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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4998 of 2006

PETITIONER: Government of India & Anr

RESPONDENT: George Philip

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/11/2006

BENCH: G.P. Mathur & Dalveer Bhandari

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No.2023 of 2006)

G. P. MATHUR, J.

       Leave granted.  

2.      This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the  judgment and order dated 10.8.2005 of High Court of Kerala, by  which the writ petition filed by the appellants challenging the order  dated 17.9.1999 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam  Bench, was disposed of with a direction that if Shri George Philip,  respondent in the present appeal, reports for duty within a period of  six months, he shall be reinstated in service but will not be entitled to  any back wages and thereby order of the Tribunal which had awarded  full back wages was modified.    

3.      Before dealing with the issue raised, it is necessary to mention  the essential facts.   The respondent herein, Shri George Philip, was  working as Scientific Officer in Plasma Physics Division, Bhabha  Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Mumbai (for short ’BARC’).  He  applied for and was granted Commonwealth Scholarship by the  Ministry of Education for advance research training in Plasma  Physics.   He moved an application in the prescribed proforma seeking  permission of the Central Government for being given leave for two  years for the said purpose.   The application form contained several  columns and in the column "duration and purpose of visit" it was  mentioned \026 "about two years \026 for advance research training in  Plasma Physics" and again in the column meant for aims and objects,  the same thing was repeated viz. "advance research training in Plasma  Physics".  The department of Atomic Energy, Government of India,  vide order dated 8.2.1982 granted permission to the respondent to  accept the Commonwealth Scholarship for a period of two years and  he was granted extraordinary leave for the said period, subject to the  conditions laid down in the Ministry of Finance O.M. No.11(1)- E(B)/67 dated June 25, 1970.  The order has some bearing and,  therefore, it is being reproduced below :- "Government of India Department of Atomic Energy

C.S.M. Marg         Bombay -400 039

Sub : Commonwealth Scholarship offered by the Govt.  of Canada       - Shri George Philips SO(C), Plasma  Physics Section.

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       Reference is invited to BARC ID Note  No.9/20/TSC/80/4922 dated 7.12.1981 on the above  subject.

       The proposal to permit Shri George Philips,  SO(SC), BARC to accept the Commonwealth  Scholarship awarded by the Ministry of Education for a  period of 2 years is approved in the Department.  He  will be granted extraordinary leave for the said period  subject to the conditions laid down in the Ministry of  Finance O.M. No.11(1)-E(B)/67 dated June 25, 1970 as  amended from time to time.                                                         Sd/-                                                       ( P.B. Desai )                                                         Director

Secretary, TC & TSC, BARC, Bombay \026 400 085 DAE ID No.36/1/81-BARC Vol. II dated February 4,  1982                                 ...

Government of India Bhabha Atomic Research Centre TC & TSC

Ref: 9/20/TSC/80/540                     February 8, 1982

Copy forwarded to :

1.      Head, Plasma Physics Section \026 Leave order  granting EOL for two years may be issued under  intimation to this section subject to the condition  that Shri George Philips should not register for  Ph.D. degree and that no extension of leave  beyond two years will be granted.   An undertaking  to this effect may please be obtained from Shri  George Philips and forwarded to this section for  record. A service bond for Rs.10,000/- in the  enclosed form may also please be obtained in  triplicate and forwarded to this section.  2.      ........................... 3.      ........................... 4.      ........................... 5.      Shri George Philips, SO (SC)         Plasma Physics Section.   

   Sd/- 8.2.82 (G. Sethuraman) Secretary, TC & TSC"                  In accordance with the order issued by the Government of  India, the respondent gave an undertaking on 9.2.1982, which reads as  under :-                                         "UNDERTAKING

Consequent to the acceptance of the scholarship awarded  by the Ministry of Education (Department of Education)  for training in Canada and the grant of extra ordinary  leave for a period of two years, this undertaking is given  that I am not registering for a Ph.D. degree and will not  request extension beyond the leave granted during the  training abroad.

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                               Signature Sd/-                                 Name : George Philip                                 Designation : SO(SC)                                 Comp. Code : G602/114 Dated : 9.2.82 Trombay, Bombay."

