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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6835/2009  

GURCHARAN SINGH & ORS.         ...APPELLANT(S)   

VERSUS  

ANGREZ KAUR & ANR.       ...RESPONDENT(S)   

J U D G M E N T  

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.  

This is a defendant’s appeal challenging the  

judgment of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana  

dismissing the Regular Second Appeal No. 3472 of 2004  

of the appellants.  The plaintiffs-respondents suit for  

declaration was dismissed by the trial court which  

decree was reversed by First Appellate Court decreeing  

the suit.  The High Court affirmed the decree of First  

Appellate Court.       

2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to this  

appeal are:-

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2.1 One Bhajan Singh was owner of suit land situated  

in Village Siraj Majra, Tehsil Amloh, District  

Fatehgarh Sahib.  Bhajan Singh was married with  

Gurmail Kaur.  Two daughters (namely Angrez Kaur  

and Paramjit Kaur) were born to Bhajan Singh with  

Gurmail Kaur. Between Bhajan Singh and Gurmail  

Kaur, a divorce in writing was entered on  

15.09.1973 whereafter Gurmail Kaur started  

residing with one Maghar Singh, the brother of  

Bhajan Singh in village Jalowal.  Gurmail Kaur  

also took alongwith her both the daughters who  

were minors at that time to Village Jalowal where  

they all resided with Maghar Singh.    

2.2 Bhajan Singh resided in Village Siraj Majra with  

Gurcharan Singh, Gurnam Singh and Kulwant Singh,  

the appellants, who looked after Bhajan Singh.   

Bhajan Singh executed a registered Will dated  

02.09.1986 in favour of Gurcharan Singh, Gurnam  

Singh and Kulwant Singh, the appellants.  A Civil  

Suit No. 556 dated 21.09.1994 was filed by the  

appellants impleading the Bhajan Singh as the

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sole defendant praying for declaration to the  

effect that plaintiffs are the owners and in  

possession of the suit land.    

2.3 In the plaint, the plaintiff pleaded that  

defendant had executed a registered Will in  

favour of the plaintiffs, which was made as per  

defendant’s free will and consent and which was  

attested and duly registered by Sub-Registrar.   

It was further pleaded in the plaint that  

defendant effected a Family Settlement on  

15.06.1994 in which suit property was given to  

the plaintiffs in equal share.  In the suit, a  

written statement was filed by the defendant –  

Bhajan Singh on 03.12.1994 where he admitted the  

plaint allegations and also prayed that decree  

be passed in favour of the plaintiffs. On the  

same day, i.e., 03.12.1994, Bhajan Singh also  

recorded his statement in the Court, where he  

stated that averments in the plaint are correct  

and he has no objection if the suit of the  

plaintiff is decreed.   

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2.4 The Court of Additional Senior Sub Judge, Amloh  

decreed the suit on 09.01.1995.  On the basis of  

admission by the defendant of the claim of the  

plaintiffs after decree dated 09.01.1995  

mutation was also affected of the land in suit  

in favour of the plaintiff on 03.03.1995.  Bhajan  

Singh died on 24.04.1998.    

2.5 After death of Bhajan Singh both Angrez Kaur and  

Paramjit Kaur filed Civil Suit No. 167 of  

19.05.1998 praying for declaration to the effect  

that decree and judgment in Civil Suit No. 556  

of 21.09.1994 decided on 09.01.1995 in respect  

of the suit property is wrong, without  

jurisdiction, illegal, null and void,  

ineffective and inoperative qua the proprietary  

rights of the plaintiffs as heirs of the said  

Bhajan Singh.    

2.6 In the suit filed by the plaintiffs, the present  

appellants, who were impleaded as defendants  

filed a written statement refuting the plaint  

allegations.  It was pleaded by defendants-

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appellants that after divorce of Bhajan Singh  

and Gurmail Kaur on 15.09.1973, Bhajan Singh was  

residing with defendants, who were serving  

Bhajan Singh.  Bhajan Singh out of his free will  

executed a Will on 02.09.1986 in favour of the  

defendants.  In the suit filed by the defendants  

-Suit No. 556 of 21.09.1994, Bhajan Singh filed  

a statement admitting the claim of the defendants  

including the confirmation regarding execution  

of Will in favour of the defendants.  It is the  

defendants, who are in possession of suit land,  

in whose favour, mutation has also been affected.   

