IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.295 OF 2009 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4685 of 2008)  

Gopika Chandrabhushan Saran & Anr.  …Appellants

Versus

M/s. XLO India Ltd. & Anr.  …Respondents  

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. Leave Granted.

2. The issue that arises for our consideration in the present appeal is

with regard to the scope of and ambit of the provisions of Section

630  of  the  Companies  Act,  1956  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the

“Act”), more specifically, as to whether the proceedings under the

said provision would cover within its purview only the employee of

the company or  also the persons claiming a right through him or

under him.  

3. In order to answer the aforesaid issue it would be necessary to set

out the facts leading to filing of the case in which the aforesaid issue

was raised and came to be considered:

Mr. Chandra Bhushan Saran (since deceased) father of appellant

no. 1 and maternal  grandfather of appellant no. 2 was allotted third

floor residential premises of the building “Devenshire House”, Westfield

Estate,  at  Bhulabhia Desai  Road,  Mumbai (hereinafter  referred  to  as

“suit  premises”)  since  he was appointed as a Director  and Technical

Advisor of  one M/s Automobile Products of India Ltd. (for short  “API

Ltd.”). Subsequently he was appointed as Managing Director of the said

company. The suit premises was owned by Her Highness Vijaya Raje

Scindia Maharani of Gwalior and was taken on lease by the API Ltd. for

the residential needs of its employee.  

However, Mr. C. B. Saran resigned as Managing Director and later

on  also  as its  Director.   Subsequent  to  his  resignation  as  Managing

Director, he was appointed as the Managing Director of Ex-Cello Ltd.,

respondent No. 1 herein.  Mr. C. B. Saran made a representation to the

then  Chairman  of  the  API  Ltd.,  that  as  a  Managing  Director  of  the

respondent No. 1 company he was entitled to rent free accommodation

and for the sake of convenience the API Ltd. may execute a licence

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agreement in respect of the suit premises in favour of respondent no. 1,

who in turn may permit him to occupy the suit premises.  

The request of Mr. C.B. Saran was considered favourably in the

Board Meeting dated 12.06.1968 in which Mr. Saran was also present as

a Director.  Accordingly, Mr. C. B. Saran along with his family, which

consisted of his wife, son and daughter, continued to occupy the said

premises.

Mr. C. B. Saran expired in Germany on 16.07.1980 and on his

demise  his  son  Mr.  Sanjay  Saran,  who  was Joint  Managing  Director

became the Managing Director of the respondent no. 1 company. By

virtue of his employment with respondent No. 1 the suit premises was

allotted in his favour and the appellant no. 1 being sister of Mr. Sanjay

Saran and appellant no. 2 being his nephew continued to stay in the suit

premises.  

4. It is pertinent to mention here that in the year 1976 API Ltd. filed a

suit before Ld. Small Causes Court against the respondent no. 1 and

Mr. C. B. Saran being suit no. 206/519 of 1976 disputing the tenancy

right in relation to the suit property. After the demise of Mr. C. B.

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Saran his legal heirs, including the appellant No. 1, were substituted

in the said suit.    

5. On  20.03.2002  the  respondent  no.  1  also  issued  a  letter  to  Mr.

Sanjay Saran stating that they are in need of the premises and the

suit premises should be vacated.   In terms of  the said letter  Mr.

Sanjay  Saran  vacated  the  premises  but  however  the  appellants

continued to hold the possession of the said premises and refused to

surrender the possession.  On the other hand, the present appellants

along with Smt. Minal Saran (since deceased), mother of appellant

No.1 and Mr. Sanjay Saran challenged the right of respondent No. 1

– company to demand possession of the suit premises.

6. The appellants also filed a suit before the Small Causes Court being

R.A.D Suit No. 502/2004. Another suit was filed by the appellants

before  the  Small  Causes  Court  being  R.A.D.  Suit  No.  1495/2007

against API Ltd. and Her Highness Vijaya Raje Scindia, Maharani of

Gwalior, alleging that Mr. C. B. Saran had executed a sub-tenancy in

favour of her mother and Mr. C. B. Saran was inducted in the suit

premises  as  a  tenant  by  API  Ltd.  in  or  about  June,  1968  on  a

monthly rental of Rs. 1400/-.  In the later suit status quo order was

passed which was extended subsequently.

