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PETITIONER: GURU NANAK FOUNDATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RATTAN SINGH & SONS

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/09/1981

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR 2075            1982 SCR  (1) 842  1981 SCC  (4) 634        1981 SCALE  (3)1543

ACT:      Jurisdiction of  the competent  court, when the Supreme Court is session of the proceedings, to entertain the Award- Scope of  sections 2  (c), 14  (2),  31(4)  and  41  of  the Arbitration Act, 1940.

HEADNOTE:      Disputes  having   arisen  between  the  parties  to  a building contract  dated 4th April, 1972, an application for the appointment  of an  arbitrator in  terms of clause 47 of the Arbitration  Agreement, numbered  as Suit  No. 400(A) of 1974 was  filed in  the Delhi High Court. By its order dated August 14, 1974, the High Court appointed the 2nd Respondent Sri M.  C. Nanda,  retired Chief  Engineer, C.P.W.D.  as the sole arbitrator.  When the reference was pending, a petition number O.M.P.  133/1969 was  moved by  the appellant,  under sections S  and 11  of the  Act,  for  the  removal  of  the arbitrator and  appointment of  another in  his  place.  The petition was  dismissed, but  in the appeal by special leave (Civil Appeal  No. 17/1977)  the Supreme Court made an order dated January  S, 1977,  wherein by  consent of  parties 3rd respondent  Sri   O.P.  Mallick,   retired  Chief  Engineer, C.P.W.D., was  appointed as  the sole  arbitrator. Since the 3rd respondent  after entering into arbitration directed the parties to  file fresh  pleadings indicating that he desired to  commence  the  arbitration  proceeding  afresh,  another C.M.P. No.  1088/77 was filed in the Supreme Court whereupon suitable directions  were given to proceed from the stage at which Sri  Nanda left.  A further  application No. 526(A)/77 was moved,  this time  before the High Court for considering the  counter  claim  but  it  was  dismissed  as  the  first respondent  who   did  question  the  jurisdictional  aspect earlier,  agreed   to  the   issue  being  included  in  the reference. Thereafter,  the  arbitrator  made  an  Award  on November 11,  1977. The  1st respondent  by his letter dated November 17,  1977, requested  the 3rd respondent arbitrator to file  or cause to be filed the award along with pleadings and documents before the Supreme Court.      The 3rd  respondent acting on the advice tendered by an officer of  the Supreme  Court filed  the award in the Delhi High Court  and informed  the par  ties The  1st  respondent moved C.M.P.  No. 14079 of 1977 in the Supreme Court seeking

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a declaration  that the award has to be filed in the Supreme Court in view of provisions contained in section 14 (2) read with section  31 (4) of the Act and for a direction that the award be collected from Delhi High Court and be filed before the Supreme  Court and  notice of the filing of the award be issued to the parties. 843      The appellant  filed a  counter affidavit and contested the petition  inter alia  contending that  Delhi High  Court would be  the court  within the meaning of section 14 (2) in which award  ought to  have been and has rightly been filed. It was  contended that if the Court withdrew the proceedings to itself,  the appellant would be denied the valuable right of appeal  under the  letters patent and a further appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.      Allowing the C.M.P. No. 14079 of 1977, the Court. B ^      HELD 1. The Supreme Court is the court having exclusive jurisdiction wherein  the  Award  dated  November  1],  1977 should be filed. [857 C]      1: 1.  On a  pure grammatical  construction as  well as taking harmonious and overall view of the various provisions contained in  the Act  it is  crystal clear  that ordinarily that court will have jurisdiction to deal with the questions arising under  the Act,  except the  one in  Chapter IV,  in which a  suit with  regard to  the dispute  involved in  the arbitration  would   be  required  to  be  filed  under  the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, where an application is made in any reference to a court competent to entertain it,  that court  alone will have jurisdiction over the arbitration  proceedings and all subsequent applications arising  out   of  that   reference  and   the   arbitration proceedings shall have to be made in that court alone and in no other court. [852 G-H, 853 A-B]      1: 2. The expression "court" as defined in section 2(c) will  have  to  be  adhered  to  unless  there  is  anything repugnant in the subject or context in which it is used. The expression "court" as used in section 21 of the Act includes the "appellate  court"  because  appellate  proceedings  are generally recognised  as continuation  of the  suit  ’.  The expression "court"  used in section 14(2), there- fore, will have to  be understood in this background. Incorporating the definition of  the expression  "court" as set out in section 2(c), in  sub-section (1)  of section 31 would mean that the award will  have to filed in that court in which the suit in respect of the dispute involved in the award would have been required to be filed. The provision contained in sub-section (2) of  section 14 will not be rendered otiose. [851 A-B, D- E, 852 F]      Ct. A.  Ct. Nacchiappa  Chettiar & others v. Ct. A. Ct. Subramanium Chettiar, [1960] 2 SCR 209, followed.      1: 4. The Scheme disclosed in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 clearly indicates that to the exclusion of all other  courts only  one court  will have jurisdiction to deal with  the proceedings  incidental to  the reference and the arbitration.  Sub-section (3)  clearly  points  in  this direction when  it provides  that all applications regarding the conduct  of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of  such proceedings  shall be made to the court wherein the award  has been  or may  be filed and to no other court. The opening  non-obstante clause of sub-section (4) excludes anything anywhere contained in the whole Act or in any other law for  the time  being in  force if  it is  contrary to or inconsistent with  the substantive  provision  contained  in sub-section (4).  To that  extent it carves out an exception

