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PETITIONER: GRAM PANCHAYAT, VILLAGE KANONDA, TEHSILBAHADURGARH, DISTRICT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DIRECTOR, CONSOLIDATION OF HOLDINGS, HARYANA,CHANDIGARH AND

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/10/1989

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) RAMASWAMY, K. FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR  763            1989 SCR  Supl. (1) 576  1989 SCC  Supl.  (2) 465 JT 1989 (4)   357  1989 SCALE  (2)914

ACT:     East  Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and  Prevention  of Fragmentation) Act 1948/East Punjab Holdings  (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules 1949---Sections 21(2) and 42/Rule 18 Confirmation of Scheme--Whether tantamount to an  order under the Act--Limitation period provided in  Rule 18--Whether attracted.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant--Panchayat owned 1200 Bighas of  land  in Village  Kanonda Distt. Rohtak in Haryana. A Scheme of  con- solidation  of Holdings under Section 20 of the East  Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948  was  confirmed on 15.1.1974, as a result  whereof  the Panchayat’s land was consolidated, repartitioned and  allot- ted  to persons, allegedly having no right to hold the  same with  the  result, the Panchayat was reduced as  a  landless person,  and financially weak. The Panchayat, therefore,  on 20.9.1977  moved an application under section 42 of the  Act objecting  to  the utilization of the Land of the  value  of -/2/-  (Two  annas) and the allotments made to  other  right holders.     After hearing the parties, the Director of Consolidation of  Holdings by his order dated 8.2.79 set aside the  scheme and remanded the case to the consolidation officer with some directions. The Director took the view that even though  the application had been made much beyond the period of  limita- tion  of six months contemplated under Rule 18, yet in  view of  the fact that the Panchayat had no other land to  culti- vate  due to which the Panchayat was unable to  develop  the agricultural  Schemes,  condoned the delay and  allowed  the application  as aforesaid. Against the said orders  the  Re- spondents  moved the High Court by means of a Writ  Petition urging  inter alia that the Director had condoned the  delay without  there  being any ground for the same and  thus  had acted  illegally.  The  High Court held  that  the  Director condoned the delay on extraneous considerations and  accord- ingly quashed the impugned 577 order of 8.2.79 passed by the Director. Hence the  Panchayat

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has filed this appeal after obtaining Special Leave. Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: (Per K.N. Saikia & M. Fathima Beevi, JJ.)     Section  42  of the Act  envisages  proceedings  wherein order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made. These are the distinct proceedings for the purpose  of exercising jurisdiction under this section. [585B]     Applying  Rule 18, the application has to be  one  under section 42 of the Act, and it has to be against an order and under  the first proviso, a certified copy of the  order  is required  to accompany the application and in computing  the period  of limitation of six months, the time spent  in  ob- taining the certified copy is to be excluded. [585F].     Rule  18 has to be interpreted as it is found,  and  the words of the rule are simple, precise and unambiguous and no more  is necessary than to understand these words  in  their natural and ordinary sense. Two different meanings cannot be given  to the same word "order" namely, that, in section  42 it does not include scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti- tion made, while in Rule 18, it would include them. [586B-C]     The Rule did not come into play when a petitioner  chal- lenged  either  the scheme of  consolidation  including  its preparation  or  confirmation  or the  repartition  made  in pursuance  thereof. The amendment made this position  clear. [586E]     Though  section  42  envisaged  orders,  preparation  or confirmation  of scheme and repartition separately, Rule  18 provides  for limitation only in respect of  an  application under  that  section  in a proceeding  where  an  order  was passed.  There  is the maxim expressio  unius  est  exclusio alterius---expression of one thing implies the exclusion  of another.  When mention has been made only of  "orders",  the inference  would  be  that preparation  or  confirmation  of scheme and repartition are excluded. [588F-G]     In  matters like consolidation of Holdings by  a  scheme and  the  preparation  and confirmation of  the  scheme  and repartition thereafter, the objections may arise at  various stages for various reasons and it will 578 not  be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule  as  to the  reasonable period after which an application  could  be made under section 42 of the Act. The Legislature itself did not do so. [589C-D]     In  the  instant case, it has not been  shown  that  the Panchayat  earlier moved an application under section 42  on the  same subject matter. There is no material to hold  that the  instant order of the Director is an order of review  of his earlier order. [590A] (Per K. Ramaswamy, J.)     As regards the exercise of the power under sections 19 & 20,  the statute does not envisage passing any  orders.  But when  exercising the power, the officer is enjoined to  pass orders and appeals are provided within the prescribed  limi- tation  against those orders to the appellate  forums.  This also,  is an indication of the fact that the  limitation  of six  months  is confined to the orders to be  revised  under section 42. [580C-D]     The prescription of limitation of six months under  Rule 18  would  be confined only to order passed  by  an  officer under  the  Act, it would not apply to  the  revision  filed against the scheme prepared on confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof. [580F]     It  is undoubted that when there is no  limitation  pre- scribed  for exercise of the revisional power under  section 42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or  repartition