The plaintiffs had no concern with Bhajan Singh,  

who was residing with defendants at Village Siraj  

Majra.  The vote and ration card of Bhajan Singh  

was with the defendants, who were serving him  

like their father.  A replication was also filed  

by the plaintiffs where Family Settlement as well  

as the Will dated 02.09.1986 was denied.  The  

trial court vide its judgment and order dated  

05.03.2003 dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs.    

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2.7 The plaintiffs aggrieved by the said judgment  

filed an appeal before District Judge.  The first  

appeal filed by the plaintiffs was decreed and  

allowed by learned Additional District Judge  

vide its judgment dated 13.08.2004.  The  

defendants filed Regular Second Appeal before  

the High Court, which was dismissed by the  

impugned judgment.  This appeal has been filed  

by the defendants aggrieved with the judgment of  

the High Court.               

3. We have heard Shri Pallav Sisodia, learned senior  

counsel and Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, learned counsel  

for the appellant.  Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior  

counsel had appeared for the respondents.    

4. Shri Pallav Sisodia, learned senior counsel for  

the appellant contends that both First Appellate Court  

and High Court erred in decreeing the suit of the  

plaintiffs.  The trial court has rightly dismissed the  

suit of the plaintiffs holding that decree dated  

09.01.1995 was a valid decree, which did not require

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any registration.  The claim of the appellants of  

declaration as owner in possession of the suit property  

in Civil Suit No. 556 was admitted by Bhajan Singh, who  

filed the written statement and got recorded his  

statement admitting the claim of the plaintiffs.  The  

decree dated 09.01.1995 was not based on any fraud or  

coercion.  Bhajan Singh at his own free will had decided  

to give the suit property to the appellants, which is  

clearly depicted by executing a registered Will dated  

02.09.1986 in favour of the appellants and further  

after the decree dated 09.01.1995 accepting the  

mutation in favour of the appellants.  Divorce between  

Bhajan Singh and Gurmail Kaur took place on 15.09.1973  

and Gurmail Kaur thereafter started residing with  

Maghar Singh, brother of Bhajan Singh and never came  

back to Bhajan Singh.  There was no relation between  

Gurmail Kaur and Bhajan Singh after the divorce dated  

15.09.1973.  The plaintiffs also went alongwith Gurmail  

Kaur after the divorce and throughout lived with Maghar  

Singh and Gurmail Kaur and never came to see their  

father Bhajan Singh.  The Will dated 02.09.1986 was  

validly executed, which Will was admitted by Bhajan

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singh in his written statement filed in Suit No. 556.   

When Bhajan Singh has admitted the execution of Will  

dated 02.09.1986, Courts below committed error in not  

accepting the Will due to want of examination of  

attesting witness whereas Will was proved by the  

defendants-appellants by producing scribe, who scribed  

the Will as well as clerk from Registrar’s Office, who  

proved the registration of the Will.  It is further  

submitted that oral Family Settlement dated 15.06.1994  

giving the suit property by Bhajan Singh in favour of  

the defendants was a valid settlement even though  

defendants were not related by blood as Uncle and  

Nephew but Bhajan Singh was living with the defendants  

after the divorce throughout. Defendants treated Bhajan  

Singh as member of their family and served them.  Family  

Settlement in above facts was valid Family Settlement.   

It is not necessary that person, who is given a right  

in any property should be necessarily a blood relation.   

It is further submitted that both the First Appellate  

Court and the High Court erred in holding that  

compromise decree dated 09.01.1995 required compulsory  

registration under Section 17 of Registration Act,

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1908.  High Court has discarded the compromise decree  

dated 09.01.1995 on the ground that same required  

compulsory registration and the decree being not  

registered was not valid decree.    

5. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel for the  

plaintiffs-respondents submits that decree dated  

09.01.1995 was obtained by fraud and on false  

allegations made in the plaint.  It is submitted that  

appellants, who were plaintiffs in the above suit  

described themselves as nephews of Bhajan Singh and  

Bhajan Singh as Uncle, which relationship was not  

proved, hence, decree was obtained by playing fraud.   

