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PETITIONER: GULAM MUSTAFA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1977 AIR  448            1977 SCR  (1) 875  1976 SCC  (1) 800  CITATOR INFO :  F          1977 SC1456  (6)

ACT:      Hyderabad land  Acquisition Act-Acquisition of land for a village  market-If a  public purpose-Excess land sold to a housing colony-If acquisition mala fide.

HEADNOTE:      Certain  lands   belonging  to   the  appellants   were compulsorily acquired  under the  Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act for running a country fair or market (mondha). After the acquisition, the  municipality parcelled out the excess land and sold  it for  a housing colony. The High Court dismissed the appellants’ writ petition, in limine.      On appeal  to this  Court it  was  contended  that  the acquisition was  not for  a public  purpose and  that it was mala fide.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: (1)(a)  Providing a  village market is an obvious public purpose.      [876C-D]      (b) A  mondha is  a country  fair  or  village  market. Market is  defined in  s. 2(20)  of the  Hyderabad  District Municipalities Act  in wide  terms and s. 72 of the said Act enumerates the  purposes for which property may be vested in a  municipality.   This  includes  markets.  It  inexoorably follows from  a joint  reading of Ss. 2(20) and 72(a) of the District Municipalities  Act that the purpose of providing a market for  the townsfolk  falls within  the powers  of  the municipality. [876G-H]      (2)(a) Striking  down any Act for mala fide exercise of power is  a judicial  resered power  exercised lethally, but rarely. The  charge of  mala fides against public bodies and authorities is  more easily  made than  made out.  It is the last refuge of a losing litigant. [876D]      (b) What has to be established is mala fide exercise of power by  the State  Government although  the beneficiary is the municipality.  There is  no evidence  of malus animus in Government. [877B]      (c) Apart  from the  fact that  a housing  colony is  a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and

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title has  vested in the municipality how it uses the excess land is  no concern  of the original owner and cannot be the basis  for   invalidating  the   acquisition.  There  is  no principle of  law by  which a  valid compulsory  acquisition stands voided  because long  later the  requiring  authority diverts it  to a public purpose other than the one stated in the declaration. [877C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 675 of 1968.      From the  judgment and  order dated  the 19th  January, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 16 of 1967.      S.  J.   Deshpande  and  A.  G.  Ratnaparkhi,  for  the appellant.      M. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondent nos. 1, 2 and 4.      D. V.  Patel, K.  Laxmanrao and  S. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent no. 3 876      The Jugement of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J. Brevity  will do  no inequity in this appeal where  three points  were urged but only one survives for serious  scanning. The subject matter is the validity of land  acquisition   proceedings   whereby   a   Municipality compulsorily purchased  the appellant’s  land for the stated public purpose  of running a country fair or market (mondha) under the  Hyderabad Land  Acquisition Act  (for short,  the Act) which  is closely  similar to the Land Acquisition Act, 1923 (Central  Act). The first charge is that the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition in limine. Seven years after the 1968 event, we cannot consider sending back the case even if there be  justice in the submission. We have therefore heard counsel Shri  Deshpande on  his substantive  grievances. The second contention  is that  there is  no ’public purpose’ to support the acquisition which is allegedly ultra a vires the Municipality’s powers.  We  disagree.  Providing  a  village market  is   an  obvious  public  purpose  and  a  municipal facility. The  last plea  which has been pressed strenuously is that  the acquisition  exercise is bad being mala fide-an uphill task  to make  out against  a public  body. Was  this colourable exercise of power ?      Striking down  any act  for mala fide exercise of power is a  judicial reserve power exercised lethally, but rarely. The  charge   of  mala-fides   against  public   bodies  and authorities is  more easily  made than  made out.  It is the last refuge  of a  losing litigant. Even so, we will examine the merits  of the contention here from the point of view of the serious factors placed for our consideration.      Was  this   acquisition  done   colore  officii  ?  The circumstances  relied   on  may   be  examined   from   this standpoint. Section 5(3) of the Act provides for declaration of the public purpose, like s. 6(3) of the Central Act. This declaration was  made in  1960 and covered at least 28 acres of land  belonging to  the appellant.  His counsel  contends that  there   in  no   public  purpose   mentioned  in   the notification because what is stated is ’government purpose’. There is  no force  in this  terminological  deviation.  The purpose has  been set  down as  for a  ’mondha’ or  ’country fair’ which  is  obviously  a  public  purpose.  So  counsel shifted to another shade of the same argument and state that ’mondha’ is not a word known to law and has not been defined anywhere and so such a purpose cannot be taken cognizance of

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by  the   law.  We  cannot  agree  to  the  linguistic  game masquerading as  a legal  point. It is plain that a ’mondha’ is a  country fair or village market. ’Market’ is defined in s. 2(20)  of the  Hyderabad District  Municipalities Act  in wide terms,  and s.  72  of  the  said  Act  enumerates  the purposes for which property may be vested in a municipality. This includes  ’markets’. It inexorably follows from a joint reading of ss. 2(20) and 72(a) that the purpose of providing a market  for the  townsfolk falls  within the  powers of  a municipality.      Failing here, counsel finally stressed that in any case no market  for a  small municipal  town requires 28 acres of land, especially  because the  Master Plan  prepared for the Municipality had allotted 877 only 15  acres for  this purpose. lt is not for the Court to investigate into  the area  necessary for  running a market. Moreover  there   is  no   mala  fides  emerging  from  this circumstance. What  has  to  be  established  is  mala  fide exercise of  power by  the  State  Government-the  acquiring authority-although the  beneficiary of  the  acquisition  is eventually  the  Municipality.  There  is  no  scintilla  of evidence suggestive of malus animus in Government.      At this  state Shri  Deshpande complained that actually the Municipal  Committee  had  sold  away  the  excess  land marking them  out into  separate plots for a housing colony, apart from  the fact  that a  housing  colony  is  a  public necessity, once  the original acquisition is valid and title has vested  in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no  concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating  the acquisition.  There is no principle of law by  which a  valid compulsory  acquisition stands voided because long  later the  requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose  other than  the one  stated in  the s.  5(3) declaration.      There is  no merit  in the  appeal which  is  dismissed without costs. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 878