REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2719 OF 2006

Govind Singh                   ..Appellant

Versus  

Harchand Kaur                        ..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.

This appeal has been preferred under Section 116A of the Representation  

of  People  Act,  1951  (hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Act  of  1951)  assailing  the  

Judgment and Order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated April  28,  

2006 delivered in Election petition No. 22/2002 as a consequence of which the  

election  of  the  appellant,  Govind  Singh  as  MLA  to  the  Punjab  Legislative  

Assembly  held  on  February  13,  2002  from  the  reserved  82-Sherpur  (S.C.)  

Assembly Constituency was declared void and hence was set aside awarding a  

cost of Rs.50,000/- to the respondent Smt. Harchand Kaur.  

2. The  election  of  the  appellant  was  challenged  by  the  respondent-  Smt.  

Harchand Kaur who is the defeated candidate and although she had secured third  

position  in  the  polling,  she  challenged   the  election  of  the  appellant  alleging  

corrupt practice  against him within the meaning of Section 123 (1) (A) of the Act  

of 1951.  

3. The essential  details  of  the Election  petition  which formed the basis  of  

challenge to the election of  the appellant,  disclose that  on June 26,  2001 the  

Governor of Punjab issued a notification under Section 15 of the Representation  

of People Act, 1951 calling for election of MLAs from all constituencies in Punjab  

to constitute the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The appellant-Govind Singh, at the  

relevant time was functioning as a Minister of Social Security, Women and Child  

Development  and  the  party  in  power  to  which  the  appellant  belonged  was  

Shiromani  Akali  Dal  (Badal).  However,  the  appellant  admittedly  resigned  on  

January 12, 2002 from the primary membership of Akali Dal as he was denied  

party ticket to contest the election from the said Assembly Constituency.  The  

Election Commission published the election schedule which stated that the last  

date for filing nomination would be January 23, 2002 and the date for scrutiny of  

nominations was fixed for 24.01.2002.  The schedule further indicated that the  

last date for withdrawal of candidature would be January 28, 2002 after which the  

poll  was to be held on February 13, 2002 and finally the counting of votes on  

February 24, 2002.  

4. In view of the aforesaid schedule fixed by the Election Commission, the  

appellant -  Govind Singh and nine others filed nominations for contesting  the  

election for the reserved 82-Sherpur (S.C.) Assembly Constituency. The appellant  

had filed nomination as an independent candidate since he had resigned from the  

membership of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal) party.  

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5. The election to the concerned constituency was held as per schedule on  

13th February, 2001 and the process was finally complete on February 24, 2002  

after  counting  of  the  votes  when  the  appellant  was  declared  elected  to  the  

reserved   82-Sherpur  (S.C.)  Assembly  Constituency  since  he  had  secured  

highest  number of  votes which was 30132.   The nearest  rival  to  the returned  

candidate i.e. the appellant-Govind Singh, was Piara Singh of the Shiromani Akali  

Dal  (Badal)  in whose favour 26525 votes had been polled and the contesting  

respondent -  Smt. Harchand Kaur secured third position in whose favour 19439  

votes had been polled. The total number of votes polled was admittedly 90882 in  

the Assembly Constituency where all these three candidates had contested.  

6. The  Respondent  -  Smt.  Harchand  Kaur,  having  been  defeated  in  the  

election felt aggrieved of the election result as she apprehended, which obviously  

was a late realisation on her part to the effect that the elected candidate i.e. the  

appellant herein, Govind Singh, had indulged in corrupt practices in the election  

process due to  which  she could  not  emerge as  a victorious candidate.   This  

prompted her to file an Election petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,  

bearing  Election  petition  No.  22/2002  wherein  she  challenged  the  petitioner’s  

election alleging illegal acts of omission and commission at the instance of the  

appellant which amounted to indulgence in corrupt practice within the meaning of  

Section 123 (1) read with Section 100 (1) (b) of the Act of 1951.   

7. Elaborating the details of her alleged plea of corrupt practice on the basis  

of which the respondent Smt. Kaur had filed the Election petition in the High Court  

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challenging the election of the appellant  -Govind Singh,  it  was stated that  the  

returned candidate  while holding the charge of  Social  Security Minister  in  the  

State Cabinet misused his power with an intention to gain benefit in the election  

2002  violating  the  procedure  as  he  sanctioned  and  released  the  old  

age/widow/handicapped  pensions  in  favour  of  the  residents  of  Sherpur  

Constituency and this was clearly with a view to secure votes of the electorates in  

the ensuing election.  A list  of 16 persons with their  addresses was furnished  

along with a few forms pertaining to those persons indicating that the petitioner  

had sanctioned their pension directly.  

8. The  respondent  herein  Smt.  Harchand  Kaur  further  alleged  that  the  

returned  candidate,  the  appellant  herein,  while  holding  the  post  of  Cabinet  

Minister  in  charge  of  Social  Security  Department  misused  his  power  and  got  

various women voters of his Constituency employed as Anganwadi Workers for  

the period upto 28.2.2002 and they were employed in service with a motive to  

compel them to undertake the work of his election and cast their votes as also  

manage other votes in his favour in the constituency in the election scheduled to  

be  held  on  13.2.2002.   A  list  of  13  women  with  their  addresses  was  given  

alongwith  the true translated copy of  one such appointment  letter.  Relying on  

these  facts,  the  respondent  alleged  that  the  appellant  is  guilty  of  committing  

corrupt practice with a view to secure votes in the election which is covered under  

Section 123 of the Act of 1951.  

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9. The  Respondent  Smt.  Harchand  Kaur  levelled  a  third  allegation  also  

alleging corrupt practice by stating that the returned candidate Govind Singh- the  

Appellant  herein,  distributed  money  among  the  voters  in  exchange  of  their  

promise to vote for him directly as well as through his agents with his consent in  

the presence of respectable village persons who stood surety on their behalf. The  

appellant had also promised to facilitate construction of drains and many pacca  

pavements  and  streets  in  case  he  was  voted  and  emerged  as  a  victorious  

candidate. Elaborating further on this aspect, the respondent herein alleged that  

the appellant Shri Gobind Singh paid cash at various places for getting votes as  

informed  by  the  respectable  persons  of  that  area,  namely,  Avtar  Singh,  S/o  

Baldev  Singh,  Balbir  Singh,  S/o Budh Singh,  both  r/o  village and Post  Office  

Ladda,  Tehsil  Dhuri,  District  Sangrur;  Jaspal  Singh,  Sarpanch  village  Bir  

Mamgarh, Tehsil Malekotla, District Sangrur and Ramzan Khan Sarpanch, village  

Jatewal,  Tehsil  Malerkotla  district  Sangrur.  However,  only  Balbir  Singh  out  of  

these persons was cited in the list of witnesses filed later on by the respondent in  

her Election petition. He was subsequently cited as a witness who could not prove  

the allegation of  cash for  votes but  was cited as a witness only to  prove the  

allegation that the petitioner had delivered speeches at various places to promote  

enmity on the ground of religion. He, however, was finally never examined by the  

respondent.  

10. Thus,  the  sum and  substance  of  the  entire  allegations  levelled  by  the  

defeated candidate Smt. Harchand Kaur - the respondent herein, is to the effect  

that the appellant-returned candidate Shri Gobind Singh with the active support of  

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his supporters indulged in corrupt practice and offered bribery in the form of gift  

and promise to give cash to those who voted in his  favour.   This vitiated the  

election and hence he is guilty of committing corrupt practice which is covered  

under Section 123 (1) A (b) and B (b) of the Act of 1951 due to which the election  

held on 13th February,  2002 deserves to be quashed and set  aside since the  

corrupt practice at the instance of the appellant is covered under Section 123 of  

the Act of 1951.

11. The appellant Shri  Singh responded to the Election petition by filing his  

written statements to the petition on August 12, 2002 wherein he initially took the  

preliminary  objection  that  no  material  facts  and  material  particulars  had  been  

pleaded in the petition concerning the allegations of corrupt practice and no time,  

date and place had been mentioned and hence the contents were liable to be  

struck  off  as  no  cause  of  action  was  disclosed  by  the  petitioner/respondent  

herein.  It was further averred that no attested or true copy of the Election petition  

had been served on the petitioner nor the verification of the petition was done as  

per the 1951 Act as well as the Code of Civil Procedure due to which the same  

was also defective as the affidavit had not been filed in support of the allegations  

of corrupt practice, in terms of the requirements of the Act of 1951.  In so far as,  

the merits of the allegations in the petition are concerned, they were denied and it  

was  clarified  that  the  returned  candidate  /  the  appellant  herein  had  already  

resigned from the Government as Minister  of Social  Security as also from the  

primary  membership  of  the  Shiromani  Akali  Dal  on  January  12,  2002.   The  

appellant  submitted that  the sanction or  release of pensions was done by the  

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District level authorities and the appellant who was then a Minister at the most,  

had recommended acceptance which was always subject to the legal norms for  

such  pension.   It  was  further  stated  that  all  the  documents  annexed  by  the  

respondent with her Election petition in the High Court pertained to the period  

2001, and therefore, were irrelevant to the period of the election that is January  

23, 2002 to February 24, 2002. The pass books of the pension receivers annexed  

by the respondent merely showed the normal flow of pensions into the pension  

accounts in 2001 without even a statement that these were sanctioned by the  

petitioner in 2002 since this was inherently impossible after his resignation.  It was  

further stated therein that none of the allegations contained the relevant material  

facts  and the  material  particulars  as to  the  date,  time and place which could  

substantiate the allegation.  

12.  The  Respondent  Smt.  Harchand  Kaur  thereafter  filed  rejoinder  to  the  

written statement wherein the facts stated in the Election petition were reiterated  

in order to contend that the appellant in fact indulged in corrupt practice to ensure  

his victory in the election.  

