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PETITIONER: GUDIKANTI NARASIMHULU AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/12/1977

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  429            1978 SCR  (2) 371  1978 SCC  (1) 240  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1980 SC1632  (28,32)  R          1984 SC1503  (9)

ACT: Bail-Grant  of bail-Practice and Procedure in the matter  of granting of bail to an accused person pending the hearing of an  appeal--Guidelines for granting bail-Order XLVII Rule  6 r/w  Order  XXI Rules 6 and 27 of the Supreme  Court  Rules, 1966.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioners  who were convicted by the  Andhra  Pradesh High Court for the offences u/ss. 148, 302, 302J 149 I.P.C., in   an  appeal  by  the  state  against  their   acquittal, surrendered  themselves to curial custody as required  under Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966, before preferring the   statutory  appeal  u/s  2(c)  of  the  Supreme   Court (Enlargement  of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act 28  of 1970 r/w S. 379 Crl.  P. C. 1973.  They were on bail at  the trial  and  appellate stages and were also on  parole  after their surrender pursuant to the High Court Judgment. Allowing their bail petition the Court, HELD  :  1. The issue of "Bail or Jail"-at the  pretrial  or post-conviction  stage-although largely hinging on  judicial discretion,  is one of liberty, justice, public  safety  and burden  of the public treasury, all of which insist  that  a developed  jurisprudence of bail is integral to  a  socially sensitized judicial process. [372 G] 2.Personal   liberty   of  an  accused  or   convict   is fundamental,  suffering  lawful  eclipse only  in  terms  of "procedure  established  by law".  The last four  words’  of Art. 21 are the life of that human right. [373 A] 3.The  significance  and  sweep  of  Art.  21  make   the deprivation of liberty, ,ephemeral or enduring, a matter  of grave concern and permissible only when the law  authorising it  is  reasonable, even handed and geared to the  goals  of community  good  and State necessity spelt out in  Art.  19. Reasonableness  postulates intelligent care  and  predicates that  deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is  not  for punitive purpose but for the bifocal interests of justice to the individual involved and society affected. [376 D-E] 4.All  deprivation  of  liberty is  validated  by  social defense  and  individual correction along an  anti  criminal

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direction.   Public justice is central to the whole of  bail law fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised.  Restorative devices to redeem the man, even  through  community service,  meditating  drill,  study classes or other resources should be innovated, and  playing foul   with  public  peace  by  tampering   with   evidence, intimidating  witnesses  or  committing  offences  while  on judicially  sanctioned "free enterprise" should be  provided against.  No seeker of justice shall play confidence  tricks on  the court or community.  Conditions may be  hung  around bail  orders  not to cripple but to protect.   Such  is  the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked  by the  judicial  discretion correlated to the  values  of  our constitution.[376 H, 377 A] 5.The  principal rule to guide release on bail should  be to secure the presenceof  the applicant who seeks  to  be liberated, to take judgment and serve sentence in the  event of  the  court  punishing him with  imprisonment.   In  this perspective,  relevance  of considerations is  regulated  by their  nexus  with the likely absence of the  applicant  for fear of a severe sentence. [375 C-D] 6.The  vital  considerations  are  :-(a)  The  nature  of charge,  the nature of the evidence and, the  punishment  to which  the party may be liable, if convicted, or  conviction is confirmed.  When the crime charged is of the highest 11-1114SCI/77 372 magnitude  and  the punishment of it assigned by law  is  of extreme  severity,  the court may reasonably  presume,  some evidence warranting that no amount of bail would secure  the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should  he be  enlarged;  (b)  whether the cause of  justice  would  be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of  the court to be freed for the time being (c) Antecedents of  the man  and socio-geographical circumstances; and  whether  the petitoner’s record shows him to be a habitual offender;  (d) when  a  person,  charged  with a  grave  offence  has  been acquitted  at  a  stage,  the  intermediate  acquittal   has pertinence to a bail plea when the appeal before this  court pends.   The  ground  for  denial  of  provisional  release, becomes  weaker  when a fair finding of innocence  has  been recorded by one court; (e) Whether the accused’s safety  may be  more in prison than in the vengeful village where  feuds have  provoked  the violent offence and (f)  the  period  in prison already spent and the prospect of delay in the appeal being  heard and disposed of. [374 G-H. 375 D, E, H, 376  A, B, C,E, V, 377 B-H] 7.Courts  should soberly size up Police exaggerations  of prospective  misconduct  of the accused, if  enlarged,  lest danger  of  excesses  and injustice creep  subtly  into  the discretionary  curial  technique.   Bad  record  and  police prediction of criminal prospects to invalidate the bail plea are admissible in principle but shall not stampede the court into a complacement refusal. [377 D-E] 8.To  answer the test of reasonableness, subject  to  the need  for  securing the presence of the bail  applicant  the court  must  also weigh the contrary factors  viz.  (i)  the better chances which a man on bail has to prepare or present his  case  that are remanded in custody, (ii)  promotion  of public  justice,  (iii) the considerable public  expense  in keeping  in  custody  where no danger  of  disappearance  or disturbance  can  arise and (iv) the  deplorable  condition, verging on the inhuman of our sub-jails. [376 E-G] 9.In the instant case, in view of the circumstances  that (a) the petitioners were free when on bail during the  trial