       Thereafter, the respondent proceeded on leave with effect from  24.8.1982 and the leave was to expire on 23.8.1984.  The Bhabha  Atomic Research Centre of Government of India issued a leave order  on 6.9.1982, which specifically mentioned that the grant of leave to  the respondent is subject to the conditions laid down in the Ministry of  Finance O.M. No.11(1)-E(B)/67 dated June 25, 1970 as amended  from time to time and as approved by Department of Atomic Energy  vide its ID No. 36/1/81-BARC Vol. II dated February 4, 1982.  The  period of leave of two years from 24.8.1982 to 23.8.1984 was to be   treated as extraordinary leave.  It was further mentioned that but for  proceeding on leave Shri George Philip would have continued to  officiate on the said post and that the period of leave will count for  increment.  The respondent, however, did not return to India and did  not report for duty after expiry of leave on 23.8.1984.  He  applied for  extension of leave which was refused and he continued to overstay the  leave.  The department sent him as many as 8 notices and telegrams  wherein it was clearly mentioned that his request for extension of  leave had been refused and he should immediately report back for  duty.  After more than two years of expiry of leave, he came back to  India and reported for duty on 10.12.1986. He was placed under  suspension pending enquiry by the order dated 2.1.1987.   An enquiry  was accordingly held under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services  (Classification and Control of Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short  ’CCS(CCA) Rules’) on the ground that by overstaying the leave w.e.f.  24.8.1984 onwards, the respondent is acting in a manner unbecoming  of a government servant and had thereby contravened the provisions  of Sub-rule (1)(iii) of Rule 3 of Central Civil Services (Conduct)  Rules, 1964.  Shri George Philip submitted his written statement of  defence wherein it was mentioned that he had enrolled himself for a  Ph.D. degree in the University of Alberta and as he had not been able  to complete his work for award of the degree, he had not returned to  India and had not joined duty.   In the departmental enquiry copies of  all the documents were supplied to the respondent and he was  afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined on  behalf of the department. After a detailed consideration of the material  on record, the enquiry officer gave his findings on 15.11.1989 to the  effect that the respondent had overstayed the leave granted to him and  the charge was fully established.  The Secretary, Government of India,  exercising powers under Rule 15(4) of CCS(CCA) Rules, after taking  into consideration the representation made by the respondent and after  consultation with Union Public Service Commission, imposed a  penalty of removal from service with immediate effect upon the  respondent by order dated 18.12.1990.   

4.      The respondent filed O.A. No.56 of 1992 before Central  Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (for short ’Tribunal’)  challenging the punishment awarded to him.  The Tribunal recorded a  finding that there can be no doubt that the respondent did not report  for duty as he should have at the end of the period of leave and that he  is guilty of abandoning the post of duty. However, it was of the  opinion that having regard to the facts of the case the punishment  imposed upon the respondent was harsh.  Accordingly, the Tribunal  by its order dated 6.1.1994 held "that the punishment imposed upon  the respondent is quashed while the findings of facts are affirmed"  and further directed that if the respondent moves the competent  authority under Rule 29-A of the CCS(CCA) Rules within one month,  the competent authority will consider the question of quantum of

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punishment afresh.  The appellants herein filed a review petition  before the Tribunal but the same was dismissed on 2.8.1994.   The  Secretary to the Government of India, thereafter, passed a fresh order  on 3.4.1996 after consultation with the Union Public Service  Commission imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement from  service upon the respondent with effect from the date when the  original order of punishment was passed i.e. 18.12.1990.  This order  was again challenged by the respondent by filing O.A. No.1127 of  1996 before the Tribunal.  The Tribunal by its order dated 17.9.1999  allowed the O.A., set aside the penalty of compulsory retirement from  service imposed upon the respondent and directed his reinstatement  with full back wages for the period between the date of removal from  service and reinstatement and treating the said period as duty for all  purposes.  It was also observed in the operative part of the order that  the appellants may pass an appropriate order awarding penalty to the  respondent commensurate with the proved misconduct keeping in  view the observations made in this regard.   The appellants challenged  the aforesaid order of the Tribunal before the High Court of Kerala by  filing a writ petition which was disposed of by the impugned order  dated 10.8.2005, whereby it was directed that if the respondent reports  for duty within a period of six months, he shall be reinstated in  service, but he will not be entitled to any back wages.   The present  appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 17.9.1999 passed by  the Tribunal and the order dated 10.8.2005 passed by the High Court  in the writ petition filed by the appellants.   

