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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2298  of  2001

PETITIONER: GURUDEVDATTA VKSSS MARYADIT & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/03/2001

BENCH: G.B. Pattanaik, Umesh C Banerjee & B.N. Agrawal.

JUDGMENT:

BANERJEE,J.

       Leave granted. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

   Urgency  of  the  situation has prompted this  Court  to dispose  of the present Special Leave Petition under Article 136  of  the  Constitution even at the stage  of  admission: Urgency  being  initiation of election process  of  Kolhapur District   Central  Co-operative  Bank  in  the   State   of Maharashtra.   Incidentally, Bombay High Court has negatived the petitioners contention of restrictive list of voters in terms  of  the  proviso to Section 27 (3) as  added  by  the amendment  to  the Maharashtra Co-operative  Societies  Act, 1960    the  primary  reason being -  the  entire  election programme,  including the list of voters stands finalised on June  30,  2000 and the amendment by way of addition to  the proviso was effected on 23rd August, 2000:  The introduction of  the  amended  proviso being effected subsequent  to  the finalisation  of  the voters list, the High Court  concluded that  basically,  the inclusion of the Societies which  were eligible  on  30th  June, 2000 could not be faulted  on  the basis  of  the  amendment  which   was  brought  into  force subsequently and they cannot be denied the right to vote and hence the Appeal before this Court.

   Before  adverting  to  the submissions advanced  on  the score  as above, one factual element ought to be noticed  at this  juncture  to wit:  promulgation of an Ordinance  being Maharashtra  Ordinance No.  X of 2001 by the Governor of the State  on  27.02.2001  during  the short  pendency  of  this appeal.

   We  shall be adverting to the same shortly in detail but before  so  doing  relevant provisions  of  the  Maharashtra Co-operative  Societies  Act, 1960 [Section 27(3)]  together with  the  amendment  to  the proviso as  effected  on  23rd August, 2000 ought to be noticed immediately herein below:-

   Section 27(3):

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   A  society which has invested any part of its funds  in the  shares  of any federal society, may appoint one of  its members to vote on its behalf in the affairs of that federal society  and accordingly such member shall have the right to vote on behalf of the society

   Proviso to the Section however reads as below:-

   Provided  that,  any  new member society of  a  federal society  shall  be eligible to vote in the affairs  of  that federal  society only after the completion of the period  of three  years from the date of its investing any part of  its fund in the shares of such federal society;

provided   further   that,   where   the election  is  to  a reserved  seat under Section 73-B, no person shall have more than one vote.

   The  Ordinance  as promulgated by the  Co-operation  and Textile  Department of the Government of Maharashtra and  as published  in the Government Gazette in terms of Clause  III of  Article  348  of   the  Constitution  being  Maharashtra Ordinance  X  of 2001 may also be noticed at  this  juncture only  as  the issue centres round the Ordinance as well  and the  relevant  extract of the same, however, is set  out  as below:-

   1.   Short title and Commencement  (1) This  Ordinance may be called the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 2001.

   (2)  It  shall be deemed to have come into force on  the 23rd August, 2000

   2.   Amendment  of Section 27 of Mah.XXIV of 1961    In Section  27  of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies  Act, 1960-

   (a) in sub-section (3)-

   (i) after the first proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted as the second proviso, namely:-

   Provided further that nothing in the first proviso shall apply  to the member society, which has invested any part of its  fund  in the shares of the federal society, before  the commencement  of  the  Maharashtra Co-  operative  Societies (Amendment) Act, 2000.

   (ii)  In  the  existing second proviso,  for  the  words provided further that the words provided also that shall be substituted:

   (b)  to sub-section (3A), the following proviso shall be added, namely,

   Provided  that, nothing in sub-section (3A) shall  apply to  an individual member of a society, who has been enrolled as  a member of that society, before the commencement of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2000.

   Mr.   V.A.  Bobde, the learned Senior Counsel in support of  the  appeal  with  his usual  eloquence  introduced  the concept  of legislative malice in the matter of promulgation of   the  Ordinance.   Malice   in   common   acceptation,

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admittedly,  means and implies spite or ill will and  it is  having regard to the common English parlance of the word malice  that Mr.  Bobde contended that promulgation of the Ordinance  is an abuse of the legislative power and  process amounting to a fraudulent user thereof and thus the malice.