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and free when on parole by the state, (b) they did not abuse the trust reposed by the court or the State during the  said periods, (c) they were acquitted by the trial court (d) four other  fellow  accused were enlarged on bail (e)  they  have suffered  imprisonment  around a year and (f)  a  reasonable prediction of the time of the hearing of the appeal may take the  court  to  a few years ahead, the  court  directed  the petitioners to be enlarged on bail on terms. [378 C-H]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Misc.   Petition No.1443 of 1977. (APPLICATION FOR BAIL) P.Ram Reddy and M. S. Rana Rao for the Appellants. G.   N. Rao for the Respondent.                            ORDER KRISHNA IYER, J. "Bail or jail ?"- at the pre-trial or post- conviction stage-belongs to the blurred area of the criminal justice system and largely binges on the hunch of the bench, otherwise  called judicial discretion.  The Code is  cryptic on  this  topic and the court prefers to be  tacit,  be  the order  custodial  or  not.  And yet, the  issue  is  one  of liberty,  justice,  public safety and burden of  the  public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of  bail  is  integral to  a  socially  sensitized  judicial process.   A  Chamber judge in this summit court I  have  to deal with this uncanalised case flow, ad hoc response to the docket  being  the  flockering  candle  light.   So  it   is desirable   that  the  subject  is  disposed  of  on   basic principle,  not  improvised brevity  draped  or  discretion. Personal  liberty,  deprived when bail is  refused,  is  too precious  a  value of our constitutional  system  recognised under Art. 21 373 that  the  curial  power  to negate  it  is  a  great  trust exercisable,  not  casually  but  judicially,  with   lively concern  for the cost to the individual and  the  community. To glamorize impressionistic orders as discretionary may, on occasions,  make  a litigative gamble decisive of  a  funda- mental right.  After all, personal liberty of an accused  or convict  is  fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse  only  in terms  of  ’procedure established by law’.   The  last  four words of Art. 21 are the life of that human right. The  doctrine  of Police Power,  constitutionally  validates punitive  processes  for the maintenance  of  public  order, security  of the State, national integrity and the  interest of  the  public generally.  Even so, having  regard  to  the solemn  issue  involved, deprivation  of  personal  freedom, ephemeral  or enduring, must be founded on the most  serious considerations   relevant  to  the  welfare  objectives   of society, specified in the Constitution. What, then, is ’judicial discretion’ in this bail context  ? In the elegant words of Benjamin Cardozo.               "The judge, even when he is free, is still not               wholly  free.   He  is  not  to  innovate   at               pleasure.   He is not a knight-errant  roaming               at will in pursuit of his own ideal of  beauty               or of goodness.  He is to draw his inspiration               from  consecrated  principlcs.  He is  not  to               yield  to  spasmodic sentiment, to  vague  and               unregulated benevolence.  He is to exercise  a               discretion  informed by tradition,  methodized               by   analogy,  disciplined.  by  system,   and

