1  

REPORTABLE     

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

   CIVIL APPEAL NO.2578 OF 2009    (Arising out of SLP No. (C) 27022 OF 2004)  

 Guljar Singh and Ors.                                 …. Appellants    Versus    Deputy Director Consolidation and Ors.           ….  Respondents  

 W I T H  

 C.A.No.2577/2009 @ SLP©No.1214 of 2005 and     

C.A.No2579/2009 @ SLP© No.5328 of 2005    

J U D G M E N T    TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.    1. Leave granted.  

2. This appeals are directed against the judgment and final order   

dated 19th of November, 2004 of the High Court of Uttaranchal at  

Nainital in W.P.Nos. 1231 (M/S), 1083(M/S) and 1084(M/S) of 2004  

whereby, the High Court had dismissed the writ petitions and affirmed  

the order    dated 20th of October, 2004 passed by the Deputy Director  

of Consolidation (in short D.D.C.), Udham Singh Nagar.   

3. The relevant facts, which would assist us in appreciating the  

controversy involved are narrated in a nutshell, which are as follows:

2  

Mohan Singh, Bhan Singh and Ram Singh jointly purchased an  

area of 302 Bighas in the village of Jagannathpur, Tehsil Kashipur,  

and District Udham Singh Nagar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the  

property in dispute’), out of which the share of Mohan Singh was  

recorded as 101 Bighas. Thereafter, all these persons together with  

three other persons, namely, Saudagar Singh, Sohan Singh and Atma  

Singh acquired 1486 Bighas and 6 Biswas by a lease deed executed by  

Zaminder Radhey Shayam in their favour. In the said deed, share of  

Mohan Singh was specified as 464 Bighas. Therefore, in total, Mohan  

Singh claimed his share in the property in dispute as 565 Bighas in  

respect of the aforesaid lands. Various objections and counter  

objections were filed by other co-sharers disputing the claim of  

Mohan Singh. In the Khatauni of 1359 F, the names of 14 persons  

were recorded as tenure holders. The tenure holders moved an  

application in the year 1959 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, stating  

therein that 17 tenure holders divided the property in dispute in 1951  

and from that time, they were in possession according to their  

division, but their names had not been recorded in the revenue records  

according to their divisions and possession. It was alleged that they  

prayed for correction of their names in the revenue records according  

to amicable arrangement. The Sub-Divisional Officer allowed their

3  

application, but in spite of that, it was claimed that their names were  

not entered in the relevant revenue records. Thereafter, correction  

proceedings started in the concerned village and the matter came up  

before the Asstt. Recording Officer, and Mohan Singh (the father of  

the appellants) filed an application on 11th of January, 1963 before the  

Asstt. Recording Officer to give effect to the order passed by the Sub-

Divisional Officer on the basis of the amicable arrangement arrived at  

between the parties. The Assistant Recording Officer passed an order  

directing to make entries in accordance with the order of the Sub-

Divisional Officer. In spite of that, according to the appellants, the  

revenue records were not corrected and the property in dispute was  

kept as separate Khatas in the name of different tenure holders.  

Thereafter, Ram Singh and others also filed an application before the  

Consolidation Officer praying that the Khatas be divided in pursuance  

of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Mohan Singh,  

however, alleged that the present entries in the revenue record must be  

maintained. It was the claim of Mohan Singh that he was ignorant  

about the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was passed on  

the basis of the alleged amicable arrangement entered into by the  

parties and also claimed ignorance about the application which was  

alleged to have been filed by him before the Assistant Recording

4  

Officer, thus refuting the claim of the Respondents that he was a party  

to the proceedings before the Assistant Recording Officer. The  

Consolidation Officer allowed the claim of Mohan Singh to the effect  

that his total share in the aforesaid land was 564 Bighas, but he  

directed that since Mohan Singh had co–opted his son, nephews,  

brothers, and widow of his brother as co-tenants in his share, his share  

was reduced. The appellants thereafter filed two appeals against the  

order of the Consolidation Officer. The appeal filed by the appellants  

was dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), whereas the  

appeal filed by Hari Singh and others was allowed. The Settlement  

Officer (Consolidation) while allowing the appeal of Hari Singh and  

others had set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and  

directed that the entries in the record of rights may be prepared in  

accordance with the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 31st of  

August, 1959. The appellants thereafter had filed two revision  

petitions against the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation)  