   It  is  in  this context Mr.  Bobde placed  very  strong reliance  on  the  statement  of  objects  and  reasons  for promulgation of the same.  In the normal course of events we would  not  have delved into the same in detail as is  being done  herein  below, but for its significance in the  matter under  consideration and elaborate submissions thereon,  the statement  of  objects and reasons for promulgation  of  the Ordinance is noticed herein below:-

   By  inserting proviso to sub-section (3) of section  27 of  the  Maharashtra  Co-operative Societies Act,  1960,  by Maharashtra  Act  No.XL of 2000, provision has been made  to give voting rights only to such member societies, which have completed  three  years from the date of their admission  as members,  in  the election of Federal  Society.   Similarly, provision  has also been made in sub-section (3A) of Section 27,  to  give voting rights to only such individual  members who  have completed two years from the date of admission  as members,  in  the  election  of   a  society.   After  these provisions  came  into effect, election programmes  of  some societies in the State were declared and while preparing the voters   lists,  there  was   some  confusion  amongst   the co-operative  as  to  whether  names of  the  societies  and individuals  who  were  already admitted as  members  before coming  into force of the said Act, that is, before the 23rd August,  2000,  could be included in the voters list.   Some societies  have  even filed Writ Petitions in the matter  in the  Honble  High  Court and matters have  reached  to  the Supreme  Court.  In these cases, the Government has taken  a stand  before the Supreme Court that the amended  provisions would  not  affect the voting rights of member societies  or members  who  had already become members prior to  the  said amendment.   Therefore,  with  a view to leave no  room  for doubt  the Government considers it necessary to clarify,  by making  a  specific clarificatory provision in the Act  that the  societies and the members who have already obtained the membership  before the 23rd August, 2000, that is, the  date of coming into force of the said amendment Act.

   2.   As both Houses of the State Legislature are not  in session  and  the Governor of Maharashtra is satisfied  that the circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take  immediate  action  further to  amend  the  Maharashtra Co-operative  Societies Act, 1960 (Mah.  XXIV of 1961),  for the purpose of aforesaid, this Ordinance is promulgated.

   On  an  analysis  of  the statement as  noticed  in  the preceding  paragraph  Mr.   Bobde contended that  the  whole purpose  of promulgation of the Ordinance has been purposive and  to  scruttle  a free and fair election.   It  has  been contended  that  legislation cannot be a tool to  satisfy  a political  end  and  the conclusion is irresistible  in  the contextual  facts  on this count only if English  words  are given  ordinary  common  English parlance.   The  factum  of having a confusion while preparing the voters list as stated in  the statement of objects and reasons, negates the  basis of  the  High Court judgment to wit:  the voter list  stands prepared  and  concluded  by 30th June,  2000.   Mr.   Bobde contended  that by reason of so-called confusion (as noticed

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above),  the Ordinance stands promulgated as the legislature was  not  in session by way of a clarificatory  order.   The submissions apparently, apart from being attractive seems to be  of  some consequence rendering it an obligation for  the Court  to  delve  into the issue in  slightly  more  greater detail.   The  tenability  of   the  submissions  as  above, however,  would  be  discussed later in this  judgment,  but before  so doing, we need to recapitulate the law as regards the  jurisdiction  of  the court to assess the  question  of justiciability of the legislation by one of the wings of the Constitution.   Doctrine  of separation of powers have  been the  basic  tenet of our constitutional framework  since  in terms  therewith each of the three organs of the State viz., the  judiciary,  executive  and  the  legislature  would  be operating  on its own spheres and fields.  It is to be noted that  there has been a catena of cases wherein this judicial reluctance have been noticed and it is now well-settled both in  this country and United States of America as well as  in United  Kingdom that certainty and finality about the status of  a statute, contribute to judicial reluctance to  inquire whether  it complied with all requisite formalities, but the decisions  are not very uncommon which have laid down in  no uncertain  terms  that  there is no blanket rule of  such  a judicial  reluctance  neither  the  judiciary  would  stand impotent  before  an  obvious  instance of  exercise  of  a manifestly  unauthorised  power:  The concept  of  political question  doctrine,  being  basically  of  American  origin, cannot  possibly be confidently reached until the matter  is considered   with  special  care,   upon  bestowing   proper attention  and  in  the event of a  conclusion  which  lends credence  to  the  question raised viz., as to  whether  the question   is   a  political   question  or  not,   Judicial inclination  to  interfere cannot be faulted though  however not otherwise.  See in this context Charles W.  Baker et al: v.   Joe  C.   Caar :  369 US 186:  7  L.ed.:2d.663).   This however, needs to be emphasised that the same stands subject to  the  facts  of each case and it is almost  a  well-neigh impossibility  to  even adumbrate as to what will  and  what will not constitute judicial reluctance to interfere, except however,  the  field  which  can be described to  be  as  ad hominem  nor  even any attempt to draw the line  since  each case  is to be decided on the given facts.  In this  context the  decision  of the Privy Council in the case of  Liyanage and  others v.  Reginam (1966 1 All ER 650) ought also to be noticed  wherein,  Their  Lordships  of  the  Privy  Council introduced  the concept of legislation ad hominem and struck down  a legislation by reason therefor.  Lord Pearce in  his inimitable style observed as below:

   Do the Acts of 1962, however, otherwise than in respect of  the Ministers nomination, usurp or infringe that power? It goes without saying that the legislature may legislature, for  the  generality  of its subjects, by  the  creation  of crimes  and  penalties  or  by enacting  rules  relating  to evidence.   But  the  Acts  of  1962  had  no  such  general intention.   They  were  clearly aimed at  particular  known individuals  who had been named in a White Paper and were in prison  awaiting  their  fate.  The fact  that  the  learned judges  declined to convict some of the prisoners is not  to the  point.   That  the  alterations in  the  law  were  not intended  for the generality of the citizens or designed  as any  improvement  of the general law, is shown by  the  fact that  the  effect of those alterations was to be limited  to the  participants  in the January coup and that after  these had  been dealt with by the judges, the law should revert to

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its normal state.

   Such   a  lack  of   generality,  however,  in  criminal legislation  need  not,  of  itself,  involve  the  judicial function,  and their lordships are not prepared to hold that every  enactment in this field which can be described as  ad hominem  and ex post facto must inevitably usurp or infringe the  judicial  power.   Nor  do they find  it  necessary  to attempt the almost impossible task of tracing where the line is  to  be  drawn  between  what  will  and  what  will  not constitute  such an interference.  Each case must be decided in  the light of its own facts and circumstances,  including the  true purpose of the legislation, the situation to which it was directed, the existence (where several enactments are impugned)  of  a common design, and the extent to which  the legislation  affects,by way of direction or restriction, the discretion   or  judgment  of   the  judiciary  in  specific proceedings.   It  is therefore necessary to  consider  more closely  the  nature of the legislation challenged  in  this appeal.

   The  observations of Lord Pearce finds approval of  this Court  in  the  case of Indira Nehru Gandhi v.   Raj  Narain (1975 Suppl SCC 1).

   Mr.   Bobde contended that the Ordinance in question  is clearly  a  legislation ad-hominem being directed solely  to the control of voting right in respect of the affairs of the most  cash- riched Federal Cooperative Bank in  Maharashtra. Mr.   Bobde contended that Kolhapur Bank is most cash-riched Co-operative Bank in the State of Maharashtra with an annual turnover  of  Rs.1500 crores:  Its financing is around  1200 crores  including  600 crores of sugar co-operative  society and  because  of the sugar factories, Kolhapur District  has maximum  concentration on Co-operative societies amongst all the districts of the State of Maharashtra.

   It  is  at  this juncture some decisions of  this  Court ought also tobe noticed and elucidation of law as propounded with the passage of time  the decisions being:

   (i)  A.K.   Roy  v.  Union of India (1982 (1)  SCC  271) wherein  this  Court in paragraphs 28 and 29 of  the  Report observed as below:

   28.   There  are  however,  two reasons why  we  do  not propose to discuss at greater length the question as regards the  justiciability  of the Presidents  satisfaction  under Article  123  (1) of the Constitution.  In the first  place, the  ordinance has been replaced by an Act.  It is true,  as contended  by Shri Tarkunde, that if the question as regards the justiciability of the Presidents satisfaction is not to be  considered for the reason that the ordinance has  become an  Act, the occasion will hardly ever arise for considering that  question because, by the time the challenge made to an ordinance  comes up for consideration before the court,  the ordinance  almost invariably shall have been replaced by  an Act.   All  the same, the position is firmly established  in the field of constitutional adjudication that the court will decide  no  more than needs to be decided in any  particular case.   Abstract  questions present interesting  challenges, but  it is for scholar and textbook writers to unravel their mystique.   It  is  not for the courts to  decide  questions which are but of academic importance.