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7. The respondent no. 1 instituted a proceeding on 04.03.2004 under

section 630 of the Act which was numbered as CC No. 74/SS/2005

against the present appellants and mother of appellant   no. 1. The

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 26.06.2007

found  the  appellants  guilty  under  Section  630  of  the  Act  and  a

sentence  of  Rs.  5,000/-  was  imposed  on  each  of  the  accused-

appellant with default stipulation of simple imprisonment for 15 days.

The appellants were directed to vacate the suit  premises within 4

months from the date of said order and in default to suffer simple

imprisonment for 4 months.

8. Being  aggrieved  by  the  said  order  the  appellants  filed  a  criminal

appeal  before  the  Sessions  Judge  which  was  dismissed.   As  the

mother  of  appellant  No.  1  died  on  29.11.2007  her  appeal  stood

abated.  Against  the  said  dismissal  the two appellants  preferred  a

criminal revision application before the High Court of Bombay.  The

learned Single Judge heard the parties on merits and dismissed the

appeal. The learned Single Judge while upholding the order of the

courts  below held  that  the  appellants  were  liable  to be  convicted

under Section 630 of the Act as they withhold the delivery of the

property of respondent No. 1 – company.   In terms of the prayer

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made  by  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants,  the

learned Single Judge granted stay of eight weeks to approach the

higher  court,  subject to an undertaking that  in the event of their

failing  before  the  higher  court,  they  shall  vacate  and  hand  over

vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to respondent

no. 1.   

9. It is against the said order that the appellants have approached this

Court. We have heard the leaned senior counsel appearing for the

parties and also scrutinised the documents on record.   

10.Mr.  Colin  Gonsalves,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the

appellants mainly contented before us that no proceeding could have

been initiated under section 630 of the Act, as the provision of the

said  section  is  applicable  only  to  the  employee  or  officer  of  the

company and no action could have been initiated under said section

against any other person other than the said employee or officer.

He, however, also made an averment to the effect that the mother of

the appellant No. 1 was a sub-tenant in the suit premises, in respect

to which a suit is pending before the Small Causes Court in which

status quo order has been granted, and therefore, this Court should

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await  the  decision  in the aforesaid  suit  pending before  the  Small

Causes Court.  

11. Mr.  Dushyant  Dave,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the

respondent  company  on  the  other  hand  submitted  that  the

judgments passed by the courts  below need no interference.   He

strenuously relied on the decision of this court in  Lalita Jalan and

Another v. Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. and others reported in (2003) 6 SCC

107.   He also  submitted that the appellants  illegally  continued to

occupy the said premises, and therefore, they are liable to vacate the

suit premises immediately.   

12.In order to examine the contentions raised by learned counsel for

the parties, it will be convenient to set out the provisions of Section

630 of the Companies Act, 1956, which read as under:

“630.  Penalty for wrongful withholding of property. —

(1) If any officer or employee of a company—

(a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company; or

(b)  having  any  such  property  in  his  possession, wrongfully  withholds  it  or  knowingly  applies  it  to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by this Act;

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he shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.

(2) The court trying the offence may also order such officer or employee to deliver up or refund, within a time to be fixed by the court, any such property wrongfully obtained or  wrongfully  withheld  or  knowingly  misapplied,  or  in default,  to  suffer  imprisonment  for  a  term  which  may extend to two years.”

13.The main purpose to make action an offence under Section 630 is to

provide a speedy and summary procedure for retrieving the property

of the company where it has been wrongly obtained by the employee

or officer of the company or where the property has been lawfully

obtained but unlawfully retained after termination of the employment

of the employee or the officer. From the bare reading of the section,

it is apparent that sub-section (1) is in two parts. Clauses (a) and (b)

of sub-section (1) create two different and separate offences. Clause

(a) contemplates a situation wherein an officer or employee of the

company  wrongfully  obtains  possession  of  any  property  of  the

company during the course of his  employment to which he is not

entitled whereas clause (b) contemplates a case where an officer or

employee of the company having any property of the company in his

possession,  wrongfully  withholds  it  or  knowingly  applies  it  to

purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and

authorised by the company. Under this provision, it may be that an

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officer or an employee may have lawfully obtained possession of any

property during the course of his employment, still it is an offence if

he wrongfully withholds it after the termination of his employment.

