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PETITIONER: GUJARAT WATER SUPPLY & SEWERAGE BOARD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNIQUE ERECTORS (GUJARAT) (P) LTD. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/01/1989

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1989 AIR  973            1989 SCR  (1) 318  1989 SCC  (1) 532        JT 1989 (1)   285  1989 SCALE  (1)170  CITATOR INFO :  D          1989 SC2259  (5,8)  E&F        1990 SC 685  (12)  R          1990 SC1340  (14,16,17)  E&R        1992 SC2192  (5)

ACT:     Arbitration  Act,  1940:  Sections 14, 17,  29,  30  and 33--Award-Setting  aside of--No evidence to support  conclu- sion--Based  on legal proposition which is  erroneous--Award of  arbitrator to be read reasonably as a  whole--Unreasoned award--Effect  of--Error  apparent on  face  of  award--What is--interest  pendente lite--Cannot be granted-interest  for period  between  date  of award and date of  decree  can  be allowed in cases governed by Interest Act, 1978.     Interest  Act, 1978: Section  3(1)(a)--Arbitration  pro- ceedings-grant of interest by Court. Words & Phrases. ’reasonable ’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     In 1978 the State Government undertook the  construction of  the  ’Bhavnagar City Water Supply Scheme’, and  on  12th January, 1979, two contracts in respect thereof were awarded to  respondent No. 1. On 29th March, 1981, respondent No.  1 filed  a civil suit with regard to measurements recorded  by the Deputy Engineer and alleged underpayments. On 14th June, 1981,  he gave notice to the State Government and the  peti- tioner Board requesting for reference of the disputes to  an arbitrator as provided for under clause 30 of the Agreement, and gave notice under section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 calling upon the petitioner to concur in the appointment  of one Shri G.G. Vaidhya. On 6th August, 1981 respondent No.  1 filed  a civil miscellaneous application for appointment  of the  said  Shri G.G. Vaidhya as the  sole  arbitrator  after withdrawing  the civil suit. The petitioner  contended  that the application was not maintainable. The Civil Judge howev- er appointed the said Shri G.G. Vaidhya as sole  arbitrator. The  arbitrator gave an interim award holding that only  two claims  were not arbitrable and that the other  claims  were arbitrable.     The  High Court having dismissed the appeal,  a  further

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appeal  was filed in this Court. This appeal  was,  however, disposed of by con- 319 sent  on  30th November, 1983 to the effect that  a  retired Secretary,  Public Department who was at that  time  sitting member  of  the petitioner-Board be appointed  as  the  sole arbitrator  to decide all the disputes between the  parties. On  8th  July, 1985, this sole arbitrator made  a  lump  sum award. The Civil Judge directed that the decree be passed in terms  of the award, rejecting the objections of  the  peti- tioner.     The  High Court by a common judgment dismissed  the  two appeals of the petitioner challenging the award.     In  the appeals to this Court by special leave,  it  was contended: (1) that the arbitrator had committed an error of law  in not deciding or disclosing his mind about the  arbi- trability of the claim or counterclaims, (2) in the award no basis or indication was given as to which claim was  reject- ed,  and further what amount was awarded as claim  and  what amount  towards element of interest, (3) there was an  error apparent  on the face of the award inasmuch as the basis  on which  interest had been awarded had not been disclosed  and whether  the interest has been awarded from the date of  the institution  of  the proceedings, (4) that the  granting  of interest pendente lite was contrary to the decision of  this Court  and (5) that the non-speaking award had  resulted  in great  prejudice to the petitioner inasmuch as  against  the claim of Rs.1 lakh, Rs.57 lakhs had been awarded. Disposing of the appeals, the Court,     HELD: 1(a) There is a trend in modern times that reasons should  be stated in the award though the  question  whether the reasons are necessary in ordinary arbitration awards  is pending  adjudication  by  the Constitution  Bench  of  this Court.  