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   29.  The other reason why we are not inclined to go into the   question   as  regards   the  justiciability  of   the Presidents  satisfaction  under Article 123 (1) is that  on the material which is placed before us, it is impossible for us  to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other.  We  are not  sure whether a question like the one before us would be governed by the rule of burden of proof contained in Section 106  of the Evidence Act, though we are prepared to  proceed on  the basis that the existence of circumstances which  led to  the  passing of the Ordinance is especially  within  the knowledge  of the executive.  But before casting the  burden on  the executive to establish those circumstances, at least a  prima  facie case must be made out by the  challenger  to show  that  there could not have existed  any  circumstances necessitating  the issuance of the Ordinance.  Every  casual or  passing  challenge  to the existence  of  circumstances, which  rendered  it  necessary  for the  President  to  take immediate action by issuing an ordinance, will not be enough to  shift the burden of proof to the executive to  establish those  circumstances.   Since the petitioners have not  laid any   acceptable  foundation  for  us   to  hold   that   no circumstances  existed or could have existed which  rendered it  necessary for the President to take immediate action  by promulgating  the  impugned  Ordinance,  we  are  unable  to entertain   the   contention    that    the   Ordinance   is unconstitutional  for the reason that the pre-conditions  to the  exercise of the power conferred by Article 123 are  not fulfilled.   That  is  why  we do not feel  called  upon  to examine  the  correctness  of  the submission  made  by  the learned  Attorney-General that in the very nature of things, the  satisfaction  of the President which is the basis  on which  he promulgates an ordinance is founded upon materials which  may  not be available to others and which may not  be disclosed without detriment to public interest and that, the circumstances  justifying  the issuance of the ordinance  as well  as  the  necessity to issue it lie solely  within  the Presidents judgment and are, therefore, not justiciable.

   (ii) The second in the line of citations from the Bar is the  decision  in  State of Gujarat & Anr.   v.   Raman  Lal Keshav  Lal  Soni  & Ors.  (1983 (2) SCC  33):   since  this particular  decision does not lend any particular assistance or so to say, advance the issue to the contentions raised in the  matter further, we refrain ourselves from dealing  with the  same,  as  such we need not dilate on  that  score  any further.

   (iii)  The  third decision being the locus classicus  to the  issue, (D.C.  Wadhwa v.  State of Bihar:  1987 (1)  SCC 378)  wherein this Court in no uncertain terms observed that since   the   primary  law   making  authority   under   the Constitution is the Legislature and not the Executive and it is  possible  that circumstances may arise which  render  it necessary  to take immediate action when the Legislature  is not  in  session,  in such a case and in order  that  public interest  may  not  suffer by reason of the failure  of  the legislature  to  deal  with   the  emergent  situation,  the Governor  is  vested  with  the   power  to  promulgate  the Ordinance.   This  Court further observed that the power  to promulgate  Ordinance  is essentially a power to be used  to meet  an  extra-  ordinary  situation though  it  cannot  be allowed  to  be perverse to serve political ends.  It is  on this  count  of judicial ad-negation Mr.  Bobde found  fault with  the judgment under appeal since the instant Ordinance,

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as appears from the Statement of objects and reasons, cannot but  be  so declared.  The law thus remains  clarified  that judicial  reluctance cannot be faulted in any way unless  of course  an  element of constitutionality of the  legislation comes  up for consideration The issue of political  question as argued before this Court in the matter and noticed above, pertains  however to the judicial review of legislation.   A large number of decisions have been cited though not noticed above, since the same do not stand to any further assistance at  the bar but judicial ad-negation has been the  resultant conclusion in all these cases unless of course, there is any violation of any fundamental right and the constitutionality is  the  issue  between  the parties as  noted  above.   The political question doctrine has however, to be treated to be a  tool for maintenance of governmental order but as noticed above, there is no blanket rule of judicial reluctance since the  question  arises  as to whether the case  presents  the political  question and for this purpose, facts of each case shall  have to be considered in its proper perspective so as to  assess  the situation.  This however, opens up  a  wider debate  on to the different issue of Article 123 and 213 and the  action  is  legislative  in character.  It  is  not  an administrative  or executive action but being legislative in nature,  it  is subject only to  constitutional  limitations applicable  to an ordinary statute.  The Ordinance, if, does not  infringe  the  constitutional   safeguards,  cannot  be examined  nor  the motive for such a promulgation can be  in question.   Mr.   Desai appearing for Intervenor  Respondent very  strongly  urged  that  the Court  cannot  examine  the satisfaction  of  the Governor in promulgating an  ordinance and  the law is well settled on this count by this Court  in the  Nagarajs  case  (K.  Nagaraj and others v.   State  of Andhra Pradesh and Another :  1985 (1) SCC 523) wherein this court  held  that it is impossible to accept the  submission that  the  ordinance  can be invalidated on  the  ground  of non-application  of mind.  It is a power of the Executive to legislate  and  this power is plenary within its field  like the  power  of the State Legislature to pass the laws.   The Constitution  Benchs  judgment in T.  Venkata Reddys  case (T.   Venkata Reddy and Others v.  State of Andhra Pradesh : 1985  (3)  SCC  198)  wherein the earlier  judgment  of  the Federal  Court  in  Laxmi Narain Das v.  Province  of  Bihar (1949  FLR  693)  have  been   followed,  re-  affirmed  the observations  in  Nagarajas  case, the  Constitution  Bench observed that the motive of Legislature in passing a statute is  beyond  the scrutiny of the courts.  It is not only  the propriety to follow the Constitutional Bench judgment but we are  definitely of the opinion and view that by no  stretch, the  courts can interfere a legislative malice in passing  a statute.  Interference is restrictive in nature and that too on the constitutionality aspect and not beyond the same.