Clause (b) also makes it an offence, if any officer or employee of the

company  having  any  property  of  the  company  in  his  possession

knowingly  applies  it  to  purposes  other  than  those  expressed  or

directed in the articles and authorised by the Act. In terms of sub-

section (2) the court is empowered to impose a fine on the officer or

employee  of  the  company  if  found  in  breach  of  the  provision  of

Section 630 of the Companies Act and further to issue direction if the

court feels it just and appropriate for delivery of the possession of

the  property  of  the  company  and  to  impose  a  sentence  of

imprisonment when there is non-compliance with the order of  the

court regarding delivery or refund of the property of the company.

14. In  Abhilash Vinodkumar Jain v. Cox & Kings (India) Ltd., (1995) 3

SCC 732 this Court had occasion to deal with scope and ambit of the

provisions of Section 630 of the Act. This Court analyzed Section 630

and drew a logical deduction in para 13, which is as follows:

“13. The logical deduction of the analysis of Section 630 of the Act in the light of the law laid down by this Court is that:

(i) Clause  (a)  of  the  section  is  self-contained  and independent of clause (b) with the capacity of creating

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penal  liability  embracing  the  case  of  an  existing employee or an officer of the company and includes a past officer or a past employee of the company;

(ii)Clause  (b)  is  equally  independent  and  distinct  from clause  (a)  as  regards  penal  consequences  and  it squarely  applies  to  the  cases  of  past  employees  or officers;

(iii)the  entitlement  of  the  officer  or  employee  to  the allotted property of  the company is  contingent upon the right and capacity of the officer or the employee by virtue of his employment to continue in possession of  the  property  belonging  to  the  company,  under authority  of  the  company and  the  duration  of  such right is coterminous with his/her employment.

In para 14 this Court further laid down the Scope and ambit of Section

630:

14. Thus, inescapably it follows that the capacity, right to possession and the duration of occupation are all features which are integrally blended with the employment, and the capacity and the corresponding rights are extinguished with the  cessation  of  employment  and  an  obligation  arises  to hand over the allotted property back to the company. Where the property of the company is held back whether by the employee, past employee or anyone claiming under them, the  retained  possession  would  amount  to  wrongful withholding of the property of the company actionable under Section 630 of the Act. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that since the provisions of Section 630 of the  Act  are  penal  in  nature  the  same  must  be  strictly construed and, the parties which have not been expressly included  by  the  legislature  in  Section  630(1)  of  the  Act, cannot by any interpretative extension be included in the said  provision,  ignores  the  situation  that  by  a  deeming fiction, the legal representatives or heirs of a past employee or  officer,  in  occupation  of  the  property  of  the company, would continue to enjoy the personality and status of the employee or the officer only. An argument quite similar in

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nature was raised in Baldev Krishna Sahi case (1987) 4 SCC 361 also while resisting the  extension of the provisions of Section 630 of the Act to the past employee or past officer and rejecting the same, this Court opined: (SCC pp. 365- 66, para 6)

“The first and foremost argument of learned counsel for  the  petitioner  is  that  the  provision  contained  in Section  630  of  the  Act  is  a  penal  provision  and therefore must be subject to a strict construction and there is no room for intendment. It is submitted that on a  true construction,  the scope and effect  of  the section was limited to such property of the company which  was  wrongfully  obtained  by  an  officer  or employee of the company. Emphasis was placed upon the words ‘any such property’  in clause (b)  of  sub- section (1) for the contention that clause (b) does not stand by itself  but is interconnected with clause (b) (sic) and therefore both clauses (a) and (b) must be read together. In essence, the submission is that sub- section  (1)  of  Section  630  of  the  Act  makes  it  an offence where any officer or employee of a company wrongfully  withholds  possession  of  such property  of the  company.  Secondly,  it  is  contended  that  the legislature never intended to include past officers and employees of a company within the ambit of Section 630 of the Act which provides for prosecution of an officer  or  employee  of  a  company  for  wrongfully withholding the property of the company inasmuch as it  has  used  different  languages  where  it  was  so intended, namely, in Sections 538 and 545. The entire argument of  the learned counsel  is  based upon the judgment  of  the  High  Court  of  Calcutta  in  Amritlal Chum case [(1987) 61 Comp Cas 211 (Cal)]. We are afraid, we find it difficult to subscribe to the narrow construction placed by the High Court of Calcutta on the provision contained in sub-section (1) of Section 630 of the Act which defeats the very purpose and object with which it had been introduced.”