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made, it would be exercised within a reasonable time. [580G]     What  is  reasonable time is always a question  of  fact depending  upon  the facts and circumstances of  each  case. [580G]     When legislature chose not to fix a particular period of limitation, by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to  a particular period. :While exercising power under  Sec- tion 42, the revisional authority may take into account  the long lapse of time as a factor in the light of the facts and circumstances  obtainable in an appropriate, case. No  abso- lute  or precise period of limitation could be predicted  or laid. [580H]     Jagtar  Singh v. Additional Director,  Consolidation  of Holdings,  Jullundar,  AIR 1984 Punjab &  Haryana  216,  ap- proved.     Haqiqat Singh v. Addl. Director, Consolidation of  Hold- ings,  AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 204; Joginder Singh &  Ors. v. The Director, 579 Consolidation of Holdings, [1988] Pun. L.J. 535 and  Harbha- jan  Singh v. Karam Singh & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 641,  referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  584  of 1982.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  21.9.1979  of  the Punjab  and  Haryana High Court in Civil Writ  Petition  No. 2247 of 1979. A.B. Rohtagi and M.S. Mann for the Appellant. Harbans Lal and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Respondents. The following Judgment of the Court were delivered by     K. RAMASWAMY, J. I wholly agree with my learned  brother Saikia, J. with regard to the reasoning and the conclusions. He  has  succinctly  stated the facts of the  case  and  the relevant  provisions of law and they need no reiteration.  I would add only few points which I deem relevant to be  dealt with. As regards the applicability of the limitation of  six months  period prescribed under Rule 18 for the exercise  of the revisional power by the State Govt. under Section 42  of the  Act,  assailing  legality or propriety  of  the  scheme prepared  or  confirmation thereof or  repartition  made  in pursuance  thereof, it could be angulated from  yet  another perspective.  Indisputably  Section 42 was  amended  by  the Amendment  Act  of 1960 incorporating after  the  words  any order  passed "(Scheme prepared or confirmed or  repartition made)".  Rule  18 was made in exercise of  the  rule  making power by the subordinate legislation. After the amendment of Section 42 was made to exercise the revisional power by  the State  Govt.  against the schemes prepared or  confirmed  or repartition  made, correspondingly, no amendment to Rule  18 was  made bringing within its ambit scheme prepared or  con- firmed  or  repartition  made in pursuance  thereof.  It  is unnecessary  to  go into the question whether  Rule  18  was declared to be intra vires or not. We proceed on the footing that  Rule 18 is ultra vires and applies to the exercise  of the  revisional power by the State Govt. under  Section  42. The  omission  to  amend the Rule is an  indication  of  the legislative  animation  that the limitation  of  six  months prescribed  under  the Rule 18 would be confined to  be  ap- plicable only to "any order passed by any officer under  the Act.  Thereby, by necessary implication the prescription  of the  limitation of six months for filing  revision  petition

