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PETITIONER: GRAMOPHONE COMPANY OF INDIA LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BIRENDRA BAHADUR PANDEY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/02/1984

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  667            1984 SCR  (2) 664  1984 SCC  (2) 534        1984 SCALE  (1)338

ACT:      Copyright Act, 1955-ss. 51 and 53-word ‘import’-meaning of. Character of order under s. 53-quasi - judicial.      International Law-Whether becomes part of municipal law without aid  of municipal statute-Whether override municipal law in case of conflict.      International Law-Rule  regarding right  of land-locked states of innocent passage of goods across another state.      Practice-Courts must interpret national law in a way so as to avoid confrontation with international law.      Interpretation-Rule  of-While   interpreting  words  of ordinary parlance reference to dictionaries of no avil.

HEADNOTE:      By treaty and by international convention, India allows transit facilities to Nepal, its neighbour and a land-locked country. A  company based  in Kathmandu,  Nepal  imported  a consignment of  pre-recorded cassettes  from Singapore which was awaiting its despatch to Nepal at Calcutta Port. As the 665 appellant  company   suspected   those   cassettes   to   be unauthorised reproductions of its records and cassettes, the import of  which into  India was  prohibited, the appellant- company moved  the Registrar  of Copyrights for action under s.53 of the Copyright Act, 1957 which enables the Registrar, after making  such enquiries as he deemed fit, to order that copies made  out of  India of  a work which if made in India would infringe  copyright, shall  not be  imported.  As  the Registrar did  not take  expenditious action, the appellant- company moved  the High  Court by  a writ petition. A single Judge made an interim order permitting the appellant-company to inspect  the consignment and if any of the cassettes were found to have infringed the appellant’s copyright, they were to be  kept apart until further orders of the Registrar. The Registrar was  directed to  deal with the application of the appellant-company in  accordance  with  law.  The  consignee preferred an  appeal against this order of the single Judge. A Division  Bench of  the High  Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the  writ petition  of the  appellant-company. The Division Bench  held that  there was no importation when the goods entered  India en  route to  Nepal. The Division Bench

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was of  the view  that the word ‘import’ did not merely mean bringing the  goods into  India, but  comprehended something more, that  is, "incorporating  and mixing,  or mixing up of the goods  imported with  the mass  of the  property in  the local area".  The company  obtained special leave to appeal. The questions  which arose  were : (i) whether international law is,  of its  own force,  drawn into  the law of the land without the  aid of  a municipal  statute, (ii)  whether, so drawn, it overrides municipal law in case of conflict; (iii) whether there  is any well established rule of international law on  the question  of the  right of land-locked states to innocent passage  of the  goods across  the soil  of another state; and  (iv) what  is the  meaning of  the word ‘import’ used in s.53 of the Copyright Act.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD :      On questions (i) & (ii).      There can  be no  question that nations must march with the international  community  and  the  municipal  law  must respect rules  of international  law even as nations respect international opinion.  The comity  of nations requires that rules of  international  law  may  be  accommodated  in  the municipal law  even  without  express  legislative  sanction provided  they  do  not  run  into  conflict  with  Acts  of Parliament. But  when they  do run  into such  conflict, the sovereignty and  the  integrity  of  the  republic  and  the supremacy of the constituted legislatures in 666 making the  laws may  not be  subjected  to  external  rules except  to   the  extent   legitimately  accepted   by   the constituted  legislatures   themselves.  The   doctrine   of incorporation also recognises the position that the rules of international law  are incorporated  into national  law  and considered to  be part  of the national law, unless they are in conflict  with an Act of Parliament. Comity of nations or no, municipal law must prevail in case of conflict. National courts cannot  say yes  if  Parliament  has  said  no  to  a principle of international law. National courts will endorse international law but not if it conflicts will national law. National courts  being organs  of the national state and not organs of international law must perforce apply national law if international  law conflicts  with it. But the courts are under  an   obligation  within   legitimate  limits,  to  so interpret the  municipal statute  as to  avoid confrontation with  the   comity  of   nations  or  the  well  established principles  of   international  law.   But  if  conflict  is inevitable, the letter must yield. [673 E-H]      Per Lord  Danning MR  in Trend  text Trading  Corpn. v. Central Bank,  [1977] I All E.R. 881; West Rand Central Gold Mining Co.  v. The  King, [1905]  2KB  391;  Lauterpacht  in International Law  (General Works); Latham CJ in Politics v. The Common  wealth 70 Commonwealth Law Reports 60; Tractoro- export, Mascow  v. M/s. Tarapore & Company and Anr, [1970] 3 SCR 53 referred to.      On question (iii).      As  the   leading  authorities   on  international  law expressed divergent  views on  the question  of the  transit rights of  land-locked countries,  the result  has been that the  land-locked   countries  have  to  rely  on  bilateral, regional or  multi-lateral agreements for the recognition of their rights.  They very  existence of innumerable bilateral treaties, while  on the  one hand it raises a presumption of the existence  of a customary right of transit, on the other it indicates  the dependence  of the right on agreement. The

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most recent  1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States, to which both Nepal and India are signatories, while providing for  freedom of  transit for  the passage of goods between the  land-locked  state  and  the  sea,  across  the territory  of   a  transit  state  emphasize  the  need  for agreement between  the land-locked  country and  the transit country. The bilateral Treaty of Trade and Treaty of Transit entered into  between India  and Nepal  in order  to  expand trade between the two countries in practice mean a guarantee to Nepal  to permit free and unhampered flow of goods needed by Nepal  from India  and a  guarantee of freedom of transit for  goods   originating  from   outside  India  across  the territory of  India to  reach Nepal.  But the  Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States and the Treaties between the two  countries, leave  either  country  free  to  impose necessary  restrictions   for  the   purpose  of  protecting industrial, 667 iterary or  artistic property  and preventing  false  marks, false indications  of origin  or  other  methods  of  unfair competition in  order to  further other general conventions. It is  clear that for this purpose, it is not necessary that the land-locked  country should  be a  party to  the general conventions   along    with   the   transit   country.   The interpretation placed  by John  H.B.  Fried  in  the  Indian Journal of international law that the provisions of the 1965 Convention permit  the States  of transit  to enforce, say a Copyright or  trade mark  convention even  if, for  example, neither the country of origin nor of destination is party to it appears to be a correct interpretation. [675 B-H]      An artistic,  literary or  musical work  is the  brain- child of  its author,  the fruit  of  his  labour,  and  so, considered to be his property. So highly is it prized by all civilised nations that it is thought worthy of protection by national laws  and  international  Conventions  relating  to Copyright. The  International Convention  for the protection of literary  or artistic  works first signed at Berne on 9th September,  1886  and  finally  revised  at  Paris  in  1971 provided for  protection to  the  authors  of  literary  and artistic works.  The Universal  Copyright  Convention  first signed at  Geneva on 6th September 1952 and revised in Paris in 1971  requires the  contracting states to provide for the adequate and  effective protection  of the rights of authors and other  copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works  including writings,  musical,  dramatic  and cinematograph works  and paintings  engraving and sculpture. [684 G-H]      On question No. (iv)      The word  ‘import’ is  not defined in the Copyright Act though it  is defined  in the Customs Act. But the same word may mean  different things  in different  enactments and  in different contexts.  It may  even mean  different things  at different places  in the same statute. It all depends on the sense  of  the  provision  where  it  occurs.  Reference  to dictionaries is hardly of any avail particularly in the case of words  of ordinary  parlance with  a variety of well-know meanings. Such  word take colour from the context. Appeal to the Latin  root won’t  help. The appeal must be to the sense of the statute. [689 C-D]      The submission  that where  goods are  brought into the country not  for commerce,  but for  onward transmission  to another country,  there can,  in law,  be no importation, is not acceptable.  In the  first place,  the language of s. 53 does not  justify reading  the words ‘imported for commerce’ for the  words ‘imported;  Nor is there any reason to assume

