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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1586 of 2006

PETITIONER: Gurpreet Singh Bhullar & Anr

RESPONDENT: Union of India & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/03/2006

BENCH: H.K. SEMA & Dr. AR  LAKSHMANAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P. (C ) No. 904 of 2006)

H.K.SEMA,J.

               Leave granted.  

               The challenge in this petition is to the order dated  3.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at  Chandigarh in C.W.P.No.15847-CAT of 2004.                 The background facts:                 Respondent No.5 Sukhmohinder Singh was  appointed as Deputy Superintendent of Police on 27.10.1988  and was confirmed on the said post on 26.02.90.  In December  1991, he was made Superintendent of Police in his own rank  and pay and thereafter promoted as S.P. on adhoc basis in the  year 1994.                  A case No.RC 2(S)/94 was registered against the  respondent under Section 120-B, 342/365 IPC by the CBI and  is pending before the Special CBI Court, Ambala.  A  chargesheet was filed on 1.7.2000.  By a letter dated  24.3.2001, the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs,  determined the year-wise vacancies - 4 for the year 1999, 3 for  the year 2000, and nil for the year 2001.    The Selection  Committee meeting was held on 25.1.2002 for preparation of  the year-wise list for the year 1999-2000 for promotion of the  State Police Officers to IPS Cadre of Punjab.  On 9.4.2002, a  Notification was issued by the Government of India in which  the name of Respondent No.5 was included in the select list of  1999 and 2000 at Serial Nos. 3 and 1 respectively with a  condition that the name of Respondent No.5 has been  included in the list provisionally, subject to his clearance in  Criminal Case pending against him.                  On 22.8.2004, respondent No.5 filed O.A.  No.617/PB/2000 in the Central Administrative Tribunal,  Chandigarh Bench, challenging the Notification dated  9.4.2002 seeking inter alia for issuance of direction to the  respondent to consider the claim and to issue notification of  appointment of the respondent to IPS on the basis of his name  being in the select list for the year 1999-2000.  The Central  Administrative Tribunal by its order dated 15.9.2004 directed  that respondent No.5 herein be given benefit of being placed in  the select panel of the year 1999-2000 without taking  consideration of the pendency of the criminal case which was  registered against him on 18.4.1994.   It was further directed  that the promotion of respondent No.5 to IPS should remain  subject to the outcome of the result of criminal case pending  against him.  It was further directed that the promotion so

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made on provisional basis could be cancelled in the event he is  convicted in the pending criminal case.                  Being aggrieved, the Union of India (respondent  No.1 herein) filed a Civil Writ Petition No.15847 of 2004 before  the Punjab & Haryana High Court for quashing the order of  the Tribunal.  The High Court by its order impugned  dismissed the Writ Petition.  Hence, the present special leave  petition.          In the order impugned the High Court noticed that  the criminal case was pending against the respondent NO.5  under Sections 120B, 342/365 IPC.  The High Court also  noticed that the challan was presented in the Court on  1.7.2000.  The High Court, however, in our view, committed  the fundamental error by misinterpreting the explanation 1 to  Regulation 5(5) and Regulation 7(3) of Indian Police Service  (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations 1955 (in short the  Regulation).  The High Court noticed that the chargesheet was  filed in the court on 1.7.2000.   The High Court also noticed  that Explanation 1 to Regulation 5(5) makes it clear that the  proceeding shall be treated as pending only after chargesheet  has actually been issued to the officer or filed in a court, as  the case may be.  Having noticed that the chargesheet has  been filed in the court on 1.7.2000 and Explanation 1 to  Regulation 5(5), the High Court, has erroneously came to the  conclusion as under:   "We are of the considered opinion that a  bare perusal of the Explanation 1 to  Regulation 5(5) makes it abundantly clear  that criminal proceedings could only be  held to be pending against the Officer if  the charge has been framed by the trial  court.  In the present case, undoubtedly,  the charge has not been framed."   

                                               (emphasis supplied)

On the aforesaid reasoning the High Court dismissed the Writ  Petition.                 Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, rightly  contended that the whole controversy is with regard to the  interpretation of Explanation 1 to Regulation 5(5) and  Regulation 7(3).   To appreciate the controversy in proper  perspective, Regulation 5(5) and Explanation 1 are quoted  below:- "5.  Preparation of a list of Suitable Officers:-                         xxx        xxxx        xxxx                         xxx        xxxx        xxxx 5(5) The list shall be prepared by including the  required number of names first from amongst  the officers finally classified as "Outstanding"  then from amongst those similarly classified as  "Very Good" and thereafter from amongst  those similarly classified as "Good" and the  order of names inter-se within each category  shall be in the order of their seniority in the  State Police Service.  