   We  may thus note here that though a definite motive has been  ascribed, we are not in a position to lend concurrence to  Mr.   Bobdes submission that there is  any  legislative malice.    Legislative   malice  is   beyond  the  pale   of jurisdiction  of  the  law  courts and  since  there  is  no constitutional   invalidity  neither  the   same  has   been contended  before  us,  question of  interference  with  the matter pertaining to the first proviso or even the ordinance does  not  and cannot arise.  In any event,  the  Ordinance, strictly  speaking, may be ascribed to be totally irrelevant in  the present context, but if the executive in its  wisdom thought  it  fit to promulgate such an ordinance, it  is  no part  of  our duty to describe it as otherwise not  required

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even   as   and  by  way  of  a  clarification   since   the administrative expediency permitted the legislative function on to the executive.

   Needless to repeat the factual score that the High Court hadnt  had the opportunity to consider the Ordinance  which stands promulgated only after the disposal of the appeal and during  the  pendency of the matter before this court:   The Ordinance,   however,  has  a  retrospective  operation  and coincides  with  the  date of introduction  of  the  amended proviso to Section 27(3) of the Act of 1960.

   On the wake of the aforesaid, we cannot proceed with the matter  any  further without however having a close look  at the   Ordinance  as  promulgated  and   in  the   event   of experiencing any difficulty, the Statement of objects can be considered  but if it is otherwise, Mr.  Bobdes  submission would  pale into insignificance and thus have to be  stamped as wholly untenable.

   It  is  on this score however, that Article 213  becomes relevant  being the source of power of the Executive to  use legislative functions.  Article 213 in so far as is material reads as below:

   213.   (1)  If at any time, except when the  Legislative Assembly  of  a  State is in session, or where  there  is  a Legislative  Council in a State, except when both Houses  of the  Legislature  are in session, the governor is  satisfied that  circumstances exist which render it necessary for  him to  take immediate action, he may promulgate such ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require:

       *               *               *               *

   (2)  An  ordinance promulgated under this article  shall have  the same force and effect as an Act of legislature  of the  State  assented  to  by the governor,  but  every  such ordinance

   (a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before  both  the Houses, and shall cease to operate at  the expiration  of  six  weeks  from   the  re-assembly  of  the Legislature,  or  if before the expiration of that period  a resolution  disapproving  it  is passed by  the  Legislative Assembly  and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if  any, upon  the passing of the resolution or, as the case may  be, on the resolution being agreed to by Council;  and

   (b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.

   Explanation   Where the Houses of the legislature of  a State  having  a  Legislative Council are  summoned  to  re- assemble  on different dates, the period of six weeks  shall be  reckoned from the later of those dates for the  purposes of this clause.

   Article 213 however is to be read along with Article 174 which enjoins that the legislature shall meet at least twice in  a  year but six months shall not intervene  between  its last  sitting in one session and the date appointed for  its first  sitting  in the next session.  Thus  maintaining  the democratic  favour  of the Constitution with three  separate organs  of  the  State functioning  within  its  restrictive

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sphere.    There  is   existing  sufficient   constitutional safeguard  and  rigour and a plain reading of  the  language used therein depicts the same.