It is further submitted that decree dated 09.01.1995  

was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 and it  

having not been registered First Appellate Court and  

the High Court has rightly discarded the decree.  It  

is submitted that the Will dated 02.09.1986 has not  

been accepted by all the three courts.  It is submitted  

that under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, a Will  

requires attestation.  It is submitted that out of the  

two attesting witnesses namely Darshan Singh and Gurdev

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Singh,  Gurdev Singh was admittedly alive, which was  

admitted by defendant himself in his statement and  

Gurdev Singh having not been produced to prove the  

Will, the Will has rightly been held not to be proved,  

which findings need no interference in this appeal. The  

scribe, who appeared to prove the Will cannot be  

treated as an attesting witness, since he had no animus  

to attest the Will.  It is further submitted that there  

can be no Family Settlement in favour of a person, who  

has no relation with the owner of the property.  The  

Family Settlement dated 15.06.1994 was no Family  

Settlement.    

6. Learned counsel for the parties have relied on  

various judgments of this Court, which we shall refer  

to hereinafter while considering the submissions in  

details.   

7. We may notice the issues framed by the trial court  

and the findings returned thereon.  On the basis of the  

pleadings of the parties, trial court framed following  

issues:-  

“1. Whether impugned judgment and decree  

passed in Civil Suit No. 556 of

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21.09.1994 decided on 09.01.1995 titled  

as Gurcharan Singh etc. Vs. Bhajan  

Singh, by S. Dalip Singh the then  

Additional Senior Sub Judge, Amloh in  

respect of property earlier in name of  

Bhajan Singh in the subject matter of  

the suit is illegal, null and void or  

otherwise bad as alleged in the plaint,  

if so its effect? OPP  

2. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to  

possession of the suit land? OPP  

3. Whether Sh. Bhajan Singh executed a  

legal and valid will dated 09.02.98 in  

favour of defendants, if so its effect?  

OPD  

4. Whether suit is not maintainable and  

competent in the present form? OPD  

5. Whether plaint is liable to be rejected  

u/o 7 rule 11 CPC? OPD  

6. Whether suit is within limitation? OPD  

7. Whether defendants have taken  

possession of the suit land from  

plaintiffs 3 weeks before filing of the  

suit? OPD  

8. Relief”   

8. Issue No.1 was decided in favour of the defendants  

holding the decree dated 09.01.1995 as a valid decree.   

Issue No.2 was decided in favour of the defendant.  The  

issue No. 3 regarding Will dated 02.09.1986 was decided  

in favour of the plaintiffs holding that defendant

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failed to prove the Will dated 02.09.1986 since one of  

the attesting witnesses was alive but was not produced  

by the defendants.  Trial court held the suit to be  

within limitation.  The trial court has also returned  

a finding that it has been proved from the evidence of  

PW1, the plaintiff that they never visited their father  

from Village Jalowal, which clearly establish that  

Bhajan Singh resided with the defendants, who used to  

look after and serve him.  The trial court also returned  

a finding that there was no element of fraud,  

misrepresentation or coercion in obtaining a decree  

dated 09.01.1995.  The First Appellate Court reversed  

the judgment of the trial court holding that the decree  

dated 09.01.1995 first time created rights in favour  

of the defendants, hence it required registration.  It  

was held that decree dated 09.01.1995 was not a valid  

document and was null and void and non est being an  

unregistered decree.  The findings of the trial court  

with regard to Will were not interfered with by the  

First Appellate Court.  In the Regular Second Appeal  

filed by the defendants, the decree of the First  

Appellate Court was confirmed.  In the Regular Second

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Appeal, following substantial questions of law were  

framed by the High Court:-  

“a) Whether in the facts and circumstances  

of the instant case, the decree dated  

09.01.1995 which has, otherwise, been  

proved to have been suffered by Bhajan  

Singh in favour of the appellant,  

could be ignored by the learned Ist  

Appellate Court on the ground of non-

registration particularly when the  

decree was based on earlier family  

settlement?  

b) Whether in the facts and circumstances  

of the instant case, the suit filed by  

the plaintiff/respondents could be  

said to be within limitation?  

c) Whether in the facts and circumstances  

of the instant case, the registered  

Will in favour of the appellants could  

be ignored by the learned courts below  

when the appellants had led  

affirmative evidence proving the due  

execution and validity of the Will?  

d) Whether the interpretation put by the  

learned Ist Appellate Court to the  

meaning of Family can be sustained in  

law?  

