http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: GULRAJ SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOTA SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/1964

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1965 AIR  608            1964 SCR  (7) 205

ACT: Decree-Pre-emption suit by illegitimate son and daughter  of a  female vendor-Whether the words "son or daughter of  such female" used in Punjab Pre-emption Act, as amended,  include an  illegitimate son or daughter of such female-Punjab  Pre- emption Act, 1913 (1 of 1913), as amended by Act X of  1960, s. 15(2)(b).

HEADNOTE: The   appellants-illegitimate  son  and  daughter   of   one Sardarni-filed  a suit to pre-empt the sale made by  her  of agricultural land to the respondents.  Both the trial  court as  well  as  the District Court on appeal  granted  to  the appellants  a  decree for pre-emption, though to  a  limited extent.  On second appeal by the respondents, the High Court directed  the dismissal of the suit on the ground  that  the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who  were entitled to, pre-emption under s. 15(2)(b) of  the Punjab  Pre-emption  Act as amended by Act X  of  1960.   On appeal  by Special Leave the appellants contended  that  the provision  in  s. 15 of the Preemption Act must be  read  in conjunction  with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which  made provision  for  the devolution of property  belonging  to  a female  owner  and  that  as  under  the  latter   enactment illegitimate  children of the Hindu female were entitled  to succeed  to  her  property, it must be held  that  when  the Punjab  legislature  used  in 1960 the  expression  ’son  or daughter’ it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female. Held:     The  normal  rule  of construction  of  the  words "child" "son" or "daughter" in a statute would include  only legitimate  children.   No  doubt, there  might  be  express provision  in the statute itself to give these words a  more extended  meaning as to include also  illegitimate  children and  s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX  of  1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision.  It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context  might indicate That the words were used in  a  more comprehensive   sense   as   indicating   merely   a   blood

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

relationship apart from the question of legitimacy.  Section 15 contains no express provision and the context, so far  as it  goes,  is not capable of lending any support to  such  a construction.   In  the  first  place,  the  words  "Son  or daughter"  occur  more than once in that  section.   It  was fairly  conceded on behalf of the appellant that  where  the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15 (1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor  the words  could have a different connotation.  Even taking  the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in  s. 15(2)(a)(i)  to the brother’s son of such vendor.  It  could hardly  be  argued  that a  brother’s  illegitimate  son  is comprehended within those words.  Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant  only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of  the female vendor. 206

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Civil Appeal No. 467 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated February  1961  of the Punjab High Court in  Regular  Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960. Bishan Narain and Naunit Lal, for the appellants. Yashpal Gandhi and S. D. Goswami, for the respondents. March 13, 1964.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR,  J.-Do the words "son or daughter of such  female" occurring in s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemption Act,  1913 as  amended by Act X of 1960 include an illegitimate son  or illegitimate  daughter of such female is the  only  question that arises in this, appeal by special leave. The appellants are the illegitimate son and daughter of  one Sardarni  Prem Prakash Kaur.  By a registered deed  of  sale dated  December  1,  1956 the said lady sold  18  bighas,  1 biswas and 5-1/2 biswansis of agricultural land for a sum of Rs.  10,000/-  to the respondents.  The appellants  filed  a suit  to pre-empt this sale.  There was some  dispute  about the consideration actually paid but we are not now concerned with it. Both the trial court as well as the District  Court on  appeal  granted  to the appellants  a  decree  for  pre- emption, though to a limited extent.  The respondents  filed a second appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges, by the judgment now under appeal, directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to pre-emption under  s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as  it  now stands under the amendment effected by Act X of 1960.  It is from  this  judgment  that, by special  leave,  the  present appeal has been brought. Mr.   Bishan  Narain-learned  Counsel  for  the   appellants submitted  to  us that the provision in s. 15  of  the  Pre- emption  Act  must  be read in conjunction  with  the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution of  property belonging to a female owner and that  as  under the latter enactment illegitimate children of a Hindu female were  entitled to succeed to her property, it must  be  held that when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression ’son or daughter’ it meant a son or a daughter who would  be entitled  to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female.   We  are unable  to  accept  this  submission  of  learned   Counsel. Section 15 whose construction calls for consideration  reads as follows:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