   Article  213 authorises promulgation of an Ordinance and confers  a  power of legislation on to the Governor only  in the event of recording a satisfaction that the circumstances exist  which  render it necessary for him to take  immediate action  and he may thus promulgate such an Ordinance as  the circumstances  appear to him to require and the Ordinance so promulgated  can be laid before the Legislative Assembly  of the State at the expiry of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature.  It is in this perspective it be noted that the power of the Executive is only an emergent power to meet the emergency.  Mr.  Bobde posed a question as a part of his submission  as regards the nature of the emergency since the statement  of  objects  records the Ordinance to be  a  mere clarificatory  Ordinance,  there seems to be some  substance since  what was implicit has been stated to be made explicit by  way  of  clarification according to  the  plain  English meaning of the words used in the statement.  This is however on  assumption that we need to delve into the matter in such detail.   The  emergency admittedly cannot thus be  said  to have  occurred  in order to have an emergent legislation  by exercise  of  an  emergent  power   of  legislation  by  the Executive.   The decision in Wadhwas case (supra) has  been rather  categorical  that  the Executive  cannot  by  taking resort  to  an  emergency  power  takeover  the  law  making function  of the legislature and in the event, the executive assume  such power, the same would be clearly subverting the democratic   process  which  lies  at   the  core   of   our constitutional  scheme,  for  this,   the  people  would  be governed not by the laws made by the Legislature as provided in  the Constitution but by laws made by the Executive.  We do  appreciate  such  an  exposition of  law  and  lend  our concurrence thereto in its entirety.  The exception however, to  the  above  has also been pointed out in  Wadhwas  case (supra)   that  in  the  event  of  there  being  too   many legislative  businesses in a particular session or the  time at the disposal of the Legislature is rather short, in which event,  the  Governor may legitimately find it necessary  to re-  promulgate  the ordinance and where such is  the  case, admittedly,  the  Ordinance  cannot possibly  be  under  any criticism.   While  it is true, that the submission  remains very attractive but the fact remains, is it necessary for us to  lay  such  an emphasis on the statement of  objects  and reasons  in  the  matter  under  consideration,  the  answer however  cannot  but  be in the negative.  The  objects  and reasons cannot but seem to note the reasons for introduction of  the  promulgation  of  such an  Ordinance.   It  has  no correlation  by itself with the objective when the same  was promulgated.   The  observations  of this Court  in  Ashwini Kumars  case  (Aswini Kumar Ghose and Another v.   Arabinda Bose  and Another:  AIR 1952 SC 369) lends credence to  such an  observation as noticed herein before wherein,  Patanjali Sastri,  C.J.   (as  His  Lordship  then  was)  stated  very succinctly in paragraph 32 of the Report as below:

   32.   As regards the propriety of the reference of  the Statement of objects and reasons, it must be remembered that it  seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover  to introduce  the Bill in the House and what objects he  sought to  achieve.   But those objects and reasons may or may  not correspond  to  the objective which the majority of  members had in view when they passed it into law.  The Bill may have

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undergone  radical  changes during its passage  through  the House  or Houses, and there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects thereby sought to  be  achieved have remained the same throughout till  the Bill  emerges  from the House as an Act of the  Legislature, for they do not form part of the Bill and are not voted upon by  the members.  We, therefore, consider that the Statement of  objects and reasons appended to the Bill should be ruled out as an aid to the construction of a statute.

   Further,  after introduction of the Bill and during  the debates  thereon  before  the Parliament,  if  a  particular provision  is inserted by reason of such a debate,  question of  indication  of any object in the objects and reasons  of the  Bill  does  not and cannot arise.   The  statements  of objects and reasons need to looked into though not by itself a necessary aid as an aid to construction only if necessary. To  assess  the  intent of the Legislature in the  event  of there  being any confusion, statement of objects and reasons may  be looked into and no exception can be taken therefor this is not an indispensable requirement but when faced with an  imperative  need to appreciate the proper intent of  the Legislature, statement may be looked into but not otherwise. The submission of Mr.  Bobde thus can only be given credence only  in  the event of there being any necessity of  such  a requirement  in the facts of the matter under consideration, to  wit  :  some confusion somewhere for assessment  of  the intent of the Legislature.

   The  proviso  for which the clarificatory Ordinance  has been  promulgated, it appears that the Legislature advisedly used  the  expression  new  members.   Members  have  been defined  under the State Co-operative Societies Act (Section 2(19)  of the Act of 1960) meaning - a person joining in  an application for registration of a co-operative society which is  subsequently  registered  or a person duly  admitted  to membership  of his society after registration and includes a nominal  associate  or sympathizer member.  Section  27  (3) proviso  as noticed above adds an appendage any new before the  member society:  whereas Mr.  Bobde contended that  the appendage  any new cannot but mean though existing but not voted since Section 27 on which the proviso as noticed above was  added  by  Maharashtra Co-operative  Societies  (Second Amendment)  Act, 2000 which came into force on and from 23rd August,  2000  and  deal with the parties voting  rights  in terms  of  Section  27  of  the   Act  of  1960,  any  other interpretation  would  be  in  violent  departure  from  the statutory  intent and it is on this score Mr.  Bobde did put very  strong  reliance  as  to   the  understanding  of  the Government  as is laid down in the Statement of objects  and reasons.   Statement of objects as noticed above can only be looked  into  in  the event of there being  any  requirement therefor  and not otherwise:  The meaning of the expressions used  in the legislation, if is of doubtful nature, may be a guide or an aid but not otherwise.  The legislature has used the  expression new  obviously with an intent to  ascribe something  other  than existing members and this  additional requirement by reason of an additional appendage by way of a statutory amendment, must be stated to be that indicative of the intent and to convey a definite meaning.  The word new in  common English parlance cannot but mean something  which was  not existing and thus a society becoming a member on or after  23rd  August, 2000 and not prior thereto:  it  cannot possibly  apply  to  existing members but only  new  members after the amendment.