We are in respectful agreement with the above view and are of the opinion that the legal representatives or the heirs of the deceased employee or officer would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 630 of the Act. To exclude them by

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giving  a  restrictive  interpretation  to  the  provisions  would defeat the very object of the provision which declares the wrongful withholding of the property of the company to be an  offence.  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  wrongful withholding is done by the employee or the officer or the past  employee  or  the  past  officer  or  the  heirs  of  the deceased employee or the officer or anyone claiming their right of occupancy under such an employee or an officer. It cannot be ignored that the legal heirs or representatives in possession  of  the  property  had  acquired  the  right  of occupancy  in  the  property  of  the  company,  by  virtue  of being family members of the employee or the officer during the employment of the officer or the employee and not on any  independent  account.  They,  therefore,  derive  their colour and content from the employee or  the officer only and have no independent or personal right to hold on to the property of the company. Once the right of the employee or the officer to retain the possession of the property, either on account of termination of services, retirement, resignation or  death,  gets extinguished, they (persons in occupation) are under an obligation to return the property back to the company  and  on  their  failure  to  do  so,  they  render themselves liable to be dealt with under Section 630 of the Act for retrieval of the possession of the property.

15. The  ratio  of  Abhilash  Vinodkumar  Jain   (supra)  was  reiterated  by

another larger bench in Lalita Jalan (supra), wherein it laid down the

main  ingredients  of  Section  630  in  para  6  and  7,  the  same  are

extracted hereunder:

“6. The question which requires consideration is whether the appellants, having not vacated the flat after the death of Shri N.K. Jalan to whom it was allotted in his capacity as director of the company, come within the ambit of Section 630  of  the  Act.  The  main  ingredient  of  the  section  is wrongful  withholding  of  the  property  of  the  company  or knowingly  applying  it  to  purposes  other  than  those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the

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Act. The dictionary meaning of the word “withholding” is to hold back; to keep back; to restrain or decline to grant. The holding back or keeping back is not an isolated act but is a continuous process by which the property is not returned or restored to the company and the company is deprived of its possession. If the officer or employee of the company does any  such  act  by  which  the  property  given  to  him  is wrongfully  withheld  and  is  not  restored  back  to  the company,  it  will  clearly  amount  to  an  offence  within  the meaning of Section 630 of the Act. The object of enacting the section is that the property of the company is preserved and is not used for purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles of association of the company or as authorised  by  the  provisions  of  the  Act.  On  a  literal interpretation  of  Section  630  of  the  Act  the  wrongful withholding of the property of the company by a person who has ceased to be an officer or employee thereof may not come within the ambit of the provision as he is no longer an officer or employee of the company. In Baldev Krishna Sahi v. Shipping Corpn. of India Ltd. (1987) 4 SCC 361 the Court was called upon to consider the question whether the words “officer or employee” existing in sub-section (1) of Section 630  should  be  interpreted  to  mean  not  only  the  present officers and employees of the company but also to include past officers and employees of  the company. It  was held that a narrow construction should not be placed upon sub- section  (1)  of  Section  630,  which  would  defeat  the  very purpose and object with which it had been introduced but should  be  so  construed  so  as  to  make  it  effective  and operative. The Court held as under in para 7 of the Report: (SCC p. 366)

“7. The beneficent provision contained in Section 630 no doubt penal,  has been purposely enacted by the legislature  with  the  object  of  providing  a  summary procedure for retrieving the property of the company (a)  where  an  officer  or  employee  of  a  company wrongfully  obtains  possession  of  property  of  the company,  or  (b)  where  having  been  placed  in possession of any such property during the course of his employment, wrongfully withholds possession of it after the termination of his employment. It is the duty of the court to place a broad and liberal construction on  the  provision  in  furtherance  of  the  object  and purpose of  the legislation which would suppress  the mischief and advance the remedy.”