5.      Shri Vikas Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, has  submitted that while seeking prior permission of the Central  Government for availing the Commonwealth Scholarship awarded by  the Ministry of Education, the respondent had stated in unambiguous  terms that he was going to join a University in Canada for advance  research training in Plasma Physics and the duration of the said  training was about two years.  He had never indicated at any point of  time that he wanted to enroll himself for a Ph.D. degree.   The  Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, had by order  dated 8.2.1982 sanctioned leave to the respondent for a period of two  years. In the said order it was clearly mentioned that the extraordinary  leave was being granted for a period of two years subject to the  condition that the respondent should not register himself for Ph.D.  degree and that no extension of leave beyond two years will be  granted and an undertaking in that regard may be obtained.   The  respondent gave an undertaking on the very next day i.e. on 9.2.1982,  wherein he clearly stated that "I am not registering for a Ph.D. degree  and will not request extension beyond the leave granted during the  training abroad."   However, the respondent did not report for duty  after his leave expired on 23.8.1984 and he requested for extension of  leave on the ground that he had enrolled himself for Ph.D. degree and  his work was not complete.   The request of the respondent was turned  down and the department sent him 8 notices and telegrams asking him  to report for duty, but he did not comply with the directions issued and  instead reported for duty on 10.12.1986, after more than two years of  expiry of leave.   In the departmental enquiry the respondent was held  guilty of the charges and accordingly the punishment of removal from  service was imposed by the competent authority on 18.12.1990.  The  Tribunal in its judgment and order dated 6.1.1994 had affirmed the  findings recorded by the enquiry officer but had merely quashed the  order of punishment, as in its opinion, it was disproportionate to the  charge and had directed for a fresh consideration limited to the  question of punishment. Thereafter, an order of compulsory retirement  from service was passed against the respondent.   This order was also  challenged by the respondent before the Tribunal and curiously  enough this time the Tribunal passed an order of reinstatement with  full back wages treating the period of removal from service till  reinstatement as period spent on duty for all purposes.  Learned  counsel has submitted that the Tribunal having affirmed the findings

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recorded by the enquiry officer in its first order dated 6.1.1994, it was  not open to the Tribunal to take a contrary view at the second stage  when the order of compulsory retirement was challenged by the  respondent and it could not have gone into the merits of the case.    Learned counsel has further submitted that having regard to the facts  and circumstances of the case the punishment of compulsory  retirement form service imposed upon the respondent could not be  said to be disproportionate to the gravamen of the charge and the High  Court erred in setting aside the said order and directing reinstatement  of the respondent.  

6.      Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel for the  respondent, has submitted that the respondent had joined for a Ph.D.  degree in a University in Canada and as he had not been able to  complete the work required for the said degree, he had no option but  to stay there even after expiry of leave.  Learned counsel has  submitted that it was a case of helplessness of a scientist who was  keen to do research work and to get a Ph.D. degree and if the  respondent had obtained the said degree, it would have been of  immense value to Bhabha Atomic Research Centre as well.  Learned  counsel has thus submitted that the requirement of discipline will be  satisfied by the order passed by the High Court, whereby the penalty  of compulsory retirement has been set aside and the respondent has  been directed to be reinstated but without any back wages.   

7.      We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions  made by learned counsel for the parties.  It requires to be noticed that  while seeking permission of the Central Government to proceed to  Canada, the respondent had clearly mentioned that the purpose of his  visit was "for advance research training in Plasma Physics" and the  duration of the training was "two years".   In the order dated 8.2.1982  passed by the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, it  was clearly mentioned that the respondent is being sanctioned  extraordinary leave for a period of two years and this was subject to  the condition that he should not register for Ph.D. degree and that no  extension of leave beyond two years will be granted.   The respondent  also gave an undertaking on 9.2.1982 that he would not register  himself for a Ph.D. degree and that he would not request extension of   leave during the training abroad. In fact, the leave order dated  6.9.1982 clearly specified that the period of leave was from 24.8.1982  to 23.8.1984 and the said period of leave will count for increment.    The fact that the respondent enrolled himself for a Ph.D. degree shows  that he did not state the correct facts while moving the application to  the Ministry of Education for award of Commonwealth Scholarship  and while seeking permission to go abroad and applying for leave.   His intention right from the beginning was to somehow get a  scholarship in order to join a University in Canada for award of a  Ph.D. degree.  There can be no manner of doubt that he violated the  undertaking given by him that he would not register for a Ph.D.  degree and would not request for extension of leave.   Though as  many as 8 notices and telegrams were sent to the respondent refusing  his request for extension of leave and asking him to report for duty,  but he chose to overstay the leave by over two years.  In the enquiry  the charges were found to have been proved and this finding was  affirmed by the Tribunal in its first order dated 6.1.1994.  It is indeed  surprising that when the respondent challenged the order of  compulsory retirement passed thereafter, the Tribunal went into the  question as to whether the charges are proved or not and after  examining the evidence again which it was not entitled to do, directed  for reinstatement with full back wages and issued a further direction  that the period of his absence shall be counted as period on duty for all  purposes.   This is clearly illegal as the order dated 6.1.1994 passed by  the Tribunal affirming the findings recorded in the enquiry had not  been challenged by the respondent and the only issue before the  Tribunal was the quantum of punishment which had been imposed

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upon the respondent as a consequence of the direction issued in the  first order of the Tribunal dated 6.1.1994.  The High Court has  observed that the benefit granted by the Tribunal cannot be denied to  the respondent since it did not find any illegality in its approach  excepting the direction regarding the wholesale back wages.   With  respects, the High Court failed to notice that the findings in enquiry  having been affirmed by the Tribunal at the first stage, it was not open  to the Tribunal while hearing the O.A. challenging the award of  punishment of compulsory retirement, to go into the question  regarding establishment of charge against the respondent.  Thus, the  second order of the Tribunal dated 17.9.1999 and the order passed by  the High Court dated 10.8.2005 in that regard are clearly illegal.    