and both the said petitions were rejected by the DDC on 7th of July,  

1975. Mohan Singh, the father of the appellants then challenged the  

aforesaid orders before the High Court of Allahabad by way of Writ  

Petition No. 7625 of 1975. While disposing of the writ petition setting

5  

aside the order of DDC and remanding the case back to DDC, the  

High Court made the following observations :-  

“This effect is apparent from the order of the Settlement  Officer (Consolidation) which has been affirmed by the  DDC, that the order of the Consolidation Officer has  been set aside and without recording his own finding on  the point indicated above, he has directed to implement  the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer on 31.8.1959.  This, on the face of it, is illegal. The order passed in a  mutation proceeding has no evidentiary value in Court or  Authority, deciding the title of the partition merit. It was  necessary for the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and  the DDC to consider and decide the case on merit and to  pass the specific order. The orders of the Settlement  Officer (Consolidation) and the DDC and manifestly  erroneous in law and are not liable to be maintained.  Although the order of the Settlement Officer  (Consolidation) is also illegal, but the justice will be met  if the case is decided by the Director of Consolidation  has the jurisdiction to consider the case of the parties on  the facts as well as law.”  

4. After remand by the High Court at Allahabad, the DDC allowed  

the revision petition of the appellants by his order dated 20th of  

October, 2004 and the entries of  Bandobast and consolidation were  

cancelled and the shares of the parties were decided in the manner  

indicated in the said order. From a bare reading of this order of DDC,  

it would be evident that the DDC while deciding the matter afresh, all  

the questions directed to be considered by the Allahabad High Court  

in the writ petition were duly considered after appreciating the

6  

evidence and the respective cases made out by the parties and the  

DDC finally came to the conclusion that the order of Consolidation  

Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) must be  

set aside and the entries of Bandobast and consolidation must be  

cancelled.  This is seen from the above order that all questions were  

duly decided and evidence, oral and documentary, were duly  

considered and after that the aforesaid findings were arrived at by the  

DDC. A thorough examination of the findings arrived at by the DDC  

would show that there was no question to be left out and for any  

reason whatsoever, the findings were not arrived at in a perverse  

manner or the findings were arbitrary in nature. The appellants  

thereafter filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the order of the  

DDC before the High Court of Uttaranchal, at Nainital. It may be  

mentioned that when the order of DDC was passed, after remand, in  

view of the U.P. Re-organisation Act, 2000 the writ petition then  

could only be filed before the High Court at Uttaranchal and  

accordingly the appellants, feeling aggrieved, filed a writ application  

impugning the order of DDC before the High Court of Uttaranchal at  

Nainital. The High Court by the impugned judgment had affirmed the  

order of the DDC and feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed this  

appeal by way of a special leave in this Court under Article 136 of the

7  

Constitution, which on grant of leave, was heard in the presence of the  

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.  

5. We have heard the arguments of the parties and perused the  

materials on record.  We have also examined the impugned order of  

the High Court and also the orders passed by the authorities in respect  

of which challenge was made before the High Court in the Writ  

Petitions.  After going through the judgment of the High Court, it is  

imperative to note that all the facts leading to the dispute of this case  

have been extensively deliberated in the High Court and the same had  

reiterated in its judgment that the DDC had complied with the  

judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in its order after following  

the observations and directions made by it.  It is well settled that we  

are entitled to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under  

Article 136 of the Constitution only when there is gross irregularity in  

the judgment of the High Court or any substantial grounds of law  

which are of public importance have been raised in such a petition. If  

these conditions are not satisfied, it would not be open to this Court to  

interfere with the concurrent findings of the High Court as well as of  

the DDC in the exercise of our discretionary power under Article 136  

of the Constitution.  