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to the  general question  of jurisdiction  of the  court  in which award  may be  filed elsewhere  provided in the Act in respect of the proceedings referred 844 to in  sub-section (4).  This provision  will have  an over- riding effect  in relation to the filing of the award if the conditions  therein   prescribed  are  satisfied.  If  those conditions are  satisfied  the  court  other  than  the  one envisaged in  section 14  (2) or  section 31 (1) will be the court in  which award  will have  to be  filed. That  is the effect of  the non-obstante  clause in  sub-section  (4)  of section  31.   Sub-section  (4)   thus   invests   exclusive jurisdiction in  the court, to which an application has been made in  any reference  and which that court is competent to entertain  as   the  court   having  jurisdiction  over  the arbitration  proceedings  and  all  subsequent  applications arising out  of reference  and the  arbitration  proceedings shall have  to be  made in that court and in no other court. Thus subsection  (4) not only confers exclusive jurisdiction on the  court  to  which  an  application  is  made  in  any reference but  simultaneously ousts  the jurisdiction of any other court  which may  as well  have jurisdiction  in  this behalf. [851 E-H, 852 A-C]      2. A  proceedings earlier to reference in a Court would not clothe  that court  with such  jurisdiction as to render the provision contained in section 31 (4) otiose. [858 D-E]      Also the  subsequent application  made by the appellant before the  Delhi High  Court, which was dismissed after the 1st respondent’s  challenge to the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court upon compromise between the parties enlarging the jurisdiction of  the arbitrator  by consent, cannot give the Delhi  High   Court  any   control  over   the   arbitration proceedings. In  view of  the fact that a reference was made by this Court to the 3rd respondent and that this Court gave further direction  about the manner and method of conducting the  arbitration   proceedings  and   fixed  the   time  for completion of  arbitration proceedings,  the  Supreme  Court alone would  have jurisdiction  to entertain the award. [854 C, E-F]      State of  Madhya Pradesh  v. M/s. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd., [1972] 3 SCR 233; followed.      Kumbha  Mawji  v.  Union  of  India,  [1953]  SCR  878, distinguished.      3. If  the Supreme  Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Award  and the  Supreme Court  in view of section 31 (4) alone has  jurisdiction for  entertaining the  award meaning that the  award has  to be  filed in the Supreme Court alone and no other, the same cannot be defeated by a specious plea that the  right of  appeal would  be denied.  In the instant case, the  door of the Supreme Court is not being closed. In fact the  door is  being held wide ajar for him to raise all contentions which  one can  raise  in  a  proceeding  in  an originating summons. [858 F-G, 859 A-B]      Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] SCR 488, explained.      State of  Madhya Pradesh  v. M/s. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd., [1972] 3 SCR 233, followed.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION  Civil  Misc.  Petitions Nos. 14079 & 14078 of 1977. 845

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                            IN                 Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1977      From the  judgment and  order dated  the 11th December. 1975 of  the High  Court of Delhi at New Delhi in O.M.P. No. 133 of 1975.      R.S. Narula and Harbans Singh for the Petitioner.      S.C.  Wattal,   R.C.  Wattal,   C.R.  Somasekharan  and T.V.S.N. Chari for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.  Interminable, time  consuming,  complex  and expensive court procedures impelled jurists to search for an alternative forum,  less formal,  more effective  and speedy for resolution  of disputes avoiding procedural claptrap and this led  them to  Arbitration Act,  1940 (’Act’ for short). However, the  way in which the proceedings under the Act are conducted and without an exception challenged in Courts, has made lawyers  laugh and  legal philosophers weep. Experience shows  and   law  reports  bear  ample  testimony  that  the proceedings under  the  Act  have  become  highly  technical accompanied by  unending prolixity, at every stage providing a legal  trap to  the unwary.  Informal forum  chosen by the parties for  expeditious disposal  of their  disputes has by the decisions  of the Courts been clothed with ’legalese’ of unforeseeable complexity.  This case  amply demonstrates the same.      A contract  dated 4th April, 1972 for construction of a building was  entered into between the appellant and the 1st respondent. Clause  47  of  this  contract  incorporated  an arbitration agreement  between the  parties. The differences and disputes  having  arisen  between  the  parties  to  the contract, . the 1st respondent moved an application numbered as Suit  No. 400  (A) of  1974 in the Delhi High Court under section 20  of the  Act seeking a direction calling upon the appellant to file the arbitration agreement in the court and for a  further direction  to  refer  the  disputes  and  the differences covered  by the  arbitration  agreement  to  the arbitrator to  be appointed by the Court. By the order dated August 14,  1974 the High Court appointed the 2nd respondent Shri M.L.  Nanda, retired  Chief Engineer,  CPWD as the sole arbitrator to  examine  the  differences  and  the  disputes between the parties and to make an 846 award in  respect of  them. When  the reference  was pending before the  arbitrator, a  petition No.  OMP 133 of 1975 was moved  by   the  appellant   in  Delhi  High  Court  seeking directions purporting  to be  under sections 5 and 11 of the Act for  the removal  of the  2nd respondent  as arbitrator. This petition  made by the appellant failed as per the order dated December 23, 1975. The appellant having been aggrieved by the  dismissal of  the petition  moved  a  special  leave petition (Civil)  No. 882  of 1976 in this Court questioning the correctness of the dismissal of the petition for removal of the arbitrator. The special leave petition came up before a bench  of this  Court. Special leave to appeal was granted and Civil  Appeal No.  17 of 1977 arising out of the special leave petition  was heard  by a  three-judges bench  of this Court. Khanna, J. speaking for the Court made an order dated January 5,  1977 wherein  by the  consent of the parties the 2nd Respondent Shri M.L. Nanda was removed as arbitrator and the 3rd  respondent Shri  C.P. Malik retired Chief Engineer, CPWD was  appointed as  the sole  arbitrator to  settle  the disputes  between  the  parties.  Usual  direction  for  the remuneration of  the arbitrator was made. The 3rd respondent was directed  to commence the arbitration proceedings within IS days  from the  date of  the order  of the  court and  to

