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PETITIONER: GVINDLAL CHHAGGAN LAL PATEL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, GODHRA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/08/1975

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BHAGWATI, P.N. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1976 AIR  263            1976 SCR  (1) 451  1975 SCC  (2) 482  CITATOR INFO :  F          1985 SC 964  (9)  RF         1986 SC1499  (16)  RF         1986 SC1518  (8)  R          1987 SC1010  (14)  R          1989 SC2206  (21)

ACT:      Mandatory and  Directory Provision-Bombay  Agricultural Produce Markets  Act, 1939-Section  4  Gujarat  Agricultural Produce Markets  Act, 1961,  ss. 5  and 6,  36-When  ’shall’ means ’may’-Principles  of constitution  of  a  Statute-  If language Plain  and unambiguous,  whether aid  of artificial guidelines to interpretation possible.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was prosecuted  for having  purchased  a certain quantity  of ginger  without obtaining  a licence as required by  the Gujarat  Agricultural Produce  Markets Act. 1964. The trial court accepted the factum of purchase but it acquitted the  appellant on  the ground  that  the  relevant notification in  regard to  the inclusion  of ginger was not shown to  have been promulgated and published as required by the Act.      On appeal,  the High  Court reversed  the acquittal and sentenced the  appellant to  a fine  of Rs.  10/-. The  High Court proceeded  on the  assumption that  the  notifications were property  made. In  the erstwhile  composite  State  of Bombay  there  was  in  operation  The  Bombay  Agricultural Produce Markets Act of 1939. On the bifurcation of the State in 1960  the said  1939 Act  was extended  by an appropriate order  to  the  State  of  Gujarat.  That  Act  remained  in operation in  Gujarat till  the year  1964 in which year the present Act  came into  force. Section 5 of the Act requires the Director to notify in the Official Gazette his intention to regulate  the purchase  and sale of agricultural produce. The section  also requires  the publication in Gujarati in a newspaper  having  circulation  in  the  area.  The  section further requires  that the objections should be invited from the public.  Section 6(1)  provides that after the expiry of the period  for making  objections and after considering the objections  and   suggestions  received  and  after  holding

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necessary inquiry,  the Director may, by notification in the Official Gazette,  declare the  area specified  in the  said notification  to   be  a  market  area  in  respect  of  the agricultural produce  to be  specified in  the notification. Sub-section  (1)   of  s.   6  further   requires  that  the notification under  the said  section shall  be published in Gujarati in a newspaper having circulation in the said area. Sub s.  (5) of  s. 6  provides that the Director may, at any time by  notification in  the official  gazette, exclude any area from  a market  area specified in a notification issued under sub-s.  (1) or  include any  area therein  and exclude from  or  add  to  the  kinds  of  agricultural  produce  so specified. The  sale or purchase of the agricultural produce concerned without  a licence  is made an offence by s. 36 of the Act.      On appeal  by special  leave, the  appellant  contended that the  notification under  s. 6(5)  of the  Act, covering additional varieties  of agricultural produce, must not only be published  in the  Official  gazette  but  must  also  be published in Gujarati in a newspaper.      The respondent  contended that  (1)  the  procedure  in regard to  the publication  which is laid down in sub-s. (1) of s.  6 must  be restricted  to notifications  issued under that sub-section  and cannot  be extended  to  those  issued under sub-section  (5) of  s. 6; (2) Assuming that the words "this section" are wide enough to cover every sub-section of s. 6. the word ’shall’ ought to be read as ’may’. ^      HELD: (1)  Section 6(1) means what it says. That is the normal  rule   of  construction  of  statutes,  a  rule  not certainly absolute and unqualified, but the conditions which bring into  play the  exceptions to that rule did not exist. It is  not  reasonable  to  assume  in  the  legislature  an ignorance of  the distinction  between a  "section"  of  the statute  and   the  "sub-section"   of  that   section.  The requirement 452 laid down  by  s.  6(1)  that  a  notification  under  "this section" shall  also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper would govern any and every notification issued under any par of s. 6, that is to say, under any of the sub-sections of s. 6. [455E-G]      (2) Sometimes  the legislature  does not  say  what  it means. That has given rise to a series of technical rules of interpretation devised  or designed  to unraval  the mind of the law-makers.  The words  of the  concluding portion of s. 6(1) are plain and unambiguous rendering superfluous the aid of artificial guide-lines to interpretation. [455H-456A]      (3) "Shall"  must normally be construed to mean "shall" and not  "may", for  the  distinction  between  the  two  is fundamental. The  use of  the word  "shall" or  "may" is not conclusive  on   the   question   whether   the   particular requirement of  law is  mandatory or directory. In each case one  must  look  to  the  subject-matter  and  consider  the importance of  the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. It is the duty of courts to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the provision  to   be  construed.  The  amendment  to  s.  6(1) notification in  regard  to  matters  described  therein  is equated with  a fresh  declaration of intention in regard to those matters,  rendering it obligatory to follow afresh the whole of  the procedure  prescribed by  s. 5.  The object of these requirements  is quite  clear. The  fresh notification can be  issued only  after considering  the  objections  and