7. The  Court  went  on  to  observe  that  it  is  only  the present officers and employees who can secure possession of any property of a company and it is possible for such an officer or employee to wrongfully take away possession of

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any  such  property  after  termination  of  his  employment. Therefore,  the  function  of  clause  (a)  though  it  primarily refers  to  the  existing  officers  and  employees,  is  to  take within  its  fold  an  officer  or  employee  who  may  have wrongfully obtained possession of any such property during the course of his employment, but wrongfully withholds it after the termination of his employment. It was further held that Section 630 plainly makes it an offence if an officer or employee of  the company who was permitted to use any property of the company during his employment, wrongfully retains or  occupies  the same after  the termination of  his employment and that it is the wrongful withholding of the property  of  the  company  after  the  termination  of  the employment, which is an offence under Section 630(1)(b) of the Act”.

This Court further laid down in paras 22 and 23 as follows:

“22. The view expressed in  J.K. (Bombay) Ltd. (2001) 2 SCC 700 runs counter  to  the view expressed  in  Abhilash Vinodkumar  Jain (1995)  3  SCC  732  wherein  it  has  been clearly held that the object of Section 630 of the Act is to retrieve  the  property  of  the  company  where  wrongful holding of the property is done by an employee, present or past, or heirs of the deceased employee or officer or anyone claiming the occupancy through such employee or  officer. The view expressed in  Abhilash Vinodkumar Jain (1995) 3 SCC 732 clearly subserves the object of the Act which is to the  effect  of  recovering  the  possession  of  the  property belonging to the company. If it is held that other members of the family of the employee or officer or any person not connected with the family who came into possession through such employee would not be covered by Section 630 of the Act,  such  a  view  will  defeat  the  quick  and  expeditious remedy provided therein. The basic objection to this view is that the aforesaid provision contained in Section 630 of the Act is penal in nature and must be strictly construed and therefore  the actual  words used should not  be given any expansive  meaning.  A  provision  of  this  nature  is  for  the purpose  of  recovery  of  the  property  and  if,  in  spite  of demand or subsequent order of the court, the possession of the property is not returned to the company, the question of imposing penalty will arise. Similar provisions are available even under the Code of Civil Procedure. In execution of a decree  for  recovery  of  money  or  enforcement  of  an injunction,  the  judgment-debtor  can  be  committed  to  a prison. Such a provision by itself will  not convert the civil proceeding into a criminal one. Even assuming that the said provision is criminal in nature, the penalty will be attracted in  the  event  of  not  complying  with  the  demand  of  the recovery of the possession or pursuant to an order made thereof. The possession of the property by an employee or

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anyone claiming through him of such property is unlawful and recovery of the same on the pain of being committed to a  prison  or  payment  of  fine  cannot  be  stated  to  be unreasonable  or  irrational  or  unfair  so  as  to  attract  the rigour of Article 21 of the Constitution. If the object of the provision of Section 630 of the Act is borne in mind, the expansive  meaning given to  the expression  “employee  or anyone claiming through him” will not be unrelated to the object of the provision nor is it so far fetched as to become unconstitutional. Therefore, with profound respects the view expressed in  J.K. (Bombay) Ltd. (2001) 2 SCC 700 in our opinion is not correct and the view expressed in  Abhilash Vinodkumar Jain (1995) 3 SCC 732 is justified and should be accepted in interpreting the provision of Section 630 of the Act.

23. If an erstwhile or former employee is prosecuted under Section 630 of the Act on account of the fact that he has not vacated the premises and continues to remain in occupation of the same even after termination of his employment, in normal  circumstances  it  may  not  be  very  proper  to prosecute his wife and dependent children also as they are bound to stay with him in the same premises. The position will be different where the erstwhile or former employee is himself not in occupation of the premises either on account of the fact that he is dead or he is living elsewhere. In such cases  all  those  who  have  come  in  possession  of  the premises  with  the  express  or  implied  consent  of  the employee  and  have  not  vacated  the  premises  would  be withholding the delivery of the property to the company and, therefore,  they are  liable  to  be prosecuted under  Section 630 of the Act. This will include anyone else who has been inducted in possession of the property by such persons who continue to withhold the possession of the premises as such person  is  equally  responsible  for  withholding  and  non- delivery of the property of the company”.