Even  if it be held that it is  obligatory  for  the arbitrator  to state reasons, it is not obligatory  to  give any detailed judgment. [325E]     1(b) An award Of an arbitrator should be read reasonably as  a  whole  to find out the implication  and  the  meaning thereof. Short intelligible indications of the grounds shall be  discernible to find out the mind of the  arbitrator  for his action. [325F]     l(c) The Court does not sit in appeal over the award and review  the reasons. The Court can set aside the award  only if  it is apparent from the award that there is no  evidence to support the conclusion or if the award is based upon  any legal proposition which is erroneous. [325G-H] 320     Indian  Oil  Corporation  Ltd. v.  Indian  Corbon  Ltd., [1988] 3 SCC 36, referred to.     l(d) It is one thing to say that an award is  unintelli- gible and it is another thing to say that the award was  bad because it was a nonspeaking award. [326F]     In the instant case, the arbitrator, in pursuance to the order of this Court had to decide which of the disputes were arbitrable and which were not. Reading the award along  with the  preamble,  it  appears clear that  the  arbitrator  had decided the arbitrability and the amount which he has award- ed was on the points which were arbitrable. In such  circum- stances  it will not be in consonance with justice to  refer the matter to the Constitution Bench or to await the dispos- al of the point by the Constitution Bench. [326B, G]     2.  Reasonableness  as such of an award  unless  per  se preposterous  or  absurd is not a matter for  the  Court  to consider.  Appraisement  of evidence by  the  arbitrator  is ordinarily  not a matter for the Court. It is  difficult  to

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give an exact definition of the word ’reasonable’. The  word ’reasonable’  has in law, prima facie meaning of  reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor,  called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. The award in the  instant  case  cannot  be  condemned  as  unreasonable. [327C-D]     Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Jagan Nath  Ashok Kumar & Anr., [1987] 4 SCC 497 referred to.     3.  The grant of interest pendente lite is  however  one infirmity in. the award which is apparent on the face of the award which in the interest of justice should be  corrected. [327E]     Executive  Engineer  (Irrigation) Balimela and  Ors.  v. Abhaduta Jena & Ors., [1988] 1 SCC 418 and State of Orissa & Ors.  v. Construction India, [1987] Supp. SCC  709  referred to.     In  the instant case, April 2, 1984 is the date  of  the reference to arbitration, on August 22, 1984 the  arbitrator entered upon the reference. July 8, 1985 is the date of  the award  and  July  19, 1985 the date of  publication  of  the award.  The latter date should be taken as the date  of  the award. Since the reference to arbitration was made after the commencement of the Interest Act, 1978 the arbitrator  under section 3(1)(a) of the said Act was entitled to award inter- est from August 6, 321 1981 till August 21, 1984. He could not have awarded  inter- est  for  the period from August 22, 1984 till the  date  of publication of the award viz. July 19, 1985. [327G-H; 328A]     4.  So far as interest for the period from the  date  of the  award  (July 19, 1985) till the date of the  decree  is concerned,  interest should be allowed for this  period,  on the  principle  that this Court can, once  proceeding  under sections 15 to 17 are initiated, grant interest pending  the litigation before it, i.e. from the date of the award to the date  of the decree. It may be doubtful whether this can  be done ln cases arising before the Interest Act, 1978 in  view of  the  restricted scope of section 29 of  the  Arbitration Act. [328D-E]     5. The interest awarded by the arbitrator for the period from August 22, 1984 till the date of award is deleted;  and the  interest  on the principal sum is confined to  9%  from August  6,  1981 till August 21, 1984.  However,  exercising powers under section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 and section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the Court directed that the principal  sum or unpaid part thereof should carry  interest at the same rate from the date of the award (July 19,  1985) till the date of actual payment. [329A-B]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 41819  of 1989.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  29.4.1988  of  the Gujarat High Court in F.A. Nos. 848-849 of 1986.     V.B. Patel, D. Patel, T.H Pandey and R.P. Kapur for  the Appellant.     Soli  J. Sorabjee, Atul Setalwad, N.J. Mehta,  P.  Shah, S.K. Sharma, S. Sharma and P.H. Parekh for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an application for leave to  appeal  under Article 136 of the Constitution  from  the judgment  and order of the High Court of Gujarat dated  29th April, 1988.

