REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1311 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3743/2007]

Gorige Pentaiah ...   Appellant

              Versus

State of A.P. & Others ... Respondents

O R D E R

Leave granted.

This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  dated

19.9.2006 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

The  brief  facts  which  are  necessary  to  dispose  of  this

appeal are recapitulated as under:

Bakaram Eswar, respondent No.3 herein, on 15.6.2004,

filed a complaint against the appellant in the Police Station,

Uppal, Hyderabad which reads as under:

“To

The Sub-Inspector of Police, Uppal.

Subject:  One  Gorige  Pentaiah  s/o  Bakkaiah  of Uppal  Village  has come to our  3200 sq.  yards  of land in Sy. No. 80 of Peerjadiguda with his men at 11.30  in  the  night  and  demolished  the  wall  and went away.  You are requested to take action.  Apart from  that  though  on  27.5.2004  said  Gorige Pentaiah s/o Bakkaia abused us  with the name of our caste  no action is taken against  them.  I  am requesting  you  to  take  action  against  the  said people.  I am filing all xerox copies of documents to show my rights  in  the  said  land.   Said  Pentaiah obtained pass books  and pahanies in  his name illegally in respect of our land in Sy. No. 80 and has been  harassing  us.   R.D.O.  has  stayed  the  said entries. You are requested to take action against the said  pentaiah and  his  men who   demolished  the compounded wall  of  our plot.   We are also afraid that they may come at any time and kill us.  Said Pentaiah  drove  our  security  guards  Ramulu  and Sudhakar  and  demolished  the  wall.   You  are requested to take action against the said person.

Sd/B.Eswar (Bakara Eswar) S/o Rajaiah

Peerjadiguda Village,  Ghatkesar Mandal, RR District.”

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The  appellant  aggrieved  by  registration  of  the  criminal

case, invoked inherent powers of the court by filing a petition

under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure  before the

High Court for quashing of the proceedings emanating from

Crime No. 281 of 2004 Police Station Uppal, Hyderabad.  The

High  Court,  by  impugned  judgment  dated  19.9.2006,

dismissed the said  petition.

Aggrieved  by the dismissal  of  the petition by the  High

Court,  present  appeal,  by  special  leave,  is  preferred  by  the

appellant.

Learned counsel  appearing for the appellant submitted

that even if all the allegations incorporated in  the complaint

are taken as true, even then, no offence is made out under

Section 3(1)(x)  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and The  Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred

to  as  “the  Act”)  and  under  Sections  447,  427,  506  of  the

Indian Penal Code.

As far as Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned, it reads

as under:

“3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe:-

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(x)  intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of  a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.”  

In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in

the  entire  complaint  is  that  on  27.5.2004,  the  appellant

abused them with the name of their caste.  According to the

basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant

ought to have alleged that the accused-appellant was not a

member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he

(respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by

the accused with intent to humiliate in a  place within public

view.  In the entire complaint, nowhere it is  mentioned  that

the  accused-appellant  was  not  a  member  of  the  Scheduled

Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or

intimidated with  intent to humiliate respondent No. 3  in a

place within public view.  When the basic ingredients of the

offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a

complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the

rigmarole  of  the  criminal  trial  would  be  totally  unjustified

leading to abuse of process of law.

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Similarly, we find that the ingredients of Section 506 of

the Indian Penal Code are totally absent in the complaint.

In  the  complaint  it  is  not  even  mentioned  that  the

accused had intimidated or threatened the complainant or any

one else.  In absence of basic ingredients of the section in the

complaint, no case under section 506 IPC can be sustained.

Section  506 reads as under:

“Whoever  commits,  the  offence  of  criminal intimidation shall  be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”.

“Criminal intimidation” has been defined in Section 503

which reads as under:

“Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation  of  any  one  in  whom  that  person  is interested,  with  intent  to  cause  alarm  to  that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means  of  avoiding  the  execution  of  such  threat, commits criminal intimidation.”

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It may be pertinent to mention here that respondent No.

3  had  filed  Civil  Suit  bearing  O.S.  No.  832  of  2004  for

perpetual injunction against appellant on 14.5.2004.  The suit

was  withdrawn  on  19.7.2004  on  the  ground  “that  due  to

personal problems the plaintiffs are not interested to continue

the proceedings against the defendants as such they intends

to withdraw the above as not pressed”.  

Respondent No.3 also filed a second suit bearing O.S. No.

1211 of 2004 in the month of July, 2004 with the following

prayer:

“Pass a decree in favour of plaintiffs and against the defendants,  their  agents,  legal  heirs,  successors, attorneys  etc.  declaring  that  the  plaintiffs  are absolute  owners  and  direct  the  defendants  to handover  the  peaceful  possession  of  the  suit schedule property to the plaintiffs”.