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that  such   was  the   object  of  the  legislature.  While interpreting the  words‘import’ in  the Copyright  Act,  one must take  note that  while the  positive requirement of the Copyright Conventions is to protect copyright, negatively 668 also, the  Transit Trade Convention and the bilateral Treaty make exceptions  enabling the  tranait state to take measure to protect  Copyright. If  this much  is borne  in mind,  it becomes clear  that   the word  ‘import’ in  s.  53  of  the Copyright Act  cannot bear  the narrow interpretation sought to be  placed upon it to limit it to import for commerce. It must be  interpreted in a sense which will fit the Copyright Act into  the setting of the International Conventions. [690 B-E]      The word  ‘import’ in seces. 51 and 53 of the Copyright Act means  bringing into  India from outside India’, that it is  not  limited  to  importation  for  commerce  only,  but includes importation  for transit  across the  country. This interpretation,  far   from  being   inconsistent  with  any principle of  International Law,  is entirely in accord with International Conventions and the Treaties between India and Nepal.[691 H, 692A]      The High  Court thought  that goods  may be  said to be imported into  the country only if there is an incorporation or mixing  up of  the goods  imported with  the mass  of the property in  the local  area. In  other words the High Court relied on  the Original  Package Doctrine’  as enunciated by Chief Justice  Marshall in  Brown v.  State of Maryland 6 L, Ed. 78.  Reliance was  placed by  the High  Court  upon  the decision of  this Court  in the  Central India  Spinning and Weaving &  Manufacturing Co.  Ltd. The Empress Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha [1958] SCR 1102. That was a case  which arose  under the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act and  the question  was whether  the power  to impose  "a terminal tax goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of a municipality" included the right to levy tax on goods  which ‘were  neither loaded  or unloaded at Wardha but were  merely carried across through the municipal area’. We are  afraid the  case is really not of any guidance to us since in the context of a ‘terminal tax’ the words ‘imported and exported’ could be construed in no other manner than was done by  the Court.  We must  however say that the ‘original package doctrine’ on which reliance was placed was expressly disapproved first  by the  Federal Court  in the Province of Madras v.  Boddu Paidanna  : [1942]  FCR 90 and again by the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, [1951] SCR 682. [690 G-H, 691 A-E]      An order  made under  s. 53  of the  Copyright  Act  is quasi-judicial. The  Registrar is not bound to make an order under s.  53 of  the Copyright Act so soon as an application is presented  to him  by the  owner of the Copyright. He has naturally to  consider the context of the mischief sought to be prevented.  He must  consider whether  the  copies  would infringe the  Copyright if the copies were made in India. He must consider  whether the  applicant owns  the copyright or the duly  authorised agent  of the  Copyright. He  must hear those claiming  to be  affected if  an  order  is  made  and consider any contention that may be put forward as an excuse for  the   import.  He   may  consider  any  other  relevant circumstance. Since all legitimate defences are upon and the enquiry is  quasi-judicial, no  one can  seriously complain. [692 E-G] 669

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos. 3216- 3218 of 1983.      Appeals by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated the  10th February, 1983 of the Calcutta High Court in Original Order Nos. 374-376 of 1982.      Soli J.  Sorabjee, Harish  N. Salve,  Sudip to Sarkar & D.N. Gupta, for the Appellant.      Santi Bhushan,  S.K. Roy Chowdhury and H.S. Parihar for Respondent No. 1 in CA. 3216 of 1983.      B. Gupta,  S.K. Roy  Chowdhary  and  H.S.  Parihar  for Respondent No. 1. in CA. 3217-18 of 1983      P.A. Francis, R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.      K. Parasaran,  Attorney General,  Gopal Subramaniam and C. V. Subba Rao in response to notice.      G.S. Sanghi, Shankar Mitra and P. Sinha for Intervener- Oceanic Shipping Agency (P.) Ltd.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA   REDDY,   J.   Nepal   is   our   neighbour. Unfortunately Nepal  is land-locked.  Nepal’s only access to the sea  is across  India. So,  as  one  good  neighbour  to another with a view to ‘maintain, develop and strengthen the friendly relations  between our two countries, by treaty and by International  Convention, we  allow a  right of innocent passage in  order to facilitate Nepal’s international trade. One of the questions before us is the extent of this right : Does the right cover the 670 transit of  goods which  may not be imported into India? May goods which  may not  be brought  into India be taken across Indian territory? What does "import" mean, more particularly what does "import" mean in Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act? Can an  unauthorised   reproduction  of  a  literary,  dramatic, musical  or   artistic  work   or  a   record  embodying  an unauthorised  recording  of  a  record  (which,  for  short, adopting trade  parlance, we may call a pirated work), whose importation  into   India  may   be  prohibited,  but  whose importation into  Nepal is  not prohibited,  be taken across Indian territory  to Nepal?  These are some of the questions which arise for consideration in this appeal.      The questions  have arisen this way: The appellant, the Gramophone  Company   of  India  Limited,  is  a  well-known manufacturer or  musical records and cassettes. By agreement with the performing artistes to whom royalties are paid, the appellant company  is the  owner of  the Copy  right in such recordings. The  appellant  received  information  from  the Custom.  Authorities  at  Calcuttath  at  a  consignment  of prerecorded cassettes  sent by  Universal  Overseas  Private Ltd.  Singapore  to  M/s.  Sungawa  Enterprises,  Kathmandu, Nepal, had arrived at Calcutta Port by ship and was awaiting despatch to  Nepal. The  appellant learnt that a substantial number of  cassettes were  pirated works’,  this fact having come  to   light  through   the  broken   condition  of  the consignment which  was lying  in the  Calcutta docks. Basing upon the  information received,  the  appellant  sought  the intervention of the Registrar of Copyrights for action under Sec. 53  of the  Copyright Act, 1957. This provision enables the Registrar,  after making such enquiries as he deems fit, to order  that copies  made out  of India of a work which if made in  India would  infringe  copy  right,  shall  not  be imported. The  provision also enables the Registrar to enter any ship,  dock or  premises where  such copies may be found and to  examine such, copies. All copies in respect of which an order  is made  prohibiting their import are deemed to be