9.  All the substantial questions of law have been  

answered by the High Court in favour of the plaintiffs  

and against the defendants.  The first substantial  

question of law framed by the High Court was with regard  

to non-registration of decree dated 09.01.1995.  We may

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first consider the rival submissions of the parties on  

the question of registration of the decree dated  

09.01.1995.  The First Appellate Court and the High  

Court both have upheld the decree 09.01.1995 as null  

and void due to non-registration of decree.  The  

question is as to whether the decree dated 09.01.1995  

required registration under Section 17 of the  

Registration Act.  Section 17 of the Registration Act  

provides for registration of documents, which is to the  

following effect:-  

“17. Documents of which registration is  

compulsory.—(l) The following documents  

shall be registered, if the property to  

which they relate is situate in a district  

in which, and if they have been executed on  

or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of  

1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866,  

or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or  

the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this  

Act came or comes into force, namely:—  

(a)  instruments of gift of  

immovable property;  

(b)  other non-testamentary  

instruments which purport or  

operate to create, declare,  

assign, limit or extinguish,  

whether in present or in  

future, any right, title or  

interest, whether vested or  

contingent, of the value of  

one hundred rupees and  

upwards, to or in immovable

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property;  

(c)  non-testamentary instruments  

which acknowledge the receipt  

or payment of any  

consideration on account of  

the creation, declaration,  

assignment, limitation or  

extinction of any such right,  

title or interest; and  

(d)  leases of immovable property  

from year to year, or for any  

term exceeding one year, or  

reserving a yearly rent;  

(e)  non-testamentary instruments  

transferring or assigning any  

decree or order of a Court or  

any award when such decree or  

order or award purports or  

operates to create, declare,  

assign, limit or extinguish,  

whether in present or in  

future, any right, title or  

interest, whether vested or  

contingent, of the value of  

one hundred rupees and  

upwards, to or in immovable  

property:  

Provided that the State Government may,  

by order published in the Official Gazette,  

exempt from the operation of this sub-

section any lease executed in any district,  

or part of a district, the terms granted by  

which do not exceed five years and the  

annual rents reserved by which do not  

exceed fifty rupees.  

(1A) The documents containing contracts  

to transfer for consideration, any  

immovable property for the purpose of  

section 53A of the Transfer of Property

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Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered  

if they have been executed on or after the  

commencement of the Registration and Other  

Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if  

such documents are not registered on or  

after such commencement, then, they shall  

have no effect for the purposes of the said  

section 53A.  

(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-

section (l) applies to—  

(i)  any composition deed; or  

(ii) … … … …  

(iii) … … … …  

(iv) … … … …  

(v)  … … … …  

(vi) any decree or order of a  

Court except a decree or order  

expressed to be made on a  

compromise and comprising  

immovable property other than  

that which is the subject-

matter of the suit or  

proceeding]; or  

… … … …  

… … … …”  

10. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 provides that nothing  

in clause (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to  

item No.(i) and (xii) enumerated therein.  We in the  

present case have to consider as to whether the decree

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dated 09.01.1995 is covered by sub-section(2)(vi) or  

not.  Both the First Appellate Court and the High Court  

have proceeded on the premise that since the decree  

dated 09.01.1995 first time created right in favour of  

the defendant, it required registration, on the ratio  

of a judgment of this Court in Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram  

Singh Major and Others, (1995) 5 SCC 709. In Bhoop  

Singh (supra), this Court laid down following in  

paragraphs 16, 17 and 18:-  

“16. We have to view the reach of clause  

(vi), which is an exception to sub-section  

(1), bearing all the aforesaid in mind. We  

would think that the exception engrafted is  

meant to cover that decree or order of a  

court, including a decree or order  

expressed to be made on a compromise, which  

declares the pre-existing right and does  

not by itself create new right, title or  

interest in praesenti in immovable property  

of the value of Rs 100 or upwards. Any other  

view would find the mischief of avoidance  

of registration, which requires payment of  

stamp duty, embedded in the decree or  

order.  

17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the  

court to examine in each case whether the  

parties have pre-existing right to the  

immovable property, or whether under the  

order or decree of the court one party  

having right, title or interest therein  

agreed or suffered to extinguish the same  

and created right, title or interest in  

praesenti in immovable property of the

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value of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of  

other party for the first time, either by  

compromise or pretended consent. If latter  

be the position, the document is  

compulsorily registrable.  

