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PETITIONER: GURCHARAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/09/1972

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1972 AIR 2661            1973 SCR  (1) 197  1972 SCC  (2) 749  CITATOR INFO :  R          1973 SC 469  (11)  RF         1980 SC1252  (3)  F          1983 SC 911  (9)

ACT: Indian  Pental Code (Act 45 of 1860). ss.362. 366  and  376- Girl  under 16 years forced to go to a place where rape  was committed  on her-Effect of absence of marks of violence  or person of victim. Prctice-Sexual offence-Necessitv for corroboration.

HEADNOTE: A  girl  under 16 years was induced to go  to  a  particular house  from where she was threatened to go to the  house  of the  appellant who ’forcibly took her to his  fields,outside the  village and committed rape on her.  The  appellant  was convicted  for  offences, under ss. 366 and 376  I.P.C.  The medical  evidence showed that there was penetration  but  no marks of violence on the victim’s person. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD  :  (1)  The  gravamen of  the  offence  was  that  the appellant  forced the girl to go with him to the  fields  to commit rape on her and this constitutes abduction punishable under  s.  362 and 366, I.P.C. There is no question  of  any kidnapping from lawful guardianship or the appellant  taking or enticing her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian or later  taking  her away for illicit  purpose  from  unlawful custody. [201A-E] State v. Gopichand, A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 282, held inapplicable. (2)  Under s. 375, I.P.C. read with the Explanation, where a person on whom rape  is committed is under 16 years of  age, her consent is immaterial     and penetration is  sufficient to  constitute  the  offence.  In  the  present  case,  mere absence of marks of violence on the person of the victim  is immaterial  because,  that  would  merely  suggest  want  of voilent   resistance   on   her   part   which   is   wholly inconsequential since she is under 16 years of age. [201G-R] (3)  In  cases  of sexual offences the  prosecutrix  is  not considered as an accomplice and her testimony is not equated with  that of an accomplice in an offence.  It is only as  a rule  of  prudence  that  courts  normally  look  for   some corroboration  of  her  testimony so  as  to  satisfy  their

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conscience that she is telling the truth and that the person accused  of  rape on her is not  being  falsely  implicated. [202G-H] In the present case, the, testimony of the victim by it-self is  impressive enough to render it safe for  sustaining  the appellant’s conviction.  Moreover, the rescue of the  victim from  the  appellant’s sugarcane field, her  complaint  soon thereafter to the prosecution witnesses about the  abduction and  the rape, the later recovery of some broken  pieces  of bangles  from  the  scene of  occurrence,  and  the  medical evidence, fully corroborate testimoney. [205A-D] Rameshwar  V.  State of Rajasthan, [1952],  S.C.R.  177  and Sidheswar Gangully v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 143 followed. Janardan  Tewari  v.  State of Bihar, [1971]  3  S.C.C.  927 referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cr.  A. No. 232 of 1969. 198 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November  28,  1968 of the Punjab & Haryana  High  Court  at Chandigarh, in Criminal Appeal No. 633 of 1968. Bal  Rai  Trika, N. S. Das Behl and Sat Pal Arora,  for  the appellant. Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUA, J. This is an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the  Constitution.  The appellant Gurcharan Singh, his  ser- vant  Shri  Sanjha Ram, Dalip Singh, his wife  Smt.   Surjit Kaur and under the latter section to, rigorous  imprisonment for four Sessions Judge, Kamal on charges under ss. 366, 368 and  376,  Indian Penal Code.  Gurcharan  Singh,  appellant, with whom alone we are concerned in this appeal was  charged with  commission of offences under ss. 366 and  376,  I.P.C. The  trial  court  acquitted Phullan  and  Surjit  Kaur  but convicted Gurcharan Singh, appellant, under ss. 366 and 376, I.P.C.  sentencing him under the former section to  rigorous imprisonment for three years and under the latter section to rigorous  imprisonment for four years and fine of  Rs.  200, with  further  rigorous imprisonment for six months  in  the event  of  default  in payment  of  fine.   The  substantive sentences   were  to  run  concurrently.   Sanjha  Ram   was convicted  under  s. 376, I.P.C. and sentenced  to  rigorous imprisonment  for  four years and a fine of  Rs.  200,  with further  rigorous  imprisonment for six months  in  case  of default in payment of fine.  He was also convicted under  s. 368,I.P.C.  and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment  for  two years.  The substantive sentences were to run  concurrently. Dalip  Singh  was  convicted  under  s.  366,  I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and  fine of Rs. 200 with further rigorous imprisonment for six months in the event of default. On  appeal a learned single Judge of the Punjab and  Haryana High Court upheld these convictions and sentences. The  prosecution  story,  as  upheld  by  both  the  learned Sessions  Judge and the High Court, is that Smt.   Paramajit Kaur  (prosecutrix),  a young girl under 16  years  of  age, whose  father Avtar Singh, had served in the Army from  1947 to  1967  and  was, according to the High Court,  a  man  of meagre means went out in the evening of November 26, 1967 to case herself.  When she’ was returning home Surjit Kaur  and Phullan met her and induced her to visit Dalip Singh’s house