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dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible.      It appears  that the 3rd respondent after entering into arbitration directed  the parties  to file  fresh  pleadings indicating that  he  desired  to  commence  the  arbitration proceedings afresh  which would  imply  that  the  pleadings filed before  the former  arbitrator and  the  evidence  led before him were to be ignored. The first respondent moved an application numbered  as CMP  No. 1088 of 1977 in this Court inter alia  praying for  a relief  that the  3rd  respondent should commence  the arbitration  proceedings from the stage where it  was left by the 2nd respondent. In other words the 1st respondent  prayed in  the petition  that the  pleadings before the former arbitrator as well as evidence recorded by him shall  be treated  as part of the proceedings before the 3rd respondent.      After hearing  both the  parties, this  Court made  the following order.  As it  has some  impact on  the outcome of this petition, it is reproduced in extenso:           "C.M.P. No. 1088/77: We have heard counsel on both      sides. It is absolutely plain that the new arbitrator 847      in tune  with the  spirit of  the order  passed by this      Court  should   proceed  with  speed  to  conclude  the      arbitration proceedings.  In the  earlier directions by      this Court  it had  been stated  that  the  proceedings      should commence  within IS days and that the arbitrator      "shall try  to dispose  of the same as expeditiously as      possible." We  direct the  arbitrator, bearing  in mind      the concurrence  of the  counsel on both sides, that he      shall conclude  the proceedings within four months from      today.           A grievance is made that the arbitrator is calling      for fresh  pleadings which  may perhaps be otiose since      pleadings have  already been filed by both sides before      the earlier  arbitrator Mr. Nanda. If any supplementary      statement is  to be  filed it  is certainly open to the      parties to  pursued the  arbitrator to  receive them in      one week  from today. The arbitrator will remember that      already some evidence has been collected and he is only      to  consider  and  conclude.  With  this  directive  we      dispose of the application."      Pursuant to the directions given by this Court, the 3rd respondent commenced  the arbitration  proceedings from  the stage where the same was left by the previous arbitrator. He gave  opportunity   to  the  parties  to  place  before  him supplementary  pleadings  if  any,  as  well  as  additional evidence if any. He also examined some witnesses.      When the  arbitration proceedings  were pending  before the 3rd  respondent,  the  appellant  moved  an  application numbered as  Suit No.  526 (A)  of 1977  in Delhi High Court praying for a relief that the counter claim of the appellant against the first respondent be also covered by the terms of reference and  an award  be made  in that  behalf. The first respondent questioned  the jurisdiction  o. Delhi High Court to entertain  the application on the ground that the Supreme Court alone is in seisin of the matter, and that court alone has jurisdiction  to give directions in the reference. Wiser counsel prevailed  with the  parties. The  first  respondent amicably agreed  to permit  the arbitrator  to  examine  the counter claim, if any, made by the appellant against the 1st respondent. In  view of  this private  agreement between the parties, application bearing number Suit No. 526 (A) of 1977 filed by  the appellant  was dismissed  by Delhi High Court. Thereafter the  arbitrator made  his award  on November  11, 1977 and  on the  same day served a notice on the parties to

