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PETITIONER: GURUPAD KHANDAPPA MAGDUM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HIRABAI KHANDAPPA MAGDUM AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/04/1978

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) SHINGAL, P.N. TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1239            1978 SCR  (3) 761  1978 SCC  (3) 383  CITATOR INFO :  F          1985 SC1716  (8)

ACT: Hindu Succession Act (Act 30 of 1956), Section 6 Explanation 1-Interpretation  of-Widow’s  share must be  ascertained  by adding  the  share to which she is entitled  at  a  notional portion  during  her husband’s life time and the  share  she would get in her husband’s interest upon his death.

HEADNOTE: Khandappa  Sangappa  Magdum died on June  27,  1960  leaving behind, his widow Hirabai, two sons Gurupad and Shivapad and three daughters.  On November, 6, 1952 Hirabai filed special civil  suit No. 26/53 for partition and separate  possession of  a 7/24 share in two houses, a land, two shops  and  mov- ables  on  the basis that these properties belonged  to  the joint family consisting of her husband, and their two  sons. The  case of the plaintiff was that if a partition  were  to take place during Khandappa’s life time between himself  and his two sons the plaintiff would have got a 1/4th share each on  the  death  of  Khandappa, Her  further  case  was  that Khandappa’s 1/4th share could devolve upon his death on  six sharers,  entitling her to 1/24th share besides.  The  trial Court  found that the suit properties belonged to the  joint family and that there was no prior partition.  Following the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda [1963] 66 Bom.  L.R. 351, limited her share to only 1/24th  and  refused  to  add  1/4th  and  1/24th  together. Dismissing  the defendant’s appeal 524/66 and  allowing  the cross-objections of the plaintiff, the Bombay High Court, by its judgment dated March 19, 1975 following 68 Rom.  L.R. 74 which  overruled 66 Bom.  L.R. 351, held that the  plaintiff wag entitled to 7/24th share. Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court. HELD  : 1. (a) What Section 6 of the Hindu  Succession  Act. 1956  deals with is the devolution of the interest  which  a male  Hindu has in a Mitakshara property at the time of  his death.   The  proviso to Section 6 contains a  formula,  for fixing  the  share  of the  claimants  while  Explanation  I contains  a formula for deducing the share of the  deceased. [765 H, 766 A-B]

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(b)  Explanation   I   which  contains   the   formula   for determining  the share of the deceased creates a fiction  by providing that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be, the share in the property that  would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken  place  immediately  before  his  death.   Whether   a partition  had actually taken place between  the  plaintiffs husband and his sons is beside the point for the purposes of Explanation 1. That Explanation compels the assumption of  a fiction that in fact "a partition of the property had  taken place",  the  point of time of the partition being  the  one immediately before the death of the person in whose property the heirs claim a share.  The fiction created by Explanation I has to be given its due and full effect. [766 E-F, 767  C- D] Commissioner  of Income Tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh,  [1959] Suppl.  S.C.R. 39; applied. East  End  Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury  Borough  Council, 1952 AC 109/ 132, quoted with approval 2.   (a)  In  order to ascertain the share of heirs  in  the property  of  a deceased coparcener it is necessary  in  the very  nature  of  things, and as they  Very  first  step  to ascertain  the  share  of the deceased  in  the  coparcenary property  , by dong that alone can one determine the  extent of the claimant’s share.  Explanation 1 to section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly factional, that. 14-315SCI/78 762 the  interest  of a Hindu Mitakshara  coparcener  "shall  be deemed to be the share in the property that would have  been allotted  to him if a partition of that property  had  taken place  immediately  before  his death.   What  is  therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place  between  the deemed and his  coparceners  immediately before   his   death.   That  assumption,  once   made,   is irrevocable.   In  other words, the assumption  having  been made  once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of  the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back  on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference, to it.  The assumption which the statute requires to  be  made that a partition had in fact taken  place  must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share  of  the heirs, through all its stages.  To  make  the assumption  at the initial stage for the limited purpose  of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for  calculating  the quantum of the share of the  heirs  is truly  to  permit  one’s imagination  to  boggle.   All  the consequences  which  flow from a real partition have  to  be logically  worked  out, which means that the  share  of  the heirs  must  be  ascertained  on the  basis  that  they  had separated  from one another and had received a share in  the partition which had taken place during the life time of  the deceased.   The allotment of this share is not a  processual step  devised  merely for the purpose of  working  out  some other  conclusion.  it has to be treated and accepted  as  a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just  as a  share  allotted to a coparcener in  an  actual  partition cannot  generally be recalled.  The inevitable corollary  of this position is that the heir will get his or her share  in the  interest  which  the deceased had  in  the  coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the  share which he or she received or must be deemed to have  received in the notional partition. [768 B-G] (b)  Ibis interpretation furthers the legislative intent  in regard  to  the enlargement of the share  of  female  heirs,