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   To  appreciate the questions involved herein, few  facts have  to  be emphasized. In 1978, the  State  Government  of Gujarat  undertook a scheme known as ’Bhavnagar  City  Water Supply Scheme’. The 322 Scheme  was  divided into two parts: (i) Raising  Main;  and (ii)  Gravity Main. Raising Main was divided into  two  sec- tions,  namely, 10.1 k.ms. and 7.4 k.ms. steel welded  pipe- line. On or about 15/16th December, 1978, the State  Govern- ment  issued letter of approval to the bargain  between  the parties on certain terms.     On 12th January, 1979, two contracts were awarded to the respondent No. 1 for Rs. 1,29,39,691 and Rs.94,30,435  which provided  the dates of completion as February 1979  and  the 3rd  week  of September, 1980 respectively. On  29th  March, 1981  the respondent No. 1 filed the Civil Suit No.  588  of 1981  in  the City Civil Court with regard  to  measurements recorded  by the Deputy Engineer and alleged  underpayments. On  4th June, 1981, the respondent No. 1 gave notice to  the State  Government  and the petitioner-Board  requesting  for reference  of the alleged disputes to the  arbitrator  under clause 30 of the agreement. On or about 8th July, 198 1  the respondent No. 1 gave notice under Section 8 of the Arbitra- tion  Act, 1940 (hereinafter called ’the Act’) calling  upon the petitioner to concur in the appointment of one Shri G.G. Vaidhya. On 21st July, 1981, he withdrew the Civil Suit  No. 588 of 1981. On 6th August, 1981, the respondent No. 1 filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 231 of 1981 in the Court of Civil Judge, (SD), Ahmedabad for appointment of the  said Shri  G.G. Vaidhya as the sole arbitrator. On  7th  November 1981, the petitioner filed reply contesting the arbitrabili- ty  of the various claims made in the application and  inter alia  contending that the application was not  maintainable. On  or  about 15th December, 1981 the  learned  Civil  Judge appointed  Shri G.G. Vaidhya as the sole arbitrator  with  a direction  that he should first decide as to which  disputes fell  within the purview of clause 30 of the  agreement.  On 5th  May, 1982, Shri Vaidhya gave an interim  award  holding that  the  claims at S. Nos. 10(g) and 10(1) only  were  not arbitrable  and further that the other claims were  arbitra- ble. A petition was filed in High Court which was  dismissed and then there was an application to this Court under  Arti- cle 136 of the Constitution which was disposed of by consent on  30th November, 1983. The said order inter alia  provided that  the parties had agreed to settle the  matter  amicably and  one Shri Mohanbhai D. Patel, Retired Secretary,  Public Works Department, Gujarat and at that time Sitting Member of the petitioner-Board was appointed as the sole arbitrator in place  of  Shri Vaidhya to decide all disputes  between  the parties relating to the following works:               "i) providing, fabricating, laying and  joint-               ing  1000 mm dia. 10,000 M long  steel  welded               pipe line under Bhavnagar               323               Emergency  Water Supply Scheme based  on  She-               trunji Dam--Agreement No. 5/2-1 of 1978-79.               ii) providing, fabricating laying and jointing               1000  mm  dia 7,400 M long steel  welded  pipe               line  under Bhavnagar Emergency  Water  Supply               Scheme  based on Shetrunji Dam  Agreement  No.               B-2/2 of 1978-79."     It was further provided that all disputes concerning the said  two works in question should be referred to  the  sole arbitrator  and  the  Board could also be  entitled  to  put counter-claims  before him. The consent terms also  provided

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the following terms:               "That  the  arbitration proceedings  shall  be               started  de  novo  meaning  thereby  that  the               earlier appointment and proceedings before the               Sole  Arbitrator  Shit G.G. Vaidhya  shall  be               inoperative and void.               That  the Board shall have a right to  agitate               all points both in fact and in law before  the               Sole  Arbitrator as per the terms  and  condi-               tions  of the contract including the  question               of arbitrability within the meaning of  clause               30 of the contract.               Both  parties shall have a right to be  repre-               sented by an Advocate and/or their representa-               tives.               The  expenses  of arbitration shall  be  borne               by  .both the parties as per rules of  Govern-               ment  in this behalf. That both parties  shall               agree to extend time as and when necessary for               competition of arbitration proceedings.               That a formal agreement for arbitration  shall               be  executed between the parties defining  the               scope of Arbitration.    _               That the provisions of the Indian  Arbitration               Act,  1940  shall  apply  to  the  proceedings               before this Sole Arbitrator."     On  31st March, 1984, Shri M.D. Patel was  appointed  as the  sole  arbitrator  jointly by the parties,  and  on  2nd April,  1984  he accepted his appointment and  directed  the parties  to  file  their claim statements  within  15  days. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 filed claim to the tune  of Rs.4,92,20,683 and a counter-claim to the extent of 324 Rs.26,87,217.40.  