13. The learned single Judge on the aforesaid case and counter case of the  

contesting parties initially framed as many as nine issues but ultimately confined  

to the following issues:

5. Whether the respondent is guilty of corrupt practices  

committed by him or with his consent as enumerated  

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in paras No. 12,13,14,17,18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25  

and 26 which materially affected the result of election  

and his election deserves to be set aside.  

6. Whether any corrupt practice (bribery, offer any gift or  

money as a reward to an Elector for having voted or  

refrain from voting, gives a gratification to any person  

with the object of inducing him to exercise any other  

Elector  right)  has  been  committed  by  returned  

candidate  or  his  election agent  or  any other  person  

with the consent of a returned candidate or his election  

agent under Section 123 of the Representation of the  

People Act, 1951?

7. Whether disbursement of money under the pretext of  

old age pension etc. between the day of nomination  

and polling day by the returned candidate  or  by his  

consent  by  other  persons  through  department  of  

Social  Security  Women  and  Child  Development,  of  

which he was a Minister, to induce the electors in his  

constituency  to  vote  for  him,  amounts  to  a  corrupt  

practice under Section 100(1)(b)?

9. Whether  the  returned  candidate  himself  or  on  his  

behalf  or  with  his  consent,  large  number  of  fresh  

appointments as Anganwari  workers were issued for  

specific period,  by the department of Social  Security  

Women and Child Development to induce the voters in  

his constituency to vote for him and thus committed a  

corrupt practice under the Act?

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14. Thus, the High Court although initially framed nine issues on the basis of  

the Election petition filed by the Respondent, the same was eventually confined to  

the challenge to the election of  the returned candidate only on the ground of  

corrupt practices as envisaged under Section 123 (1) read with Section 100 (1)  

(b)  of  the Act  of  1951 wherein  ‘bribery’  has been considered to  be a corrupt  

practice i.e. any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other  

person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to  

any person whomsoever, with the object, directly or indirectly inducing him to vote  

or refrain from voting at an election or as a reward to an election for having voted  

or  refrain  from voting.  Hence,  the analysis  of  oral  and documentary evidence  

made by the High Court has been confined to the issues nos. 5, 6, 7 and 9 quoted  

hereinbefore as to whether the returned candidate is guilty of corrupt practices  

alleged against him or has been committed by him or his election agent or any  

other person with the consent of the returned candidate-the appellant herein.  The  

analysis made by the High Court  also indicated that  it  took into consideration  

issue no. 7, as to whether disbursement of money under the  pretext of old age  

pension  etc.  between  the  day  of  nomination  and  polling  day by  the  returned  

candidate or with his consent by other persons through The Department of Social  

Security Women and Child Development of which he was a Minister, induced the  

electorate in his constituency to vote for him so as to bring it within the ambit and  

scope of corrupt practice laid down under Section 100 (1) (b) of the Act of 1951.

15. The High Court further proceeded to consider issue no. 9   as to whether  

the returned candidate himself or on his behalf or with his consent, large number  

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of ladies were recruited as fresh Anganwadi Workers for a specific period by the  

Department of Social Security women and Child Development in order to induce  

the  voters  in  his  constituency  to  vote  for  him  and  thus  committed  a  corrupt  

practice under the Act.  

16. The learned single Judge of the High Court who tried the Election petition  

therefore scrutinized the oral evidence led by the contesting parties as also the  

documents produced and on its scrutiny in the light of the submissions advanced  

by  the  contesting  parties,  recorded  a  finding  that  the  returned  candidate/the  

appellant  Gobind Singh had used the tool  of  payment  of  pension to bribe the  

voters.   The learned Judge went  on to  record that  the election petitioner  had  

succeeded  in  establishing  that  the  returned  candidate  had  committed  corrupt  

practice within the meaning of Section 79 (2) of the Act by inducing the voters to  

vote for him in consideration of payment of cash named as pension on 10.2.2002,  

11.2.2002  and  12.2.2002  when the  polls  were  to  be  held  on  13.2.2002. The  

learned Judge further found considerable merit in the submission of the election  

petitioner-the respondent  herein to the effect  that  the case concerning corrupt  

practices had been sufficiently pleaded in the Election petition at paras 17 to 21,  

24, 26 and 30.  The learned Judge further proceeded to observe that the affidavit  

in the prescribed form in support of the allegations of corrupt practice and the  

particulars thereof which was required to be attached with the petition, had also  

been done.  The learned single Judge was therefore of the view that the broad  

and basic features of the case of the election petition stands established and the  

corrupt practice committed by the returned candidate is fully covered by Section  

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123 (1) (A) of the Act. The money in the name of pension was presented as a gift  

to  the voters  directly for  inducing the voters to  vote in  favour  of  the returned  

candidate which would be clearly covered by the aforementioned provision of the  

Act.  

17. The High Court was further pleased to observe that the resignation of the  

appellant from the Cabinet or from the primary membership of the Shiromani Akali  

Dal had no connection with the distribution of cash in the name of pension on  

10.2.2002, 11.2.2002 and 12.2.2002 when voting was to take place on 13.2.2002.  

Hence,  the  election  of  the  returned  candidate  to  82-Sherpur  (SC)  Assembly  

Constituency to which the appellant Gobind Singh had been declared elected,  

was declared void and consequently was set aside.  It was, therefore, directed  

that the Election Branch of the Registry with regard to the disqualification of the  

returned  candidate  to  contest  any  further  election  be  communicated.   The  

Election  petition  thus  was  allowed  with  cost  which  was  determined  at  Rs.  

50,000/-.  

18. The returned candidate Shri Govind Singh-the appellant herein, obviously  

felt  aggrieved with the judgment and order of the High Court setting aside his  

election and hence has preferred this appeal assailing the judgment and order of  

the High court.  However, we were informed that during pendency of this appeal,  

the appellant  has already completed his  term as a member of  the Legislative  

Assembly but this appeal could not be treated as infructuous since the appellant  

is bound to suffer the consequence of disqualification on account of the setting  

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aside of his election on the alleged indulgence in corrupt practice in the previous  

election which will affect his candidature to contest any election in future.  

19. Assailing  the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  High  Court,  it  was  

submitted  at  the  threshold  by  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant-  Shri  

Hansaria,  that  the  allegation  of  the  respondent  herein,  while  challenging  the  

election of the appellant, relates to the acts attributed to the appellant as Minister  

prior to filing his nomination on 23.1.2002 as in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 the  

respondent alleged that the appellant Shri Gobind Singh got released pension to  

various  persons  by  misusing  his  position  as  a  Minister,  Social  Security  

Department. In paragraph 20, it has been alleged that the appellant misused his  

power  as  Social  Security  Minister  and  violated  the  procedure  in  

sanctioning/releasing the old age/widow/handicapped persons. In para 21 of the  

election petition, the Respondent has further alleged that the appellant being the  

Cabinet Minister holding the charge of Social Security Department misused his  

power and got various women voters of his Constituency employed as anganwadi  

workers.  

20. In order to demolish the case of  the respondent,  a sure shot argument  

advanced  by  the  counsel  for  the  appellant  was  that  none  of  the  aforesaid  

allegations even if assumed to be correct - although the same are disputed, would  

amount to corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 (1) (A) of the Act as  

those acts related to the period when the appellant was holding the charge of the  

Social Security Minister and the acts were in discharge of his official duties which  

was  perfectly  legal  and  justified.   In  support  of  this  submission,  reliance was  

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placed by the learned counsel on the decision delivered in the matter of  Mohan  

Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba @ Dadasaheb,1994 (2) SCC 392, wherein it was  

held that any allegation made with reference to a period prior to nomination as a  

candidate,  does  not  amount  to  corrupt  practice.  It  was  submitted  that  in  the  

instant case, the appellant resigned as a Minister on 12.1.2002 and became a  

candidate for  the election only on 23.1.2002 when he filed his  nomination for  

contesting the election as an independent candidate. Hence, it  was contended  

that  any  act  attributed  to  the  appellant  in  his  capacity  as  a  Minister,  even  if  

assumed to be correct, although the same are disputed, would not come within  

the ambit of the allegation of indulgence in corrupt practice.  It was further averred  

that the sanction, approval or grant of pension by a Minister does not amount to  

bribery under  clause (1)  of  Section 123 of  the Act  as it  is  not  a gift,  offer  or  

promise of any gratification which is sine qua non for attracting the said provision.  

It  was still  further  submitted  that  the act  of  approval  of  appointment  of  some  

women as anganwadi workers by a Minister is also not covered by the provision  

of  Section  123  of  the  Act  as  there  is  no  evidence  on  record,  either  oral  or  

documentary,     that the appellant appointed any anganwadi workers. The only  

material relied upon   by the respondent in this regard is Exhibit PW-1/46 to PW-

1/70 which                are applications for appointment of anganwadi workers. In  

any event, all these 25 applications except 6 of them (Ext. PW-1/52,58,62,66,68  

and  69)  are  undated.  Even  the  6  applications  which  bears  date  are  from  

22.2.2001 (Ext. PW1/62) to 24.12.2001 (Ext.PW1/69), i.e. prior to the appellant  

becoming a candidate in the election. In addition, only 2 of 25 applications (Ext.  

PW-1/50  and  70)  bear  endorsement  by  the  appellant  and  both  of  them  are  

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undated.  There  is  also  no  whisper  in  paragraphs  17  to  21  that  the  appellant  

distributed any amount in cash by way of pension.  