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goods the  import of which is prohibited or restricted under Sec. 11  of the  Customs Act,  1962. The  provisions of  the Custom Act,  are to  have effect in respect of those copies. All copies  confiscated under the provisions of the said Act are not  to vest  in the  Government, but to be delivered to the owner  of the  copy right  in the work. As the Registrar was not  taking expeditious action on the application of the appellant  and  as  it  was  apprehended  that  the  pirated cassettes would be released for transportation to Nepal, the appellant filed  a writ  application in  the  Calcutta  High Court seeking a writ in the nature of Mandamus to compel the Registrar to  pass an appropriate order under Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act and to prevent release 671 of  the   cassettes  from   the  custody   of  the   customs authorities. The  learned single  judge of the Calcutta High Court, on  the request  of the appellant, issued a Rule Nisi and made  an  interim  order  permitting  the  appellant  to inspect the  consignment of  cassettes and  if  any  of  the cassettes  were   thought  to   infringe   the   appellant’s copyright, they  were to  be kept apart until further orders of the  Registrar. After causing the necessary inspection to be made,  the  Registrar  was  directed  to  deal  with  the application under Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act in accordance with law after hearing interested parties. The Registrar was directed to  deal with  the application  within eight  weeks from the date of the High Court’s order. In the event of any of the  cassettes held back by the appellant being found not to infringe  any  provision  of  the  Copy  right  Act,  the appellant was  to pay  damages as  assessed  by  the  Court. Against the  learned Single  Judge’s  order,  the  consignee preferred an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the word ’import’ did  not merely mean bringing the goods into India, but comprehended something more, that is, "incorporating and mixing, or  mixing up of the goods imported with the miss of the property  in the local area". The learned judges thought it would  be wrong  to say  that there  was importation into India, the  moment the  goods  crossed  the  Indian  customs barrier. Keeping  in  view  the  treaties  with  Nepal,  the Division Bench  took the  view that there was no importation when the  goods entered  India en route to Nepal. The appeal was, therefore,  allowed and  the writ petition filed by the present appellant was dismissed. And so, the writ petitioner in the  High Court  has appealed  to us  under  136  of  the Constitution.      First, we  shall examine  if there  is any  mandate  of international law  or if  the  rules  of  international  law afford us  any guidance  and if  such mandate or guidance is perceptive under  Indian law.  Two questions  arise,  first, whether international  law is,  of its own force, drawn into the law  of the  land without the aid of a municipal statute and, second,  whether, so  drawn, it overrides municipal law in case  of conflict. It has been said in England that there are  two   schools  of   thought,  one   school  of  thought propounding the doctrine of incorporation and the other, the doctrine of  transformation.(’) According  to the one, rules of international  law are  incorporated into  the law of the land automatically  and considered  to be part of the law of the land unless in 672 conflict with  an Act of Parliament. According to the other, rules of  International law  are not  part of the law of the land, unless  already so  by an  Act of Parliament, judicial decision or  long established  custom. According  to the one

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whenever the  rules of international law changed, they would result in  a change  of the law of the land along with them, ’without the  aid of an Act of Parliament.  According to the other, no  such change  would occur  unless those principles are ’accepted and adopted by the domestic law’. Lord Danning who had  once accepted  the transformation  doctrine without question, later veered round to express a preference for the doctrine of  incorporation and  explained  how  courts  were justified in applying modern rules of international law when old  rules  of  international  law  changed.  In  fact,  the doctrine of  incorporation,  it  appears,  was  accepted  in England long  before  Lord  Danning  did  so.  Lord  Danning himself referred to some old cases. Apart from those, we may refer to  West Rand  Central Gold  Mining Co. v. The King(1) where the court said:           "It is  quite true  that whatever has received the      common consent  of civilized nations must have received      the assent  of our  country, and  that to which we have      assented  along  with  other  nations  in  general  may      properly be  called international law, and as such will      be acknowledged  and applied by our municipal tribunals      when legitimate  occasion arises for those tribunals to      decide questions  to which  doctrines of  international      law may be relevant".      Lauterpacht in International Law (General Works) refers to the  position in Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland and says  it is the same. He quotes what a German Court said to meet an argument that the role of customary international law conflicted  with Art.24  of the  German  Code  of  Civil Procedure. The  court had  said,  "The  legislature  of  the German Reich  did not  and could not intend any violation of generally  recognised   rules  of  international  law,  when enacting Art.  24 of  the German  Code of  Civil Procedure". Lauterpacht refers to another German case where the argument that ’there  ought not to be a direct recourse to the law of nations, except  in so far as there has been formed a German customary  law’   was  rejected  with  the  statement,  "The contention  of   the  Creditor  that  international  law  is applicable only  in so  far as it has been adopted by German Customary law,  lacks foundation  in law. Such a legal maxim would, more- 673 over, if  generally applied,  lead to  the untenable  result that in  the intercourse  of nations with one another, there would obtain  not a  uniform system-international  law-but a series of  more or less diverse municipal laws". Lauterpacht summarises the position this way:-           "While it, is clear that international law may and      does act directly within the State, it is equally clear      that as  a rule  that direct operation of international      law is,  within the  State subject  to  the  overriding      authority of  municipal law. Courts must apply statutes      even if  they  conflict  with  international  law.  The      supremacy of international law lasts, pro foro interno,      only so  long as  the  State  does  not  expressly  and      unequivocally derogate from it. When it thus prescribes      a departure  from international  law,  conventional  or      customary, judges  are confronted  with a  conflict  of      international law  and municipal  law and, being organs      appointed by the State, they are compelled to apply the      latter".      There can  be no  question that nations must march with the international  community  and  the  Municipal  law  must respect rules  of International  law even as nations respect international opinion.  The comity  of Nations requires that

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Rules of  International  law  may  be  accommodated  in  the Municipal Law  even  without  express  legislative  sanction provided  they  do  not  run  into  conflict  with  Acts  of Parliament. But  when they  do run  into such  conflict, the sovereignty and  the  integrity  of  the  Republic  and  the supremacy of the constituted legislatures in making the laws may not  be subjected to external rules except to the extent legitimately  accepted   by  the   constituted  legislatures themselves. The  doctrine of  incorporation also  recognises the  position  that  the  rules  of  international  law  are incorporated into  national law and considered to be part of the national  law, unless  they are  in conflict with Act of Parliament. Comity  of Nations  or no,  Municipal  Law  must prevail in  case of conflict. National Courts cannot say yes if Parliament  has said  no to  a principle of international law. National  Courts will endorse international law but not if it  conflicts with  national law.  National courts  being organs of the National State and not organs of international law must  perforce apply  national law  if international law conflicts with  it. But  the Courts  are under an obligation within legitimate  limits, to  so  interpret  the  Municipal Statute as  to avoid conformation with the comity of Nations or the well established principles of International law. But if conflict is inevitable, the latter must yield. 674      The proposition  has been  well stated  by Latham CJ in Politics v. The Commonwealth(1):           "Every statute  is to  be interpreted and applied,      as  far   as  its   language  admits,   as  not  to  be      inconsistent with  the comity  of nations  or with  the      established rules  of international  law ..........  It      must be  held that  legislation  otherwise  within  the      power of  the. Commonwealth  Parliament does not become      invalid  because   it  conflicts   with   a   rule   of      international law,  though every  effort should be made      to  construe  Commonwealth  statutes  so  as  to  avoid      breaches of  international  law  and  of  international      comity. The  question, therefore,  is not a question of      the power  of the  Commonwealth Parliament to legislate      in breach  of international  law,  but  is  a  question      whether in fact it has done so".      The Supreme  Court of  India has  said practically  the same thing  in Tractor  export, Moscow  v.  M/s  Tarapore  & Company and Anr.(2)           "Now, as  stated in  Halsboury’s Laws  of England,      Vol.  36,   page  414,  there  is  a  presumption  that      Parliament does not assert or assume jurisdiction which      goes  beyond  the  limits  established  by  the  common      consent of  nations and  statutes are to be interpreted      provided, that  their language permits, so as not to be      inconsistent with  the comity  of nations  or with  the      established principles  of international  law. But this      principle applies  only where there is an ambiguity and      must give  way before a clearly expressed intention. If      statutory enactments are clear in meaning, they must be      construed according  to their  meaning even though they      are contrary  to the comity of nations or international      law".      The observations show that the court was only concerned with a principle of interpretation, but, by, implication, it may be possible to say that the court preferred the doctrine of incorporation;  otherwise the  question of interpretation would not truly arise. What has been 675 said in  the Tractoroexport case is entirely consistent with