On 22nd August, 1984 the parties  appeared before  the arbitrator after filing of claims  and  counter- claims.     On 1st October, 1984 the petitioner filed an application before  the  arbitrator praying that preliminary  issues  be raised  and decided first as to which of the  disputes  were arbitrable  under clause 30 Of the agreement. On  8th  July, 1985,  a  lumpsum award was made by the arbitrator,  and  on 19th July, 1985 the parties were informed about the  signing of  the  award. On the same day the award filed by  the  re- spondent No.1’s Advocate which was dated 8.7.1985 was regis- tered as Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 144/85.  There- after,  notice was issued on the same day and served on  the petitioner also on the same day. The petitioner filed objec- tions to the award and the Objection Petition was registered as Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 158/85. Reply to  the objections was filed by the respondent No. 1. On 17th  June, 1986, however, the learned Civil Judge directed that  decree be  passed in terms of the award. Two appeals were filed  by the petitioner. On the 29th April, 1988 the High Court by  a judgment  dismissed the petition challenging the  award  and upheld  the  award. Aggrieved thereby,  the  petitioner  has moved this Court as mentioned hereinbefore.     Various  grounds were urged in support of this  applica- tion.  It  was contended, firstly, that there was  an  error apparent  on  the face of the award and that the  award  was bad.  It was submitted that the arbitrator had committed  an error  of law in not deciding or disclosing his  mind  about the arbitrability of claims or counter-claims, more so  when the  Board’s application for deciding the same, was  pending before  the arbitrator. Before the learned Trial  Judge  the Board had submitted an application to the arbitrator seeking

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to raise a preliminary issue regarding arbitrability of  the claims. As noted by the learned Trial Judge, it appears that the  third  meeting specifically mentioned that  the  claims were  placed  before the arbitrator  and  their  contentions about  the arbitrability were considered. So,  these  issues were  gone into and it appears that the parties  had  agreed and  proceeded on the basis that the claims may be  examined and it was not necessary to decide preissue of arbitrability and  it was agreed that aH the claims be decided  claimwise. So,  it cannot be said that the arbitrator had  acted  arbi- trarily  in discussing all the questions raised  before  him without  first  deciding the question  of  arbitrability  or non-arbitrability of an issue as such.     The  Court in its judgment has discussed the conduct  of the  parties. It appears that the Court found that the  par- ties themselves had 325 agreed  that the arbitrator should decide claimwise  and  on merit.  The Court so found, and in or opinion, rightly.  The arbitrator so proceeded. There was no error committed by the arbitrator  in  so  conducting himself.  It  was,  secondly, contended  that out of the numerous claims before the  arbi- trator, some of which, according to the petitioner, were  ex facie  not arbitrable and some were withdrawn including  the claims for interest of Rs.54,61,073 and compound interest of Rs.82,26,039.  and in the award no basis or  indication  was given  as  to which claim was rejected and  further  of  the amount  which was awarded as claim and what  amount  towards element  of interest. It was, thirdly, contended that  there was  an error apparent on the face of the award inasmuch  as the  basis on which interest has been awarded has  not  been disclosed and whether the interest has been awarded from the date of the institution of the proceedings. It was,  fourth- ly,  contended that granting of interest pendente  lite  was contrary  to  the decision of this Court.  It  was,  lastly, contended  that  non-speaking award had  resulted  in  great prejudice inasmuch as against the claim of Rs. 1 lakh, Rs.57 lakhs have been awarded.     The scope and extent of examination by the Court of  the award  made by an arbitrator has been laid down  in  various decisions.  It  has  to be noted that there is  a  trend  in modern  times  that reasons should be stated  in  the  award though  the  question whether the reasons are  necessary  in ordinary  arbitration awards between the parties is  pending adjudication by the Constitution bench of this Court.  Even, however,  if it be held that it is obligatory for the  arbi- trator  to state reasons, it is not obligatory to  give  any detailed judgment. An award of an arbitrator should be  read reasonably  as a whole to find out the implication  and  the meaning  thereof.  Short  intelligible  indications  of  the grounds  should be discernible to find out the mind  of  the arbitrator for his action even if it be enjoined that in all cases of award by any arbitrator reasons have to be  stated. The reasons should not only be intelligible but should  also deal  either  expressly or impliedly  with  the  substantial points  that  have  been raised. Even in a  case  where  the arbitrator  has  to state reasons, the  sufficiency  of  the reasons depends upon the facts and the circumstances of  the case.  The Court, however, does not sit in appeal  over  the award  and review the reasons. The Court can set  aside  the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusion or if the award is  based upon  any  legal  proposition which is  erroneous.  See  the observations of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Indian Carbon Ltd., [1988] 3 SCC 36.

