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PETITIONER: GUJARAT POTTERY WORKS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: B.   P. SOOD, CONTROLLER OF MINING LEASES FOR INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/10/1966

BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1967 AIR  964            1967 SCR  (1) 695  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1981 SC2138  (3)

ACT: Mines  and Minerals (Regulation and Development)  Act  1957- Agreement  to  lease with possession in 1939-Lease  deed  in 1951-Modification  by Controller under the  Rules-Period  of lease  if  from commencement of Act or  earlier-Validity  of modification. Mining  Leases (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956 r.  2(c)- "Existing   Mining  lease",  meaning  of---continuance   and validity of Rules. Constitution of India, Art. 31-A(l)(e)-"Winning" meaning of.

HEADNOTE: Along  with  an agreement to execute a  perpetual  lease  of mineral  rights  possession was delivered to the  lessee  in 1939.   The  lease was executed in 1951, in execution  of  a decree for specific performance.  The leasee transferred his rights  to  the appellant in 1954.  In 1960  the  respondent Controller  modified  the terms of the  lease  under  Mining Lease  (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956, which  continued in force by s. 29 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation  and Development)  Act,  1957.  The modifications were  that  the period  of lease was reduced to 25 years from 1939  and  the -renewal was to be regulated in accordance with the law and rules in force. The  appellant’s revision was  dismissed by the Central Government.  Inappeal to this Court, the appellant challenged the order on the groundsthat   (i) the mining lease in favour of the appellant was dated  1951, therefore, was not an "existing mining lease" as defined  in r. 2(c) of the Rules; (ii) the lease was not for the purpose of merely " winning" the mineral but was also for extracting the mineral and taking it away; therefore, the protection of Art.  31A(i)(e) was not available to save the  reduction  in the  period of the lease without payING compensation;  (iii) the  rules  were made before enactment of  the  Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, and were therefore void as till  then Central Legislature could enact with respect to acquiring of properly  for Union purpose only and not for State  purpose; (iv)  the rules were ultra vires the 1948 Act and  therefore could  not continue after the enactment of the 1957  Act  as only valid rules could continue under s. 29 of the 1957 Act; and  (v)  the Controller was not justified in  limiting  the

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period of the lease to 25 years from 1939. HELD:(Per Subba Rao, C.J., Sikri and Dayal, JJ.) :  The appeal  must  be allowed to the effect that  the  period  of lease  shall be 20 year.% from June 1, 1958, when  the  1957 Act came into force, and its renewal would be ’regulated  in accordance with the law and rules in force,.  The appeal  in respect of other modifications must be dismissed. [705 E] The  granting  of  a  lease is  different  from  the  formal execution  of the lease deed.  The execution of  the  formal deed is only compliance with the legal ’requirements to make the  grant  legally  enforceable.  Rule 27  of  the  Mineral Concession  Rules.,  1949 show that it is really  the  sanc- tioning  of the lease which amounts to the granting  of  the lease.   Further, the agreement to lease was acted  upon  by the parties and gives further, the terms of the lease.  [698 C, D] M16Sup-CI/66-16 696 (ii)The  expression "winning" in Art. 31A(1)(e)  should  be construed  to mean "getting or extracting minerals from  the mines and other incidental purposes." [701 D] The  various definitions in the Act or the rules are  for  a limited  purpose  and the word ’winning’ or ’win’  does  not always have the same content, and, therefore, they cannot be any   guide  for  construing  the  word  ’winning’  in   the constitutional  provision of Art. 31A(1)(e).  Therefore  the rules for the modification of any rights accruing under this lease cannot bedeemed  to  be void on the  ground  that they take away the rights conferredby  Arts. 14, 19  or 31 of the Constitution. [702 C-E] (iii)     The  1956 rules were made in connection  with  the regulation of mines  and for the development of minerals and  the  Central Legislature was competent to provide for the making of  such rules  by  the 1948 Act.  The rules do not come  within  the field  of  the acquisition and requisitioning  of  property. [702 H] (iv)Even  if  the  rules  were  not  consistent  with   the provisions  of  the 1948 Act and were therefore  void,  they could be continued after the enforcement of the 1957 Act. The effect of s. 29 of the 1957 Act is that the rules  which were made or purported to have been made under the 1948  Act in  respect of matters for which rules could be  made  under the  1957  Act would be deemed to have been made  under  the 1957  Act  as if that Act had been in force on the  date  on which such rules were made and would continue in force. [703 E, G] (v)The Controller was competent to modify the terms of the lease  in favour of the appellant in order to bring it  into conformity with the provisions of the 1957 Act and the rules under s. 13 thereof. [704 F] Per  Hidayatullah  and  Bachawat, JJ.  The  appeal  must  be dismissed. The  lease in 1939 was the only subsisting lease.  In  order to bring the lease in conformity with the Act and the Rules, its  period  could  be  cut down  to  20  years  from  1939. Actually the Controller cut down the period to 25 years from 1939.   The  appellants had no just grievance  against  this order. [705 H; 706 A]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 428 of 1964. Appeal  by special leave from the order dated  30th  January