21. While challenging the finding recorded on corrupt practice, it was further  

elaborated that the averments made at paragraph 24, 26 and 30 are vague and  

lack  in  material  facts  with  full  particulars  as  section  83(1)  (a)  (b)  of  the  Act  

mandates  that  Election  petition  must  contain  material  facts  and  if  there  are  

allegations of  corrupt  practice,  it  must  also contain  full  particulars.  This  is  the  

mandatory requirement of law and no election petition can be entertained without  

full particulars of material facts.  In order to substantiate this contention, it was  

stated  that  in  paragraph 24,  26 and 30 alleging  that  the  appellant  distributed  

money in cash amongst  voters,  no particulars about  the date,  time and place  

where money was allegedly distributed, nor the name of the people to whom it  

was  distributed  have  been  mentioned.  It  was,  therefore,  contended  that  the  

averments  are vague, general and omnibus and hence the averments relating to  

allegation of corrupt practice made in paragraph 24, 26 and 30 cannot be looked  

into and are fit to be ignored.  Reliance was placed by the learned counsel in  

support of this submission, on the ratio of judgments delivered in the matter of  

Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggarwal reported in 2009 (10) SCC 541,  Anil Vasudev  

Salgaonkar  Vs.  Naresh  Kushali  Shigaonkar reported  in  2009  (9)  SCC  310,  

Ananga Uday Singh Deo Vs. Ranga Nath Mishra & Ors. reported in 2002(1) SCC  

499 and Azhar Hussain Vs. Rajiv Gandhi reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 315.  It  

was still further submitted that material facts as well as material particulars have  

not been supplemented by the respondent election petitioner in spite of specific  

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objection  taken  by  the  appellant  in  preliminary  objections  1  and  2  and  the  

respondent having opportunity to supplement and amplify the material facts and  

particulars not doing it could not have been allowed to adduce evidence beyond  

the pleadings as the evidence which is led beyond the pleadings, is liable to be  

ignored.  

22. Objections  have  also  been  raised  by  the  returned  candidate-appellant  

herein by placing reliance on Section 83 (1) (c) of the Act on the plea that this  

provision requires that every petition shall be verified in the manner laid down in  

the CPC and proviso thereof requires filing of an affidavit in the prescribed form in  

support of the allegation of corrupt practice. Order VI Rule 15 (2) CPC requires  

that the persons verifying shall specify, by reference to numbered paragraphs of  

the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon  

information and believed to be true. Rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules,  

1961 provides that the affidavit in terms of proviso to Section 83 (1) shall be in  

Form  25.  Form  25  requires  the  Election  petition  to  separately  state  which  

allegations of the corrupt practice are true to his knowledge and which allegations  

are  true  to  his  information.   On  these  averment,  it  was  submitted  that  the  

respondent  in  the  present  case  has  stated  in  the  verification  of  the  Election  

petition, that the contents of paragraph 17, 18, 20, 21, 24 and 30 are true to his  

knowledge as well as information and contents of paragraph 19 and 26 are true  

and  correct  being  reproduction/reference  to  the  provisions  from  the  

Representation of People Act/Constitution of India/Registration of Electors Rules,  

1960. It was, therefore, submitted that such a verification is no verification in the  

15

eye of law as the same facts cannot be both true to knowledge and also true to  

information. It was further stated that paragraph 19 has not been verified at all as  

the said paragraph does not contain any reproduction/reference of any provision  

of  law;  whereas this paragraph contain specific  averment regarding release of  

pension by the appellant to ineligible persons.  

23. In substance, it was contended that the issue of defective verification and  

affidavit in the written statement in paragraph 4 and 5 are specific issues which  

were framed by the High Court being issue No.3 and 4 as preliminary issues. Yet,  

the  High  Court  proceeded  to  record  evidence  without  deciding  the  aforesaid  

preliminary issues and recorded finding on merits.  It  was, therefore, submitted  

that merely because the High Court has considered the case on merits, the same  

is no ground to ignore defective pleading, verification and affidavit in the Election  

petition so as to consider the evidence on merits.  In support of this submission,  

reliance  was  placed  by  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  on  the  ratio  of  the  

decisions delivered in the matter of Ramakant Mayekar v. Celine D’Silva, 1996 (1)  

SCC 399,  Ananga Uday Singh Deo v. Ranga Nath Mishra, 2002 (1) SCC 499,  

and M. Chinnasamy v. K.C. Palanisamy, 2004 (6) SCC 341.  

24. Learned counsel finally submitted that in the present appeal, this Court is  

exercising power under Section 116A of the Act, which is an appeal both on law  

and fact as mentioned in the aforesaid section itself.  Hence, the contention of the  

respondent that this Court should be slow in interfering with the finding of fact  

arrived at by the High Court is untenable. This Court, as the first appellate court,  

is entitled to re-assess and re-appreciate the entire pleading and evidence on its  

16

own  and  come  to  an  independent  conclusion.  In  any  event,  the  impugned  

judgment of the High Court suffers from inherent legal infirmities and recorded  

perverse findings and hence the judgment is liable to be set aside and the appeal  

is fit to be allowed.  Learned counsel therefore invited the attention of this Court to  

the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 as also 9, 10, 11 and 12 relied upon heavily by  

the Respondent and commented extensively on the value of the testimony of oral  

evidence as well as documentary evidence.   

25. Countering the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, learned  

counsel for the respondent Ms. Kamini Jaiswal submitted that on a bare perusal  

of the Election petition, it is apparent that the verification of the Election petition  

was proper and the same was done on the proper format and in compliance of  

the settled law on that issue. It specifically provided the paras which were based  

on the knowledge and the paras which were based on the information gathered  

from the various sources. The verification also provides the exact source of the  

information which was mentioned in the appeal paper book. It was stated that the  

election petition is in the appropriate format in form 25 as per the Rule 94 A of the  

Conduct of Rule 1961. The format required the affidavit to state distinctly as to  

which are the paragraphs of the Petition based on the knowledge and which are  

the paragraphs based on the information and the same has been done in the  

manner as required in the appeal paper book.  It was, therefore, urged that the  

Petition should be read in its entirety and not in isolation which disclosed that the  

petitioner immediately before the dates of 25.01.2002 and 11.02.2002 was the  

Cabinet  Minister  holding  the  charge  of  Social  Security  and  Development  

17

Department  and had exercised his  influence over  the officials  to  get  amounts  

released to the residents of his Constituency in the name of the pension for the  

old  aged,  handicaps  etc.  The  pension  was  not  only  released  to  the  eligible  

pensioners but the ineligible persons also who received money in the name of  

pension. The Petitioner although had ceased to be a Minister and may not have  

had the official authority to approve the grant of pension, he had enough clout as  

he held the charge as a Minister for all  these years and hence with a view to  

allure the voters, he exercised his influence by recommending the applications of  

the  residents  of  his  Constituency,  during  the  period  immediately  before  the  

election which resulted in payment of money to as many as 27856 persons in the  

Sherpur  Constituency.   PW-1 Smt.  Paramjit  Kaur-  Child  Development  Officer,  

Dhuri admitted that the petitioner during the period of January and February 2002,  

had  signed  on  the  applications,  approving  them  and  this  fact  has  not  been  

contested in cross-examination.   Learned counsel asserted that PW-9, PW-10,  

PW-11 had stated categorically that the public meetings were called and forms  

were filled and the amount of Rs. 600 to 1200 were paid to various people in the  

name of pension,  during a public  meeting.  It  was therefore submitted that  the  

grounds contended are not such that  this Hon’ble Court  in  the exercise of  its  

appellate jurisdiction would set aside a well reasoned order of the High Court. The  

said witnesses are truthful and would not come to make a false statement. The  

witnesses are material and truthful which would be evident from the evidence of  

PW-9,  PW-10,  PW-11  and  the  learned  counsel  also  critically  analysed  the  

evidence of  these witnesses in support  of  the contention that these witnesses  

who supported the plea of the respondent in regard to her allegation of corrupt  

18

practice, are reliable witnesses.   

26. Learned counsel submitted that PW-9 Ram Singh who was a Tailor Master  

deposed that in the gathering held on 13.2.2002 and 11.2.2002, Rs. 600 or Rs.  

800 were paid and Shri Kanjla also gave Rs. 1200 to some of them.  In his cross-

examination, he has further accepted that the amount of Rs. 1200 was given as  

pension but he did not ask anyone in his family to accept Rs. 1200 for casting  

votes. He has further also deposed that it is wrong to suggest that pension was  

only for the old age pension but it was also for the handicapped persons like him.  

This witness further has stated in his cross-examination that after the election was  

held,  he  told  Bibi  Harchand Kaur  that  he  would  be  prepared  to  appear  as  a  

witness that the votes were cast in consideration of money. He accepted that he  

was a frequent visitor to the House  of Bibi Harchand Kaur whom he knew since  

long.  She also knew all  his  family members for  the last  5/6 years.  He further  

accepted the fact that he alongwith Bibi Harchand Kaur had come in the car for  

deposition and the whole expenses of travel as well as eatables had been born by  

her.  He also denied suggestion that  being an associate with  the party of  Bibi  

Harchand  Karu  and  being  related  to  her  community,  he  was  making  a  false  

statement.  

27. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  further  placed  reliance  on  PW-10  

Jaspal Singh son of Sarwan Singh who deposed that Shri Gobind Singh Kanjla  

alongwith a  group of people with him came for the purposes of filling up pension  

forms.  The pension forms were filled up on 12.2.2002,  although he had been  

19

coming to his  village earlier.  The work of  filing up the forms for  pension was  

executed opposite to State Bank of India, Sandhaur Branch at about 6.30 to 7.00  

p.m. The Minister  was calling the ladies and made the entries in the pension  

books from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 600/-. This witness stated that payment used to be  

made in cash and he claimed to identify this signatures of  Shri  Gobind Singh  

Kanjla. The signatures of Exs. PW1/1 and PW1/3 in green ink were that of Shri  

Gobind Singh Kanjla and signature on other documents also were of Shri Gobind  

Singh Kanjla.  

28. This witness stated that he was a Sarpanch and had been performing the  

duties of attesting applications for fee concession and admission forms. He also  

accepted that the old age pension forms were attested by the Sarpanch, he also  

had been attesting the old age forms. This witness deposed that  Shri  Gobind  

Singh Kanjla had directed him to attest certain forms and he denied that he was  

attesting forms for money consideration. He deposed that Gobind Singh Kanjla  

had been forcing him to attest those forms. Although, he was not a Minister but  

still he was acting like a Minister. But he did not report this matter to any quarter  

viz. the Police, D.G., S.D.M. or anywhere else with regard to forcible signature on  

pension forms at the instance of Shri Gobind Singh Kanjla but he reported the  

matter to Harchand Kaur-the election petitioner.  The report could not be lodged  

as he was physically beating the reporters. Nobody was coming forward to report  

the matter against Shri Gobind Singh Kanjla.  He also admitted that he did not  

report the matter with regard to payment of certain amount of Rs. 200/- to Rs.  