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326     In  the  instant case, the arbitrator by virtue  of  the terms  mentioned  in the order of this Court had  to  decide which of the disputes were arbitrable and which were not. It is  true that the arbitrator has not specifically stated  in the award that he had to decide the question of arbitrabili- ty.  The arbitrator has rested by stating that he had  heard the  parties on the point of arbitrability of the claim  and the  ,counter-claim. He has further stated that after  ’con- sidering  all the above aspects’ and ’the question of  arbi- trability  or  non-arbitrability’ he had made the  award  on certain aspects. Reading the award along with the  preamble, it  appears clear that the arbitrator had decided the  arbi- trability  and the amount he has awarded was on  the  points which  were arbitrable. The contention that  the  arbitrator had not decided the question of arbitrability as a  prelimi- nary  issue  cannot also be sustained. A  reference  to  the arbitrator’s  proceedings which were discussed in detail  by the High Court in the judgment under appeal reveal that  the procedure  adopted  by the arbitrator, i.e.,  that  he  will finally  decide the matters, indicated that the parties  had agreed to and the arbitrator had proceeded with the  consent of the parties in deciding the issues before him and in  not deciding  the question of arbitrability as a separate,  dis- tinct  and  preliminary issue. The arbitrator has  made  his award  beating  all the aspects including  the  question  of arbitrability  in mind. It was contended before us that  the arbitrator has made a non-speaking award. It was obliged  to make  a  speaking award, it was submitted by  terms  of  the order  of  this  Court. We cannot  sustain  this  submission because  it is not obligatory as yet for the  arbitrator  to give  reasons in his decision. The arbitrator, however,  has in  this case indicated his mind. It appears to us that  the point  that  the non-speaking award is per se  bad  was  not agitated  before the High Court. We come to that  conclusion from the perusal of the judgment under appeal though, howev- er, this point has not been taken in the appellant’s appeal. It  is one thing to say that an award is unintelligible  and is  another to say that the award was bad because it  was  a non-speaking  award. The point taken was that the award  was unintelligible  and not that it was non-speaking. But  there was nothing unintelligible about the award.     We were invited to refer the matter to the  Constitution Bench and await the disposal of this point by the  Constitu- tion  Bench. The contract in this case was entered  into  in 1978. The proceedings for initiation of arbitration  started in  1981. The matter had come up to this Court before  which resulted  in the order dated 30th November,  1983.  Pursuant thereto, the award has been made and no grounds specifically were urged though they were taken in the appeal in the High 327 Court in the arguments before the High Court about the award being  bad  because  it is non-speaking.  In  those  circum- stances, it will not be in consonance with justice for us to refer  the matter to the Constitution Bench or to await  the disposal  of  the point by the Constitution  Bench.  It  was further submitted before us that the award was  unreasonable and that the arbitrator had awarded a large amount to  money but  the  original claim was not so large and  as  such  the award  was disproportionate. This contention, as it  is,  it appears  from the judgment of the High Court, was not  urged and  canvassed  before  the High Court. The  claim  and  the counter-claim together in its totality, in our opinion, does not  make the award amount disproportionate.  Reasonableness as such of an award unless the award is per se  preposterous

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or  absurd  is not a matter for the court to  consider.  Ap- praisement of evidence by the arbitrator is ordinarily not a matter  for  the  court. It is difficult to  give  an  exact definition  of the word ’reasonable’. Reason varies  in  its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the  individual and the times and the circumstances in which he thinks.  The word ’reasonable’ has in law prima facie meaning of reasona- ble  in  regard to those circumstances of which  the  actor, called  upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know.  See the  observations on this point in Municipal Corporation  of Delhi  v. M/s. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar & Anr., [1987]  4  SCC 497.  Judged by the aforesaid yardstick the award cannot  be condemned as unreasonable.     