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1962  of the Government of India, Ministry of  Steel,  Mines and  Fuel (Department of Mines & Fuel), New Delhi-1 in  case No. M-II-29 (26)/60. G.L. Sanghi, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and  Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. Niren De, Addl.  Solicitor-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R.   H. Debar, for respondent Nos.  1 and 2. R.   H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 3. E.   C. Agarwala and M. S. Gupta, for respondents Nos. 4-20, 22---25 and 28 to 31. The Judgment Of SUBBA RAO, C. J., SIKRI and RAGHUBAR  DAYAL, JJ. was delivered by DAYAL, J. The dissenting Opinion 697 of HIDAYATULLAH and BACHAWAT, JJ. was delivered by BACHAWAT, J. Raghubar  Dayal,  J.  This appeal,  by-  special  leave,  is against  the  order dated January 30, 1962, of  the  Central Government under r. 7 of the Mining Leases (Modification  of Terms)  Rules, 1956, hereinafter called the 1956  rules,  on revision against the order dated September 29, 1960, of  the Controller of Mining Leases, under r. 6 of the said rules. It  may be mentioned here that respondents Nos. 26  and  27. who  were  formal parties, died during the pendency  of  the appeal   and   an   application   to   bring   their   legal representatives on record has been rejected. The  facts  leading to this appeal are as  follows.   Jairam Jagmal  originally  held a perpetual  lease  from  Chimanlal Chandulal  Jani  and  others, inamdars  and  owners  of  the mineral  rights  for  excavating white clay  from  the  area leased and for taking it away.  The lessors entered into  an agreement for executing the perpetual lease, on December  2, 1939.   They  did not, however, execute  the  lease,  though possession over the leasehold land had been delivered to the said  Jairam  Jagmal after the execution of  the  agreement. Ultimately,  the lease was executed on November 3, 1951,  in execution  of  a decree of a Civil Court  for  the  specific performance of the agreement to lease. The  original lessee, Jairam Jagmal, transferred his  right, title  and interest in the lease to the appellant  in  1954. On September 29, 1960, the Controller of Mines, modified the terms  of the lease after following the procedure laid  down for modifying the lease under the 1956 rules which continued to  be in force in view of s. 29 of the Mines  and  Minerals (Regulation  and Development) Act, 1957, hereinafter  called the 1957 Act.  The modifications were that the period of the lease  was  reduced to 25 years from December  2,  1939  and further  renewal was to be regulated in accordance with  the law  and rules in force.  Dead rent was payable at the  rate of  Rs. 10 per acre per annum.  The lease was  made  further subject to the rules made or deemed to have been made  under ss. 13 and 18 of the 1957 Act and royalty was to be  payable in accordance with s. 9 of that Act. The  appellant  preferred  a  revision  before  the  Central Government under r. 7. That was rejected. The correctness of the orders challenged in appeal1 is ques- tioned  on  various grounds.  The first is that  the  mining lease  in favour of the appellant is dated November 3,  1951 and  therefore is not an ’existing mining lease’ as  defined in  r.  2(c) of the 1956 rules.  The lease was  executed  on November 3, 1951 in execution 698 of  the  decree for specific performance.  An  agreement  to lease  was  however  executed  on  December  2,  1939.   The question  is whether the lease can be said to be granted  in 1939 or in 1951.  If it was granted in 1951, the  contention