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so  that she may be given nice clothes.  On  reaching  Dalip Singh’s  house she was handed over to him.  By then  it  had grown  dark.  Dalip Singh threatened her- with a  knife  and asked her to accompany him.  He took her 199 to the appellant’s baithak (sitting room) closeby and  after handing  her over to the appellant, Dalip Singh  went  away. The  appellant  threatened Paramjit Kaur with a  pistol  and took  her to his fields outside the village and in the  room where his tube-well Machine was installed he committed  rape on  her twice.  After a couple of hours Sanjha  Ram  arrived there.   The appellant then went away leaving Paramjit  Kaur in  Sanjha  Ram’s custody.  During the  appellant’s  absence Sanjha  Rain  also  committed rape  on  After  sometime  the appellant  returned  with a bedding and  food  for  Paramjit Kaur.   But she declined to eat anything.  The  whole  night she was kept in that room where the appellant and Sanjha Ram both  committed rape on her.  On the following  morning  the appellant  left  her  in the custody of Sanjha  Ram  with  a direction  that  some  customer should  be  found  for  her. Sanjha Ram used to take Paramjit Kaur to the sugarcane field during  day time and bring her back to the room  during  the night.  Sanjha raped her even in the sugarcane field. In  the meantime, when Paramjit Kaur did not return home  on November  26,  1967, her uncle, Shingara Singh,  her  father Avtar Singh and some others began searching for her in their village  and  also in the other near  by  villages.   Having failed in their search, first information report was  lodged on  the  morning  of November 29, 1967  by  Shingara  Singh, younger  brother  of Avtar Singh, with  the  police  station Ladwa,  about  two miles away from  village  Nawarsi,  where Paramjit  Kaur  resided  with  her  parents.   The   offence mentioned  in  the  F.I.R. was  under  ss.  363/366,  I.P.C. Suspicion  was  cast in the F.I.R. on Dalip Singh,  his  son Trilok  Singh,  his  wife  Surjit  Kaur,  Gurcharan   Singh, appellant  and his wife because Paramjit Kaur used to go  to their house which was located in the neighborhood.  The same day  viz  :  November 29, Anokhi Singh  (P.W.  6)  felt  the presence  of  some persons in Gurcharan  Singh,  appellant’s sugarcane field which is near to his own sugarcane field and conveyed  this information to Col.  Harnam Singh, (P.W.  4). Thereupon Col.  Harnam Singh, along with Jagjit Singh,  Gian Singh,  Rachpal  Singh  Chima, Rachhpal  Singh  Nagra,  Gian Chand, Kishan Singh and Anokh Singh, the informant, went  to the  sugarcane  field of Gurcharan Singh,  where,  they  saw Paramjit  Kaur and Sanjha Ram.  The latter tried to  escape, but was secured.  Paramjit Kaur narrated the whole story  of what  had happened since the evening of November  26,  1967. Paramjit Kaur and Sanjha Ram were’ then taken to the  police station Ladwa.  On the way they met S.I. Balwant Singh,  who was coming to village Nawarsi for investigation pursuant  to the  information  lodged by Shingara Singh,  uncle  (if  the prosecutrix.   The  Sub-Tnspector, on  meeting  this  party, recorded  the statement of the prosecutrix and of the  other witnesses accompanying her.  Paramjit Kaur was got  examined by 200 lady  doctor K. Kaushalya, Medical Officer, Civil  Hospital, Karnal  at  about 7 p.m. who found a tear on  the  posterior margin of her hymen which bled on examination.  In the  lady doctor’s opinion rape had been committed on her about  three or  four  days prior to the examination.   In  the  doctor’s opinion the healing process of the hymen was- going on.  She also  examined her for finding her age.   X-ray  examination for determining the age of the prosecutrix was also taken by