16. The capacity, right to possession and the duration of occupation are

all features which are integrally blended with the employment. Once

the right of the employee or the officer to retain the possession of

the  property,  either  on  account  of  termination  of  services,

retirement, resignation or death, gets extinguished, they (persons in

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occupation) are under an obligation to return the property back to

the company and on their failure to do so, they render themselves

liable to be dealt with under Section 630 of the Act for retrieval of

the possession of the property.  

17. The ratio laid down in the above said two cases makes it explicitly

clear that Section 630 of the Act will cover within its ambit not only

the employee or officer but also the past employee or the past officer

or  the  heirs  of  the deceased  employee  or  anyone claiming under

them in possession of the property. The legal heirs or representatives

in possession of the property acquire the right of occupancy in the

property of the company, by virtue of being family members of the

employee or the officer during the employment of the employee or

the officer  and not  on any independent  account.  They,  therefore,

derive their colour and content from the employee or the officer only

and have no independent or personal right to hold on to the property

of the company.

18. The case in hand is the one which falls under the first part of clause

(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 630. The suit premises was allotted

to Mr. C. B. Saran, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, in

his capacity as a Managing Director of the respondent company. The

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appellants  herein  had  no  direct  relationship  with  the  respondent

company.  Both of them came in possession of the suit  premises

through the original allottee of the said premises, namely, Mr. C. B.

Saran,  who  has  since  died.   The  company  has  every  right  and

jurisdiction to preserve its property and to see that the same is not

used for purposes other than the one expressed or directed in the

articles of association of the company.  On a careful reading of the

ratio of the decisions in Abhilash Vinodkumar Jain (supra) and Lalita

Jalan (supra), it is explicitly clear that they are squarely applicable to

facts of  the present  case.   When the legal  representatives of  the

original  allottee  withhold  the  property  wrongfully  the  company  is

entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 630 of the Act so as to

retrieve the property being withheld wrongfully.  The above quoted

decisions  have  also  laid  down  that  all  those  who  have  come  in

possession of the premises with the express or implied consent of the

employee and have not vacated the premises would be withholding

the delivery of the property to the company and, therefore, they are

liable to be prosecuted under Section 630 of the Act as is done in the

present case.

19. We  may  also  mention  that  the  averment  of  the  learned  senior

counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  that  the  proceedings  under

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Section 630 should have been stayed as the civil suit was pending, is

without any merit in the light of the decision of this Court in  Atul

Mathur v. Atul Kalra,  reported in (1989) 4 SCC 514,  wherein it was

held that stay of proceedings by the criminal court under Section 630

of the Act, whenever a suit has been filed would not only lead to

miscarriage  of  justice  but  also  render  ineffective  the  salutary

provisions of Section 630. the said observations are extracted herein

below:   

“16………………..Merely  because  Respondent  1  had schemingly filed a suit before tendering his resignation, it can never be said that the civil court was in seisin of a bona fide dispute between the parties and as such the criminal court should have stayed its hands when the company filed a complaint under Section 630.  If  a view is mechanically taken that whenever a suit has been filed before a complaint is  laid  under  Section  630,  the  criminal  court  should  not proceed  with  the  complaint,  it  would  not  only  lead  to miscarriage of justice but also render ineffective the salutary provisions of Section 630.”

20. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we hold

that the respondent company was within its jurisdiction to get the

suit premises vacated under the provisions of Section 630 of the Act.

We also hold that the learned courts below were justified in arriving

at  a  finding  that  the  provisions  of  Section  630  of  the  Act  are

applicable  to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  present  case.

Consequently  the  courts  below also  acted  within  their  power  and

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jurisdiction  in  directing  for  vacation  of  the  suit  premises  by  the

appellants.   While upholding the said order of the courts below, we

however  observe  that the proceedings were  initiated in the Small

Causes Court by filing a suit which is pending as of now.  There was

an interim order passed in the said suit directing for maintenance of

status quo.  Since we have held that the provisions of Section 630 of

the Act are applicable to the present case, we hold that the directions

of the court below in this case would be implemented subject to the

condition  that  if  the  aforesaid  suit  is  decided  in  favour  of  the

appellants, the appellants shall be entitled to a order of restitution, if

so directed, in accordance with law and that such an order shall be

given effect to in accordance with law.   

21.In terms of the aforesaid observations and directions, the present

appeal is dismissed.    

       ………………………..J.                         [S.B. Sinha]

   ...………………………J.

                    [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi February 13, 2009

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