600/- to any quarter as it is a usual phenomena.  

20

29. Reliance was also placed by the Respondent on the evidence of PW-11,  

Davinder  Singh  who  deposed  that  Mr.  Gobind  Singh  Kanjla  the  appellant/  

returned candidate had visited his village before the election. Firstly, he came on  

7.1.2002  and  second  time  on  10.2.2002  to  attend  the  Bhog  of  Akhand  Path  

Sahib. The Bhog Ceremony was kept by one Gurmail Singh, Zimindar. When he  

came on 7.1.2002, he had opened the account of various persons and distributed  

the copies concerning pensions like old age pension and handicap pension. On  

10.2.2002, when he came for the second time, an announcement was made on  

the loudspeaker inviting the villagers to come over and collect the pension and in  

the form of pension Rs. 500 each was given to various persons. He denied having  

given back this amount but he deposed that Shri Kanjhla was exhorting the voters  

to cast their votes in his favour and the pension would be doubled from Rs. 500 to  

Rs. 1500. He denied the suggestion that being a Congressman, he was deposing  

falsely in support of the allegation that the amount of pension was distributed and  

no passbooks were prepared.  

30. The  counsel  for  the  Respondent  submitted  that  all  material  facts  and  

material particulars were stated in the petition and what constitute material facts  

and the material particulars depend on the facts of each case and no general  

rules can be laid down.  

Learned counsel placing reliance in this regard on the decision reported in  

Mahadeorao Sukaji  Shivankar  v.  Ramaratan Bapu & Ors., 2004 (7)  SCC 181  

21

submitted that if there are more than one allegations and the material facts are  

sufficient with regards to one of such allegations, the petition is maintainable and  

cannot  be  thrown out.   Learned  counsel  also  placed reliance  on  the  case  of  

Subhash  Desai  Vs.  Sharad  J.  Rao -  AIR  1994  SC  2277  in  support  of  his  

submission.  It was, therefore, contended that the findings arrived at by the High  

Court are fit to be sustained and the appeal was fit to be dismissed.   

31. In order to test the relative strength and weaknesses of the plea of the  

contesting parties, while considering an election appeal which is directed against  

a judgment and order by which the election of a returned candidate has been set  

aside on the allegation of corrupt practice, it would be worthwhile to recollect at  

this stage that although the High Court has the jurisdiction and competence to  

declare the election of a returned candidate to be void on the allegation of corrupt  

practice, it  is well settled by now in view of the ratio laid down in a catena of  

decisions of the Supreme Court that the mandate of the people in a democracy as  

expressed by the result  of  the election must  prevail  and be respected by the  

Courts  and,  therefore,  heavy  onus  lies  on  the  election  petitioner  seeking  the  

setting aside of the election of a successful candidate and therefore he has to  

make out a clear case for such relief both in the pleading and at the trial. The  

electoral process in a democracy undoubtedly is too sacrosanct to be permitted or  

allowed to be polluted by corrupt practice and if the Court arrives at a finding of  

commission of corrupt practice by a returned candidate or his election agent or by  

any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent,  

then the election of the returned candidate shall be declared to be void since the  

22

underlying principle is that the corrupt practice having been committed, the result  

of the election does not echo the direct voice of the people. But, at the same time,  

it cannot be overlooked as was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of  

R.P. Moidutty Vs. P.T. Kunju Mohammad & Anr. reported in 2000 (1) SCC 481  

that  the  consequences flowing from the proof of corrupt practice at the election  

are serious and hence the onus of establishing commission of corrupt practice  

lies  heavily on the person who alleges the same.    The onus of  proof  is  not  

discharged merely on preponderance of probabilities but  the standard of proof  

required is akin to that of proving a criminal or a quasi criminal charge.  Hence,  

clear cut evidence, wholly credible and reliable is needed to prove beyond doubt  

the charge of corrupt practice.

32. The aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid  

authority has adequately been taken care of in the election petitions which are  

filed alleging corrupt practice wherein utmost caution and care are applied while  

dealing with the allegation of indulgence in corrupt practices at the instance of the  

returned candidate, but in the process, misappreciation of evidence and hence  

error of judgment in coming to a definite conclusion cannot be ruled out due to  

which appeals are preferred against the judgment and order of the High Court  

delivered in election petitions.  The instant appeal also is one such appeal where  

the election of the returned candidate has been set aside by the High Court vide  

impugned judgment on the findings of corrupt practice which is under challenge  

and  hence  we  have  carefully  scrutinized  the  evidence  led  by  the  contesting  

parties and critically considered the submissions of the counsel for the respective  

23

parties in the light of the settled law laid down, before the election of a returned  

candidate is allowed to be quashed and set aside.  

33. The  counsel  for  the  appellant  although  has  primarily  challenged  the  

judgment and order of the High Court in order to assail the findings recorded on  

the charge of corrupt practice, the counsel had also submitted that the respondent  

had  filed  the  Election  petition  without  disclosing  ‘material  facts’  with  ‘full  

particulars’  which  is  envisaged  under  Section  83(1)(a)(b)  of  the  Act  which  

mandates that the Election petition must contain material facts and it must also  

contain full particulars.  It was contended that this is the mandatory requirement of  

law and no Election petition can be entertained without material  facts with full  

particulars in absence of which it is not fit to be entertained.  

34. In our view, the submission of the counsel for the appellant to the effect  

that the petition lacked material  facts with material  particulars, is clearly in the  

nature of preliminary objection affecting maintainability of the Election petition and  

hence we consider it appropriate to deal with this contention, before we proceed  

further to examine the correctness of the pleas raised in regard to challenge to  

the allegations of corrupt practice.  

35. On the  plea of  lack of  ‘material  facts’  with  ‘material  particulars’,  It  was  

submitted on behalf  of  the appellant  that  in  paragraphs 24,  26 and 30 of  the  

Election petition, it has merely been stated that the appellant distributed money in  

cash to the voters but no specific particulars about the date, time and place where  

money was allegedly distributed, nor the name of the persons to whom it was  

24

distributed have been mentioned.  The counsel, therefore, had contended that the  

averments of the election petitioner are vague, general  and omnibus and thus  

cannot  be  looked  into  and  were  fit  to  be  ignored.  Developing  his  arguments  

further  on  this  plea,  it  was  submitted  that  material  facts  as  well  as  material  

particulars had not been supplemented by the respondent - election petitioner in  

spite  of  specific  objection  taken by the appellant  in  his  preliminary  objections  

bearing  numbers  1  and  2.  The  respondent  although  had  opportunity  to  

supplement  and amplify  the material  facts and particulars,  he failed to  do the  

same and hence the averments of the respondent-election petitioner should not  

have been allowed to lead evidence beyond  pleadings as the evidence which is  

led beyond pleadings, is liable to be ignored. To reinforce this submission, the  

counsel for the appellant relied upon several pronouncements of this Court which  

include the matter of  Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal reported in 2009 (10) SCC  

541, Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar v. Naresh Kushali Shigaonkar reported in 2009 (9)  

SCC 310, Ananga Uday Singh Deo v.  Ranga Nath Mishra & Ors. reported in  

2002(1) SCC 499 and  Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi reported in 1986 (Supp)  

SCC 315.

36. The  counsel  for  the  respondent  Ms.  Jaiswal  however  countered  the  

aforesaid submission and submitted that the plea of the appellant regarding the  

lack of  ‘material  particulars’  and ‘material  facts’  is  not  sustainable and on this  

count, it was submitted that the election petition should be read in its entirety and  

not in isolation since the petition in question in fact categorically stated that the  

appellant candidate immediately before the date of filing nomination on 25.1.2002  

25

and prior to resigning from the portfolio of Minister holding the charge of Social  

Security Department had exercised his influence over the officials to get amounts  

released in his constituency in the name of pension for the old age widow and  

handicapped  people  and  the  averments  to  that  effect  have  specifically  been  

pointed out in para 17 of the Election petition. In the alternative, the counsel for  

the  respondent  submitted  that  even  if  the  Election  petition  lacked  extensive  

details  regarding  ‘material  particulars’,  the  same  was  not  enough  to  reject  a  

petition and in support of this submission, the counsel for the respondent on her  

part  also  relied  upon  several  authorities  of  the  Supreme  Court  which  are  

Ram  Sharan  Yadav  v.  Thakur  Muneshwar  Nath  Singh,  1984  (4)  SCC  at  

page 649, Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba @ Dadasaheb, 1994 (2) SCC at  

page 393,  Mahadeorao Sukaji  Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu & Ors., 2004 (7)  

SCC at page 181, Regu Mahesh v. Rajendra Pratap Bhanj Dev, AIR 2004 SC at  

page 42 and 43 and Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal, 2009 (10) SCC at page 548  

and 549.  

37. Dealing with this preliminary question as to whether the election petition  

filed  by the respondent  was fit  to  be dismissed on the  ground of  the  lack of  

‘material facts’ with ‘material particulars’, we are fully conscious of the well-settled  

legal position to the effect that if the election petition fails to disclose any cause of  

action and there is non-compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 83  

of the Representation of People Act 1951 which requires that the election petition  

should contain material facts on which the petitioner relies, it should set forth full  

particulars of any corrupt practice including full  statement of the names of the  

26

parties which is alleged to have been committed alongwith the specific date and  

place of the commission of such corrupt practice.  But it would also be equally  

appropriate  to  bear  in  mind  that  although  the  expression  ‘material  facts’  has  

neither been defined in the Act of 1951 nor  in the Code of Civil Procedure, it has  

been understood by the courts in general terms to mean the entire bundle of facts  

which  would  constitute  a  complete  cause  of  action.    Their  Lordships  of  the  

Supreme Court in 2009 (10) SCC at page 548 have observed thus:  

“‘material  facts’  are  facts  upon  which  the  plaintiff’s  cause of action or the defendant’s defence depends.  Broadly speaking, all primary or basic facts which are  necessary either to prove the cause of action by the  plaintiff  or  defence  by  the  defendant  are  ‘material  facts’.   Material  facts are facts which,  if  established,  would give the petitioner  the relief  prayed for.    But  again what could be said to be material  facts would  depend upon the facts of  each case and no rule of  universal application can be laid down”.   