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the proceedings intimating that the arbitrator has made 848 the award.  The 1st  respondent by his letter dated November 17, 1977  requested the 3rd respondent arbitrator to file or cause  to   be  filed  the  award  alongwith  pleadings  and documents before the Supreme Court.      It  appears   that  the   3rd   respondent   arbitrator approached the  Registry of  the Supreme Court for filing of award when  he was  advised by an officer of this Court that the award  should be  filed in Delhi High Court. Pursuant to this advice the 3rd respondent filed the award in Delhi High Court and informed the 1st respondent accordingly. Thereupon the  1   st  respondent   moved  this   petition  seeking  a declaration that  the award has to be filed in this Court in view of  provisions contained  in section  14 (2)  read with section 31 (4) of the Act and for a direction that the award be collected  from Delhi High Court and be filed before this Court and notice of the filing of the award be issued to the parties. In seeking this relief the 1st respondent contended in  the   petition  that  the  reference  was  made  to  the arbitrator by this Court; that further directions were given by this  Court and  this Court  has seisin of the matter and therefore this Court alone has jurisdiction to entertain the award in  view of the provisions contained in section 31 (4) of the Act.      During the  pendency of  this petition,  by an order in C.M.P. No. 14078 of 1977, the ’proceedings before Delhi High Court were stayed.      The appellant  filed a  counter-affidavit and contested the petition  inter alia  contending that  Delhi High  Court would be  the Court  within the meaning of section 14 (2) in which award  ought to  have been and has rightly been filed. It was  contended that if the court withdrew the proceedings to itself,  the appellant would be denied the valuable right of appeal  under the  letters patent and a further appeal to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.      The narrow  question in  this case therefore is whether in view of the circumstances herein delineated, which is the court which  would have jurisdiction to entertain the award; in other  words which  is the  court having  jurisdiction in which the award should be filed by the arbitrator?      At the  outset relevant  provisions of  the Act  may be noticed. The  expression ’Court’ has been defined in section 2 (c) as under: 849      2    (c)  "Court"   means    a   Civil   Court   having                jurisdiction  to decide the questions forming                the subject  matter of  the reference  if the                same had  been the  subject matter of a suit,                but does  not, except  for the purpose of the                arbitration proceedings  u/s  21,  include  a                Small Cause Court."      Section 14  provides for  filing  of  the  award.  Sub- section 2 is relevant for the present purpose which reads as under:      "14  (2)  The  arbitrators  or  umpire  shall,  at  the                request  of  any  party  to  the  arbitration                agreement or  any person  claiming under such                party or if so directed by the Court and upon                payment  of  the  fees  and  charges  due  in                respect of  the arbitration  and award and of                the costs  and charges  of filing  the award,                cause the  award or  a  signed  copy  of  it,                together with  any depositions  and documents                which may  have been  taken and proved before

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              them, to  be filed  in Court,  and the  Court                shall thereupon give notice to the parties of                the filing of the award." Section 31  deals with  the jurisdiction  of  the  court  in respect of an award which reads as under:      "31  (1)  Subject to  the provisions  of  this  Act  an                award  may  be  filed  in  any  Court  having                jurisdiction  in  the  matter  to  which  the                reference relates.           (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any                other law  for the  time being  in force  and                save as  otherwise provided  in this Act, all                questions regarding  the validity,  effect or                existence of  an award  or  an  award  or  an                arbitration agreement  between the parties to                the agreement  or persons claiming under them                shall be  decided by  the Court  in which the                award under  the agreement  has been,  or may                be, filed and by no other court.           (3)  All applications  regarding  the  conduct  of                arbitration proceedings  or otherwise arising                out of  such proceedings shall be made to the                Court where  the award  has been,  or may be,                filed and to no other court. 850           (4)  Notwithstanding anything  contained elsewhere                in this  Act or in any other law for the time                being in  force, where  in any  reference any                application under this Act has been made in a                Court competent  to entertain  it, that Court                alone  shall   have  jurisdiction   over  the                arbitration proceedings  and  all  subsequent                applications arising  out of  that reference,                and the arbitration proceedings shall be made                in that Court and in no other Court."      The dictionary meaning of expression ’Court’ in section 2 (c)  has to  be applied  wherever that  word occurs in the Act, but  with this  limitation that  if there  is  anything repugnant in  the subject or context, the dictionary meaning may not  be applied to the expression ’Court.’ Assuming that there is  nothing repugnant  in the  subject or  context the expression ’Court’  in the  Act would  mean that civil court which would have jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter  of a suit but does not include a Small Cause Court though  it is a civil court except for the arbitration proceedings under  section 21.  Section 14  sub-section  (2) provides for filing of the award in the court and in view of the definition of the expression ’Court’ the arbitrator will have to  file the  award in  that  court  which  would  have jurisdiction to  entertain the  suit  forming  the  subject- matter of reference.      Paraphrasing this  clause in  simple language  it would mean that the court in which the suit involving a dispute in arbitration would  be required  to be filed alone would have jurisdiction to  entertain the award. This will by necessary implication incorporate the provisions as to jurisdiction of court to  entertain civil  suits as  set out  in the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908. In  fact,  Section  41  of  the  Act provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules made  thereunder,  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908,  shall apply  to all proceedings before the court and  to all  appeals under the Act. In other words, in the absence  of an  arbitration agreement  if a  dispute was required to be resolved by initiating proceedings in a civil