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qualitatively  and  quantatively.  Even  assuming  that  two interpretations  of Explanation 1 are  reasonably  possible, Courts  must prefer that interpretation which  will  further the  intention of the legislature and remedy  the  injustice from which the Hindu women have suffered over the years.  By restricting the operation of the fiction created by Explana- tion  I  in the manner suggested by the  appellant,  Courts, shall  be taking a retrograde step, putting back as it  were the clock of social reform which has enabled the Hindu women to  acquire  an equal status with males in matters  of  pro- perty. [768 G, 769 A-B] Rangubhai   Lalji  v.  Laxman  Lalji,  68  (Bom)  L.R.   74; Sushilabai  Ramachandra  Kulkarni  v,  Narayanarao  Gopalrao Deshpande  and  Ors., A.I.R. (1975) Bom.  257;  Vidyaben  v. Jagadishchandra  N.  Bhatt, A.I.R. 1974 Guj. 23;  Ananda  v. Haribandu, A.I.R. 1967 Orissa 194; approved. 3.   In the instant case, (a)  There is no justification for limiting the  plaintiff’s share to 1/24th by ignoring the 1/4th share which she  would have  obtained  had  there  been  a  partition  during   her husband’s  life  time between him and his two  sons.   In  a partition between Khandappa and his two sons, there would be four  sharers in the coparcenary property, the fourth  being Khandappa’s  wife,  the  plaintiff.   Khandappa  would  have therefore  got a 1/4th share in the coparcenary property  on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and his sons. [766 G-H, 767 B-C] (b)  By  the  application of the normal rule  prescribed  by Section  6 of the Hindu Succession: Act,  1956,  Khandappa’s interest  in  the  coparcenary  property  would  devolve  by survivorship  upon the surviving members of the  coparcenary and not in accordance with the provisions of the Act.   But, since  the  widow  and  daughter  are  amongst  the   female relatives  specified in class I of the Schedule to  the  Act and Khandappa died leaving behind a widow and daughters, ,he proviso to section 6 comes into play and the normal rule  is excluded.  Khandappa’s interest in the coparcenary  property would  therefore  devolve,  according to  the  proviso, by intestate succession under the Act and not by  survivorship. Testamentary  succession is out of question as the  deceased had  not made a testamentary disposition though,  under  the explanation to section  763 30  of the Act, the interest of a male Hindu  in  Mitakshara coparcenary.  property is capable of being disposed of by  a will or other testamentary disposition. [765 E-G] (c)  The plaintiff’s share as determined by the  application of  the rules of intestate succession contained in  Sections 8,  9  and 10 of the Hindu Succession . Act will  be  1/6th. The  deceased  Khandappa died leaving behind him  two  sons, three  daughters and a widow.  The son, daughter. and  widow are  mentioned  as  heirs in class I  of  the  Schedule  and therefore, by reason of the provisions of section 8(a)  read with  the 1st clause of section 9, they take  simultaneously and  to the exclusion of other heirs.  As between  them  the two  son’s,  the  three daughters and the  widow  will  take equally.  each having one share in the  deceased’s  property under  section 10 read with Rules 1 and 2 of  that  section. [766-C-D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 182       828 of 1975.

