http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: GOVIND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR. JEETSINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/11/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR  365            1988 SCR  (2)  44  1988 SCC  (1) 198        JT 1987 (4)   525  1987 SCALE  (2)1169

ACT:      M.P. Accommodation  Control Act,  1961: Sec.  12(1)(a)- Bonafide need of landlord-To be judged from objective point- Not merely  by assertion/denial  of parties-Interference  by High Court  in second  appeal with findings of fact of first appellate Court-Permissibility of.

HEADNOTE: %      The respondent-landlord  filed a  suit for  eviction of the tenant from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide requirement under  s. 12(1)(e)  of  the  M.P.  Accommodation Control Act,  1961. The  appellant-tenant contended that the respondent-landlord   was    already   in    occupation   of accommodation sufficient  to meet  his requirement  and that the suit  was filed  in order  to extract  higher rent.  The trial court decreed the suit.      The first  appellate court,  applying the  tests  which appeared to  it to  be objective,  found that  the  need  in respect of  suit accommodation  was not  a bona fide one and allowed the appeal of the appellant-tenant. E      In second  appeal by  the respondent-landlord, the High Court held  that the  first appellate  court had drawn wrong inferences, that  there was  no proper appreciation of facts and that  all the  facts had  not been  borne  in  mind.  It allowed the  appeal, restored  the order  of the trial court and ordered eviction.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: The  need of  the landlord must be reasonable and must be  bona fide  in order  to evict  the  tenant  on  the relevant provisions  of  the  various  Acts.  Whether  in  a particular situation  the need  was reasonable  or bona fide must be  judged from the objective view point, not merely by assertion or denial of the parties. [46E-F]      In second appeal, the scope of interference by the High Court is limited. [47A]      Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 127, relied on. 45      In the  instant case, prima facie, it might be possible to hold that the High Court was in error in interfering with

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

the findings  of the  first appellate  court. But in view of the fact  that subsequent to the decision of the High Court, the  first   wife  of   the  landlord   had  died   and  the accommodation which was in her occupation has become vacant, and  taking   into  cautious  consideration  the  subsequent events, it  must be  held that  there was  no more bona fide need of  the landlord to evict the tenant of the premises in question. Order of eviction has, therefore, to be set aside. [47F-H]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3117 of 1984.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  16.12.1983 of  the Madhya Pradesh  High Court in Civil Second Appeal No. 166 of 1980.      Dr. Shankar  Ghosh,  V.  Gambhir,  S.  Sarin  and  S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant.      T.S. Krishnamurti  Iyer and  Shakil Ahmad  Syed for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh  in Second  Appeal No.  166 of  1980. By  the aforesaid judgment, the High Court has reversed the findings of the first appellate court.      The respondent-landlord  had filed  a suit for eviction in September,  1977, inter  alia, under  Section 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called ’the Act’)  alleging  that  the  premises  in  question  was required bona  fide for  the requirement of the landlord. It was stated in the written statement filed by the petitioner- tenant that  the  respondent-landlord  had  already  in  his occupation  sufficient   accommodation  and   the  same  was sufficient to  meet his  requirement and  that the  suit was filed in  order to  extract the higher rent. The trial court decreed the suit.      The  appellant   went  up  in  appeal.  The  Additional District Judge,  Indore which  was the first appellate court allowed the appeal of the appellant-tenant and set aside the decree passed by the trial 46 court under section 12(1)(e) of the Act. The first appellate court looked  into the  evidence and  came to the conclusion that the  need in  respect of  suit  accommodation  was  not bonafide one.      It was  the case  of the landlord that three rooms were in his possession in the ground floor and one tin shed which the landlord  was formerly using as a Garage for his car but which was  no longer  with him.  Landlord was suffering from Harnia and one of the wives was also suffering from Asthama. After analysing  the evidence the First Appellate Court came to the  conclusion that  the evidence  was not such that the plaintiff-landlord found it difficult in climbing the stairs and there was no danger of heart-attack as he had stated. So far as  the wife’s  illness was  concerned, this  also,  the first appellate  court  did  not  accept  the  case  on  the analysis of  the evidence.  It was  observed  by  the  first appellate court  that the  wife of the landlord did not come to the  witness box  to say  that  she  was  suffering  from Asthama. Nor  the Doctor  who was  stated to  be the  family Doctor affirmed  that fact.  It may,  however, be  mentioned that the  landlord himself  is a  Doctor. The  landlord  had