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court, that  court which will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit  alone would  have jurisdiction  to  entertain  the award and  the arbitrator  in view of section 14 sub-section (2) would  have to  file the  award in that court. There was some  controversy   between  the  High  Courts  whether  the expression ’Court’ would comprehend appellate court in which the award can 851 be filed but it was finally resolved by the decision of this Court in Ct. A. Ct. Nacchiappa Chettiar others v. Ct. A. Ct. Subramanium Chettiar,  (1) wherein  it  was  held  that  the expressions ’suit and ’court’ in section 21 of the Act would also  comprehend  proceedings  in  ’appeal’  and  ’appellate Court’ respectively. This Court observed that the expression ’court’  in   section  21   includes  the   appellate  court proceedings which  are generally  recognised as continuation of the suit; and the word ’suit’ will include such appellate proceedings. Indisputably,  award will  have to  be filed in the court  in  which,  in  the  absence  of  an  arbitration proceeding a  suit  will  have  to  be  filed  touching  the subject-matter involved  in the  suit. If sub-section (2) of section 14 was the last word on the question of jurisdiction of the  court in  which the  award is to b;. filed, there is considerable force  in the submission of Mr. Narula that the award in this case will have to be filed in Delhi High Court alone.      Section 31  of the  Act provides  the forum in which an award may  be filed.  Sub-section (1) of section 31 provides that an  award may be filed in any court having jurisdiction in the  matter to which the reference relates. Incorporating the definition  of the  expression ’court’  as  set  out  in section 2  (c) in  sub-section (1)  of section 31 would mean that the  award will have to be filed in that court in which the suit  in respect  of the  dispute involved  in the award would  have  been  required  to  be  filed.  This  is  quite consistent with  the provision  contained in sub-section (2) of section  14. So  far there  is no  difficulty. The scheme disclosed in  sub-sections (2),(3)  and (4)  of  section  31 clearly indicates  that to the exclusion of all other courts only one  court will  have jurisdiction  to  deal  with  the proceedings incidental to the reference and the arbitration. Subsection (3)  clearly points  in this  direction  when  it provides that  all applications  regarding  the  conduct  of arbitration proceedings  or otherwise  arising out  of  such proceedings shall  be made  to the court where the award has been or  may be filed and to no other court. Then comes sub- section (4).  It opens  with a  non-obstante clause  and  is comprehensive in character. The non-obstante clause excludes anything anywhere contained in the whole Act or in any other law for  the time  being in  force if  it is  contrary to or inconsistent with  the substantive  provision  contained  in sub-section (4).  To that  extent it carves out an exception to the  general question  of jurisdiction  of the  court  in which award may be filed elsewhere 852 provided in  the Act  in respect of the proceedings referred to in subsection (4). The provision contained in sub-section (4) will  have an  over-riding effect  in  relation  to  the filing of the award if the conditions therein prescribed are satisfied. If those conditions are satisfied the court other than the  one envisaged  in section 14 (2) or section 31 (1) will be the court in which award will have to be filed. That is the  effect of the non-obstante clause in sub-section (4) of  section  31.  Sub-section  (4)  thus  invests  exclusive jurisdiction in  the court, to which an application has been

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made in  any reference  and which that court is competent to entertain  as   the  court   having  jurisdiction  over  the arbitration  proceedings  and  all  subsequent  applications arising out  of reference  and the  arbitration  proceedings shall have  to be  made in that court and in no other court. Thus sub-section (4) not only confers exclusive jurisdiction on the  court  to  which  an  application  is  made  in  any reference but  simultaneously ousts  the jurisdiction of any other court  which may  as well  have jurisdiction  in  this behalf. To illustrate the point, if an award was required to be filed  under section  14 (2)  read with section 31 (1) in any particular  court as  being the  court in  which a  suit touching  the   subject-matter  of  award  would  have  been required  to  be  filed,  but  if  any  application  in  the reference under  the Act  has been filed in some other court which was  competent to  entertain that application, then to the exclusion  of the first mentioned court the latter court alone, in  view of  the overriding  effect of  the provision contained in  section 31  (4),  will  have  jurisdiction  to entertain the  award and  the award will have to be filed in that court  alone and  no other court will have jurisdiction to entertain the same.      The provision  contained in  sub-section (2) of section 14 will  neither be  rendered otiose nor stand in disharmony on the  construction that  we place  on sub-section  (4)  of section 31  because the  expression ’court’  as  defined  in section 2  (c) will  have to  be adhered  to unless there is anything repugnant  in the subject or context in which it is used. Therefore,  the expression  ’court’ as used in section 14 (2) will have to be understood in this background.      On a  pure grammatical  construction as  well as taking harmonious  and  overall  view  of  the  various  provisions contained in  the Act  it is  crystal clear  that ordinarily that court will have jurisdiction to deal with the questions arising under  the Act,  except the  one in  Chapter IV,  in which a  suit with  regard to  the dispute  involved in  the arbitration would be required to be filed under the 853 provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, where an application is made in any reference to a court competent to entertain it,  that court  alone will have jurisdiction over the arbitration  proceedings and all subsequent applications arising  out   of  that   reference  and   the   arbitration proceedings shall have to be made in that Court alone and in no other court.      In this  case an  application was  made to  Delhi  High Court under  section 20  of the  Act for a direction to file the arbitration  agreement in the court. As provided in sub- section (2)  of section 20, the proceeding was numbered as a suit. The  suit ended  in  an  order  of  reference  to  the arbitrator, the 2nd respondent. A subsequent application was made to  Delhi High  Court under section 5 read with section 11  of  the  Act  for  removal  of  the  2nd  respondent  as arbitrator. On  this application being dismissed, the matter was brought  to this  Court in appeal being Civil Appeal No. 17 of  1977. By the decision of this Court in the appeal the 2nd  respondent  was  removed  as  arbitrator  and  the  3rd respondent was  appointed as  sole arbitrator. Indisputably, therefore, the  arbitrator was  appointed by this Court. The order appointing  the 3rd  respondent as  arbitrator gave  a further direction  that the  arbitrator shall enter upon the reference within  15 days  from the date of the order of the Court  and   he  should  try  to  dispose  of  the  same  as expeditiously as  possible. The  final order  was  that  the appeal was  disposed of  in terms  hereinabove indicated.  A