8  

6. In our view, the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the  

authorities and affirmed by the High Court would clearly show that  

such findings were arrived at on consideration of all materials placed  

before the court and after giving proper hearing to the parties. Such  

findings of fact, in our view, cannot be interfered with in the exercise  

of our power under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the  

instant appeal is liable to be dismissed for the reasons given  

hereinunder.    

7. From the record, it appears that the DDC, after remand, by the  

High Court of Allahabad in a writ application to decide the dispute  

between the parties afresh had considered all the evidence of the  

present case and evidence on record by following such directions of  

the High Court, and other materials on record and accordingly, had set  

aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant  

Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Kashipur, and thereby cancelled  

the entries of Bandobast and consolidation. Keeping the findings  

arrived at by the DDC which was affirmed by the High Court and  

while doing so, the High Court made the following observations :

9  

“This Court is of opinion that every time in such a old  case it is not just and proper to quash the orders on  technical grounds and force the litigants to go back  again and again to litigate on the same point. In other  words now in this round of litigation, after 25 years of  the order passed by the Allahabad High Court, this Court  should not go beyond examining if the directions of the  Allahabad High Court were complied with by the DDC in  disposing of the revision afresh or not.”  

8. Thus being so observed, the Uttaranchal High Court went on to  

note that the perusal of the order dated 20th of October, 2004, showed  

that the DDC had then recorded the findings as to the claims of the  

parties keeping in view of the directions of the Allahabad High Court.  

Therefore, the High Court was correct to observe that the DDC had  

complied with the order of the Allahabad High Court and dismissed  

the petition of the appellants. It is very important for the disposal of  

this case to refer again to the relevant portion of the judgment of the  

High Court to elaborate this observation made by the Court.  

“Learned counsel for the appellants of all the three writ  petitions argued before me that share of one or the other  is being shown to be less than what they had claimed. It  is further argued by all the appellants that as to their  share, claims were not properly considered. I may  remind it here that this Court is exercising its  jurisdiction in supervisory-cum-revisional power and  cannot decide the intricate questions of facts relating to  shares. Rather, from the perusal of the impugned order,  it is clear that in a detailed judgment of 14 pages learned  Dy. Director of Consolidation has given reasons for its  findings on shares of each one of the parties. In the

10  

circumstances, it cannot be said that the Dy. Director of  Consolidation has not complied with the directions of  Allahabd High Court while disposing of the writ  petition.”  

9. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that the High  

Court in the exercise of its revisional-cum-supervisory power cannot  

go into the intricate details of facts and decide the questions raised  

therein. We are in agreement with these views of the High Court,  

except that in exceptional cases such orders which are based on  

perversity and arbitrariness could be interfered with by the High  

Court. After a long period of litigation ranging for almost 50 years,  

the DDC had decided according to the shares of the parties after  

complying with the observations made by the Allahabad High Court  

as had been noted by the High Court in its impugned judgment and it  

is not proper to set aside the orders on technical grounds and force the  

litigants to go back again and again to litigate on the same point. In  

any view of the matter, we are not in a position to observe that there  

was anything for the High Court to interfere with the order of the  

DDC, as it appears from the observations made by the Allahabad High  

Court that the DDC will decide the dispute and consider all aspects of  

the matter and the entire materials including the oral and documentary  

evidence on record.    

11  

10. From the order dated 20th of October, 2004, passed by the  

DDC, it is clear to us as to how the parties had got the shares given to  

them by the DDC. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the  

DDC had wrongly shown some of the plots being submerged into the  

river bed. This Court is not in a position to disbelieve what the DDC  

had stated unless firm evidence to the contrary is on record. The  

appellants had not been able to produce any evidence to satisfy this  

contention.  

11. The Learned Counsel for the appellants also raised a contention  

that after the creation of the separate State of Uttaranchal, Additional  

District Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar had no jurisdiction to  

exercise power of the DDC.  We do not agree to this contention as  

well. This is because all the notifications issued by the Govt. of Uttar  

Pradesh are applicable to the state of Uttaranchal under Section 86 of  

UP Reorganization Act, 2000 read with Section 88 of the said Act.  