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suggestions which the Director receives within the specified time.  In  fact,  the  initial  notification  has  to  state expressly that  the Director  shall consider  the objections and suggestions  received by  him within  the stated period. The publication  of the notification in the Official Gazette was evidently  thought by  the legislature  not an  adequate means of communicating the Director’s intention to those who would be  vitally affected  by the  proposed declaration and who  would   therefore  be   interested  in  offering  their objections  and  suggestions.  It  is  a  matter  of  common knowledge that  publication in  a newspaper attracts greater public attention  than publication  in the official gazette. That is  why the  legislature has  taken care to direct that the notification  shall also  be published  in Gujarati in a newspaper. A  violation of  this requirement  is  likely  to affect valuable rights of traders and agriculturists because in the  absence of proper and adequate publicity their right of trade  and business  shall  have  been  hampered  without affording to  them an  opportunity to  offer objections  and suggestions. Once  an area  is declared to be a market area. no place  in the  said area  can be used for the purchase or sale  of   any  agricultural   produce  specified   in   the notification without  the necessary  licence. A violation of the said provisions attracts penal consequences under s. 36. It is.  therefore, vital  from the  point  of  view  of  the citizens’ right  to carry on trade or business, no less than for the  consideration that  violation of  the Act  leads to penal consequences,  that the  notification must receive due publicity. There is something in the very nature of the duty imposed by  ss. 5  and 6.  something in  the very object for which the  duty is  cast. that  the duty  must be performed. [456C, 458B, F-H, 459A-B]      (4) The  legislative history of the Act reinforces this conclusion. In  the Bombay Act, which was made applicable to Gujarat till  1964, it  was not  necessary to publish in the newspaper   notifications    corresponding   to    s.   6(5) notifications under  the new  Act. The  Gujarat Legislature, having before  it the  model  of  the  Bombay  Act.  made  a conscious departure from it by providing for the publication of the  notification in  a newspaper and by substituting the word ’shall’ for the word ’may’. [459D-F]      (5) A  notification under  s. 6  must be  published  in Gujarati in  a newspaper.  This requirement is mandatory and must be  fulfilled. Admittedly, the notification in question was not  published in  a newspaper  at  all,  much  less  in Gujarati. Accordingly,  the inclusion  of new  varieties  of agricultural  produce   in  that  notification  lacks  legal validity and  no prosecution can be founded upon its breach. [459E-H]      (6) The  High Court  took into  consideration  a  wrong notification. Reliance  on the  earlier judgment  of Gujarat High Court  on the  construction of  the Bombay Act was also wrong since  the language there was wholly different. [460E- G] 453

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 158 of 1972.      Appeal by  special leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the  12th November,  1971 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1970.      H.S. Patel,  S.S. Khanduja  and Lalita  Kohli, for  the