Provided that the name of an officer so  included in the list shall be treated as  provisional if the State Government withholds  the integrity certificate in respect of such an  officer or any proceedings departmental or  criminal are pending against him or anything  adverse against him which renders him  unsuitable for appointment to the service has

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come to the notice of the State Government.   

Provided further while preparing yearwise  select list for more than one year pursuant to  the 2nd proviso to sub regulation (1), the officer  included provisionally in any of the select list  so prepared shall be considered for inclusion  on the select list of subsequent year in  addition to the normal consideration zone and  incase he is found fit for inclusion in the  suitability list for that year on a provisional  basis such inclusion shall be in addition to the  normal size of the select list determined by the  Central Government for such year.  

EXPLANATION 1: The proceedings shall be  treated as pending only if a charge-sheet has  actually been issued to the Officer or filed in a  Court as the case may be."

                                                         (emphasis supplied)  

               Explanation 1 as quoted above will make it crystal  clear that the proceedings shall be treated as pending only if a  chargesheet has actually been issued to the officer or filed in a  Court. The language employed in the statute is unambiguous.  The Explanation nowhere states about charges having been  framed by the Trial Court.  The High Court, in our view,  erroneously read something to the Explanation, which is not  provided by the Regulation.   There is no concept of charge  being framed by the Trial Court in the context of Explanation  1 of the Regulation.                   Explanation 1 to Regulation 5(5) is further clarified  in Regulation 7(3).  Regulation 7 speaks of select list.    Regulation 7(3) reads as under: "(3). The list as finally approved by the  Commission shall from the Select List of the  members of the State Police Service.             

Provided that if an officer whose name is  included in the Select List is, after such  inclusion, issued with a charge-sheet or a  charge-sheet is filed against him in a Court of  Law, his name in the Select List shall be  deemed to be provisional."

               A conjoint reading of explanation 1 to Regulation  5(5) and proviso to Regulation 7(3) speaks about the  chargesheet being filed against an officer in a court of law.    There is no concept of charges being framed under the  Regulation.                In Prakash Kumar   vs.     State of Gujarat, (2005)  2 SCC 409, the Constitution Bench of this Court observed in  paragraph 20 at  SCC p.423 thus: "20.  Before we proceed to consider the rigours  of Sections 15 and 12 we may at this stage  point out that it is a trite law that the  jurisdiction of the Court to interpret a statute  can be invoked only in case of ambiguity. The  Court cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or  intention when the language of the statute is  plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic  construction may not always be given effect to.  Courts should avoid a construction which  would reduce the legislation to futility. It is

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also well settled that every statute is to be  interpreted without any violence to its  language. It is also trite that when an  expression is capable of more than one  meaning, the court would attempt to resolve  the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the  purpose of the provision, having regard to the  consequences of the alternative constructions."         In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC  577, the three judge-Bench of this Court pointed out in  paragraphs 35 and 37 ( SCC p. 588) and (SCC p. 589) as  under:- "35.In a case where the statutory provision is plain  and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the  same in a different manner, only because of harsh  consequences arising therefrom." "37. The Court’s jurisdiction to interpret a statue  can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is  well known that in a given case the court can iron  out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of  the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation  or intention when the language of the provision is  plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract  words to a statue or read something into it which is  not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is  also necessary to determine that there exists a  presumption that the legislature has not used any  superfluous words. It is well settled that the real  intention of the legislation must be gathered from  the language used. It may be true that use of the  expression "shall or may" is not decisive for arriving  at a finding as to whether the statue is directory or  mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must  be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also  equally well settled that when negative words are  used the courts will presume that the intention of  the legislature was that the provisions are  mandatory in character." (See also Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of  India 1992 Supp (l) SCC 594 at SCC p.624, para  67)   In the case of Balram Kumawat v. Union of India  (2003) 7 SCC 628 the three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed  out in paragraph 23 at SCC p. 635 as under:- "Furthermore, even in relation to a penal statute  any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical  construction may not always be given effect to. The  law would have to be interpreted having regard to  the subject-matter of the offence and the object of  the law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is  not to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes  of law. Criminal jurisprudence does not say so." and further in paragraph 30 at SCC pp.638-39 it was pointed  out as under:- "30. Yet again in Supdt. And Remembrancer of  Legal Affiars to Govt. of W.B. v. Abani Maity  (1979)  4 SCC 85, the law is stated in the following terms:  (SCC p.90, para 18) "19{18}. Exposition ex visceribus actus is  a long-recognised rule of construction.  Words in a statue often take their  meaning from the context of the statute  as a whole. They are therefore, not to be  construed in isolation. For instance, the  use of the word ’may’ would normally