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what we have  said earlier.      Is   there    any   well   established   principle   of international law  on the  question of  the right  of  land- locked States  to innocent  passage of goods across the soil of another  State? It  appears that "the leading authorities on international  law have  expressed divergent views on the question of  the transit  rights of  land-locked  countries. While one  group of  writers, such  as, Sibert,  Scelle  and others have  held the  view that  these  countries  have  an inherent right  of transit  across  neighbouring  countries, other equally eminent authorities, such as, Mc Nair and Hyde have held  the view  that these  rights are  not  principles recognised   by   international   law,   but   arrange   but arrangements made  by sovereign  States". (1)  The result of the  lack  of  unanimity  has  been  that  the  land  locked countries have  to rely  on bilateral,  regional  or  multi- lateral agreements  for the recognition of their rights. The very existence  of innumerable  bilateral treaties, while on the one  hand it  raises it  raises  a  presumption  of  the existence of  a customary  right of transit, on the other it indicates the  dependence of  the right  on  agreement.  The discontenting situation  led  to  attempts  by  national  to commodity the  rules relating to transit trade. The earliest attempt was  the Convention  on the Freedom of Transit known generally as  the Barcelona  Convention. The  second attempt was the  Convention on the High Cease, 1958. The most recent in the  1965 CONVENTION  ON  TRANSIT  TRADE  OF  LAND-LOCKED STATES. As  this is the latest Convention on the subject and as both  India and  Nepal have signed the Convention, it may be useful  to refer to it in some detail. The Convention was the result  of a  Resolution of  the United  Nations General Assembly  which,   "recognising  the   need  of  land-locked countries  for  adequate  transit  facilities  in  promoting international trade",  invited "the  Governments  of  Member States to  give full recognition to the needs of land-locked Member States  in the matter of transit trade and therefore, to accord them adequate facilities in terms of international law and  practice in  this regard,  bearing mind  the future requirements resulting  from the economic development of the land-locked countries".  Article 1  (a)  of  the  Convention defines  the  term  ’land-locked  States’  as  meaning  ’any Contracting State  which has  no sea-cast. The term "traffic in Transit"  is defined  like this:  the  passage  of  goods including unaccompanied  baggage across  the territory  of a Contracting State between 676 a land-locked  State and  the sea  when  the  passage  is  a portion of  a complete   journey  which begins or terminates within the  territory of  that land-locked  State and  which includes sea  transport directly preceding or following such passage. The  transshipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, and change in the mode of transport of such goods as well as the assembly, disassembly  or reassembly  of machinery and bulky goods shall  not render  the passage  of goods  outside  the definition of  "traffic in  transit" provided  that any such operation  is  undertaken  solely  for  the  convenience  of transportation. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as imposing  an  obligation  on  any  Contracting  State  to establish  or   permit  the   establishment   of   permanent facilities on  its territory  for such assembly, disassembly or reassembly";  The term  "transit  State"  is  defined  as meaning ’any  Contracting State with or without a sea-coast, situated between  a land-locked  State and  the sea, through whose territory  "traffic in  transit"  passes’.  Article  2 prescribes that  freedom of  transit shall  be granted under

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the terms  of this  Convention for  traffic in  transit  and means of  transport. Traffic in transit is to be facilitated on routes  in use  mutually acceptable  for transit  to  the Contracting States  concerned. No  discrimination is  to  be exercise based on the place of origin departure, entry, exit or  destination   or  any   circumstances  relating  to  the ownership  of   the  goods   or  the   ownership,  place  of registration or  flag of   vessels,  land vehicles  or other means of  transport used.  Art. 3  provides for exemption of Traffic in  Transit from  customs duties or import or export taxes or  any special dues in respect of transit, within the transit State.  Art. 4  refers to  means  of  transport  and tariffs. Art.  5 refers  to  methods  and  documentation  in regard to  customs, transport, Act. Art. 6 refers to storage of goods in transit. Art. 7 refers to delays or difficulties in traffic  in transit. Art. 8 refers to free zones or other customs facilities.  Art. 9  refers to  provision of greater facilities. All  that we  need mention about Articles 4 to 9 is that  details have necessarily to be worked out by mutual agreement. Art.  10 refers  to relation  to  most  favoured- nation clause.  Art. 11 refers to ’exceptions to Convention’ or grounds  of pubic  health, securities, and protection. of intellectual property.  It is  perhaps useful to extract the whole of Art 11.           "Exceptions to  Convention on  grounds  of  public      health,  security,   and  protection   of  intellectual      property      1.  No.   Contracting  State  shall  be  bund  by  this Convention to afford transit to persons whose admission into its territory is forbidden, 677 or  for  goods  of  a  kind  of  which  the  importation  is prohibited, either  on  grounds  of  public  morals,  public health, or  security or  as a precaution against diseases of animals or plants or against pests.      2. Each  Contracting State  shall be  entitled to  take reasonable precautions  and measures  to ensure that persons and goods,  particularly goods  which are  the subject  of a monopoly, are  really in  transit, and  that  the  means  of transport are really, used for the passage of such goods, as well as  to protect  the safety  of the  routes and means of communication.      3. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the measures which a  Contracting State  may be  called upon  to take  in pursuance  of   provisions  in   a   general   international convention, whether of a word-wide or regional character, to which it  is a  party, whether  such convention  was already concluded on  the date  of this  Convention or  is concluded later, when such provisions relate:      (a)  to export or import or transit of particular kinds           of articles  such as narcotics, or other dangerous           drugs, or arms; or      (b)  to protection  of industrial, literary or artistic           property,  or   protection  of  trade  names,  and           indications of  source or  appellations of origin,           and the suppression of unfair competition.      4.  Nothing   in  this  Convention  shall  prevent  any Contracting State  from taking  any action necessary for the protection of  its essential  security interests".  Art.  12 refers to exceptions in case of emergency. Art. 13 refers to application of the Convention in time of war. Art. 14 refers to obligations under the Convention and rights and duties of United Nations  Members. Art. 15 refers to reciprocity. Art. 16 refers  to settlement  of disputes.  Art.  17  refers  to signature. Art.  18 refers  to ratification. Art. 19. refers