The details of the scheduled property are as under:

“All that the piece and parcel of plots bearing Nos. 198 to 216 (totally plots 19) in Survey No. 80, total admeasuring 3,200 sq. yards or 2675 sq. meters, situated  at  Peerzadiguda  Village  and Grampanchayath, Ghatkesar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and bounded by:

North:  Land  belongs  to  Satyanarayana  (survey  of India) and Purender Reddy;

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South  :  Road  and  land  belongs  to  late  Cheruku

Sailu;

East : Road and grave yard;

West : Land belongs to Humari Manikyam”

On  careful  consideration  of  the  prayer  made  in  the

second suit, it becomes abundantly clear that respondent No.

3 was not even in possession of the suit property on the date

of incident and this fact has not been disputed by the learned

counsel  appearing  for  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh.  When

respondent  No.3 was not even in possession of  the land in

question,  the  allegation  made  in  the  complaint,  that  the

appellant demolished the wall on 14.6.2004, could not arise.

The  allegations  are  totally  baseless  and  without  any

foundation.  On  the  face  of  it,  it  looks  that  the  criminal

complaint filed by the respondent No. 3 was totally false and

frivolous. The complaint was filed with an oblique motive. In

this view of the matter, charges under sections 427 and 447

are also wholly illegal and unsustainable in law.

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In our considered view, in a case of this nature, the High

Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section

482 Cr.P.C. and quashed the complaint.

Scope  and  ambit  of  courts’  powers  under  section  482 Cr.P.C.

This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope

and ambit of courts’ powers under section 482 Cr.P.C.  Every

High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do

real and substantial  justice,  for the administration of which

alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;  

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and  

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.  

Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide

have  to  be  exercised  sparingly,  carefully  and  with  great

caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests

specifically laid down in this section itself.   Authority of the

court exists for the advancement of justice.  If any abuse of

the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the

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court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice

by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions

in the Statute.   

Discussion of decided cases

Reference  to  the  following  cases  would  reveal  that  the

courts have consistently taken the view that they must use

this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the

ends of justice.  The English courts have also used inherent

power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that

the  Crown Court  has inherent  power  to  protect  its  process

from abuse.  In Connelly v. DPP [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin

stated that where particular criminal  proceedings constitute

an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow

the  indictment  to  proceed  to  trial.   Lord Salmon in  DPP v.

Humphrys [1977]  AC  1  stressed  the  importance  of  the

inherent  power  when  he  observed  that  it  is  only  if  the

prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court

and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power

to intervene.  He further mentioned that the court’s power to

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prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and

should be jealously preserved.   

In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, this

court  summarized  some  categories  of  cases  where  inherent

power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a  legal  bar  against  the  institution  or continuance of the proceedings;

(ii) where  the  allegations  in  the  first information report or complaint taken at their  face  value  and  accepted  in  their entirety  do  not  constitute  the  offence alleged;

(iii) where  the  allegations  constitute  an offence,  but  there  is  no  legal  evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

The powers possessed by the High Court under section

482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the

power requires great caution in its exercise.  The court must

be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is

based on sound principles.  The inherent power should not be

exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.  The High Court

should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a

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case  where all  the  facts are  incomplete  and hazy;  more  so,

when the evidence has not been collected and produced before

the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are

of  such  magnitude  that  they  cannot  be  seen  in  their  true

perspective  without sufficient  material.   Of  course,  no hard

and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the

High  Court  will  exercise  its  extraordinary  jurisdiction  of

quashing the proceedings at any stage.

This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy &

Others (1977) 2 SCC 699 observed that the wholesome power

under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a

proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the

proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of

the  court  or  that  the  ends  of  justice  require  that  the

proceeding ought to be quashed.  The High Courts have been

invested  with  inherent  powers,  both  in  civil  and  criminal

matters,  to  achieve  a  salutary  public  purpose.    A  court

proceeding  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  degenerate  into  a

weapon of harassment or persecution.  The court observed in

this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere

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law though justice  must  be  administered  according  to laws

made  by the legislature.   This  case  has been followed in  a

large  number  of  subsequent  cases  of  this  court  and  other

courts.

In  Chandrapal Singh & Others v. Maharaj Singh &

Another (1982) 1 SCC 466, in a landlord and tenant matter

where  criminal  proceedings  had  been  initiated,  this  Court

observed in para 1 at page 467 as under:-

“A  frustrated  landlord  after  having  met  his waterloo in the hierarchy of civil courts, has further enmeshed  the  tenant  in  a  frivolous  criminal prosecution  which  prima  facie  appears  to  be  an abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated are  so  telling  that  the  further  discussion  may appear to be superfluous.”

The  court  noticed that the tendency  of  perjury  is  very

much on the increase.  Unless the courts come down heavily

upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to

ridicule.   The  court  also  observed  that  chagrined  and

frustrated  litigants  should  not  be  permitted  to  give  vent  to

their  frustration  by  cheaply  invoking  jurisdiction  of  the

criminal court.