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indicate that the provision was not  mandatory. But in the context of a  particular statute, this word may connote  a legislative imperative, particularly when  its construction in a permissive sense  would relegate it to the unenviable  position, as it were, ’of an in effectual  angel beating its wings in a luminous  void in vain’. ’If the choice is between two  interpretations’, said Viscount Simon,  L.C. In Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated  Collieries, Ltd. 1940 AC 1014 at AC   p.1022) ’the narrower of which would fail to achieve the  manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid  a construction which would reduce the legislation to  futility and should rather accept the bolder  construction based on the view that Parliament  would legislate only for the purpose of bringing  about an effective result’".                 The interpretation of the statute assigned by the  Division Bench of the High Court as sought to be done in the  present case, if accepted, would negate the intendment of the  Legislature and frustrate the statute itself.  In fact, there is no  ambiguity in the statute, which would require interpretation  negating the intendment of the Legislature as sought to be  done by the High Court.                  Filing of chargesheet is preceded by an indepth  investigation. Charges are filed in Court when the prima facie  case is established in course of the investigation.  The  intendment of the Legislature is that a person who is charged  with a criminal offence in which charge is filed in court and  the case being pending for trial, that too against a police  officer, the inclusion of such officer in the list shall be treated  as provisional.  The dangerous interpretation assigned to the  statute by  the High Court would negate the intendment of the  Legislature.  In our view, the High Court has committed grave  fundamental error of law and the same is unsustainable in  law.         Mr. L.Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel, in his  usual fairness submitted that he is not persuaded to join in  issue on the interpretation of regulations.   He, however,  challenged the locus standi of the appellants herein.    According to him, the appellants are not aggrieved parties and  the Special Leave Petition is not maintainable.  It is his say,  that in the vacancies considered there were four vacancies in  1999 and three vacancies in 2000 and the zone of  consideration is one to three in each vacancy. The appellant  No.1 being in Sl.No.53 of the seniority list and appellant No.2  in serial No.27 of the seniority list, they do not possess any  right to be considered for promotion to the post occupied by  the respondent No.5 and as such they are not aggrieved  parties.  He relied on the decision of this Court rendered in the  case of  Gopabandhu Biswal   vs.  Krishna Chandra  Mohanty (1998) 4 SCC 447 where this Court in paragraphs 13  and 14 at SCC pp.454-455 held that only aggrieved party has  locus standi to challenge the decision.   He also referred to  the decision of this Court in the case of  Dr.Duryodhan Sahu    vs.   Jitendra Kumar Mishra (1998) 7 SCC 273, and the  decision of this Court rendered in the case of  Dattaraj  Nathuji Thaware   vs.  State of Maharashtra (2005) 1 SCC  590,  where this Court held that the PIL is not maintainable in   service matters.          This contention need not detain us any longer.   Because, permission to file SLP has already been granted by

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this Court on 6.1.2006.         Be that as it may, in this case both the Union Public  Service Commission and Union of India have filed counter in  support of the appellants.  Union Public Service Commission-  respondent No. 4 has in paragraph 5(d) and 5(e) supported the  contentions of the appellants that the Writ Petition filed by the  Commission was dismissed inter alia on the wrong  interpretation of the Regulations by the High Court. Union of  India \026 respondent No.1, also filed counter in support of the  appellants.  It is contended inter alia in the counter that the  Union of India and the Union Public Service Commission were  also intended to file Special Leave Petition before this Court  and because of that reason the appointment of Respondent  No.5 was made subject to the right of the Government and  that of Union Public Service Commission to file the Petition  before this Court.  However, since the petitioners have filed  Special Leave Petition, they, instead of filing separate Special  Leave Petitions filed counter in support of the petitioners.                     On the assertion that the appellants are not  aggrieved parties and the Special Leave Petition is not  maintainable, counsel for the appellants, contended that in  fact vacancies in 1999-2000 were carried forward to 2002.  In  2002, 8 vacancies were considered and the seniority of  appellant No.1 was in serial No.24 and the appellant No.2 was  in serial No.12.  It is further contended that had one vacancy  in favour of respondent No.5 was not wrongly considered both  the appellant nos. 1 and 2 could have been well within the  zone of consideration.  Their rights to be considered has been  deprived and, therefore, they are the aggrieved parties.                       Counsel also referred to the counter filed by the  Special Secretary, Government of Punjab, Department of  Home Affairs and Justice, on behalf of the respondents No.2  and 3.  It is stated that both the appellants are direct recruit  DSP’s of 1990-91 batch.  They have more than eight years of  service and were eligible for consideration during the selection  committee meeting held on 25.1.2002 for preparation of select  list for the year 1999-2000.  In view of the categorical stand  taken by the Government of Punjab in its counter it cannot be  said that the appellants are not within the zone of  consideration and that they are not the aggrieved parties.                 In the view we have taken, the impugned order of  the High Court is not legally sustainable.  It is, accordingly,  quashed and set aside.  Consequently, the Notification dated  30.9.2005 is also quashed.  The appeal is allowed with no  order as to costs.