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

stated  that  six  rooms  were  in  his  possession  and  he explained  how   six  rooms   were  being   used   and   the accommodation with his wife in the ground floor comprises of three rooms;  for her residence, kitchen and store and a tin shed for  storing fuel  etc. In the aforesaid background the first appellate  court  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the requirement of the landlord was not reasonable nor bonafide. It is a well-settled law in this branch that the need of the landlord must  be reasonable  and must be bona fide in order to evict  the tenant  on  the  relevant  provisions  of  the various Acts. Whether in a particular situation the need was reasonable or  bona fide  must be  judged from the objective view point not merely by assertion or denial of the parties. The learned  Judge of the first appellate court applying the tests which  appeared to  him to  be objective  tests found, that  such   need  is   not  bona  fide  or  reasonable.  He accordingly allowed  the appeal  and set  aside the order of eviction.      The landlord went up in appeal before the High Court in Second Appeal.  The High  Court came  to the conclusion that the first  appellate court  had drawn  wrong inferences  and there was  no proper  appreciation of  facts and furthermore the High Court was of the opinion that all the facts had not been borne  in mind  by the  first appellate court. The High Court allowed  the appeal  and set  aside the  judgment  and decree of  the first  appellate court and restored the order of the trial court and ordered eviction. 47      The tenant  has come  up here.  It is  well-settled law that in  Second Appeal the scope of interference by the High Court is limited.      This Court in the case of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 S.C.R.  127 had  occasion to  consider the  scope  of  the Second Appeal under the Madhya Pradesh Act. There this Court held that  the High  Court had  exceeded its jurisdiction in Second  Appeal  in  reversing  the  decision  of  the  first appellate court. This Court further observed that the issues whether the respondent required the shop in question for the purpose of  starting new  business as  a dealer  in iron and steel materials, and if so, whether his requirement was bona fide were  both questions  of fact.  Their determination did not involve  the application  of any legal principles to the facts established  in the  evidence. This Court further held in that  case that the findings of the first appellate court on these  issues were  no doubt  inferences from other basic facts, but  that  did  not  alter  the  character  of  these findings and  they remained findings of facts and therefore, the  conclusion  of  the  first  appellate  court  that  the respondent did not bona fide require a shop premises in that case for the purpose of starting new business as a dealer in iron and  steel materials  represented findings of facts and could not  be interfered  with by  the High  Court in second appeal unless  it was shown that in reaching it a mistake of law was committed or that it was based on no evidence or was such as no reasonable man could reach.                                         (Emphasis supplied).      We are  prima facie  inclined to  take the view that it might have  been possible in this case to hold that the High Court was  in error  in interfering with the findings of the first appellate  court but in the facts of this case we need not rest  our decision  on that basis, because subsequent to the decision  of the  High  Court  the  first  wife  of  the landlord  had  died  and  three  rooms  which  were  in  her occupation have  become vacant.  In that  view of the matter and taking into cautious consideration to all the subsequent

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

events it must be held that there was no more bona fide need of the  landlord to  evict the  tenant of  the  premises  in question.      This appeal  must, therefore,  be allowed and the order of eviction  set aside.  The appeal  is accordingly allowed. The parties will bear their own costs. 48      This,  however,  will  not  prevent  the  parties  from exchanging  their   position  by   mutual  arrangements   or agreement by  the tenant  going upstairs in three rooms, now in occupation  of the  landlord, and  the  landlord  getting three more  rooms in  the ground  floor in the occupation of the tenant. N.P.V.                                       Appeal allowed. 49