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This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others

v. Sambhajirao  Chandrojirao  Angre  &  Others (1988)  1

SCC 692 observed in para 7 as under:

“7. The  legal  position  is  well  settled  that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence.   It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which  appear  in  a  particular  case  to  consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique  purpose  and where  in  the  opinion  of  the court  chances  of  an  ultimate  conviction  is  bleak and,  therefore,  no  useful  purpose  is  likely  to  be served  by  allowing  a  criminal  prosecution  to continue,  the  court  may  while  taking  into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the  proceeding  even  though  it  may  be  at  a preliminary stage.”  

In  State  of  Haryana  &  Others  v.  Bhajan  Lal  &

Others 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, this court in the backdrop of

interpretation  of  various  relevant  provisions  of  the  Cr.P.C.

under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by

this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the

extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India or the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. gave

the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein

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such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the

process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Thus, this court made it clear that it may not be possible to

lay  down  any  precise,  clearly  defined  and  sufficiently

channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to

give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such

power should be exercised:

“(1)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken  at  their  face  value  and  accepted  in  their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2)  Where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information report  and  other  materials,  if  any,  accompanying the  FIR  do  not  disclose  a  cognizable  offence, justifying an investigation by police  officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of  any  offence  and  make  out  a  case  against  the accused.

(4) Where,  the  allegations  in  the  FIR  do  not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable  offence,  no  investigation  is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  FIR  or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach  a  just  conclusion  that  there  is  sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  Code  or  the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the  proceedings  and/or  where  there  is  a  specific provision  in  the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where  a  criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly attended  with  mala  fide and/or  where  the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

This court in Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary & Others

(1992) 4 SCC 305 observed thus:

“132. The  criminal  courts  are  clothed  with inherent  power  to  make  such  orders  as  may  be necessary  for  the  ends  of  justice.   Such  power though unrestricted  and undefined  should  not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do  real  and  substantial  justice  for  the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482  of  the  Code  are  very  wide  and  the  very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.  Courts  must  be  careful  to  see  that  its

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decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.”

In  G. Sagar Suri & Another v. State of UP & Others

(2000) 2 SCC 636,  this court observed that it is the duty and

obligation  of  the  criminal  court  to  exercise  a  great  deal  of

caution in issuing the process particularly when matters are

essentially of civil nature.   

This court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala (2000) 8 SCC

590 observed thus:-

“18. It  is  well  settled  that  the  power  under section 482 Cr.P.C has to be exercised by the High Court,  inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are  per se  illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of  the  court;  in  such  a  case  not  quashing  the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of  the  court  resulting  in  great  hardship  and injustice to the accused.  In our opinion, exercise of power  under  section  482  CrPC  to  quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice.”

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This  court  in  Zandu  Pharmaceutical  Works Ltd.  &

Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC

122 observed thus:-

“It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers,  court  would  be  justified  to  quash  any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it  amounts  to  abuse  of  the  process  of  court  or quashing  of  these  proceedings  would  otherwise serve  the  ends  of  justice.  When  no  offence  is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be  quashed,  it  is  permissible  to  look  into  the materials  to  assess  what  the  complainant  has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”

In  Indian  Oil  Corporation v.  NEPC  India  Ltd.  &

Others (2006) 6 SCC 736, this court again cautioned about a

growing tendency  in  business  circles  to  convert  purely  civil

disputes into criminal cases.  The court noticed the prevalent

impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do

not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.   The

court further observed that “any effort to settle civil disputes

and  claims,  which  do  not  involve  any  criminal  offence,  by

applying  pressure  through  criminal  prosecution  should  be

deprecated and discouraged.”  

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The  question  before  us  is  -  whether  the  case  of  the

appellants comes under any of the categories enumerated in

Bhajan Lal (supra)?  Is it a case where the allegations made

in the first information report or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not

make out a case against the accused under Sections 420, 467

and 120B IPC? For determination of the question it becomes

relevant to note the nature of the offences alleged against the

appellants, the ingredients of the offences and the averments

made in the FIR/complaint.

A  three  judge  Bench  of  this  court  in  Inder  Mohan

Goswami  &  Another  v. State of Uttaranchal & Others

AIR 2008 SC 251 has examined scope and ambit of section

482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.   The court in the said

case observed that inherent powers under section 482 should

be exercised for the advancement of justice.  If any abuse of

the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the

court,  then  the  court  would  be  fully  justified  in  preventing

injustice by invoking inherent powers of the court.

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In  our  considered  opinion,  filing  of  such  a  frivolous

complaint in the instant case is a total abuse of process of

law.   Consequently,  we  set-aside  the  impugned   judgment

passed by the High Court and quash the complaint emanating

from   Crime  No.281  of  2004,  Police  Station,  Uppal,

Hyderabad.

The appeal is accordingly allowed and disposed of.

…….……………………..J.      (Dalveer Bhandari)

…….……………………..J.      (J.M. Panchal)

New Delhi; August 20, 2008

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