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             subordinated  to ’the primordial necessity  of               order in the social life.  Wide enough in  all               conscience  is the, field of  discretion  that               remains."               The   Nature  of  the  Judicial   Process-Yale               University Press, (1921)].               Even so it is useful to notice the tart  terms               of Lord Camden that               ’the  discretion  of  a judge is  the  law  of               tyrants   :  it  is  always  unknown,  it   is               different in different men; it is casual,  and               depends upon constitution, temper and passion.               In the best, it is oftentimes caprice; in  the               worst, it is every vice, folly and passion  to               which  human nature is liable . . ." (I  Bovu.               Law Dict., Rawles’ III Revision p.  885-quoted               in Judicial Discretion-National College of the               State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada p. 14). Some jurists have regarded the term ’judicial discretion’ as a misnomer.  Nevertheless, the vestingn of discretion is the unspoken  but  inescapable, silent command of  our  judicial system, and those who exercise it will remember that               "discretion,  when  applied  to  a  court   of               justice, means sound discretion guided by law.               It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it               must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but               legal and regular."               (Attributed to Lord Mansfield, Tingley v.    Bolby,               14 N.W. 145)                374               "An  appeal  to  a judge’s  discretion  is  an               appeal   to  his  judicial  conscience.    The               discretion   must   be   exercised,   not   in               opposition   to,  but  in   accordance   with,               established principles of law."               [Judical Discretion, (ibid) p. 33] Having  grasped the core concept of judicial discretion  and the  constitutional  perspective  in which  the  court  must operate public policy by a restraint on liberty, we have  to proceed  to see what are the relevant criteria for grant  or refusal of bail in the case of a person who has either  been convicted and has appealed or one whose conviction has  been set aside but leave has been granted by this Court to appeal against  the  acquittal.   What  is  often  forgotten,   and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a  person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an  appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said :               "I observe that in this case bail was  refused               for  the prisoner.  It cannot be too  strongly               impressed  on the, magistracy of  the  country               that   bail  is  not  to  be  withheld  as   a               punishment,  but that the requirements  as  to               bail  are merely to secure the  attendance  of               the prisoner at trial."               (R.v  Rose-1898  18 Cox CC. 717; 67  LJQD  289               quoted  in  The Granting of Bail’,  Mod.   Law               Rev.  Vol. 81, Jan. 1968 p. 40, 48). This  theme was developed by Lord Russel of  Killowen  C.J., when he charged the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899 :               it  was  the  duty  of  magistrates  to  admit               accused persons to bail, wherever practicable,               unless there were strong grounds for supposing               that  such  persons would not appear  to  take               their  trial.  It was not the  poorer  classes               who  did not appear, for  their  circumstances

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             were  such as to tie them to the  place  where               they carried on their work.  They had not  the               golden wings with which to fly from justice."               [(1899)  63  J.P. 193, Mod.  Law, Rev.  p.  49               ibid].               In Archbold it is stated that               "The  proper  test of whether bail  should  be               granted  or refused is whether it is  probable               that  the  defendant will appear to  take  his               trial....               The test should be applied by reference to the               following considerations :               (1)   The nature of the accusation.               (2)   The nature of the evidence in support of               the accusation.               (3)   The  severity  of the  punishment  which               conviction will entail...                375               (4)   Whether the sureties are independent, or               indemnified by the accused person. . . . . "               (Mod.  Law Rev. ibid. p. 53-Archbold, Pleading               Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases,  36th               edn., London, 1966 para 203) Perhaps, this is an overly simplistic statement and we  must remember  the constitutional focus in Art. 21 and 19  before following diffuse observations and practices in the  English system.   Even in England there is a growing awareness  that the  working of the bail system requires a second look  from the  point  of  view of correct  legal  criteria  and  sound principles,  as has been pointed out by Dr. Bottomley.  (The Granting  of  Bails : Principles and Practices :  Mod.   Law Rev. ibid, p. 40 to 54). Let  us  have  a glance at the pros and cons  and  the  true principle around which other relevant factors must  revolve. When  the  case  is  finally disposed of  and  a  person  is sentenced  to  incarceration, things stand  on  a  different footing.   We are concerned with the penultimate  stage  and the  principal  rule to guide release on bail should  be  to secure  the  presence  of  the applicant  who  seeks  to  be liberated, to take judgment and serve sentence in the  event of  the  court  punishing him with  imprisonment.   In  this perspective,  relevance  of considerations is  regulated  by their  nexus  with the likely absence of the  applicant  for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As  Erle  J. indicated, when the crime charged (of  which  a conviction  has been sustained) is of the highest  magnitude and  the  punishment  of it assigned by law  is  of  extreme severity,  the court may reasonably presume,  some  evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of  the  convict  at the stage of  judgment,  should  he  be enlarged.  (Mod.  Law Rev. p. 50 ibid, 1852 I. E. &  B.  1). Lord Campbell CJ concurred in this approach in that case and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities, as follows :               "I  do  not  think that an  accused  party  is               detained in custody because of his guilt,  but               because there are sufficient probable  grounds               for  the  charge  against him as  to  make  it               proper  that he should be tried,  and  because               the  detention  is  necessary  to  ensure  his               appearance  at trial. It is a  very  important               element in considering whether the’ party,  if               admitted  to  bail, would appear to  take  his               trial;  and  I  think  that  in  coming  to  a               determination  on  that point  three  elements               will  generally be found the most important  :