18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can,  

on the basis of the aforesaid discussion,  

be summarised as below:  

(1) Compromise decree if bona  

fide, in the sense that the  

compromise is not a device to  

obviate payment of stamp duty and  

frustrate the law relating to  

registration, would not require  

registration. In a converse  

situation, it would require  

registration.  

(2) If the compromise decree  

were to create for the first time  

right, title or interest in  

immovable property of the value of  

Rs 100 or upwards in favour of any  

party to the suit the decree or  

order would require registration.  

(3) If the decree were not to  

attract any of the clauses of sub-

section (1) of Section 17, as was  

the position in the aforesaid  

Privy Council and this Court’s  

cases, it is apparent that the  

decree would not require  

registration.  

(4) If the decree were not to  

embody the terms of compromise, as  

was the position in Lahore case,  

benefit from the terms of  

compromise cannot be derived, even  

if a suit were to be disposed of  

because of the compromise in

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question.  

(5) If the property dealt with  

by the decree be not the “subject-

matter of the suit or proceeding”,  

clause (vi) of sub-section (2)  

would not operate, because of the  

amendment of this clause by Act 21  

of 1929, which has its origin in  

the aforesaid decision of the  

Privy Council, according to which  

the original clause would have  

been attracted, even if it were to  

encompass property not litigated.  

11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed  

reliance on paragraph 18(2) to support his submission  

that since for the first time right, title and interest  

in the suit property being created in favour of the  

defendants, it required registration. Respondent’s  

counsel further submits that defendant in the statement  

before the Court has admitted that the respondents-

defendants for the first time obtained right, title and  

interest in the suit property by virtue of decree dated  

09.01.1995.  The present is a case where by decree  

dated 09.01.1995 only suit property was made part of  

the decree. Suit No. 556 was filed with the pleading  

that Will dated 02.09.1986 as well as Family Settlement  

dated 15.06.1994, which are specifically pleaded in

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paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint are to the following  

effect:-  

“2. That the defendant has executed a valid  

and legal Will dated 02.09.1986 in favour  

of the plaintiffs with his free will and  

consent while he was in a fit disposing  

mind, which was attested and registered by  

the Sub-Registrar.   

3.  That the defendant considering it  

proper has effected a family settlement on  

15.06.1994 vide which the property in suit  

was allotted to the plaintiffs in equal  

shares and the defendant has relinquished  

all his right, title and interest  

whatsoever in the said property in favour  

of the plaintiff in the said family  

settlement.”    

12. In the suit, Bhajan Singh was only defendant, who  

filed his written statement on 03.12.1994, allegations  

in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint were admitted by  

the defendant in his statement in paragraphs 2 and 3,  

which is to the following effect:-  

“2.  Para No. 2 of the plaint is admitted  

to be correct.  

3.  Para No. 3 of the plaint is admitted to  

be correct.”  

13. In the written statement, the defendant Bhajan  

Singh prayed that suit of the plaintiffs be decreed as  

prayed.  The pleading in the suit and in the written

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statement clearly leads to the conclusion that suit was  

filed on the basis of pre-existing right in favour of  

plaintiffs, which was basis of the suit.  Pre-existing  

right of the plaintiffs was admitted by the defendant  

and decree was passed therein.    

14. Thus, the submission of the plaintiffs-respondents  

that suit was not based on pre-existing right of the  

plaintiffs cannot be accepted, which is belied by the  

categorical pleading in the plaint.  In view of the  

above pleadings, we are of the view that very basis of  

the applicability of the judgment of Bhoop Singh  

(supra) is knocked out and is not attracted in the  

present case.  This Court in a recent judgment in Civil  

Appeal No.800 of 2020 – Mohammade Yusuf & Ors. Vs.  