There  is, however, one infirmity in the award which  is apparent  on the face of the award which in the interest  of justice  as  the law now stands declared by this  Court,  we should  correct,  viz., the question  of  interest  pendente lite. The right to get interest without the intervention  of the  Court and the powers of the court to grant interest  on judgment  have  been  examined by this  Court  in  Executive Engineer  (Irrigation) Balimela and Ors. v. Abhaduta Jena  & Ors., [1988] 1 SCC 418 which observations were also followed by  this  Court in State of Orissa &  Ors.  v.  Construction India, [1987] Supp. SCC 709. In accordance with the  princi- ples  stated therein and the facts in this case, it  appears that  the principal amount awarded is Rs.57,65,273. This  is confirmed. In this case, 2nd April, 1984 is the date of  the reference to arbitration, on 22nd August, 1984 the  arbitra- tor  entered upon the reference. 8th July, 1985 is the  date of the award and 19th July, 1985, is the date of the  publi- cation of the award.     The interest awarded, in the instant case, covers  three periods: (i) 6th August, 1981 to 21st August, 1984 prior  to the  commencement of the arbitration proceedings; (ii)  22nd August, 1984 to 19th July, 328 1985 pendente lite; and (iii) 19th July, 1985 to 17th  June, 1986 (date of award to date of decree).     Having  regard to the position in law emerging from  the decision  of this Court in Executive  Engineer  (Irrigation) Balimela  & Ors. (supra) and section 29 of  the  Arbitration Act, 1940 and section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  we would  modify the grant of interest in this case. The  arbi- trator  has  directed interest to be paid at 17%  per  annum from 6.8.1981 upto the date of decree viz., 17.6.1986. Since in this case the reference to arbitration was made after the commencement of the Interest Act, 1978, the arbitrator under section 3(1)(a) of the said Act was entitled to award inter- est  from  6.8.1981 till 21.8.1984 in view of  this  Court’s decision  in Abhaduta Jena’s case (supra). In the  light  of the  same decision, he could not have awarded  interest  for the  period from 22.8.1984 till the date of the  publication of  the  award viz. 19.7. 1985. So far as interest  for  the period from the date of the award (19.7.1985) till the  date of the decree is concerned, the question was not specifical- ly  considered in Abhaduta Jena’s case (supra)  but  special leave  had  been refused against the order in so far  as  it allowed  interest for this period. We think interest  should be allowed for this period, on the principle that this Court can, once proceedings under sections 15 to 17 are initiated, grant interest pending the litigation before it, i.e.,  from the  date of the award to the date of the decree. It may  be doubtful  whether this can be done in cases  arising  before the  Interest Act, 1978 in view of the restricted  scope  of section 29 of the Arbitration Act. But there can be no doubt

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about  the  court’s power to grant this  interest  in  cases governed by the Interest Act, 1978 as section 3(1)(a)  which was  applied  by Abhaduta Jena to arbitrators  will  equally apply to enable this Court to do this in these proceedings.     In this connection, it is necessary to consider  whether the  date  of commencement of  the  arbitration  proceedings should be taken as the date of the reference or the date  on which the arbitrator entered upon the reference as the  date of  the calculation of interest. In this case, the  proceed- ings commenced on 2nd April, 1984 and the arbitrator entered upon  the reference on 22nd August, 1984. Having  regard  to the  facts and the circumstances of the case, it  is  neces- sary, in our opinion, to take 22nd August, 1984 as the date. It  is also necessary to consider whether the date of  award should  be taken as the date of its making or  its  publica- tion.  The award was made on 8th July, 1985 and it was  pub- lished  on 19th July, 1985, and, therefore, the latter  date would be taken as the date of the award. 329     We  would, however, delete the interest awarded  by  the arbitrator  for the period from 22.8.1984 till the  date  of the  award and confine the interest on the principal sum  of Rs.57,65,273  to interest at 9 per cent from  6.8.1981  till 21.8.1984  (which  has  been worked  out  at  Rs.29,82,443). However,  in exercise of our powers under section 3  of  the Interest  Act, 1978 and section 29 of the  Arbitration  Act, 1940,  we direct that the above principal sum or the  unpaid part thereof should carry interest at the same rate from the date  of the award (19.7.1985) till the date of actual  pay- ment. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. N.V.K.                                     Appeals  disposed of. 330