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for the appellant is sound, but if it is held to be  granted in 1939, the contention fails and the lease would be  liable to  modification under the 1956 rules as r. 2(c) defines  an ’existing mining lease’ to be a lease which has been granted before October 25, 1949. The  granting  of  a  lease is  different  from  the  formal execution of the lease deed.  The Mineral Concession  Rules, 1949,  made  under  s. 5 of the  1948  Act  and  hereinafter referred  to as the 1949 rules, deal with the procedure  for the  grant of mining leases in respect of land in which  the minerals  belong  to Government, under Chapter IV.  Rule  27 deals  with  applications  for  mining  leases.   Rule   28A provides  that  when a mining lease is  granted  the  formal lease  shall  be  executed within six months  of  the  order sanctioning  the  lease  and if no such  lease  is  executed within the aforesaid period, the order sanctioning the lease shall  be  deemed to have been revoked.  It  is  really  the sanctioning  of the lease which amounts to the  granting  of the lease.  Execution of the formal lease is only compliance with  the  legal  requirements to  make  the  grant  legally enforceable. Further,  the agreement of lease dated December 2, 1939  was acted  upon  by the parties and gives all the terms  of  the lease.  It states: "we have given possession of the land bounded as follows, we execute this (agreement) containing the following terms." After noting the boundaries, it states: "The  land  bearing the above boundaries admeasured about  2               bighas  and  is ’Kharaba’.  Out of  this  land               wehereby  give ’lease’ to excavate white  clay               (Khadi)  and  to  take the same  away  on  the               following terms." This  is a clear statement about the giving of the lease  of the  land for excavating white clay.  Term No. 2 deals  with royalty  to  be  paid.  The  various  terms  thereafter  use expressions  like  ’leasehold land’, ’during the  period  of this  lease’, ’after the period of the lease is over’,  ’any portion  of  the  land leased’ and  about  ’terminating  the lease’ etc.  Term No. 17 is: "Pursuant  to  this agreement, we will  execute  the  proper lease and you will have to incur all the expenses in respect thereof." Term No. 19 is also significant and is: 699 "In case from this date continuously for three years you  do not excavate and thus you do not pay royalty to us, then  in that  event this Agreement is at an end and this is  clearly understood.  However, if you do excavate for three years and afterwards you do not again do the work in the fourth  year, then  it  is  clearly understood  that  the  Agreement  will continue  permanently  on your paying to us Rs. 200  (rupees               two  hundred.   However, you excavate  in  the               fourth  year, then we are entitled  to  demand               royalty, not the said sum of Rs. 200 but  only               royalty." Thus  the  deed  of agreement really granted  the  lease  to Jagmal.  It was the mere execution of the proper lease which was  put off and the proper formal lease was to be  executed later. The  actual deed of lease executed in 1951 was  executed  in pursuance  of the aforesaid agreement of lease.  This  lease deed also says: "Besides,  according  to the terms of  the  said  Agreement, within the period of three years from the date of the Agree- ment, you continue excavating clay from the said land and if

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you abide by the other terms of the same Agreement, then  in that  event,  you were given right to get from  us  executed permanent lease." The  terms  incorporated in this lease are  practically  the same as were mentioned in the agreement. We  are,  therefore of opinion that the lease in  favour  of Jagmal  was  really granted in December 1939  and  that  the execution  of the lease in November 1951 was only to give  a formal shape to the lease granted much earlier, The lease in suit therefore is a lease which comes within the  expression ’existing mining lease’ within r.  2(c) of the 1956 rules. It  is  next  contended  for the  appellant  that  the  rule contravenes  art.  31  of the  Constitution  and  that  art. 31A(l)(e) does not cover the present case. Sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Central Act 53 of 1948), referred to shortly as the 1948 Act, provided that the rules made  under sub-s.  (1)  for the purpose of modifying  or  altering  the terms  and conditions of the mining lease will  provide  for the  payment  of  compensation by the  party  who  would  be benefited by the proposed modification or alteration to  the party whose rights under the existing lease would thereby be adversely affected and will also provide for the  principles on which, the manner in which and the authority by which the said  compensation shall be determined.  Rules 9 and  10  of the 1956 rules deal with these matters. 700 Rule  9  provides  for the payment of  compensation  to  the lessee  where  the  area  of an  existing  mining  lease  is reduced, the amount of compensation being determined in  the manner  and in accordance with the principles set out in  r. 10.   Clause  (ii) of sub.-r. (2) of r.10 provides  that  in determining  the  compensation payable under the  rule,  the Controller  and  the Tribunal will have regard to  the  fact that  no  compensation shall be payable in  respect  of  the reduction of the period of the lease or any modification  in the amount of royalty.  It is therefore that no compensation had  been allowed or had been paid to the appellant for  the modification  in his lease with respect to the reduction  of the period of the lease from perpetuity to 25 years and  the royalty  being payable in accordance with the provisions  of the Act. Article 31A(l)(e) provides: "Notwithstanding  anything contained in article 13,  no  law providing  for  the extinguishment or  modification  of  any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to  be void  on the ground that it is inconsistent with,  or  takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article  14, article 19 or article 31." It is said that the lease in favour of the appellant is  not for  the purpose of merely ’winning’ the mineral but is  for other purposes as well, i.e., for the purpose of ’extracting the  mineral  and taking it away’ and  that  therefore  this provision  does not cover the case of modification  made  in this lease.  It is urged that ’winning a mineral’ means only ’getting at the mineral in order to make the mine workable’, and  does not include the right to work the mine  thereafter and  to  carry  the  mineral away.   Reliance  for  such  an interpretation is placed on some English cases.  It was held in Lewis v. Fothergill(1) that the expression ’win coal’  in the lease in that case meant ’to put the mine in a state  in which  continuous  working can go forward  in  the  ordinary