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against the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof would stand excluded. It is no 580 doubt true as contended for respondents that the  Consolida- tion Officer who has prepared the scheme or confirmed it  or modified  or repartition made when it is objected to by  the affected  party,  has to consider the objections and,  as  a part thereof by necessary implication, has to assign reasons and  the  record must contain reasons. But  the  legislature made  a dichotomy between the orders passed and scheme  pre- pared  or  confirmation thereof or repartition  affected  in pursuance  thereof. He is not free to take  arbitrary  deci- sion. Assigning reasons are sine quo non for application  of the  mind though he does not appear to communicate the  rea- sons therefore. But to an order passed assigning reasons  in its support and communication thereof are necessary concomi- tants and this was made manifest when Section 19, 20 and  21 are looked into. As regards the exercise of the power  under Section 19 and 20 the statute does not envisage passing  any orders. But when exercise of the power in Sub-sec. 20 of 21, the  officer  is  enjoined to pass orders  and  appeals  are provided  within  the prescribed  limitation  against  those orders to the appellate forums. This, also, is an indication of the fact that the limitation of six months is confined to the orders to be revised under section 42.     It is undoubted that the scheme prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof are amena- ble  to  the revisional jurisdiction under section  42.  The State Govt. would consider the legality or propriety of  the reasons  or  the grounds on which the scheme  was  initially prepared  or  confirmed or modified or repartition  made  in pursuance  thereof.  But that does not mean that  it  is  an order made and the limitation of six months prescribed under Rule  -18 would get attracted to the revision filed  against the  scheme  prepared  or modified or  repartition  made  in pursuance  thereof. Thus I have. little hesitation  to  hold that the prescription of limitation of six months under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by  any officer  under the Act; it would not apply to  the  revision filed  against the scheme prepared or confirmed or  reparti- tion made in pursuance thereof.     It  is undoubted that when there is no  limitation  pre- scribed  for exercise of the revisional power under  Section 42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or  repartition made,  it would be exercised within a reasonable time.  What is a reasonable time is always a question of fact  depending upon the facts and circumstances in each case. When legisla- ture  chose not to fix a particular period of limitation  by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a  particu- lar  period.  The long lapse of time may be a fact  for  the revisional authority to take into 581 account in the light of the facts and circumstances  obtain- able  in an appropriate case. No absolute or precise  period of limitation could be predicated or laid. Take for instance the facts of this case. the previous Sarpanch is a benefici- ary from the impugned order and has chosen not to take steps to  have  the  scheme impugned by filing  a  revision  under Section 42 of the Act. The Gram Panchayat, being a  juristic person,  could  not by itself except through  the  executive authority  take. any action against the scheme  prepared  by the Consolidation Officer to assail its legality or proprie- ty  by filing the revision. The revision petition was  filed soon  after the new Sarpanch came into office. Take  another instance  of  a  case where the officer  concerned  and  the

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person benefitted, in confabulation, have made a scheme  and repartition  affected  in pursuance thereto and kept  it  in dark  to the knowledge of the person affected by the  scheme prepared  or the partition made. Until the  person  affected had actual knowledge, it is not possible to become award  of it. The limitation begins to run from the date of the knowl- edge  of the fraud so played. It is always open to  the  af- fected  person  to come forward and say that for  the  first time  he  became aware of the scheme prepared  or  partition made in pursuance thereof only when his rights are sought to be  interfered  with  or exercise of the  enjoyment  of  the property  is  interdicted. Therefore  immediately  within  a reasonable  time thereafter he is to file a revision  before the  State  Govt. Having had the knowledge of  the  impugned action if he stood by without taking any further action,  it is always open to the other party to bring it to the  notice of the State Govt. of the ground or the circumstances  under which  the revision petitioner when he became aware  of  the scheme prepared or the repartition made and he  deliberately chose to acquiesce to it and if the State Govt. is satisfied of  the same, unless satisfactory explanation for the  delay is given, the State Govt. may decline to interfere with  the impugned  action  or may decline to entertain  the  revision petition itself. Thus it could be seen that each case has to be angulated on its own given facts and circumstances as  to the  reasonable period of limitation within which the  revi- sional  power is to be filed. Even though more than 5  years time  had  elapsed from the date of the preparation  of  the scheme till date of the filing of the revision under Section 42,  there  is sufficient ground in this case  for  the  new Sarpanch in not filing a revision within six months from the date  of  the original scheme and the State  Govt.  is  well justified in exercising the power under Section 42. The High Court is unjustified in interfering with the order passed by the  Consolidation Officer. Accordingly, the appeal  is  al- lowed. No costs. 582     K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the Judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  Chandi- garh dated 21.9.1979 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979 allowing  the  petition and setting aside the order  of  the Director, Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.     The appellant Gram Panchayat, hereinafter referred to as the  ’Panchayat’,  was the owner of 1200 Bighas of  land  in village  Kanonda,  Tehsil Bahadurgarh,  District  Rohtak.  A Scheme of consolidation of holdings, hereinafter referred to as  ’the Scheme’, of the village was confirmed on  15.1.1974 under section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings  (Consolidation and  Prevention  of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (50  of  1948), hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’. The Panchayat,  there- fore,  moved an application under section 42 of the  Act  on 20.9.1977  for  setting aside the Scheme, objecting  to  the utilisation  of the land of value of -/2/- (two  annas)  and allotments made to the other rightholders for their benefit. On  24.1. 1979 a Mushtehri Mundadi was made for  information of  all the villagers concerned, but the  rightholders  were absent and ex party proceedings were taken against them. The Panchayat’s case was that under the said Scheme the Panchay- at  land  was consolidated, repartitioned  and  allotted  to persons  who  did not have any right to hold the  land.  Be- sides,  the  land of Dharat containing two wells and  a  big house being religious place of worship was also  partitioned under  the  Scheme and consequently the Panchayat  has  been reduced  to  a  landless person,  financially  weakened  and