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contention that  thereafter this  Court was not in seisin of the matter  was urged  relying upon the fact that the appeal was disposed of by the order of the court and that there was no further proceeding before this Court. This contention has merely to  be stated  to be  rejected, as  will be presently pointed out.  After the  disposal of  the  appeal,  CMP  No. 896/77 was  presented to this Court for clarification and/or modification of  the order  of the  Court dated  January  5, 1977. This  Court by its order dated February 10, 1977, gave further directions  and a  specific time  limit was fixed by this Court  directing the  3rd respondent  as arbitrator  to conclude the proceedings within four months from the date of order of  the Court.  Even with  regard to  the  conduct  of proceedings this  Court directed  that  the  3rd  respondent should proceed  with the  reference from  the stage where it was left by the 2nd respondent and that not only that he may permit additional  evidence to  be led  but he must consider the  pleadings   and  evidence  already  placed  before  the previous arbitrator.  This will  indisputably show that this Court had  complete control  over the proceedings before the arbitrator. 854      Mr. R.S.  Narula, learned  counsel  for  the  appellant pointed out that subsequently an application was made by the appellant before  Delhi High  Court that  the 3rd respondent must also resolve the dispute arising out of a counter-claim made by  the appellant  against the ] st respondent and that this application  was entertained  by Delhi  High Court  and that therefore,  it cannot be said that this Court alone was in seisin  of the  matter or was seized of the matter. There is  no   substance  in   this  contention  because  the  1st respondent had  challenged the  jurisdiction of  Delhi  High Court to  entertain the  same and ultimately the application filed  by   the  appellant  was  dismissed,  albeit  upon  a compromise between the parties enlarging the jurisdiction of the arbitrator  by consent.  But the  petition  having  been dismissed  and  the  contention  having  been  taken  as  to jurisdiction, it  cannot b.-  said that Delhi High Court had control over  the arbitration  proceedings. In  the light of this  uncontroverted  evidence  in  view  of  the  provision contained in  sub-section (4)  of section  31 the arbitrator will have  to file  the award  in this  Court and he rightly approached this  Court upon  a notice being given by the 1st respondent for filing the award in this Court.      Curiously, an  officer of  this Court  took it into his head to  advise the  arbitrator to  file the  Award in Delhi High Court  without obtaining any direction of the Court. We must  record   our  displeasure  about  this  usurpation  of jurisdiction of  the Court  by an  officer of this Court. We say no  more. In  view of the fact that a reference was made by this Court to the 3rd respondent and that this court gave further direction  about the manner and method of conducting the  arbitration   proceedings  and   fixed  the   time  for completion of  arbitration  proceedings,  this  Court  alone would have jurisdiction to entertain the award.      The view which we are taking is completely borne out by the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s Saith &  Skelton (P)  Ltd. (1).  In that case the facts were that the State of Madhya Pradesh had entered into a contract with M/s  Saith &  Skelton  (P)  Ltd.  for  the  supply  and erection  of  penstocks  for  Gandhi  Sagar  Power  Station, Chambal Hydel  Works. Clause 21 of the contract incorporated an arbitration agreement. Disputes having arisen between the parties to  the contract,  the contractor  intimated to  the Madhya Pradesh State nominating one Shri T.R.