8.      Another question which arises for consideration is whether in  view of the findings recorded in the enquiry, which were affirmed by  the Tribunal in its first order dated 6.1.1994 that the respondent  violated the undertaking given by him by registering himself for a  Ph.D. degree and further in not reporting for duty after expiry of leave  on 23.8.1984 and overstaying his leave by more than two years, the  punishment of compulsory retirement imposed upon him can be said  to be suffering from such illegality which may warrant interference  either by the Tribunal or by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction  under Article 226 of the Constitution.   

9.      It is trite that the Tribunal or the High Court exercising  jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution are not hearing an  appeal against the decision of the disciplinary authority imposing  punishment upon the delinquent employee.  The jurisdiction exercised  by the Tribunal or the High Court is a limited one and while  exercising the power of judicial review, they cannot set aside the  punishment altogether or impose some other penalty unless they find  that there has been a substantial noncompliance of the rules of  procedure or a gross violation of rules of natural justice which has  caused prejudice to the employee and has resulted in miscarriage of  justice or the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the  gravamen of the charge. The scope of judicial review in matters  relating to disciplinary action against employees has been settled by a  catena of decisions of this Court and reference to only some of them  will suffice.   In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749,  it was observed as under in para 18 of the reports :-

"18.  A review of the above legal position would  establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the  appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have  exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to  maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion  to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the  magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High  Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial  review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on  penalty and impose some other penalty. If the  punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the  appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High  Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief,  either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to  reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the  litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases,  impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in  support thereof."           

       In Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386, after  considering large number of cases, the principle was summarized as  under in para 71 of the reports:- "71.    Thus, from the above principles and decided cases,

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it must be held that where an administrative decision  relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned  as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the court is confined to  Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing  authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a  primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental  freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies  in such a context. The court while reviewing punishment  and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are  violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the  administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of  punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long  delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings  and in the time taken in the courts, and in such extreme  or rare cases can the court substitute its own view as to  the quantum of punishment."             

       In Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & Anr. v. Munna  Lal Jain (2005) 10 SCC 84, it was observed that the Court should not  interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or  suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the  conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or  moral standards. The Court would not go into the correctness of the  choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should  not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of  judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process  and not the decision.    

       In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade (2005) 3  SCC 134, the respondent was dismissed from service on the charge of  having used abusive and filthy language against his supervisor.   The  labour Court on the finding that the punishment of dismissal was  harsh and improper, directed his reinstatement with continuity of  service and two-third back wages. The writ petition filed by the  employer was dismissed both by the learned Single Judge and also by  the Division Bench of the High Court.  In appeal a three Judge Bench  of this Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and also the  award of the labour Court and upheld the order of the disciplinary  authority dismissing the respondent from service.  In Bharat Forge Co.  Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate (2005) 2 SCC 489, the respondent  workman was found sleeping at about 11.40 a.m. while he was on  duty in the first shift.  On some earlier occasions also he was found  guilty of similar misconduct. After domestic enquiry wherein he was  found guilty, he was dismissed from service.  The labour Court held  that the punishment of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate and  no reasonable employer could impose such punishment for the proved  misconduct and accordingly directed reinstatement with fifty per cent  back wages.  There was a revision to the Industrial Tribunal and then  a writ petition and finally in letters patent appeal the Division Bench  of the High Court modified the award of the labour Court by directing  the employer to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to the workman.   In  appeal this Court, after referring to large number of earlier decisions,  set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restored the order  passed by the employer.    