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appellant.      S. K.  Zauri, Amaresh  Kumar and M. V. Goswami, for the respondents 1-2.      H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff, for respondent no. 3.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD, J. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  convicting  the appellant under  section 36  read  with  section  8  of  the Gujarat  Agricultural   Produce  Markets  Act,  20  of  1964 (referred to herein as "the Act"), and sentencing him to pay a fine  of Rs. 10/-. The judgment of conviction was recorded by the  High Court  in an  appeal from an order of acquittal passed by  the learned  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class, Godhra.      An Inspector  of  Godhra  Agricultural  Produce  Market Committee filed  a complaint  against the appellant charging him with  having purchased  a certain  quantity of ginger in January and  February, 1969  without obtaining  a licence as required by  the Act.  The learned  Magistrate accepted  the factum of  purchase but  he acquitted  the appellant  on the ground that  the relevant  notification  in  regard  to  the inclusion of  ginger was  not shown to have been promulgated and published as required by the Act.      The case  was tried  by the  learned Magistrate  by the application of  procedure appointed for summary trials. That circumstance  together  with  the  token  sentence  of  fine imposed by  the  High  Court  gives  to  the  case  a  petty appearance. But  occasionally, matters apparently petty seem on closer  thought to  contain points  of importance though, regretfully, such  importance comes to be realized by stages as the  matter travels  slowly from one court to another. As before the  Magistrate so  in the  High  Court,  the  matter failed to  receive due  attention: a  fundamental premise on which the  judgment of  the High  Court is based contains an assumption contrary  to the record. Evidently, the attention of the  High Court was not drawn either to the error of that assumption or  to some  of the more important aspects of the case which the parties have now perceived.      It  is   necessary,  in   order   to   understand   the controversy,  to  notice  some  of  the  relevant  statutory provisions.      In the erstwhile composite State of Bombay there was in operation an  Act called  the  Bombay  Agricultural  Produce Markets Act, 22 of 1939. On the bifurcation of that State on May 1,  1960 the new State of Gujarat was formed. The Bombay Act of 1939 was extended by 454 an  appropriate  order  to  the  State  of  Gujarat  by  the Government of  that State. That Act remained in operation in Gujarat till  September 1,  1964 on  which date  the Gujarat Agricultural Produce  Markets Act,  20 of  1964,  came  into force.      The Act  was passed  "to consolidate  and amend the law relating  to   the  regulation  of  buying  and  selling  of agricultural produce  and the  establishment of  markets for agricultural produce  in the State of Gujarat". Section 4 of the Act  empowers the State Government to appoint an officer to be  the Director  of  Agricultural  Marketing  and  Rural Finance. Sections 5, 6(1) and 6(5) of the Act read thus:-           "5.  Declaration   of  intention   of   regulating      purchase and  sale of agricultural produce in specified      area.-(1) The  Director may,  by  notification  in  the      Official Gazette,  declare his  intention of regulating      the purchase  and sale of such agricultural produce and      in  such  area,  as  may  be  specified  therein.  Such

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    notification shall  also be  published in Gujarati in a      newspaper having  circulation in  the area  and in such      other manner as may be prescribed.           (2)  Such   notification  shall   state  that  any      objection or suggestion received by the Director within      the period  specified in  the notification  which shall      not be  less than  one  month  from  the  date  of  the      publication of the notification, shall be considered by      the Director.           (3) The  Director shall  also send  a copy  of the      notification  to   each  of   the   local   authorities      functioning in  the area  specified in the notification      with a request to submit its objections and suggestions      if any,  in writing  to the  Director within the period      specified in the notification.           6. Declaration  of  market  areas.-(1)  After  the      expiry of  the period  specified  in  the  notification      issued under section 5 (hereinafter referred to in this      section  as   ’the  said   notification’),  and   after      considering the  objections  and  suggestions  received      before its  expiry and  holding such  inquiry as may be      necessary, the  Director may,  by notification  in  the      Official Gazette,  declare the  area specified  in  the      said notification or any portion thereof to be a market      area for  the purposes of this Act in respect of all or      any of  the kinds  of agricultural produce specified in      the  said   notification.  A  notification  under  this      section shall  also  be  published  in  Gujarati  in  a      newspaper having  circulation in  the said  area and in      such  other  manner, as may be prescribed.           6. (5)  After declaring in the manner specified in      section 5  his intention of so doing, and following the      procedure there  in, the  Director may,  at any time by      notification in  the Official Gazette. exclude any area      from a  market area  specified in a notification issued      under sub-section  (1), or include any area therein and      exclude from  or  add  to  the  kinds  of  agricultural      produce so specified any kind of agricultural produce." 455 By section  8, no  person can  operate in the market area or any part  thereof except  under and  in accordance  with the conditions of a licence granted under the Act. Section 36 of the Act  provides, to  the  extent  material,  that  whoever without holding  a licence  uses any  place in a market area for the  purchase or  sale of  any agricultural  produce and thereby  contravenes   section  8  shall  on  conviction  be punished with the sentence mentioned therein.      Rule 3  of the  Gujarat  Agricultural  Produce  Markets Rules, 1965 provides that a notification under section 5 (1) or section  6(1) shall  also be published by affixing a copy thereof at  some conspicuous  place in the office of each of the local  authorities functioning  in the area specified in the notification.      The simple  question, though  important, is whether the notification issued  under section 6(5) of the Act, covering additional varieties of agricultural produce like ginger and onion, must  not only  be published  in the official gazette but must  also be  published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The concluding sentence of section 6(1) says that a notification under "this section" "shall also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper"  having circulation in the particular area. The argument of  the appellant  is twofold:  Firstly, that "this section" means  this subsection  so that  the  procedure  in regard to  publication which  is laid down in subsection (1) of section  6 must  be restricted  to  notifications  issued