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855 Sharma as  an arbitrator under clause 21 of the contract. On receipt of  the intimation the Government nominated one Shri G.S. Gaitonde  as an  arbitrator and  on his resignation one Shri  R.R.   Desai  was  nominated  as  an  arbitrator.  The arbitrators  appointed  Shri  R.C.  Soni  as  umpire.  On  a disagreement between the arbitrators the reference was taken over by  the umpire.  A petition  was moved on behalf of the Government in  the Court  of the  Additional  Distt.  Judge, Mandsaur for  setting aside  the nomination as arbitrator of both Shri  T.R. Sharma  and Shri  R.R.  Desai  as  also  the appointment  of  Shri  R.C.  Soni  as  umpire.  The  learned Additional Distt.  Judge held  that the  appointment of Shri R.R. Desai  as arbitrator  and Shri  R.C. Soni as umpire was invalid. The  contractor filed  an appeal  before  the  High Court of  Madhya Pradesh which was converted into a revision petition. The  High Court by its order dated August 6, 1970, appointed Shri  R.C. Soni as the sole arbitrator and to that extent modified  the order  of the  Additional Distt. Judge. The State  approached this  Court by  petition  for  special leave to  appeal which was granted. This Court by consent of both the  parties appointed Shri V.S. Desai, Senior Advocate of this Court as the sole arbitrator. During the pendency of the proceedings,  this Court gave directions to call for the records and  to be  sent to  the arbitrator.  The Court also extended  time   initially  granted  to  the  arbitrator  to complete the proceedings. The arbitrator thereafter gave his award and  filed the  same in  the Supreme Court. A petition was filed  by the  Contractor for  passing  a  judgment  and decree according  to the  award. The  State filed a petition praying for an order declining to take the award on its file or in  any event  to set aside or modify the same. On behalf of the  State it was, inter alia, contended that the Supreme Court is  not the  court contemplated by section 14 (2) read with section  2 (c) of the Act where the award can be filed. Negativing this contention this Court held as under:           "According to  Mr. Shroff  the Award  should  have      been filed,  not in this Court, but in the Court of the      Additional District  Judge, Mandsaur,  as that  is  the      Court which  will have  jurisdiction to  entertain  the      suit regarding  the subject matter of the reference. We      are not  inclined to  accept  this  contention  of  Mr.      Shroff. It  should be  noted that  the opening words of      section 2  are "In  this Act,  unless there is anything      repugnant in  the subject  or context".  Therefore  the      expression "Court" will have to be under- 856      stood as  defined in  section 2 (c) of the Act, only if      there is  nothing repugnant  in the subject or context.      It  is  in  that  light  that  the  expression  "Court"      occurring in  section 14 (2) of the Act will have to be      understood and  interpreted. It  was  this  Court  that      appointed Shri  V.S. Desai  on  January  29,  1971,  by      consent of  parties, as  an arbitrator  and to make his      award. It  will be seen that no further directions were      given in  the said  order which will indicate that this      Court had  not divested  itself of  its jurisdiction to      deal with  the award  or matters  arising  out  of  the      award. In  fact, the  indications are  to the contrary.      The direction  in the  order dated January 29, 1971, is      that the  arbitrator is "to make his award". Surely the      law contemplates  further steps  to be  taken after the      award has  been made, and quite naturally the forum for      taking the further action is only this Court. There was      also direction  to the  effect that  the parties are at

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    liberty to  apply for  extension of time for making the      award. In  the absence  of any  other court having been      invested with  such jurisdiction by the order, the only      conclusion that is possible is that such a request must      be made  only to  the court  which passed  that  order,      namely, this Court.      That this  Court retained  complete  control  over  the      arbitration proceedings  is made  clear by  its  orders      dated February  1, 1971  and April  30,  1971.  On  the      former  date,   after  hearing  counsel  for  both  the      parties, this  Court gave  direction that the record of      the arbitration proceedings be called for and delivered      to the  sole arbitrator  Mr. V.S.  Desai. On the latter      date, again,  after hearing  the  counsel,  this  Court      extended the  time for  making the award by four months      and  further  permitted  the  arbitrator  to  hold  the      arbitration proceedings  at Bombay.  The nature  of the      order passed  on January  29, 1971,  and the subsequent      proceedings, referred  to above, clearly show that this      Court  retained   full  control  over  the  arbitration      proceedings.      Mr. Shroff  referred us  to the  fact that in the order      dated January  29, 1971,  it is  clearly  stated:  "The      appeal is  allowed". According  to him, when the appeal      has come  to an  end finally,  this Court  had lost all      jurisdiction regarding the arbitration proceedings, and      therefore the 857      filing of  the award,  should be  only in  the court as      defined in section 2 (c) of the Act. Here again, we are      not inclined  to accept  the contention  of Mr. Shroff.      That the  appeal was  allowed, is no doubt correct. But      the appeal  was allowed  by setting  aside the order of      the High  Court and  this Court  in turn  appointed Mr.      V.S. Desai as the sole arbitrator. All other directions      contained in  the order dated January 29, 1971, and the      further proceedings,  as pointed  out earlier, indicate      the retention  of full  control by  this Court over the      arbitration proceedings". The reasoning  therein will  mutatis mutandis  apply to  the facts which  are more  or less  identical in the case before us. Therefore, both on principle and on authority this Court alone will have jurisdiction for the filing of the award.      Mr. Narula contended that the decision of this Court in Kumbha Mawji  v. Union  of  India  (1)  will  indicate  that section 31  (4) is  not confined  to applications made after the  reference  is  made  or  during  the  pendency  of  the reference but  may take within its sweep an application made earlier to  the reference  being made.  And that  if such an application is  made that court alone will have jurisdiction to entertain  subsequent applications.  Proceeding from this basis Mr.  Narula contended  that  the  initial  application under section  20 for  filing the  arbitration agreement was made to  Delhi High  Court and,  therefore,  all  subsequent applications will  have to  be made  to that court alone. In Kumbha Mawji’s  case a  contention was  raised  before  this Court that section 31 (4) is merely confined to applications during the course of pendency of a reference to arbitration. This Court  after analysing  the scheme  of section 31, held that there  is no  conceivable reason  why  the  legislature should have intended to confine the operation of sub-section (4) only  to applications  made during  the pendency  of  an arbitration,  if   as  is  contended,  the  pharse  ’in  any reference’ is  to be  taken as  meaning ’in  the course of a reference’. Ultimately  this Court  held that the phrase ’in