This authority has also taken note of the ratio of the decision in the case of  

Samant  N.  Balkrishna  v.  George  Fernandez wherein  the  three  Judge  Bench  

headed by the then Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah laid down five criteria which are  

mandatory  under  Section  83  of  the  Act  for  determination  as  to  whether  the  

Election petition discloses that it does not lack in material facts and particulars.  It  

was laid down therein that it is mandatory to first of all record a concise statement  

of material facts and then the fullest possible particular.  Any omission of even a  

single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and statement of claim  

would be treated as bad.   The function of particulars is to present in full, a picture  

27

of the cause of action and to make the opposite party understand the case he will  

have to meet. The learned Judges further held therein that the ‘material facts’ and  

‘material particulars’ are distinct matters and while the material facts will mention  

statements of fact, the particulars will set out the names of persons with date, time  

and place while stating the material facts as it will not be sufficient merely to quote  

the words of the section since the efficacy of the material facts in that event would  

be lost.  

38. While dealing with the question of material facts and material particulars,  

we also considered it appropriate to take into account the ratio of the decision  

delivered in the case of Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar Vs. Ramaratan Bapu and  

Ors.  reported in 2004 (7) SCC 181 wherein the three Judge Bench of this Court  

had been pleased to consider the question as to what would constitute material  

facts and material particulars and also discussed its concept and the distinction  

between the two.  In this authority too, it  was emphasized and held that what  

particulars would amount to ‘material facts’ would depend upon the facts of each  

case and no rule of universal application can be laid down.   It was also held that  

material particulars, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts and  

the expression material facts although have not been defined in the Act nor in  

CPC, it will have to be inferred that material facts are those facts upon which the  

party relies for his claim or defence.  In other words, material facts are facts upon  

which the plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s defence depend.   But what  

particulars ultimately will  be said to be ‘material  facts’  would depend upon the  

facts  of  each  case  and  no  rule  of  universal  application  can  be  laid  down.  

28

Particulars, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by  

the party.    This amplify,  refine and embellish material facts by giving finishing  

touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more  

clear and more informative.   Thus, material particulars ensure conduct of fair trial  

which would not take the opposite party by surprise.  

39.  The ratio that can be deduced from the aforesaid three authorities of the  

Supreme Court has further been reiterated in the case of Samant N. Balkrishna v.  

George Fernandez and latter on in  Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan  

Bapu & Ors., 2004 (7) SCC 181 as also in Ram Sukh (supra) wherein it has been  

once again held that although, it is the legal requirement under Section 83 of the  

Act of 1951 to clearly set out material facts and material particulars in the election  

petition,  ultimately it  has been unequivocally held that  there can be no rule of  

universal application which can be laid down as to what would constitute ‘material  

facts’ and ‘material particulars’ and ultimately it is the facts of each case which will  

be relevant  for  determination as to  whether the election petition was fit  to  be  

rejected on the plea of lack of material facts and material particulars or it was fit to  

be entertained if the same disclosed a cause of action for consideration by the  

Court.   

40. We have, therefore, carefully considered the correctness of the assertion of  

the counsel for the appellant whether the election petition in the case at hand was  

fit to be rejected for want of material facts and material particulars and we have  

noticed that the respondent has categorically stated the date, time and place of  

29

occurrence of the alleged corrupt practice at the instance of the appellant and has  

also  given  out  the  names of  the  witnesses who were to  support  the  election  

petition filed by the respondent.   But  what  exactly  would be the worth of  the  

evidence of witnesses relied upon by the counsel was a matter to be considered  

at  the  appropriate  stage  during  trial,  but  to  contend  that  the  election  petition  

lacked in material facts and material particulars due to which the election petition  

filed by the respondent was fit to be rejected on the ground of lack of material  

facts and material particulars, would not be legally correct and justified.   In fact,  

we have noticed that the High Court in the impugned judgment and order has not  

even addressed this issue as to whether the petition was fit to be rejected on this  

ground or not, but the counsel for the appellant seems to have acquiesced with  

the same.   However, since the counsel for the parties have addressed this Court  

on  this  issue  which  is  clearly  in  the  nature  of  a  preliminary  objection,  we  

considered it just & appropriate to deal with this issue but for the reasons stated  

hereinbefore, we do not accept the contention of the counsel for the appellant that  

the Election petition was fit to be rejected for lack of material facts and material  

particulars.  

41. The next question on which the entire edifice of the election petition rests,  

which  has  been  the  core  issue  on  which  the  counsel  for  the  parties  have  

addressed  this  Court,  is  the  question  as  to  whether  the  appellant  -returned  

candidate  had  indulged  in  corrupt  practice  or  not   while  contesting  in  the  

Assembly  Election  of  Sherpur  Constituency.   As  already  stated  hereinbefore,  

learned counsel  had,  first  of  all,  submitted that  the corrupt  practice of  bribery  

30

defined in Section 123 (1) will be attracted only if it had been committed by the  

candidate after filing his nomination paper.  It was submitted that the appellant  

had  resigned  as  Social  Security  Minister  on  January,  12  2002  and  filed  his  

nomination  subsequently  on  23rd January,  2002.   Hence,  there  could  be  no  

question of misuse of power by him after he resigned from the post of Social  

Security Minister as also the party and subsequently became a candidate for the  

election.  Consequently, the allegation of corrupt practice of bribery is not made  

out as the alleged action relates to the period when he was no longer holding the  

charge of Social Security Minister.   The counsel further elaborated on this aspect  

and  submitted  that  the  period  of  misuse  of  power  alleged by the  respondent  

herein  pertain  to  the  period  between  January  23,  2002  to  9th,  10th and  11th  

February, 2002 during which the petitioner was admittedly not a Minister.   Hence,  

the Petition has a fatal contradiction between the allegation and the time period to  

which  the  allegation  pertained  as  the  petitioner  had  admittedly  resigned  as  a  

Minister on January 12, 2002.   The counsel, therefore, submitted that the alleged  

corrupt practice pertains to the period when the appellant herein was the Minister  

which position he relinquished before becoming a candidate in the election and  

hence, there could be no question of distribution of pension by him during the  

election when he ceased to be a Minister.  It was submitted that in the present  

case none of the witnesses can be relied upon to come to a conclusion that the  

appellant had committed corrupt practice as PW-9, Ram Singh was summoned to  

prove  that  the  appellant  had  delivered  speeches  at   village  Ladda  promoting  

feeling of enmity on the ground of religion, caste and community and further to  

influence  people  not  to  vote  for  the  party  belonging  to  which  the  respondent  

31

belonged.  It was submitted that this witness did not depose for the purpose for  

which he was called to give evidence which was the issue of illegal distribution of  

pension by the appellant to his voters.   

42. The  counsel  for  the  respondent,  on  the  other  hand,  relied  upon  the  

evidence of PWs - 9, 10 and 11 referred to hereinbefore and submitted that these  

witnesses  have  stated  categorically  that  the  public  meetings  were  called  and  

forms were filled and the amount of Rs. 600 to Rs. 1200 were paid to various  

people in the name of pension during a public meeting.   The counsel for the  

respondent, therefore, urged that these three witnesses ought to be relied upon in  

support of the plea that the appellant had misused his official position and got the  

pension distributed which was clearly with a motive to influence the voters in his  

favour.   The counsel  has taken us to the evidence of  PW-9, Ram Singh and  

cross-examination  of  PW-10,  Jaspal  Singh  who  was  a  Sarpanch  of  village  

Ibrahimpur from 1992 to 2003 and had failed in the Assembly Election of 2002  

which was held on 13.2.2002, as also in his cross-examination.   The counsel  

further has taken us through the evidence of PW-11, Davinder Singh who was a  

voter in village Gathala which falls in Sherpur Constituency.  

43. On  a  careful  analysis  of  the  case  and  counter  case  of  the  returned  

candidate that is the appellant herein and the defeated candidate - respondent  

herein,  it  is  patently  clear  that  the  allegation  of  corrupt  practice  in  regard  to  

distribution of pension can be divided into two parts – the first part relates to the  

distribution of  pension which pertains to the period prior  to 12.1.2002 and the  

32

second part pertains to three dates which is 10/11/12.2.2002 when the appellant  

was a candidate for the election but was no longer a Minister so as to distribute  

old age widow/handicapped persons.  In factual aspects of the matter this clearly  

indicate that even if the plea of the respondent - election petitioner with regard to  

the  allegation  of  distribution  of  pension  amounting  to  corrupt  practice  which  

pertained prior to the period of January 12, 2002 is taken into consideration, the  

same cannot by any legal yardstick or even ordinary prudence would constitute  

indulgence  in  corrupt  practice  by  the  appellant  as  he  was  duly  holding  the  

portfolio of  Social  Security  as Minister  who had the legal authority  to approve  

distribution of pension as part of his official duty.  It is not difficult to infer that the  

distribution of pension to the eligible persons in the constituency or even outside  

the constituency was part of the discharge of official  duty as Minister and it is  

nobody’s  case  that  this  distribution  did  not  lie  within  the  legal  domain  of  the  

Minister who could order distribution of pension to the eligible persons in the area  

who were either old, handicapped or widow.  Therefore, distribution of pension to  

old age/widow/handicapped persons which was ordered or approved ensuring its  

distribution could not possibly be inferred as an action which could amount to  

indulgence in corrupt practice.  We, therefore, find sufficient reason and force in  

the plea of the counsel for the appellant to the effect that the corrupt practice of  

bribery as defined in Section 123(1) would be attracted only if such act had been  

committed by a candidate after filing of his nomination paper and the ratio of the  

judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant in the case clearly adds  

weight to his submission.    