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under that subsection and cannot be extended to those issued under subsection  (5) of  section 6;  and secondly, assuming that the words "this section" are wide enough to cover every sub-section of  section 6  the word "shall" ought to be read as "may".      First, as  to the meaning of the provision contained in section 6 (1) of the Act. It means what it says. That is the normal  rule   of  construction  of  statutes,  a  rule  not certainly absolute and unqualified, but the conditions which bring into  play the  exceptions to  that rule  do not exist here. Far  from it;  because, the  scheme of the Act and the purpose  of   the  particular   provision  in  section  6(1) underline the  need to  give to  the  provision  its  plain, natural meaning.  It is  not reasonable  to  assume  in  the legislature  an  ignorance  of  the  distinction  between  a "section" of  the statute  and  the  "subsections"  of  that section. Therefore,  the requirement  laid down  by  section 6(1) that  a notification under "this section" shall also be published in  Gujarati in  a newspaper  would govern any and every notification  issued under any part of section 6, that is to  say, under  any of  the sub-sections of section 6. If this requirement  was to  govern notifications  issued under sub-section (1)  of section  6 only.  the legislature  would have said so.      But the  little complexity that there is in this matter arises out  of a  known phenomenon,  judicially noticed  but otherwise disputed,  that sometimes the legislature does not say what  it means.  That has  given rise  to  a  series  of technical rules  of interpretation  devised or  designed  to unravel the  mind of  the law-makers. If the words used in a statute are  ambiguous, it  is said,  consider the object of the statute,  have regard  to  the  purpose  for  which  the particular provision is put on the statute-book 456 and then  decide what  interpretation best  carries out that object and  purpose. The  words of the concluding portion of section 6(1) are plain and unambiguous rendering superfluous the aid of artificial guide-lines to interpretation. But the matter does  not rest  there.  The  appellant  has  made  an alternative argument  that  the  requirement  regarding  the publication in  Gujarati in a newspaper is directory and not mandatory, despite  the use  of the word "shall". That word, according to the appellant, really means "may".      Maxwell, Crawford  and Craies  abound in  illustrations where  the   words  "shall"   and  "may"   are  treated   as interchangeable, "Shall  be liable to pay interest" does not mean "must  be made  liable to  pay interest",  and "may not drive on  the wrong  side of  the road" must mean "shall not drive on  the wrong side of the road". But the problem which the use  of the  language of  command  poses  is:  Does  the legislature intend  that its  command shall at all events be performed ?  Or is  it enough  to comply with the command in substance ?  In other  words,  the  question  is  :  is  the provision mandatory or directory ?      Plainly, "shall"  must normally  be construed  to  mean "shall" and  not "may",  for the distinction between the two is fundamental.  Granting the  application of mind, there is little or  no chance that one who intends to leave a lee-way will use  the language  of command  in the performance of an act. But  since, even  lesser  directions  are  occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to delve deeper and  ascertain the  true meaning  lying  behind  mere words.      Crawford on  ’Statutory Construction’  (Ed. 1940,  Art. 261, p. 516) sets out the following passage from an American