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Dr.  L.  R.  Sardana,  Radiologist  in  the  same  hospital. According  to both Dr. Sardana and Dr. Kaushalya the age  of the prosecutrix could be between 15 and 16 years.  She,  was clearly under 16 years. The  prosecutrix appeared as P.W. 3 and narrated  the  whole story in a straightforward manner.  She had off and on  been going to the house of Gurcharan Singh, appellant, during the last four or five years and also borrowing odd articles from the appellant’s wife.  The appellant’s wife also used to pay visits to Paramjit Kaur’s house.  On the evening of November 26 Paramjit Kaur who, like all young girls, was fond of nice clothes, was induced by Surjit Kaur, wife of Dalip Singh  to go  with her to see new clothe.  Surjit Kaur wanted to  sell those  clothes.  Thus induced the prosecutrix was  taken  to Dalip  Singh and handed over to him.  The  prosecutrix  had, however,  never been to the house of Sanjha Ram  her  cross- examination an attempt was made on behalf of the accused  to elicit  from  her if there was any animosity  or  litigation between  Dalip Singh on the one side and Shingara Singh  and Anokh  Singh  on the other but Paramjit Kaur  expressed  her ignorance  about, it.  She also denied the  suggestion  that she had gone out on.  November 26 of her own accord and  had herself  returned home on the 28th.  She was  cross-examined at great length but her credibility remained unshaken.  Lady doctor  K. Kaushalya’s statement recorded in the  committing magistrate’s court was brought on the record of the Sessions Court  where  she  was  also  further  examined  and  cross- examined.   Nothing was elicited to discredit her  evidence. Harnam  Singh (P.W. 4) who is a Sarpanch and a  retired  Lt. Colonel  from the Army has deposed about the  circumstances, in  which at about 11.30 a.m. on November 29, 1967,  he  and others,  when considering their future course of action  and plan  for  making further search for Paramjit  Kaur,  learnt from  Anokh  Singh  about the presence  of  someone  in  the sugarcane field of Gurcharan Singh and on going there  found Paramjit Kaur and Sanjha Ram.  The main challenge on  behalf of the appellant has been that this Harnam Singh has  enmity with  the  appellant and that he has  been  instrumental  in falsely implicating the appellant in this case. As already observed, the two courts below have accepted  the prosecution  version  and convicted the appellant  for  both offerings viz : under ss. 366 and 376, I.P.C.

201 In  this Court the first objection raised on behalf  of  the appellant  against his prosecution and conviction  under  s. 366,   I.P.C.  is  that  kidnaping  and  abduction  of   the prosecutrix was. complete as soon as she was induced by  the two ladies to accompany them.  In support of this submission reliance  has been placed on a decision of the  Bombay  High Court  reported as State v. Gopichand(l).  This decision  is wholly  unhelpful  to  the  appellant.   According  to  this decision,  when  a minor girl was kidnapped by  A  from  the lawful custody of her husband, her subsequent taking away by B,  who was no, party to the original kidnapping,  from  the unlawful  custody  of A, for illicit intercourse,  does  not amount  to  kidnapping  and B is not guilty  under  s.  366. Plainly the ratio of this decision has no application to the case  in hand.  There is no question of any kidnapping  from the lawful custody in the present case, the real gravamen of the  offence  here being that  Gurcharan  Singh,  appellant, induced the prosecutrix by threatening her with a pistol  to go  with him to the room in his fields where  his  tube-well was  fixed and there he committed rape on her, Section  362,