Sections 86 and 88 which are necessary for our purpose are  

reproduced below :  

“86. Territorial extent of laws:- The provisions of Part II  shall not be deemed to have affected any change in the  territories to which the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of  Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961 (U.P. Act 1 of 1961)  and any other law in force immediately before the  appointed day, extends or applies, and territorial  references of any such law to the State of Uttar Pradesh

12  

shall, until otherwise provided by a competent  Legislature or other competent authority be construed as  meaning the territories within the existing state of Uttar  Pradesh before the appointed day.  

 88. Power to construe laws:- Notwithstanding that no  provision or insufficient provision has been made under  Section 87 for adaptation of a law made before the  appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority, required  or empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose  of facilitating its application in relation to the State of  Uttar Pradesh or Uttaranchal, construe the law in such  manner, without affecting the substance, as may be  necessary or proper in regard to the matter before the  court, tribunal or authority.”  

12. From the reading of the aforesaid two provisions, it would not  

be possible for us to hold that the Additional District Magistrate,  

Udham Singh Nagar had no jurisdiction to exercise power of the  

DDC.  

13. It was next contended that the order of the DDC, Udham Singh  

Nagar dated 20th of October, 2004 was passed in contravention of the  

directions issued by the High Court of Allahabad as stated herein  

earlier. As has been already mentioned above, the High Court at  

Uttaranchal correctly noted that the order passed by the DDC was not  

in contravention of the directions of the Allahabad High Court. The  

DDC had taken into consideration the observations made by the  

Allahabad High Court and after perusing all the material documents

13  

and contentions of the parties, passed the order dated 20th of October,  

2004. Thus the contention that the DDC had not taken into  

consideration the order of the Allahabad High Court cannot be  

accepted and accordingly rejected.  

14. It was next contended that the order of the Sub-Divisional  

Officer, Kashipur, passed on 31st of August, 1959 under Sections 33  

and 39 of the UP Land Revenue Act, could not be relied on and form  

the basis of the order passed by the DDC and the same cannot modify  

and disturb the basic year entries as recorded in the Khata of the  

appellants.  We do not find any ground to uphold this contention. It  

has to be noted that the proceedings started under the UP  

Consolidation of Holdings Act, and the allocation of Chaks were  

made pursuant to the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and  

the DDC, after duly considering the claims of the parties. It is well  

settled that the DDC is conferred with wide powers under the Act to  

adjudicate the issue posed before him. In order to elaborate this point,  

it is essential to refer to the case of Sheo Nand & Ors vs. Deputy  

Consolidation Allahabad and Ors. 2000 (3) SCC 103. In the said  

case, this Court, referring to Section 48 of the Act had noted that:  

“The Section gives very wide powers to the Deputy  Director. It enables him suo motu on his own motion or  on the (application of any person to consider the

14  

propriety, legality, regularity and correctness of all the  proceedings held under the Act and to pass appropriate  orders. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy  Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the  parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon  and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the  parties and the Revenue Records may be prepared  accordingly.     Normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of his powers,  is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded  concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the  Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but where the  findings are perverse, in the sense that they are not  supported by the evidence brought on record by the  parties or that they are against the weight of evidence, it  would be the duty of the Deputy Director to scrutinize the  whole case again so as to determine the correctness,  legality or propriety of the orders passed by the  authorities subordinate to him. In a case, like the present,  where the entries in the Revenue record are fictitious or  forged or they were recorded in contravention of the  statutory provisions contained in the U.P. Land Records  Manual or other allied statutory provisions, the Deputy  Director would have full power under Section 48 to re- appraise or re-evaluate the evidence on record so as to  finally determine the rights of the parties by excluding  forged or fictitious revenue entries or entries not made in  accordance with law.    If, therefore, during the course of the hearing of the  revision filed by the appellant under Section 48 of the  Act, the Deputy Director reopened the whole case and  scrutinized the claim of the appellants in respect, of two  other villages, it could not be said that the Deputy  Director exceeded his jurisdiction in any manner. It will  be noticed that while scrutinizing the evidence on record,  the Deputy Director had noticed that the entries were  fictitious and in recording some of the entries in the  revenue record in favour of the appellants, statutory  provisions including those contained in U.P. Land

15  

Records Manual were not followed. In that situation, the  Deputy Director was wholly justified in looking into the  legality of the entire proceedings and disposing of the  revision in the manner in which he has done.”  