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case approvingly:  "The question  as to whether a statute is mandatory or  directory  depends  upon  the  intent  of  the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The  meaning and  intention of the legislature must govern, and  these are  to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of  the provision,  but also  by considering its nature, its  design, and the consequences which would follow from construing  it the  one way  or the  other." Thus,  the governing  factor   is  the   meaning  and   intent  of  the legislature, which  should be  gathered not  merely from the words used  by the  legislature but  from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word  ’shall’ or ’may’ is not conclusive on the question whether the  particular requirement  of law  is mandatory or directory. But  the circumstance  that the  legislature  has used a  language of  compulsive force  is  always  of  great relevance and  in   the absence  of anything contrary in the context  indicating  that  a  permissive  interpretation  is permissible,  the   statute  ought   to  be   construed   as pre-emptory. One  of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no  more is  necessary than  to  expound  those words  in  their  natural  and  ordinary  sense,  the  words themselves in  such case best declaring the intention of the legislature(1). Section  6(1) of  the Act provides in terms, plain and  precise that  a  notification  issued  under  the section  "shall   also"  be   published  in  Gujarati  in  a newspaper. The word ’also’ provides an 457 important clue  to the  intention of the legislature because having provided  that the notification shall be published in the Official  Gazette, section  6(1) goes on to say that the notification shall  also  be  published  in  Gujarati  in  a newspaper. The  additional mode of publication prescribed by law must,  in  the  absence  of  anything  to  the  contrary appearing from  the context  of the provision or its object, be assumed to have a meaning and a purpose. In Khub Chand v. State of  Rajasthan, it  was observed that "the term ’shall’ in its  ordinary significance  is mandatory  and  the  court shall ordinarily  give  that  interpretation  to  that  term unless such  an  interpretation  leads  to  some  absurd  or inconvenient consequence  or be  at variance with the intent of the  Legislature, to be collected from other parts of the Act. The  construction of the said expression depends on the provisions of  a particular  Act, the  setting in  which the expression appears,  the object  for which  the direction is given,  the   consequences  that   would   flow   from   the infringement   of    the   direction    and    such    other considerations". The  same principle  was expressed  thus in Haridwar Singh  v. Begum  Sumbrui. "Several  tests have been propounded in  decided cases  for determining  the  question whether a  provision in a statute, or a rule is mandatory or directory. No  universal rule  can  be  laid  down  on  this matter. In each case one must look to the subject-matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured."  Recently in the Presidential Election Case(3), the learned  Chief Justice  speaking on  behalf of  a  seven Judge Bench observed: "In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the importance of  the provision, the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether  the provision  is directory or mandatory. It is the  duty of  the courts  to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of

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the provision  to be  construed. ’The  Key to the opening of every law  is the  reason and  spirit of  the law, it is the animus imponentis,  the intention of the law maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole’."      The scheme  of the Act is like this: Under section 5(1) the Director  of  Marketing  and  Rural  Finance  may  by  a notification in  the Official  Gazette declare his intention of regulating  purchase and  sale of agricultural produce in the specified area. Such notification is also required to be published in  Gujarati in  a newspaper having circulation in the particular area. By the notification, the Director under section 5(2)  has to  invite objections  and suggestions and the notification  has to  be stated that any such objections or suggestions received by the Director within the specified period, which shall not be less than one month from the date of the  publication of the notification, shall be considered by the  Director. After  the expiry  of the aforesaid period the Director,  under section  6(1), has the power to declare an area  as the  market area  in respect  of the  particular kinds of  agricultural produce.  This power  is not absolute because by  the  terms  of  section  6(1)  it  can  only  be exercised after  considering the  objections and suggestions received by  the Director  within the stipulated period. The notification under  section 6(1)  is  also  required  to  be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The 458 power conferred  by section 5(1) or 6(1) is not exhausted by the  issuance   of  the   initial  notification  covering  a particular area  or relating  to a  particular  agricultural produce. An  area initially  included in the market area may later be  excluded, a  new area may be added and likewise an agricultural produce  included in  the notification  may  be excluded or  a new  variety of  agricultural produce  may be added. This is a salutary power because experience gained by working the  Act may  show the  necessity for  amending  the notification  issued  under  section  6(1).  This  power  is conferred by section 6(5).      By section  6(5), if  the Director  intends to  add  or exclude an area or an agricultural produce, he is to declare his intention of doing so in the manner specified in section 5 and  after following  the  procedure  prescribed  therein. Thus, an  amendment to  the  section  6(1)  notification  in regard to  matters described therein is equated with a fresh declaration  of   intention  in  regard  to  those  matters, rendering it  obligatory to  follow afresh  the whole of the procedure prescribed  by section  5. That  is to say, if the Director  intends   to  add   or  exclude   an  area  or  an agricultural produce,  he  must  declare  his  intention  by notification in  the Official  Gazette and such notification must also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. Secondly, the Director  must invite  objections or suggestions by such notification  and  the  notification  must  state  that  any objections or  suggestions received  within  the  stipulated time shall  be considered  by him.  The Director  must  also comply with  the requirement of sub-section (5) of section 3 by sending  a copy  of the notification to each of the local authorities  functioning  in  the  particular  area  with  a request  that   they  may   submit  their   objections   and suggestions within the specified period. After the expiry of the period aforesaid and after considering the objections or suggestions received  within that  period, the  Director may declare that  the particular area or agricultural produce be added or excluded to or from the previous notification. This declaration has  to be  by a  notification in  the  Official Gazette and the notification has to be published in Gujarati