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   While  the  statements  of objects and  reasons  in  the normal  course  of event cannot be termed to be the main  or principal  aid  to  construction  but in  the  event  it  is required to discern the reasonableness of the classification as in the case of Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr.  v.  Union of India & Anr.  [AIR 1990 SC 2114] statement of objects and reasons  can  be usefully looked into for  appreciating  the background  of legislatures classification.  This Court  in para  16  of the judgment last noticed had the following  to state:

   For   determining   the  purpose  or  object   of   the legislation,   it   is   permissible  to   look   into   the circumstances  which prevailed at the time when the law  was passed  and which necessitated the passing of that law.  For the  limited purpose of appreciating the background and  the antecedent  factual matrix leading to the legislation, it is permissible  to  look  into  the Statement  of  Objects  and Reasons  of  the Bill which actuated the step to  provide  a remedy  for the then existing malady.  In a.  Thangal  Kunju Musaliar  v.  M.  Venkitachalam Potti, [1955 (2) SCR 1196  : AIR  1956 SC 246], the Statement of Objects and Reasons  was used for judging the reasonableness of a classification made in  an  enactment to see if it infringed or was contrary  to the  Constitution.   In  that decision for  determining  the question,  even  affidavit  on behalf of the State  of  the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law there under  consideration had been passed and which  necessitated the  passing of that law was relied on.  It was  reiterated in  State  of West Bengal v.  Union of India, [1964 (1)  SCR 371  :  (AIR 1963 SC 1241)  that the Statement and  Objects and   Reasons  accompanying  a   Bill,  when  introduced  in Parliament,  can  be  used  for   the  limited  purpose  of understanding  the  background and the antecedent  state  of affairs  leading  up  to  the  legislation.   Similarly,  in Pannalal  Binjraj  v.  Union of India, [1957 SCR 233 :   AIR 1957  SC 397] a challenge to the validity of  classification was  repelled  placing  reliance on an  affidavit  filed  on behalf  of the Central Board of Revenue disclosing the  true object  of enacting the impugned provision in the Income-tax Act.

   The  High Court of Australia also without any  departure therefrom permits reference to the explanatory memorandum to the  Bill  in  order  to ascertain the  mischief  which  the statute  was  intending to remedy:  See in this context  CIC Insurance  Limited  v.  Bankstown Football Club Ltd.   [1997 (187) CLR p.  384] wherein it has been stated

   It  is well settled that at common law, apart from  any reliance  upon  s 15 AB of the Acts Interpretation Act  1901 (Cth),  the  court may have regard to reports of law  reform bodies to ascertain the mischief which a statute is intended to  cure (Black-Clawson International Ltd.  v.   Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg  :   1975  AC 591 at 614,  629,  638). Moreover,  the  modern approach to statutory  interpretation (a)  insists  that  the context be considered in  the  first instance,  not  merely  at some later stage  when  ambiguity might  be  thought to arise, and (b) uses context  in  its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the  law and the mischief which, by legitimate means such as those  just  mentioned,  one  may discern  the  statute  was intended  to  remedy  (Attorney General  v.   Prince  Ernest Augustus  of  Hanover :  1957 AC 436 at 461).  Instances  of

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general  words  in a statute being so constrained  by  their context  are numerous.  In particular as Mc Hugh JA  pointed out  in Isherwood v.  Butler Pollnow Pty Ltd.  (1986 6 NSWLR 363  at  388), if the apparently plain words of a  provision are  read in the light of the mischief which the statute was designed  to overcome and of the objects of the legislation, they  may  wear  a   very  different  appearance.   Further, inconvenience  or  improbability  of result may  assist  the court  in  preferring to the literal meaning an  alternative construction  which,  by  the  steps  identified  above,  is reasonably open and more closely conforms to the legislative intent  (Cooper  Brookes (Wollomgong) Pty Ltd.  v.   Federal Commissioner of Taxation.:  1981 (147) CLR 297 at 320-321).

   Another  decision  of the Australian High Court  in  the case of Newcastle City Council v.  GIO General Limited [1998 (72)  ALJR  97 (Aust.) may also be noticed at this  juncture wherein  the  observations  and elucidation  of  cannons  of construction  and  interpretation by Brennan, CJ seem to  be very  apposite  and we do record our unhesitant  concurrence therewith.