33

44. We, thus, do not agree with the High Court that although the appellant had  

resigned as Social Security Minister on January 12, 2002, the same would not  

have any bearing on his defence that he had not indulged in corrupt practice, at  

least in so far as distribution of pension from to 12th January, 2002 is concerned  

and the same would clearly be in favour of the appellant as any distribution of  

pension that was made prior to the filing his nomination on 23rd January, 2002  

whether in the capacity as a Minister or otherwise, would clearly not amount to  

indulgence in corrupt practice. In the decision relied upon by the counsel for the  

appellant  delivered  in  the  case  of  Mohan  Rawale  v.  Damodar  Tatyaba  @  

Dadasaheb – 1994 (2) SCC 392 also, it was held that the expression ‘candidate’  

in Section 79(b) of the Act completely excludes the acts by a candidate up to the  

date he is nominated as a candidate.  Therefore, the allegations relating to the  

period anterior to the commencement of the candidature cannot be relied upon to  

establish corrupt practice proprio vigore.    

45. Reliance was also placed by the counsel  in the matter reported in  Kona  

Prabhakara  Rao  v.  M.  Seshagiri  Rao  -1982  (1)  SCC  442  wherein  it  was  

contended that any act attributed to the appellant in his capacity as a Minister,  

even if assumed to be correct although the same are disputed, would not come  

within the ambit of corrupt practice as sanction, approval or grant of pension by a  

Minister during his tenure as a Minister cannot amount to bribery under clause (1)  

of Section 123 of the Act as it is not a gift, offer or promise of any gratification  

which is a sine qua non for attracting the said provision. Sanction and approval for  

grant of pension as a Social Security Minister clearly would be within the ambit of  

34

the authority of the Minister to get it distributed as not distributing pension while  

discharging the functions  of  a Minister  would  on the contrary amount  to  non-

performance on the part of the Minister in the State which could also include his  

constituency  and  to  hold  that  even  though  the  Minister  had  the  authority  to  

sanction and approve old age/widow/handicapped pension the same was done in  

order to lure the persons of his constituency so as to vote for him in any future  

election which he might contest and the same would amount to offer or promise of  

any gratification, would be wholly unrealistic and a far fetched allegation.   In fact  

it has not even been contended and rightly so, that the appellant herein who was  

then  a  Minister,  had  no  authority  to  sanction  and  approve  the  distribution  of  

pension although he was a Minister.  What has been contended, is that the same  

had been done with an oblique motive to influence the voters of his constituency  

so that they would vote for him in the ensuing election.  This allegation would be  

difficult to accept and hold it as proved as the candidature of the appellant had not  

even been announced in the year 2001 although it could be perceived as a mere  

possibility that he might contest in future election.   In any case, it was difficult to  

anticipate from which constituency he would be contesting and whether he would  

be  contesting  under  the  banner  of  any  party  or  would  be  contesting  as  an  

independent candidate.   Hence, it  is not difficult  to hold that the allegation of  

corrupt practice on the ground that he had distributed pension in his constituency  

although  he  was  holding  the  portfolio  of  a  Social  Security  Minister  upto  12th  

January, 2002 is illogical, bereft of reasoning and hence illegal.    

35

46. As already recorded hereinbefore, this Court in a series of decisions out of  

which two have been referred to hereinbefore, have taken the view that any act  

performed by a candidate prior to his becoming a candidate would not amount to  

indulgence in corrupt practice. However, we do not wish to be understood so as  

to endorse that even if any illegal act has been done by a candidate prior to his  

filing  of  nomination which is  not  within  the legal  discharge of  duty,  would not  

amount to corrupt practice so as to protect himself from the charge of corrupt  

practice.   But  where the appellant  in  discharge of  his  official  duty distributed,  

sanctioned,  approved  or  permitted  the  grant  of  old  age/widow/handicapped  

pension prior to the filing of his nomination which was 23rd January, 2002 in the  

case at hand, it cannot be construed as indulgence in corrupt practice and hence,  

we find sufficient force in the contention of the counsel for the appellant on this  

count to the effect that he cannot be held to have committed corrupt practice if he  

had distributed pension amount even in his constituency upto 12th January, 2002  

which was clearly within his legal and official domain as he was not a candidate in  

the election.  

47. However, the respondent - election petitioner has also alleged that even  

after filing his nomination on 23rd January, 2002 and immediately before the date  

of polling on 13.2.2002, the appellant had gone to his constituency and in brazen  

defiance of the Code of Conduct of Election, distributed pension through his agent  

on  10/11/12.2.2002  and  this  part  of  the  allegation  which  may  be  treated  as  

second  part  of  the  allegation  obviously  would  have  a  serious  bearing  on  the  

allegation of corrupt practice against the appellant in case it is held to be proved,  

36

since the distribution of money under the garb of pension immediately prior to the  

date  of  polling,  will  have  to  be  treated  clearly  and  unambiguously  as  corrupt  

practice within the meaning of Section 123 of the Act of 1951.   

But we have to bear in mind that this serious allegation will have to pass  

through the litmus test in the light of the evidence of the witnesses led by the  

respondent  in  support  of  his  allegation so as to  arrive at  a  conclusive finding  

whether the witnesses are fit to be relied upon in order to uphold the allegation of  

corrupt practice.    

48. At  this  stage,  it  would  be  worthwhile  to  recollect  the  well-settled  legal  

position  that  a  charge  of  corrupt  practice  is  in  the  nature  of  a  quasi-criminal  

charge,  as its  consequence is  not  only to  render  the election  of  the returned  

candidate  void  but  in  some  cases  (as  in  the  instant  one)  might  incur  

disqualification  from  contesting  even  the  next  election.  The  evidence  led  in  

support of the corrupt practice must therefore, not only be cogent and definite but  

if  the  Election  petition  has  to  succeed,  it  must  establish  definitely  and  to  the  

satisfaction  of  the  court,  the  charge  of  corrupt  practice  which  the  defeated  

candidate levelled against the returned candidate.   The onus lies heavily on the  

election petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt  

the benefit goes to the returned candidate.   It is well acknowledged that in the  

case  of  an  election  petition,  based  on  allegations  of  commission  of  corrupt  

practice, the standard proof generally speaking is that of a criminal trial, which  

requires strict proof of the charge beyond reasonable doubt and the burden of  

37

proof is on the candidate who alleges corrupt practice and that burden does not  

shift.   This was the view expressed by their Lordships in the case of  Gajanan  

Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe reported in 1995 (5) SCC 360 wherein  

their  Lordships  had  placed  reliance  also  on  the  case  of  Nihal  Singh  v. Rao  

Birendra Singh & Anr. – 1970 (3) SCC 239,  Om Prabha Jain v. Charan Das -  

1975 (4) SCC 849,  Daulat Ram Chauhan v. Anand Sharma – 1984 (2) SCC 64  

and Quamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta -1994 Supp (3) SCC 5 wherein the same view  

had been taken.   However, the Courts have been cautioned to hold that even  

though the burden is on the petitioner to prove the charge of corrupt practice, it  

should  not  be  understood  to  mean  or  imply  that  the  returned  candidate  is  

absolved from his liability to bringforth the evidence on the record to revert the  

case  of  the  petitioner  and  particularly  prove  such  facts  which  are  within  the  

special knowledge of the elected candidate.  

49. It was further held in the case of Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh- 1985 (1)  

SCC pg. 91 & 97 : AIR 1985 SC 89 that the charges of corrupt practice are to be  

equated with criminal charges and proof thereof would not be preponderance of  

probabilities,  as in civil  action,  but  proof  beyond reasonable doubt  and if  after  

balancing the evidence adduced,  there still  remains little  doubt  in  proving the  

charge, its benefit must go to the returned candidate. Various tests have been laid  

down by the High Courts and by the Supreme Court to determine the burden of  

proof  required  to  establish  a  corrupt  practice.  The  most  well  accepted  test  

however is that  the charge must be established fully to the satisfaction of  the  

Court.  But while insisting upon the standard of strict  proof  beyond a reasonable  

38

doubt, the courts  are not required to extend or stretch the doctrine to such an  

extreme extent  as  to  make it  well  nigh  impossible  to  prove any  allegation  of  

corrupt practice as was observed in the case of S. Harcharan Singh v. S. Sajjan  

Singh – 1985 (1) SCC 370 : AIR 1985 SC 236 wherein it was held that such  

approach would defeat and frustrate the very laudable and sacrosanct object  of  

the Act for maintaining purity of the electoral process.  

50.  Bearing the aforesaid principle and the aforesaid legal proposition of law  

in  mind,   we  have  examined  the  evidence  led  by  the  election  petitioner/the  

respondent  herein  as  to  whether  the  allegation  of  distribution  of  pension  on  

10/11/12.2.2002 which was immediately prior to the date of polling has been held  

to be proved or not.  As already noted, the respondent in this context has relied  

upon PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 which has been extensively related hereinbefore.  

51. However, when we scrutinized the evidence of PW-9, we have noticed that  

PW-9 has not stated as to what are the entries that are made and who are the  

persons  for  whom  the  entries  have  been  made.  This  witness  in  his  cross-

examination  has  merely  stated  that  he  disclosed  to  the  respondent  about  

payment of Rs. 1200 after about a month of the incident and he was paid amount  

to Rs.1200 but there is no evidence on record that PW-9 is a pension holder or is  

entitled to grant of pension.   No document has been produced to show that he is  

entitled to pension as per Government policy or any pension was ever sanctioned  

to him. Thus, there is no corroboration to the evidence of PW-9 to allege payment  

of Rs. 1200.   PW-9 has also stated in his cross- examination that he came to the  

39

High  Court  to  give  evidence  with  the  respondent  in  her  car  and  the  whole  

expenses of travel as well as eatables were borne by her.   It, therefore, cannot  

be ruled out that PW-9 is a highly interested witness belonging to the village of  

election  petitioner  who  had  been  brought  before  the  Court  in  the  car  of  the  

election petitioner.  