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Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated the  19th  March,  1975 of the Bombay High  Court  in  First Appeal No. 524 of 1966 from original decree. R.   B. Datar for the Appellant. V.   N. Ganpule and (Mrs.) V. D. Khanna for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD,  C.J. It will be easier, with the help  of  the following pedigree to understand the point involved in  this appeal                  Khandappa Sangappa Magdum                     Hirabai (Plaintiff) Gurupad     Biyawwa   Bhagirathibai  Dhundubai  Shivapad (Deft. 1)  (Deft. 3)  (Deft. 4)1    (Deft. 5)  (Deft. 2) Khandappa  died on June 27, 1960 leaving him  surviving  his wife  Hirabai  who is the plaintiff, two  sons  Gurupad  and Shivapad, who are defendants 1 and 2 respectively, and three daughters,  defendants 3 to 5. On November 6 , 1962  Hirabai filed special civil suit No. 26 of 1963 in the court of  the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli for partition and separate possession of a 7/24th share in two houses, a land, two shops avoid movables on the basis that these  properties belonged  to  the joint family consisting  of  her  husband, herself  and  their two sons.  If a partition were  to  take place  during Khandappa’s lifetime between himself  and  his two  sons, the plaintiff would have got 1/4th share  in  the joint family properties, the other three getting  1/4th share each.  Khandappa’s 1/4th share would devolve upon  his death  on six sharers, the plaintiff and her five  children, each  having  a  1/24th share  therein.   Adding  1/4th  and 1/24th,  the  plaintiff claims a 7/24th share in  the  joint family properties.  That, in short, is the plaintiffs case. Defendants  2 to 5 admitted the plaintiff’s claim, the  suit having  H been contested by defendant 1, Gurupad, only.   He contended  that  the suit properties did not belong  to  the joint  family, that they were Khandappa’s  self-requisitions and that, on the date of Khandappa’s 764 death  in 1960 there was no joint family in  existence.   He alleged that Khandappa had effected a partition of the  suit properties between himself and his two sons in December 1952 and  December 1954 and that, by a family  arrangement  dated March  31, 1955 he bad given directions for disposal of  the share  which was reserved by him-for himself in the  earlier partitions.   There was, therefore, no question of  a  fresh partition.  That, in short, is the case of defendant 1. The trial court by its judgment dated July 13, 1965 rejected defendant  1’s  case that the  properties  were  Khandappa’s self-acquisitions  and that he had partitioned  them  during his  lifetime.   Upon  that finding  the  plaintiff.  became indisputably  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  joint  family properties  but, following the judgment of the  Bombay  High Court  in  Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda(1)  the  learned trial judge         limited  that share to 1/24th,  refusing to  add 1/4th and 1/24th together. As against  that  decree, defendant 1 filed first appeal No. 524 of 1966 in the Bombay High Court, while the plaintiff filed cross-objections. By a judgment dated March 19, 1975 a Division Bench         of the  High Court dismissed defendant 1’s appeal  and  allowed the  plaintiff’s  cross-objections by holding that the  suit properties belonged      to the joint family, that there was no  prior partition and that the plaintiff is entitled to  a 7/24th share. Defendant I has filed this appeal against  the High Court’s judgment by special leave.           Another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rangubai  Lalji v. Laxman Lalji(2) had already  reconsidered