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rendered incapable of rendering service in the village.     After  hearing  the parties the Director  in  his  order dated 8.2. 1979 observed that it was evident from the perus- al  of  the record that the Scheme of Consolidation  of  the village was confirmed on 15.1. 1974 whereas the  application had been filed on 20.9. 1977 and as such the application had been  filed too late. After the expiry of six months  period the  application  was time barred. However, he said  in  his order:               "In  this case only to benefit some land  own-               ers,  the land of the value of two  annas  has               been  allotted  due  to  which  the  deserving               persons have been left over and they have  not               been  given even Abadi plots. Apart from  this               the Panchayat had no other land to  cultivate,               due to which the Panchayat is unable to devel-               op  the  agricultural  schemes  and  in  these               circumstances  of  the matter  I  condone  the               delay in filing the present application." 583      He  accordingly set aside the Scheme and  remanded  the case to the Consolidation Officer under section 21(2) of the Act with some directions. Against that order the respondents moved  the  High Court of Punjab and Haryana in  Civil  Writ Petition  No.  2247  of 1979 urging, inter  alia,  that  the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had condoned the delay without  there  being any ground for the same and  that,  in doing  so, he had acted illegally and with material  irregu- larity.  The High Court held that from the  observations  of the  Director it was evident that the delay was condoned  on extraneous considerations as no reason whatsoever was  given by  the applicant in the application filed before him  under section  42  of  the Act as to why it was  filed  after  the period  of limitation. In that view of the  matter,  holding that  the  Director of Consolidation of Holdings  had  acted illegally  and with material irregularity in  condoning  the delay,  the High Court by the impugned order  dated  21.9.79 allowed  the  writ  petition and quashed the  order  of  the Director of Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.      Mr.  A.B. Rohtagi, the learned counsel for  the  appel- lant, submits that the High Court erred in setting aside the Director of Consolidation’s order applying to the  confirma- tion of the Scheme the period of limitation of six months as prescribed in Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings  (Consoli- dation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules 1949,  herein- after  referred  to as ’the Rules’, inasmuch  as  that  rule speaks only of orders and not of confirmation of the Scheme; and  that a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court in  Jagtar  Singh v. Additional Director,  Consolidation  of Holdings,  Jullundar,  AIR 1984 P & H 216, taking  the  view that  the bar of limitation under Rule 18 does not apply  to those  petitions under section 42 in which the  legality  or validity  of a scheme prepared or confirmed  or  repartition made  is challenged has overruled AIR 1982 Punjab  and  Har- yana--  148  and  that Full Bench decision  has  since  been followed in 1988 Pun. L.J. 535. Mr. Rohtagi further  submits that  on merits also there was ample justification  for  the Director to have taken the view it did inasmuch as Panchayat lands  were taken into consolidation and  repartitioned  and allotted  to  persons who had no right to  obtain  the  land thereby impoverishing the Panchayat and rendering it incapa- ble of giving any help to the villagers.     Mr.  Harbans  Lal, learned counsel for  the  respondents submits  that  the Full Bench decision that  the  limitation under rule 18 does not cover an order confirming a scheme is