15. From the above-quoted observations of this Court, it is clear  

that the DDC has wide range of discretionary powers mandated under  

the Act by which he could proceed to modify even the basic year  

entries if found to be wrongly derived at. Therefore, the contention  

that the DDC could not have modified the basic year entries was not  

correct. It appears to us that the Khatuani prepared in the Bandobast  

was incorrectly made and the courts below including the DDC had  

been duly conferred with power under the Act to correct the same. In  

fact, the Assistant Recording Officer, Kashipur had passed an order in  

1963 to correct the entries as per the order of the Sub-Divisional  

Officer, Kashipur dated 31st of August, 1959 but the same was not  

complied with.   

16. The learned counsel for the appellants also contended that  

relying on Section 11A of the Act, any objection for the first time  

could not be entertained by the authorities. We do not agree with this  

submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. We have already  

observed that the respondents had not accepted the order passed by  

the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Kashipur and they had filed

16  

their separate objections to this regard, hence, the contention could not  

be said to be correct and, therefore, it should be rejected. Further  

more, a reading of the application dated 6th of July, 1959 would  

clearly show that the parties had appeared before the authorities below  

before the remand of the case to the DDC which would be evident  

from Annexure R2.   

17. It is evident from the perusal of the order of the Allahabad High  

Court while passing the order of remand that the several issues which  

were raised by the parties were fully considered and finally directed  

the DDC to follow the procedures for coming to a proper conclusion  

afresh on merits. Since the High Court at Allahabad clearly directed  

the DDC to decide the matter on merits and in compliance with the  

said direction, the DDC considered all the entire materials, oral and  

documentary, on record to decide the matter, we do not find any  

excess jurisdiction exercised either by the DDC or by the High Court  

in coming to a finding arrived at by them.  

18. The DDC after complying with the observations made by the  

Allahabad High Court had taken all steps to determine whether the  

consolidation process was proper or not. On this count also, we are  

unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the  

appellants. It may be noted that many of the original parties to the

17  

consolidation proceedings had died over the period of time. At this  

stage on consideration of the impugned judgment of the High Court as  

well as of the DDC, we find that there is no evidence or material on  

record to contradict or upset the findings of the High Court which  

affirmed the findings of the DDC. In this connection, reliance can be  

placed to a decision of this Court in the case of Vishnu Kamath vs.  

Ahmad Syed Ishaque, [AIR 1955 SC 283] in which this Court  

observed that:  

“The finality given to the decision of the Settlement  Officer (Consolidation) does not follow that it cannot be  questioned in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court  where there is an error apparent on the face of the  record”  

19. The observations made by this Court as above that there must  

be an error apparent on the face of the record affirms our observation  

that for an appeal to be allowed in such a situation such as this, a high  

standard must be met in the way of evidence produced to support the  

case of the appellants as noted herein earlier. All the materials and  

issues discussed in their petition were elaborately discussed and  

argued before the High Court of Uttaranchal which had affirmed the  

findings of the DDC and found no infirmity therein.  

18  

20. Lastly it was contended that the DDC exceeded his jurisdiction  

contrary to the decision of the Allahabad High Court. The Allahabad  

High Court, as has been mentioned above, directed the DDC to decide  

the case on merits. It has not come to our notice that the Allahabad  

High Court, in any way, specified the way the merits of the case  

should be determined. We, therefore, believe, based on the review of  

his findings that he did the best he could do in performing his duty as  

had been mandated by the Allahabad High Court.   

21. Based on the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any  

infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Uttaranchal High Court and  

thus feel it unnecessary to interfere with the same.   

22. The appeals are thus dismissed. There will be no order as to  

costs.  

   …….……………………J.              [ARIJIT PASAYAT]      

NEW DELHI;           ………………………….J.  APRIL 15, 2009.                          [TARUN CHATTERJEE]  

19