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and dissented from  earlier   Division  Bench  judgment   in Shiramabai Bhimgonda(1)     In     these   two  cases,   the judgment of the Bench was delivered by the same   learned Judge,  Patel J. On further consideration the learned  Judge felt  that  Shiramabai(1)  was  not  fully  argued  and  was incorrectly    decided  and that on a true view of law,  the widow’s  share must be  ascertained by adding the  share  to which  she is entitled at a notional  partition  during  her husband’s life time and the share which she would get in her husband’s  interest  upon his death. In the  judgment  under appeal,  the High Court has based itself on the judgment  in Rangubai   Lalji(2)  endorsing  indirectly  the  view   that Shiramabai(1) was incorrectly decided. Since the view of the High.  Court that the suit  properties belonged  to  the joint family and that there was  no  prior partition is well-founded and is not seriously disputed, the decision  of  this appeal rests on the    interpretation  of Explanation 1 to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act,  (30 of 1956).  That section reads thus               "6.   When  a  male  Hindu  dies   after   the               commencement  of this Act, having at the  time               of  his  death  an interest  in  a  Mitakshara               coparcenary  property,  his  interest  in  the               property (1)(1963)66Bom.L.R.351. (2)  68 Bom.  LR. 74. 765               shall   devolve  by  survivorship   upon   the               surviving  members of the coparcenary and  not               in accordance with this Act :               Provided  that, if the deceased had  left  him               surviving a female relative specified in class               I of the Schedule or a male relative specified               in that class who claims through such a female               relative, the interest of the deceased in  the               Mitakshara coparcenary property shall  devolve               by  testamentary or intestate succession,  as-               the  case  may be, under this Act and  not  by               survivorship.               Explanation   I.-For  the  purposes  of   this               section,  the interest of a  Hindu  Mitakshara               coparcener shall be deemed to be the share  in               the property that would have been allotted  to               him  if a partition of the property had  taken               place    immediately   before    his    death,               irrespective  of  whether he was  entitled  to               claim partition or not.               Explanation   2.-Nothing  contained   in   the               proviso to this section shall be construed  as               enabling  a person who has  separated  himself               from  the coparcenary before the death of  the               deceased  or  any  of his heirs  to  claim  on               intestacy a share in the interest referred  to               therein." The  Hindu Succession Act came into force on June 17,  1956, Khandappa having died after the commencement of that Act, to wit  in 1960, and since he had at the time of his  death  an interest  in  Mitakshara  coparcenary  property,  the   pre- conditions  of section 6 are satisfied and that  section  is squarely  attracted.  By the application of the normal  rule prescribed  by  that section, Khandappa’s  interest  in  the coparcenary property would devolve by survivorship upon  the surviving  members of the coparcenary and not in  accordance with  the provisions of the Act.  But, since the  widow  and daughter are amongst the female relatives specified in class

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I  of  the Schedule to the Act and  Khandappa  died  leaving behind a widow and daughters, the proviso to section 6 comes into  play  and the normal rule  is  excluded.   Khandappa’s interest   in  the  coparcenary  property  would   therefore devolve,  according to the proviso, by intestate  succession under  the  Act  and  not  by  survivorshop.    Testamentary successive is out of question as the deceased had not made a testamentary  disposition  though under the  explanation  to section  30  of  the Act, the interest of a  male  Hindu  in Mitakshara coparcenary property is capable of being disposed of by a will or other testamentary disposition. There  is thus no dispute that the normal rule provided  for by  section  6  does not apply, that  the  proviso  to  that section  is  attracted and that the decision of  the  appeal must  turn  on the meaning to be given to Explanation  1  of section  6.  The interpretation of that Explanation  is  the subject-matter of acute controversy between the parties. Before considering the implications of Explanation 1, it  is necessary  to  remember that what section 6  deals  with  is devolution  of  the  interest which a male Hindu  has  in  a Mitakshare coparcenary property at 766 the  time of his death.  Since Explanation 1 is intended  to be  explanatory of the provisions contained in the  section, what  the Explanation provides has to be correlated  to  the subject matter which the section itself deals with.  In  the instant  case  the plaintiff’s suit, based as it is  on  the provisions of section 6, is essentially a claim to obtain  a share  in the interest which her husband had at the time  of his  death in the coparcenary property.  Two  things  become necessary  to determine for the purpose of giving relief  to the  plaintiff.  One, her share in her husband’s  share  and two,  her husband’s own share in the  coparcenary  property. The proviso to section 6 contains the formula for fixing the share of the claimant while Explanation 1 contains a formula for  deducing  the share of the deceased.   The  plaintiff’s share,  by  the  application  of  the  proviso,  has  to  be determined  according  to  the  terms  of  the  testamentary instrument, if any, made by the deceased and since there  is none in the instant case, by the application of the rules of intestate  succession contained in sections 8, 9 and  10  of the  Hindu  Succession  Act.  The  deceased  Khandappa  died leaving  behind him two sons, three daughters and  a  widow. The  son,  daughter and a widow are mentioned  as  heirs  in class  I  of the Schedule and therefore, by  reason  of  the provisions  of  section  8(a) read with the  1st  clause  of section 9, they take simultaneously and to the exclusion  of other  heirs.   As  between them the  two  sons,  the  three daughters  and the widow will take equally, each having  one share in the deceased’s property under section 10 read  with Rules 1 and 2 of that section.  Thus, whatever be the  share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, since there are six sharers in that property each having an equal share, the plaintiff’s share therein will be 1/6th. The next step, equally important though not equally easy  to work out, is to find out the share which the deceased had in the  coparcenary property because after all,  the  plaintiff has  a  1/6th interest in that share.  Explanation  1  which contains  the  formula  for determining  the  share  of  the deceased  creates a fiction by providing that the interest of a Hindu Mistakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be  the share  in the property that would have been allotted to  him if  a partition of the property had taken place  immediately before  his death.  One must, therefore, imagine a state  of affairs  in  which a little prior to  Khandappa’s  death,  a

