  come  from  the legislative  mint with some intrinsic meaning. Sometimes  it remains unchanged. Like currency, words sometimes appreciate or  depreciate in value". The learned Judge further  stated: "Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some  mischief, to  supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of  policy,  to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn,  like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in  the language  of  the  statute, as read in the  light  of  other external  manifestations of purpose. That is what the  Judge must seek and effectuate." (See: Courts, Judges and Politics by  Walter  F. Murphy: ’Some Reflections of the  Reading  of Statutes’ by Felix Frankfurter).     Judicial  interpretation given to the words  defined  in one  statute does not afford a guide to construction of  the same  words in another statute unless the Statutes are  pari materia  legislations.  In  the present case,  the  aim  and object of the two legislations are not similar in the  first place.  Secondly, the definition of ’private forest’ in  the KLR  Act is not just the same as the definition of  ’private forest’ in the Vesting Act. Indeed, there is a vast  differ- ence  in between the two. The object of the Vesting Act  was to provide for the Vesting in the Government 409 of private forest in the State of Kerala for the  assignment thereof to the agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation.  The  preamble of the Act  provides  that  such agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increase  the agricultural  production  in the State and  to  promote  the welfare  of  the agricultural population in the  State.  Two separate definitions have been provided in the Vesting  Act; the  first is  applicable to the Malabar district where  the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (’The  MPPF Act’)  applied  immediately before the  appointed  day;  the second  concerned is in relation to the remaining  areas  in the  State of Kerala. The definition of ’private forest’  as is  applicable  to the Malabar district is  not  general  in terms  but limited to the areas and lands to which the  MPPF Act  applied  and exempts therefrom  lands  described  under sub-clauses  (A) to (D). This significant reference to  MPPF

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Act in the definition of ’priVate forest’ in the Vesting Act makes  all  the difference in the case. The MPPF Act  was  a special  enactment. It was enacted by the  erstwhile  Madras State  to  preserve the private forests in the  district  of Malabar and erstwhile South Kannara District. The Scheme  of that  Act  has been explained by several  decisions  of  the Kerala High Court and that scheme appears to be that if  the land is shown to be private forest on the date on which  the MPPF Act,came into force, it would continue to be a  forest, even  if there was subsequent replantation. (See:  State  of Kerala  v. Anglo American D.T.T. Co., [1980] Ker.  L.T.  215 and  State  of Kerala v. K.C. Moosa Haji,  (supra)  (FB)-AIR 1984 Ker. 149 at 154-155.)     It  is  not in dispute that the lands involved  in  this appeal were all forests as defined in the MPPF Act, 1949 and continued  to be so when the Vesting Act came into force  in 1971.  In  Malankara case (supra), this Court was  not  con- cerned  with the lands covered by the MPPF Act, and  denuded thereafter  of forest growth and cultivated with  fresh  re- plantation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to  transplant the meaning accorded to ’private forest’ from the KLR Act to the  Vesting Act. That wide concept cannot fit into the  new legal source.     In State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Sm. Mfg. (Wvg.)  Co. Ltd.,  [1974]  1 SCR 67 1, this Court  while  upholding  the constitutional validity of the Vesting Act has observed that the  Forest  Lands  in the State of Kerala  has  attained  a peculiar  character owing to the geography and  climate  and the  evidence available showed that the vast areas of  these forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural plantations. That much is clear from the following  observa- tions (at 683): "It is therefore, manifest that when the legislature  stated in 410 the  preamble  that  the private  forests  are  agricultural lands,  they  merely wanted to convey that  they  are  lands which  by  and large could be prudently and  profitably  ex- ploited for agricultural purposes."     There is thus a judicial recognition of the  distinction between  private forest in Travancore-Cochin area in  Kerala State  and  the  private forest in  Malabar  district.  This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the  anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant.     Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or  nilams as defined in the KLR Act. ’Garden’  means  lands used  principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut  trees or  pepper  vines or any two or more of  the  same.  ’Nilam’ means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. Sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultiva- tion  of which in the general sense would be cultivation  of agricultural  crops.  Such agricultural crops  are  by  name specified.  Lands  used for any purpose  ancillary  to  such cultivation  or for preparation of the same for  the  market are  also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause  (C). It  first refers to lands which are  principally  cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers  to only the fruit beating trees. It next refers to ’lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term ’agricultur- al  crop’ in a wide sense so as to take within its fold  all species  of  trees fruit-beating or otherwise, it  would  be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the  cashew or other fruit-beating trees. It may be significant to  note that the Legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has  used

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the  words to identify the different categories of crops  or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have "associa- tions,  echoes and overtones". While construing such  words, judges  must,  as Felix Frankfurter, J.,  said  "retain  the associations,  hear  the echoes and capture  the  overtones" (supra  p. 414). When so examined and construed, we  do  not discover  any  indication that the words in  sub-clause  (C) "any  other  agricultural  crop" are quite  wide  enough  to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptus planta- tions.     It is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking  legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legis- lature but also listen attentatively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3  with those  of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3  sub-section  (1), private forests vest in Government. Sub-clause (2)  however, excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits 411 applicable to an owner if they are under his personal culti- vation.  Cultivation for this purpose "includes  cultivation of trees or plants of any species". The explanation to  sub- section  (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands  used for  the cultivation of any kind of tree, fruit  bearing  or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section  3 sub-section  (2).  The legislature has  thus  excluded  from vesting  under Section 3 sub-section (2) the trees of  every variety. But while providing for exclusion under  sub-clause (C),  the legislature could not have again thought of  trees or  plants  of all kinds. It seems to have  considered  only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the  inten- tion  was otherwise, the sub-clause(C) would have been in  a different language.     In  our  view as a matter of pure  construction  untram- melled  by authority, the words used in the latter  part  of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all  varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees.     This  is also the conclusion of the High Court not  only in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subse- quent  two decisions; Malayalam Plantation Limited and  K.C. Maosa Haji cases (supra).     In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In  the circumstances  of the case, however, we make no order as  to costs. T.N.A.                                         Appeal   dis- missed. 412