   The observations however runs as below:

   Moreover,  as  the extrinsic material reveals,  s.40(3) was intended to be remedial.  As far as practicable, s.40(1) and  (3)  should be construed to promote the objects of  the Act.  Nevertheless, as I pointed out in Kingston v.  Keprose Pty  Ltd.   [1987  (11)  NSWLR 404 at 423],  in  applying  a purposive  construction, the function of the court  remains one  of construction and not legislation. When the  express words  of a legislative provision are reasonably capable  of only  one  construction  and  neither  the  purpose  of  the provision  nor any other provision in the legislation throws doubt  on  that construction, a court cannot ignore  it  and substitute  a different construction because it furthers the objects of the legislation.

   The  circumstances in which recourse can legitimately be had to the extrinsic material

   Mr.   Sackar relied on s 15Ab of the Acts Interpretation Act  to urge this Court to examine and take into account the extrinsic  material.   Section  15AB  is  entitled  Use  of extrinsic  material  in  the interpretation of an  Act  and relevantly provides:

   (1)  Subject to sub-section (3), in the  interpretation of  a provision of an Act, if any material not forming  part of  the Act is capable of assisting in the ascertainment  of the  meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material:

   (a)  to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary  meaning  conveyed  by the text  of  the  provision taking  into account its context in the Act and the  purpose or object underlying the Act;  or

   (b) to determine the meaning of the provision when:

   (i) the provision is ambiguous or obscure;  or

   (ii)  the  ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of  the provision taking into account its context in the Act and the

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purpose  or object underlying the Act leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable.

   (2)  Without limiting the generality of sub-section (1), the  material that may be considered in accordance with that sub-section  in the interpretation of a provision of an  Act includes;

   (b)  any  relevant  report of a  Royal  Commission,  Law Reform  Commission,  committee of inquiry or  other  similar body  that  was laid before either House of  the  Parliament before the time when the provision was enacted;  ..

   (e)  any  explanatory  memorandum relating to  the  Bill containing the provision..

   On  a perusal of the aforesaid, be it noted that in  the event the language is clear, categorical and unequivocal, no outside  aid is required or is permissible for  interpreting the  proviso to the Section by the Amending Act of 2000.  In the contextual facts and in the view we have taken above, we regret  our inability to accede to or record our concurrence with the submissions of Mr.  Bobde.

   Further  we  wish  to  clarify that  it  is  a  cardinal principle  of interpretation of statute that the words of  a statute  must  be understood in their natural,  ordinary  or popular  sense and construed according to their  grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the  statute to suggest to the contrary.  The golden rule is that  the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary  meaning.   It is yet another rule of  construction that  when  the  words of the statute are clear,  plain  and unambiguous,  then  the Courts are bound to give  effect  to that  meaning, irrespective of the consequences.  It is said that  the words themselves best declare the intention of the law  giver.   The Courts have adhered to the principle  that efforts  should  be made to give meaning to each  and  every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of  construction to brush aside words in a statute as  being inapposite  surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute.   Bearing  in  mind,  the  aforesaid  principle  of construction,  if  the expression any new  member  society occurring  in the proviso to sub- section (3) of Section  27 is  construed, it conveys the only meaning that it refers to the  societies  to  be  formed hereafter and  not  of  those societies  which have already become member societies of the federal   society.   Therefore,  the   requirement  of   the completion of the period of three years from the date of its investing any part of its fund in the shares of such federal society  would  apply only to those societies  which  became member  society  of the federal society after  20th  August, 2000.   In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the  High Court does not suffer from any infirmity.  Even if there  remained any doubt in the matter of interpreting  the proviso,  the  Ordinance that has been promulgated  on  27th February,  2001, called the Maharashtra Ordinance No.  X  of 2001,  after the first proviso to sub-section (3), a  second proviso  had  been  inserted,  has   removed  any  doubt  or controversy in as much as it has been indicated therein that the first proviso will not apply to the member society which has  invested  any  part  of its fund in the  share  of  the federal  society before the commencement of the  Maharashtra

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Co-operative  Societies  (Amendment)  Act, 2000  dated  20th August, 2000.  The aforesaid Ordinance also has been given a retrospective  effect,  to  be effective from  23rd  August, 2000.   The Ordinance having been held to be valid by us  as stated  above,  the so-called prohibition contained  in  the first  proviso  to  sub-section (3) of Section 27  will  not apply  to  all  those societies which  have  already  become members of the federal society prior to 23rd August, 2000.

   On  the  wake  of the aforesaid the Appeal  thus  fails: Each party, however, to pay and bear its own costs.