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not tenable inasmuch as confirmation of a scheme is only  by an  order as contemplated under rule 18,    and an  applica- tion challenging that order of confirmation has, there- 584 fore,  to be made within six months thereof; and  that  even assuming that there was no bar of limitation, an application had to be made within a reasonable time which, according  to learned counsel, would be ’about two years’; and that by any standard  the appellant’s application under section  42  was belated  and  could not have been allowed.  Lastly,  counsel submits that there were three earlier applications dismissed by  the Director under section 42 of the Act, including  one by  the Panchayat itself, and the Director had no  power  to review his own order.     The  questions to be decided therefore are, whether  for the purpose of limitation under rule 18 of the Rules confir- mation  of  a scheme would be an order as envisaged  in  the rule;  if  it  was not an order, whether  the  Director  was justified  in  setting aside the scheme  and  remanding  the matter to the Consolidation Officer; and whether the  Direc- tor’s  order was one of review of his earlier order  and  as such beyond his jurisdiction.     To  decide the first question we may conveniently  refer to the provisions of the Act and rule 18 of the Rules.     Section  42 of the Act empowers the State Government  to call for proceedings under the Act. It says:               "42.  Power  of State Government to  call  for               proceedings:The  State Government may  at  any               time  for the purpose of satisfying itself  as               to  the  legality or propriety  of  any  order               passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repar-               tition  made  by any officer under  this  Act,               call  for and examine the record of  any  case               pending before or disposed of by such  officer               and  may pass such order in reference  thereto               as it thinks fit:                         Provided that no order or scheme  or               repartition shall be varied or reversed  with-               out  giving the parties interested notice’  to               appear  and opportunity to be heard except  in               cases where the State Government is  satisfied               that  the  proceedings have been  vitiated  by               unlawful consideration." From  a perusal of this section there arises no  doubt  that under  it  the State Government may for the  stated  purpose call  for  proceedings wherein any order is  passed,  scheme prepared  or  confirmed or repartition made by  any  officer under this Act. Under the proviso the State 585 Government shall not vary or reverse any order or scheme  or repartition without giving the interested parties opportuni- ty of being heard except in cases where the State Government is  satisfied  that the proceedings have  been  vitiated  by unlawful  consideration.  There is therefore no  doubt  that this section envisages proceedings wherein order is  passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made. These  are the  distinct  proceedings  for the  purpose  of  exercising jurisdiction under this section.     Rule  18  deals with limitation  for  application  under section 42, and it reads:               "18. Limitation for application under  section               42:--An application under section 42 shall  be               made  within  six months of the  date  of  the               order against which it is filed:                         Provided   that  in  computing   the

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             period  of limitation, the time spent  in  ob-               taining certified copies of the orders and the               grounds  of appeal, if any, filed  under  sub-               section  (3) or sub-section(4) of section  21,               required to accompany the application shall be               excluded:                         Provided  further, that an  applica-               tion  may  be  admitted after  the  period  of               limitation prescribed therefore if the  appli-               cant satisfies the authority competent to take               action under section 42 that he had sufficient               cause  for not making the  application  within               such period." From  a perusal of this rule there arises no doubt that  for applying  this  rule  the application has to  be  one  under section 42 of the Act and it has to be against an order  and under  the  first proviso a certified copy of the  order  is required  to accompany the application and in computing  the period  of limitation of six months, the time spent  in  ob- taining the certified copy is to be excluded.     While the Division Bench comprising P.C. Jain and  Tewa- tia, JJ of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the  instant case applied the period of limitation to the confirmation of the  scheme  and in that view of the matter  set  aside  the Director’s  order,  the  Full Bench  comprising  P.C.  Jain, Acting C.J., Tewatia and Tiwana, JJ. held:               "A bare perusal of rule 18 of the Rules  would               show  that  .it provides limitation  only  for               petitions filed against orders               586               passed. There is no reference in the Rules  to               a scheme prepared or confirmed or  repartition               made.  The fact that in section 42 of the  Act               the  words  ’scheme prepared or  confirmed  or               repartition made’ have been added as a  result               of  amendment, cannot justify  the  conclusion               that in Rule 18 of the Rules these words  have               also to be read." We  respectfully  agree with this view. Rule 18  has  to  be interpreted  as  we find it and the words of  the  rule  are simple,  precise  and unambiguous and no more  is  necessary than to understand these words in their natural and ordinary sense.  Two different meanings cannot be given to  the  same word ’order’ namely, that in section 42 it does not  include scheme  prepared or confirmed or repartition made; while  in rule  18  it would include them. The  Full  Bench  therefore rightly  held  that rule 18 of the Rules does not  apply  to those  proceedings in which the legality or validity of  the scheme  prepared or confirmed or repartition made  is  chal- lenged.  The  Full Bench rightly approved  the  decision  in Haqiqat Singh v. Addl. Director, Consolidation of  Holdings, AIR  1981 Punjab & Haryana 204, wherein it was held  that  a reading  of  section  42 as well as the scheme  of  the  Act unmistakably  pointed  out  that the statute  made  a  clear distinction between order passed by an officer under the Act and  the performance of duties by the authorities under  the Act in the matter of preparation and confirmation of  scheme of consolidation and re-partition made in pursuance thereof. So it could not possibly be held that preparation or confir- mation  of a scheme and the repartition carried  would  fail within the scope of ’order’ as used in rule 18 of the rules. The rule did not come into play when a petitioner challenged either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation or confirmation of the repartition made in pursuance  there- of. The amendment made this position clear.