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to accession.  Art. 20  refers to entry in to force. Art. 21 refers to  revision. Art.  22 refers to notifications by the Secretary-General. And Art. 23 refers to authentic texts. 618      It is thus seen that the Convention while providing for freedom of  transit for the passage of goods between a land- locked State  and the sea, across the territory of a transit State emphasizes  the need  for agreement  between the land- locked country  and the  transit country and, more important for our  present purposes,  it specifies certain exceptions. It is  indeed remarkable  that the Convention places traffic (illicit) in  industrial, literary  or artistic  property on the same  footing as  traffic in  narcotics, dangerous drugs and arms.  This opinion  of the  International Community  as revealed by  the convention  must be borne in my mind in our further  consideration   of  the   question.  It   may,   be interesting to  notice  here  what  Johan  H.E.  Fried,  who represented the Government of Nepal as one of the members of the delegation  at the  U.N. Conference  which produced  the Convention, has to say about these exceptions. In an article which he  wrote in  the Indian Journal of International law, he said,:           "The test  of a  treaty are  its  exceptions.  The      proof of  a treaty pudding is, when it cannot be eaten.      It is  the old  problem of  finding a  balance  between      demands for  saving clauses and the opposite claim that      the very  value of a treaty depends on its reliability.      For land  locked States,  conditions under their outlet      to the  outside world may be curtailed can of course be      crucial.      The Convention declares exceptions permissible for five reasons (1) certain well-specified reasons of public policy; (2) because  of overriding  international  obligations;  (3) emergency in the country of transit; (4) in case of war: (5) protection of its essential security interests.      A few  words about each, in view of their extraordinary importance.      1. Exceptions  for reasons  of public policy. The State of transit  may-this is  permissive, not obligatory-prohibit transit of  certain goods  for the  reason that their import into its  own territory is prohibited, namely (Art. 11, Para 1):      (a)     grounds  of   public  morals-   e.g.,  indecent           literature: 679      (b)  on grounds  of public  health or  public security;           (e.g.,  contaminated  food  or  improperly  packed           explosives);      (c)    as  precaution  against  animal  diseases  plant           diseases or pests.      This clause  (dubbed at  the Conference  as the  "dirty pictures  and   rotten  fish   clause")    will  not  hamper international trade if properly applied.      2. The same can probably be said of the "measures which a Contracting  State may  be called  upon to take ("poutetre amena a  prendre" in  the equally  authentic French  version which is  several niches  less permissive)  in obedience  to certain international  treaties to  which  it  is  a  party, namely, treaty provisions relating to      (a)  "expert, import or (i) transit of particular kinds           of articles  such as narcotics, or other dangerous           drugs, or  arms". (As to arms this would therefore           only become  operative if  a worldwide or regional           treaty prohibiting  or  restricting  international           arms trade existed).

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    (b)  "protection of  industrial, literary  or  artistic           property, or  protection of  trade names", and the           like           These  provisions   are  noteworthy  because  they      permit the  States of  transit to  enforce, say a copy-      right or  trade-mark convention  even if  for  example,      neither the  country of  origin nor  of destination  is      party to  it...........................  Far  as  these      provisions go, transit traffic must not be hampered for      any other  reason of  public policy  of  the  State  of      transit. If  that State  forbids importation of certain      luxury goods  for  financial  reasons,  or  of  certain      textiles to protect its own spinning industry, that is,      economic reasons,  or of shortwave radios for political      reasons-all such  goods must still be permitted to pass      through its territory.      3. Qualifiedmergency................................... 680      4. War.................................................      5.      Protection      of      essential      security interests..............................      We may  now take  a  look  at  the  treaties  with  our neighbour Nepal  and the  Protocols. First,  the ’Treaty  of Trade’ which  was  contracted  "in  order  to  expand  trade between   their   respective   territories   and   encourage collaboration in  economic development".  Art. 2  stipulates that  the  contracting  parties  shall  endeavour  to  grant maximum facilities  and to  undertake all necessary measures for the  free and  unhampered flow  of goods,  needed by one country  from  the  other,  to  and  from  their  respective territories. Art.  3  enjoins  the  contracting  parties  to accord unconditionally  to  each  other  treatment  no  less favourable than  that accorded  to any  third  country  with respect to  (a) customs  duties and  charges of  any    kind imposed on or in connection with importation and exportation and   (b)    import   regulations   including   quantitative restrictions. Art.  4 provides  that the contracting parties should, on  a reciprocal  basis, exempt  from basic  customs duty as well as from quantitative restrictions the import of such primary  products as  may be mutually agreed upon, from each other.  Art. 8  casts a duty on the contracting parties to  cooperate   effectively  with   each  other  to  prevent infringement  and  circumvention  of  the  laws,  rules  and regulations of  either country  in  regard  to  the  matters relating to  foreign exchange  and  foreign  trade.  Art.  9 specially  provides   that   notwithstanding   the   earlier provisions  of  the  treaty  either  Contracting  Parry  may maintain or introduce such restrictions as are necessary for the purpose of      (a)  protecting public morals,      (b)  Protecting human, animal and plant life,      (c)  Safeguarding national treasures,      (d)   safeguarding the  implementation of laws relating           to the  import  and  export  of  gold  and  silver           bullion, and 681      (e)  safeguarding  such   other  interests  as  may  be           mutually agreed upon.      Article (10)  which may  be extracted  in  full  is  as follows:  "Nothing  in  this  Treaty  shall  prevent  either Contracting Party  from taking  any measures  which  may  be necessary for  the  protection  of  its  essential  security interests  or   in  pursuance   of   general   international conventions,  whether  already  in  existence  or  concluded hereafter, to  which it  is a  party  relating  to  transit,

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export or  import of  particular kinds  of articles  such as opium or  other dangerous  drugs or  in pursuance of general conventions intended  to prevent infringement of industrial, literary or  artistic property  or relating  to false marks, false indications  of origin  or  other  methods  of  unfair competition".      It appears  to us  that the  Treaty of  Trade concerned itself with trade between India and Nepal and not with trade between Nepal  and other  countries. The provisions relating to import,  export, transit and the free and unhampered flow of goods refer to the import and the export from one country to another  i.e. from India to Nepal and from Nepal to India and to the transit and the free and unhampered flow of goods in the  course of  trade between the two countries. Even so, express reservation  is made to enable each of the countries to impose restrictions for certain purposes and to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of essential security   interests    and    effectuating    international conventions relating  to opium and other dangerous drugs and also to  effectuate "general conventions intended to prevent infringement of industrial, literary or artistic property or relating to  false marks,  false indications  or  origin  or other methods of unfair competition". (Art. 10)      The Treaty of Transit is more relevant. Its scheme, and sequence and  even the language indicate that it is based on the  1965   CONVENTION  ON   TRANSIT  TRADE  OF  LAND-LOCKED COUNTRIES. The Preamble to the treaty mentions that a treaty has been  concluded ’recognising that Nepal as a land-locked country needs  access to  and from  the sea  to promote  its international trade,  and recognising the need to facilitate the traffic  in transit  through their  territories’. Art. 3 defines ’Transit’ in Transit’ and is as follows:      "The term  ’Traffic in  Transit’ means  the passage  of goods including  unaccompanied baggage  across the territory of a  Contracting party  when the  passage is a portion of a complete journey which begins 682 or terminates  within the territory of the other Contracting Party. The  transshipment, warehousing,  breaking  bulk  and change in the mode of transport of such goods as well as the assembly or  reassembly of  machinery and  bulky goods shall not render  the passage  of goods outside the idefinition of "traffic  in   transit"  provided   any  such  operation  is undertaken solely  for the  convenience  of  transportation. Nothing in  the Article  shall be  construed as  imposing an obligation on  either  Contracting  Party  to  establish  or permit the  establishment of  permanent  facilities  on  its territory for such assembly, disassembly, or reassembly".      Art.1  requires   the  Contracting  Parties  to  accord ’Traffic  in   Transit’  freedom  of  transit  across  their respective territories  through routes  mutually agreed upon making no destination based on flag of vessels the places of origin, departure  entry, exit,  destination,  ownership  of goods or vessels.      Art. 4  exempts Traffic  in Transit from customs duties and  transit  duties  or  other  charges  except  reasonable charges for  transportation and  such other  charges as  are commensurate with  the costs of services rendered in respect of such transit.      Art. 5  requires each  of the  Contracting  Parties  to provide,  for   the  convenience   of  traffic  in  transit, warehouses or  sheds, for  the storage of traffic in transit awaiting customs clearance before onward transmission.      Art. 6  stipulates that  Traffic in  Transit  shall  be subject to the procedure laid down in the Protocol, Articles