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way’.    This  meaning  was  adopted  in  interpreting   the expression ’win in Lord Rokeby v. Elliot.(2) According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, ’to win’ has the meanings:  (i) to get or extract coal or other mineral  from the  mine,  pit  or  quarry; (ii)  to  sink  shaft  or  make excavation so as to reach a seam of coal or vein of ore  and prepare it for working. The expression ’to win’ interpreted in the English cases was in respect of the context of the expression used in  certain leases   The  expression  ’winning’  in   a   constitutional provision like art 31A(1)(e) should be given a wider meaning as the Constitution (1) L.R. 5 Ch.  App. 103, III.- (2) L.R. (1878) 9 Ch.  D. 685, 689. 701 makers would be using it to cover cases which deal with  the obtaining  of minerals and in that case that  wider  meaning would be ’to get or extract the mineral from the mine’.  The object of the . constitutional provision was to make the law providing for the extinguishment or modification of a  lease etc.,  in  connection with mineral rights  immune  from  the provisions  of  arts.  14, 19 and 31.   There  could  be  no logical reason for not to cover the leases which allowed the working  of  the mines after the minerals in the  mines  had been  won,  in the narrow sense, i.e., the  making  of  such arrangements  which  would allow the working  of  the  mine. Modifying  the  provisions of any lease  merely  for  making arrangements  for  the  working of the  mine  could  not  be effective  in making the law free from the  requirements  of the  various minerals in the public interest.   Modification of  the leases governing the working of the mines  could  be necessary  for the public interest.  Section 2 of  both  the 1948 and the 1957 Acts declared that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the  regulation of mines and the development of minerals  to the extent thereinafter provided. We are therefore of opinion that the expression ’winning’ in art.  31A(1)(e) be construed to mean ’getting or  extracting minerals from the mines and other incidental purposes’. Our  attention  has  been  drawn to  the  use  of  the  word ’winning’  along  with other expressions necessary  for  the proper  working of a mine in the Acts and Rules, and  it  is urged  that  the  word ’winning’ has been there  used  in  a narrow  sense.   In the context of the Acts and  Rules,  the Legislature  or  the rule-making authority had  to  use  all possible  expressions for the purposes of the mining  leases so  that  all conceivable types of mining  leases  could  be covered  by the provisions of the enactment and  the  rules. ’Mining lease’, according to s. 3, cl. (d) of the 1948  Act, means  a  lease granted for the purpose  of  searching  for, winning,  working,  getting, making  merchantable,  carrying away or disposing of minerals or for the purposes  connected therewith  and  includes  an  exploring  or  a   prospecting license.   The definition is very comprehensive and is  with the object indicated earlier. It  is  significant to notice that  the  expression  ’mine’, according  to cl. (b) of s. 3, means any excavation for  the purpose  of searching for or obtaining minerals.   Here  the word  obtain’  is  used  to  cover  the  various   processes necessary  to  get  the  mineral  ’and  would  include   the processes  covered by the expressions ’winning’,  ’working’, ’getting’ etc. ’Mining  lease’,  according to r. 3(i) of  the  1949  rules, means  a  lease to mine, quarry, bore, dig and  search  for, win,  work  and carry away any  mineral  specified  therein.