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             the  charge,  the nature of  the  evidence  by               which  it is supported, and the punishment  to               which the party would be liable if  convicted.               In  the  present case, the charge is  that  of               wilful   murder;  the  evidence  contains   an               admission by the prisoners of the truth of the               charge, and the punishment of the offence  is,               by law, death."                      (Mod.  Law Rev. ibid, p. 50-51) It  is  thus obvious that the nature of the  charge  is  the vital  factor  and  the  nature  of  the  evidence  also  is pertinent.  The punishment to 376 which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. Another  relevant  factor is as to whether  the,  course  of justice  would  be thwarted by him who seeks  the  benignant jurisdiction  of the Court to be freed for the  time  being. [Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England  London 1960 p. 75-Mod.  Law Rev. ibid p. 50.] Thus  the  legal principle and practice validate  the  court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses  for  the prosecution or otherwise  polluting  the process  of  justice.   It  is  not  only  traditional   but rational,  in this context, to enquire into the  antecedents of  a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has  a bad  recordparticularly a record which suggests that  he  is likely to commit serious offences while on bail.  In  regard to  habituals, it is part of criminological history  that  a thoughtless  bail order has enabled the, bailee  to  exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members  of society.   Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence.  about the  criminal  record of a defendant, is  therefore  not  an exercise in irrelevance. The  significance and sweep of Art. 21 make the  deprivation of  liberty ’a matter of grave concern and permissible  only when  the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed  and geared  to the goals of community good and  State  necessity spelt out in Art. 19.  Indeed, the considerations I have set out   as   criteria  are  germane  to   the   constitutional proposition  I  have  deduced.   Reasonableness   postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by  refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for  the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected. We  must  weigh the contrary factors to answer the  test  of reasonableness,  subject  to  the  need  for  securing   the presence,  of the bail applicant.  It makes sense to  assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his  case  than  one remanded in  custody.   And  if  public justice  is to be promoted, mechanical detention  should  be close to ours,the  function of bail is limited,  ’community roots’ of the, applicant arestressed  and, after the  Vera Foundation’s Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship  is losing  ground.  The considerable public expense in  keeping in  custody where no danger of disappearance or  disturbance can  arise,  is  not a  negligible  consideration.   Equally important  is  the  deplorable condition,  verging  on.  the inhuman,  of our subjails, that the unrewarding cruelty  and expensive  custody of avoidable incarceration makes  refusal of  bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release  justly sensible. A   few  other  weighty  factors  deserve  reference.    All deprivation  of liberty is validated by social  defence  and individual  correction  along  an  anti-criminal  direction.

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Public  justice is central to the whole scheme of bail  law. Fleeting  justice must be forbidden but  punitive  harshness should be minimised.  Restorative devices to redeem the man, even,  through  community service, meditative  drill,  study classes or other resources should be innovated, and  playing foul with public peace by 377 tampering   with   evidence,   intimidating   witnesses   or committing  offence  while on  judicially  sanctioned  ’free enterprise,’  should  be  provided against.   No  seeker  of justice  shall  play  confidence  tricks  on  the  court  or community.  Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not  to  cripple  but  to protect.   Such  is  the  holistic jurisdiction  and  humanistic  orientation  invoked  by  the judicial   discretion  correlated  to  the  values  of   our constitution. Viewed from this perspective, we gain a better insight  into the rules of the game.  When a person, charged with a  grave offence, has been acquitted at a stage, has the intermediate acquittal  pertinence to a bail plea when the appeal  before this  Court  pends  ? Yes, it has.  The  panic  which  might prompt the accused to jump the gauntlet of justice is  less, having  enjoyed the confidence of the court’s verdict  once. Concurrent  holdings  of  guilt have  the  opposite  effect. Again, the ground for denial of provisional release  becomes weaker  when  the  fact stares us in the face  that  a  fair finding-if that be so of- innocence has been recorded by one court.   It  may  not  be  conclusive,  for  thejudgment  of acquittal may be ex facie wrong, the likelihood of desperate reprisal, if enlarged, may be a deterrent and his own safety may  be  more in prison than in the vengeful  village  where feuds  have  provoked  the  violent  offence.   It  depends. Antecedents of the man and socio-geographical  circumstances have  a bearing only from this angle.  Police  exaggerations of prospective misconduct of the accused, if enlarged,  must be  soberly sized up lest danger of excesses  and  injustice creep  subtly into the discretionary curial technique.   Bad record  and  police  prediction  of  criminal  prospects  to invalidate  the  bail plea are admissible in  principle  but shall not stampede the court into a cornplacent refusal. Realism is a component of humanism which is the heart of the legal  system.   We  come across cases  where  parties  have already suffered 3, 4 and in one case (the other day it  was unearthed)  over  10  years in prison.   These  persons  may perhaps  be acquitted-difficult to guess.  If they are,  the injustice  of  innocence  long  in  rigorous   incarceration inflicted  by  the protraction of curial  processes,  is  an irrevocable  injury.   And, taking a pragmatic  view,  while life  imprisonment  may,  in  law, last  a  whole  life,  in practice  it hardly survives ten years, thanks to  rules  of remission.   Thus,  at the worst, the prisoner may  have  to sere  some more years, and, at the best, law is  vicariously guilty  of  dilatory  deprivation of  citizen’s  liberty,  a consummation vigilantly to be vetoed.  So, a circumstance of some consequence, when considering a motion for bail, is the period  in  prison  already spent and the  prospect  of  the appeal  being  delayed  for hearing, having  regard  to  the suffocating  crowd  of  dockets  pressing  before  the   few Benches. It is not out of place to mention that if the State takes up a flexible attitude it may be possible to permit long spells of  parole, under controlled conditions, so that  fear  that the  full  freedom if bailed out, might be  abused,  may  be eliminated  by  this  experimental  measure,  punctuated  by reversion  to prison.  Unremitting insulation in  the  harsh