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8 and  9 correspond to the provisions of Articles 11, 12 and 13 of  the 1965  CONVENTION ON  TRANSIT TRADE OF LAND-LOCKED STATES and  are similar  to Article  9 and  5 to  10 of  the Treaty of  Trade and  reserve  the  right  of  each  of  the contracting  parties  to  impose  restrictions  for  certain purposes  and  take  measures  in  connection  with  certain interests. In particular Art. 9 mentions that nothing in the treaty shall  prevent either  Contracting Party  from taking any measure  which may  be necessary in pursuance of general conventions intended  to prevent infringement of industrial, literary or  artistic property  or relating  to false marks, false indications of origin or other methods of 683 unfair competition.      The protocol  annexed to the Treaty of Transit contains a detailed  procedure for  the transit  of goods  across the territory of  India en-route  from the  Port of  Calcutta to their   Nepalese destination. The Protocol contains detailed provisions to ensure the goods reaching Nepal and to prevent the contingency of the goods escaping into the Indian market while on the way to Nepal.      While the  Treaty of Trade generally guarantees to each of the  Contracting Parties  the free and unhampered flow of goods needed  by one  country from  the other, the Treaty of Transit generally  guarantees to  each  of  the  Contracting Parties freedom of transit across the territory of the other Contracting Party  in respect  of goods  which have  to pass through the  territory of  such other  Contracting party  to reach the first Contracting Party from outside the territory of  the  second  Contracting  Party.  In  practice  the  two treaties really mean a guarantee to Nepal to permit free and unhampered flow  of goods  needed by  Nepal from India and a guarantee of  freedom of  transit for goods originating from outside India  across the territory of India to reach Nepal. In the  matter of  payment of  customs duties  the Treaty of Trade provides  for the  most favourable treatment while the Treaty of  Transit grants  exemption from such payment. Both treaties  contain   reservations.  There  is  a  reservation enabling  the   imposition  of   such  restrictions  as  are necessary for  the  purpose  of  protecting  public  morals, human,  animal   and  plant   life,  safeguarding   national treasures, the implementation of laws relating to the import and export  of gold  and silver bullion and the safeguarding of other  mutually agreed  interests. There  is  an  express reservation  for   the  protection   of  essential  security interests. There is also provision for necessary measures in pursuance of  general international  conventions relating to transit, export or import of articles such as opium or other dangerous drugs.  There  is  further  provision  for  taking necessary  measures  in  pursuance  of  general  conventions intended to prevent infringement of industrial, literary and artistic  property   or  relating   to  false  marks,  false indications  of   origin  or   other   methods   of   unfair competition. So,  the two treaties generally assure to Nepal the free  and unhampered  flow from  India  and  freedom  of transit across  India, to goods or of goods which we may say in the broad way are not res extra commercium. In particular the treaties expressly contain reservations enabling each of the contracting parties to 684 take measures  in pursuance  of general  conventions for the protection of industrial, literary and artistic property.      So we  have it  that Art.  11 of the 1965 CONVENTION ON TRANSIT TRADE  OF LAND-LOCKED  STATES, Art. 10 of the Treaty of Trade  and Art.  9  of  the  Treaty  of  Transit  contain

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exceptions to  protect  "industrial,  literary  or  artistic property" and  to prevent "false marks, false indications of origin or  other methods of unfair competition", pursuant to general conventions. Neither the International Convention of 1965 nor  the Treaties  between the two nations prohibit the imposing of  restrictions for  this purpose.  On  the  other hand, they contain reservations to the contrary. So great is the concern  of the  International Community for industrial, literary or artistic property that the Convention on Transit Trade of  Land-locked Countries  views traffic in, this kind of property  with the  same gravity  as it  views traffic in narcotics   dangerous drugs  and arms. So, the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States and the Treaties between the two  countries, leave  either  country  free  to  impose necessary  restrictions   for  the   purpose  of  protecting industrial, literary  or artistic  property  and  preventing faise marks, false indications of origin or other methods of unfair competitions  in order  to  further    other  general conventions. It  is clear  that for  this purpose, it is not necessary that  the land-locked country should be a party to the general  Convention along  with the transit country. The interpretation  placed   by  Johan   H.E.  Fried   that  the provisions of  the 1965.  Convention permit  the  States  of transit to enforce, sa/ a Copyright or trade mark convention even if,  for example,  neither the country of origin nor of destination is  party to  it appears  to us  to be a correct interpretation.      The next  step for  us to  consider is whether there is any general  Convention on  Copyright. An artistic, literary or musical  work is the brain-child of its author, the fruit of his  labour, and,  so, considered  to be his property. So highly is  it prized  by all  civilised nations  that it  is thought  worthy   of  protection   by  national   laws   and international  Conventions   relating  to   Copyright.   The International Convention  for the  protection of literary or artistic works first signed at Berne on 9th September, 1886, was revised  at Berlin in 1908, at Rome in 1928, at Brussels in 1948,  at Stockholm in 1967 and finally at Paris in 1971. Art. 1  of  the  Convention,  as  revised,  constitutes  the countries to  which the  Convention applies into a Union for the protection of 685 the rights  of authors in their literary and artistic works. The expression   ’literary and artistic works’ is defined to include every  production in  the literary,  scientific  and artistic domain whatever may be the mode or formation of its expression.  It  is  provided  that  the  work  shall  enjoy protection in  all countries of the Union. Various detailed, provisions are  made in the Convention for the protection of the works.  Art. 9  provides that  authors of  literary  and artistic works  protected by  the convention shall enjoy the exclusive right  of authorising  the reproduction  of  these works in any manner or form. It is also expressly stipulated that any  sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction for  the purposes of the Convention. We are not really concerned with the several details of the Convention. But we may refer to Art. 16 which provides:      "1.   Infringing copies  of a  work shall  be liable to           seizure in any country of the Union where the work           enjoy legal protection;      2.    The  provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall           also apply  to reproductions coming from a country           where the  work is  not protected or has ceased to           be protected.      3. The  seizure shall take place in accordance with the