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This definition of the ’mining lease’ does not cover all the purposes mentioned in s. 3(d)   of   the  1948   Act.    The definition deals with such matters 702 which  are  covered  by the rules, as a  ’mining  lease’  is defined for the purposes of the rules. Rule 41(1)(ii) of the 1949 rules reads: "If any mineral not specified in the lease is discovered  in the leased area he shall not win and dispose of such mineral without obtaining a lease therefore. . . . It is clear that the word ’win’ here includes the getting of the  mineral  as it is only thereafter that the  lessee  can dispose of it. Section 3(c) of the 1957 Act defines ’mining lease’ to  mean a  lease  granted  for the  purpose  of  undertaking  mining operations  and  includes  a sub-lease  granted  for  mining operations. It follows that the various definitions in the Act or in the rules  referred to above are for a limited purpose and  that the  word ’winning’ or ’win’ does not always have  the  same content,  and  that therefore they cannot be any  guide  for construing   the  word  ’winning,  in   the   constitutional provision of art. 31A(1)(e). We therefore hold that the lease in suit is a lease for  the purpose  of winning coal and comes within art. 31A(1)(e)  of the  Constitution  and  that therefore  the  rules  for  the modification of any rights accruing under this lease  cannot be  deemed to be void on the ground that they take away  the rights conferred by arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. It  has been contended that the 1956 rules which  came  into effect on September 15, 1956 were made before the  enactment of  the  Constitution  VII Amendment  Act,  1956,  and  were therefore  void as till then the Central  Legislature  could enact  with  respect  to acquiring  of  property  for  Union purposes only and not for State purposes.  The VII Amendment came  into  force  on November,  1,  1956.   This  Amendment deleted  entries Nos. 33 of List I and 36 of List  11  which dealt  with acquisition and requisition of property and  the Central  Legislature could legislate in this regard for  the purpose of the Union only.  The Amendment Act substituted an entry  for item 42 of List Ill.  The substituted  entry  was ’acquisition and requisitioning of property’. Besides   these  entries,  entry  No.  54  of  List  I   was ’Regulation  Of mines and mineral development to the  extent -to which such regulation and development under the  control of  the  Union  is  declared by  Parliament  by  law  to  be expedient in the public interest.  The 1956 rules were  made in  connection  with  the regulation of mines  and  for  the development  of  minerals and the  Central  Legislature  was competent  to  provide for the making of such rules  by  the 1948  Act.   The  rules  do not come  within  the  field  of acquisition 703 and  requisitioning  of property.  We do not  consider  this contention for the appellant to be sound. It has been contended that the Legislature was not competent to make a law providing for the property of an individual to be  given to another and that therefore the 1956 rules  were void.   The objection really is that the modifications  made to the appellant’s lease benefit the lessors, the owners  of the  minerals leased and a law providing for benefiting  the lessors  who  were  private persons at the  expense  of  the lessees,   the  appellant,  contravenes  art.  14   of   the Constitution inasmuch as the rules deny equal protection  of laws  and  equality  before the law  by  treating  similarly

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situated   persons  viz.,  the  lessors  and  the   lessees, differently.  The contention is not open to the appellant in view of art. 31A(1)(e).  Further, the modifications have not been made to benefit the owners.  They have been made in the public interest.  It is only incidental that the lessors may get  some  advantage.   It may be mentioned  here  that  the lessors too were not agreeable to the proposed modifications and had raised objections before the Controller. It  has also been contended that the 1956 rules  were  ultra vires  the 1948 Act and therefore could not  continue  after the  enactment  of the 1957 Act as only  valid  rules  could continue  under  s. 29 of the 1957 Act.  Even if  the  rules were not consistent with the provisions of the 1948 Act  and were  therefore  void, we do not agree that they  could  not have  continued  after  the enforcement  of  the  1957  Act. Section 29 reads: "All  rules made or purporting to have been made  under  the Mines  and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,  1948, shall,  in  so  far  as they relate  to  matters  for  which provision  is  made  in this Act and  are  not  inconsistent therewith, be deemed to have been made under this Act as  if this  Act had been in force on the date on which such  rules were made and shall continue in force unless and until  they are superseded by any rules made under this Act." The effect of this section is that the rules which were made or purported to have been made under the 1948 Act in respect of matters for which rules could be made under the 1957  Act would  be deemed to have been made under the 1957 Act as  if that  Act had been in force on the date on which such  rules were made and would continue in force.  The Act of 1957 in a way  is deemed to have been in force when  the  modification rules were framed in 1956.  The 1956 rules. would be  deemed to be framed under the 1957 Act and therefore their validity and continuity depends on the provisions of the 1957 Act and not of the 1948 Act. 704 In  this  connection we may refer to the  case  reported  as Abdul  Majid  v. P.R. Nayak(l).  In that case s. 58  of  Act XXXI  of  1950  repealed Ordinance No.  XXVII  of  1949  and provided as follows: "The  repeal  by this Act of the Administration  of  Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 (XXVII of 1949) shall not affect the previous  operation thereof, and subject  thereto,  anything done  or  any  action taken in the exercise  of  any  power, conferred by or under that Ordinance shall be deemed to have been  done or taken in the exercise of the powers  conferred by  or under this Act, as if this Act were in force  on  the day on which such thing was done or action was taken." Section 58 was construed thus: "The  language  used in s. 58 is both  striking  and  signi- ficant.   It does not merely provide that the orders  passed under  the  Ordinance shall be deemed to  be  orders  passed under the Act, but it provides that the orders passed  under the Ordinance shall be deemed to be orders under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day on which certain things were done or action was taken.  Therefore the object of this section is, as it were, to antedate this Act so as to  bring it  into  force on the day on which a particular  order  was passed  which  is  being challenged.  In  other  words,  the validity  of an order is to be judged not with reference  to the Ordinance under which it was passed, but with  reference to the Act subsequently passed by Parliament." The  rules  have not been challenged to be ultra  vires  the 1957 Act in the instant case. It  follows that the Controller was competent to modify  the