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partition  of the coparcenary property was effected  between him  and  other  members of  the  coparcenary.   Though  the plaintiff,  not  being  a coparcener, was  not  entitled  to demand  partition  yet, if a partition were  to  take  place between her husband and his two sons, she would be  entitled to  receive  a share equal to that of a  son.  (see  Mulla’s Hindu  Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, para 315).   In  a partition between Khandappa and his two sons, there would be four  sharers in the coparcenary property, the fourth  being Khandappa’s  wife,  the  plaintiff.  Khandappa  would   have therefore  got a 1/4th share in the coparcenary property  on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and, his sons Two things are thus clears : One, that in a partition of the coparcenary  property Khandappa would have obtained a  1/4th share and 767 two,  that the share of the plaintiff in the 1/4th share  is 1/6th,  that  is  to  say,  1/24th.   So  far  there  is  no difficulty.   The question which poses a somewhat  difficult problem is whether the plaintiff’s share in the  coparcenary property is only 1/24th, or whether it is 1/4th plus 1/24th, that  is  to say, 7/24th. The learned trial  Judge,  relying upon the decision in Shiramabai which was later overruled by the Bombay High Court, accepted the former contention  while the  High Court accepted the latter.  The question is  which of these two views is to be preferred. We  see no justification for limiting the plaintiff’s  share to  1/24th by ignoring the 1/4th share which she would  have obtained  had  there been a partition during  her  husband’s life  time between him and his two sons.  We think  that  in overlooking that 1/4th share, one unwittingly permits  one’s imagination  to boggle under the oppression of  the  reality that there was in fact no partition between the  plaintiff’s husband  and  his sons.  Whether a  partition  had  actually taken place between the plaintiff’s husband and his sons  is beside  the  point for the purposes of Explanation  1.  That Explanation compels the assumption of a fiction that in fact "a partition of the ’property had taken place", the point of time  of the partition being the one immediately before  the death  of  the person in whose property the  heirs  claim  a share. The fiction created by Explanation 1 has to be given its due and full effect as the fiction created by section 18A(9) (b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was given by this  Court in  Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. S.  Teja  Singh(1). It  was held in that case that the fiction that the  failure to send an estimate of tax on income under section 18A(3) is to  be deemed to be a failure to send a return,  necessarily involves  the fiction that a notice had been issued  to  the assessee  under section 22 and that he had failed to  comply with  it.   In an important aspect, the case  before  us  is stronger in the matter of working out the fiction because in Teja  Singh’s case, a missing step had to be supplied  which was  not provided for by section 18A(9) If b),  namely,  the issuance  of  a notice under section 22 and the  failure  to comply  with  that notice.  Section 18A(9)  (b)  stopped  at creating  the  fiction that when a person fails to  send  an estimate of tax on his income under section 18A(3) he  shall be deemed to have failed to furnish a return of his  income. The   section   did  not  provide  further   that   in   the circumstances  therein  stated, a notice  under  section  22 shall be deemed to have been issued and the notice shall  be deemed  not  to  have  been  complied  with.   These  latter assumptions  in regard to the issuance of the  notice  under section  22 and its non-compliance bad to be, made  for  the