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I.P.C.,  which defines abduction lays down that  whoever  by force  compels or by any deceitful means induces any  person to  go, from any place is said to abduct that person.   The, appellant’s  case  clearly  falls  within  this  definition. Kidnapping  from lawful guardianship Which offence  was  the subject matter of discussion in Gopichand’s case (supra)  is defined  in s. 361, I.P.C. and according to that  definition undoubtedly taking or enticing any minor out of the  keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor completes the  offence. That  is  not  the case before  us.   The  first  challenge, therefore, fails. The counsel has then contended that there was no question of the commission of rape in this case and for that purpose  he has  tried  to seek support from the medical  evidence.   We consider  it  unnecessary  to  deal  at  length  with   this argument,  which,  in face of the medical evidence  and  the statement  of the prosecutrix, does not seem to possess  any merit, ’Me suggestion that, there being no marks of violence on  the  private  parts or elsewhere on the  person  of  the prosecutrix,  there could be no offence of rape on  her,  is wholly  misconceived.   Rape  has been defined  in  s.  375, I.P.C., according to which a man is said to commit "  rape", who,  except  in  the cases  therein  excepted,  has  sexual intercourse  with a woman under circumstances falling  under any  of the five descriptions stated therein.  We  need  not deal  with all the descriptions.  Suffice it to  point  _out that  where a person on whom rape is committed is  under  16 years of age, even consent is immaterial (vide fifthly of s. 375) and penetration is sufficient to constitute the  sexual intercourse  necessary  to  the  offence  of  rape  (vide  : explana- (1)  A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 282. 202 tion  to s. 375.) No attempt has been made on behalf of  the appellant  to  take his case out of  these  provisions.   No other  argument  was addressed on the basis of  the  medical evidence  for  contending  that  there  was  no  penetration except,  as  already  noted, that there  were  no  marks  of violence on the person of the prosecutrix.  That is  clearly immaterial  ’because  that  would  merely  suggest  want  of violent resistance on the part of the prosecutrix, which  is wholly  Inconsequential  when the prosecutrix  is  under  16 years of age.  Absence of violent or stiff resistance in the present case may as well suggest, helpless surrender to  the inevitable due to sheer timidity.  In any event her  consent would  not take the case out of the definition of rape.   So far  as  the  age of the prosecutrix  is  concerned,  it  is noteworthy that in the High Court her age was not questioned at  least  by  the  counsel appearing  for  Dalip  Singh  as expressly noticed in the impugned judgment.  Even on  behalf of Gurcharan Singh, appellant, we do not find any  challenge to  the  age of the prosecutrix in the High Court.   In  any event  the High Court considered the evidence on  the  point and  believing the testimony of Tilak Raj (P.W. 8),  who  is the  head master of the school in which the prosecutrix  had been  studying,  and  the  evidence of  the  mother  of  the prosecutrix, came to the conclusion that her date of  birth- was  April  10, 1952 and, therefore, she was  less  than  16 years of age on the date of the occurrence.  This conclusion is unquestionable. Indeed,  before us the conclusion of the High Court  on  the age of the prosecutrix was not assailed. The  point most seriously canvassed in this Court on  behalf of  the  appellant was that the solitary  statement  of  the prosecutrix without corroboration in material particulars is