Rajkumar & Ors. decided on 05.02.2020 had occasion to  

consider Section 17 as well as judgment of Bhoop Singh  

(supra).  While elaborating Section 17, this Court laid  

down following in paragraph 6:-  

“6. A compromise decree passed by a Court  

would ordinarily be covered by Section  

17(1)(b) but subsection(2) of Section 17  

provides for an exception for any decree or  

order of a Court except a decree or order  

expressed to be made on a compromise and  

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comprising immovable property other than  

that which is the subject-matter of the  

suit or proceeding. Thus, by virtue of sub-

section(2)(vi) of Section 17 any decree or  

order of a Court does not require  

registration. In sub-clause(vi) of sub-

section (2), one category is excepted from  

sub-clause(vi), i.e., a decree or order  

expressed to be made on a compromise and  

comprising immovable property other than  

that which is the subject-matter of the  

suit or proceeding. Thus, by conjointly  

reading Section 17(1)(b) and Section  

17(2)(vi), it is clear that a compromise  

decree comprising immovable property other  

than which is the subject matter of the  

suit or proceeding requires registration,  

although any decree or order of a Court is  

exempted from registration by virtue of  

Section 17(2)(vi). A copy of the decree  

passed in Suit No.250-A of 1984 has been  

brought on record as Annexure P-2, which  

indicates that decree dated 04.10.1985 was  

passed by the Court for the property, which  

was subject matter of the suit. Thus, the  

exclusionary clause in Section 17(2)(vi) is  

not applicable and the compromise decree  

dated 04.10.1985 was not required to be  

registered on plain 8 reading of Section  

17(2)(vi)………………………….“  

15. In the above case, this Court further relied on  

earlier judgment of this Court in Som Dev and Others  

Vs. Rati Ram and Another, (2006) 10 SCC 788 in paragraph  

13 and laid down following:-  

“13.  This Court in Som Dev and Others Vs.  

Rati Ram and Another, (2006) 10 SCC 788

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while explaining Section 17(2)(vi) and  

Section 17(1)(b) and (c) held that all  

decree and orders of the Court including  

compromise decree subject to the exception  

as referred that the properties that are  

outside the subject matter of the suit do  

not require registration. In paragraph 18,  

this Court laid down following:-   

“18. ……………But with respect, it must  

be pointed out that a decree or order  

of a court does not require  

registration if it is not based on a  

compromise on the ground that  

clauses (b) and (c) of Section 17 of  

the Registration Act are attracted.  

Even a decree on a compromise does  

not require registration if it does  

not take in property that is not the  

subject-matter of the suit…………………….”   

16. In the above case, the earlier decree, which was  

sought to be ignored on the ground that it was not  

registered related only with the suit property.  This  

Court held that the said decree did not require  

registration.  Following reasons were given in  

paragraph 14:-  

“14. In facts of the present case, the  

decree dated 04.10.1985 was with regard to  

property, which was subject matter of the  

suit, hence not covered by exclusionary  

clause of Section 17(2)(vi) and present  

case is covered by the main exception  

crafted in Section 17(2)(vi), i.e., “any  

decree or order of a Court”. When  

registration of an instrument as required  

by Section 17(1)(b) is specifically

24    

excluded by Section 17(2)(vi) by providing  

that nothing in clause (b) and (c) of sub-

section (1) applies to any decree or order  

of the Court, we are of the view that the  

compromise decree dated 04.10.1985 did not  

require registration and learned Civil  

Judge as well as the High Court erred in  

holding otherwise. We, thus, set aside the  

order of the Civil Judge dated 07.01.2015  

as well as the judgment of the High Court  

dated 13.02.2017. The compromise decree  

dated 04.10.1985 is directed to be  

exhibited by the trial court. The appeal is  

allowed accordingly.”  

17. Reverting back to the facts of the present case,  

it is clear that the Suit No. 556 of 21.09.1994 filed  

by the appellants against Bhajan Singh relates to the  

suit property described in plaint and decree was passed  

only with regard to suit property A to D.  The decree  

dated 09.01.1995 was, thus, expressly covered by  

expression “any decree or order of a Court”.  When  

legislature has specifically excluded applicability of  

clause (b) and (C) with regard to any decree or order  

of a Court, applicability of Section 17(1)(b) cannot  

be imported in Section 17(2)(v) by any indirect method.   

We, thus, are of the considered opinion that decree and  

order dated 09.01.1995 did not require registration and  

were fully covered by Section 17(2)(vi), which contains

25    

exclusion from registration as required in Section  

17(1). High Court as well as First Appellate Court  

erred in coming to the conclusion that decree dated  

19.01.1995 required registration and due to not  

registered is null and void.     

18. Trial Court’s view that decree dated 19.01.1995  

being binding on Bhajan Singh, the plaintiffs, who are  

the daughters of Bhajan Singh cannot avoid the decree.   