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in a  newspaper having  circulation in  the particular area. The last  of these  obligations arises  out of  the  mandate contained in the concluding sentence of section 6(1).      The object  of these  requirements is  quite clear. The fresh notification  can be issued only after considering the objections  and  suggestions  which  the  Director  receives within the specified time. In fact, the initial notification has to  state expressly that the Director shall consider the objections and suggestions received by him within the stated period. Publication  of the  notification  in  the  Official Gazette was  evidently thought  by the  legislature  not  an adequate means  of communicating the Director’s intention to those  who   would  be  vitally  affected  by  the  proposed declaration  and   who  would  therefore  be  interested  in offering their objections and suggestions. It is a matter of common knowledge  that publication  in a  newspaper attracts greater public  attention than  publication in  the Official Gazette. That  is why  the legislature  has  taken  care  to direct that  the notification  shall also  be  published  in Gujarati in  a newspaper. A violation of this requirement is likely  to   affect   valuable   rights   of   traders   and agriculturists because in the absence of proper and adequate publicity, their right of trade and business shall have been hampered without  affording to  them an opportunity to offer objections and suggestions, an opportunity which the statute clearly deems so 459 desirable. By section 6(2), once an area is declared to be a market area,  no place  in the said area can be used for the purchase or  sale of  any agricultural  produce specified in the notification except in accordance with the provisions of the Act.  By section  8 no  person can operate in the market area or any part thereof except under and in accordance with the conditions  of  a  licence  granted  under  the  Act.  A violation of  these provisions  attracts penal  consequences under section  36 of the Act. It is therefore vital from the point of  view of  the citizens’  right to carry on trade or business, no  less than for the consideration that violation of  the   Act  leads   to  penal   consequences,  that   the notification must  receive due  publicity.  As  the  statute itself has  devised an  adequate means  of  such  publicity, there is  no reason  to permit  a departure  from that mode. There is something in the very nature of the duty imposed by sections 5  and 6,  something in  the very  object for which that duty  is cast,  that the  duty must be performed. "Some Rules", as  said in Thakur Pratap Singh v. Sri Krishna, "are vital and  go to  the root  of the  matter: they  cannot  be broken". The  words of  the statute  here must  therefore be followed punctiliously.      The legislative  history of  the  Act  reinforces  this conclusion.  As   stated  before,  the  Bombay  Agricultural Produce Markets  Act, 1939  was in  force  in  Gujarat  till September 1, 1964 on which date the present Act replaced it. Section 3(1) of the Bombay Act corresponding to section 5(1) of the  Act provided  that the  notification ‘may’  also  be published in  the regional  languages of  the area.  Section 4(1) of  the Bombay Act which corresponds to section 6(1) of the Act provided that "A notification under this section may also be published in the regional languages of the area in a newspaper circulated  in the said area". Section 4(4) of the Bombay Act corresponding to section 6(5) of the Act provided that exclusion  or inclusion  of an  area of an agricultural produce may  be made  by the Commissioner by notification in the Official  Gazette, "subject to the provisions of section 3". Section  4(4) did  not provide  in terms as section 6(5)