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not enough to sustain the conviction of the appellant.   The learned counsel appearing for Gurcharan Singh contended that Dalip Singh and Sanjha Ram may have rightly convicted.   But so  far as the appellant is concerned the  evidence  against him is neither reliable nor sufficient for bringing home  to him  the  offence of abduction and rape  beyond  reasonable doubt.  The basic question which, therefore. arises is as to how far the testimony of the prosecutrix before us can  form the basis of the appellant’s conviction.  It is well-settled that  the prosecutrix cannot be considered as an  accomplice and, therefore, her-testimony cannot be equated with that of an  accomplice  in  an  offence.  As  a  rule  of  prudence, however, court normally looks for some corroboration of  her testimony  so  as  to satisfy its  conscience  that  she  is telling the truth and that the person accused of rape on her has  not  been falsely implicated.  The matter  is  not  res integra  and  this Court has, on more  occasions  than  one, considered and enunciated the legal position.  In  Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan(1) this Court observed: (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 377. 203 .lm15 "Now  a woman who has been raped is not an  accomplice.   If she  was ravished she is the victim of an outrage.   If  she consented  there  is  no. offence unless she  is  a  married woman,  in which case questions of adultery may arise.   But adultery  presupposes  consent  and so is not  on  the  same footing as rape.  In the case of a girl who is below the age of  consent,  her  consent will not matter  so  far  as  the offence  of  rape  is concerned, but if  she  consented  her testimony  will  naturally  be  as suspect  as  that  of  an accomplice.  So also in the case of unnatural offences.  But in  all these cases a large volume of case law has grown  up which treats the evidence of the complainant somewhat  along the  same  lines  as accomplice evidence  though  often  for widely  different  reasons and the position now  reached  is that  the rule about corroboration has hardened into one  of law.   But  it is important to understand exactly  what  the rule  is  and what the expression ’hardened into a  rule  of law’ means." After  referring to the well-known English decision in  King v.  Baskerville(1)  from  which the,  observations  of  Lord Reading,  the  Lord Chief Justice of England,  were,  quoted with  approval, the law in India was, stated to  be  exactly the same so far as the accomplices are concerned and it  was observed that in case of sexual offences it could not be any higher.  The view taken by the High Court in that case  that as  a matter of law no conviction without corroboration  was possible   was   disapproved.    The   true   rule,    after consideration of decided cases is stated thus :               "In my opinion, the true rule is that in every               case   of  this  type  the  rule   about   the               advisability   of  corroboration   should   be               present to the mind of the judge.  In a  _jury               case he must fell the jury of it and in a non-               jury  case he must show that it is present  to               his  mind by indicating that in his  judgment.               But   he   should   also   point   out    that               corroboration can be dispensed with if, in the               particular  circumstances of the  case  before               him,  either  the jury, or, when there  is  no               jury, he himself, is satisfied that it is safe               to  do so.  The rule, which according ,to  the               cases  has  hardened into one of law,  is  not               that  corroboration is essential before  there

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             can be a conviction but that the necessity  of               corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except               where  the  circumstances  make  it  safe   to               dispense with it, must be present to the  mind               of  the  judge, and in jury cases,  must  find               place  in  the  charge,  before  a  conviction               without  corroboration can be sustained.   The               tender years of the child, coupled               (1)   [1916] 2 K.B. 658.               204               with  other  circumstances  appearing  in  the               case,  such,  for example  as  its  demeanour,               unlikelihood  of  tutoring and so  forth,  may               render corroboration unnecessary but that is a               question of fact in every case.  The only rule               of  law is that this rule of prudence must  be               present  to the mind of the judge or the  jury               as  the  case  may be and  be  understood  and               appreciated by him or them.  There is no  rule               of practice that there must, in every case, be               corroboration  before  a  conviction  can   be               allowed to stand." Adverting to the nature and extent of corroboration required when  it  is not considered safe to dispense  with  it  this Court added :               "It  would be impossible, indeed it  would  be               dangerous  to formulate the kind  of  evidence               which   should,  or  would,  be  regarded   as               corroboration.   Its  nature and  extent  must               necessarily  vary with circumstances  of  each               case  and  also according  to  the  particular               circumstances of the offence charged." In Sidheswar Ganguly v. State of West Bengal(1) the decision in.  Ramashwar’s case (supra) was approved and it was  added that the nature of the corroborative evidence should be such as  to lend assurance that the evidence of  the  prosecutrix can be safely acted upon. In Janardan Tewari v. State of Bihar(2) it was observed               "We are satisfied that this girl was raped and               we  have  only to find out  who  the  culprits               were.  In this connection, the law is that the               evidence   of   the   prosecutrix   must    be               corroborated  in some measure to  connect  the               accused.  Enough corroboration is available in               this  case from the evidence of Bir Kumar  who               gave  the  information  to  his  grand  mother               immediately   after  the  incident  and   also               deposed on oath in Court.  Bir Kumar Singh  is               a  young boy aged 12 years and  therefore,  we               have to be cautious about accepting his testi-               mony.   We have read his evidence.  Bir  Kumar               Singh  was  closely  questioned  to  find  out               whether he understood nature of evidence,  and               whether  he was capable of giving  answers  to               the questions put to him.  The Sessions  Judge               was  satisfied that Bir Kumar was a  competent               witness  and his statement struck us as  being               rue." (1) 1958 S.C. 143.  (2) [1971] 3 S.C.C. 927. 205 In  the  present case Paramjit Kaur stated  to  Hamam  Singh (P.W.  4) as soon as he and his companions found her in  the appellant’s sugarcane field as to how she had been  abducted andhow the appellant and Sanjha Ram had committed rape  on her. She  wept when she narrated the story. The recovery  of