52. The evidence by PW-10 Jaspal Singh is also not free from blemish.  When  

the first list of witness filed by the respondent Jaspal Singh was summoned to  

prove that the appellant distributed cash at various places for getting votes, the  

name of Jaspal Singh had been deleted in the revised list of witnesses and in any  

event, there were no details as to the date and place of alleged distribution of  

cash regarding which this witness was to depose.   On perusal of the deposition  

of this witness, it  is evident that he has not stated the name of any person to  

whom cash was allegedly paid as was claimed by him.   No pension book entry  

made by the appellant had been produced on record and the pension book which  

was produced on record bearing Exhibit  PW-4/1, PW-4/84 does not have any  

entry made by the appellant.   This witness has also not stated that the appellant  

has  made any entry  in  the  aforesaid  book produced  on record  and no  other  

pension book except aforesaid are on record.   The witness also appears to be  

highly  interested  as  he  admitted  that  he  belongs  to  the  party  to  which  the  

respondent belongs.    

53. PW-11 had stated in his evidence that the appellant came to his village on  

7.1.2002  and  opened  accounts  of  various  persons  and  distributed  copies  of  

40

passbook concerning pensions.   It was submitted that opening of accounts and  

or distribution of paper is not a corrupt practice even if such evidence is believed  

it pertains to the period when the appellant was functioning as Minister and hence  

was legally authorized to approve of the sanction.  PW-11 has further deposed  

that on 10.2.2002 appellant came to his village for the second time and invited the  

villagers to come over and collect the pension in the form of Rs. 500 each.   But  

the names of persons by whom the alleged amount of Rs. 500 was given have  

not been mentioned.   This witness has not stated that any amount was given to  

him.   It was, therefore, submitted that no reliance ought to have been placed on  

this  vague  statement  by  this  witness  that  cash  was  given  to  person  in  the  

absence of identity of those persons.   This witness also appears to be highly  

interested witness as he has admitted that his wife was given ticket for Panchayat  

Samiti election by the party to which the respondent belongs.  It was, therefore,  

submitted by the counsel for the appellant that reliance ought not to have been  

placed on the evidence of PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 for recording of finding of  

corrupt practice of testimony of these witnesses. It was also pointed out that PW-

12 the respondent herself has not given any evidence and her evidence is only  

hearsay.  Therefore,  her  evidence is  of  no  worth  or  value  so  as  to  prove  the  

charge of corrupt practice.  

54. In so far as the documentary evidence  relied upon by the High Court is  

concerned, it was submitted that Exhibit PW 1/1 to PW 1/45 are the applications  

for grant of pensions. It was stated that these applications pertain to the period of  

28.2.2001  to  4.12.2001  when the  appellant  was  a  Minister  and  the  appellant  

41

became a candidate for the election on 23.1.2002 when he filed his nomination  

paper  and  thus  any  action  taken  by  him prior  to  this  date  cannot  amount  to  

corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 of the Act.  Furthermore, these  

applications  also  bear  the  endorsements  of  (a)  Village  Sarpanch  (b)  Halka  

Lambardar, (c) village Patwar, (d) Block Development Project Officer, (e) Clerk in  

the office of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, and (f) Sub Divisional Magistrate, who  

are the sanctioning authorities.  It  was,  therefore,  submitted that  these exhibits  

ought not to have been relied upon to conclude that the appellant had committed  

corrupt practice.  

55. From the aforesaid critical analysis made by the counsel for the contesting  

parties on the evidentiary value of the witnesses for proving and disproving the  

alleged  charge  of  corrupt  practice,  it  is  evident  that  in  so  far  as  the  alleged  

distribution of cash on 10/11/12.2.2002 is concerned, the oral evidence of PW-9,  

PW-10 and PW-11 alone are on record but the documentary evidence which has  

been placed by the respondent has absolutely no connection and link in regard to  

distribution  of  pension  on  10/11/12.2.2002  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  notice  the  

reason for non-production of these documents as admittedly, the appellant had  

ceased  to  be  a  Minister  on  that  date.    Hence,  if  any  endorsement  of  the  

distribution of pension even if it were made for 10/11/12.2.2002, the same cannot  

be attributed to the appellant  in  order  to prove the charge of  corrupt  practice  

alleging distribution of cash to the voters. Thus, the allegation of the distribution of  

cash on 10/11/12.2.2002 rests only on the oral testimony of PW-9, PW-10 and  

PW-11 as even the defeated candidate Smt. Harchand Kaur PW-12 has not been  

42

able to state anything which would prove the charge of distribution of cash on  

these three dates prior to the date of election.    

56. But having analyzed the oral evidence relied upon by the High Court, we  

have noticed that the High Court has placed heavy reliance on the evidence of  

PWs-9, 10 and 11 but has failed to take into account the evidence of PW-1-Smt.  

Paramjit  Kaur,  Child  Development  Project  Officer,  Dhuri,  PW-2-Shri  Devinder  

Kumar, Superintendent Social Security in the office of District Programme Office,  

Sangrur, PW-4 - N.K. Kapur , Assistant Manager, State Bank of Patiala, Ghanauri  

Kalan,  PW-5 -  Shri  Satish  Kapur  son  of  Shri  Sohan Lal  Kapu,  District  Social  

Security Officer, Sangrur and PW-6 -Jagmail Singh, C.D.P.O. Block Malrerkotla-II  

and  PW-7  -  Pritpal  Singh,  C.P.D.O.  Block  Sherpur.  These  witnesses  have  

deposed which unambiguously are in the nature of rebuttal  of the evidence of  

PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 who have been relied upon by the High Court yet the  

evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4 and PW-6 have been brushed aside although  

they  were  competent  authorities  for  distribution  of  pension  and  hence  

independent  witnesses  who were  more  trustworthy  in  comparison  to  the  four  

witnesses i.e. PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 who are clearly interested witnesses as  

they themselves have admitted their link to the Respondent Smt. Kaur.  

57. On scrutiny of the evidence of PW-1 Smt. Paramjit Kaur who was the Child  

Development  Project  Officer,  Dhuri  and  had  produced  the  record  of  old  age  

pension of voters of Sherpur Constituency in respect of 12 villages indicate that it  

pertained to January/February, 2002 and had been exhibited as PW-1/1 to PW-

43

1/4. This witness has deposed that old age pension is given to the males of 65  

years and females of 60 years. The application in this regard had to be submitted  

to the Child Development Project Officer for grant of pension which was to be  

forwarded to the Sub-Divisional  Magistrate who was the sanctioning authority.  

The pension letters were issued after the sanction was accorded by the Sub-

Divisional  Magistrate.  The  attention  of  this  witness  was  drawn  to  the  words  

(Parwan)  written  in  the  Punjabi  script  which  in  English  means  approved  and  

underneath the words ‘Parwan’, the signatures were alleged to be of the appellant  

herein  Govind Singh.  This  signature  was alleged to  have appeared in  all  the  

applications Exhibits PW-1/1 to PW-1/45 but this PW1-Child Development Project  

Officer deposed that a Minister is not directly involved in sanctioning the old age  

pension and if an applicant is not eligible and does not fulfill the requirement of  

getting pension, then even on the asking of the Minister such a person cannot be  

granted pension. She has further admitted familiarity with the returned candidate  

as she had been meeting the appellant  as a Minister  in the official  meetings.  

Thus, this witness can clearly be treated as an independent witness who has not  

supported the case of the respondent in regard to distribution of pension at the  

hands of the appellant.  

58. Similarly PW-2 Shri Devinder Kumar, Superintendent Social  Security  in  

the  office  of  District  Programme  Office,  Sangrur  has  conceded  in  the  cross-

examination that approval letters were in respect of the whole District of Sangrur  

and not of Sherpur Constituency alone and the orders did not have the signatures  

of the returned candidate.  

44

59. PW-4 Shri N.K. Kapur,  Assistant Manager, State Bank of Patiala, who was  

posted at Ghanauri Kalan Branch of the Bank had produced on record the original  

ledger  and  photocopies  of  samples  from the  original  ledger  in  respect  of  84  

persons  belonging  to  village  Ghanauri  Kalan  and  Ghanauri  Khurd.  These  

documents were exhibited as Exs. PW-4/1 to PW-4/84. This witness stated that  

no other amount could be credited in these accounts except the pension received  

by  the  person  concerned  from the  Social  Security  Department.  In  his  cross-

examination, this witness stated that those accounts were opened on 7.9.2001,  

6.8.2001 and on some other dates. But this witness has further deposed that he  

was  not  in  a  position  to  state  whether  any  deposit  had  been  made in  these  

accounts in the year 2002 and in one of the accounts no transaction has been  

recorded showing any credit. In another account opened on 25.2.2002 he denied  

the  opening of  account  by him or  the procedure  for  releasing  the pension  or  

personal knowledge about the identity of any of the 84 persons.  

60. PW-5  Shri  Satish  Kapur  son  of  Shri  Sohan  Lal  Kapur,  District  Social  

Security Officer, Sangrur stated that pension was released from November 2001  

to  March  2002  and  the  payments  have  been  made  from  August,  2001  to  

February, 2002. He had produced copies of compilation made from originals as  

well as the original themselves. He showed his inability to explain as to who had  

sanctioned  the  pension  by  stating  that  he  was  not  posted  at  Sangrur.  The  

compilation placed on record had been duly certified by the District Social Welfare  

Officer, Sangrur.  

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61. PW-6   Jagmail  Singh,  C.D.P.O.  Block  Malrekotla-II,  had  produced  92  

applications in respect of pension out of which 86 belong to old age pension, 5 of  

handicapped and only 1 belonged to widow category. These applications were  

submitted before July, 2001  which was admitted by this witness himself. Similar  

is the position with regard to the pension record pertaining to the year 2001 which  

had been produced by PW-7 Pritpal Singh, C.P.D.O. Block Sherpur.  