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any reference’  used in  sub-section (4) of section 31 means ’in the course of any reference’, and concluded that section 31, sub-section (4) would vest exclusive jurisdiction in the court in which an application for the filing of an award has been first  made under section 14 of the Act. We fail to see how this  decision would  help in  answering the  contention canvassed on behalf of the 858 appellant. In  fact the  decision in Kumbha Mawji’s case was further explained by this Court in Union of India v. Surjeet Singh Atwal.(1)  The  contention  in  the  latter  case  was whether an  application under section 34 of the Act for stay of the  suit was  an application  made in a reference within the meaning  of section  31 (4)  of the  Act and, therefore, subsequent application  can only  be made  to that  court in which stay  of the  suit was  prayed for. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Kumbha Mawji’s case urging that the  expression ’in any reference’ under section 31 (4) of the  Act is  comprehensive enough  to  cover  application first made  after the  arbitration is  completed and a final award  made   and  the   subsection  is   not  confined   to applications made  during the  pendency of  the  arbitration proceeding. Negativing  this contention this Court held that accepting the  wider meaning  given to  the phrase  ’in  any reference’ as  implying ’in  the course  of a  reference’ an application under  section 34  is not  an application  in  a reference within  the meaning of the phrase as elaborated in Kumbha Mawji’s  case.  The  Court  took  notice  of  various sections under  which an  application can  be made  before a reference has  been made.  Therefore, the decision in Kumbha Mawji’s case would not mean that a proceeding earlier to the reference in  a court  would clothe  that  court  with  such jurisdiction as to render the provision contained in section 31 (4) otiose.      Mr. Narula  lastly urged  that if  this Court  were  to arrogate jurisdiction  to itself  by putting  on sub-section (4) of  section 31 a construction as canvassed for on behalf of the  1st respondent it would deprive the appellant of its valuable right  to prefer an appeal under the Letters Patent and  approach   this  Court   under  Article   136  of   the Constitution. If  this Court  has jurisdiction  to entertain the award and this Court in view of section 31 (4) alone has jurisdiction for  entertaining the  award meaning  that  the award has  to be filed in this Court alone and no other, the same cannot be defeated by a specious plea that the right of appeal would  be denied.  In an  identical situation in M/s. Saith Skelton  (P) Ltd. case, this Court held that the award has to  be filed  in this  Court alone which would certainly negative an  opportunity to appeal because this is the final court. Conceding  as  held  by  this  Court  in  Garikapattl Veeraya v.  N. Subbiah  Choudhury, (2)  that  the  right  of appeal is  a vested  right and  such a  right to  enter  the superior court accrues to the litigant 859 and exists as on and from the date the lis commences, by the view A  we are taking such a right is not denied or defeated because the  highest court  to which  one can come by way of appeal will  entertain all  contentions that  may have to be canvassed on behalf of the appellant. The door of this Court is not  being closed  to the  appellant. In fact the door is being held  wide ajar for him to raise all contentions which one can  raise in  a proceeding  in an  originating summons. Therefore, we see no merit in this contention and it must be rejected.      Accordingly we allow CMP 14079 of 1977 and declare that

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this  Court  is  the  Court  having  exclusive  jurisdiction wherein the  award dated  November 11, 1977, should be filed and we  further direct  the 1st  respondent to  approach the Registrar of  the Delhi Court to collect the award alongwith the record  of proceedings  of the  3rd  respondent  in  the reference made  by this  Court and the same be filed in this Court. We  direct that  on the  receipt of the Award and the proceedings a  notice of  the filing  of the award should be issued to  the appellant  and the  1st  respondent  and  the further proceedings should be held. The costs of the present hearing will abide the final outcome of the matter. V.D.K.                                     Petition allowed. 860