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   In a subsequent decision reported in 1988 Pun. L.J. 535: Joginder  Singh and Ors. v. The Director,  Consolidation  of Holdings, decided on August 8, 1988, where the direct  hold- ers  had not challenged any order of the  consolidation  au- thorities  but had attacked the validity of the  scheme  and the repartition, it was rightly held that the bar of limita- tion of six months in rule 18 of the Rules was not attracted to the facts of that case.     Mr. Harbans Lal submits that the above decisions require reconsideration.  We  do  not agreed. We  have  perused  the provisions of the Act and rule 18. The Act provides for  the compulsory consolidation of, and for prevention of  fragmen- tation of, agricultural holdings in the 587 State  of  Punjab and for the assignment or  reservation  of land  for  common purposes of the village. It  appears  that prior to the Act there were two methods of consolidation  in vogue  in the Province, one through the  Revenue  Department and  the  other through the Cooperative Department  but  the progress of consolidation was very slow and lengthy and  the Act  sought to remedy those defects. Section 19 of  the  Act provides for publication of draft scheme and on such  publi- cation  any  person likely to be affected  by  such  scheme, shall,  within 30 days of such publication,  communicate  in writing to the Consolidation Officer any objections relating to  the  scheme.  The Consolidation  Officer,  shall,  after considering  the  objections, if any  received,  submit  the scheme with such amendment as he considers necessary togeth- er  with  his remarks on the objections  to  the  Settlement Officer  (Consolidation).  Thus, in this section we  do  not find  any provisions for any order being passed. Section  20 deals with confirmation of the scheme. Under  sub-section(2) thereof  if any objections are received to the draft  scheme published under sub-section (1) of section 19 and also if no written or oral objections to the draft scheme are  received under  subsection  (3)  of that section  by  the  Settlement Officer (Consolidation) he shall confirm that scheme.  Under sub-section (3) if any objections are received to the  draft scheme  published under sub-section (1) of section 19 or  if any  written or oral objections are received by the  Settle- ment Officer (Consolidation) before the confirmation of  the draft  scheme by him the  Settlement  Officer(Consolidation) may after taking the objections into consideration  together with  the remarks thereon of the Consolidation  Officer  and also after considering the written or oral objections either confirm the scheme with or without modifications, or  refuse to confirm it. In case of such refusal the Settlement  Offi- cer (Consolidation) shall return the draft scheme, with such directions as may be necessary to the Consolidation Officer, for  reconsideration and resubmission ..  Under  sub-section (4)  upon the consideration of the scheme under  sub-section (2) or (3) the scheme as confirmed shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned.  Thus, this  section  also does not envisage passing of  any  order with reference to any person affected by the scheme. It  may be  true, as Mr. Harbans Lal submits, that the  confirmation may  be  done  in the form of an order.  However,  the  word ’order’  has not been used by the legislature in  this  sec- tion.     Section 21 deals with repartition. Under sub-section (1) of  this  section, the Consolidation  Officer  shall,  after obtaining  the  advice of the land owners of the  estate  or estates concerned, carry out repartition in accordance  with the scheme of consolidation of holdings 588