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does,  that  the  procedure  prescribed  in  regard  to  the original notification  shall be  followed if  an area  or an agricultural produce  is to  be excluded  or  included.  The Gujarat legislature,  having before  it  the  model  of  the Bombay Act,  made a conscious departure from it by providing for the  publication of  the notification in a newspaper and by substituting  the word  ‘shall’ for the word ‘may’. These are significant  modifications in  the statute  which was in force  in  Gujarat  for  over  4  years  from  the  date  of reorganisation till  September 1,  1964. These modifications bespeak the  mind of  the legislature that what was optional must be made obligatory.      We are  therefore of  the opinion that the notification issued under  section 6(5)  of  the  Act,  like  that  under section 6(1),  must also  be  published  in  Gujarati  in  a newspaper having  circulation in  the particular  area. This requirement is  mandatory and  must be fulfilled. Admittedly the notification  (Ex. 10)  issued  under  section  6(5)  on February 16,  1968 was  not published in a newspaper at all, much less  in Gujarati,  Accordingly, the  inclusion of  new varieties of agricultural produce in that notification lacks legal validity  and no  prosecution can  be founded upon its breach. 460      Rule 3  of the  Gujarat  Agricultural  Produce  Markets Rules,  1965   relates  specifically   and  exclusively   to notifications "issued  under subsection  (1) of section 5 or under sub-section  (1) of  section 6."  As we  are concerned with a  notification issued under sub-section (5) of section 6, we  need not  go into  the question  whether  Rule  3  is complied with.  We may however indicate that the authorities concerned  must  comply  with  Rule  3  also  in  regard  to notifications issued  under sections  5(1) and  6(1) of  the Act.  After   all,  the  rule  is  calculated  to  cause  no inconvenience to  the authorities  charged with  the duty of administering the  Act.  It  only  requires  publication  by affixing a  copy of  the notification  at  some  conspicuous place in  the  office  of  each  of  the  local  authorities functioning in the area specified in the notification.      The  prosecution   was  conducted  before  the  learned Magistrate in  an indifferent manner. That is not surprising because the  beneficent purpose  of summary trials is almost always  defeated   by  a   summary   approach.   Bhailalbhai Chaturbhai Patel,  an Inspector  in the  Godhra Agricultural Produce Market  Committee, who  was a  material witness  for proving the  offence, said  in his  evidence that he did not know whether  or not the notifications were published in any newspaper or on the notice board of the Godhra Municipality. The learned  Magistrate acquitted the appellant holding that the prosecution  had failed  to prove  beyond  a  reasonable doubt that  the notifications were published and promulgated as required by law.      In  appeal,   the  High  Court  of  Gujarat  began  the operative part  of its judgment with a wrong assumption that Ex. 9  dated April 19, 1962 was a "notification constituting the Godhra  Market area."  In fact  Ex. 9  was issued  under section 4-A(3)  of the  Bombay Act as amended by Gujarat Act XXXI of  1961 declaring  certain areas  as  "market  proper" within the  Godhra Market  area. The  High Court  was really concerned with  the notification, Ex. 10, dated February 16, 1968 which  was issued  under section 6(5) of the Act and by which new  varieties of  agricultural  produce  like  onion, ginger, sunhemp  and jowar  were added  to the old list. The High Court set aside the acquittal by following the judgment dated February  12, 1971  rendered by A. D. Desai, J. in Cr.

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Appeal 695 of 1969. That judgment has no application because it arose  out of  the Bombay  Act and  the  question  before Desai, J.  was whether  section 4(1)  of the  Bombay Act was mandatory or  directory. That  section, as  noticed earlier, provided that  the notification  "may" also  be published in the regional  language of the area in a newspaper circulated in that  area. The  High Court,  in the  instant  case,  was concerned with  section 6(5)  of the  Act which  has made  a conscious  departure   from  the  Bombay  Act  in  important respect. The High Court did not even refer to the provisions of the  Act and it is doubtful whether those provisions were at all  brought to  its notice.  Everyone concerned  assumed that the  matter was  concluded by  the earlier  judgment of Desai, J.      For these reasons we set aside the judgment of the High Court and  restore that  of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Godhra. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant. P.H.P.                                       Appeal allowed. 461