62. All the aforesaid witnesses namely PWs 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 therefore who can  

clearly be treated as non-partisan witnesses and were competent to depose as to  

how the pension applications were sanctioned have not supported the case of the  

respondent  that  any  illegality  had  been  committed  by  the  appellant  while  

distributing pension which started from the year 2001 and continued up to March  

2002.   In  spite  of  this,  the  High  Court  has  not  given  any  weightage  to  the  

depositions of these witnesses but has chosen to rely only on the evidence of  

PW-9  Ram  Singh,  PW-10  Jaspal  Singh,  PW-11  Devinder  Singh  and  PW-12  

Harchand  Kaur  who  can  clearly  be  treated  as  interested  witnesses.   The  

depositions of these witnesses clearly stand contradicted by the evidence of PW-

1-Child  Development  Project  Officer,  Dhuri  who  had  deposed  and  stated  the  

procedure and the manner in which the application for grant of pension had to be  

approved. As indicated hereinabove, she has stated that the application had to be  

submitted to the Child Development Project Officer for grant of pension and the  

same was  forwarded  to  the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate  who is  the  sanctioning  

authority and after sanction was accorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the  

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pensions are issued. It is difficult to appreciate as to how the statement of this  

witness can be treated less trustworthy than PW-10 Jaspal Singh who was the  

Sarpanch and claims to have identified the signature of the appellant herein when  

the  competent  authority  PW-1-  Child  Development  Project  Officer  could  not  

recognize the signature of the appellant. PW-1-Child Development Project Officer,  

Dhuri  in  comparison  to  PW-10  was  more  competent  who  is  a  sarpanch  and  

cannot be treated to be the competent authority to sanction the application for  

grant  of  pension who could  be relied  by the High Court  when the competent  

authority Child Development Project Officer has not supported the evidence of  

PW-10.  The  sarpanch  PW-10  Jaspal  Singh  as  per  his  own  version  was  a  

supporter of the party to which the respondent belong and hence the credibility of  

this  witness  cannot  be  more  weighty  than  the  credibility  of  PW-1  –Child  

Development Project Officer who was competent to approve the application after  

which it was forwarded to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for grant of pension. The  

value of the evidence of PW-10 definitely, therefore, cannot be treated to be more  

weighty and worthy of credence than the evidence of PW-1.  

63. PW-11  Devinder  Singh  although  has  supported  the  case  of  defeated  

candidate Smt. Kaur in regard to grant of old age and handicapped pension but  

he also has conceded that the election petitioner i.e. the defeated candidate Smt.  

Kaur / respondent herein had helped his wife during the election and she secured  

ticket for his wife. Thus this witness has also clearly admitted personal allegiance  

to the respondent herein and hence his evidence cannot be treated to be more  

trustworthy than the evidence of the officers who were PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-5  

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and PW-6 who have not supported the case of the respondent and Smt. Kaur  

herself has not been able to depose anything which could improve her case in  

any manner.  Thus, while comparing the evidence of PW-9,   PW-10, PW-11 and  

PW-12 relied upon by the respondent Smt. Kaur with the evidence of PW-1, PW-

2,  PW-4,  PW-5  and  PW-6,  it  is  not  possible  to  attach  more  weight  to  the  

witnesses relied upon by the respondent herein as we cannot overlook the well-

settled position that the behaviour, character and demeanor of the witnesses who  

had been examined at the stage of trial has to be taken into account and is of  

prime consideration.   In view of this position, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4,  

PW-5 and PW-6 is clearly more reliable than PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11.

64. In so far as the allegation of appointment of some ladies as Anganwadi  

workers is concerned, PW-1-Child Development Project Officer, Dhuri who is Smt.  

Paramjit Kaur had deposed that applications of various candidates who sought  

appointment as Anganwadi workers which has been exhibited as Exs. 1/46 to  

PW-1/70  were given appointments  till  2002 and in  her  cross-examination  she  

further stated that she was not posted at Dhuri which covered the Constituency in  

question  when  these  appointments  were  made.  She  further  deposed  that  a  

Selection Committee on the basis of the instruction issued in the year 1988 was  

constituted. The Child Development Project Officer as well as the Senior Medical  

Officer used to be the members. The Anganwadi workers were required to be  

selected from the village or at the most from the adjoining village. No MLA or  

Minister was the member of the Selection Committee. She has given details of  

marks which had been allocated in the interview. The witness was confronted with  

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the  instructions  dated  31.5.2000  to  show  the  allocation  of  marks  for  various  

qualifications and the document was taken on record as Exs. PW-1/71, she has  

candidly and unequivocally accepted that  all  applicants were appointed before  

11.11.2001 and no one was appointed thereafter and it may be reiterated herein  

that even if the Anganwadi workers were appointed in the year 2001, the same  

cannot  clearly  be  held  to  be  illegal  as  the  appellant  was  admittedly  a  Social  

Security Minister at the relevant time and therefore any appointment made during  

this  period  cannot  be alleged to be indulgence in  corrupt  practice in  order  to  

impress the voters as these appointments were made in the year  2001 much  

before the appellant  became the candidate in the election.  We, therefore,  find  

substance in the plea that the exhibits relied upon by the appellant alleging illegal  

appointment  of  the  Anganwadi  workers  do  not  strengthen  the  case  of  the  

respondent in any manner. As already stated hereinbefore, we fail to comprehend  

as  to  how  the  appellant  could  be  held  to  be  instrumental  in  appointing  the  

applicants  as Anganwadi workers when he had ceased to be a Minister and had  

already declared his candidature as an independent candidate as he had no legal  

authority to appoint  Anganwadi worker after  he had resigned from the post  of  

Minister on 12.1.2002 and had filed his nomination on 23.1.2002.  The counsel for  

the respondent also has not laid much emphasis on this plea and the arguments  

that  have  been advanced by the  counsel  for  the  parties  are  primarily  on  the  

allegation of corrupt practice regarding distribution of cash as pension amount  

while he was a Minister and even after he had been declared as a candidate.    

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65. Thus, we have noticed serious infirmities, inconsistencies in the evidence  

of the three witnesses i.e. PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 relied upon by the High Court  

in  support  of  the case of  the respondent  herein  who could  not  be treated as  

independent and trustworthy witnesses as against PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-5 and  

PW-6  discussed  hereinbefore  who  were  the  competent  authorities/officials  to  

sanction  pension  applications  as  also  in  regard  to  grant  of  appointment  to  

Anganwadi workers in the year 2001 when the appellant was a Social Security  

Minister and not a candidate in the election so as to brush aside their evidence  

and prefer to rely upon the evidence of PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 which were  

extremely shaky, subjective and fragile. Besides this,  the High Court has clearly  

mixed up the alleged charge of corrupt practice which pertains to the period prior  

to the filing of nomination of the appellant which was on 25.1.2002 and had been  

pleased  to  set  aside  the  election  of  the  appellant  not  after  a  careful  and  

meticulous scrutiny of the evidence but on an overall view that the appellant had  

indulged in  corrupt  practice  on the evidence primarily  of  three witnesses only  

whose testimony were neither independent nor free from inconsistencies and at  

the most were general in nature.   

66. Thus, on a threadbare scrutiny of the evidence which we have carefully  

analyzed, it  is not difficult  to notice that the election of the appellant could not  

have been set aside only on the testimony of PW-9, PW-10, PW-11 who had  

failed to stand the test of scrutiny to the extent that even though the appellant was  

alleged to have indulged in corrupt practice, the same for the reasons assigned  

hereinbefore  do  not  lead  to  the  irresistible  conclusion  that  the  appellant  had  

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indulged in corrupt practice merely on account of the fact that he had distributed  

old  age  pension  or  handicapped  and  widow  pension  to  the  voters  of  his  

constituency although he was the Minister holding the portfolio of Social Security  

Minister within whose domain lay the approval and distribution of pension which  

was in clear discharge of official duty.  The alleged case that this was done even  

after  he  ceased  to  be  a  Minister  and  after  he  had  filed  his  nomination  for  

contesting election, could not be proved with unimpeachable evidence since there  

was  no  reason  for  the  appellant  to  ensure  compliance  of  formality  of  filling  

pension forms for distribution of cash as he had ceased to be a Minister on those  

dates.  As the specific case of the respondent is that pension was distributed to  

influence the voters, then any distribution made in the capacity as a Minister could  

not be legally faulted as long as the same was distributed during his tenure as  

Minister and after the appellant had ceased to be a Minister, he was not legally  

entitled to distribute the pension and hence ensuring compliance of formality of  

filling up pension forms with the aid of PW-10- Sarpanch by pressurizing him to fill  

up pension forms makes no sense or reason so as to prove the charge of illegal  

distribution of pension amounting to corrupt practice.    

67. In  view  of  the  unsatisfactory  analysis  of  the  evidence  and  erroneous  

approach of the High Court while recording the finding on the issue of corrupt  

practice, we consider this appeal fit to be allowed as no conclusive inference can  

be drawn that the respondent Smt. Kaur who had secured only third position in  

the election has succeeded in proving the charge of corrupt practice against the  

returned candidate-the appellant herein and the same at best can be held to be  

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based  on  allegations  which  desperately  required  unimpeachable  evidence  of  

trustworthy nature adduced by independent witnesses which could not be treated  

as tainted or evidence of doubtful nature. Since the charge of corrupt practice has  

to  be  proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt  and  not  merely  by  preponderance  of  

probabilities, the evidence relied upon by the High Court cannot be held to be of  

such probative value which do not reflect on the credibility of the witnesses relied  

upon by the High Court, so as to interfere with the election result by which the  

appellant had been elected.  Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order  

of the High Court and allow this appeal.  However, the parties are left to bear their  

own cost.  

………………………………….J (J. M.  Panchal)

………………………………….J           (Gyan Sudha Misra)

New Delhi, November 22,  2010  

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