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Legislation of  each country".  India we  may mention  is  a party to the Berne Convention.      The Universal  Copyright  Convention  which  was  first signed in  Geneva on  September 6, 1952 was revised in Paris in 1971.  Each Contracting State is called upon to undertake ’to provide for the adequate and effective protection of the right  of  authors  and  other  copy-right  proterietors  in literary, scientific  and artistic works including writings, musical, dramatic  and cinematograph  works  and  paintings, engraving and  sculpture’. The  rights are  to  include  the exclusive right  to authorise  reproduction  by  any  means, public performance  and broadcasting. Each Contracting State is required  to adopt  such measures  as  are  necessary  to ensure the  application of the Convention. The Convention is not in  any  way  to  affect  the  provision  of  the  Berne Convention for  the protection of literary or artistic works or membership  in the  Union created by that Convention. The Universal Copyright  Convention is  not  applicable  to  the relationships among countries of 686 the Berne Union in so far as it relates to the protection of works having  as their country of origin, within the meaning of the Berne Convention, a country of the Berne Union. India is a signatory to the Universal Copyright convention also.      The time  is now  ripe for  us  to  refer  to  our  own Copyright Act  of 1957. Section 2(c), (h), (o), (p), (f) and (w) define  ’artistic work’, dramatic work’,  literary work, ’musical   work’,    ’cinematograph   film’   and   ’record’ respectively. Sec. 2(y) defines "work" as meaning any of the following works, namely,:      (i)   a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works;      (ii)  a cinematograph film;      (iii) a record.      ’Record’ is  defined by  Sec. 2(w)  to mean  ’any disc, tape perforated  roll or  other device  in which  sounds are embodied so  as to be capable of being reproduced therefrom, other than  a sound  track associated with the cinematograph film. ’Recording’  is defined  by Sec.  2(x)  to  mean  ’the aggregate of  the sounds  embodied in  and capable  of being reproduced by  means of  a  record".  "Infringing  copy’  in relation to a record is defined to mean, by  Sec. 2(m)(iii), "any such  record embodying  the  same  recording.  If  such record  is   made  or   imported  in  contravention  of  the provisions of  the Act’.  Sec. 13(1)  states that  copyright shall subsist  through out  India in (a) original, literary, dramatic, musical  and  artistic  works;  (b)  cinematograph films; and  (c) records.  Sec. 14  explains the  meaning  of ’Copyright’ in relation to various ’works’. In the case of a record, copyright  is said  to mean  "the exclaims right, by virtue of,  and subject to the provisions of, this Act to do or authorise  the doing  of any  of the  following  acts  by utilising the record, namely:      (i)  to  make  any  other  record  embodying  the  same           recording; 687      (ii) to cause  the recording embodying in the record to           be heard in public;       (iii) to  communicate the  recording embodied  in  the           record by radio diffusion" (Sec. 14(1)(d).      Sections 17 to 21 deal with ’Ownership of Copyright and the rights  of the  owner’, Sections  22 to 29 with ’Term of Copyright’, Sections  30 to  32 with ’Licences’, Sections 33 to 36  with ’Performing Rights Societies’, Sections 37 to 39 with Rights  of Broadcasting  Authorities, Sections 40 to 43 with International  Copyright and  Sections 44  to  50  with

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Registration of  Copyright. Sections  51  to  53  deal  with infringement of Copyright.      Sec, 51 states when Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be  infringed.  In  particular  clause  (b)  states  that Copyright shall be deemed to be infringed "when any person-      (i) makes  for sale or hire, or sells or lets for hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or hire, or      (ii) distributes  either for the purpose of trade or to such an  extent as  to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright or      (iii) by way of trade exhibits in public, or      (iv) imports  (except for  the private and domestic use of the importer) into India,      any infringing copies of the work’.      There is an explanation to which it is not necessary to refer for the purposes of this case, 688      Sec. 52  enumerates the acts which shall not constitute an infringement  of copyright. It is unnecessary to refer to the various  acts enumerated  in Sec.  52. it  is enough  to state that  bringing into  India an  infringing work for the purpose of  transit to Nepal or any other country is not one of the excepted acts.      Sec. 53  which is  of direct relevance as it deals with importation  of   infringing  copies’   needs  to  be  fully extracted’. It says,:      "53.(1) The  Registrar of Copyrights, on application by the owner  of the  copyright in  any work  or by  this  duly authorised agent  and on payment of the prescribed fee, may, after making such inquiry as he deems fit, order that copies made out  of India  of the work which if made in India would infringe copyright shall not be imported.      (2) Subject  to any  rules made  under  this  Act,  the Registrar of  Copyrights or  any person authorised by him in this behalf  may enter  any ship, dock or premises where any such copies  as are  referred to  in sub-section  (1) may be found and may examine such copies.      (3) All  copies to  which any  order  made  under  sub- section(1) applies  shall be deemed to be goods of which the import has  been prohibited  or restricted  under Sec. 11 of the Customs  Act, 1962,  and all  the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly;      Provided that  all such  copies confiscated  under  the provisions of  the said Act shall not vest in the Government but shall  be delivered to the owner of the copyright in the work.      This provision  empowers the Registrar of Copyrights to make an  order that  copies made  out of  India of  any work which if  made in  India would infringe Copyright, shall not be imported. This the Registrar may do on the application of the owner  of the  Copyright in  that work  or by  his  duly authorised agent  on payment of the prescribed fee and after making such enquiry as he deems fit. 689 The effect  of such an order by the Registrar is to deem all copies to  which the  order applies to be goods of which the port has  been prohibited or restricted under sec. 11 of the Custom Act,  1962, and  to attract all the provisions of the Customs Act  that  basis,  including  the  liability  to  be confiscated, with  the modification  that copies confiscated under the  provisions of  the Act  shall  not  vest  in  the Government, but  shall be  delivered to  the  owner  of  the Copyright.      The question is what does the word import’ mean in Sec. 53 of  the Copyright  Act ?  The word  is not defined in the