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terms  of the lease in favour of the appellant in  order  to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the 1957 Act and the rules made under s. 13 thereof. The only other question to be dealt with now is whether  the Controller was justified in limiting the period of the lease to  25 years from December 2, 1939.  Sub-s. (1) of s.  8  of the 1957 Act reads: "The  period for which a mining lease may be  granted  shall not- (a)  in the case of coal, iron ore or bauxite exceed  thirty years; and (b)  in the case of any other mineral, exceed twenty years." (I A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 440.  705 The lease in suit is for excavating white clay and therefore a  mining lease for this purpose is not to exceed 20  years. The question raised is that this period of 20 years for  the purpose of the lease to be modified should run from the date the 1957 Act came into force and not from the original  date of the lease. We  agree with this contention.  The period of the lease  is to  be brought in conformity with the provisions of the  Act for  future and the period for which a lease can be  granted is  not  to exceed 20 years.  The Act is concerned  for  the regulation  of  mines subsequent to its  enactment  and  has nothing to take into consideration with what has taken place earlier.  As a new lease is granted after the enforcement of the  Act and can run up to 20 years, there is no reason  why the term of an existing lease for mining be not so  modified as  to make it run up to 20 years after the  enforcement  of the  Act.   We  therefore  accept  the  contention  for  the appellant  and  hold  that the Controller was  in  error  in limiting  the period of the lease to 25 years from  December 7,  1939.   The period of the lease could be  limited  to  a period  of 20 years commencing from June 1, 1958,  the  date notified as the date on which the 1957 Act came into force. We  therefore allow the appeal and modify the order  of  the Central  Government dated January 30, 1962 and the order  of the  Controller dated September 29, 1960 to the effect  that the period of the lease shall be 20 years counting from June 1, 1958, when the Act of 1957 came into force, and that  its renewal  would be regulated in accordance with the  law  and rules  in force when it falls due.  The appeal with  respect to   the  other  modifications  of  the  lease  will   stand dismissed. In  the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties  to bear their own costs. Bachawat, J. We cannot accept the contention that the agree- ment  dated December 2, 1939 is not a lease.  The  document, though  in form an agreement to lease,  finally  ascertained the terms of the lease, gave the lessee a right to exclusive possession  immediately  and operated as a  present  demise. Counsel  submitted that in view of the instrument  of  lease dated  November 3, 1951, there was an implied  surrender  of the  lease, if any, created by the document dated  March  2, 1939.   There  is no force in this  contention.   The  lease dated  November 3, 1951 was not granted in  accordance  with the Rules made under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation  and Development)  Act, 1948 and by s. 4(2) of that Act was  void and  of no effect.  The lease dated December 2, 1939 is  the only subsisting lease and could properly be modified by  the Controller. The lease was for excavating white clay.  In order to  bring it  in  conformity with the Act and the  Rules,  its  period could be cut

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706 down  to  20  years from December 2,  1939.   Actually,  the Controller cut down the period to 25 years from December  2, 1939.  The appellant can have no just grievance against this order.   For the reasons given in our judgment in C.A.  Nos. 172-174 of 1963, the other contentions of the appellant  are rejected. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Y. P. Appeal partly allowed.