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the   prosecutrix  and  Sanjha  Ram  from  the   appellant’s sugarcane  field, her complaint to Harnam Singh  and  others about the abduction and rape and the later recovery  of some broken pieces of banglesfrom  the said field  and  the medical  evidence,  in our opinion,  fully  corroborate  the testimony   of   the   prosecutrix   which   even    without corroboration seems to us to be impressive enough torender it  safe for sustaining the appellant’s conviction.  Nothing at all has been elicited from, her lengthy cross-examination by  more  than  one  defence counsel  so  as  to  shake  her credibility.  Her statement suggesting  slight  exaggeration with respect tothreats shown to her by Dalip Singh  and by the appellant doesriot   affect  the  truth  of   her testimony on the real material point.A   common   village girl of less than 16 years’ that she is, due allowance must be made for the statement elicited from her incourt during  cross-examination  by counsel or  the  defence.  Her recovery   virtually from the custody of Sanjha Ram has been proved  not  only by Harnam Singh (P-W4) but also  by  Pyara Singh  (P.W. 5) and Anokh Singh (P.W. 6) and we do not  find any cogent ground for doubting this part of the  prosecution case. The  appellant in his defence pleaded alibi. He  raised thisplea  in  his statement under s. 342, Cr. P.C.  in  the trial  court.  In the commitment court we do not  find  this plea in his statement under s. 342, Cr. P.C. where he stated that  he  would make a detailed statement in  the  court  of sessions.  He  produced  D.W. 3, Shankar  Dass,  his  cousin brother          (the appellant’s  mother’s  brother’s  son) According  to  this evidence marriage of Smt,  Iswari  Devi, sister of Sankar Dass was solemnised at Rohtak November  24, 1967.   Gurcharan Singh, according to this witness went  to Rohtak on November 23.  The marriage party arrived at Rohtak on 24th and departed on the evening of 25th.  The  appellant is said to have stayed on there for the night of the   25th. On the 26th the appellant’s son who is stated to be mentally deranged  was  to  be examined by Dr.  Vidya  Sagar  in  the Medical College Hospital, Rohtak and the appellant is stated to  have returned to Rohtak on November 27 without  his  son being  examined  by Dr. Vidya Sagar who happened  to  be  on leave.  Me appellant’s son was, however, shown to the doctor by  Shankar   Dass on November 29, 1967.  According  to  the trial  court  the appellant could easily  have  reached  his village on the evening of November 26,-a view with which  we entirely agree. High Court also did not accept the plea  of alibi and, in our 206 opinion,  rightly.  The appellant also pleaded that  he  was incapable  of  having sexual intercourse but this  plea  was belied by his medical examination.  Neither the trial  court nor   the  High  Court  accepted  the  plea.   It  is   also interesting  to  note  that  the  appellant  has  not   been consistent  in giving, his age on different  occasions.   In his application dated August 27, 1963 to the police station, Ladwa,  complaining against Harnam Singh and others that  he apprehended danger at their hands, he gave out his age to be between  30  and 32 years.  According to this  assertion  in 1967 he would be about 36 years of age.  In his  certificate of  medical examination, Ex.  PC, dated 12th December.  1967 his age is stated to be 45 years.  In his statement under s. 342  he  gave his age as 50 years.  In the  trial  court  he stated under S. 342, Cr.  P.C. that he was unable to perform sexual  intercourse  but  this plea,  as  already  observed, cannot  be  accepted in face of the result  of  his  medical examination.   A faint-hearted suggestion was thrown by  the

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appellant’s counsel that it is impossible for a medical  man to  state  whether a man is capable of  sexual  intercourse. But  this  argument  was not seriously pursued  and  in  our opinion rightly. On  a  consideration of the arguments addressed we  have  no doubt that the appellant has been rightly convicted for both the  offences.   So  far as the  question  of  sentence  is concerned it ha,,.-, to be borne in mind that the  appellant is  a  Lumbardar of his village and has also  officiated  as Sarpanch  for  some time.  Keeping in view  the  responsible position  held  by the appellant in our view.  the  sentence imposed is by no means unduly harsh.  The appeal accordingly fails  and is dismissed.  The appellant should surrender  to his bail bond to serve out the sentence. V.P.S.                             Appeal dismissed. 207