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Copyright Act  though it  is defined in the Customs Act. But the  same  word  may  mean  different  things  in  different enactments and  in different  contexts.  It  may  even  mean different things at different places in the same statute. It all depends  on the  sense of the provision where it occurs. Reference  to   dictionaries  is   hardly  of   any   avail, particularly in  the case of words of ordinary parlance with a variety  of well  known meanings.  Such words  take colour from the  context. Appeal  to the Latin root won’t help. The appeal must  be to  the sense of the statute. Hidayatullah J in Burmah  Shall etc v. Commercial Tax Officer, [1961] 1 SCR 902 has  illustrated how the contextual meanings of the very words import’ and export’ may vary.      We may  look at  Sec.  53,  rather  than  elsewhere  to discover the meaning of the word  "import". We find that the meaning is  stated in  that provision itself. If we ask what is not to be imported, we find the answer is copies made out of India which if made in India would infringe copyright. So it follows  that ’import’  in the  provision means  bringing into India  from out of India. That, we see in precisely how import is  defined under  the Customs Act. Sec. 2(23) of the Customs Act, 1962 defines the word in this manner:      "Import, with  its grammatical  variation  and  cognate expression means  bringing into  India from  a place outside India. But we do not propose to have recourse to Customs Act to interpret  expressions in the Copyright Act even if it is permissible to do so because Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act is made to run with Sec. 11 of the Customs Act. 690      It  was   admitted  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the respondents that  where go  are brought into the country not for commerce,  but for onward submission to another country, there can,  in law,  be no  important. It  was said that the object of  the Copyright  Act  was  to  precious  authorised reproduction of  the work  or the  unauthorised explosion of the reproduction  of a  work in  India and this object would not be  frustrated if  infringing  copies  of  a  work  were allowed transit  across the country. If goods are brought in only to  go out,  there is  no import,  it was  said. It  is difficult to  agree with this submission thought it did find favour with  the Division  Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the  judgment under  appeal.  In  the  first  place,  the language of  Sec. 53  does not  justify  reading  the  words ’imported for commerce for the words imported’. Nor is there any reason  to assume  that  such  was  the  object  of  the legislature. We have already mentioned the imported attached by International  opinion,  as  manifested  by  the  various International Conventions and Treaties, to the protection of Copyright and  the gravity with which traffic in industrial, literary or  artistic  property  is  viewed,  treating  such traffic on  par with  traffic in  narcotics, dangerous drugs and arms.  In interpreting the word import’ in the Copyright Act, we  must take  note that  while positive requirement of the  Copyright   Conventions  is   to   protect   copyright, negatively  also,  the  Transit  Trade  Convention  and  the bilateral Treaty  make exceptions enabling the Transit State to take  measure to protect Copyright. If this much is borne in mind, it becomes bear that the word import’ in Sec. 53 of the Copyright  Act cannot  bear the  narrow   interpretation sought to  be placed  upon it  to limit  it  to  import  for commerce. It  must be  interpreted in a sense which will fit the Copyright  Act into  the setting  of  the  International Conventions.      The Calcutta  High Court thought that goods may be said to be  imported  into  the  country  only  if  there  is  an

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incorporation or  mixing up  of the  goods imported with the mass of  the property  in the local area. In other words the High Court  realized on  the original  package doctrine’  as enunciate by  the American Court. Reliance was placed by the High Court  upon the  decision of  this court in the Central India Spinning  and Weaving  & Manufacturing  Co.  Ltd;  The Empress Mills,  Nagpur v.  The Municipal  Committee,  Wardha [1958] SCR 1102). That was a case which arose under the C.P. and Berar  Municipalities Act  and the  question was whether the power  to impose  ’a terminal  tax on  goods or  animals imported into 691 or exported  from the limits of a municipality" included the right to  levy tax  on goods  which were  neither loaded  or unloaded at  Wardha but  were merely  carried across through the municipal  area’. This  court said  that it did not. The word ’import’  it was  thought meant not merely the bringing into but  camprised something  more, that  is ’incorporating and mixing  up of the goods with the mass of the property in the local  area’, thus  accepting  the  enunciation  of  the ’Original Package  Doctrine’ by  Chief Justice  Marshall  in Brown v.  State of Maryland 6 L.Ed. 78. Another reason given by the  learned Judges to arrive at the conclusion that they did, was  that the  very levy  was  a  ’terminal  tax’  and, therefore, the  words ’import  and  export’,  in  the  given context, had something to do with the idea of a terminus and not an  intermediate Stage  of a  journey. We are afraid the case is  really not  of any  guidance to  us  since  in  the context  of   a  ’terminal  tax’  the  words  ’imported  and exported’ could  be construed  in no  other manner  than was done by  the Court.  We must  however say that the ’original package doctrine’ as enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall on which reliance was placed was expressly disapproved first by the Federal  Court  in  the  Province  of  Madras  v.  Buddu Paidama, [1942]  FCR 90  and again  by the  Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, [1951] SCR 682. Apparently, these decisions  were not brought to the notice of the court which decided the case of Central India Spinning and Weaving and  Manufacturing   Co.  Ltd.   The  Empress  Mills  Nagpur Municipal Committee,  Wardha. So we derive no help from this case. As we said, we prefer to interpret the words  ’import’ as it is found in the Copyright Act rather than research for its meaning  by referring  to other  than research  statutes where it has been used.      The learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  invited  our attention to Radhakishan v. Union of India : [1965] 2 S.C.R. 213, Shawhney  v. Sylvania  and Laxman,  77  Bom.  LR.  380, Bernado v.  Collector of  Customs A.I.R. 1960 Kerala 170, to urge that  importation was  complete so  soon as the Customs barrier was  crossed. They  are cases  under the Customs Act and it  is needless for us to seek aid from there when there is enough  direct light  under the  Copyright  Act  and  the various conventions and treaties which have with the subject Copyright’ from  different angles.  We do not also desire to crow our  judgment with  reference to  the  history  of  the Copyright and the Customs legislations in the United Kingdom and India  as we  do not think it necessary to do so in this case.      We have,  therefore, no  hesitation in  coming  to  the conclusion that  the word ’import’ in Secs. 51 and 53 of the Copyright Act 692 means ’bringing  into India  from outside India’, that it is not limited  to importation  for commerce  only but includes importation   for    transit   across   the   country.   Our

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interpretation,  far   from  being   inconsistent  with  any principle of  International law,  is entirely in accord with International Conventions and the Treaties between India and Nepal. And, that we think is as it should be.      We have said that an order under Sec. 53 may be made by the Registrar  of Copyrights on the application of the owner of the  Copyright, but  after making  such  enquiry  as  the Registrar deems  fit. On  the order being made the offending copies  are  deemed  to  be  goods  whose  import  has  been prohibited or  restricted under  Sec. 11 of the Customs Act. There upon the relevant provisions of the Customs Act are to apply, with the difference that confiscated copies shall not vest in  the Government, but shall be delivered to the owner of the  Copyright. One  fundamental difference  between  the nature of  a Notification  under Sec.  11 of the Customs Act and an order made under Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act is that the former  is quasi-legislative  in  character,  while  the latter is  quasi-judicial in  character. The  quasi-judicial nature of the order made under Sec. 53 is further emphasised by the  fact that  an appeal  is provided  to the  Copyright Board against the order of the Registrar under Sec.72 of the Copyright Act.  We mention  the character of the order under Sec. 53 to indicate that the effect of an order under of the Copyright Act  is not  as portentous as a notification under Sec. 11  of the  Customs Act.  The Registrar is nor bound to make an  order under Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act so soon as an application  is presented  to him  by the  owner  of  the Copyright. He  has naturally  to consider the context of the mischief sought  to be  prevented. He  must consider whether the copies  would infringe  the Copyright if the copies were made in  India. He  must consider whether the applicant owns the Copyright  or  is  the  duly  authorised  agent  of  the Copyright. He  must hear these claiming to be affected if an order is  made and  consider any  contention that may be put forward as  an excuse  for the  import. He  may consider any other relevant  circumstance. Since  all legitimate defences are open  and the  enquiry is  quasi-judicial,  no  one  can seriously complain.      In the  result, the  judgment of  the Division Bench is set aside  and that  of the  learned single  judge restored. There is  no order  as to  costs. We  are  grateful  to  the learned Attorney  General, who appeared at our instance, for the assistance given by him. H.S.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 693