The submission of the learned counsel for the  

respondent that decree dated 09.01.1995 was obtained  

by fraud also needs to be considered.    

19. The submission of the learned counsel for the  

respondent is that since in the suit, which was filed  

by the defendant, they described the defendant as uncle  

of the plaintiffs, who were looking after and serving  

the defendant, which statement having been found not  

to be proved, it was fraud played on the defendant and  

the Court.    

20. We need to revisit the facts and sequence of events

26    

in the case to examine as to whether any fraud was  

played on the Court or Bhajan Singh in obtaining the  

decree dated 09.01.1995.  Bhajan Singh had executed a  

registered Will dated 02.09.1986, which was a  

registered Will and pleaded in paragraph 2 of the  

plaint.  In paragraph 3 of the plaint, it was also  

pleaded that pursuant to a Family Settlement dated  

15.06.1994 by which Bhajan Singh decided to allot  

plaintiffs in equal share and relinquished all his  

rights in the suit property, which pleadings were  

admitted by Bhajan Singh in his statement.  The decree  

was passed on 09.01.1995 on the basis of which mutation  

was sanctioned on 03.03.1995.  Bhajan Singh was  

admittedly alive till 24.04.1998 and in his lifetime,  

he never objected the decree or mutation in favour of  

the defendants.  It has been accepted by the Courts  

below that both Bhajan Singh and Gurmail Kaur were  

divorced and which divorce was recorded in writing on  

15.09.1973 as proved before the Courts below. Gurmail  

Kaur after 15.09.1973 started living with Maghar Singh,  

brother of Bhajan Singh in Village Jalowal and  

thereafter never returned to Bhajan Singh.  Gurmail

27    

Kaur also filed a suit for maintenance against Bhajan  

Singh, which was dismissed for non-prosecution.  The  

plaintiffs, i.e., Angrez Kaur and Paramjit Kaur, after  

divorce went with their mother and lived with Maghar  

Singh and never returned to Bhajan Singh.  In her  

statement, PW1 has admitted that she never came to see  

her father.  The Courts have found that Bhajan Singh  

lived with the defendants after the divorce, who were  

taking care of Bhajan Singh.  The execution of  

registered Will by Bhajan Singh on 02.09.1986 in favour  

of the defendants and further his admission that all  

the claim of the defendants in Suit No. 556  are correct  

and accepting that he has relinquished his rights in  

favour of the plaintiffs, Gurcharan Singh, Gurnam Singh  

and Kulwant Singh clearly disprove any ground of fraud  

either on the Court or on Bhajan Singh.  The divorce  

between Bhajan Singh and Gurmail Kaur took place on  

15.09.1973 and thereafter for 25 years, Bhajan Singh  

lived away from his wife and daughters and it was the  

defendants, who were taking care of Bhajan Singh.   

Admitting the claim of plaintiffs/appellants in the  

suit filed against the defendant Bhajan Singh for

28    

declaration cannot be termed as any fraud played on  

Bhajan Singh or the Court.  Sequence of events clearly  

indicate that Bhajan Singh of his own volition wanted  

to give the entire property to the defendants due to  

the circumstances of the case, in which Bhajan Singh  

was placed.  It is due to this reason that Bhajan Singh  

in his Will dated 02.09.1986 stated that he has no wife  

or children.  We, thus, do not find any substance in  

the submission of the learned counsel for the  

respondents that any fraud was played in obtaining  

decree dated 09.01.1995 by the defendants.  The decree  

dated 09.01.1995 cannot be held to be suffering from  

any fraud or coercion as contended by the learned  

counsel for the respondents.  

21. We having held that decree dated 09.01.1995 was a  

valid decree, the decision of the trial court  

dismissing the suit for declaration that decree dated  

09.01.1995 was null and void, has to be upheld. In view  

of our above conclusion, we do not find it necessary  

to consider various submissions raised by the learned  

counsel for the parties regarding the validity of the

29    

registered Will dated 02.09.1986.   

22. In view of the foregoing discussions, we set aside  

the judgment of the High Court as well as First  

Appellate court and restore the decree of trial court.   

The appeal is allowed accordingly.     

......................J.  

                                ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )  

......................J.  

                                 ( NAVIN SINHA )  

New Delhi,  

March 19, 2020.