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and   hardened   company   of  prisoners   leads   to   many unmentionable vices that humanizing interludes of parole are part of the compassionate constitutionalism of our system. 378 The basics being thus illuminated, we have to apply them  to the  tangled knot of specifics projected by each case.   The delicate  light of the law favours release unless  countered by  the  negative criteria necessitating that  course.   The coffective instinct of the law plays upon release orders  by strapping  on  to them protective and  curative  conditions. Heavy  bail  from poor man is obviously wrong.   Poverty  is society’s  malady  and  sympathy,  not  sternness,  is   the judicial response. In  this  jurisprudential  setting, I  take  up  each  case. Detailed  ratiocination  is  not called for,  since  I  have indicated  the broad approach.  And, for a  bail  order-Once awareness of matters of relevance is assured-the briefer the better, and prolixity may be fraught with unwitting  injury. The focus is on personal freedom, barricaded or banned  when it  turns  a menace to the fair  administration  of  justice which is the foundation of a free society. The reasons which I have set out at great length which in my view  bear  upon  the  grant  or  refusal  of  bail  warrant enlargement  of the petitioners in the facts of the  present case.   If is a fact that he has been acquitted  along  with others  in the trial court although that acquittal has  been set  aside in the High Court.  Further, there is no  sugges- tion  possible  that during the time they were  on  bail-and they were free during the pendency of the trial and when the appeal  was pending in the High Court-that they  abused  the trust  reposed  by the Court allowing them to be  at  large. Moreover,  four  of  the fellow accused  have  been  already enlarged   on  bail  by  this  Court  and  an   attempt   at cancellation thereof rebuffed. The petitioners have suffered imprisonment around a year and areasonable  prediction  of the time of the hearing  of  the appeal many take us to a few years ahead.  Which means  that incarceration  during  that  period may  possibly  prove  an irrevocable injury if the appeal ends in their favour.   The Magistrate’s  report  about the conduct of  the  petitioners while in sub-jail is not uncomplimentary. Counsel  for the respondent-State rightly stresses that  the village  is factious and that the petitioners are  activists in  one faction.  The potentiality of community peace  being disturbed should therefore be obviated by proper safeguards. It  is  significant that the State itself has  released  the petitioners  on parole and there is nothing to suggest  that while on such spell of freedom anything injurious to  public interest  or  public  peace  or  public  justice  has   been comniitted. The cummulative result of these considerations persuades  me to  direct the petitioners to be enlarged on  bail,  namely, their own bond to appear to receive sentence in the event of an  adverse verdict from this Court.  However they  will  be put on conditions which counsel for the petitioners accepts. The  petitioners  will keep out of  the  village  Gonegondla except for one day in a week.  They will be allowed to enter the  village on that day only after reporting to the  police at  the  Gonegondla police station.  They  shall  leave  the village the next day and they wilt report to the police when they  are  departing from the village.  This will  help  the police to have a vigilant eye on the petitioners and prevent them, 379 from doing mischief inside the village and incidentally wilt

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help the petitioners carry on their agricultural  operations by once-a-week supervision. It is commendable, if the petitioners choose to report daily before any therapeutic centre for psychic reformation,  such as a transcendental meditation centre. This   is  left   to their  option  but may eventually prove to their  good.  The petition is disposed of accordingly. S.R. Petition allowed. 380