             "15.   Persons  in whom right  of  pre-emption               vests in respect of sales of agricultural land               and village                                    207               immovable property.-(I) The right of  pre-emp-               tion  in  respect  of  agricultural  land  and               village immovable property shall vest-               (a)   where  the  sale  is by  a  sole  owner:               First, in the son or daughter or son’s son  or               daughter’s son of the vendor;               Secondly,  in the brother or brother’s son  of               the vendor;               Thirdly,  in the father’s brother or  father’s               brother’s son of the vendor;               Fourthly,  in  the  tenant  who  holds   under               tenancy  of  the vendor the land  or  property               sold or a part thereof;               (b)   where  the  sale is of a  share  out  of               joint land or property and is not made by  all               the cosharers jointly: -               First, in the sons or daughters or son’s  sons               or daughter’s sons of the vendor or vendors;               Secondly, in the brothers or brother’s sons of               the vendor or vendors;               Thirdly, in the father’s brothers or  father’s               brother’s sons of the vendor or vendors-,               Fourthly, in the other co-sharers;               Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy               of the vendor or vendors the land or  property               sold or a part thereof;               (c)   where  the sale is. of land or  property               owned  jointly  and  is made by  all  the  co-               sharers jointly: -               First, in the sons or daughters or son’s  sons               or daughter’s sons of the vendors;               Secondly, in the brothers or brother’s sons of               the vendors;               Thirdly, in the father’s brothers or  father’s               brother’s sons of the vendors;               Fourthly,  in  the  tenants  who  hold   under               tenancy of the vendors or any one of them  the               land or property sold or a part thereof.               (2)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               sub-section (1)-               (a)   where the sale is by a female of land or               property  to which she has  succeeded  through               her  father or brother or the sale in  respect               of such               208               land or property is by the son or daughter  of               such  female after inheritance, the  right  of               preemption shall vest:-               (i)   if  the sale is by such female,  in  her               brother or brother’s son;               (ii)  if the sale is by the son or daughter of               such  female, in the mother’s brothers or  the               mother’s brother’s sons of the vendor or  ven-               dors;               (b)   where the sale is by a female of land or               property  to which she has  succeeded  through               her  husband, or through her son in  case  the               son  has inherited the land or  property  sold               from  his  father, the  right  of  pre-emption               shall vest: -               First, in the son or daughter of such female;

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

             Secondly,  in  the husband’s brother  or  hus-               band’s brother’s son of such female." The submission of learned Counsel virtually amounts to  this that in order to construe the words used in s. 15 one should travel  beyond  the  enactment and ascertain  the  class  of persons  who are entitled under the Hindu Succession Act  to succeed  as heirs of the intestate vendor.  Even  a  cursory examination  would show that this construction is  untenable and that the framers of the Act did not proceed on any  such theory.   Take,  for  instance,  the  case  where  a  female succeeds  to  property through her father or  brother  dealt with in s. 15(2)(a) of the Pre-emption Act.  Her heirs under the  Hindu  Succession  Act would be, if  the  property  was inherited  from her father, her son or  daughter  (including the  children  of any predeceased son or  daughter)  and  in their  absence  the heirs of the father.  If,  however,  the property  was inherited from her brother, the devolution  is different (vide s. 15(1) and (2)).  The devolution  provided by  s. 15(2)(a)(i) of the Pre-emption Act is  different  and confers  the  right  to  pre-empt  on  her  brother  or  her brother’s son.  The theory, therefore, that we should resort to the line of heirs as in an intestate succession under the Hindu  Succession  Act or, for the matter of  that,  to  any other  system  of Common Law or statute  applicable  to  the vendor  is  obviously  untenable.   Pursuing  this  line  of reasoning  a little, it was not disputed that if the  female vendor  were  a Christian by religion, only  her  legitimate issue  would  be denoted by these words.  As  it  is  common ground that the statutory right of pre-emption conferred  by s. 15 is as much applicable to a Christian owner of property as to a Hindu, it would be seen that the construction of the words of this statute of general application would be 209 made to depend on the religion to which the vendor belonged, and  in fact would vary with any change made by  statute  in the  law of intestate succession as applicable to  different communities.  The position that would arise on a  conversion of  the  vendor  to  a different  faith,  with  a  different personal law as to succession would bring out in bold relief the   unsustainability  of  the  submission  based  on   the peculiarities of the personal law as to intestate succession applicable to the vendor. We  have, therefore, to ascertain whether by the  expression ’son  or daughter’ only the legitimate issue of such  female is  comprehended  or whether the words are  wide  enough  to include illegitimate children also.  That the normal rule of construction  of  the  words "child",  "son"  or  "daughter" occurring  in  a  statute  would  include  only   legitimate children i.e., born in wedlock, is too elementary to require authority.   No doubt, there might be express  provision  in the  statute  itself  to give these words  a  more  extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of  the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes  :a good  illustration  of such a provision.  It might  even  be that without an express provision in that regard the context might  indicate that the words were used in a  more  compre- hensive  sense  as indicating merely  a  blood  relationship apart  from  the question of legitimacy.   Section  15  with which  we :are concerned contains no express  provision  and the  context, so far as it goes, is not capable  of  lending any support to such a construction.  In the first place, the words  "son  or  daughter"  occur more  than  once  in  that section.   It was fairly conceded by Mr. Bishan Narain  that where  the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred  to, as in s. 15(1). the words mean only the legitimate issue  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

the  vendor.   If  so, it cannot be that in the  case  of  a female vendor the words could have a different  connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is  a reference  in  s. 15(2)(a)(i) to the brother’s son  of  such vendor.   It  could  hardly  be  open  to  argument  that  a brother’s  illegitimate  son is  comprehended  within  those words.   The  matter  appears  to us to  be  too  clear  for argument  that  when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words  "son  or daughter"  it meant only a legitimate son and  a  legitimate daughter of the female vendor. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 210