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confirmed  under section 20 and the boundaries of the  hold- ings as demarcated shall be shown on the Shajra which  shall be  published  in  the prescribed manner in  the  estate  or estates  concerned. There is no provision of passing of  any ’order’  under  this sub-section. Under subsection  (2)  any person aggrieved by the repartition may file written  objec- tion within 15 days of the publication before the Consolida- tion Officer who shall after hearing the objectors pass such orders  as he considers proper confirming or  modifying  the repartition.  Thus  this sub-section  envisages  passing  of orders  on the objections after hearing the objectors.  Sub- section (3) provides that any person aggrieved by the  order of  the  Consolidation  Officer under  sub-section  (2)  may within  one  month of that order file an appeal  before  the Settlement  Officer (Consolidation) who shall after  hearing the  appellant pass such order as he considers proper.  This sub-section  also clearly envisages passing of an  order  on appeal  by  an  aggrieved person as  above.  Subsection  (4) provides  that any person aggrieved by the order of  Settle- ment  Officer (Consolidation) under sub-section (3)  whether made  before  or after the commencement of the  East  Punjab Holdings  (Consolidation  and Prevention  of  Fragmentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962 may within 60 days of that order appeal to the Assistant Director of Consolida- tion  and under sub-section (5) any appeal against an  order of  the  Settlement Officer  (Consolidation)  pending  under sub-section  (4) immediately before the commencement of  the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of  Frag- mentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962, either before  the State or any officer to whom the powers  of  the State  Government in this behalf have been delegated,  shall be decided by the Assistant Director of Consolidation.     Thus, the above sub-sections clearly envisage passing of orders by the respective authorities.     We have already extracted section 42 of the Act and Rule 18  of the Rules. It would be clear that though  section  42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme  and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only in  respect of an application under that section in  a  pro- ceeding  where an order was passed. There is the  maxim  ex- pressio unius est exclusio alterius--expression of one thing is  the exclusion of another. Mention of one  thing  implies the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified  in a law an intention to exclude all others  from its  operation may be inferred. When mention has  been  made only of ’Orders’, the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are 589 excluded. Again, Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus  optima fit interpretation. The best interpretation is made from the context.  As we have seen, while section 19 and 20  did  not envisage  passing of any order section 21 envisaged  passing of  orders. Section 42 deals with applications  against  or- ders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition. Rule 18 mentions only orders and hence by inference excludes ’preparation and confirmation of scheme and repartition’. We have accordingly no doubt in approving the Full Bench  deci- sion  in Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director,  Consolidation of Holdings (supra).     Mr. Harbans Lal’s submission that even if no  limitation was  prescribed the application of the Panchayat before  the Director was inordinately delayed is not tenable.  According to  the  learned counsel the period of two  years  would  be reasonable  period. We are unable to agree. In matters  like Consolidation  of Holdings by a scheme and  the  preparation

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and  confirmation of the scheme and  repartition  thereafter the  objections  may  arise at various  stages  for  various reasons  and it will not be possible to prescribe  any  hard and fast rule as to reasonable period after which an  appli- cation could be made under section 42 of the Act. The legis- lature  itself did not do so. In the instant case  the  Pan- chayat filed the application on 20th September, 1977  before the  Director of Consolidation under section 42 of  the  Act praying for the revocation of the Scheme and for  directions for  fresh valuation to be ordered and repartition  effected through  appropriate authorities stating that  the  Sarpanch was not given any Nishan Dehi or demarcation on the spot nor was  issued  any passbook, and the petition  was  not  filed earlier because the new Sarpanch came to know all these only a  month ago and so the petition was claimed to be in  time. The original Sarpanch was a beneficiary out of the Panchayat land  and  he took no steps and the  present  Sarpanch  took charge  only a few months ago. There were lot of  complaints about  valuation and allotments to rightholders.  Under  the above circumstances when the Director himself considered  it fit  for  granting the prayer, it cannot be  said  that  the application was unreasonably delayed.     The  next submission of Mr. Harbans Lal is  equally  un- tenable.  It is true that in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam  Singh and Anr., AIR 1966 SC 641, it has been held that there is no provision in the Act granting express power of Review to the State Government with regard to an order made under  section 42  of  the  Act and in the absence of any  such  power  the Director, Consolidation of Holdings could not have  reviewed his previous order dismissing an application of the Panchay- at 590 under  section  42 of the Act, and if so  done,  the  review order  of  the  Director would be ultra  vires  and  without jurisdiction.  In the instant case it has not been shown  to us  that the Panchayat earlier moved any  application  under section 42 on the same subject matter and the instant  order of the Director amounted to a review of his own order. There is no material to hold that the instant order of the  Direc- tor  is  an order of review of his earlier  order;  and  Mr. Rohtagi clearly denied that it was so.     In  the result we allow this appeal, set aside  the  im- pugned  order  of  the High Court and restore  that  of  the Director,  Consolidation. We, however, leave the parties  to bear their own costs. Y. Lal                                       Appeal allowed. 591