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purpose of giving due and full effect to the fiction created by section 18A(9) (b).  In our case it is not necessary, for the  purposes  of  working out the fiction,  to  assume  and supply a missing link which is really what was meant by Lord Asquith in his famous passage in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council.(1) He said if you are bidden to treat  an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must  also imagine as real the consequences and (1)  [1959] Stipp. 1 S.C.R. 394 (2)  [1952] A.C. 109/132 768 incidents  which,  if the putative state of affairs  had  in fact   existed,   must  inevitably  have  flowed   from   or accompanied  it;  and  if the statute  says  that  you  must imagine a certain state of affairs, it cannot be interpreted to  mean that having done so, you must cause or permit  your imagination  to  boggle  when it  comes  to  the  inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property  of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature  of things, and as the very first step, to ascertain the  share, of the deceased in the coparcenary property.  For, by  doing that  alone can one determine the extent of  the  claimant’s share.   Explanation  1 to section 6 resorts to  the  simple expedient,   undoubtedly fictional, that the interest  of  a Hindu  Mitakshara  coparcener "shall be deemed  to  be"  the share  in the property that would have been allotted to  him if a partition of that property had taken place  immediately before his death.  What is therefore required to be  assumed is  that  a partition had in fact taken  place  between  the deceased  and his coparceners immediately before his  death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable.  In other words, the  assumption  having been made once for  the  purpose  of ascertaining  the share of the deceased in  the  coparcenary property,  one  cannot  go  back  on  that  assumption   and ascertain  the share of the heirs without reference  to  it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that  a partition  had in fact taken place must permeate the  entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through  all  its  stages.  To make the  assumption  at  the initial  stage for the limited purpose of  ascertaining  the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for  calculating the  quantum  of the share of the heirs is truly  to  permit one’s  imagination  to boggle.  All the  consequences  which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked  out, which means that the share of the heirs must be  ascertained on  the basis that they bad separated from one  another  and had received a share in the partition which had taken  place during the life time of the deceased.  The allotment of this share  is  not  a processual step  devised  merely  for  the purpose of working out some other conclusion.  It has to be- treated  and accepted as a concrete reality, something  that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a  coparcener in  an actual partition cannot generally be  recalled.   The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir  will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased  bad in  the  coparcenary property at the time of his  death,  in addition  to the share which he or she received or  must  be deemed to have received in the notional partition. The interpretation which we are placing upon the  provisions of  section  6, its proviso and explanation I  thereto  will further the legislative intent in regard to the  enlargement of   the   share   of  female   heirs,   qualitatively   and quantitatively.   The Hindu Law of  Inheritance  (Amendment) Act,  1929 conferred heirship rights on the son’s  daughter,

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daughter’s  daughter  and  sister in  all  areas  where  the Mitakshara  law prevailed.  Section 3 of the  Hindu  Women’s Rights  to Property Act. 1937, speaking  broadly,  conferred upon  the  Hindu  widow the right to a share  in  the  joint family property as also a right to demand partition like any male member of the family.  The Hindu Succession 769 Act,  1956  provides  by section  14(1)  that  any  property possessed  by a female Hindu, whether acquired  before  or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as a full  owner  thereof  and  not  as  a  limited  owner.    By restricting   the  operation  of  the  fiction  created   by Explanation  I in the manner suggested by the appellant,  we shall  be taking a retrograde step, putting back as it  were the clock of social reform which has enabled the Hindu Woman to  acquire  an  equal  status  with  males  in  matters  of property.    Even  assuming  that  two  interpretations   of Explanation  I are reasonably possible, we must prefer  that interpretation  which  will  further the  intention  of  the legislature  and remedy the injustice from which  the  Hindu women have suffered over the years. We are happy to find that the view which we have taken above has  also  been taken by the Bombay High Court  in  Rangubai Lalji  v.  Laxman  Lalji (supra) in which  Patel,  J.,  very fairly, pronounced his own earlier judgment to the  contrary in  Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda (supra)  as  incorrect. Recently,  a  Full Bench of that High  Court  in  Sushilabai Ramachandra  Kulkarni  v. Narayanrao  Gopalrao  Deshpande  & Ors.,(1)   the   Gujarat   High   Court   in   Vidyaben   v. Jagdishchandra  N. Bhatt(2) and the High Court of Orissa  in Ananda v. Haribandhu(3) have taken the same view.  The  Full Bench  of the Bombay High ,Court in Sushilabai  (supra)  has considered exhaustively the various decisions bearing on the point and we endorse the analysis contained in the  judgment of Kantawala C. J., who has spoken for the Bench. For these reasons we confirm the judgment of the High  Court and ,dismiss the appeal with costs. S.R.   Appeal dismissed. (1)  A.I.R. 1975 (Bombay) 257. (2)  A.I.R. 1974 Guj. 23. (3)  A.I.R. 1967 Orissa 194. 770