10.     There are several decisions of this Court wherein the order of  disciplinary authority directing removal or dismissal of an employee  on the ground of long absence or overstay of leave has been upheld.   In Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 309, the  appellant who was constable in Railway Protection Special Force  left  duty without leave being granted and returned after 25 days and then  sought leave.  The order of removal from service passed by the  authorities was set aside by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition  filed by the employee who directed that some punishment other than   order of removal or dismissal or compulsory retirement from service

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may be passed.  The Division Bench of the High Court restored the  order passed by the disciplinary authority and the said judgment was  affirmed by this Court in appeal on the ground that the scope of  interference with punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is  very limited and unless the punishment is shockingly  disproportionate, the Court cannot interfere with the same and the  employee having failed to show any mitigating circumstances in his  favour, the punishment awarded by the authorities could not be  characterized as disproportionate or shocking. In Delhi Transport  Corporation v. Sardar Singh (2004) 7 SCC 574, several cases of  conductors involving absence from duty ranging from 45 days to 294  days without sanctioned leave were considered. The order of the  Single Judge of the High Court holding that the employer was  justified in passing the order of termination/removal was affirmed by  this Court reversing the order of Division Bench of the High Court,  wherein the order of the Industrial Tribunal refusing to accord  approval to the punishment had been approved.   In Union of India &  Ors. v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (2005) 13 SCC 228, the order of removal  from service passed against the respondent, who was a constable in  CRPF on the ground that he had overstayed his leave by 315 days was  affirmed by this Court reversing the decision of the High Court, by  which it was held that the misconduct alleged called for a minor  punishment and not a punishment of removal from service.   In State  of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Mohd. Ayub Naz (2006) 1 SCC 589, the  respondent who was an employee of cooperative department remained  absent for about 3 years and his service was terminated after a  departmental enquiry.   The learned Single Judge of the High Court  took the view that the facts and circumstances of the case called for a  lesser punishment and thus directed that the employee shall be  deemed to have retired after having put in 20 years of service with all  retiral benefits, which order was affirmed in letters patent appeal  before the Division Bench.   This Court set aside the order of the High  Court with the observation that while considering the quantum of  punishment, the role of administrative authority is primary and that of  Court is secondary, confined to see if discretion exercised by the  disciplinary authority caused extensive infringement of rights and held  that the punishment of removal was absolutely correct.    

11.     The contention of Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior  counsel that respondent was in a dilemma as he had not been able to  complete the research work for award of a Ph.D. degree and,  therefore, he could not return to India to join duty and also that if the  respondent had completed his Ph.D., he would have been more useful   and advantageous to BARC, cannot be accepted.  Bhabha Atomic  Research Centre is a premier scientific institution of the country  where research is conducted in the field of atomic energy.   The work  is basically of experimental nature for which very expensive  equipment has to be acquired.  If the employees of BARC are allowed  to proceed on long leave in order to acquire some higher degree or  expertise which may advance their own career prospects, the ultimate  sufferer would be BARC as the equipment on which they are working  would lie idle for a long period.   The nature of work being highly  specialized, there would not be many people in the organisation who  may carry on the work in that particular field unlike a factory where  one workman may be substituted by another to work on a particular  machine.  By the time the employee returns for work, the equipment  may become obsolete resulting in wastage of public money.  The fact  that while sanctioning leave a specific undertaking was sought from  the respondent that he would not register for a Ph.D. degree and that  he would not ask for extension of leave, clearly shows that BARC was  guarding against such a contingency as for completing Ph.D. in the  field of atomic energy and related subjects requires considerable  amount of practical work, which cannot normally be completed in two  years.   At any rate, the respondent being fully aware of the conditions  under which he was sanctioned leave, viz., that he was not to register

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for Ph.D. degree and was not to make a request for extension of leave  beyond two years, it was not open to him to enroll himself for Ph.D.  and then seek extension of leave on the ground that he had not been  able to complete the research work for award of the degree and should  not be compelled to leave his work midway.   

12.     We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the facts and  circumstances of the case, the punishment of compulsory retirement  imposed upon the respondent cannot be held to be disproportionate,  much less shockingly disproportionate, and there was absolutely no  ground on which the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with  the order passed by the appellants.   

13.     Before parting with the case we consider it our duty to refer to a  rather unusual one-sided approach of the High Court.   In the  penultimate paragraph of the judgment, the High Court has observed  "that the respondent was not personally representing himself in the  proceedings and he had authorized throughout his power of attorney  holder, obviously indicating that he was not available for being  considered for employment".  Then in the operative portion of the  order six months’ time is granted to the respondent to report for duty.   It appears that this long period of time was granted to the respondent  as he was not present in India and was abroad.   In a case involving  overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to  join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is  wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization.  Article  51A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every  citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and  collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of  endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the  employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty.  Courts should  not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit  and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution has the tendency to  negate or destroy the same.   

14.     In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs.  The judgment  and order dated 17.9.1999 of the Tribunal and the judgment and order  dated 10.8.2005 of the High Court are set aside and the order of  compulsory retirement passed by the appellants is affirmed.